Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LUNGSTRUM, District Judge. This lawsuit arises from a dispute regarding pipeline systems which were formerly used to transport blend stocks and natural gas liquids between Conway, Kansas, and an oil refinery formerly owned by Farmland Industries, Inc. located in Cof-feyville, Kansas. Plaintiff JP Morgan Trust Company, National Association, brings this lawsuit in its capacity as the liquidating trustee established under the Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization plan of Farmland Industries, Inc., now known as Reorganized FLI, Inc. (Farmland). Defendant Mid-America Pipeline Company, LLC and its predecessors (Mid-America) previously provided common carrier/public utility service, in part by way of leased capacity on a pipeline owned by defendant Texaco Natural Gas, Inc. (Texaco) extending between Conway and El Do-rado, Kansas. Texaco terminated the lease as of August 31, 2001, and removed the pipeline from common carrier/public utility service, thus allegedly depriving Farmland of its needed pipeline capacity between Conway and its refinery in Cof-feyville. Texaco subsequently leased, then sold, the pipeline to one or more of the defendant ONEOK entities. Farmland’s complaint asserts various state law contract, antitrust, and tort claims against entities associated with Mid-America, Texaco, and ONEOK. This matter is presently before the court on the motions of Mid-America, Williams Energy Services (Williams), and the ONEOK defendants to dismiss (Docs. 11, 14, 16 & 19) Farmland’s complaint. In these motions, defendants raise a myriad of arguments in favor of dismissal of Farmland’s complaint. After thoroughly considering the parties’ arguments, the court concludes that it will grant the motions in part and deny them in part. Specifically, the court will deny Mid-America’s motion to dismiss Mid-America Pipeline Company (MAPCO). The court will grant Mid-America’s motion to dismiss Farmland’s claims against Mid-America Pipeline Company, LLC (MAPL) with respect to Farmland’s third-party beneficiary and tort claims, and the court will otherwise deny this motion. The court will grant Williams’ motion in its entirety, and deny the ONEOK defendants’ motion in its entirety. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Farmland’s complaint alleges that for more than fifty years it owned and operated a petroleum refinery located in Coffey-ville, Kansas. The refining process for making gasoline, diesel, and the other essential petroleum products requires the efficient blending of crude oil with butanes and other feedstock products which are commonly referred to as “blend stocks” or “NGLs” (natural gas liquids products). The area in and around Conway, Kansas, is characterized by underground, excavated salt dome storage which is ideal for the storage of blend stocks and NGLs. These blend stocks and NGLs are brought to Conway from across the Midwest and stored for later transport to petroleum refineries such as Farmland’s Coffeyville refinery. At all relevant times, pipelines existed that connected these blend stocks . and NGLs in storage in Conway with the Coffeyville refinery. Additionally, the Cof-feyville refinery produced blend stocks and NGLs. When the Coffeyville refinery produced more blend stocks and NGLs than were needed for refining, they were pipe-lined back to Conway for storage until a later time. Farmland’s blend stocks and NGLs were transported to and from the Coffey-ville refinery and Conway through El Do-rado, Kansas, via a common carrier, public utility pipeline system that was at all relevant times owned and/or operated by what plaintiff collectively refers to as the “MAP Entities.” These include Mid-America Pipeline Company (MAPCO), a Delaware corporation which was converted in 2002 to Mid-America Pipeline Company, L.L.C. (MAPL) and their predecessor MAPCO Intrastate Pipeline Company (collectively and singularly, Mid-America), as well as Williams Energy Services (Williams). The parties’ business relationship dates back to at least 1982. In 1982, Mid-America owned a six-inch diameter pipeline between Conway and El Dorado, a distance of approximately sixty-six miles. On July 19, 1982, Mid-America as “Carrier” and Farmland as “Shipper” entered into a transportation agreement that was intended to meet Farmland’s service demand to transport the blend stocks and NGLs, as well as refined petroleum products, back and forth between the Cof-feyville refinery and El Dorado. The agreement called for the construction of an additional pipeline between El Dorado and the Coffeyville refinery based upon guaranteed revenues paid by Farmland to Mid-America. The agreement provided that Mid-America would “construct, maintain, and operate” (1) a pipeline from El Dorado to Coffeyville with a six-inch diameter pipeline segment and a four-inch diameter pipeline segment, and (2) a separate six-inch diameter pipeline segment to El Dorado from Coffeyville. The agreement set forth a throughput commitment whereby Farmland was required to pay Mid-America to transport three million barrels each year for ten years even if Farmland did not transport three million barrels per year. In the agreement, Mid-America agreed to transport the product on a “timely and ratable” basis and to file any necessary tariffs with the Federal Regulatory Commission (FERC) and/or the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) to implement the terms and conditions of the agreement. The agreement also required Mid-America to enter into a joint tariff agreement with Kansas Nebraska Pipeline Company (Kaneb) to provide further pipeline transportation from El Dorado to points on the larger Kaneb system so that Farmland could transfer its refined petroleum products on the Kaneb system in Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. The parties agreed that Mid-America would “operate the pipeline system as a common carrier” to transport petroleum products into and out of Farmland’s Coffeyville refinery. Farmland’s complaint alleges that a common carrier operates as a public utility in Kansas, is regulated by the KCC, and has all of the rights and obligations of public service in addition to any private contract obligations. The agreement required Mid-America to “exercise due diligence ... to secure all necessary federal, state and local permits and licenses for the construction, operations, and maintenance of the facilities.” Mid-America further agreed that while it could assign its rights, no assignment relieved it from any of its obligations under the agreement. The 1982 agreement between Farmland and Mid-America was amended effective May 1, 1985, and was entirely superseded by a new agreement. The 1985 agreement provided for the construction of an additional eight-inch pipeline adjacent to the previously constructed Mid-America four-inch pipeline segment in order to provide for Farmland’s greatly increased transportation needs. In the 1985 agreement, Farmland guaranteed to transport five million additional barrels of blend stock, NGLs, and refined petroleum products per year for eight years. Again, Farmland agreed to a “take-or-pay” contract provision whereby it promised to pay Mid-America for the transportation of five million barrels per year for eight consecutive years regardless of whether Farmland actually transported that volume. This financial commitment totaled $3.75 