Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER EATON, Judge. This consolidated action is before the court on competing USCIT Rule 56.2 motions for judgment upon the agency record filed by Shandong Huarong Machinery Co., Ltd. (“Huarong”), Liaoning Machinery Import & Export Corp., Ltd. and Liaoning Machinery Import & Export Corp. (collectively “LMC”), Shandong Machinery Import & Export Corp. (“SMC”), and Tianjin Machinery Import & Export Corp. (“TMC”) (collectively “plaintiffs”), and by defendant-intervenor Ames True Temper (“Ames”). By their motions, the parties contest certain aspects of the United States Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce” or “the Department”) final results of the twelfth administrative review of the anti-dumping orders covering heavy forged hand tools (“HFHTs”) from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) for the period of review (“POR”) beginning February 1, 2002, and ending January 31, 2003. See HFHTs, Finished or Unfinished, With or Without Handles, From the PRC, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,581 (ITA September 15, 2004) (“Final Results”), as amended, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,892 (December 1, 2004) (“Amended Final Results”). In addition, Ames challenges the liquidation instructions issued by Commerce to the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”). The court has jurisdiction over the antidumping determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and over Ames’ challenge to the liquidation instructions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4). For the following reasons, Commerce’s Final Results are sustained in part, and remanded in part. BACKGROUND In February 2003, in response to requests made by plaintiffs and Ames, Commerce initiated the twelfth administrative review of four antidumping duty orders originally published in 1991. See HFHTs, Finished or Unfinished, With or Without Handles, From the PRC, 68 Fed.Reg. 14,-394, 14,395 (ITA Mar. 25, 2003). The subject orders applied to merchandise categorized as bars/wedges, picks/mattocks, hammers/sledges, and axes/adzes sold by nearly ninety producers. Commerce focused its review on exporters of the subject merchandise, which included Huarong (axes/adzes, bars/wedges), SMC (axes/adzes, bars/wedges, picks/mattocks, hammers/sledges), LMC (axes/adzes, bars/wedges), and TMC (bars/wedges, axes/adzes, hammers/sledges, picks/mattocks). The Final Results were published on September 15, 2004. After commencement of the present action, certain ministerial errors contained in the Final Results were raised and corrected through a voluntary remand and the Amended Final Results were published on December 1, 2004. In the Final Results, Commerce applied adverse facts available (“AFA”) to plaintiffs’ sales of subject merchandise on an order-specific basis. That is, “total” AFA were applied to Huarong and LMC for their sales of merchandise within the scope of the axes/adzes and bars/wedges orders, and to TMC for its sales covered by the bars/wedges order. See Final Results 69 Fed.Reg. at 55,583. Partial AFA were applied to SMC’s sales under the bars/wedges order. See id. Commerce also kept in place the antidumping orders against SMC’s hammers and sledges and LMC’s bars and wedges. See id. at 55,-581; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(d)(1) (2005). Ultimately, the Department calculated the country-wide antidumping duty rates (“PRC-wide”) for HFHTs as follows: bars/wedges at 139.31%; picks/mattocks at 98.77%; hammers/sledges at 27.71%; and axes/adzes at 55.74%. See id. at 55,583. STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing a final antidumping determination from Commerce, the court “shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found ... to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2003) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). The existence of substantial evidence is determined “by considering the record as a whole, including evidence that supports as well as evidence that ‘fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1984)). “As long as the agency’s methodology and procedures are reasonable means of effectuating the statutory purpose, and there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the agency’s conclusions, the court will not impose its own views as to the sufficiency of the agency’s investigation or question the agency’s methodology.” Cerámica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 404-05, 636 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1986), aff'd, 810 F.2d 1137, 1139 (Fed.Cir.1987) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)); see also Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 27 CIT -, -, 276 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1301 (2003). With respect to Ames’ challenge to Commerce’s liquidation instructions, this Court applies the standard of review set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and will “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 706 of the APA authorizes the court to review the agency determination under three different standards: (1) arbitrary or capricious; (2) abuse of discretion; or (3) not in accordance with law. See 33 Charles Alan Wright & Charles H. Koch, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Judicial Review of Administrative Action § 8334, at 167 n. 2 (2006). “Under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard the scope of review is a narrow one.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 442, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974). “Applying this standard of review, an administrative action is to be upheld if the agency has ‘considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.’” Humane Soc’y of the United States, 236 F.3d at 1324-25 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983)). DISCUSSION I. Plaintiffs’ Motion A. Application of Total AFA to Huar-ong’s, LMC’s, and Company A’s Sales of Bars/Wedges: Prinei-pal/Agent Relationships Huarong, LMC, and Company A (collectively “the Companies”) contend that Commerce wrongfully applied total AFA to their sales of bars and wedges based on its determination that they misrepresented the nature of purported agency relationships. As part of its findings, Commerce concluded that “nearly all of the sales functions were conducted by the principalis], and that the agent[s’] participation was limited, for the most part, to supplying invoices to the principal.” Issues and Decisions Mem. for the Twelfth Admin. Rev. of the Antidumping Duty Orders on HFHTs From the PRC (“Issues and Decisions Mem.”) at 46. Thus, Commerce found that the purported agents were merely vehicles employed by the principals to circumvent the payment of their assigned antidumping duty rates. See Def.’s Resp. to Mots. J. Ag. R. (“Def.’s Resp.”) at 9. In Commerce’s view, the Companies significantly impeded the administrative review by “continually misrepresenting] the true nature of their relationship with their principal or agent during the [period of review].” Issues and Decisions Mem. at 46. The Companies, on the other hand, argue for the legitimacy of their agency relationships, and insist that an application of AFA to their bars/wedges sales is not justified because they “provided all the information requested by Commerce and cooperated to the best of their ability in [their] efforts to comply with Commerce’s mandate.” Pls.’ Mem. of Pts. and Auth. in Supp. of Mot. J. Agency R. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 17. In the Final Results, Commerce found the two claimed agency relationships to be shams. See Final Results 69 Fed.Reg. at 55,583 (“Huarong, LMC/LIMAC, and [Company A] participated in an ‘agent’ sales scheme whereby one PRC company allowed another PRC company to enter subject merchandise under the first company’s invoices.”). In the first arrangement, Company A allegedly served as Huarong’s agent for its sales of bars and wedges in the United States. In the second, LMC acted as Company B’s purported agent for its U.S. bars and wedges sales. The Companies argue that neither relationship should serve as the basis for applying AFA because: (l)(a) the Companies submitted to Commerce all of the requested information as well as some additional documents that were not part of Commerce’s demand, and thus did not impede Commerce’s review and (b) that by doing so, they acted to the best of their abilities to comply with Commerce’s request; and (2) despite Company A’s and LMC’s relatively minimal responsibilities, they performed sufficient duties to qualify both as actual agents. See Pls.’ Mem. at 17-19; 21-23. As an example, in support of the first argument, Huarong claims that: In its initial submission to Commerce, Huarong fully disclosed that it utilized an agent for a portion of its sales of subject merchandise bars/wedges. It also included without request by Commerce a copy of the agent/principal contract entered into by Huarong and [Company A]. At no point did Huarong fail to provide information to Commerce or provide incorrect information. In fact, in the next submission, Commerce asked again about agent sales, and requested that Huarong report all such “agent sales” as its own. Huarong complied by providing a sales flow diagram illustrating the agency relationship, and indicated that the agent sales had indeed been reported as sales by Huarong. Pls.’ Mem. at 18. Regarding Commerce’s finding that the limited business activities actually undertaken by Company A and LMC prevented the establishment of an agency relationship, the companies contend that “it shows good business sense for the customer to have an open relationship with the manufacturer, not just the agent, to address [issues arising with the customer’s order].” Pls.’ Mem. at 19. These same arguments are made with respect to Commerce’s application of total AFA to Company A. Company A, which purportedly acted as Huarong’s agent for sales of bars and wedges to the United States, argues that it was equally cooperative as Huarong and LMC in complying with Commerce’s requests. The Companies, therefore, take the position that Commerce erred in determining that they impeded the review, thereby justifying the use of facts otherwise available pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). In addition, they dispute the finding that they failed to act to the best of their abilities by participating in, and then concealing, a fraudulent invoicing scheme, thereby justifying the use of AFA pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). Commerce defends its application of total AFA to the companies by stating that “ ‘[rjenting’ a dumping margin merits the application of adverse facts available.” Def.’s Resp. at 9. Commerce maintains that the Companies were participants in an invoicing scheme whereby the “principal” employed an “agent,” which was subject to much lower duties than the principal, as a tool to evade Commerce’s orders. Based on Huarong’s submitted responses regarding its relationship with Company A, Commerce found that: The record shows that [Company A], whose cash deposit and assessment rates were lower than Huarong, sold blank invoices to Huarong, which then reported the entries as [Company A’s] to Customs and benefitted from the very low rates applicable to [Company A]. Likewise, the record shows that LMC and [Company A] sold their invoices to companies that reported their entries to Customs as made by LMC or [Company A], as appropriate, and, thus, benefitted from lower rates. In questionnaire responses, Huarong claimed that its relationship with [Company A] was a bona fide business arrangement whereby [Company A] acted as an agent for Huarong’s sales of bars/wedges to one United States customer. However, after two supplemental questionnaires, Huarong revealed that Huarong handled all of the negotiations and shipping arrangements for the sales in question. [Company A] received a fee for simply allowing Huarong to represent to Customs that the merchandise was [Company A] merchandise, rather than Huarong merchandise. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). Commerce further found that LMC provided similarly incomplete responses to the initial section A questionnaire. After reviewing the record of this review, we find that [LMC] continually misrepresented the true nature of its relationship with [Company B] during the POR. In its questionnaire responses, ... [LMC] claimed that its relationship with [Company B] was a bona fide business arrangement whereby it acted as an agent for [Company B’s] sales to one U.S. customer. However, only by issuing three supplemental questionnaires to [LMC] did the Department learn that [LMC] did not negotiate the terms of (ie., the price and quantity), or arrange shipping for, the sales in question nor did it find new customers for [Company B]. Instead, [Company B] paid [LMC] to use its sales invoices to take advantage of [LMC’s] lower cash deposit rate during the POR. Absent our requests for additional information, the Department would not have discovered that [LMC] did not provide the services expected from a true “agent”.... Adverse Facts Available Mem. LMC (A-570-803) (ITA Mar. 1, 2004) at 4-5; Def.’s Conf.App. Ex. 17. The same finding was made with respect to Company A’s submissions. See Adverse Facts Available Mem. Company A (A-570-803) (ITA Mar. 1, 2004) at 4; Def.’s Conf.App. Ex. 15. Thus, because, in Commerce’s view, the Companies provided it with incomplete questionnaire responses concerning the responsibilities of the arrangement participants, the Department was justified in using facts otherwise available and AFA because they had “significantly impeded the proceedings and interfered with the assessment of accurate antidumping duties ... [and] thus failed to cooperate to the best of their respective abilities.” Def.’s Resp. at 10. The court concurs in Commerce’s finding that the Companies initially failed to provide pertinent details concerning their invoicing arrangements. In its review of the record, the court examined the Companies’ initial questionnaire responses, which reveal that the purported agency relationships, while claimed as legitimate, were not fully explained. See generally Huar-ong Resp. to Questionnaire Sec. A (May 28, 2003); Company A Resp. to Questionnaire Mini-Sec. A (Apr. 23, 2003); LMC Resp. to Questionnaire Sec. A (May 28, 2003). In addition, the information contained in the responses to the supplemental questionnaires demonstrated the true nature of the arrangements. For instance, it was not until its September 3, 2003 response to Commerce’s supplemental section A questionnaire that Huarong disclosed the details of the arrangement by stating that: Usually, the customer contacts Huarong, but places the order with [Company A]. The customer generally sends Huarong a fax copy of the order.... The customer in the United