Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge. Plaintiffs Dwayne Richard Johnson (“Johnson”), Damian A. Graham (“Graham”), Charles Henry Covington (“Coving-ton”), Phenix Crumpton (“Crumpton”), and Daniel A. Antonelli (“Antonelli”) bring these related civil rights actions alleging that former Whitemarsh Township Police Sergeant Guy A. Anhorn (“Anhorn”), Whi-temarsh Township Police Lieutenant Jesse Stemple (“Stemple”), Whitemarsh Township (“the Township”), the Whitemarsh Township Police Department (“the Police Department”), and Michael A. Zeock, William P. Rimel III, Peter B. Cornog, Anne Younglove, Ronald J. Derosa, and Lawrence Gregan (collectively, “the individual Township officials”) violated their constitutional and state law rights. The plaintiffs are all African American residents of Pennsylvania. Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, plaintiffs Graham, Covington, Crumpton, and Antonelli allege that An-horn stopped them (in three separate incidents) without reasonable suspicion and on the basis of race, in violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause, and state law. Plaintiff Johnson alleges that Anhorn undertook racially motivated official conduct against him, in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law. The plaintiffs further allege that Stemple and Anhorn conspired to violate their civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and state law. In addition, they allege that Stemple, Whitemarsh Township, and the Whitemarsh Township Police Department are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acquiescing in, promoting, or condoning An-horn’s alleged conduct. The plaintiffs also seek recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against the individual Whitemarsh Township officials, Stemple, and the Township for allegedly neglecting to prevent Stemple and Anhorn’s conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs’ civil rights. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all counts and all plaintiffs. Anhorn and the individual Township officials move for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to all claims by all plaintiffs. For the reasons that follow, I will grant in part and deny in part summary judgment to Anhorn, without prejudice to raise certain claims in a motion in limine before trial. I will deny summary judgment to the individual Township officials without prejudice to raise in a motion in limine before trial. I will deny summary judgment to Stemple, the Township, and the Township Police Department, without prejudice to raise certain claims in a motion in limine before trial. Qualified immunity is denied to Anhorn and to the individual Township officials due to outstanding issues of material fact. I. FACTS The allegations in this case arise primarily from four separate encounters in 2001 and 2002 between the plaintiffs and then-Sergeant Guy Anhorn (“Anhorn”). Because Anhorn’s history with the Whitem-arsh Township Police Department (“the Police Department”) and Whitemarsh Township (“the Township”) is relevant to the claims of all plaintiffs, I will begin with these facts. Then I will discuss each plaintiffs encounter with Anhorn, presenting the version of events most favorable to the plaintiff, as supported by evidence in the record. During all relevant times, Anhorn was one of five sergeants in the approximately thirty-five-member Whitemarsh Township Police Department. (Johnson Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Hale Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B at RMA-00005.) As sergeant, Anhorn was the immediate supervisor of a platoon of officers. (Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 14.) Defendant Jesse Stemple (“Stemple”) was the only lieutenant in the Police Department during the time in question and was Anhorn’s immediate supervisor. (Johnson Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Hale Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. B at RMA-00005.) As lieutenant, Stemple was second in command and oversaw the day-to-day operations of the Department. (Hale Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. B at RMA-00003.) Stem-ple’s duties also included taking charge of the Department in the Chief of Police’s absence, such as the interim period between Chief Richard Zolko’s death in July 2002 and the Township’s appointment of a new Chief in 2003. (Id. at RMA-00003, 00010.) Whitemarsh Township’s governing body is its Board of Supervisors (“the Township Board”). During the relevant time period, the Township Board included defendants Michael A. Zeock, William P. Rimel III, Peter B. Cornog, Anne Younglove, and Ronald J. Derosa, and defendant Lawrence Gregan held the position of Township Manager. (See Johnson Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-20.) The Chief of Police is appointed by the Township Board and is accountable to the Township-Manager for the performance of the Police Department. (See Hale Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. B at RMA-00010.) At some point during the 1990s, police officers in the Department became concerned about Anhorn’s policing practices. Officers were concerned that Anhorn regularly conducted searches and seizures without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, exhibited racial bias against African Americans, engaged in racial profiling, and falsified Investigative Reports and Affidavits of Probable Cause. (See generally Hale Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. B; Keystone Rep., Pls.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. H.) Some of these concerns were communicated to the Township Board. In about 1995, then-Officer Donald Bowers (“Bowers”) wrote a memorandum to then-Chief Zolko, explaining that Anhorn regularly engaged in illegal search and seizure practices. (See Dolan Dep., Township’s Ex. K at 24-25.) In about 1999, retired Officer Paul Davis told Township Supervisor Anne Younglove (“Younglove”) about Anhorn’s practices and recommended that the Township Board take action. (Id. at 61.) Township Supervisor Michael Zeock (“Zeock”) was a Township Police Officer prior to joining the Township Board in 2001 and had personal knowledge of An-hom’s practices. (See id. at 159-60; Keenan Dep., Pis.’ Resp. to Township’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. K at 137.) After joining the Board in 2001, Zeock notified the Board about the officers’ concerns about Anhorn. (See Dolan Dep., Township’s Ex. K at 159.) Some of these concerns were also communicated to then-Chief Zolko and-Stem-pie. During the mid-1990s, former Officer Scott McElree (“McElree”) spoke with Zolko about the “department chatter” about “concerns about Anhorn with searches and -seizures ... that certainly it will cause a concern sometime to the department in the future ...” (McElree Dep., Township’s Ex. N at 17-21.) McEl-ree also spoke with Stemple around the same, time and told him “[bjasically the same things that I, said to Zolko .... that there were concerns ... and ... officers would talk a lot in the locker, roll call ... about [Anhorn’s] search and seizure issues on the street.” .(Id. at 24-25.) Nonetheless, at least some Township police officers perceived that Anhorn was under Chief Zolko’s and Stemple’s protection, and that due to their friendship, Zolko and Stemple were unlikely to take any disciplinary action -against Anhorn in response to complaints. (See id. at 59; Keenan Dep., Pis.’ Resp. to Township Ex. K at 108.) After Zolko’s death in 2002, the Township Board commissioned Charles D. Hale (“Hale”) of Resource Management Associates, Tinley Park, IL, to conduct a performance assessment of the Police Department. (See Hale Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. B at RMA-00003.) From December 2 until December 12, 2002, Hale interviewed members of the Department, personally observed officers in the field, reviewed internal documents, and conducted a confidential attitude survey of the members of the department. (Id.) On December 23, 2002, Hale submitted his findings, (“the Hale Report”) to the Township Board. (Id.) The Hale Report noted several officers’ allegations of misconduct by Anhorn, including allegations of racial profiling and deliberate falsification of reports, as well as the existence of an “inner circle” and a “double standard” within the Police Department. (Id. at RMA-00014-15.) Although Hale “discovered no indication of brutality, corrupt behavior, improper practices, racial bias, sexual harassment or mistreatment of citizens,” Hale recommended that the officers’ allegations be brought to the attention of the Township Board and that the next Chief of Police initiate an immediate investigation. (Id. at RMA-00007,15.) After reviewing the Hale Report, the Township Board commissioned David J. MacMain (“MacMain”), an attorney from a Philadelphia law firm, to investigate the allegations about Anhorn’s misconduct. (See Stemple’s Reply at 13; MacMain Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. M at DJM-00001.) MacMain reviewed the Hale Report, reviewed Anhorn’s personnel file, and interviewed the thirty officer-ranked members in the department and Anhorn himself. (MacMain Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. M at DJM-00002-8.) On March 7, 2003, MacMain submitted his report to the Township Board. (Id. at DJM-00001.) MacMain did not find that Anhorn had engaged in racial profiling or discrimination, or in falsifying reports. (Id. at DJM-00009.) On March 10, 2003, twenty-four of the thirty Township police officers sent a letter to the Township Board requesting an immediate meeting with the Board to challenge Hale’s and particularly MacMain’s findings. (See Mar. 10, 2003 Letter, Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. D.) The letter stated: The results of the [MacMain] investigation were inaccurate and did not reflect the information provided by the police officers and staff. Officers believe that attempts were made by an administrative police officer [ie., Stemple] and supervisory police officer [ie., Anhorn] to intimidate, manipulate, coerce, obstruct and harass officers prior to, during, and following their participation in the investigation. Several officers sought protection from the township manager [Gre-gan] but received none. (Id.) In a follow-up letter on March 19, 2003, the officers stated that “actions, and inaction, by the township manager have acerbated [sic ] the problems and contributed to our lack of confidence in the recent investigations and in the administration of the Township.” (See Mar. 19, 2003 Letter, Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. E.) In April 2003, a group of the officers who signed the March 10,' 2003 letter gave a Power Point presentation to the Township Board detailing their- complaints. (See Keystone Rep. at KIN-00004-5, Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. H; see generally Power Point • Presentation, Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. F.) Several police officers gave statements describing Anhorn’s illegal policing practices, such as racial profiling, illegal searches and seizures, and falsification of police reports, as well as Anhorn’s efforts to intimidate officers who cooperated in MacMain’s investigation. Officers alleged that Stem-ple had attempted, to cover up complaints about. Anhorn’s misconduct and generally allowed Anhorn to operate with impunity. In addition, officers alleged that Township Manager, Gregan and the Board had been notified about Anhorn’s efforts to intimidate officers cooperating with the Mac-Main investigation, but Gregan and the Board took no action. (Id. at Power Point-00020, 23.) In response to the officers’ Power Point presentation, the Township Board commissioned the Keystone Intelligence Network (“Keystone”) to investigate the officers’ allegations. Anhorn was placed on administrative leave during the investigation. (See Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 170.) The primary purpose of the investigation was to “obtain all relevant information regarding accusations of alleged racial profiling and various other allegations of official misconduct on the part of Sergeant Guy Anhorn, Lieutenant Jesse Stemple and other Township police officers.” (Keystone Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. H at KIN-00004.) On June 27, 2003, Keystone submitted its report to the Board (“the Keystone Report”). (Id. at KIN-00001.) The Keystone Report noted, inter alia, that: • Sixteen officers stated that they have heard Anhorn make “racially inappropriate remarks,” such as referring to African Americans as “critters,” “crits,” “crumbs,” “porch monkeys,” and stating that “anytime you have blacks and whites together they are up to no good” (id. at KIN-00008-15); • Eight officers stated that they have observed Anhorn engage in racial profiling (id. at KIN-00016-22); • Officers made seventeen separate allegations of improper searches and seizures conducted by Anhorn (id. at KIN-00022-51); and • Five officers made four separate allegations of efforts by Anhorn to intimidate officers acting as internal investigation witnesses (id. at KIN-00056-58). The Keystone Report also contained allegations by two officers that Stemple had attempted to influence a witness in the MacMain investigation (id. at KIN-00059-61), as well as statements by five officers that Stemple had ignored misconduct by Anhorn (id. at KIN-00062-66). Furthermore, the Keystone Report noted statements by officers that they were aware that Sergeant An-horn was a very good friend of Lieutenant Jessie [sic] Stemple and the late Chief Zolko and that any report made against Sergeant Anhorn would result in no action being taken against Sergeant Anhorn. The officers also indicated that they felt that retaliation might result against them which could effectively end their law enforcement careers. (Id. at KIN-00067.) Anhorn retired with full benefits in July 2003. (Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 169-70.) Stemple is currently a Township lieutenant. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Damian A. Graham At approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 4, 2001, plaintiff Damian A. Graham, who is African American, was the front seat passenger in a Toyota Land Cruiser being driven by a friend. (Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn at 5; Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 31.) They picked up Graham’s 'girlfriend from a house on Center Avenue in Whitemarsh Township. (Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 30-32.) Adjacent to the house, separated by a gate and a fence, was a gas station, which was closed for business. '{Id. at 32, 65.) Shortly after leaving the driveway and turning onto Germantown Pike, they were stopped by Anhorn. {Id. at 33.) Anhorn allegedly stopped the car in response to a radio call by Officer Charles Swan about a Toyota Land Cruiser leaving a private drive near the Texaco Service Station. (Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 209-12.) Swan did not communicate that the vehicle had committed any motor vehicle violations. {Id. at 209.) No previous radio calls had reported any crimes in progress in the particular area. {Id. at 211.) Either prior to or shortly after the stopi, Anhorn submitted a radio call stating that the driver of the car was a black male. (Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 2Í3.) Anhorn approached the driver’s side and asked the driver what he was doing there. {Id. at 215.) The driver answered that he was giving his friend a ride to pick up his girlfriend-. (Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 37; Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 215-16.) - Anhorn -looked over at Graham in the passenger seat and believed he recognized Graham from prior encounters. {Id. at 214, 218, 219.) Anhorn said that he knew who Graham was and asked him, and Graham responded that he was Damian Graham. {Id. at 218.) Anhorn ordered Graham out of the car and searched him twice. During the first search, Anhorn had Graham spread his arms and legs and patted down his outer clothing, but did not find any weapons or contraband. (Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 39.) Then, after Anhorn questioned the driver and ran the driver’s license without encountering any problems, An-horn came back to Graham and told him he wanted to search him again because he knew -Graham was a prior burglar and he had a “history” with Graham. {Id. at 40.) During the second search, Anhorn reached into the pockets of -Graham’s jeans and jean jacket, eventually finding less than 3 grams of cocaine and a hotel key in the small coin pocket above the right front pocket of Graham’s jeans and over two hundred dollars in the left breast pocket of his jean jacket. {Id. at 28, 41-47.) After finding the drugs, Anhorn arrested Graham on ' drug charges. (Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 49-50.) Anhorn prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause dated the same night. {See Aff. of Probable Cause of Nov. 4, 2001, Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G.) It includes assertions that, according to Graham’s deposition testimony, are false, including that Anhorn patted Graham down “for [the officers’] safety” and found “a long flat pointed object ... [a] suspected weapon” and that Anhorn recovered over 3 grams of cocaine. (See Graham Dep., An-horn’s Ex. 7 at 64-66.) In subsequent proceedings, Graham filed a motion to suppress the items discovered by Anhorn that night. (Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn at 7.) A Montgomery County court of common pleas judge granted the motion, finding that the police had lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car in which Graham was a passenger. (Id.; see also Tr. in Commonwealth v. Graham, Pls.’ Resp. to Anhorn, Ex. I.) Facts Relating to Plaintiff Charles Henry Covington On December 29, 2002, plaintiff Charles Henry Covington, who is African American, lived at home with his parents. (See Covington Dep., Township’s Ex. B at 32-33.) At approximately 4 a.m. that night, Covington left to pick up some friends. (Id. at 46.) Covington had not had any alcohol or marijuana that night. (Id. at 41.) Covington had picked up his friends and was driving lawfully on Ridge Pike when he passed Anhorn in his parked car. (Id. at 46-47; Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 181.) Anhorn followed Coving-ton’s car and pulled Covington over shortly thereafter. (Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 181-82.) Upon Anhorn’s request, Covington was able to produce the car’s registration, but not his driver’s license. (Covington Dep., Township’s Ex. B at 52.) Anhorn then ordered Covington out of the car and had him stand by the trunk. (Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 187.) At this point, Covington’s jacket was lying on the seat. (Covington Dep., Township’s Ex. B at 54.) Anhorn opened the car door, took Coving-ton’s jacket (which was lying on the seat), and threw it on the trunk. (Covington Dep., Township’s Ex. B at 54, 84.) Anhorn searched through the pockets of Coving-ton’s jacket, eventually finding a clear plastic bag of marijuana. (Covington Dep., Township’s Ex. B at 83-84, 90.) Anhorn prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause relating to the incident. (See Aff. of Probable Cause of Jan. 13, 2003, Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn Ex. T.) It contains statements that, according to Covington’s deposition testimony, are false, including allegations that Covington’s seat was reclined “almost horizontal and he was lying back so that he his head was about resting on the rear seat,” that as Anhorn approached the car he observed the right rear passenger attempting to hide Coving-ton’s jacket, that Covington “appeared glass-eyed as if here were ‘high’,” that Anhorn subjected Covington to a sobriety test, and that Anhorn saw a “large clear plastic bag with marijuana sticking out of the [jacket] pocket.” (See Covington Dep., Township’s Ex. B at 62-64 and 80-84; Dolan Dep., Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn Ex. U at 18-19.) Facts Relating to Plaintiffs Daniel A. Antonelli and Phenix Crumpton At approximately 12:30 a.m. on October 7, 2002, plaintiff Daniel A. Antonelli, who is African American, was driving his car lawfully when he was stopped by Anhorn on Ridge Pike. (Johnson Am. Compl. ¶ 25; Antonelli Dep., Township’s Ex. H at 39-40; Crumpton Dep., Township’s Ex. I at 40-41.) Plaintiff Phenix Crumpton, who is African American, was one of the backseat passengers. (Id.) Anhorn approached the car and ordered Crumpton to get out of the car. (Crumpton Dep., Township’s Ex. I at 49-50.) Crumpton responded by handing over to Anhorn a marijuana “blunt” he had hidden in his sock and two jars of marijuana he was carrying on his person. (Id. at.50-51.) Officers Howard Laskey (“Laskey”) and Craig Cubbins (“Cubbins”) reported to the scene and, at Anhorn’s direction, searched the car. (Laskey Dep., Pis.’ Resp. to An-horn Ex. 0 at 104—5; Cubbins Dep., Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn Ex. P at 18-19.) By reaching up into the area under the driver’s seat, they discovered "a brown bag wedged there that contained jars of marijuana. (Id.) According to Laskey and Cubbins, this bag was not in plain view. (Id.) Anhorn prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause relating to the incident. (See Aff. of Probable Cause of Oct. 7, 2002, Anhorn’s Ex. 6.) It contains several allegations that, according to Antonelli’s and Crumpton’s deposition testimony, are false, including that Anhorn observed An-tonelli’s car go through a red light, that “there was a strong smell of burning drugs in the car,” and that “bottles of marijuana with red and blue caps visible” were found under Antonelli’s seat. (See Antonelli Dep., Township’s Ex. H at 37-40, 98, 100; Crumpton Dep., Township’s Ex. I at 40-41, 87-90,117.) That night, Antonelli and Crumpton were arrested and charged with drug possession, criminal conspiracy, corruption of minors, and committing a traffic violation. (See Investigative Report., Anhorn’s Ex. 5.) All the charges arising from the incident were either' dropped