Full opinion text
ORDER CARNES, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND...............................................................1188 I. Factual Background................................................1188 A. A History of Amendments.......................................1188 B. Key Provisions of the Current Ordinance.........................1190 C. The Parties....................................................1195 II. Procedural History.................................................1195 DISCUSSION.................................................................1196 I. Individuals Sued in their Official Capacity............................1196 II. Federal Constitutional Standards for Regulating Speech...............1196 A. Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral..............................1196 B. Are All Sign Regulations Necessarily Content-Based?.............1198 C. Commercial Speech ............................................1198 III. Standing...........................................................1199 IV. Challenged Provisions of the Avondale Estate’s Ordinance.............1200 A. Provisions of the Ordinance Directed at Commercial Speech.......1200 1. Real Estate Signs...........................................1200 2. Yard Sale Signs ............................................1202 B. Provisions of the Ordinance Directed at Noncommercial Speech____1204 1. General Size, Height, Number, and Setback Restrictions Are Content-Neutral......................................1204 a. Height, Size, and Number Restrictions ...................1205 b. Setback Provision ......................................1208 2. Exemption of Seasonal Displays and Decorations..............1209 a. Seasonal Display Exemption.............................1209 3. Flags......................................................1211 4. Grandfathering Provision...................................1213 V.Analysis Under the Georgia Constitution.............................1216 VI. Voting Rights Act..................................................1216 VII. Equal Protection Claims............................................1218 VIII. Severability of Unconstitutional Provisions...........................1219 CONCLUSION................................................................1220 Established as a planned community in the 1920’s and placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1986, Avon-dale Estates is a small municipality just outside the City of Atlanta. For decades, Avondale Estates [hereinafter “Avondale”] has been known for its well-tended lawns, its Tudor-style buildings, its lake, and its lasting charm as a village-type community surrounded by a large bustling metropolis. Avondale is also known for its rules and regulations. The City Fathers apparently believe that it is no accident that Avondale has maintained its aesthetic appeal at a time when many other older middle-class neighborhoods have not; instead, they contend that it is their hands-on monitoring of the neighborhood that has helped insure its preservation. The plaintiffs, who are residents of Avondale, however, chafe under these rules and what they perceive as Avondale’s badge-heavy enforcement. Represented by the ACLU in this litigation, the plaintiffs specifically challenge Avondale’s Sign Ordinance as being in violation of the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The case is now before this Court on both parties’ motions for summary judgment, each of which the Court concludes should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. BACKGROUND Plaintiff and defendant have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Unless otherwise indicated, the Court draws the facts of this case from Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute [71] (“PSMF”), Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ “Fourth” Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [73] (“Defs.’ Resp.”), Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts [74] (“DSUF”), and Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts [76] (“Pis.’ Resp.”). I. Factual Background A. A History of Amendments As noted, the City of Avondale Estates, is a small municipality located approximately ten miles from downtown Atlanta. At least one square mile of the city’s one and a quarter square miles consists of residential structures, most of which are single family homes. There are approximately 1,200 single family homes in the City. (Defs.’ Resp. at 2.) On September 11, 1967, defendant adopted an ordinance prohibiting all signs except “street number and/or resident’s name” in “any area of the city zoned for residential use.” (PSMF at ¶ 1.) At the time this action was filed in July of 2000, defendant had continued to ban all signs in residential areas except house numbers, historic markers, original house designations, and street identification numbers. (PSMF at ¶ 2.) Since the start of this litigation, and likely in response to it, defendant has amended its sign ordinance five times. These amendments were adopted on November 8, 2000, November 26, 2001, November 25, 2002, September 22, 2003, and March 23, 2004. On November 8, 2000, after a partial moratorium on enforcement of the ordinance, defendant repealed portions of the ordinance that, among other things, outright prohibited the display of noncommercial signs and limited the display of flags. (PSMF at ¶ 5; Sign Ordinance, attach, as Ex. A to Defs.’ Resp. to Pis.’ Summ. J. Mot. [12].) On November 26, 2001, defendant adopted a new sign ordinance. This new ordinance allowed one real estate sign, one yard sale sign, and signs containing “noncommercial messages.” The ordinance limited each residence to three signs with each sign being no higher than three feet and no larger than four square feet in size. Historic markers were permitted to be up to seven feet high and twelve and a half square feet in size. Both sides of a double faced sign counted toward the four foot limit, and yard sale signs were limited to half the size of all other signs and restricted to the day of sale. (PSMF at ¶ 6.) In the November 2001 ordinance, real estate signs were permitted to contain the words “for sale,” “for lease,” or “for rent,” along with the name of the owner or owner’s agent and a telephone contact number. Real estate signs, however, were not permitted to display the corporate logo or emblem of the agency advertising the property, or any other commercial message unrelated to the property itself. (Sign Ordinance, attach, as Ex. A to Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute [42].) Seasonal displays and noncommercial announcements of occasions such as birthdays and anniversaries were also exempt from the ordinance. (PSMF at ¶ 6.) In addition to removing any non-compliant sign, the code enforcement officer and other city personnel were authorized to issue citations for any violation of the ordinance. Any such citation was to be taken to the municipal court of the City of Avondale Estates and prosecuted as any other criminal citation would be in the municipal court. (Sign Ordinance, attach, as Ex. A to Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute [42].) On November 25, 2002, defendant amended its ordinance for a third time. This version of the sign ordinance repealed the three sign limit, and replaced it with a four square feet per sign, twelve square feet per lot limit. Both sides of a two faced sign no longer counted toward the size limit, and the express exemption for historic markers was eliminated. (PSMF at ¶ 7.) The ordinance devoted an entire section, § 5-376, to the display of flags. (Sign Ordinance, attach, as Ex. A to Defs.’ Mot. to Amend Answer [48].) The flag section imposed proportionality requirements that required a fifteen foot “professionally fabricated flagpole” to display a 3x5 foot flag. This section also required that all flags displaying a “logo, message, statement, or commercial message” conform to all the other sign regulations contained in the ordinance. (PSMF at ¶ 7.) The November 2002 ordinance also articulated more specific criminal penalties for violations of the ordinance. Whereas earlier versions of the ordinance only provided for the issuance of citations to be taken to the municipal court of the City and prosecuted as any other criminal citation, version three of the ordinance specified that the maximum punishment for violation of the ordinance was a fine of $1,000 or six months imprisonment or both. (Sign Ordinance, attach, as Ex. A to Defs.’ Mot. to Amend Answer [48].) Defendants’ fourth amendment to the sign ordinance was adopted on September 22, 2003, just seven days after the Court heard oral argument on the parties’ third round of summary judgment motions. (PSMF at ¶ 8.) This version of the ordinance adjusted the proportionality requirements between flag and flagpole to allow homeowners to display flags without the use of a fifteen foot flagpole. Each residence could have up to two flagpoles displaying two flags each, except on holidays when an unlimited number of flags of any size could be displayed. (PSMF at ¶¶ 13,-15.) The 2003 amendment also modified the seasonal display exemption to prohibit the display of seasonal decorations on the city’s right of way. Seasonal displays, however, remained exempt from the ordinance’s general setback provision that prohibited signs from being erected any closer than ten feet from the back of the sidewalk or fifteen feet from the edge of the road where a sidewalk does not exist. (Sign Ordinance, attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65]; PSMF at ¶ 8.) The ordinance restricted residential signs to a total of twelve square feet per lot, with a per sign limitation of four square feet. As in the November 2002 version of the ordinance, only one side of a double faced sign counted toward the size limits, and signs could be no higher than three feet. (PSMF at ¶ 10.) Yard sale signs were limited to two square feet in size and could only be posted on the day of the sale. (PSMF at ¶ 21.) The real estate sign provision of the ordinance continued to limit “for sale,” “for lease,” or “for rent” signs to a single sign no larger than four square feet advertising the real property upon which the sign is located. (Sign Ordinance, attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65].) The ordinance also specified that any literature packets, notices, or other ancillary information on real estate signs must be displayed within the four square feet allowed for each sign face area. (PSMF at ¶ 24.) The fifth, and most recent, amendment to the City’s ordinance was adopted on March 23, 2004. (Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [79].) This last set of amendments focused on the use of real estate and yard sale signs, and the seasonal display exemption. (Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [79].) Though defendant has not filed anything with the Court specifically addressing these latest amendments, plaintiffs have filed a brief pleading entitled “Plaintiffs’ Comment on Defendant City’s Sign Ordinance Changes of March 23, 2004.” [80] In this pleading, the plaintiffs indicate generally that the new amendment does not improve the City’s legal position, but do not address as specifically as plaintiffs have done in previous pleadings the particular new provisions in play. The March 2004 amendments do affect the Court’s analysis. Moreover, the Court recognizes that the City’s continuing amendments of its sign ordinance have always been responsive to the plaintiffs’ complaints and have greatly reduced the plaintiffs’ challenges as to the constitutionality of the ordinance. Thus, these amendments have had a positive effect on the litigation. Nevertheless, this unending amendment process has created a constantly moving target that has been burdensome for this Court and particularly for the plaintiffs. Recognizing the burden on the plaintiffs that each new round of amended ordinances has created, the Court has endeavored to analyze this latest ordinance by utilizing the parties’ four previous rounds of summary judgment motions with their accompanying responses and replies. Hopefully, these pleadings have adequately presented all of both parties’ issues to the Court for resolution. If they have not, however, the Court will be open to a motion for reconsideration as to any matters it may have missed. Nevertheless, to advance the ball in this case, the Court will evaluate the City’s ordinance as of the date of this Order and indicate its position concerning the constitutionality of remaining provisions. For the most part, previous provisions of the ordinance that have been eliminated from, or modified by, the current version of the ordinance will not be addressed by the Court. B. Key Provisions of the Current Ordinance As of November 28, 2003, plaintiffs challenged the following sections of the City’s ordinance: a. § 5-375(a)(2)-limiting signs to three feet in height; b. § 5-380(a)-limiting signs to four square feet per sign and twelve square feet per lot; c. § 5-374(a)-requiring signs to be set back ten feet from the back of the sidewalk or fifteen feet from the edge of the road where there is no sidewalk; d. § 5-372(e)-banning signs on the public right of way; e. § 5-363(f)-exemption for seasonal displays and decorations; f. § 5-362-defining commercial message, real estate sign, and sign; g. § 5-380(a)(l)-restrieting real estate signs; h. § 5-380(a)(4)-regulating yard sale signs; i. § 5-310-grandfathering signs that were lawful as of January 26, 1987. (Pis. Filing of List of Challenged Ordinance Sections [72] (“Pis.’ Filing”).) The Court will summarize these and other key provisions of the ordinance as they now stand after the March 2004 amendments. In doing so, the Court directs its attention to those provisions of the ordinance applicable to residential signage, which is the subject matter focus of plaintiffs’ complaint. Section 5-361(a) of the City’s ordinance contains a clear statement of purpose: In order to protect the public safety, including traffic safety, to assure aesthetic harmony and compatibility of signs with surrounding land uses, to enhance the business and economy of the city, to protect the public investment in streets and highways, to maintain the tranquil environment of residential areas, to promote industry and commerce, and to provide for orderly and reasonable display of advertising for the benefit of all its citizens, recognizing that the city is one of the country’s foremost planned communities and is on the National Register of Historic Places, the governing authority finds that the improper control of signs would be detrimental to the unique characteristics of the city. The governing authority thus determines that the public health, safety and welfare require the adoption of this article. This statement of purpose goes on to characterize signs as a “valuable medium of communication” and a “proper and necessary use[] of private property.” (Sign Ordinance at § 5 — 361(b), attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65].) However, the statement of purpose also recognizes that the same characteristics that make signs a valuable medium of communication, “can distract motorists and pedestrians, thus creating traffic hazards.” (Id.) The statement also notes that, “the clutter created by an excess in number, size and height of signs creates a distraction to travelers and negatively impacts the general appearance of an area.” As a consequence, the governing authority finds that, “signs and advertising should be reasonably regulated in the interest of traffic safety, aesthetics and public welfare by the establishment of standards for the location, size, illumination, number, construction and maintenance of all signs and advertising structures in the city.” (Id. at § 5 — 361(d).) The ordinance defines the terms “commercial message,” “real estate sign,” and “sign,” as follows: Commercial message means any message that promotes a business or attempts to generate good will for a business; any message that advertises a product or service for sale; and any message that proposes a commercial transaction. Any sign containing any commercial message shall be regulated as a commercial sign. Real estate sign means a sign erected by the owner, or the owner’s agent, advertising the real property upon which the sign is located for rent, lease or sale or notifying prospective purchaser or lessors that the property has been sold or leased and identifying the owner’s agent and providing contact information for same and any other information required by law. Sign means any letter, figure, character, mark, plane, point, marquee sign, design, poster, pictorial, picture, stroke, stripe, line, trademark, reading matter or illuminated service, which shall be so constructed, placed, attached, painted, erected, fastened or manufactured in any manner whatsoever, so that the same shall be used for the attraction of the public to any place, subject, information, person, firm, corporation, public performance, article, machine or merchandise whatsoever which is displayed in any manner whatsoever whether outdoors or indoors in such a manner as to be visible from any sidewalk, public street, or right-of-way. (Id. at § 5-362) (emphasis added). Per the terms of the ordinance, “no signage other than house number, original house designation, street identification number, real estate sign, security identification sign, yard sale sign, or sign containing a noncommercial message shall be allowed on any residential property in the city.” (Id. at § 5-380(a).) In residential districts, even these allowed signs may not exceed three feet in height. (Id. at § 5-375(a)(2).) Other than a yard sale sign or real estate sign, signs containing commercial messages are not allowed on residential property. (Id. at § 5-380(a).) In addition, no sign may have a total sign face area larger than four square feet. (Id.) All residential property is limited to a total of twelve square feet of sign face per lot, but only one side of a double-faced or projecting sign counts toward the twelve square feet limit. (Id. at § 5 — 380(a)(2).) The ordinance contains a separate provision indicating: In the event that a court of competent jurisdiction declares that the provision [restricting total square feet of sign face per lot to twelve square feet] as applied to political or campaign signs is unconstitutional or invalid by judgment or decree, it is the intention of the governing authority that said subsection shall be considered severed from this section as applied to political or campaign signs, but [] continue to apply to all other signs. (Id. at § 5-380(a)(3).) In addition, no sign may be erected in a manner which blocks from view any traffic sign, street sign, or signal. (Id. at § 5-375(a)(6).) The ordinance also contains specific guidelines for the use of real estate signs that state: There shall be a limit of one real estate sign per residential lot. It shall be subject to the same size, setback and height provisions governing signs on residential lots. However, a separate sign structure containing literature packets or ancillary information such that (sic.) pertaining to reduced price, under contract or sold status may be placed on a lot, provided that it otherwise meets the size, height and setback provisions for signs on said lot. Real estate signs and ancillary real estate signs shall be removed within 5 days of the sale or lease of the property upon which they are situated. (Sign Ordinance at Section 3, attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [79]) (emphasis added). The same section addressing the use of real estate signs also addresses the use of yard sale signs. The yard sale sign guidelines provide: One yard sale, garage sale, or estate sale sign, subject to the size, height, and setback restrictions provided elsewhere for signs on residential lots, may be displayed on the premises where a yard sale is to be conducted beginning 5 days before the date of the sale. Said signs must be removed when the sale is terminated. The governing authority considers such sales to be a part of the incidental occupation of the residential property and permissible limited commercial activity under this ordinance. (Id. at Section 5) (emphasis added). All signs, whether for noncommercial, real estate, or yard sale purposes must be placed at least ten feet back from the back of the sidewalk or fifteen feet from the edge of the road nearest to the sign where a sidewalk does not exist. (Sign Ordinance at § 5-374(a), attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65].) Similarly, all signs, unless otherwise exempted or placed upon the right of way by governmental authority, are barred from the public right of way. (Sign Ordinance at Section 6, attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [79].) Seasonal displays are not exempted from the ordinance’s prohibition on placing signs on the public right of way; the September 2003 amendments deleted a previous exemption. However, seasonal displays continue to retain significant exemptions under the current version of the ordinance. Specifically, as long as they do not contain commercial messages, “[seasonal displays and decorations located within the city, including but not limited to Halloween, July 4th, Christmas, Hanukkah, Kwanzaa, and