million per year, which effectively guaranteed Mid-America the revenue it needed to construct the additional pipeline, operate it, and profit on the investment. The agreement reaffirmed Mid-America’s earlier contractual obligation to continue to maintain and operate (1) a six-inch pipeline from El Dorado to near Burden, Kansas (which lies between El Dorado and Coffey-ville), and (2) a six-inch pipeline from Cof-feyville to El Dorado. Mid-America again agreed to obtain and maintain its FERC, KCC, and joint Kaneb tariffs. The KCC tariff that was made a part of the agreement provided for pipeline transport all the way from Conway to the Coffeyville refinery and then out of the Coffeyville refinery back to El Dorado, where the refined products were transferred into the Kaneb pipeline. In the period encompassed by the 1985 agreement and through August 31, 2001, Mid-America had available to use, and did in fact use, both its owned six-inch pipeline between Conway and El Dorado and pipeline capacity that it leased from Texaco between Conway and El Dorado in order to meet both its private contract and common carrier/public utility obligations. The 1985 agreement again required Mid-America to operate its pipeline system as a common carrier and to “exercise due diligence to secure all necessary federal, state, and local permits and licenses for the construction, operation, and maintenance.” Mid-America agreed not to assign or transfer any interest in the pipeline system except to a successor upon sale of substantially all of its assets, but any such succession would not relieve Mid-America from its obligations under the 1985 agreement. During the period of the 1985 agreement, Farmland transported or paid for the transportation of five million barrels per year, including on occasion 2.8 million to 2.9 million barrels of NGLs from Conway to Coffeyville. At the end of the agreement, Farmland transported the volume for which it previously'paid for but did not transport, i.e., the make-up period. Farmland and Mid-America conducted business pursuant to the 1982 agreement, the 1985 agreement, and certain KCC and FERC tariffs from July 19, 1982, to March 7,1996. On December 27, 1994, Farmland filed a complaint with the KCC. The complaint, as later amended, sought an order directing Mid-America to file rates which were just and reasonable for the transportation of hydrocarbons between Conway and Cof-feyville and from Coffeyville to El Dorado. Farmland’s complaint alleges that the KCC has powers and duties imposed by law to regulate public utilities and common carriers and to review and adjust their rates and terms and conditions of service. As part of the 1994 complaint proceedings, in January of 1996 Mid-America applied for, but was denied, approval by the KCC to abandon service of the six-inch pipeline segment between Coffeyville and El Dora-do. On March 7, 1996, Farmland and Mid-America entered into an agreement settling the 1994 complaint proceedings and all other matters then in controversy before the KCC. The settlement agreement incorporated a pipeline capacity lease which provided for Farmland’s continuing use of the pipeline system between Conway and the Coffeyville refinery. The 1996 settlement inured to the benefit of Farmland “and any respective successors or permitted assignees.” The March 26, 1996, KCC order approving the settlement determined that Mid-America was a public utility and common carrier operating in Kansas and required certain other applications, accounting procedures, and approvals. The settlement provided that Farmland had the exclusive right to use the entire outbound capacity of Mid-America’s six-inch pipeline between the Coffeyville refinery and El Dorado, pursuant to the terms of the 1996 capacity lease, from January 1, 1997, through December 31, 1999. The settlement also required Mid-America to provide inbound pipeline capacity from Conway to the Coffeyville refinery for blend stocks and NGLs in amounts to exceed three million barrels annually. At that time, Farmland was increasing its capacity at the Coffeyville refinery, and therefore it required increased volumes of blend stocks and NGLs. Mid-America filed a tariff at the KCC that made more than three million barrels per year of inbound pipeline capacity from Conway to the Cof-feyville refinery available to Farmland. The 1996 settlement also provided that Farmland could transport blend stocks and NGLs outbound on the eight-inch pipeline from Coffeyville to Conway. KCC tariffs were implemented to provide for this transportation. The 1996 settlement further provided that [Mid-America] shall not suspend or abandon service on either the inbound or outbound pipelines ... during the period from January 1, 1996, through December 31, 1999.... Subsequent to December 1999, [Mid-America] will not seek to suspend or abandon service ... without at least 240 days prior written notice to Farmland except in the event of an emergency suspension. Settlement and Mutual Release Agreement § 9, at 10. Pipeline capacity inbound from Conway to the Coffeyville refinery exceeded the three million barrels that was required to meet Mid-America’s contractual obligation to Farmland pursuant to the 1996 agreement as well as Mid-America’s applicable KCC tariff. Both the 1996 agreement and the KCC tariff provided for Farmland to receive reduced transportation rates once it surpassed the volume thresholds of one and one-half million barrels and three million barrels, respectively, per year. In order for Farmland to receive the benefit of its bargain, capacity in excess of three million barrels per year had to be made available. Mid-America could not meet its obligations as increased without leasing capacity on Texaco’s Conway/El Dorado pipeline. In 1998, both the 1996 agreement and the applicable KCC tariff were extended to run through 2011. On February 12, 1998, in anticipation of a proposed merger between Williams and Mid-America, Farmland and Williams entered into a letter agreement that required certain amendments to the settlement. In the 1998 letter agreement, Farmland and Williams agreed to file a tariff for the inbound transportation over the pipeline from Conway to the Coffeyville refinery and to provide transportation at the specific rates set out therein through 2012. Under the agreement, the price per barrel of product that Farmland shipped into the Coffeyville refinery became less expensive as the volume increased. Outbound transportation of blend stocks and NGLs on the eight-inch diameter pipeline from the Coffeyville refinery to Conway was continued through 2011 under the terms and conditions of the 1996 capacity lease. Farmland, Mid-America, and Williams amended the 1996 settlement agreement on September 20, 1999, via an amendment which was effective March 30, 1998. This so-called 1998 agreement amended the 1996 lease, extending the term of the option of Farmland to extend the 1996 capacity lease through December 31, 2012. As alluded to previously, Texaco provided the MAP Entities with additional capacity from a Texaco-owned six-inch pipeline that extended between Conway and El Dorado. This Texaco pipeline was consistently operated by Mid-America and its predecessor as part of their common carrier and public utility pipeline service in the state of Kansas since 1982. The Texaco pipeline was placed into public service with the full knowledge and approval of Texaco, pursuant