States is a long-time customer and handles the orders as it chooses.... For all agent sales, however, title to the goods passed from Huar-ong to the U.S. customer. The agent did not take title.... Generally Huarong negotiated the price and quantity of the sale.... Generally Huarong confirmed the purchase order by telephone with the U.S. customer.... Huarong Resp. to Supplemental Questionnaire Sec. A at 5-7 (Sept. 3, 2003) (emphasis in original). More, specifically, Huar-ong stated that “[Company A] issued the sales invoices.” Id. at 7. In other words, the record shows that all of the sales activity was performed by Huarong, that Company A received payment not for carrying out duties tied to the sale of the merchandise, but for merely providing the principal with blank invoices and packing lists, and that the true nature of the arrangement was not immediately revealed to Commerce. Similarly, both LMC and Company A ultimately reported in their supplemental questionnaire response that, for “agent” sales: (1) the U.S. customer contacted the principal directly; (2) the principal negotiated the price, quantity, and shipping terms of the merchandise; (3) the principal made the sales calls; (4) the principal filled out the invoices and the purchase orders with the relevant sales data; (5) the principal paid the freight forwarder; and finally (6) that the “agents” issued the sales invoices. See LMC Resp. to Supplemental Questionnaire Sec. A at 5-8 (Sept. 29, 2003); Company A Resp. to Supplemental Questionnaire Sec. A at 1-5 (Oct. 31, 2003). Thus, it is apparent that both LMC and Company A were agents in name only as they were not burdened with any responsibilities concerning the sales other than providing their principals with invoices and packing lists. As with Huar-ong, Commerce only learned these details after issuing supplemental questionnaires. As a result of the inadequate answers found in the initial section A responses, Commerce was required to issue several supplemental questionnaires in order to get the necessary information to complete its investigation. Consequently, even though the Companies ultimately disclosed the circumstances surrounding their “agency” relationships, their failure to do so until after the issuance of several supplemental questionnaires surely significantly impeded Commerce’s investigation by requiring the agency to prolong its review. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (a); see also Shandong Huarong Gen. Group Corp. v. United States, 27 CIT -, -, 2003 WL 22757937, *7 (Oct. 22, 2003) (not published in the Federal Supplement) (finding that respondents significantly impeded a review by submitting inaccurate questionnaire responses that precluded Commerce from conducting verification.). Thus, the court’s review of the record leads it to conclude that Commerce’s use of facts otherwise available in determining the margins for the Companies’ sales of bars and wedges was supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with the law under § 1677e (a). Having found Commerce’s use of facts otherwise available to be justified, the court now turns to the propriety of Commerce’s application of total AFA to the Companies’ sales of bars and wedges to the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). If an interested party “fail[s] to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information,” Commerce may then use an adverse inference when choosing from the facts otherwise available. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). Although the statute does not provide a standard for what constitutes acting to the best of a party’s ability, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that phrase to “require[ ] the respondent to do the maximum it is able to do.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2003). “When a respondent fails to respond to Commerce’s requests and the information it requested is material to the investigation, this court previously has found such behavior to be unreasonable and the use of AFA appropriate.” Chia Far Indus. Factory Co., Ltd. v. United States, 28 CIT -, -, 343 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1363 (2004). In accordance with this standard, the court finds that the Companies’ failure initially to provide the relevant information with respect to their invoicing arrangement, information that was fully within their command, justified Commerce’s application of AFA to the Companies’ sales of bars and wedges. B. Commerce’s Application of Total AFA to Huarong’s and TMC’s Forged Tamper and Scraper Sales Huarong and TMC next dispute Commerce’s application of total AFA to their sales of forged tampers and scrapers. Commerce states that, because Huarong and TMC failed to provide the requested information, it was justified in using facts available. See Issues and Decisions Mem. at 37; 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). Commerce then applied AFA to Huarong and TMC based on its conclusion that their actions demonstrated a failure to cooperate by not acting to the best of their abilities to comply with its request for information. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see Def.’s Resp. at 13 (citing Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1380). Throughout the course of the twelfth review, Commerce asked Huarong and TMC, as well as SMC, to provide information concerning sales of tampers and scrapers. See Issues and Decisions Mem. at 37. SMC “responded to the request by explaining that they did not provide the information about the sales data because they did not want to provide it while a scope inquiry on the subject merchandise was still pending.” Pls.’ Mem. at 13. As of the time of Commerce’s request, the agency had initiated formal scope inquiries as to tampers on August 4, 2003, and for scrapers on December 2, 2003. See Issues and Decisions Mem. at 34. The tampers inquiry terminated on July 29, 2004, while the inquiry regarding scrapers remains open. Huarong and TMC maintain that their failure to provide Commerce with the requested information was the result of a miscommunication. Upon receiving Commerce’s request for information relating to tampers and scrapers, SMC, apparently believing these tools were not covered by the order, notified Commerce that it would not provide the requested information because of the pending scope inquiry. See Pls.’ Mem. at 13. Huarong and TMC argue that, because Commerce never contested SMC’s explanation as to why the company was not going to provide the requested information, they assumed that Commerce had waived its request for information on tampers and scrapers. Id. Indeed, Huarong and TMC contend that: [They] did not purposefully try to evade Commerce’s request for the sales data on scrapers and tampers. Rather, after Commerce failed to respond to SMC’s explanation for its failure to supply the requested information, Huarong and TMC genuinely believed that the issue had been laid to rest. Had Commerce again requested the information from Huarong and TMC, they would have provided [it]. This was merely a mis-communication among the parties, and Huarong and TMC should not receive AFA for a mistake. Pls.’ Mem. at 13. In addition, Huarong and TMC argue that nothing required a response given the pending scope inquiry concerning the products subject to the request. Commerce first supports its application of total AFA to Huarong and TMC by maintaining that a pending scope determination does not cut-off a party’s duty to respond to a request for information to the best of its ability. See Def.’s Resp. at 12-13; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(0(4) (“[Notwithstanding the pendency of a scope inquiry, if the Secretary considers it appropriate, the Secretary may request information concerning the product that is the subject of the scope inquiry for purposes of a review under this subpart.”). In addition, Commerce insists that “ ‘intent’ is not a necessary factor for the application of [AFA].” Def.’s Resp. at 12 (citing Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1381). Commerce’s application of AFA to a respondent requires that agency to engage in the two-step analysis set forth in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677e(a) and 1677e(b). With respect to a respondent’s state of mind, the Federal Circuit has provided the following instruction: Under subsection (a), if a respondent “fails to provide [requested] information by the deadlines for submission,” Commerce shall fill in the gaps with “facts otherwise available.” The focus of subsection (a) is respondent’s failure to provide information. The reason for the failure is of no moment. The mere failure of a respondent to furnish requested information — for any reason — requires Commerce to resort to other sources of information to complete the factual record on which it makes its determination. As a separate matter, subsection (b) permits Commerce to “use an inference that is adverse to the interests of [a respondent] in selecting from among the facts otherwise available,” only if Commerce makes the separate determination that the respondent “has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply.” The focus of subsection (b) is respondent’s failure to cooperate to the best of its ability, not its failure to provide requested information. Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1381 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e) (emphasis in original). Thus, subsection (a) is triggered by a finding that a respondent has failed to provide requested information. For a respondent to be subjected to the application of AFA under subsection (b), however, a more detailed analysis is required. Before making an adverse inference, Commerce must examine respondent’s actions and assess the extent of respondent’s abilities, efforts, and cooperation in responding to Commerce’s requests for information. Compliance with the “best of its ability” standard is determined by assessing whether respondent has put forth its maximum effort to provide Commerce with full and complete answers to all inquiries in an investigation. While the standard does not require perfection and recognizes that mistakes sometimes occur, it does not condone inattentiveness, carelessness, or inadequate record keeping.... To conclude that an importer has not cooperated to the best of its ability and to draw an adverse inference under section 1677e(b), Commerce need only make two showings. First, it must make an objective showing that a reasonable and responsible importer would have known that the requested information was required to be kept and maintained under the applicable statutes, rules, and regulations. Second, Commerce must then make a subjective showing that the respondent under investigation not only has failed to promptly produce the requested information, but further that the failure to fully respond is the result of the respondent’s lack of cooperation in either: (a) failing to keep and maintain all required records, or (b) failing to put forth its maximum efforts to investigate and obtain the requested information from its records. Id. at 1382-83. (citations omitted); see also Hebei Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp. v. United States, 29 CIT -, -, 2005 WL 2323148, *6 (Sept. 22, 2005) (not published in the Federal Supplement). Put another way, under the facts of this case, Commerce’s use of an adverse inference cannot be based solely on a respondent’s failure to submit requested information, but rather requires a demonstrated failure on behalf of the respondent to put forth its maximum efforts in attempting to provide Commerce with the requested data. Here, the language of 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(4) makes it clear that Commerce was entitled to seek the requested information regardless of the status of the scope inquiries, and that Huarong and TMC were required to respond. The question is whether Huarong and TMC, having failed to respond, should be excused from answering the questionnaires based on SMC’s representations to Commerce and the Department’s subsequent silence. The court finds that it is simply not the ease that Huarong and TMC had reason to believe that Commerce’s silence with respect to SMC’s statements meant that they need not respond to the agency’s inquiries. Each company was directly asked to supply information. Neither supplied the information nor did either inquire on its own behalf whether the request had somehow lapsed. Considering the importance of the review process, Commerce’s failure to reply to SMC can provide no excuse for either company’s failure to supply the information. Had the respondents made inquiries of their own, the result might be different, but having exerted no independent efforts to ascertain the status of Commerce’s request, they cannot now be heard as having relied upon the unanswered statements of another. Taking into account the failure of both Huarong and TMC to provide Commerce with requested information, the court does not find error in Commerce’s decision to apply AFA to both companies’ sales of those products. It is not clear to the court, however, that Commerce properly extended its application of AFA to cover Huarong’s sales of all products covered by the axes/adzes and bars/wedges orders, and TMC’s sales of all products under the bars/wedges order. See Issues and Decisions Mem. at 38 (“[W]e continue to apply total AFA to Huarong and TMC due to their failure to provide the requested data for sales of forged tampers and scrapers, respectively.”). Indeed, this Court has previously found unreasonable the application of “total” AFA to a respondent when Commerce had verified some, but not all of the respondent’s sales. See Goldlink Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 30 CIT -, -, 431 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1331-32 (2006) (not published in the Federal Supplement) (“The Court, therefore, remands this issue back to Commerce to re-examine its determination to apply total adverse facts rather than partial adverse facts for the unverifiable sales.”) (emphasis in original). That is, Commerce generally may use an adverse inference only with respect to the specific information that a respondent failed to provide. See Shandong Huarong Gen. Group Corp., 27 CIT at -, 2003 WL 22757937, *19 (holding that, “the findings that justified the use of facts available and a resort to adverse facts available with respect to [respondents’] sales data and factors of production, cannot be used to accord similar treatment to issues relating to [respondents’] evidence of independence from state control.”); see also Gerber Food (Yunnan) Co., Ltd. v. United States, 29 CIT -, -, 387 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1287 (2005). Therefore, the court remands this matter for Commerce to explain why its determination that Huarong’s and TMC’s failure