Full opinion text
ORDER DENYING PETITION HINKLE, Chief Judge. By petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner Bryan F. Jennings challenges his state court conviction and sentence of death. I deny the petition. I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY Facts. The relevant facts are set out in the trial court’s sentencing order, as quoted by the Florida Supreme Court opinion addressing Mr. Jennings’ first round of postconviction claims: In the early morning hours of May 11, 1979, Rebecca Kunash was asleep in her bed. A nightlight had been left on in her room and her parents were asleep in another part of the house. The Defendant went to her window and saw Rebecca asleep. He forcibly removed the screen, opened the window, and climbed into her bedroom. He put his hand over her mouth, took her to his car and proceeded to an area near the Girard Street Canal on Merritt Island. He raped Rebecca, severely bruising and lacerating her vaginal area, using such force that he bruised his penis. In the course of events, he lifted Rebecca by her legs, brought her back over his head, and swung her like a sledge hammer onto the ground fracturing her skull and causing extensive damage to her brain. While she was still alive, Defendant took her into the canal and held her head under the water until she drowned. At the time of her death, Rebecca Kunash was six (6) years of age. Jennings v. State, 583 So.2d 316, 318 (Fla. 1991). State Proceedings. Mr. Jennings was tried in the Circuit Court of Brevard County and was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnaping, and sexual battery. He was sentenced to death. See Jennings v. State, 413 So.2d 24, 25 (Fla.1982) (per curiam) (Jennings I). On direct appeal of those convictions, the Florida Supreme Court held that Mr. Jennings was deprived of a fair trial because his public defender refused to cross-examine a critical witness, believing that because the witness was represented by the public defender’s office, cross-examination would violate the code of professional responsibility. See id. at 25-26. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the verdict and sentence. It remanded the case for a new trial. See id. at 27. Mr. Jennings was retried in the Circuit Court of Brevard County and was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnaping, sexual battery, burglary of an occupied dwelling with assault, and aggravated battery. Again he was sentenced to death. Jennings v. State, 453 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1984) (Jennings II). On direct appeal Mr. Jennings argued, among other things, that a confession he gave police shortly after the murder was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as enunciated in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Florida Supreme Court rejected this and his other claims, and it affirmed his convictions and sentence. See Jennings II. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction based upon the admission of Mr. Jennings’ confession. See Jennings v. Fla., 470 U.S. 1002, 105 S.Ct. 1351, 84 L.Ed.2d 374 (1985) (mem.). The Florida Supreme Court then remanded the case for a new trial. See Jennings v. State, 473 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1985). Following a change of venue, Mr. Jennings’ third trial commenced in Bay County, Florida, in March 1986. He was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, kidnaping with intent to commit sexual battery, sexual battery, and burglary. Following an advisory jury verdict voting 11 to one in favor of death, Mr. Jennings was again sentenced to death. See Jennings v. State, 512 So.2d 169, 171, 173 (Fla.1987) (per curiam) (Jennings III) The convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See id. at 176. The Florida Supreme Court did, however, reverse Mr. Jennings’ sentences with respect to the crimes of sexual battery and kidnaping with intent to commit sexual battery because the trial court failed to certify him as a mentally disordered sex offender with respect to those crimes. See id. at 175-76. Mr. Jennings then filed for postconviction relief in state court. His motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal, except that the Florida Supreme Court agreed that Mr. Jennings was entitled to see portions of the state’s files as public records. See Jennings v. State, 583 So.2d 316 (Fla.1991) (per curiam) (Jennings TV). Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court extended the limitations period for Mr. Jennings to raise postconviction arguments that might arise upon review of the additional records. See id. at 319. Mr. Jennings did raise a number of such claims. Following a summary judgment hearing and interlocutory appeal in 1994, and an evidentiary hearing in October 1997, the trial court denied all relief. Mr. Jennings appealed and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. See Jennings v. State, 782 So.2d 853 (Fla.2001) (Jennings V). Federal Proceedings. Mr. Jennings filed the instant federal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Briefing was ordered with respect to jurisdiction and venue. The state moved to dismiss, and the motion was denied. The action was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the state habeas petition Mr. Jennings was pursuing in the wake of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). The state habeas petition was denied and this action resumed. The state responded to the petition, and Mr. Jennings replied. The petition is ripe for adjudication. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and is therefore subject to its terms. See, e.g., (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (“Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition after AEDPA’s effective date, so the statute applies to his case.”) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997)). Under chapter 153, as amended by AEDPA, a writ can issue only if the state court’s ruling “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2); (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). AEDPA “plainly sought to ensure a level of ‘deference to the determinations of state courts,’ provided those determinations did not conflict with federal law or apply federal law in an unreasonable way.” (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 386, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996)). “Contrary To.” A state court decision “is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law if either (1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced with materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a result different from that reached in a Supreme Court case.” Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2001). See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. “Unreasonable Application.” A Supreme Court precedent has been “unreasonably applied” if “it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner’s case [or] if a state court unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context.” Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241. The test is objective. