Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BENNETT, Chief Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION..........................................................989 A. Factual Background...................................................989 1. Undisputed Facts..................................................989 2. Disputed Facts....................................................991 B. Procedural Background................................................993 II.LEGAL ANALYSIS........................................................993 A. Standards For Summarg Judgment.....................................994 B. Arguments Of The Parties .............................................996 1. The defendants’ argument in support of summary judgment...........996 2. The plaintiff’s arguments in resistance..............................997 C. Eligibility To Bring FMLA Claim ......................................999 1. Definition of “worksite”...........................................1000 2. Estoppel.........................................................1002 D. The Substantive FMLA Claims........................................1003 1. FMLA claims generally...........................................1003 2. Podkovich’s interference claim ....................................1004 a. Defendants’ proffered lawful reason............................1005 b. Failure to return after exhausting FMLA leave..................1006 3. Podkovich’s discrimination claim..................................1007 a. Prima facie case and causation................................1008 b. Glaser’s legitimate reason.....................................1009 c. Pretext......................................................1010 E. Podkovich’s Title VII and ICRA Retaliation Claims.....................1012 1. Federal and Iowa law claims......................................1012 2. The retaliation claims ............................................1012 a. Prima facie case and causation................................1014 b. Pretext......................................................1015 F. Podkovich’s Pregnancy Discrimination Claim..........................1016 1. Prima facie case and causation....................................1016 2. Pretext..........................................................1017 III.CONCLUSION 1018 In February of 2005, the U.S. Surgeon General issued an Advisory on Alcohol Use in Pregnancy to raise public awareness about this important health concern. Although the Surgeon General’s Advisory primarily is concerned with alcohol exposure and birth defects, this controversy, which involves, in part, a former employee’s allegations of pregnancy and sex discrimination against a distributor/wholesaler of alcoholic beverages presents an ironic twist on the Surgeon General’s warning against the combination of pregnancy and alcohol, presumably, however, not precisely in the way the Surgeon General envisioned. More specifically, the plaintiff asserts her former employer violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (hereinafter, “FMLA”) by failing to restore her to her position after she took leave, due to complications with her pregnancy, and by discharging her in retaliation for taking leave. Additionally, the plaintiff asserts allegations of sex and pregnancy discrimination against her employer under Title VII, averring she was discharged in retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment and, or alternatively, for being pregnant. As is typical in these types of cases, the parties dispute not only the ultimate outcome, but also the pertinent factual underpinnings of the case. I. INTRODUCTION A. Factual Background The core undisputed facts and sufficient detail of the disputed facts are set forth below to put in context the parties’ arguments for and against summary judgment. 1. Undisputed Facts Glazer’s is a wholesale distributor and broker of wines, spirits and beer, licensed to operate in the State of Iowa. Under Iowa law, Glazer’s is permitted to act in a wholesale distributor capacity only with respect to beer and wine. Regarding spirits, contrarily, Glazer’s acts merely as a broker between the supplier and retailer and essentially markets its supplier’s products to assigned retail accounts within a specific geographic area. In February of 2002, Podkovich began working at Glazer’s in the capacity of a spirit sales representative/broker at Glazer’s Sioux City branch. At the time Pod-kovieh was hired, Glazer’s employed five spirit sales representatives throughout Iowa. As part of her duties, Podkovich traveled throughout western Iowa, including the Sioux City and Council Bluffs regions, visiting accounts to market spirits. During her tenure at Glazer’s, Mike Coff-man directly supervised Podkovich. Coff-man worked out of Glazer’s Des Moines location, and accordingly, Podkovich’s sales area and contacts were assigned by the Des Moines office. Although Podkovich made all of her reports to the Des Moines office, usually by facsimile, she spent little time in Des Moines. On average, Podko-vich traveled to Des Moines approximately less than once a month. However, she did maintain a mailbox at Glazer’s Des Moines location. In addition, she attended training and sales meetings in Des Moines, in addition to orientation. In contrast, Pod-kovich utilized the Sioux City office approximately once per week. Podkovich was allowed to use an open desk and telephone in the Sioux City location, as well as a storage space in which she stored display eases and product materials and promotional items. The storage area was locked and in order to access her items, Podkovich would have to requisition a Sioux City employee to open the area. From 