to explicit contract provisions of the Texaco/Mid-America pipeline lease. In return, Mid-America collected KCC tariffs for use of the capacity. Farmland and other shippers relied on and benefit-ted from this additional pipeline capacity for twenty consecutive years, commencing in 1982. Historically, beginning in 1982, Mid-America had leased the Texaco capacity from Texaco’s predecessor, Getty Pipeline Company, and all attendant rights and obligations were assumed by Texaco. As a condition of the 1982 pipeline capacity lease, the parties agreed as follows: It is understood that Mid-America is a common carrier and shall operate the [Getty/Texaco] pipeline system as a common carrier pipeline. It is agreed that nothing in this Agreement is intended to be or shall be interpreted in contradiction to the duties and obligations of Mid-America as a Common Carrier. Farmland’s complaint alleges that, under K.S.A. § 66-105 a common carrier and public utility includes all pipeline companies and all persons and associations of persons operating such agencies for public use in the conveyance of property within the state. It further alleges that a common carrier operates as a public utility in Kansas, is regulated by the KCC, and has all of the rights and obligations of public service in addition to any private contract obligations, including the duty to meet the service demands of the public and shippers like Farmland. On August 1, 2001, in contravention of Mid-America’s contractual and legal duties to Farmland, Mid-America failed to renew its lease with Texaco or take any other action (such as purchasing the pipeline) to maintain the Texaco pipeline capacity in public utility/common carrier service and available public utility service. With the knowledge and acquiescence of Texaco and Mid-America, more than half of the pipeline capacity available to meet Mid-America’s contract obligations to Farmland between Conway and the Coffeyville refinery was eliminated. Mid-America had the reasonable ability to continue to lease or purchase the Texaco pipeline capacity or buy the Texaco pipeline from Texaco, but it did neither. Texaco offered to continue the lease with Mid-America and/or sell the pipeline to Mid-America. Mid-America did not seek or receive approval from the KCC to abandon the Texaco pipeline capacity even though Mid-America had the statutory obligation to do so before the Texaco pipeline capacity could be removed from common carrier/public utility service. Farmland alleges that when Texaco removed the Texaco pipeline capacity from common carrier/public utility service, Farmland was directly affected and suffered substantial monetary damages. Texaco was fully aware that the capacity of the Texaco pipeline had been dedicated to common carrier/public utility service for twenty years and that Mid-America had the statutory obligation to seek and obtain approval from the KCC before the pipeline capacity could be removed from common carrier/public utility service. On January 27, 2003, Farmland alleged at the KCC that Texaco leased the Texaco pipeline capacity to a direct or indirect subsidiary of defendant ONEOK, Inc. On February 14, 2003, Texaco admitted that it leased the Texaco pipeline capacity to a subsidiary of ONEOK. On September 29, 2003, ONEOK filed an answer in the KCC proceedings in which it stated that on or about September 30, 2001, ONEOK caused defendant ONEOK Field Services Company (OFSC) to enter into a lease with Texaco to operate the Texaco pipeline capacity between Conway and El Dorado. In testimony filed with the KCC on February 9, 2004, ONEOK stated that it caused OFSC to purchase the Texaco pipeline between Conway and El Dorado on or about December 31, 2003. ONEOK NGL Marketing, L.P. (ONGL) transports NGLs on the Texaco pipeline and also sells its capacity to third parties, thus denying Farmland’s use of the pipeline. ONEOK and OFSC knew that the Texaco pipeline capacity between Conway and El Dorado had been dedicated to common carrier/public utility service for twenty years and that to remove that capacity from common carrier/public utility service would require the prior approval of the KCC. ONEOK, OFSC, and ONGL knew that Farmland was an intended beneficiary of the Mid-America/Texaco pipeline lease and the Texaco pipeline capacity between Conway and El Dorado. They knew that Farmland relied upon the lease and the pipeline capacity, and that Farmland would be directly affected and suffer substantial monetary damages upon removal of the pipeline from common carrier/public utility service. Despite this knowledge, they converted the Texaco pipeline capacity from public to private use. Based on these allegations, Farmland asserts six claims. The first of these is a breach of contract claim. In this claim, Farmland alleges that Mid-America and Williams owed duties and responsibilities to Farmland under the 1998 amended settlement and 1998 amended capacity lease and the documents they incorporated. Farmland alleges that the Texaco pipeline was not available from September 1, 2001, through March 3, 2004, to partially meet contractual and public service obligations. According to Farmland, Mid-America unilaterally took actions which made its ability to perform under the contracts impossible. Thus, Farmland was deprived of its contracted-for inbound and outbound pipeline transportation between Conway and the Coffeyville refinery. It resulted in the unmet contract and public utility/common carrier (public service) demand of Farmland. Additionally, Mid-America abandoned service to Farmland in contravention of the contract terms embodied in the 1996 settlement and transportation agreements as well as the 1998 transportation agreement. Farmland’s second claim is a breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary to the Mid-America/Texaco pipeline lease. This claim alleges that Mid-America leased the Texaco pipeline capacity to meet its legal (common carrier/public utility) requirements to fulfill the needs of pipeline shippers such as Farmland, that Mid-America’s duty to act as a common carrier was explicitly set out in the lease, and that Farmland was an intended beneficiary of the lease. When Texaco terminated the pipeline capacity lease with Mid-America and thereafter leased and sold the pipeline to OFSC, Texaco unlawfully removed the pipeline capacity from common carrier/public utility service and from meeting Farmland’s public service needs. The claim alleges that Texaco and the ONEOK entities knew that Farmland was a beneficiary of the lease, that the pipeline capacity had been dedicated to common carrier/public utility use for twenty years, that the pipeline capacity could not be used for any other purpose absent KCC approval of abandonment of the pipeline capacity from common carrier/public utility service, that KCC did not approve abandonment of the pipeline, and that ONEOK authorized OFSC to lease and purchase the pipeline and ONGL is using the pipeline to which Farmland is lawfully entitled to sell NGLs. Farmland’s third claim is an antitrust claim. Farmland alleges that Texaco and the ONEOK entities entered into an agreement and combination to remove the Texaco pipeline capacity from public service and to use the pipeline and its capacity to service one refiner (Frontier Oil at El Dorado) in preference and exclusively to the detriment of a competing refiner (Farmland) and to take from the public