to report information on scrapers and tampers justified its apparent application of AFA to Huarong’s total sales of merchandise covered by the bars/wedges and axes/adzes orders, and TMC’s total sales covered by the bars/wedges order, and not just the merchandise for which requested information was not produced. C. 139.31% AFA Rate Applicable to TMC’s Exports of Bars/Wedges In selecting the rate applicable to TMC’s bars and wedges in this administrative review, Commerce chose the PRC-wide rate of 139.31% from the eighth administrative review. TMC objects to the application of the rate for several reasons, among them is its claim that “the Department cannot select unreasonably high AFA rates that have no relationship to a respondent’s actual dumping margin.” Issues and Decisions Mem. at 51. For TMC, because it “fully disclosed every sale of subject merchandise during the POR ... [,] the Department can calculate and assess dumping margins on all of the sales....” Id. In other words, TMC argues that the 139.31% rate is “unreasonably high and should be revised.” Id. For its part, Commerce states that it chose the 139.31% rate because “other more recently calculated margins for bars/wedges do not offer an adequate incentive to induce TMC to cooperate in this proceeding, given that these rates are either less than, or nearly the same as, the cooperative rates calculated for TMC in the most recent reviews of its bars/wedges sales.” Issues and Decision Mem. at 42. The court finds that Commerce has not justified its use of the 139.31% rate. When making a determination with respect to the application of AFA, Commerce is required to read §§ 1677e(a) (directing the agency to “use the facts otherwise available” in reaching its determination when “necessary information is not available on the record ... ”) and (b) (allowing the agency to “use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available”) together. Indeed, Commerce may not use an adverse inference unless the use of facts otherwise available has resulted from a respondent’s actions. Only having found that the use of facts otherwise available is warranted may Commerce then determine that the party has “failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information ... [and] use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (emphasis added). Section 1677e(b) further states that the “adverse inference may include reliance on information derived from ... (1) the petition, (2) a final determination in the investigation under this subtitle, (3) any previous review under section 1675 of this title or determination under section 1675b of this title, or (4) any other information placed on the record.” Id. Put another way, the statute can be reasonably understood as requiring the rate selected as AFA to be factually supported in all instances. As this Court has held, an assessment rate, standing alone, is not a “fact” or a set of “facts otherwise available,” and under no reasonable construction of the provision could it be so interpreted. The statute does not permit Commerce to choose an antidumping duty assessment rate as an “adverse inference” without making factual findings, supported by substantial evidence .... Gerber Food (Yunnan) Co., Ltd., 29 CIT at -, 387 F.Supp.2d at 1285. Moreover, Commerce must also impose an AFA rate that is a “reasonably accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to non-compliance.” Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, by merely selecting a rate from a previous review, Commerce has not provided the court with sufficient factual findings justifying its application of the 139.31% rate. In particular, the Department has failed to explain why the chosen rate represents a reasonably accurate estimate of TMC’s actual rate to which it has added an amount to encourage TMC to cooperate in future proceedings. Thus, because Commerce cannot, absent adequate justification, select the highest available rate to apply as AFA, the court remands this issue to Commerce to afford it an opportunity to provide a factual basis for its selection of the 139.31% rate. D. Application of Partial AFA to SMC’s Sales of Bars and Wedges For Failing to Report Finished Coating on Tool Heads as a Factor of Production In its Final Results, Commerce applied AFA to SMC’s sales of bars and wedges based on its failure to provide data regarding certain factors of production for those tools. See Final Results 69 Fed. Reg. at 55,583. Specifically, Commerce cites SMC’s responses to Section C and D of the questionnaire in which SMC indicated that the heads of those tools were coated with an “enamel, polyurethane, varnish or other finish (not including paint).” SMC Responses to Sections C and D of Questionnaire at C-11, C-15, C-18 (Aug. 11, 2003). Despite SMC’s responses, it did not provide Commerce with any information as to the cost of the finish coating. Based on SMC’s failure to provide the requested finish coating cost information, Commerce used facts otherwise available to determine that cost. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a); see also Issues and Decisions Mem. at 16. In addition, because it found that SMC failed to review the questionnaire response for accuracy prior to submission, Commerce determined that SMC failed to put forth its maximum efforts to provide Commerce with requested information and used an adverse inference in selecting from among the facts otherwise available. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see also Issues and Decisions Mem. at 16. As a result, Commerce used the highest ratios of finished coating weight to steel input weight based on the data received from TMC in this investigation to calculate the normal value of SMC’s bars and wedges. See Issues and Decisions Mem. at 16. SMC insists that its questionnaire responses were induced by “Commerce’s ‘introduction of a new system for reporting CONNUMs that was started for the first time in this administrative review.’ ” Pls.’ Mem. at 26 (quoting Issues and Decision Mem. at 15). According to SMC, it never meant to inform Commerce that a finish coating other than standard paint was applied to the bars/wedges and it did not report the factor of production information because, in its view, there was none to report. See id. at 26. Commerce maintains that the format of its questionnaire was in no way confusing. See Def.’s Resp. at 14, 15 (“[T]he questionnaire issued in this review was unambiguous.”). It notes that the questionnaire specifically asked the respondents, in one field, to indicate whether the tool heads were painted, and in a separate field to report whether the tool heads were coated with “an enamel, polyurethane, varnish or other finish” other than ordinary paint. SMC Responses to Section C and D of Questionnaire at C-11, C-15, C-18. Commerce further supports its application of partial AFA to SMC by citing Nippon Steel for the proposition that the standard for using AFA “does not condone inattentiveness, carelessness, or inadequate record keeping.” Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1382. Moreover, Commerce contends that, if SMC found the questionnaire to be confusing, it should have made that known to the Department prior to submitting its answers. See Def.’s Resp. at 15. The court finds SMC’s arguments unpersuasive. Upon review of the subject questionnaire, it is difficult to find any ambiguity in Commerce’s request for information regarding the finish, if any, applied to the tools. The questionnaire asked in Field Number 3.10, which is entitled “Paint,” whether the “bar/wedge is painted or not painted,” and instructed the respondent to place a “1” in the response if the tool was painted, and a “2” in the event that no paint was applied. SMC’s Responses to Sections C and D of Questionnaire at C-15. Directly below Field Number 3.10 is Field Number 3.11, which is entitled “Finish Coating.” This category directed respondent to indicate whether the “[bar/wedge] head is coated with an enamel, polyurethane, varnish or other finish (not including paint).” Id. at C-16 (emphasis added). As with the paint inquiry, respondents were instructed to place a “1” in the response if their tools were finish coated and a “2” if no such coating was applied. With respect to its bars/wedges, SMC placed a “1” in both the Paint and Finish Coating columns, indicating that the tool heads were both painted and coated with some other finish. See Pls.’ Conf. Appx., SMC’s Responses to Sections C and D of Questionnaire. Therefore, the court agrees that the failure of SMC to report the costs associated with the requested finish coating factor of production warranted the use of facts otherwise available under § 1677e(a) because, having failed to provide Commerce with data relating to one of SMC’s questionnaire responses, SMC prevented Commerce from calculating normal value based on a complete factual record, and thus impeded the investigation. “Compliance with the ‘best of its ability’ standard [for the use of AFA] is determined by assessing whether respondent has put forth its maximum effort to provide Commerce with full and complete answers to all inquiries in an investigation.” Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1382. Because it “withh[eld] information that [had] been requested by the administering authority ...and failed to recognize, pri- or to submitting its response, that it had done so, SMC failed to put forth its maximum efforts to provide Commerce with the requested cost data for the finish coating. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e. In addition, Commerce limited its application of AFA to the specific area of SMC’s failure, i.e., the cost of the finish coating. This being the case, the court affirms Commerce’s determination. E. Commerce’s Decision Not to Revoke the Antidumping Duty Order Applicable to SMC and LMC Finally, SMC and LMC contest Commerce’s denial of their requests to have the antidumping duty orders applicable to their respective sales of hammers/sledges and bars/wedges revoked. See Final Results 69 Fed.Reg. at 55,582; see also Issues and Decision Mem. at 19-20, 26-27. 1. SMC’s Request to Revoke Anti-dumping Order Covering Hammers/Sledges; Commercial Quantities Commerce’s regulations provide that “before revoking an order ... the Secretary must be satisfied that, during each of the three ... years, there were exports to the United States in commercial quantities of the subject merchandise to which a revocation ... will apply.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(d)(1). At issue in the instant action is Commerce’s finding that the anti-dumping duty order should remain in effect because SMC did not export its hammers and sledges to the United States in commercial quantities for three consecutive years. Neither the statute nor the regulations provide a definition of “commercial quantities.” See Pls.’ Mem. at 28; see also Def.’s Resp. at 22. SMC maintains that it complied with the regulations by participating meaningfully in the U.S. market. See Pls.’ Mem. at 28. According to SMC, its exports significantly increased over the three-year period encompassing 2000-2001, 2001-2002, and 2002-2003. While the parties agree that the total number of pieces exported during the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 periods constituted commercial quantities, Commerce found that the hammer/sledge exports during 2000-2001 failed to meet the regulatory standard. See Pls.’ Mem. at 28; see also Def.’s Resp. at 22-23. Although the levels attained in the subsequent two years were greater, SMC argues that the number of hammers/sledges exported to the United States during 2000-2001 satisfied the regulatory requirement of exporting subject merchandise in commercial quantities. Indeed, SMC emphasizes that, during the tenth administrative review, which covered 2000-2001, Commerce made no mention of any failure on SMC’s part to sell the subject merchandise in commercial quantities and gave SMC a zero percent margin for its hammers/sledges exports. See Pls.’ Mem. at 28; see also HFHTs From the PRC, 67 Fed.Reg. 57,789, 57,792 (Sept. 12, 2002) (“tenth review”). Because Commerce did not, at the time of the tenth review, question whether the subject merchandise was exported in commercial quantities, SMC insists that Commerce is prohibited from doing so now. See Pls.’ Mem. at 29. Commerce acknowledges that neither the statute nor the regulations provide guidance with respect to the definition of commercial quantities. See Def.’s Resp. at 22. For Commerce, the absence of any formal standard requires commercial quantities to be determined on a “case-by-case basis, based on the unique facts of each proceeding.” Id. Commerce explains that its current practice is to “compare[ ] the quantity of exports in each period of review to an appropriate benchmark period and also consider[] sales in absolute terms, examining whether the quantity in any of the periods was abnormally small.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching its conclusion in the instant matter, Commerce asserts that it adhered to this practice and used the export levels for 2002-2003 as the benchmark period. See Def.’s Resp. at 22. In other words, Commerce compared the volume of exports by SMC to the United States from 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 to the volume exported in 2002-2003. In comparing the exports from 2000-2001 to the benchmark period of 2002-2003, Commerce found the former figures to be “dwarfed” by the latter and, thus, insufficient to support a finding that the order was no longer necessary to prevent dumping. Id. Next, Commerce asserts that the absence of a discussion within the tenth review concerning whether SMC exported hammers/sledges in commercial quantities was to be expected. Commerce is correct. As Commerce notes, “[t]he yearly review procedures do not require a ‘commercial quantities’ analysis.” Id. at 24. Commerce argues that neither the fact that SMC’s exports were not discussed in terms of commercial quantities in the tenth review, nor the assignment of a zero margin supports a finding that SMC complied with 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(e). This is because whether a respondent exported the subject merchandise in commercial quantities is not a factor that Commerce considers when assigning dumping margins. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 351.213 (artic-Mating the factors and procedures to be applied in an administrative review. Notably absent from this list is a requirement that the subject merchandise be exported in commercial quantities.). “When a particular term is not expressly defined in a statute, the meaning of that term may be discerned by looking to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” Cal. Indus. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 436 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2006) (internal citations, alterations and quotation marks omitted). Commerce claims that it has satisfied the requirement of California Products, Inc. because its benchmark methodology is a “current practice” aimed at discerning meaning for the phrase “commercial quantities” under 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(e)(1). See Def.’s Resp. at 22. Using SMC’s exports from 2002-2003 as the benchmark, Commerce found that the volume in 2000-2001 was “abnormally small” in comparison, and, thus, did not amount to “commercial quantities.” Id. What Commerce does not explain is why its current practice fulfills the purpose of the regulation, which is to ensure that an exporter will continue to participate in fair trade practices upon revocation. See Rules and Regulations, Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties (“Preamble”), 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296, 27,325-26 (ITA May 19, 1997). Indeed, Commerce retained the “commercial quantities” language in the regulation even after the requisite notice and comment period produced some remarks suggesting that the phrase was not needed. Specifically, Commerce stated that: [W]e believe that it is reasonable to presume that if subject merchandise, shipped in commercial quantities, is being dumped or subsidized, domestic interested parties will react by requesting an administrative review to ensure that duties are assessed and that cash deposit rates are revised upward from zero. If domestic interested parties do not request a review, presumably it is because they acknowledge that the subject merchandise continues to be fairly traded. However, neither presumption can be made when merchandise is not being shipped in commercial quantities. Preamble at 27,326; see also Pure Magnesium From Canada: Final Results of Anti-dumping Duty Administrative Review and Determination Not To Revoke Order in Part, 64 Fed.Reg. 12,977, 12,979 (Mar. 16, 1999) (“This requirement ensures that the Department’s revocation determination is based upon a sufficient breadth of information regarding a company’s normal commercial practice.”). Without further explanation, however, it is difficult to see how the current “benchmark” methodology employed by Commerce would further the purpose of the regulation. That is, why is Commerce’s method a reasonable way to ensure the regulation’s goals. For that reason, the court remands this issue in order to allow Commerce to provide the court with an explanation as to how its methodology results in a reasonable measure of “commercial quantities.” That is, Commerce must explain: (1) how it arrived at the “benchmark period”; (2) why it was reasonable in its selection; and (3) how a comparison of the two periods demonstrates that the exports for the year 2000-2001 do not constitute commercial quantities. 2. LMC’s Request to Revoke Anti-dumping Duty Order Covering Bars/Wedges: Sale of Merchandise at Not Less Than Normal Value Commerce also denied LMC’s request to have the antidumping duty order applicable to its sales of bars/wedges revoked, basing its denial on LMC’s failure to sell its merchandise at not less than normal value for three consecutive years. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(e)(1)(i). Commerce’s conclusion was based on its application of AFA to LMC’s sales of bars and wedges for its failure to participate to the best of its ability to provide information on its invoicing practices, and LMC’s consequent receipt of an above de minimis dumping margin for the period of review. See Def.’s Resp. at 25. Because of the imposition of a more than de minimis margin, Commerce found that LMC was necessarily selling its merchandise at less than normal value. See Def.’s Resp. at 25. LMC contends that the margin was assigned as a result of the Department’s erroneous application of AFA to its bars/wedges sales. See Pls.’ Mem. at 31. For LMC, the decision not to revoke the order covering its bars and wedges cannot be based on an unlawfully assigned margin. Commerce argues that both its application of AFA to LMC and its subsequent assignment of an above de minimis margin were appropriate, and that therefore its decision not to revoke the order was supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law. Having previously found Commerce’s application of AFA to LMC’s sales of bars/wedges to be supported by substantial evidence, the court finds that the resulting margin and, consequently, Commerce’s decision not to revoke based on LMC’s failure to meet the regulatory requirements of 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(e)(1)(i) are supported by the same. Thus, Commerce’s decision not to revoke the anti-dumping duty order covering LMC’s sales included within the scope of the bars/wedges order is sustained. II. Ames’ Motion A. Commerce’s Use of Steel Billet Instead of Hexagonal Steel Bar as a Surrogate Value for TMC Ames first challenges Commerce’s use of a surrogate value for steel billet when calculating the normal value of certain of TMC’s merchandise. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c), when the subject merchandise is exported from a nonmarket economy country (“NME”), normal value may be calculated by valuing the factors of production in a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by Commerce. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (c)(1). As TMC’s merchandise is exported from China, a NME, Commerce used this methodology to determine normal value for TMC’s bars/wedges, axes/adzes, and hammers/sledges. See Issues and Decision Mem. at 5-7. Ames does not argue with this methodology, but rather disputes Commerce’s decision to use steel billet instead of hexagonal steel bar when valuing this input. See Def.-Int.’s Br. Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. (“Def.-Int.’s Br.”) at 8. In support of its contention that Commerce valued the wrong kind of steel, Ames points to TMC’s product catalog, which describes certain tools as made from hexangular stock. See id. According to Ames, the conversion of steel billet into a hexagonal shape requires equipment that has not been shown to be in TMC’s possession. See id. at 9. Commerce claims that, although TMC did have descriptive language in its catalog indicating the use of hexagonal steel bar, this observation alone is not dispositive. See Def.’s Resp. at 25. Rather, Commerce relies on the record invoices from TMC’s suppliers, which demonstrate that TMC bought substantial quantities of steel billet and scrap rail but no hexagonal stock. See id. at 25-26; see also Issues and Decision Mem. at 7. Thus, the Department based its determination on data that “dealt specifically with the inputs used and were linked to the raw material inventory.... ” Def.’s Resp. at 25. Commerce concludes that the “ambiguous statement [contained in the catalog] does not overcome the documentary evidence supplied by TMC’s suppliers regarding the material inputs they used to produce HFHTs.” Issues and Decision Mem. at 7. As to Ames’ argument that TMC does not have the equipment to transform billet into hexagonal bars, Commerce notes that, “[g]iven that the forging process heats the steel input to a degree such that the input can be shaped into the desired form,” no practical barrier exists to prevent the billet from being shaped into hexagonal bar. Id. Thus, Commerce contends that the fact that TMC does not have access to a rolling mill or other such machinery does not foreclose a finding that TMC