Easter,” are exempt from the ordinance’s height and size limitations. (Sign Ordinance at § 5 — 363(f), attach. as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65].) In addition, seasonal displays and decorations are exempt from the ten and fifteen feet setback provisions of the ordinance. (Id.) However, those who wish to display flags must still comply with the guidelines laid out in the special flag section of the ordinance. With regard to the display of flags in residential districts, the ordinance requires that all flags be displayed on “purpose-built, professionally fabricated flagpoles” that do no exceed twenty-five feet in height or the height of the primary structure on the lot, whichever is less. The maximum flag size for pole heights up to twenty-five feet is twenty-four square feet, and, absent a special land use permit or variance, each lot is allowed a maximum of two flagpoles. (Id. at § 5 — 376(a) — (c).) The ordinance also contains proportionality requirements requiring that the hoist side of the flag not exceed 20% of the vertical height of the flagpole. (Id. at § 5-376(b).) This proportionality requirement is modified somewhat for mast arm flagpoles, i.e., staffs extending at an angle from a building. (Id. at § 5-3760')-) For a mast arm flagpole, the hoist side of the attached flag may be 60% of the length of the flagpole. (Id.) The ordinance goes on to specify that, “[fjlags displaying a logo, message, statement or expression relating to commercial interests, and banners not meeting the definition of a flag contained in Section 5-362 must conform to all applicable ordinances pertaining to signs.” (Id. at § 5-376(e).) The ordinance continues by saying that, “[n]othing contained in this section shall be interpreted to prohibit or restrict the right to display eligible flags as banners or noncommercial signage as allowed elsewhere in the Code of Ordinances of the City of Avondale Estates.” (Id. at § 5-376(1).) On officially designated county, state, or federal holidays, flags can be of an unlimited size and number. (Id. at § 5-376(h).) For all signs, in a provision referred to by both parties as the “grandfathering” clause, the ordinance provides, “[s]igns lawfully existing on the effective date of the ordinance, January 26, 1987 ... which do not conform to the provisions of this article shall be deemed to be non-conforming signs and may remain, except as otherwise specifically qualified by this article.” (Id. at § 5-370.) This grandfathering provision has been the center of the parties’ debate over a historical marker and condominium sign currently on display in the City. In addition to its substantive provisions directing the use of signs, the current version of the ordinance contains a severability provision which provides: It is hereby declared to be the intention of the governing authority that the sections, paragraphs, sentences, clauses and phrases of the Sign Ordinance are sever-able, and if any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or section of this ordinance shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid by judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, the unconstitutional or invalid phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph shall be struck and the remaining, phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, and sections shall be effective as if the unconstitutional or invalid portion had not existed. (Id. at § 5-382(a).) The maximum punishment for violating the City’s ordinance is a fíne of $1,000, six months imprisonment, or both. (Id. at § 5-381.) C. The Parties Plaintiffs Katharine Kennedy and Daniel Waggoner are residents and registered voters of the City of Avondale Estates. (Am. Compl. [34] at ¶ 3.) These plaintiffs aver that they “desire to engage in their rights of freedom of speech, enjoyment and use of their property, and to participate in the political process without unlawful interference by defendants.” (Id.) These plaintiffs desire to support political candidates and to advocate their views on issues by displaying signs at their residences. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff Anne Keating is a licensed and practicing real estate agent who has done business in Avondale Estates and who wishes to do so in the future without interference with her right to engage in commercial speech. (Id. at ¶ 3.) She regularly advertises her business and the availability of her clients’ property for purchase by placing signs on the clients’ property. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Defendant, the City of Avondale Estates, is a political subdivision of the State of Georgia. It has the power to sue and be sued in its own name. (Id. at ¶4.) Defendant John Parker is the city manager-police chief of Avondale Estates. (Id. at ¶ 5.) He enforces the sign ordinance by informing residents to remove signs and by directing other officials in their enforcement of the ordinance. (Id.) Defendant Lyda Steadman is the city clerk-treasurer; she directs the code enforcement officer and has the authority to assign other city employees to enforce the sign ordinance. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Defendant Craig A. Mims is the code enforcement officer; he contacts persons to inform them to remove signs and issues summons for sign violations. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Defendants Parker, Steadman, and Mims are sued in their official capacity only. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7.) II. Procedural History The original complaint in this case was filed on July 20, 2000. (Compl. [1].) On June 14, 2002, plaintiffs original complaint was amended to reflect changes resulting from defendants’ adoption of a new sign ordinance on November 26, 2001. (Am. Compl. [34].) On September 26, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment as to this newly enacted ordinance. (Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute [42].) On August 28, 2003, the Court ordered oral arguments on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [42], Defendants’ Motion to Stay Summary Judgment Proceedings [44], Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute [51], and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [55]. (Order [57].) Due to changes in defendants’ ordinance subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [42] and Defendants’ Motion to Stay Summary Judgment Proceedings [44], both motions were denied as moot. On September 15, 2003, the Court heard oral arguments from both parties. At that hearing the Court learned that additional changes in the ordinance were imminent. On September 23, 2003, defendants filed a Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65], indicating that defendants had, in fact, amended the ordinance. Consequently, on that same day, the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute [51] and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [55]. (Order [66].) At the same time, the Court administratively terminated the action without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to re-open the action within forty-five days. (Id. at 6.) The Court indicated that plaintiff could reopen the action by filing a new motion for summary judgment. (Id.) Plaintiff elected to do so, and on November 25, 2003, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to reopen the case. (Order [69].) The case is now before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment [71], Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [74], and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Material Regarding Occurrence Subsequent to Summary Judgment Filings [81]. As noted, since the filing of these motions, the City has again amended the ordinance. DISCUSSION I. Individuals Sued in their Official Capacity Plaintiffs have sued John Parker, Lyda Steadman, and Craig A. Mims in their official capacities only. (Am. Compl. [34] at ¶¶ 5-7.) At the same time, plaintiffs have asserted claims against the City of Avondale Estates directly. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Therefore, before discussing the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, the Court will address the appropriateness of suing these individual defendants in their official capacities. The United States Supreme Court has noted that official capacity suits, “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); see also Owens v. Fulton County, 877 F.2d 947, 951 n. 5 (11th Cir.1989) (“For liability purposes, a suit against a public official in his official capacity is considered a suit against the local government entity he represents.”). “Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials because local government units can be sued directly.” See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir.1991). Here, plaintiffs have essentially named the same defendant multiple times. Accordingly, all claims against defendants John Parker, Lyda Steadman, and Craig A. Mims are DISMISSED and summary judgment is GRANTED as to these defendants. II. Federal Constitutional Standards for Regulating Speech A. Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. I. To evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation challenged on First Amendment grounds as a burden on speech, the Supreme Court utilizes a two-tiered system of review. This two-tiered system begins by asking whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations are those that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech based upon its content. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). Because such restrictions are presumptively invalid, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), content-based speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny. To survive a strict scrutiny review, the State must show that its regulation is, “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board., 502 U.S. 105, 118, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991)(citing Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987)). In contrast, content-neutral regulations are unrelated to the content of the speech and apply to all speech, regardless of the message. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445. These regulations are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. Intermediate scrutiny means that a content-neutral restriction on speech is valid “if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). More simply put, a content-neutral restriction will survive if the government can show a reasonable basis for believing its policy will further a “substantial government interest and that the policy is the least restriction possible which would further that interest.” Artistic Entm’t, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 331 F.3d 1196, 1205 (11th Cir.2003). The Court’s “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration. Id. Indeed, even if a regulation has an incidental effect on some speakers and messages, but not others, the regulation may be deemed neutral if it also serves some purpose unrelated to the content of the expression. Id. In some cases, a regulation may appear on its face to be content-based, but, in fact, be properly classified as content-neutral because the regulation is justified by a content-neutral desire to avoid negative secondary effects of the speech. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724-25, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 11.2, at 908 (2d ed.2002). If a regulation is deemed to be content-neutral, then the Court must inquire whether the regulation is a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. Courts may approve reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions as long as they are, “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech ... they serve a significant governmental interest, and ... they leave open ample alternative channels for communication.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). Using the intermediate standard of review while, at the same time, considering this time, place, or manner restriction analysis, the Eleventh Circuit has created a three-step inquiry for determining the constitutionality of viewpoint neutral regulations. For a viewpoint neutral regulation of speech to be upheld the “government must show: (1) it has the constitutional power to make the regulation (2) an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech is at stake, and (3) the ordinance is narrowly drawn to achieve its desired ends, leaving other channels for the communication of information.” Messer v. City of Douglasville, Georgia, 975 F.2d 1505, 1510 (11th Cir.1992). B. Are All Sign Regulations Necessarily Content-Based? In Granite State Outdoor Adver. Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Fla., 213 F.Supp.2d 1312 (M.D.Fla.2002) (Moody, J.), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir.2003), the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida recognized the “catch-22” confronting cities and municipalities who attempt to regulate signs in their communities. The same “catch-22” was recognized by another district court in this circuit in Lamar Adver. Co. v. City of Douglasville, Georgia, 254 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1327 n. 3 (2003) (Martin, J.). The “catch-22” of sign regulation is a product of the following logic: (1) the government may regulate and prohibit signs to further legitimate governmental interests in part because posted signs can be perceived as an aesthetic harm, see Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981); (2) any ordinance prohibiting signs must provide an exception for “For Sale” real estate signs, because the Supreme Court has said so, Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); (3) sign regulations that require the regulator to read the sign to determine whether the regulation applies are content-based, see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993); (4) content-based sign regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and, by virtue of this high standard, are generally found to be unconstitutional; (5) since the required exemption for “For Sale” signs necessarily requires one to read the words “For Sale,” it becomes virtually impossible to draft a constitutional sign ordinance. Granite State (Clearwater), 213 F.Supp.2d at 1328. Yet, given the breadth of jurisprudence establishing, as substantial governmental goals, traffic safety and the appearance of a city, see Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. 