the right to compete for the transport and sale of blend stocks and NGLs in the Mid-Continent Region, thus eliminating competition in the transportation and sale of commodities. This arrangement effectively restrained trade in pipeline transportation, substantially increased the costs of one refiner as compared to another, and eliminated competition in the sale of commodities by removing all shippers and commodity sellers from what was previously a common carrier/public utility system available to all. Mid-America joined in the conspiracy by failing to defend and preserve its continuing use of the pipeline capacity, and instead acquiesced and participated in the combination in restraint of trade. Farmland’s fourth claim is a claim for negligence per se. In this claim Farmland alleges that Mid-America and Texaco violated public utility law as determined by the KCC by abandoning the pipeline without seeking or receiving authority to do so from the KCC, as is required by Kansas law. This claim alleges that the legislature has provided Farmland with a private right for a violation of this law under K.S.A. § 66-176. Farmland’s fifth claim is a claim for civil conspiracy which alleges that Mid-America, Texaco, and the ONEOK entities combined to unlawfully remove the Texaco pipeline capacity from public service. It alleges that they were fully aware that removal of the pipeline capacity would harm Farmland and that their actions resulted in a breach of the lawful duties that Mid-America and Texaco owed to Farmland. Lastly, Farmland’s sixth claim is a claim for bad faith and unfair dealing. This claim alleges that Mid-America had a duty to honor the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the 1996 settlement and transportation agreements as well as the 1998 transportation agreement. Mid-America held itself out as a common carrier/public utility and was legally obligated to take actions that were required to permit full performance of those agreements by Mid-America, as well as the related common carrier/public utility obligations. Mid-America promised to make capacity and transportation available to Farmland until at least 2011 pursuant to the contracts and related common carrier/public utility obligations, but instead failed to renew the Texaco pipeline capacity lease and/or buy the Texaco pipeline, thus rendering Mid-America unable - to meet its contract or common carrier/public utility obligations. In this claim Farmland alleges that the contracts and the related KCC tariffs impose obligations of law, equity, and custom necessary to carry them into effect. Mid-America, Williams, and the ONEOK defendants now ask the court to dismiss Farmland’s complaint. They raise a myriad of arguments in this regard. In analyzing these arguments, the court wishes to emphasize a threshold issue, which is that the court’s resolution of these motions is made more difficult by the fact that many of defendants’ arguments rely on documents beyond the pleadings, and therefore the court must determine the extent to which it will consider those documents at this procedural juncture. To the extent that the court cannot or declines to consider those documents, the court must determine whether to exclude the materials or consider them and convert the motions into ones for summary judgment. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when “ ‘it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claims which would entitle [it] to relief,’ ” Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4-5-16, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)), or when an issue of law is disposi-tive, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from con-clusory allegations, and all reasonable inferences’ from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff. Beedle, 422 F.3d at 1063. The issue in resolving such a motion is “not whether [the] plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (quotation omitted); accord Beedle, 422 F.3d at 1063. It is generally unacceptable for the court to look beyond the four corners of the complaint when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir.2002). However, it is “accepted practice, if a plaintiff does not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but the document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quotation omitted). The rationale for this is that “[i]f the rule were otherwise, a plaintiff with a deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by not attaching a dispositive document upon which the plaintiff relied.” GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir.1997). With respect to documents that are not referred to in plaintiffs complaint and/or are not central to plaintiffs claims, it is well established that the court must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if the court relies upon material from outside the complaint. Burnham v. Humphrey Hospitality Reit Trust, Inc., 403 F.3d 709, 713 (10th Cir.2005). Upon converting the motion to one for summary judgment, the court “must provide the parties with notice so that all factual allegations may be met with countervailing evidence.” Id. The required notice may be actual or constructive. David v. City of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir.1996). Thus, the submission of evidentiary materials by the movant, the nonmovant, or both of them constitutes sufficient notice. Id. The court has discretion in deciding whether to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment by accepting or rejecting the attached documents. Poole v. County of Otero, 271 F.3d 955, 957 n. 2 (10th Cir.2001). ANALYSIS For the reasons explained below, the court will grant the motions to dismiss.in part and deny them in part. Specifically, the court will deny the motion to dismiss Mid-America Pipeline Company (MAPCO) based on its conversion to Mid-America Pipeline Company, LLC (MAPL) because, even considering the documents filed with the Delaware Secretary of State, the court cannot say that it appears beyond a doubt that Farmland can prove no set of facts which would entitle it to relief against MAPCO. As to Mid-America’s other motion to dismiss (i.e., the motion to dismiss claims against MAPL), although the court rejects Mid-America’s collateral estoppel and tariff limitations period arguments at this procedural juncture, the court will grant the motion to dismiss Farmland’s third-party beneficiary and tort claims; the court will otherwise deny the motion. The court will grant Williams’ motion to dismiss in its entirety because Farmland’s complaint does not contain any relevant allegations against Williams. As for the ONEOK defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court will deny this motion in its entirety because Farmland’s complaint and the court records from the Farmland bankruptcy proceedings submitted by the parties do not establish the facts necessary for the court to apply equitable or judicial estoppel to bar Farmland’s claims and also because Farmland’s reorganization plan and disclosure statement gave ONGL adequate notice of Farmland’s potential claims against it and, consequently, Farmland preserved those claims. I. Motion to Dismiss Mid-America Pipeline Company Defendant Mid-America Pipeline Company, LLC (MAPL) in its capacity as predecessor of Mid-America Pipeline Company (MAPCO) seeks dismissal - of Farmland’s claims against MAPCO on