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“Stated simply, a federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.”). Accordingly, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (same). “Unreasonable Determination.” Factual determinations by the state courts are “presumed to be correct, and the petitioner can rebut this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.” Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 930-31 (11th Cir.2001) (citing Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1130 n. 58 (11th Cir.2000)). Therefore, Mr. Jennings must prove by clear and convincing evidence the unreasonableness of any challenged state court factual determinations. However, this statutory presumption of correctness “applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed determinations of law and fact.” Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.2001). The presumption of correctness afforded factual findings extends to both trial and appellate state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Bui v. Haley, 279 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir.2002) (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981)). III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING An evidentiary hearing is not necessary in this case. Section 2254(e)(2) states that an evidentiary hearing may not be held if the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of his claim in state court proceedings (except under enumerated exceptional circumstances). A petitioner “cannot be said to have ‘failed to develop’ relevant facts if he diligently sought, but was denied, the opportunity to present evidence at each stage of his state proceedings.” Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 960 (11th Cir.2002) (citing (Michael) Williams, 529 U.S. at 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479). Mr. Jennings does not claim that he was denied the opportunity to develop the record. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court extended the limitations period to afford him an opportunity to do just that. See Jennings IV, 583 So.2d at 319. The trial court conducted postconviction evidentiary hearings in 1989 and 1997. (F22 & F28.) Respondent does not argue, and there is no record indication, that Mr. Jennings failed to develop the relevant facts in the state court litigation. Section 2254(e)(2) sets forth when a hearing may not be held; but even if a hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2), it remains inappropriate “if such a hearing would not assist in the resolution of [the] claim.” Breedlove, 279 F.3d at 960 (citation omitted). Stated affirmatively, “ ‘a habeas petitioner is entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing if he or she alleges facts that, if proved at the hearing, would entitle petitioner to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Meeks v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 316, 319 (11th Cir.1992)). But in a post-AEDPA world, whether petitioner would be entitled to relief is considered in light of the heavy presumptions in favor of sustaining the state court adjudication. Although the standard for granting the hearing remains the same, the measure underlying that standard has changed. IV. ANALYSIS A. CLAIM I: Brady Mr. Jennings claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the state’s failure to disclose evidence, contrary to Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which held that suppression of evidence materially favorable to the accused violates due process. Alternatively, he asserts that his attorney’s failure to discover evidence amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This claim is unfounded. A.l. Claim I: The Brady & Strickland Standards of Review The Brady Standard. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment....” 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Both exculpatory and impeachment evidence are within Brady’s ambit. See id. at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375. In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), the Supreme Court clarified the materiality standard, setting out four important aspects. First, a petitioner need not prove by a preponderance that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in an acquittal, but whether, in the absence of the Brady material, “he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Second, a petitioner must show “that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 434-35, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Third, if a reviewing court finds a Brady violation, it may not deem the violation harmless error. Id. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Fourth, in determining materiality, the evidence is considered collectively, not item by item. Id. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. In sum, “[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: [1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). The Strickland Standard. The standard for proving ineffective assistance was well-established at the time of Mr. Jennings’ third trial. See Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Broadly speaking, a petitioner “must show that his lawyer’s performance fell below an ‘objective standard of reasonableness’ and that the lawyer’s deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner.” Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). A “strong presumption” exists “that counsel’s performance was reasonable and that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable and professional judgment.” Id. (quoting Chandler v. U.S., 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc)). More specifically, Mr. Jennings can satisfy Strickland’s ineffective assistance standard only if he specifically established (1) “that no objectively competent lawyer would have taken the action that his lawyer did take,” Van Poyck, 290 F.3d at 1322 (citing Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315), and (2) “that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the case would have been different if his lawyer had given adequate assistance.” Id. at 1323 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 695, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (reiterating the need for “proof of both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense”). Under AEDPA, however, the question here is not whether the defendant “would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance. ...” Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99, 122 5.Ct. 1843. Rather, Mr. Jennings “must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner” or that the state court decided this case differently than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts and thus was “contrary to” the Strickland standard. Id. at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Applying the Two Standards. The Brady materiality standard and the Strickland prejudice standard are identical. See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (adopting the Strickland prejudice standard for determining Brady materiality); accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir.2001) (“The prejudice component of an ineffective assistance claim and the materiality component of a Brady claim both require the same thing ... a reasonable probability of a different result in the proceeding.”). Therefore, failure to prove Brady materiality forecloses a Strickland claim based upon counsel’s failure to discover the evidence in question. A.2. Claim I: The Individual Claims Prosecutor’s Memorandum. Three witnesses, who were housed with Mr. Jennings in the Brevard County Jail in June 1979, testified at trial that Mr. Jennings confessed to the murder — Allen Kruger, Clarence “Rick” Muszynski, and Billy Crisco. Mr. Muszynski and Mr. Kruger heard one confession in the cell they shared with Mr. Jennings. (F5 at 623-47; F6 at 907-20.) Mr. Crisco approached Mr. Jennings independently and Mr. Jennings gave him a nearly identical confession. (F6 at 936-46.) Postconviction discovery yielded a memorandum by assistant state attorney Michael Hunt containing notes of his interview with Allen Kruger on May 20, 1982. Mr. Jennings raised four related points regarding the memorandum: (1) that it indicated Mr. Kruger read other statements to enhance his memory with respect to the victim’s age (F31, Appellant’s Brief at 55); (2) that it was relevant to whether the victim was conscious during the episode (id); (3) that it indicated Mr. Musz-ynski was an agent of the state when he received Mr. Jennings’ confession (id at 55-56); and (4) that it could have been used to undermine the state’s position as to the order in which Mr. Kruger and Mr. Muszynski approached the state. {Id. at 54.) The Florida Supreme Court correctly identified and applied Brady as the controlling standard, addressing each component of the claim in detail in upholding the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. See Jennings V, 782 So.2d at 856-58. Mr. Jennings has cited no Supreme Court case that reached a different result on materially indistinguishable facts and thus the ruling cannot be deemed contrary to federal law. He has not attempted to refute the Florida Supreme Court’s detailed findings with respect to the prosecutor’s memorandum, and he has not argued that it reached any unreasonable determination on this score. His initial petition instead addresses the issue de novo, arguing it just as he argued it in state court, rather than addressing potential inadequacies in the state court adjudication. (Pet. at 25-28.) With respect to the memorandum, Mr. Jennings has failed to establish any entitlement to habeas relief. Taped Statement of Judy Slocum. Mr. Jennings next addresses the state’s failure to disclose the taped statement of Judy Slocum obtained by the sheriffs department on June 6, 1979. In brief, Ms. Slocum stated that at approximately 1:15 a.m. on the morning of the murder, she drove Mr. Jennings from a bar to his home so he could change pants and then drove him back to the bar. (Pet. at 28-29; F21 Appx. to Mtn. to Vacate, Exh. 1.) Ms. Slocum said that he needed her to drive because “he knew he had too much to drink” and that when she left the bar at 2:30 a.m., he was “pretty much loaded.” (Id. at 30; F29 at 246-47) (stipulating that the word “pretty” was inadvertently omitted from the transcript). Mr. Jennings contends that Ms. Slocum’s statement would have been used at trial and during the penalty phase. Defense counsel could have used it to “demonstrate Mr. Jennings’ extremely intoxicated condition” to the jury, to corroborate his alleged intoxication to the mental health experts, and to impeach the state’s experts who testified that there was no evidenee of intoxication. (Id. at 32.) He also claims the statement could have been used to impeach and to undermine the credibility of Mr. Muszynski and Mr. Kruger because Mr. Jennings’ intoxication was allegedly inconsistent with the level of detail expressed in his confession to them. Finally, he says the statement would have established mitigation and negated aggravating circumstances. (Id. at 32-33.) The Florida Supreme Court deemed this aspect of the Brady claim procedurally barred because it had been raised and denied in Mr. Jennings’ prior postconviction motion and appeal. See Jennings V, 782 So.2d at 858. This issue is preserved for federal habeas review. See Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1479 (11th Cir.1997) (“Once a state supreme court on direct review has ... based its disposition solely on a rejection of the merits of a claim, no amount of procedural bar holding as to that claim in further proceedings will suffice to bar the claim from federal habe-as review.”). The claim is without merit, however. In the earlier proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court quoted at length and adopted the trial court’s meticulous refutation of this claim. See Jennings IV, 583 So.2d at 318-19. The trial court noted several deficiencies in the argument: Mr. Jennings knew about Ms. Slocum and her potential testimony; the defense was aware of witness Patrick Clawson’s statement that Mr. Jennings had a girl drive him home because he was too drunk; defense counsel had the statement of, but declined to call, Floyd Canada, who drank with Mr. Jennings hours before the murder; other witnesses could have testified to Mr. Jennings’ inebriation, but did not because such a theory simply was not the thrust of his defense. See id. (quoting F22, Order [on Mtn. for Reh’g]). Indeed, Mr. Jennings’ trial counsel, Mr. Howard, in addressing the Slocum interview during Mr. Jennings’ 1997 postconviction eviden-tiary hearing, stated that he “made a tactical decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense.” (F29 at 176.) When asked whether having the Slocum interview would have changed that tactical decision he responded, “I don’t know for sure.... I did not feel then, and still do not feel that an intoxication defense ... would have been a strong defense.... ” (Id. at 178.) Mr. Jennings approaches the issue de novo in this court. He does not assail the state court adjudication of the claim, except that his Reply attacks the Florida Supreme Court’s purported failure to engage in a cumulative Brady analysis, an issue addressed below. Mr. Jennings is not entitled to habeas relief as to the Slocum interview. Muszynski Letter. A letter written on October 22, 1985, by Mr. Muszynski, one of the cellmates to whom Mr. Jennings confessed in 1979, was also found in postconviction discovery. The letter, which was addressed to the state attorney in Titusville, Florida, said: I was interviewed and left a calling card by Wayne D. Porter, Investigator for your Office in reference to a murder case of a six year old child which had been sexually abused. In order for me to be able to communicate with your office for any possible assistance you may require of me I would appreciate if you would have an attorney appointed for me so that I will not infringe on any of my Fifth Amendment rights, being a layman, and that all discussions would be handed through said attorney representing me. Hoping this arrangements [sic] suits your purposes; I remain Sincerely yours, /s/ Clarence Muszynski Clarence Muszinski [sic] (F21 Appx. to Mtn. to Vacate, Exh. 3.) Mr. Jennings claims that the letter could be used to impeach Mr. Muszynski because it “requested] a price for his cooperation and testimony against