or reversed. (See Antonelli Dep., Township’s Ex. H at 105-6; Crumpton Dep., Township’s Ex. I at 96-97.) Facts Relating to Plaintiff Dwayne Richard Johnson At approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 20, 2002, plaintiff Dwayne Richard Johnson, who is African American, was filling his car with gas at an Amoco Service Station in Whitemarsh Township. (Johnson Am. CompL ¶ 34.) The driver’s side door was open approximately a foot and his radio was playing music. (Johnson Dep., Township’s Ex. L at 50.) While Johnson was pumping gas, a station attendant, a gray-haired Caucasian man, came out of the station and screamed at Johnson to turn his music down, then went back into the station. (Id. at 50-51.) Johnson entered the station after the attendant and found the attendant standing behind the counter. (Id. at 52-53.) Johnson said to the attendant, “I’m a paying customer ... How dare you disrespect me like this. I own two McDonald’s restaurants and I don’t talk to any of my customers like that.” (Id. at 52.) The attendant began to make negative comments about Johnson’s music, to which Johnson replied that he was a paying customer and that he had the right to listen to whatever type of music he wanted. (Id. at 53.) The attendant told him to “get the hell out of here, you nigger.” (Id. at 53.) A Caucasian woman standing behind the counter next to the attendant said to Johnson, “[G]et out of here before I shoot you.” (Id.) The attendant told the woman to “go get my gun.” (Id.) When Johnson began to leave the station, the attendant came out from behind the counter and proceeded to walk over to a white car. (Id. at 54.) Fearing that the attendant was carrying out his threat, Johnson went quickly to his car and drove to the Whitemarsh police station, where he reported the incident to the police. (Id. at 54, 68.) Approximately three days later, Anhorn called Johnson at home. (Johnson Dep., Township’s Ex. L at 60.) Anhorn identified himself as Sergeant Anhorn from the Whitemarsh Police and told Johnson that he had spoken to the gas station attendant and heard what Johnson had said to the man. (Id. at 60.) Anhorn told Johnson that he was “in violation” and that he could never go to that gas station again, and that if Johnson were “caught on those premises or anywhere near there ... [he] would be arrested for terroristic threats and criminal trespass” and other charges. (Id. at 61.) Johnson said to Anhorn, “[S]o you’re banning me from going back to the gas station based on what they said. This is the first time you talked to me. You called me and you’re telling me that I can’t ever go there.” (Id. at 64.) Anhorn said, “[T]hat’s absolutely right.” (Id.) Approximately four to seven days later, Anhorn called Johnson at home again. (Id. at 66.) According to Johnson, Anhorn said, “Mr. Johnson, this is Sergeant An-horn ... [D]idn’t I tell you to stay away from the Amoco[?] ... [Y]ou were at the Amoco today.” (Id.) Johnson denied it. (Id.) Anhorn said, “[Y]es, you were ... I have information that says you were there; a black Navigator was at the Amoco.” (Id.) Johnson asked what the license plate of the car was, and Anhorn stated that he did not know. (Id.) Johnson never heard from Anhorn again. (Id.) II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment should be granted “if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir.1997). A factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must make make a showing “sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. DISCUSSION Against Anhorn, the plaintiffs bring Count I under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments), Count II under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (alleging violations of equal rights under the law), Count III under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (alleging that Anhorn conspired to violate their civil rights), Count XV under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and state law claims under Counts V-X. Anhorn moves for summary judgment as to .all counts and all plaintiffs on the basis of qualified immunity. Against Stemple, the plaintiffs bring Count III under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (alleging that Stemple conspired to violate their civil rights), Count V (alleging state law conspiracy), Count XI under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleging supervisory liability for Anhorn’s violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments), Count XII under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (alleging violations of .equal rights under the law), Count XIII under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (alleging violations by Stem-pie as Police Department policymaker), Count XIV under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (alleging neglect to prevent conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), and Count XV under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Stemple moves for summary judgment as to all counts and all plaintiffs. ■ . . Against the named Township officials, the plaintiffs bring Count XIV under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 and Count XV under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Township officials move for summary judgment as to both counts and all plaintiffs on the basis of qualified immunity. Against the Township and the Township Police Department, the plaintiffs bring Count IV under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Count XIV under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. The Township and the Township Police Department move for summary judgment as to both counts and all plaintiffs. A. Anhorn’s Motion for Summary Judgment Anhorn moves for summary judgment against all plaintiffs and all claims, arguing that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and qualified immunity from all of the plaintiffs’ claims. I will consider his motion as it relates to each plaintiff in turn. 1. Plaintiff Graham’s Claims To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a state actor engaged in conduct that deprived him or her of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir.2000). Graham claims that on November 4, 2001, Anhorn stopped him and searched him without reasonable suspicion ■ in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham additionally claims that Anhorn later knowingly or recklessly submitted false statements in an Affidavit of Probable Cause relating to the incident, in further violation of the Fourth Amendment. Anhorn moves for summary judgment and qualified immunity as to each of Graham’s claims. Due to genuine issues of material fact, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment or qualified immunity at this stage. a. The Initial Stop of Graham The Fourth Amendment requires that in order to conduct an investigatory stop, a police officer must have at least articulable and reasonable suspicion based on his experience and observations that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In the instant case, Graham has put forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Anhorn stopped the car in which Graham was riding without articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Anhorn does not dispute that when he observed the car, it was being driven normally and lawfully. However, Anhorn found it significant that the car had left a driveway behind a closed gas station at 3:30 a.m. Taking the facts as attested by Graham, although the driveway was adjacent to a closed gas station, it is visibly separated from the station by both a metal gate and a wooden fence. Further, according to Graham, after being stopped, the passengers behaved normally and the driver gave a reasonable, truthful explanation for their presence.’ (See Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 65.) Thus, under. Graham’s account of events, the only potentially suspicious facts relating to the cai' were the late hour and the car’s proximity, without access, to a closed business. These two facts alone are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere proximity without access to a closed business is not reasonably suggestive of criminal activity. A late hour, without additional indicia of criminal activity, is insufficient by itself to create reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop. Cf. U.S. v. Johnson, 238 F.Supp.2d 663 (D.Del.2002) (police had reasonable suspicion justifying Terry stop of occupant of lawfully parked car, where officers observed at relatively late hour of weekday evening a crowd of people congregating around two parked cars in area known for high drug activity, two men fled scene as officers approached, and after officers ordered everyone in and around cars to show their hands, occupant looked surprised and concealed his hands). The mere observation that a ear is leaving a private driveway that is adjacent to, but has no access to, a closed gas station is insufficient as a matter of law to provide articulable, reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car are engaging in criminal activity. Anhorn does not rest his justification for the stop bn his own independent reasonable suspicion. Primarily, he defends his actions based on his reliance upon a radio call allegedly placed by Officer Swan for another officer to check out a particular vehicle. (See Anhorn’s Memo, of Law at 28-29: “Unquestionably, Sgt. Anhorn is entitled to rely upon Swan’s request.”) For a stop initiated on the basis of a radio call to be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the calling officer him or herself must have had articulable, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). Thus, even if Anhorn were relying on the radio call, as he alleges, Swan’s call must itself be based upon artic-ulable, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. But there is no evidence in the record about what Swan saw and why he believed his observations gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As a result, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether Swan’s radio call was based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and thus justified Anhorn’s Terry stop. Because Graham has alleged and supported sufficient facts for a jury to reasonably conclude that Anhorn’s stop of the vehicle was unreasonable under the circumstances, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment as to Graham’s Fourth Amendment claims arising from the stop. b. The Search of Graham If the initial stop were unlawful, everything that flowed from the stop (including the subsequent search of Graham) would also be unlawful under Terry. Even assuming arguendo that Anhorn’s initial stop were lawful, Graham could nonetheless survive summary judgment as to the search if a reasonable jury could find that Anhorn’s subsequent pat-down of Graham exceeded what was reasonable under the circumstances. Graham has presented sufficient evidence to establish this Fourth Amendment violation. The police may seize contraband discovered through a pat-down if the contraband either reasonably feels like a weapon or, alternatively, is immediately apparent as recognizable contraband through “plain feel,” and the search stays within the bounds marked by Terry. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). Anhorn does not dispute that after an exterior pat-down of Graham’s clothing, Anhorn reached into the pocket of Graham’s jeans in order to discover the illegal drugs, which amounted to less than three grams of cocaine. According to Graham, the drugs were located in the small coin pocket above the, front right .ppcket of his jeans. .(See Graham Dep. at 28, 41-47.) If Graham’s testimony is believed, a reasonable jury could infer that the drugs were not of a size or shape to be perceived as a weapon, contrary to Anhorn’s allegation. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (bulge in jacket of driver, who had been lawfully ordered out of automobile following traffic stop, permitted officer’s conclusion that defendant was armed and justified pat-down search of defendant whereby weapon was discovered). . Thus, taking the facts in Graham’s favor, Anhorn’s search into the coin pocket of Graham’s jeans exceeded the scope justified by his suspicions, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, even if his initial stop were assumed to be lawful, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment as to the lawfulness of his search of Graham’s person. c. Equal Protection Violation as to Graham Anhorn also seeks summary judgment on Graham’s claim that Anhorn impermissibly stopped and searched him on the basis of race. Selective enforcement of the law on the basis of race violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). In Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998), the Supreme Court held that in order to overcome summary judgment on a § 1983 claim where intent is an element of the claim, the plaintiff must “identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of proving the pertinent motive.” Id. at 600, 118 S.Ct. 1584. Although' the Court shared the D.C. Circuit’s concern that “an official’s state of mind is ‘easy to allege and hard to disprove,’ ” the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s requirement of “clear aiid convincing” évidence of discriminatory intent as overly stringent and inhibiting of legitimate claims. Id. at 584-5, 118 S.Ct. 1584. Graham offers overwhelming affirmative evidence, including testimony from other police officers, that Anhorn exhibited racial bias towards African Americans in performing his duties as a police officer in Whitemarsh Township and that he regularly engaged in racial profiling. (See, e.g., Power Point Presentation, Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Éx. F at Power Point-00002, 5, 12, 13; Keystone Rep., Pis.’ Resp. to Stemple Ex. H at KIN-00008-15, 16-22.) Graham is African American. When taken together and considered in the light most favorable to Graham, this evidence would allow a reasonable jury to infer that Anhorn’s stop and search of Graham was impermissibly motivated by racial bias or discriminatory motive. Thus, because Graham has satisfied his burden to produce affirmative evidence of impermissible intent, Anhorn’s motion for summary judgment must be denied as to Graham’s Equal Protection claims. d. False Statements on Graham’s Affidavit of Probable Cause Finally, Graham alleges that Anhorn knowingly or recklessly made false statements in the Affidavit of Probable Cause relating to his arrest. It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an individual to be arrested on the basis of an Affidavit of Probable Cause that contains statements that were made knowingly falsely or with reckless disregard for the truth, where those statements are material or necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). An assertion is made with reckless disregard when “viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir.2000). Here, Graham alleges that An-horn knowingly or recklessly made false statements in the Affidavit of Probable Cause relating to his arrest. Specifically, Graham challenges the statements that the driveway was a “private alley [that] had access to [the gas station’s] rear door and parked customers’ cars” and that Anhorn felt a “long flat pointed object” when he patted down the exterior of Graham’s jeans. (See Aff. of Probable Cause of Nov. 4, 2001, Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn Ex. G; compare with Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 64-66.) These allegations were necessary or material to the finding of probable cause in Graham’s case. The allegation about the private driveway’s access to the gas station supported the reasonable suspicion underlying the alleged radio call justifying the stop. Further, Anhorn’s allegation that he felt a “long flat pointed object” during the pat-down supported Anhorn’s justification for reaching into Graham’s pocket, where the illegal drugs were found. Anhorn’s allegation is so clearly in opposition to Graham’s version of events that, if a jury believed Graham, they could reasonably infer that Anhorn deliberately lied on the Affidavit'. At the least, a jury could infer that Anhorn had “obvious reasons” to doubt the veracity of his statements in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. Because a reasonable jury could find that Anhorn’s statement on Graham’s Affidavit of Probable Cause violated the Fourth Amendment under Franks, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim. e. Qualiñed Immunity as to Graham Anhorn asserts qualified immunity against all of Graham’s claims. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and the burden of pleading . and proving it rests upon the official invoking it. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir.1988). A government official performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified immunity from suit insofar as his conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The test is objective, rather than subjective. Id. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727. “[Qualified immunity is an objective question to be decided by the court as a matter of law... .The jury, however, determines disputed historical facts material to the qualified immunity question.” Carswell, 381 F.3d at 242 (citations omitted). “[A] decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there, are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis.” Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir.2002). The qualified immunity defense involves a two-step analysis. First, a court must determine whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant official’s conduct violated a constitutional right at all. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If it did, the court must then determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, given the specific facts of the case. Id. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Even if the official is mistaken, he or she may be shielded from liability nonetheless if he or she made a “reasonable mistake as to what the law requires.” Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir.2004). . Here, Graham has overcome the first step of Saucier (establishing a violation of a constitutional right). As I explained in my analysis of Anhorn’s arguments for summary judgment, Graham has provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Anhorn’s stop and search of Graham and his subsequent statements on Graham’s Affidavit of Probable Cause violated the Fourth Amendment, and that Anhorn’s racial profiling violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendments. Proceeding to the second step of Saucier, I must determine whether Anhorn should nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity because his actions in this context did not violate a clearly established right, either because the law is uncertain or because the officer made a reasonable mistake as to the application of the law. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151; Carswell, 381 F.3d at 242. Again, at this stage, I must take all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151. %. The Initial Stop For Anhorn’s conduct arising from the stop of Graham’s car, there are three stages to consider in the analysis of qualified immunity: the stop itself; the pat-down, and the search of Graham’s jeans. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Anhorn’s decision to stop was based merely on the late hour and the fact that a car pulled out of a private driveway close to, but visibly barred from, a closed gas station. Given these facts, it would be eléarly established under Terry that Anhorn lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. An-horn contends, however, that the driveway from which Graham’s car was pulling out had visible access to the closed gas' station nearby. If Anhorn prevails on this factual issue, the law would not be clearly established that this was inadequate suspicion to justify a Terry stop. That is, although Terry is well-established, Anhorn may have reasonably (albeit mistakenly) believed that his alleged observations would be enough to establish reasonable suspicion that the occupants of Graham’s car were engaging in criminal activity that may have involved the closed gas station. As a result, there remain genuine disputes of material fact that preclude qualified immunity relating to the stop (i.e., whether the driveway had visible access to the closed gas station nearby, as Anhorn asserts, or whether it was clearly separated from the gas station by physical barriers, as Graham asserts). Anhorn argues that if what he personally observed were insufficient to give him the right to make the stop, he would be entitled to qualified immunity nonetheless because he “relied on another officer’s radio transmission.” (Anhorn’s Memo, of Law at 32.) Anhorn’s position appears to be that once another officer makes a radio request to stop a certain vehicle, even if nothing more is said and the circumstances do not indicate the basis for the call, Anhorn would be entitled to qualified immunity for conducting the stop. This is incorrect. The law clearly requires that an officer’s reliance upon another officer’s flyer or bulletin be reasonable under the circumstances. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232-233, 105 S.Ct. 675. The law at the time of the stop gave clear notice to officers like Anhorn that they act at their own peril if they conduct a Terry stop based on a radio call that gives no reason- or rationale for the stop. The law became clearly established when the Third Circúit considered the issue of qualified immunity under similar circumstances in Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446 (3d Cir.1997). In Rogers, the court denied qualified immunity to a police officer who arrested an individual in reliance on (erroneous) oral statements by fellow officers about the existence of an arrest warrant. The court found that it was unreasonable for the arresting officer to rely on “vague, inconclusive” statements that merely related “rumors” of an arrest warrant, without ever obtaining a “clear statement ... confirming the existence of probable cause for the suspect’s arrest.” Id. at 449, 455-56. The court held that “where a police officer makes an arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity ..., provided it was objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed.” Id. at. 455 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). Based on the evidence presently before the court, it was objectively unreasonable for Anhorn under the established law of Rogers to believe that a lawful basis for a Terry stop existed solely on Officer Swan’s radio call. According to Anhorn’s deposition testimony, Officer Swan’s call merely stated that a Toyota Land Cruiser was leaving a private drive behind.a gas station. (See Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 209-12.) If these were the sole contents of Swan’s radio call, Swan’s radio call failed to provide a “clear statement” or even an articulable basis for the Graham stop, much like the vague, inconclusive statements in Rogers. Considered objectively, a call stating that a car was leaving a driveway behind a gas station would communicate completely lawful activity that would fail to give rise to reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. ‘Without more, Anhorn’s reliance upon the radio call (as it is described in Anhorn’s deposition) as his basis for the-stop, was unreasonable and he is not entitled to qualified immunity on this basis. If the jury finds the facts as presented by Graham, Anhorn’s stop was clearly illegal and he is not entitled to qualified immunity. Depending on the content of Swan’s radio call, Anhorn might be entitled to qualified immunity, but the call would have to communicate more than what has been provided to the court at this stage. If, on the other hand, the jury accepts Anhorn’s own articulable observations as his basis for the stop (ie., that the private’ drivéway looked as though it had access to the closed gas station), Anhorn would be entitled to qualified immunity, because it would be a closer call whether his observations were sufficient to establish articulable, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry. Due to these genuine factual disputes, Anhorn is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. ii. The Search Even if Anhorn received qualified immunity on the initjal stop itself, the question remains as to whether Anhorn could have reasonably believed that the scope of his search was lawful. This issue cannot be' resolved in Anhorn’s favor at this stage, due to genuine factual disputes. It is clearly established that under Terry, .a weapons search must be conducted within a scope reasonably calculated to discover a weapon. See 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Here, it is genuinely disputed whether An-horn conducted a second search of Graham’s person after failing to discover anything during the first search, whether the cocaine was found in Graham’s front right jean pocket or in the small coin pocket above the front right pocket, and whether the contraband seemed by touch to be a potential weapon. (Compare Anhorn Dep., Township’s Ex. D at 219-221, with Graham Dep., Anhorn’s Ex. 7 at 28, 40-47.) If the jury finds the facts as presented by Graham, the extent of Anhorn’s search would be illegal. According to Graham’s version, Anhorn failed to discover anything during the first search, then decided to research Graham and reached into Graham’s small coin pocket, where he found a small amount of drugs. This second search, if as described by Graham, is not reasonably necessary to secure the officer’s safety, given that the first search revealed nothing of concern. Furthermore, the size of Graham’s small coin pocket makes it unlikely that an officer would discover a weapon there, or that the amount of drugs found there could be reasonably perceived as a potential weapon. Thus, taking the facts as alleged by Graham, the scope of Anhorn’s search would violate the clearly established bounds of Terry and it would not be objectively reasonable for him to believe that he had the right to make such a search. If, on the other hand, the jury finds in Anhorn’s favor that there was only one pat-down and the contraband seemed by feel to be a possible weapon, Anhorn’s search of Graham’s coin pocket would be clearly within the scope allowed by Terry. Therefore, there remains a genuine dispute of fact material to Anhorn’s qualified immunity for his search of Graham and Anhorn is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. iii The Equal Protection Claim Anhorn does not dispute that it is clearly established that stopping and searching an individual on the basis of race is unlawful, but argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Graham has provided insufficient evidence of impermissible intent. As explained above, because Graham has provided sufficient evidence of intent to go to the jury, Anhorn is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Graham’s Equal Protection claim at this stage. iv. The Affidavit of Probable Cause Similarly, Anhorn does not dispute that it is clearly unlawful to knowingly or recklessly make false statements on an Affidavit of Probable Cause under Franks. An-horn’s defense is that he was truthful, not that he was reasonably mistaken as to the veracity of his statements. {See Anhorn’s Memo, of Law at 30: “Sgt. Anhorn’s Statements in The Affidavit Were Truthful.”) As explained above, because a reasonable jury could credit Graham’s assertions and find that Anhorn knowingly or recklessly made false statements on Graham’s Affidavit of Probable Cause, Anhorn is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. v. Outstanding Issues of Fact Under Forbes As required by Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir.2002), I specify the facts relevant to qualified immunity that are in dispute: • Exactly what was said by Swan in his radio bulletin to Anhorn, which is relevant to whether Anhorn’s reliance on the bulletin to make the stop was reasonable, thereby entitling him to qualified immunity on the stop; • Whether the private driveway had access to the gas station’s rear door and parked customers’ cars and whether the area had previously been.the site of previous late-night burglaries, thereby providing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for Officer Swan’s radio call and rendering Anhorn’s stop lawful; • Whether Anhorn searched Graham only once, whether Anhorn found the contraband in Graham’s small coin pocket, and whether the contraband could have reasonably felt like a weapon, thereby justifying the scope of Anhorn’s search; • Whether Anhorn’s stop and/or search were motivated by racial bias or discriminatory motives, which is relevant to the equal'protection claim; and • Whether, in Graham’s Affidavit of Probable Cause, Anhorn stated falsely and with knowledge of or reckless disregard for his falsity that Graham put his hands in his pockets when he was ordered out of the car and that Anhorn felt a “long flat pointed object” when he patted down the exterior of Graham’s jeans, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment under Franks. Not in dispute are the facts that Anhorn had prior contacts with Graham and that on the night in question, Graham had a criminal history that included several prior arrests for drug possession and one prior arrest for burglary. In sum, Anhorn is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage, where I must make all reasonable inferences in Graham’s favor. At trial, a jury will have to resolve a number of factual disputes relevant to the question of qualified immunity in Graham’s case. If some of the facts were resolved in Anhorn’s favor, Anhorn may be entitled to qualified immunity, because he may have had reasonable suspicion for the initial' stop and subsequent search, he may not have made the stop based upon an impermissible motive, and his statements on the Affidavit of Probable Cause may be either truthful or not knowingly or recklessly false. 