2001 to 2003, Glazer’s employed less than fifty total employees at the Sioux City branch location. In September of 2002, Podkovich made a complaint regarding inappropriate emails containing sexual references that she received from a Glazer’s supervisory employee named Dan Wanderscheid. Wander-scheid worked at the Sioux City branch office. Podkovich, in accordance with Glazer’s anti-harassment policy, complained to Larry Rubida, the Sioux City branch manager. Following an investigation of Podkovich’s complaint, Glazer’s gave Wanderscheid the choice of either resigning or being terminated. Wanders-chied opted to resign. In exchange for his voluntary resignation, Wanderscheid received a severance package from Glazer’s. Glazer’s did not tell the remainder of their employees about Podkovich’s complaint. Rather, the company informed its employees merely that Wanderscheid left the company to pursue other interests. Months after the incident with Wanders-chied, Podkovich became pregnant. Due to certain complications with her pregnancy, Podkovich took four weeks off of work from March 1, 2003, to April 1, 2003. Pod-kovich filled out a leave request requesting “Family/Medical Leave.” Later, in August of 2003, Podkovich again took medical leave due to continued complications with her pregnancy. Prior to this second leave of absence, Coffman wrote Podkovich up on several occasions in July and August of 2003. Specifically, Podkovich was written up once on July 10, 2003. Prior to the current litigation, Podkovich did not receive a copy of this write up even though it was placed in her file. Later, Coffman again wrote two separate write ups critiquing Podkovich’s performance both of which were dated August 15, 2003. The August write ups were mailed to Podkovich while she was on leave. In the midst of these events, Glazer’s began negotiating with a company that supplied spirits named Diageo. Glazer’s sought to establish an arrangement to exclusively broker Diageo’s brands of spirits in Iowa. Glazer’s had previously negotiated exclusive distributorship arrangements with Diageo in Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas. In the summer of 2003, Doug Howell, the president of Glazer’s at the time, prepared a proposal for Diageo. The initial proposal was premised upon Diageo paying Glazer’s a total commission level that would cover a staff of eight spirit sales representatives throughout Iowa. This initial proposal anticipated that Podkovich would staff the Diageo broker position in Sioux City. However, Howell’s initial proposal was rejected by Diageo. Diageo’s counterproposal included a commission level that would only support four spirit sales representatives/brokers. Thus, Howell needed to assess which of the five existing brokerage positions would be eliminated. Ultimately, Glazer’s restructured its operations and eliminated Podkovich’s position. Podkovich was not informed of this arrangement at that time. Podkovich attempted to return to work during the first week of November of 2003. She tried to make arrangements for her return to work, but she could not elicit a response from Coffman. Finally, Podko-vich was advised by Amy Burgess that Howell needed to meet with her in Des Moines, but that the meeting would not be until the week after Podkovich’s leave had ended. On November 11, 2003, Podkovich contacted Rusty Harmount, who worked in human resources at Glazer’s Texas office to explain the issues she was having in working with the Des Moines office to coordinate her return. The following day, Podkovich drove to Des Moines to meet with Howell. Howell informed Podkovich her position had been eliminated and offered her a severance package. Podkovich declined Glazer’s offer. After Podkovich left the office, Glazer’s later telephoned her and demanded she provide the company with a doctor’s work release when she returned the signed severance package. Thereafter, Podkovich filed for unemployment, which Glazer’s immediately contested. 2. Disputed Facts Myriad facts are disputed by the parties. First, the parties dispute the nature and quality of Podkovich’s contacts with the Sioux City branch office. For example, Glazer’s contends Podkovich went to the Sioux City office once a week to perform the office-related tasks of her job. Glazer’s contends Podkovich regularly utilized the Sioux City branch office’s fax machine to fax her reports to the Des Moines office. Although Podkovich admits she went to the Sioux City office approximately once a week, she denies she went there to perform the office-related tasks of her job. Rather, Podkovich contends she would usually fax reports to her supervisor at the Des Moines office using a relative’s fax machine and only on occasion utilized the Sioux City branch office to perform the office-related tasks of her job. Podkovich admits that she was allowed to use an open desk in the Sioux City office but argues that she did not have anything on the desk to indicate it was hers and that she usually only sat there if she needed to use the telephone. Additionally, Podkovich claims the desk was only made available to her for a limited time. A few months after she started work at Glazer’s, the Sioux City location reorganized and another employee took the desk Podkovich had been using. After her desk was removed, Podkovich claims she also no longer had a voice mail through the Sioux City office, and that thereafter, she called the Des Moines office’s 1-800 number to check her voice mails. Second, the parties dispute certain facts surrounding Podkovich’s sexual and pregnancy discrimination allegations. With respect to her sexual discrimination complaint, Podkovich contends that, after the investigation into her complaint