Mr. Jennings. The price was an appointment of attorney to represent him[.]” (Pet. at 33.) As with the Slocum interview, the Florida Supreme Court deemed this aspect of Mr. Jennings’ Brady claim procedurally barred because it had been raised and denied in his prior postconviction motion and appeal. See Jennings V, 782 So.2d at 858. Despite the procedural bar holding, the court noted that the letter “does not constitute Brady material because it does not establish a reasonable probability of achieving a different result” since it merely contained “a request for counsel to avoid incriminating himself.” Id. at 858 n. 6. Mr. Jennings has failed to demonstrate that this determination is contrary to federal law or objectively unreasonable. Indeed, the court’s interpretation of the letter is reasonable. He is not entitled to habeas relief on Brady grounds with respect to Mr. Muszynski’s letter. Other Suspects. The final aspect of Mr. Jennings’ Brady claim involves the state’s failure to produce a series of law enforcement field notes generated during the homicide investigation. The notes reveal five suspicious person reports received during the investigation. (F28 at 538^17.) As noted in the trial court’s order denying postconviction relief (quoted by the Florida Supreme Court), Mr. Jennings’s trial counsel, Mr. Howard, testified that: with that one exception, none of the other field interrogation cards gave you enough or any substance to really relate it to this particular offense.... The relevance or actually the usefulness, I’ll put it that way, to the defense [is as a] phantom suspect. (F29 at 236.) The “one exception” was a report that on the day before the murder, a man claiming to have escaped from an asylum accosted a 20-year-old woman and kept “talking about funny things.” (F28 at 545.) Mr. Howard admitted that there was a “high likelihood” that he “might not have been successful” in admitting any evidence on this point. (F29 at 235.) Against this backdrop, the Florida Supreme Court concluded: “Appellant’s reliance on the forgoing evidence to create a ‘phantom suspect’ rather than present admissible evidence that someone else committed the crime in question does not satisfy his burden of establishing a reasonable probability of a different result.” Jennings V, 782 So.2d at 859. Mr. Jennings has failed to demonstrate that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. Mr. Jennings posits that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied the Kyles decision because it “did not consider, as required, the attack on the good faith of law enforcement’s investigation arising from the series of nondisclosures.” (Reply at 11.) But, had the field notes been turned over in the first instance, there would have been no lack of good faith to prove. Otherwise, Mr. Jennings attacks only the state court’s ostensible failure to consider this Brady evidence cumulatively with the rest. I will address that issue next. A.3. Claim I: The Brady Evidence Considered Cumulatively Mr. Jennings is correct that, in determining materiality under Brady, the evidence must be considered collectively. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Mr. Jennings repeatedly argues that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law by failing to engage in a cumulative analysis of the nondisclosed evidence. (Pet. at 34 (“A cumulative analysis [of the Muszynski letter] with the other Brady material was not conducted.”)); Reply at 5 (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court failed to consider this [Kruger notes] nondisclosure cumulatively ...”); id. at 8 (“The Florida Supreme Court’s application of a procedural bar in 2001 precluded cumulative consideration of all the nondisclo-sures of exculpatory evidence as required by Kyles v. Whitley.”); id. at 9 (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court did not conduct a cumulative analysis ....”); id at 11 (“The cumulative and synergistic effect of the nondisclosures was ignored.”). In taking this position, Mr. Jennings is mistaken. The Florida Supreme Court stated in Jennings V: Overall, the cumulative effect of the alleged Brady violations does not establish Brady materiality. The notes concerning the Kruger interview do not undercut confidence in the verdict. Moreover, the Slocum tape, Muszynski letter, and the “other suspects” claim do not require relief individually or collectively. 782 So.2d at 862 (citations omitted). Thus, the Florida Supreme Court did conduct a cumulative analysis, which included both the Muszynski letter and Slocum interview, which were considered in 1991 but procedurally barred from reconsideration on the merits in Jennings V. Mr. Jennings takes no issue with the court’s cumulative analysis and thus fails to establish any entitlement to habeas relief. He would not prevail in any event, for the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply, or achieve a result contrary to, clearly established federal law. Thus, Mr. Jennings’ claims, individually and collectively, do not warrant relief under the deferential review mandated by AEDPA. This is more so given the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Jennings’ guilt. While “none of the Brady cases has ever suggested that sufficiency of evidence (or insufficiency) is the touchstone,” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 n. 8, 115 S.Ct. 1555, it is not irrelevant. As a practical matter, there is no other way to determine whether there exists any reasonable probability that disclosure would have yielded a different verdict. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Kyles when it observed that the question is whether, in the absence of the Brady material, the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence,” 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, and by its holding that a petitioner must show “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. The evidence against Mr. Jennings was vast, including three witnesses to whom he confessed. While his Brady claim is premised on the notion of impeaching Mr. Kruger and Mr. Muszynski, it would not bar the fact of his confession to them and would not affect Mr. Crisco’s testimony. Additionally, Mr. Jennings’ fingerprints were found on the bedroom window; there was testimony that a nearby shoe print was consistent with his shoes; there was evidence that his clothes were wet on the morning of the crime; and he had abrasions on his penis. With all this evidence, it is unreasonable to believe that introducing the nondisclosed evidence would put the case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Mr. Jennings has failed to demonstrate any entitlement to habeas relief under Brady. Ineffective Assistance. As noted at the outset, Mr. Jennings argues that to the extent a Brady violation might not be found due to lack of trial counsel’s diligence, “the claim is converted to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” (Pet. at 35.) No substantive allegations are made in this respect. In any event, Mr. Jennings’ failure to demonstrate Brady materiality is fatal to any potential ineffective assistance claim based upon failure to discover the