2882, and given the obvious connection between sign regulations and the attainment of these goals, the Supreme Court presumably did not intend that cities and municipalities be unable to draft a constitutional sign ordinance. Nevertheless, several courts have so ruled. See Granite State (Clearwater), 213 F.Supp.2d at 1328 (listing courts that have followed the “catch-22” theory). Contrary to these cases and, at the outset of this analysis, this Court rejects the proposition that a sign regulation, which requires the regulator to read the sign, in order to determine whether or not the regulation applies, is automatically content-based. This conclusion is consistent with several Supreme Court cases that have found laws which on their face drew content-based distinctions to be content-neutral laws, if these laws have a content-neutral purpose or justification. See Erwin Chemerinskt, Constitutional Law § 11.2, at 904-08 (2d ed.2002) (discussing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480,147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988); and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)). Thus, the Court does not embrace the catch-22 logic of some courts. C. Commercial Speech Before engaging in a standard content-neutral vs. content-based analysis, the Court must also determine whether the speech at issue in a case is commercial. At its most basic, commercial speech is that which “propose[s] a commercial transaction,” and it has been entitled to First Amendment protection since 1975. Virginia State Board, of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975). Because commercial speech is entitled to less protection than noncommercial speech, however, the standard for analyzing restrictions on commercial speech is unique. Quite simply, commercial speech is subject to “modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). When confronted with a restriction on commercial speech the Court must ask itself, first, “whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Cory. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). To be entitled to protection, the commercial speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” Id. Next, the Court must determine “whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.” Id. If the speech is protected and the governmental interest is substantial, then the Court “must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Id. The requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be no more extensive than “necessary” does not mean that the government’s regulation must be the “least-restrictive-means” possible. Board of Trs. of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). Instead, there must be a “reasonable fit” between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. See id; see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). The fit does not have to be the “single best disposition” but, rather, “one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.” Id. This requires something more than satisfying a rational-basis level of review. Indeed, “if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.” City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 418 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. 1505. III. Standing In their response to plaintiffs’ fourth motion for summary judgment and brief in support of their own cross-motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the definitions of “commercial message” and “sign” because, “in none of the various declarations filed in this case has any plaintiff or former plaintiff alleged that he or she has been injured by these definitions.” (Defs.’ Resp. at 12-13.) Defendants base their argument on the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir.2003). The overbreadth doctrine permits third-party standing when a statute that is constitutionally applied to a litigant, could potentially be unconstitutionally applied to third parties not before the court. In Granite State (Clearwater), the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff asserting the overbreadth doctrine must still establish that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury. Id. at 1116. The Granite State (Clearwater) panel applied this holding to find that a billboard company had standing to challenge one provision of a sign ordinance and not the other. Granite State (Clearwater) did not change the well-settled law of standing, however. Id. at 1117. For standing to exist, first, there must be an injury in fact that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Second, there must be “a causal connection between the injury and the causal conduct.” Finally, there must be “a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 1116. The “essence of the standing question ... is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)(internal quotations omitted). Here, the definition of “sign” is the very heart of the City’s ordinance. Without this definition, it is impossible to know what falls under the ordinance’s umbrella. Similarly, without the definition of “commercial message,” it is impossible to know what signage is allowed on residential property where, “[n]o signage other than house number, original house designation, street identification number, real estate sign, security identification sign, yard sale sign, or sign containing a noncommercial message shall be allowed on any residential property in the city.” (Sign Ordinance at § 5-380(a), attach, as Ex. A. to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65] Xemphasis added). Plaintiffs Waggoner and Kennedy are residents of the City who wish to participate in the political process in a manner that the current ordinance does not allow. Plaintiff Keating is a real estate agent who has done business in the City and wishes to do so in the future without the burden of the ordinance’s restrictions on the posting of real estate signs. The ordinance in question clearly restricts these parties’ speech. Whether it does so at a constitutionally permissible level, the ordinance has caused the parties to suffer an arguable injury. In addition, should it find the City’s ordinance to be unconstitutional, plaintiffs’ injuries can be adequately redressed by this Court. Finally, plaintiffs live and work under the City’s ordinance, and clearly have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have standing and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [74] as to this issue is DENIED. IV. Challenged Provisions of the Avon-dale Estate’s Ordinance Having set out the constitutional standards applicable to sign regulations which regulate speech and having determined that plaintiffs have standing, the Court now turns to the specific provisions challenged in this case. A. Provisions of the Ordinance Directed at Commercial Speech 1. Real Estate Signs In their April 10, 2003, summary judgment motion challenging ordinance sections, plaintiffs object to the definition of “real estate sign” contained in § 5-362 of the ordinance. Plaintiffs challenge the definition on the ground that it contains multiple content limitations, including a prohibition on the posting of websites for contacting real estate sellers or their agents, that are, “not justified by any constitutional authority possessed by the city.” (Pis.’ Filing at 4; Pis.’ Fourth Motion for Summ. J. [71] at 25 (“Pis.’ Fourth”).) Plaintiffs also challenge the ban on “corporate logo” contained in the definition of “real estate sign” as enforced in a discriminatory manner, undefined so as to violate due process, and contrary to regulations issued by the Georgia Real Estate Commission. (Pis.’ Filing at 4-5; Pis.’ Fourth at 29-32.) Further, plaintiffs challenge § 5-380(a)(l) and its requirement that any literature packets or notices be included in the four square feet area allotted for real estate signs. (Id. at 5.) Lastly, to the extent that information packets count as second signs under the ordinance, plaintiffs challenge the limitation of one real estate sign per lot. (Pis.’ Filing at 6.) As previously noted, subsequent to the filing of plaintiffs’ fourth motion for summary judgment and list of challenged provisions, the City’s ordinance was amended once again. In its latest definition of “real estate sign,” this last round of amendments removes the ban on displaying corporate logos or agency emblems on real estate signs. (Sign Ordinance at Sec. 2, attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [79].) The new definition of “real estate sign” also does not contain the previous version’s ban on the posting of “any other commercial message unrelated to the property itself.” (Id.) Presumably, this is the language that precluded real estate agents from posting their website addresses on real estate signs. The new definition of “real estate sign” goes on to provide that a real estate sign may include, not only contact information for the owner’s agent, but “any other information required by law.” (Id.) This allowance for “any other information required by law” provides ample room for real estate agents to post any information required by the Rules of the Georgia Real Estate Commission, codified as Title 520 of the Georgia Administrative Code, on their signs. The newly amended § 5-380(a)(l) addresses another one of plaintiffs’ objections to the previous version of the ordinance by removing the requirement that any literature packets or notices — i.e., a sign indicating the property had been “Sold” — be included in the prescribed four square feet area allotted for real estate signs. (Id. at Sec. 3.) The amended ordinance now provides for, “a separate sign structure containing literature packets or ancillary information such that (sic.) pertaining to reduced price, under contract or sold status may be placed on a lot, provided that it otherwise meets the size, height and setback provisions for signs on said lot.” (Id. at Sec. 4.) Collectively, the March 23, 2004, amendments address plaintiffs’ previous objections to the ordinance’s treatment of corporate logos, websites, ancillary information such as literature packets and status of sale notices, and, because the amendment does not treat ancillary information as a second sign, the limitation of one real estate sign per lot. The City, itself having addressed plaintiffs’ concerns, the Court has no need to determine whether now-redacted provisions would have been constitutional. Therefore, in connection with real estate signs, the only issue left for the Court to address is plaintiffs’ objection to the four square feet in size and three square feet in height limitations on real estate signs. (Pis.’ Filing at 4.) Real estate signs propose a commercial transaction and are clearly commercial speech. See Linmark, 431 U.S. at 91, 97 S.Ct. 1614. Accordingly, the Court applies the Central Hudson test to determine the constitutionality of this provision of the ordinance. As lawful, non-misleading advertising material, real estate signs are protected by the First Amendment. This is the threshold inquiry under Central Hudson. Having established the protected status of real estate signs, the Court must determine whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. Here, among other things, the City’s asserted interests in regulating real estate signs are public safety, traffic safety, aesthetic harmony, compatibility of signs with surrounding land uses, orderly and reasonable displays of advertising for the benefit of all its citizens, and maintenance of tranquil residential areas. (See Sign Ordinance at § 5-361 (a), attach, as Ex. A. to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65].) It is well settled law that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to maintain traffic safety and advance its aesthetic interests. Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. at 805, ■104 S.Ct. 2118. The Court finds that the City’s interest is substantial. Since the speech at issue is protected and the governmental interest asserted is substantial, the Court must determine whether the ordinance restricting real estate signs to four square feet in area and three square feet in height, “directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether' it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343. In doing so, the Court looks only for a “reasonable fit” between the City’s stated purpose and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. Board of Trs. of the State Univ. of New York, 492 U.S. at 480, 109. S.Ct. 3028. Without question, the provision limiting real estate signs to four square feet in size and three square feet in height promote the City’s aesthetic interests. The provision creates some continuity between the signs posted by owners and various real estate agencies, and prevents the erection of gigantic signs on some lots versus numerous smaller real estate signs on another residential lot. The City allows a uniform size, four-foot square, three-foot high sign that can contain multiple names and telephone numbers, and even a description of the property. The City adds to that an allowance for a separate sign structure containing literature packets or information pertaining to reduced price, under contract, or sold status. The City has provided ample means for potential buyers/sellers and landlords/renters to learn about the availability of residential property located in the City. Indeed, the Court finds no real barrier to the exchange of information about the sale or rental of residential property in the City. Here, there is a “reasonable fit” between the City’s stated purpose and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, and our inquiry need go no further. Thus, the Court concludes that the ordinance’s size and height restrictions on real estate signs are constitutional. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment [73] is DENIED and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [74] is GRANTED as to the size and height restriction on real estate signs. At the same time, the Court finds no constitutional error in the ordinance’s definition of “real estate sign” and Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment [73] is DENIED and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [74] is GRANTED as to this issue. 2. Yard Sale Signs In connection with yard sale signs, plaintiffs object to the provision allowing only one sign that is two square feet in size. This limitation was contained in the pre-March 23, 2004, version of § 5-380(a)(4). (Pis.’ Filing at 6.) Plaintiffs further object to the ordinance’s restriction of the one yard sale sign to, “the premises where the yard sale is being held on the day of the sale only.” (See id.) The March 2004 amendments removed the two square feet limit on yard sale, garage sale, and estate sale signs. (Sign Ordinance at Sec. 5, attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [79].) The new yard sale provision now provides that these signs are subject to the same size, height, and setback restrictions provided for all other residential signs (four square feet in size, three feet in height, ten or fifteen feet setback). (Id.) The new provision also allows for the display of a yard sale sign on the premises where a yard sale is to be conducted beginning five days before the date of the sale. (Id.) The City, itself having addressed the plaintiffs’ concerns over the restriction concerning the size and timing of a yard sale sign, the Court need only consider the constitutionality of restricting yard sale postings to a single sign on the premises of the sale. Like real estate signs, but on a smaller scale, yard sale signs solicit a commercial transaction and are commercial speech. Therefore, the Court applies the Central Hudson test to determine the constitutionality of the yard sale provision of the ordinance. First, as lawful, non-misleading advertising material, yard sale signs are protected by the First Amendment. Second, as was the case for real estate signs, the City’s stated purpose in regulating yard sale signs includes maintenance of public safety, traffic safety, and aesthetic harmony. (See Sign Ordinance at § 5-361(a), attach, as Ex. A. to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65].) Third, the state may legitimately exercise its police power to maintain safety and advance its aesthetic interests, and the City’s interest in doing so is substantial. See Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles, 466 U.S. at 805, 104 S.Ct. 2118. Because the speech at issue is protected and the governmental interest asserted is substantial, the Court must determine whether the ordinance restricting yard sale signs to a single sign posted on the premises where the sale will occur, “directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343. Once again, the Court looks only for a “reasonable fit” between the City’s stated purpose and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. Board of Trs. of the State Univ. of New York, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028. As was the case for real estate signs, the one yard sale sign limit promotes the City’s aesthetic interests. The provision prevents those conducting a yard sale from erecting numerous yard sale signs on their residential lot. The provision also keeps those conducting a yard sale from blanketing the streets with directional signs to a yard sale that may, in addition to being unsightly, distract and confuse traffic. For five days before the date of a yard sale, the residential lot where the sale will be held may display a sign advertising the sale for all the world to see. If those holding yard sales feel that one yard sale sign posted for five days does not adequately promote their event, they are free to advertise by other means. To maintain the aesthetics of a community, a city, “must be given discretion in determining both the best method of achieving that goal and the degree of protection necessary.” Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053 (11th Cir.l987)(internal citation omitted). Granting the City its due discretion, the Court finds there is a “reasonable fit” between the City’s stated goal of preserving traffic safety and aesthetic harmony and its regulation of yard sale signs. The ordinance’s number and location restriction on yard sale signs is constitutional. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment [73] is DENIED and Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [74] is GRANTED as to the number and location restrictions on yard sale signs. Having determined the constitutionality of those provisions of the ordinance directed at commercial speech, the Court now turns its attention to plaintiffs’ challenges to provisions of the ordinance that are directed at noncommercial speech. B. Provisions of the Ordinance Directed at Noncommercial Speech 1. General Size, Height, Number, and Setback Restrictions Are Content-Neutral The City’s ordinance currently provides, “[f]or all property located in a residential district, there shall be a total maximum of twelve square feet of sign face per lot. For projecting or double-faced signs each display face shall not be added together in computing the area of the sign face for that sign.” (Sign Ordinance at § 5-380(a)(2), attach, as Ex. A to Notice of Amendment to Sign Ordinance [65].) The ordinance restricts all signs allowed in residential zoning districts to a total sign face area no greater than four square feet. (Id. at § 5-380(a).) The maximum height for any residential sign is three feet, measured from the ground level to the top of the sign. (Id. at § 5-375(a)(2).) The ordinance goes on to state, “[n]o sign shall be constructed, erected, used, operated or maintained ... in any residential district, within 10 feet from the back of the sidewalk or within 15 from the edge of the road nearest to the sign where a sidewalk does not exist.” (Id. at § 5-374(a).) Taken together, these provisions mean that individuals who choose to make their signs the maximum four square feet in size are entitled to three such signs on their lot. If they choose to post smaller signs, residents may have more than three signs per yard. Information can be posted on both sides of these three signs, but no sign can be higher than three feet. Depending on whether there is a sidewalk, all signs would need to be set back either ten or fifteen feet. (Id.) These restrictions concerning the size and number of signs are content-neutral. That is, the size and number restrictions on signs do not vary depending on what words are written on them. A resident who wishes to express the view, “War is not the answer,” can erect the same number and the same size signs as a resident whose signs caution the reader to “Repent or burn in hell.” All residents can erect signs, regardless of the message communicated by these signs, as long as the signs are not higher than three feet, as long as the total square feet of the signs, collectively, do not exceed 12 square feet, and as long as no