the grounds that during the summer of 2002 MAPCO, a Delaware corporation, converted itself to a limited liability company under Delaware law and emerged from the conversion as MAPL. Thus, MAPL contends that Farmland’s claims against MAPCO should be dismissed because MAPCO no longer exists. MAPL contends that, furthermore, because of the conversion Farmland’s claims against MAPCO are redundant of its claims against MAPL. In support of this motion, MAPL relies on a “Certificate of Formation” for MAPL and a “Certificate of Conversion,” both of which are authenticated by certificates from the Delaware Secretary of State stating that they were filed on July 30, 2002. MAPL also relies on the Deláware Secretary of State’s subsequent certification that the appropriate conversion documents were filed. Based on these documents, MAPCO contends that it no longer exists as a distinct corporate entity and continues instead as MAPL. Because MAPL’s arguments rely on materials beyond the pleadings, the court must first determine the extent to which it may consider these documents on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting it to one for summary judgment. The court first wishes to clarify that it will not consider these documents on the grounds that they are referred to in Farmland’s complaint, they are central to Farmland’s complaint, and they are indisputably authentic. To the contrary, although the authenticity of these documents is not disputed, the documents are neither referred to in the complaint nor central to Farmland’s claims. Rather, MAPL has submitted these documents to set up the affirmative defense that MAPCO no longer possesses the capacity to be sued. As such, these documents are central to this affirmative defense, not to plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, the court will not consider these documents on this basis. Instead, MAPL urges the court to take judicial notice of these materials as matters of public record without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Facts subject to judicial notice may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004). At any stage of the proceedings the court may take judicial notice of a fact which is not subject to reasonable dispute, a requirement that is satisfied if the fact is “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2). Thus, “the court is permitted to take judicial notice of ... facts which are a matter of public record.” Van Woudenberg v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 560, 568 (10th Cir.2000), abrogated on other grounds by McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 955 (10th Cir.2001). The decision of whether to take judicial notice of a particular fact is within the court’s discretion. Klein v. Zavaras, 80 F.3d 432, 435 n. 5 (10th Cir.1996). In this case, the court will exercise its discretion and, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment, will take judicial notice of the fact that the Certificate of Formation for MAPL and the Certificate of Conversion from MAP-CO to MAPL were both filed with the Delaware Secretary of State on July 30, 2002, and that the Delaware Secretary of State issued a certificate stating that the appropriate conversion documents were filed. These documents are public records which are properly authenticated. See Fed.R.Evid. 902(4) (certified copies of public records are self authenticated). Thus, the fact that they were filed with and issued by the Delaware Secretary of State, as well as their contents, are not subject to reasonable dispute. Indeed, public documents filed with the secretary of state such as those at issue here generally satisfy the judicial notice standard and district courts routinely take judicial notice of such documents in resolving motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Shurkin v. Golden State Vintners, Inc., Case No. 04-3434, 2005 WL 1926620, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Aug.10, 2005) (taking judicial notice of the fact of a certificate of organization); CS Assets, LLC v. H & H Real Estate Dev., Inc., 353 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1187 (N.D.Ala.2005) (same, registration as a foreign corporation). The issue, then, is what effect the filing of these documents had on the corporate status of MAPCO. The Delaware statutes in effect at the time of the conversion provided that any entity could convert to a Delaware limited liability company by filing a certificate of formation and a certificate of conversion with the secretary of state. Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-214(b) (2002). Upon the filing of these documents “the other entity shall be converted into a domestic limited liability company ... subject to all of the provisions of this chapter.” Id. § 18 — 214(d). The conversion does not effect the obligations or liabilities incurred prior to conversion. Id. § 18-214(e). All rights, privileges, powers, and property remain vested in the emerging limited liability company, and “all debts, liabilities and duties of the other entity that has converted shall remain attached to the domestic limited liability company to which such other entity has converted, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities and duties had originally been incurred or contracted by it in its capacity as a domestic limited liability company.” Id. § 18-214(f). Moreover, the conversion does not affect any obligations or liabilities of the corporation incurred prior to the conversion. Del.Code Ann. tit. 8, § 266(d) (2002). Under these statutes, there seems to be little point in keeping MAPCO in this lawsuit because MAPL likely will be subject to full liability for MAPCO in any event. Nonetheless, accepting the allegations in Farmland’s complaint as true, as the court must in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court cannot say that it appears beyond a doubt that Farmland can prove no set of facts which would entitle it to relief against MAPCO. The Delaware statutes provide that the conversion constitutes a continuation of the other entity and is not a dissolution of the other entity “[ujnless otherwise agreed,” Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-214(g), or “[ujnless otherwise provided in a resolution of conversion,” Del.Code Ann. tit. 8, § 266(f). Thus, determining whether MAPCO in fact was dissolved or continued to MAPL may require resort to internal corporate documents. Indeed, Farmland contends that it needs to conduct discovery to obtain information concerning the distribution of MAPCO’s assets. Also, the record before the court does not establish that MAPCO necessarily took the appropriate steps internally to convert the corporation to a limited liability company. See, e.g., Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18 — 214(h); Del.Code Ann. tit. 8, § 266(b). The certificate issued by the Delaware Secretary of State constitutes only “prima facie evidence of the conversion,” DehCode Ann. tit. 8, § 266(c), not conclusive proof. As such, this matter is not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. While the court recognizes that this issue ultimately may prove to be a mere technicality, it nonetheless presents an issue of fact that this court will not resolve on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, MAPL’s motion to dismiss Farmland’s complaint against MAPCO is denied. The court also