evidence. See, e.g., Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir.2001) (“The prejudice component of an ineffective assistance claim and the materiality component of a Brady claim both require ... a reasonable probability of a different result in the proceeding.”). A.4. Claim I: Conclusion Mr. Jennings has failed to demonstrate that the Florida Supreme Court reached a result that is objectively unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law on his Brady or ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Nor has he proved (or even alleged) that the state court adjudication rests upon an unreasonable fact determination. Claim I is unfounded. B. CLAIM II: The Strickland Claim Mr. Jennings next claims that his trial attorney, Mr. Howard, rendered ineffective assistance in violation of Strickland. Specifically, he claims that Mr. Howard failed to follow up with certain witnesses whose testimony would have produced a different outcome, particularly in the penalty phase of trial. The bulk of the evidence pertains to Mr. Jennings’ intoxication on the morning of the crime, proof of which he asserts could have precluded one or more aggravating circumstances. This claim is unfounded. B.l Claim II: The Strickland Standard of Review The standard for proving ineffective assistance is set out above. See Part III. A.4; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is no dispute that the Florida Supreme Court correctly identified Strickland as the controlling standard, and Mr. Jennings does not claim that the state court ruling was based upon an unreasonable fact determination. Nor does he claim that that court reached a result contrary to that of the United States Supreme Court on a materially indistinguishable set of facts. Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the Florida Supreme Court applied the Strickland standard in an objectively unreasonable manner. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843. B.2. Claim II: The Evidence Not Presented Intoxication Testimony. There is no dispute that Mr. Jennings went to one or more bars and drank into the early morning hours prior to the murder. While Mr. Howard made a tactical decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense during the guilt phase of trial (F29 at 176), he did present evidence of Mr. Jennings’ alleged intoxication during the penalty phase. Two witnesses and two mental health experts testified during the penalty phase. Catherine Music, Mr. Jennings’ aunt with whom he was residing, testified that Mr. Jennings “fell against the wall” when he entered her house about 5:00 a.m. (F10 at 1610-11, 1613.) She assumed he had been drinking because he “was unsteady, and staggered, you know, that little bit.” {Id. at 1614.) When Mr. Jennings left the house, ostensibly to buy a pack of cigarettes, she was concerned because she did not think he should be driving in his condition. {Id. at 1614-15.) Russell Schneider, an acquaintance, testified that he had been drinking with Mr. Jennings at a bar on the night before the murder. Mr. Schneider estimated that Mr. Jennings drank approximately one and one-half pitchers of beer between 11:00 p.m. and 2:30 a.m., when Mr. Schneider left the bar and Mr. Jennings remained. {Id. at 1617-19.) Additionally, Mr. Howard hired two experts' — a psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Gutman, and a clinical psychologist, Dr. Elizabeth McMahon — who each testified that when Mr. Jennings was intoxicated, his ability to control his behavior and conform his conduct to the law were affected. (F9 at 1364-66, 1376, 1447, 1470, 1475-76, 1481.) Mr. Jennings contends that Mr. Howard was ineffective by failing to follow up on the leads discussed below that would have yielded further evidence of intoxication. Though Mr. Howard stated that even in light of the additional evidence, he would not have presented an intoxication defense during the guilt phase of trial {id. at 182, 245), he would have introduced some of the additional evidence during the penalty phase as evidence of Mr. Jennings’ “mental status,” his inability to “conform his conduct ... to the law,” and “possibly on the issue of intent.” {Id. at 183.) Mr. Jennings also points out that the evidence could have been presented to the mental health experts as objective evidence of intoxication. Annis Music. Mr. Howard made a note to contact Annis Music, Mr. Jennings’ cousin and daughter of Catherine Music, who lived in the house where Mr. Jennings was staying at the time of the murder. The note indicates that Ms. Music could testify regarding Mr. Jennings “appearance” on the morning of the murder. According to her affidavit in 1989, Ms. Music spoke with Mr. Jennings at midnight and again at 2:30 a.m. on the morning in question. She testified during the 1997 post-conviction evidentiary hearing that Mr. Jennings claimed he was “getting very drunk” and that he would not be able to drive home from the bar where he was drinking with Patrick Clawson, Ms. Music’s fiancé. (F29 at 82-83.) His speech was slurred. (Id at 84.) Ms. Music saw Mr. Jennings around 6:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder. She testified that he was “very wide-eyed and, obviously, very intoxicated” and that he “couldn’t walk down the hall without banging into the walls.... ” (Id.) She opined that “by the way he looked” he might have been doing more than drinking alcohol. (Id. at 86.) Mr. Howard recognized that Ms. Music’s testimony would be inconsistent with other testimony regarding intoxication, including that of her mother, Catherine Music, in that Annis Music’s affidavit was “skewed in favor of the defendant” (id.), and “put[ ] a whole lot more staggering into all of this and drunkenness and evei’ything.” (Id. at 244.) He also agreed that she would be cross-examined on her familial relationship to the defendant. (Id. at 209.) Mr. Jennings claims that Ms. Music’s testimony during the penalty phase would have produced a different verdict. He claims further that, had Mr. Howard contacted Ms. Music, she could have put him in contact with Mr. Clawson, who could have offered similar testimony. (Pet. at 45-48, 53-54.) Patrick Clawson. Patrick Clawson had been drinking with Mr. Jennings during the early morning hours before the murder. Mr. Clawson testified at the 1997 postconviction hearing that when he left the bar at 2:30 a.m., Mr. Jennings was “pretty inebriated” and that Mr. Clawson was “not so sure he could hold himself up ... he was pretty drunk.” (F29 at 97.) He also testified that he was skeptical whether Mr. Jennings was sober enough to climb into a window and pull a child out of it. (Id.) The prosecutor impeached Mr. Clawson with his June 1979 statement in which he said that Mr. Jennings “wasn’t falling down drunk, but he might have had a slight stagger, but he was responsible [and] could talk straight.” (Id. at 100.) Mr. Clawson admitted that the original statement was accurate. (Id.) Mr. Howard knew of Mr. Clawson. In fact he attempted to locate him, but was advised that Mr. Clawson was stationed overseas with the military. (Id. at 196.) In any event, Mr. Howard indicated a “problem” with calling Mr. Clawson because if he had called Mr. Clawson and obtained favorable testimony, “then this [former