could convert steel billet into hexagonal stock. Here, Commerce’s decision is supported by its review of what TMC actually purchased from its raw material suppliers. That is, Commerce “examined the invoices, which dealt specifically with the inputs used and were linked with the raw material inventory, rather than a general reference in a brochure.” Def.’s Resp. at 25; see also Def. Conf. R. Ex. 14 (consisting of TMC’s Response to Section D of Questionnaire (November 3, 2003)). Commerce also took into account that the process TMC was known from record evidence to have used, could produce hexagonal shapes. Ames’ argument, on the other hand, is largely based on conjecture. Thus, the court finds that Commerce has supported its finding with substantial evidence and sustains its conclusion. B. Commerce’s Failure to Apply AFA to TMC’s Sales of Axes/Adzes and Picks/Mattocks Supplied by Company C Ames’ next contention is that Commerce erred in not applying AFA to TMC’s sales of axes/adzes and picks/mattocks supplied by Company C. Ames argues that because Commerce applied AFA to SMC for failing to report data that Company C would not provide, it should also apply AFA to TMC even though Company C did cooperate by supplying TMC with requested information. Ames contends that Commerce’s past practice dictates that AFA be applied to both respondents based on Company C’s status as an interested party. See Def-Int.’s Br. at 12. Commerce maintains that applying AFA to TMC, which participated to the best of its ability in this portion of the review, would be contrary to public policy. See Def. Resp. at 19; Issues and Decisions Mem. at 30. Ames’ argument is rooted in its analyses of two prior Commerce determinations: Fresh Garlic From the PRC, 68 Fed.Reg. 75,210 (Dec. 30, 2003) (“Fresh Garlic”); and Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From the PRC (final results), 62 Fed.Reg. 61,276 (Nov. 17, 1997) (“Tapered Roller Bearings 1995-1996”). According to Ames, these determinations bind Commerce to apply AFA to all respondents associated with an uncooperative interested-party supplier, regardless of whether a respondent cooperated or whether the interested-party supplier cooperated with that respondent. See Def.-Int.’s Br. at 12-13. Indeed, Ames insists that: [A] supplying producer is an interested party whose failure to cooperate is attributable to the exporting respondent. ... [A]s long as one respondent received [AFA] for its response for this reason, any other respondent that also sold subject merchandise to the United States manufactured by that respondent should also receive [AFA], Id. at 12. Central to Ames’ argument is its contention that Company C is an interested party under § 1677(9). Id. at 13. Ames contends that, had Commerce found Company C to be an interested party, its lack of cooperation with respect to SMC would be properly attributable to both SMC and TMC. Id. In Commerce’s view, its decision to refrain from applying AFA to TMC was proper because, unlike SMC, TMC fully complied with Commerce’s requests. See Def.’s Resp. at 19-20. Commerce further insists that applying AFA to TMC in this instance would be contrary to the purpose behind AFA, which is to encourage respondents to fully participate in administrative reviews. See id. at 19. For Commerce, because “[t]he purpose of the ‘adverse inference’ is to encourage participation, [it] properly concluded that applying an ‘adverse inference’ to TMC, notwithstanding its cooperation, would be contrary to that purpose.” Id. Therefore, because TMC cooperated to the best of its ability and persuaded Company C to do the same, Commerce maintains that its decision to not apply AFA to TMC was reasonable. The court agrees with Ames that Company C, as a foreign manufacturer of the subject merchandise, is an interested party under § 1677(9)(A) (including within the ambit of “interested party” a “foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter ... of subject merchandise....”). Nonetheless, while acknowledging that Commerce has previously applied AFA to respondents whose interested-party suppliers failed to provide relevant factors of production data, see Fresh Garlic at 75,210; see also Tapered Roller Bearings 1995-1996 at 61,-276, the court finds that Commerce correctly determined that the situation presented here is distinct from that in those past investigations. An examination of the facts in those two investigations demonstrates that, in Fresh Garlic, the supplier data was rejected as untimely, and in Tapered Roller Bearings 1995-1996, the respondent never actually produced any of the requested information. Thus, although these respondents made efforts to get interested parties to give them the information needed to be responsive, ultimately, they failed to obtain the information in a timely fashion or were unable to obtain the information at all. Unlike the respondents in the investigations cited by Ames, TMC was able to comply with Commerce’s request because it successfully convinced Company C to provide it with the necessary data. Commerce’s choice to recognize this cooperation by not applying AFA was reasonable because TMC, by its cooperation and timely production of information, did nothing that would trigger the use of either facts otherwise available or AFA. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e. C. Propriety of PRC-Wide Rate Applicable to Huarong’s Scraper Sales Ames next objects to Commerce’s application of the PRC-wide 55.74% rate to Huarong’s sales of scrapers because, in its view, that rate is sufficiently low that Huarong would actually benefit from it. See Def.-Int.’s Br. at 16. Commerce applied the PRC-wide rate as a result of Huarong’s previously discussed failure to report factors of production data concerning its forged scrapers. See id. While Huarong challenges Commerce’s decision to apply AFA to its forged scrapers sales, it does not take issue with the calculation of the rate. See Pls.’ Mem. at 12-13. Because Ames believes that the 55.74% rate is insufficient to encourage cooperation, it urges the court to direct Commerce to calculate a rate using information from Huarong’s questionnaire responses. See Def.-Int.’s Br. at 16. As part of its argument, Ames states that, during the investigation, it calculated a rate based on data submitted by Huar-ong and urged its use by Commerce. Ames claims that Commerce failed sufficiently to take into account this proposed rate and thus acted in violation of 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(b)(1). (“In making the final determination in a[n] ... antidump-ing investigation ..., the Secretary will consider written arguments in case or rebuttal briefs filed within the time limits in this section.”). Notably, this rate was dramatically greater than the PRC-wide rate. Id. at 20. Because it submitted its proposed rate in writing, Ames contends that Commerce was required by regulation to consider its claim that Huarong was bene-fitting from the application of the PRC-wide rate. See id. at 17. In response to an argument made by Commerce, Ames takes issue with the Department’s finding that the data Huarong reported was incomplete and, thus, could not be used to calculate an accurate anti-dumping duty rate. Ames insists that, despite Huarong’s failure to respond to supplemental questionnaires, the information contained in Huarong’s initial response was sufficiently complete to support an individual rate calculation. Id. at 18. In addition