declines MAPL’s invitation to convert the motion to one for summary judgment at this procedural juncture. MAPL’s motion relied on public records of which the court may take judicial notice on a motion to dismiss. Thus, because MAPL did not rely on other types of materials outside the complaint, the court is not persuaded that MAPL’s motion gave Farmland sufficient constructive notice that the court might convert the motion. With this threshold issue of the nature of the relationship between MAPCO and MAPL defined, then, the court will again simplify its references to MAPCO and MAPL by referring to them, both collectively and singularly, as Mid-America. II. Motion to Dismiss of Mid-America Pipeline Company, LLC (MAPL) Mid-America’s primary contention in support of its motion to dismiss is that all of Farmland’s claims against it are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on the findings and conclusions made by the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) in complaint proceedings instituted by Farmland. Mid-America also contends that Farmland’s breach of contract, third-party beneficiary, and antitrust claims against Mid-America are barred by a limitations period contained in a tariff which it filed with the KCC. Mid-America raises separate grounds for dismissal of Farmland’s third-party beneficiary, negligence per se, civil conspiracy, and bad faith and unfair dealing claims. Lastly, Mid-America moves for a more definite statement with respect to Farmland’s antitrust claim. 1. Collateral Estoppel Mid-America’s collateral estoppel argument is based on factual findings made by the KCC during proceedings which Farmland initiated by filing a complaint on August 29, 2001, regarding Mid-America’s then-anticipated abandonment of the Texaco pipeline. The KCC conducted an evi-dentiary hearing on August 24-26, 2004. It issued a written order (the KCC Order) on January 31, 2005, and an order denying the parties’ petitions for reconsideration on March 18, 2005 (the KCC Order on Reconsideration). Mid-America contends that all six of Farmland’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel because the KCC has already determined that the loss of capacity Farmland allegedly experienced as a result of termination of the Texaco lease did not cause the unmet service demand that Farmland complains of in this case. This argument is based on a paragraph in the KCC Order which states as follows: The Commission concludes the evidence supports a finding that MAPL continued to provide reasonably efficient service, as required by K.S.A. 66-1,217 in fulfilling its common carrier obligations after its lease of the Texaco line was terminated.... Even though Farmland complained that MAPL’s eastbound transport of product was inadequate and did not meet Farmland’s demand, the evidence established that Farmland’s ability to receive eastbound deliveries at Coffeyville was reduced by limitations of Farmland’s facilities and this contributed to Farmland receiving less than what it demanded. The record developed in this proceeding does not establish that MAPL failed to meet Farmland’s eastbound [inbound] transport demand due to its loss of the Texaco line. KCC Order, ¶ 73, at 36-37 (emphasis added). Farmland filed a petition for reconsideration of the KCC order, noting the implication that Farmland was not harmed by the loss of capacity that Mid-America experienced as a result of termination of the Texaco lease. On reconsideration, the KCC reiterated that it “found MAPL violated the law but then concluded service thereafter provided by MAPL was sufficient and efficient public utility sendee as required by K.S.A. 66-1,217.” KCC Order on Reconsideration, ¶ 16, at 7. The thrust of Mid-America’s argument is that, because the KCC determined that Mid-America’s loss of the Texaco pipeline capacity did not cause Farmland’s unmet service demand, Farmland cannot prove damages as a proximate cause of the unmet service demand, which is an essential element of each claim asserted by Farmland. Just as with the documents that Mid-America submitted regarding the conversion of MAPCO to MAPL, Farmland’s complaint does not rely on the KCC Order or the KCC Order on Reconsideration and those orders are not central to Farmland’s claims; thus, the court will not consider them in resolving Mid-America’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion on that basis. Instead, just as the court did with respect to Mid-America’s motion to dismiss Farmland’s claims against MAPCO, the court will take judicial notice of the KCC Order and the KCC Order on Reconsideration, as public records, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment for the purpose of evaluating the preclusive effect of those orders. The parties do not dispute that the KCC was acting in a judicial capacity and therefore the KCC Order and the KCC Order on Reconsideration are entitled to the same preclusive effect to which they would be entitled in Kansas courts. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir.1990). Under Kansas law, “the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a second litigation of the same issues between the same parties or their privies even in connection with a different claim or cause of action.” In re City of Wichita, 277 Kan. 487, 506, 86 P.3d 513, 526 (2004) (quotation omitted). For the doctrine to apply, three factors must be present: “(1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be the same or in privity, and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). Farmland contends that the KCC Order and the KCC Order on Reconsideration did not constitute a prior judgment on the merits because the KCC is only authorized to determine whether there has been a violation of Kansas public utility laws, and it does not have authority to award damages. See W. Kan. Express, Inc. v. Dugan Truck Line, Inc., 11 Kan.App.2d 336, 339-41, 720 P.2d 1132, 1135-36 (1986). The court is not persuaded by this argument. K.S.A. § 66-176 provides a private right of action for damages whenever a public utility or common carrier violates the laws regulating public utilities and common carriers. Thus, a finding by the KCC that a public utility or common carrier has committed such a violation forms the basis for a civil action and thus implicitly determines the parties’ rights and liabilities. The court will not, however, apply collateral estoppel to bar Farmland’s claims, at least at this procedural juncture, largely because Mid-America’s argument is based on a mistaken interpretation of the KCC Order. Mid-America construes the language from the KCC Order to mean that the KCC necessarily determined that Farmland suffered no damages. More precisely, the KCC Order states that Farmland’s ability to receive inbound deliveries was “reduced” by limitations at the Coffeyville refinery and this “contributed to” Farmland receiving less than what it demanded. The KCC did not find, despite Mid-America’s argument to the contrary, that Farmland suffered absolutely no damages whatsoever by Mid-America’s reduction in pipeline capacity. Thus, the KCC’s finding does not preclude Farmland from litigating the issue of the extent to which Mid-America did not meet its service demands, nor does it preclude Mid-America from litigating the extent to which limitations at the Coffeyville refinery contributed to Farmland’s unmet service demand. Simply put, the issue