contradictory] statement pops up.” (Id.) Floyd Canada. Mr. Jennings also attacks Mr. Howard’s failure to call Floyd Canada (Pet.52-53, 57), who dropped Mr. Jennings off at his home at 5:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder, and whose statements included that Mr. Jennings was staggering drunk. Mr. Howard considered Mr. Canada’s favorable statements “inconsistent” with his initial statement to the police that Mr. Jennings was “straight” at 4:30 a.m., a statement that “suggested] very strongly that Mr. Jennings was simply not intoxicated.” (Id. at 176-77, 198.) Mr. Howard made a “tactical decision not to put Mr. Canada on the stand,” believing his testimony would be “detrimental” to Mr. Jennings’ case. (Id. at 199.) Mr. Howard testified during the 1997 postcon-viction hearing that he “probably should have taken a chance with Canada and let the State try to chew him up.... ” (Id. at 265.) Catherine Music. As noted above, Catherine Music testified during the penalty phase that Mr. Jennings was drunk around 5:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder. However, Mr. Jennings claims that Mr. Howard was ineffective by failing to adduce testimony at trial tracking her earlier statement that Mr. Jennings “looked kind of wild looking” when he got home. (Pet. at 51; F29 at 193-94.) Mr. Howard testified at the postconviction hearing that he had some concern because Catherine Music’s statement read as if no one else was present when Mr. Jennings returned home at 5:00 a.m., thus potentially conflicting with Annis Music’s claim to have seen him enter the house, particularly given the disparities between their two statements regarding the level of Mr. Jennings’ intoxication. Drug Expert. Mr. Howard’s file also included a notation that he wished to “ask for L.S.D. expert.” (Id. at 188.) This issue arose in connection with Mr. Jennings’ self-report to the penalty phase mental health experts that he had taken LSD in the hours preceding the murder. Mr. Howard never contacted an expert to explain the effects of LSD, and he failed to elicit testimony from Drs. Gut-man and McMahon regarding the potential effects of LSD. Mr. Jennings contends that Mr. Howard’s neglect of the LSD issue amounted to ineffective assistance with respect to the outcome of the penalty phase. (Pet. at 48-49, 55.) During the postconviction hearing, Mr. Howard presented the testimony of a clinical neuro-psychologist who testified that Mr. Jennings’ behavior the morning of the murder was consistent with consumption of LSD, and that LSD would explain his ability to function physically despite his copious consumption of alcohol. (F29 at 38-42, 52-53.) The issue was raised during the penalty phase of trial during the cross-examination of the state’s expert psychiatric witness, Dr. Burton Podnos, who testified that Mr. Jennings reported in his psychiatric examination that he had “three or four pitchers of beer and two hits of acid, and that he shared the beer with some friends.” (F10 at 1519.) Dr. Podnos opined that Mr. Jennings ingestion of LSD would “not necessarily” be a significant factor in the commission of the offenses, (id. at 1521-22), but that two average hits of LSD, in conjunction with Mr. Jennings’ underlying personality disorder and his consumption of alcohol, “might” impair his ability to conform his conduct to the law (id. at 1525), and would likely diminish Mr. Jennings’ ability to control his impulses. (Id. at 1528.) Dr. Podnos admitted that, depending upon the actual effect of the alcohol and drugs on Mr. Jennings, his ability to conform his conduct to the law might have been impaired, and his behavior “could easily be classified as an extreme mental disturbance, active psychosis or hallucinations.” {Id. at 1534.) Dr. Podnos concluded on re-direct that the best barometer of Mr. Jennings’ state of mind was his ability to carry out the acts of which he had been convicted. {Id. at 1538.) Other Evidence. Two other matters were raised in Mr. Jennings’ second post-conviction motion: Mr. Howard’s failure to capitalize upon deposition testimony by Mr. Crisco and his failure to make use of a motion filed by Mr. Kruger in his 1979 criminal proceedings. These matters were not raised in Mr. Jennings’ original October 1989 postconviction motion, and thus were deemed procedurally barred when raised for the first time in the 2001 proceedings before the Florida Supreme Court. See Jennings V, 782 So.2d at 861. B.3 Claim II: Analysis of the State Court Adjudication Intoxication Testimony. The trial court denied relief on this claim as raised in Mr. Jennings’ original postconviction motion dated October 3, 1989. (F22, Order Summarily Denying Def. Mtn. for PosNConviction Relief.) The motion raised counsel’s failure to contact Annis Music, Patrick Clawson, and Floyd Canada (F21, Mtn. to Vacate Judgment & Sentence at 30-31; F23, Initial Brief of Appellant at 37-38), and, at least to some extent, the LSD issue. (F23, Initial Brief of Appellant at 44; F22, Order [on Mtn. for Reh’g] at 6.) It does not appear that Mr. Jennings raised the issue of Catherine Music’s testimony in his original petition. The trial court addressed the evidence point-by-point, discussing the evidence that was in fact presented with respect to intoxication and highlighting discrepancies that undermined the weight of the evidence not presented. (F22, Order Summarily Denying Def. Mtn. for PosNCon-viction Relief at 3) (noting discrepancies between Catherine Music’ and Annis Music’s versions of events; noting that Mr. Clawson testified that he, not Mr. Jennings, talked with Annis Music at 2:30 a.m. on the morning of the murder). The court observed that Mr. Howard “was thoroughly prepared for this trial, as evidenced by pre-trial motions and preparations, thorough objections and well-prepared requests at trial.... ” {Id. at 4.) The trial court concluded that counsel had not been ineffective. The trial court’s subsequent order upon Mr. Jennings’ motion for rehearing went into detail, concluding that Annis Music’s testimony was subject to severe impeachment (Order [on Mtn. for Reh’g] at 5-6); that counsel could not have predicted that Mr. Clawson would testify to other than his statement that Mr. Jennings was not severely impaired (id. at 6); that the expert witnesses were well aware of, and testified with respect to, Mr. Jennings’ claims of excessive alcohol consumption, as well as his alleged LSD consumption (id. at 6-8, 8 n. 17); and that sufficient evidence was presented during the penalty phase to establish a potential for mitigation. (Id. at 9-10.) The Florida Supreme Court agreed. It identified the proper standard, quoted from the trial court’s order, and expressly agreed with it on all points. Jennings IV, 583 So.2d at 319-21. Upon review in 2001, the Florida Supreme Court deemed Mr. Jennings’ ineffective assistance claim procedurally barred, as it previously had been addressed on its merits. See Jennings V, 782 So.2d at 860, 860 n. 8. Mr. Jennings has failed to demonstrate that the state adjudication of his claim was objectively unreasonable. Specifically, there is nothing to suggest a different outcome had Mr. Howard offered this additional evidence of Mr. Jennings’ alleged intoxication along