2. Plaintiff Covington’s Claims Covington alleges that Anhorn stopped and 'searched him on December 29, 2002 without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, in violation of the Fourth 'Amendment; that Anhorn stoppéd and searched him on the basis of race, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that Anhorn later knowingly or recklessly submitted false statements in an Affidaidt of Probable Cause relating to the incident, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Anhorn seeks summary judgment and qualified immunity as to all of these claims. Due to genuine disputes of material fact, he is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. a. The Initial Stop of Covington The Fourth Amendment requires that a police officer conducting a traffic stop have at least “articulable and reasonable suspicion that ... either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law.” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Covington has provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Anhorn stopped his car without articulable and reasonable suspicion of a violation. Specifically, he offers deposition testimony that he was obeying the speed limit and that his seat was not reclined to any unusual degree when he was stopped by Anhorn. (See Covington Dep., Township’s Ex. B at 43, 180.) These are the primary factors upon which Anhorn rests his decision to stop Covington’s car, and Covington’s evidence, if believed, would eliminate those factors. Nonetheless, the evidence that Covington offers does not necessarily end the inquiry. The outstanding issue is whether Anhorn could lawfully make a Terry stop of Covington to investigate criminal activity, independent of the traffic violation. I must consider whether articulable, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may be established given the remaining, undisputed facts, namely the late hour (approximately 4 a.m.) and Anhorn’s observation that Covington and his companions were three youths riding in a 2002 Jaguar. As a matter of law, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment upon these facts. The late hour and the presence of three youths in the expensive car are insufficient in themselves to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop. It is undisputed that Covington’s car had Pennsylvania plates, and that its appearance was not unusual. There is no evidence in the record that any crimes in the area had been reported involving youths in a car specifically matching Covington’s description. Cf. U.S. v. Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529 (3d Cir.1998) (a radio bulletin stating that two black males driving a black sports car were believed to have committed three robberies in the area a short time earlier would not justify arresting any African American men who happened to drive by in any type of black sports car, but a more precise description could justify arrest of individuals matching that description). A police officer may not lawfully stop any youth driving an expensive car late at night. Under Terry, additional articulable facts would be necessary to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Because a reasonable jury may thus find that Anhorn lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial traffic stop of Covington’s car, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment as to the lawfulness of the initial stop under the Fourth Amendment. b. The Search of Covington’s Jacket Assuming arguendo that Anhorn’s initial stop on the basis of a traffic violation was lawful, the next issue would be whether Anhorn may be entitled to summary judgment as to the lawfulness of his search of Covington’s jacket (which was not being worn by Covington). He is not. Anhorn’s first justification for searching Covington’s jacket was that he had reason to believe Covington might pose a danger to him. Pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, an officer with reasonable suspicion that the car’s occupants might be “dangerous and gain immediate control of a weapon” may lawfully conduct a search of the car’s passenger compartment. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). See also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d.492 (1998) (striking down Iowa statute allowing full vehicle searches pursuant to traffic stops, because while potential threat to safety of officer issuing a traffic, citation may justify ordering the driver and passengers to exit car, the threat is insufficient, without more, to justify an automobile search). Furtive hand movements may give an officer reasonable suspicion that a passenger may be dangerous, depending on the surrounding circumstances. See U.S. v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10 (3d Cir.1997) (occupant of a lawfully parked car’s furtive hand movements and refusal to obey officers’ orders during traffic stop provided specific, articulable facts to support belief that passenger may be armed, thus warranting pat-down search for weapons). Anhorn alleges that either prior to or after the stop, he observed Covington’s passenger attempting to hand Covington the jacket, which was located on the bdck seat. Covington denies this. {See Coving-ton Dep. at 80-83.) Therefore, if Coving-ton’s version is accepted as true, Anhorn’s reasonable suspicion of danger relating to the jacket no longer exists. As an alternative justification, An-horn claims that the bag of marijuana was sticking out of the jacket pocket, in plain view. When an officer observes an object in plain view, no “search” occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the owner has shown “no intention to keep [the object], to himself.” Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Here, Covington offers testimony that the bag of marijuana was not visible, including testimony by another officer at the scene. (See Covington Dep., .Township’s Ex. B at -82—84; Dolan Dep., Pis.’ Resp. to Anhorn Ex. U at-18-19.) Therefore, a reasonable jury could find in Covington’s favor that no “plain view” justification existed for seizing the marijuana. Because a reasonable jury could find that Anhorn’s search of the jacket was unsupported by either reasonable suspicion or the plain view justification, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment as to the lawfulness of his search of Covington’s jacket. c. Equal Protection Violation as to Covington As I concluded in my discussion of Graham’s Equal Protection claim, there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude that Anhorn stopped Covington on the basis of’his race (African American), in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Anhorn is not entitled to summary judgment as to Covington’s Equal Protection claims. d. False Statements on Covington’s Affidavit of Probable Cause Covington alleges