of the extent to which each party was responsible for Farmland’s damages attributable to its allegedly unmet service demand was not previously determined. Moreover, the issues presented in Farmland’s complaint in this case are not entirely identical to those which were decided by the KCC. The KCC determined the lawfulness of the defendants’ actions under its authority and jurisdiction to regulate public utilities and common carriers. It determined whether Mid-America fulfilled its obligations as a common carrier when its capacity to transport liquids was significantly reduced after the Texaco lease ended and that pipeline was removed from public use. To that end, it determined that Mid-America had an obligation to notify the KCC that its liquids pipeline capacity would be reduced when the Texaco lease expired, that Mid-America did not give the KCC the required notice, and that Mid-America nonetheless continued to provide “reasonably sufficient and efficient service” over its remaining pipelines as required by K.S.A. § 66-1,217. That portion of the KCC Order upon which Mid-America’s collateral estoppel argument relies is contained in the discussion of whether Mid-America met its statutory obligation to continue to provide reasonably sufficient and efficient service under § 66-1.217. Farmland points out that the issue of whether Mid-America continued to provide “sufficient and efficient service” is a measure of public common carrier regulatory compliance unrelated to contractual obligations. Farmland contends that “service demand” is a term of art in utility law whereby here Farmland is suing for unmet contract demand. Thus, a finding by the KCC that Mid-America met a regulatory requirement designed to prevent discriminatory allocation of its available, but diminished, capacity is not the same issue as fulfillment of contractual obligations and duties owed. The fact that the KCC’s finding was relevant to Mid-America’s legal duties as a common carrier rather than to its contractual duties to Farmland is further emphasized by the KCC Order on Reconsideration in which the KCC reiterated that it concluded that Mid-America provided “sufficient and efficient public utility service as required by K.S.A. 66-1.217.” Accordingly, if the KCC’s finding is entitled to any preclusive effect, it is only as to those aspects of Farmland’s claims which are based on Mid-America’s legal obligations as a common carrier or public utility, not as to the contractual aspects of those claims. Because of this distinction, the court finds Mid-America’s reliance on Leck v. Cont’l Oil Co., 971 F.2d 604 (10th Cir.1992), and Ruyle v. Cont’l Oil Co., 44 F.3d 837 (1994), to be misplaced. Leek involved a dispute between mineral interest owners and the operator of a drilling unit. The owners asserted before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission that the operator was permitting uncompensated drainage to occur by allowing production from another well in the same producing formation. The Commission determined that the owners’ correlative rights were not being violated. The owners subsequently filed suit alleging breaches of contract and of fidu-eiary duty for failure to protect against drainage. The Tenth Circuit held that the Commission’s ruling collaterally estopped the owners from asserting uncompensated drainage had occurred, pointing out that the Commission’s finding that their correlative rights were not violated necessarily included a finding that no drainage was occurring. 971 F.2d at 606. Ruyle presented similar circumstances and, again, the Tenth Circuit applied collateral estop-pel to bar the mineral interest owners’ claims. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit explained that “when, as here, the judicial relief sought depends entirely upon the adjustment and protection of correlative rights already ruled on by the Commission, the court is not at liberty to make such a[n] award if the Commission has concluded that no correlative rights have been violated.” 44 F.3d at 845. Unlike in Leek and Ruyle, in this case Farmland’s claims do not depend entirely upon the rights that have already been ruled on by the KCC. To the contrary, here Farmland’s claims are based in part on Mid-America’s contractual obligations to Farmland, which consist of obligations separate and distinct from Mid-America’s common carrier/public utility obligations which were addressed by the KCC. For all of these reasons, then, Mid-America’s motion to dismiss Farmland’s complaint on the basis of collateral estop-pel is denied. The court also declines to convert this aspect of Mid-America’s motion into one for summary judgment. The motion relied on administrative rulings which are properly the subject of judicial notice that the court may consider in resolving a motion to dismiss. Because Mid-America did not rely on other types of materials outside the complaint, the court is not persuaded that Mid-America’s motion gave Farmland sufficient notice that the court might convert the motion. 2. Tariff Limitations Period Mid-America also contends that Farmland’s breach of contract, third-party beneficiary, and antitrust claims should be dismissed because Farmland failed to give notice of its claims or to file suit within the time period required under the tariff which governs the relationship between Mid-America and Farmland. The relevant tariff provision provides as follows: Notice of claims for loss or damage must be made in writing to Carrier within nine (9) months after delivery of the Product, or in the case of a failure to make delivery, then within (9) months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed. Suit against Carrier shall be instituted only within two (2) years and one (1) day from the day when notice in writing is given by Carrier to the claimant that Carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice. Where claims are not filed or suits are not instituted thereon in accordance with the foregoing provisions, such claims will not be paid and the Carrier shall not be liable. Mid-America Tariff, Item 75 Claims— Time for Filing, at 4. The complaint alleges that because of the unavailability of the Texaco pipeline capacity, Mid-America did not meet contractual obligations, see Complaint (Doc. 1) ¶ 99, at 18-19, and resulted in Farmland’s unmet service demands, see id. ¶ 101, at 19. Mid-America argues that Farmland’s claims are “for loss or damage” as the result of Mid-America’s alleged “failure to make delivery.” Mid-America contends that Farmland did not give the required “notice” of the claim of failure to make delivery of the product within nine months after Mid-America failed to make delivery and that Farmland’s claim is therefore barred by its failure to follow the required notice-and-disallowance procedure. Mid-America contends, alternatively, that Farmland gave the required “notice” of the claim by virtue of the complaint that Farmland filed with the KCC on August 29, 2001; that Mid-America gave written notice that it was “disallow[ing]” the claim by virtue of its response to Farmland’s complaint that Mid-America filed with the KCC on September 24, 2001; and that this case was filed on May 31, 2005, which was well after the two-year-and-one-day limitations period set forth in the tariff. As a threshold matter, the court notes that it will resolve this dispute under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. In