with what was presented to the jury. As the trial court pointed out, Annis Music’s testimony conflicted with her mother’s as to the extent of Mr. Jennings’ intoxication. Mr. Clawson would be subject to impeachment and Mr. Howard had no way to know whether Mr. Claw-son’s testimony would be favorable to Mr. Jennings. Thus, although Mr. Howard may have been derelict in failing to track down Mr. Clawson, no prejudice resulted from that oversight. Mr. Howard testified that he made a tactical decision not to call Mr. Canada given his inconsistent statements. Catherine Music did testify as to Mr. Jennings’ intoxication. Her earlier statement that Mr. Jennings was “wild” looking is but an afterthought to this testimony. The only evidence of Mr. Jennings’ LSD consumption was his self-report to the penalty phase mental health experts. Mr. Howard tried to establish through independent investigation whether Mr. Jennings had taken any drugs other than alcohol, but was unable to do so. Despite these obstacles, he managed to elicit an admission from the state’s expert witness that, had Mr. Jennings in fact taken LSD on the night preceding the murder, his ability to conform his conduct to the law might have been substantially impaired. Based on the above and on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, it is not reasonably probable that the guilty verdict or recommendation of death would have been different had Mr. Howard presented any one or all of these matters. Under these circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that Mr. Jennings failed to establish a violation of Strickland is not objectively unreasonable. See (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”). Accordingly, Mr. Jennings is not entitled to habeas relief insofar as his ineffective assistance claim relates to the intoxication testimony. Other Evidence. Nor is Mr. Jennings entitled to relief with respect to the Crisco statement or the Kruger court filing. The Florida Supreme Court deemed both claims procedurally barred — the Crisco issue because it was successive to his original postconviction penalty phase ineffective assistance claim, and the Kruger issue because it was untimely as well as beyond the scope of the 1991 limited remand, which was limited to the assertion of claims unearthed by review of additional public records erroneously withheld up to that point in time. See Jennings V, 782 So.2d at 861. A federal court ordinarily “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Because this procedural default doctrine is not jurisdictional in habeas cases, see id., 501 U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, a procedural default may be excused if the habeas petitioner can demonstrate cause for a procedural default in state court and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or where failure to consider the claim would result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 749-50, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Mr. Jennings has made no attempt to overcome the procedural default with respect to the Crisco statement or the Kruger court record and, thus, he is not entitled to relief with respect to these matters. B.4. Claim II: Conclusion Mr. Jennings has failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief insofar as his ineffective assistance claim relates to the intoxication testimony. He has failed to overcome the procedural default with respect to the Crisco statement and Kruger court record. Claim II is unfounded. C. CLAIM III: Confrontation Mr. Jennings alleges that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated when the trial court refused to permit introduction of two prior, ostensibly inconsistent, statements during the cross-examination of Mr. Muszynski. The claim does not warrant habeas relief. C.l. Claim III: Facts & Procedural Background Trial Proceedings. During trial, Mr. Howard cross-examined Clarence Muszyn-ski with respect to two postconviction motions Mr. Muszynski had filed in 1981 and 1982 in which he claimed to be “totally insane” in 1979 when he committed the offense which put him in jail with Mr. Jennings. (F5 at 656-58.) Mr. Howard had Mr. Muszynski identify both documents and sought to introduce them into evidence to be “included in the court file” but not necessarily “published to the jury.” (Id. at 659-60.) The court advised Mr. Howard to offer them during his case-in-chief. (Id.) Mr. Howard established that Mr. Musz-ynski’s motions alleged that less than one month before his trial, and within months of his encounter with Mr. Jennings, he had been confined to a mental ward in Texas and had experienced hallucinations. (Id. at 660-61.) Mr. Muszynski admitted that he had made up the allegations. (Id. at 661-63.) Mr. Muszynski maintained that he was not placed under oath and had not read the documents. (Id. at 667.) Mr. Howard attempted during his case-in-chief to introduce the motions. (F7 at 1122.) The state objected on grounds that the motions contained numerous irrelevancies, including the basis for Mr. Muszynski’s prior convictions. (Id. at 1124.) Mr. Howard responded that it was necessary to impeach Mr. Muszynski’s inconsistent statement at trial that he was never hospitalized. (Id. at 1125.) The court denied admission of the documents, concluding that Mr. Muszynski had not denied making the prior statements (which would have permitted the entry of the documents under section 90.614 of the Florida evidence code), but had admitted to making them and had admitted they were untrue. (Id. at 1126.) Direct Appeal. Mr. Jennings argued on direct appeal that refusal to admit the statements “violated his constitutional rights.” (F20, Initial Brief of Appellant at 24.) No substantive argument was directed to the constitutional claims, however. Following a discussion of generally unhelpful authorities, Mr. Jennings cited Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), for the correct, but rather broad, proposition that “a trial court may not frustrate a defendant’s legitimate right to present his defense by strict adherence to state evi-dentiary rules.” (F20, Initial Brief of Appellant at 27.) Cf. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (holding unconstitutional a state hearsay rule that would bar testimony of witnesses subject to cross-examination that a person other than defendant confessed to committing the crime, where the confessions were against interest and corroborated by other evidence in the case). Mr. Jennings concluded that “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to present evidence is supreme, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of that fundamental right.” The Florida Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he motions could not be introduced for purposes of impeachment because Muszynski admitted that he had made the prior inconsistent statements.” Jennings III, 512 So.2d at 173 (citing § 90.614, Fla. Stat.). The court also noted that “[i]n any event, [Mr. Jennings] received whatever benefits the motions could give him because their contents were made clear to the jury and defense counsel read aloud the oath in its entirety.” Id. C.2. Claim III: Analysis Mr. Jennings claims that Mr. Howard sought to introduce the motions to attack Mr. Muszynski’s claim that he did not know he was under oath when he signed the motions. (Pet. at 61.) This is not borne out by the trial record, as outlined above. Be that as it may, Mr. Jennings claims that the Florida Supreme Court erred by failing to conduct a “Sixth Amendment analysis” of his claim on appeal. (Id.) Mr. Jennings does not, however, suggest what Sixth Amendment authorities the Florida Supreme Court might have applied, and he has cited no federal authority that might support the result he urges in this case. In this proceeding, Mr. Jennings cites only two federal cases throughout his argument. First he cites to a portion of Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), which says nothing of value to Mr. Jennings’ claim, holding that the state could not introduce into evidence the statement of an accomplice who was not available to testify at trial and who was not subject to cross-examination by an attorney in any prior proceeding. See id. at 406-07, 85 S.Ct. 1065. The other federal case cited by Mr. Jennings is United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), from which he merely borrows the phrase “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” (Pet. at 63) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039). The Court in Cronic addressed an ineffective assistance claim that did not resemble the current facts. In short, Mr. Jennings seeks to capitalize on the Florida Supreme Court’s failure (or choice, as the case may be) not to address the merits of the constitutional claim he asserted on direct appeal. But he cites no federal authority to support his claim that extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement must be admitted despite a witness’s acknowledgment that he made the prior statement. No clearly established federal authority exists to support such a claim. Cf. United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir.2001) (holding, under the more liberal federal evidentiary Rule 613, that a court has Rule 403 discretion to narrow the scope of, or to exclude altogether, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement); Fed. R. Ev. 608(b) (excluding extrinsic evidence of pri- or conduct of witness — other than conviction of crime — for purpose of supporting or attacking witness’s credibility). C.3. Claim III: Conclusion Mr. Jennings cites no support for his claim of constitutional entitlement to the admission of Mr. Muszynski’s motions. He has not established that the Florida Supreme Court reached a result in any way at odds with clearly established federal law. Nor has he claimed or proved that the state decision was premised upon an unreasonable fact determination. Claim III is unfounded. D. CLAIM TV: Edwards Mr. Jennings next claims that the state was permitted to introduce evidence obtained as the fruit of an interrogation that violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (holding that once an accused requests counsel, he may not be interrogated further until counsel has been made available or the accused initiates further communications). What error Mr. Jennings seeks to assign the state courts through this claim is unclear. (Pet. at 64-66.) The claim does not warrant habeas relief. D.l. Claim IV: Facts & Procedural Background Investigation. Shortly after the murder, Mr. Jennings was identified as a suspect and taken into custody on an outstanding traffic warrant. He was fingerprinted, and his fingerprints matched those found at the murder scene. He was then interrogated about the murder. He confessed, and evidence was obtained pursuant to the confession, including a sweatshirt Mr. Jennings had discarded from a bridge and certain diagrams he drew. (F18 at 3240-41.) The police also obtained hair samples and photographs of his person. (Id.) The United States Supreme Court vacated Mr. Jennings’ second conviction based upon admission of the confession, which was obtained in violation of Edwards. See Jennings v. Florida, 470 U.S. 1002, 105 S.Ct. 1351, 84 L.Ed.2d 374 (1985) (mem.). Third Trial. Before his third trial, Mr. Jennings sought to suppress all of the evidence described above, reasoning that all of the evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree. (F18 at 3238-43.) The trial court suppressed Mr. Jennings’ confession, the sweatshirt, and the diagrams, reasoning that they flowed directly from the improper interrogation. (F12 at 1991-92.) But the court admitted the remaining evidence, including fingerprints, hair samples, and photographs of Mr. Jennings’ penis, reasoning that this evidence inevitably would have been obtained through discovery. (Id.) Direct Appeal. Mr. Jennings reiterated his argument on direct appeal. (F20, Initial Brief of Appellant at 21-22.) The Florida Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to Edwards violations and found that no violation had occurred because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. See Jennings III, 512 So.2d at 171-72. D.2. Claim TV: Analysis The basis for Mr. Jennings’ challenge is not entirely clear. His petition initially asserts violation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, concluding that “the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling was [an] unreasonable application of federal constitutional law.” (Pet. at 64-65.) He then suggests that his ability to assert his fruit argument was hampered by the state’s withholding of the field interrogation cards discussed in Part III.A.2 above, (Pet. at 66), apparently reasoning that he could have used the cards to demonstrate that the police would not necessarily have pursued him as a suspect. At no point does Mr. Jennings cite any federal authority that conflicts with the Florida Supreme Court’s determination of this claim. Nor does he attempt to explain in what way that court’s adjudication might have unreasonably applied federal law; indeed, he does not cite any case or other federal law that he believes was applied unreasonably. The court’s decision was well-reasoned and was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. And more recently, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the very premise of Mr. Jennings’ claim — that physical evidence obtained in violation of Edwards is inadmissible. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004). This standing alone would require rejection of this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (requiring a petitioner to establish a violation of “clearly established federal law”). D.3. Claim TV: Conclusion The United States Supreme Court has rejected the premise of Mr. Jennings’ fruit of the poisonous tree argument. The Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of the fruit argument did not conflict with or unreasonably apply federal law. Claim IV is unfounded. E. CLAIM V: Motion to Suppress Mr. Jennings argues that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because the trial court failed to suppress evidence obtained in conjunction with his warrantless arrest. This claim is without merit. E.l. Claim V: Background Suppression Hearing. Before trial, Mr. Jennings filed a motion to suppress evidence seized in conjunction with his arrest based upon