doing so, it will consider the contents of the 1996 settlement agreement on the grounds that the parties have submitted an indisputably authentic copy of this document and it is both relied on in Farmland’s complaint and central to Farmland’s breach of contract claim. Additionally, the court will take judicial notice of the relevant tariff provision. Mid-America has provided a certified copy of this tariff and the original is a public record which is on file with the KCC. Thus, this is a proper subject for judicial notice. “Tariffs are those terms and conditions which govern the relationship between a utility and its customers.” Danisco Ingredients USA, Inc. v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 267 Kan. 760, 765, 986 P.2d 377, 381 (1999). When duly filed with the KCC they generally bind both the utility and the customer. Id. A provision in a tariff which purports to limit the liability of a public utility to its customers is enforceable to the extent that it is lawful and declared invalid only insofar as it seeks to limit liability for greater than ordinary negligence. Id. at 773, 986 P.2d at 386. Here, Farmland does not argue that the tariff provision limiting Mid-America’s liability by setting forth a time for the filing of claims against it is invalid because it seeks to limit liability for greater than ordinary negligence. Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that more stringent time limitations are enforceable as reasonable. Id. at 770-71, 986 P.2d at 384-85 (noting that in Russell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 57 Kan. 230, 233-34, 45 P. 598 (1896), the Kansas Supreme Court “upheld a 60-day limitation on the time in which claims for negligence could be brought”). Thus, the sole question presented here is the extent to which the “Time for Filing” provision relied upon by Mid-America is enforceable against Farmland’s claims in this case. Farmland contends that its claims do not fall within the ambit of the tariff limitations period because its claims are not claims for “failure to make delivery” or for “loss or damage” to “Product” after delivery. Farmland’s theory is that the tariff limitations period applies to circumstances when the product is accepted (i.e., tendered) for re-delivery by a common carrier but then is not re-delivered out of the pipeline or it applies in those circumstances in which product has been tendered to the pipeline but re-delivery terms have been breached, such as the redelivery of contaminated product or redelivery of less product than tendered by a shipper. “A public utility tariff is to be construed in the same manner as a statute.” Id. at 772, 986 P.2d 377, 986 P.2d at 385; accord Grindsted Prods., Inc. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, 262 Kan. 294, 310, 937 P.2d 1, 11 (1997). Thus, a tariff must “be construed as a whole, including footnotes, from the ordinary and popular meaning of the words used.” Grindsted, 262 Kan. at 310, 937 P.2d at 11. Based on this fundamental principle of tariff interpretation, the court rejects the meaning that Farmland seeks to attribute to the tariff provision because it is contrary to the ordinary and popular meaning of the words used in the tariff. The tariff, by its plain terms, applies to a “failure to make delivery,’’ not, as Farmland would have it, a “failure to make redelivery.” Thus, the court finds Farmland’s interpretational argument to be without merit. Nonetheless, the court does believe that Farmland’s other argument precludes the court from ruling that Farmland’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In this respect, Farmland contends that Mid-America has not produced anything to show that Mid-America gave Farmland the required notice that it was disallowing Farmland’s claim sufficient to trigger the running of the two-year-and-one-day limitations period. By raising the bar of the tariff limitations period, Mid-America has asserted an affirmative defense for which it has the burden of proof. Certainly, courts may dismiss a claim based upon the applicable statute of limitations on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the face of the complaint reveals that the claim is time barred. See Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d. 1036, 1041 n. 4 (10th Cir.1980) (statute of limitations defense may be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “when the dates given in the complaint make clear that the right sued upon has been extinguished”). But, here, the allegations ip Farmland’s complaint do not .reveal that Farmland’s claims are barfed by the tariff limitations period. It is not incumbent upon Farmland to allege facts to prove that the required notices were given or not given so as to avoid its claims being barred by the tariff limitations period. Rather, at this procedural juncture Mid-America- has the burden of proving that it appears beyond a doubt that Farmland can prove no set of facts demonstrating that it is entitled to relief. Absent a factual record,, this issue simply is not ripe for determination on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Thus, this aspect of Mid-America’s motion is denied. The court" also declines to convert this motion to one for summary judgment. Mid-America is of course welcome to renew this argument on a motion for summary judgment if it wishes to do so. Even then, the court simply wishes to acknowledge that it can envision that issues of fact may permeate the determination of whether the required notices were given and, to that end, on a motion for summary judgment Mid-America should be mindful that it will carry the heavy burden of persuading the court that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. 3. Third-Party Beneficiary Claim Mid-America contends that it is not a proper party to Farmland’s third-parly beneficiary claim because Farmland does not allege that Mid-America breached the contract that forms the basis for this claim. In Bodine v. Osage County Rural Water Dist. No. 7, 263 Kan. 418, 949 P.2d 1104 (1997), the Kansas Supreme Court held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on a breach of contract/third-party beneficiary claim where the plaintiff improperly named the wrong party to the contract. Id. at 432-33, 949 P.2d at 1114-15. In Bodine, the plaintiffs breach of contract/third-party beneficiary claim was premised on a contract between the city and the rural water district. The plaintiff had sued the rural water district but had alleged that the city, not the rural water district, breached the contract. The court held that the plaintiff could not sue the i-ural water district because the plaintiff did not allege that the rural water district breached the contract. Id. at 433-32, 949 P.2d at 1114. The court approvingly cited Wunschel v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 17 Kan.App.2d 457, 839 P.2d 64 (1992), in which the plaintiff third-party beneficiaries properly sued the party who breached the contract directly without naming the other party to the contract at all, and Noel v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 15 Kan.App.2d 225, 805 P.2d 1244 (1991), in which the court allowed the third-party beneficiary to sue either party to the contract as long as the third-party beneficiary actually sued the party to the contract who was responsible for or actually caused the breach of contract. In this case