about Wanderscheid, she was treated negatively. In addition, she claims that Howell and Rubida both made threats to her that if word got out about her complaint of sexual harassment and the actual reason for Wan-derschied’s departure, she would be fired. Podkovich avers this same threat was communicated to her boyfriend, Dustin Allen. Glazer’s denies any such threats were made in connection with the investigation into Wanderschied’s conduct. In addition, Podkovich contends that after she returned home following the meeting in Des Moines in which she was terminated, she learned that it had become common knowledge at the Sioux City location that Wan-derscheid was forced to leave the company as a direct result of her sexual harassment complaint. With respect to her pregnancy discrimination claim, Podkovich contends that as her pregnancy progressed, Coffman, her supervisor, began treating her differently. For instance, Podkovich avers Coffman inquired about the due date of her pregnancy and her expected availability for the holidays, which typically was a busy time for the company and coincided with her anticipated delivery. Podkovich contends Coffman made statements suggesting that regardless of her due date, she needed to be available for the holiday show. Thereafter, Podkovich asserts that Coffman became critical of Podkovich’s work and did not assist her with tasks that he had previously helped her with. Consequently, Podkovich was forced to complete two physically demanding store resets in August of 2003 on her own, when previously Coffman had assisted her or assigned others to provide assistance to Podkovich. Not surprisingly, Glazer’s denies, outright, the occurrence of these events. Although Glazer’s does admit that Podkovich executed two store resets on her own, it denies that those resets can be characterized as more physically demanding than any other. Moreover, the parties dispute the occurrence of certain events surrounding Pod-kovich’s attempt to return to work. First, Podkovich contends that while she filled out and received paperwork with respect to her first period of FMLA leave, she did not fill out or receive any documentation from Glazer’s regarding her second and final FMLA leave period. In addition, Podkovich claims that following her leave in August, Coffman refused to take her phone calls and further refused to return her calls. Further, Podkovich contends that Dorothy Crisostomo and Cynthia Davenport, two of Glazer’s representatives at the company’s headquarters in Texas, had informed Podkovich that her return to work date based on her allotted FMLA leave was November 7, 2003. Based on this information, Podkovich believed the totality of her leave was covered and that is why she did not attempt to make arrangements for her return to work until the first week of November. Podkovich further avers that after she attempted to return to work in November of 2003, she received a call from Howell on November 11, 2003, shortly after she spoke with Har-mount from Glazer’s headquarters on that same day. Podkovich alleges Howell was rude and hostile throughout the conversation and that he represented he was upset by the fact that Podkovich had complained to Harmount. Near the end of Howell and Podkovich’s conversation, Howell informed her she had been eliminated from her job and that she needed to come to Des Moines to sign paperwork related to her termination and to discuss a severance package. The next day, at the meeting with Howell, Podkovich contends he continued behaving in a rude and hostile manner. He demanded she sign the severance agreement immediately and indicated that if she did, Glazer’s would not contest or refuse her unemployment. Podkovich further asserts that she requested information about why she was being terminated. In response, she contends Howell simply told her she no longer had a job and failed to mention anything about the Diageo negotiations and subsequent restructuring of the spirit sales representative/brokers positions. Moreover, Podkovich claims she inquired as to why Coffman would not return or answer her telephone calls. She contends she was advised that Hoffman told Coffman not to have any contact with Podkovich. Although the parties agree that Howell mentioned that Podkovich might be able to relocate, Podkovich further avers his subsequent comments made it apparent that Podkovich would have to pick up and transfer to a distant location immediately. In contrast, Glazer’s contends that Pod-kovich received leave paperwork for both periods of her FMLA leave and that her FMLA leave expired nearly one month prior to the date Podkovieh attempted to return to work. Moreover, Glazer’s argues that Coffman did take phone calls from Podkovieh while she was on leave and disputes the contention that Howell advised Coffman not to take Podkovich’s calls. Further, Glazer’s denies Podkovich’s claims that she received a phone call from Howell on November 11, 2003, in which he informed her her position had been eliminated. Rather, Glazer’s asserts the first time Podkovieh was informed her position had been eliminated was on November 12, 2003, at the meeting that occurred at the Des Moines office. Glazer’s also refutes Podkovich’s contentions that Howell behaved in a rude and hostile manner toward Podkovieh, demanded she sign the severance agreement and represented Glazer’s would not contest her unemployment if she accepted the severance agreement. Glazer’s admits that Podkovieh requested information about why she was being terminated, but in contrast to Pod-kovich’s rendition of the facts, indicates Howell thoroughly explained the impact that the Diageo contract had on her position. Further, Glazer’s denies Podkovich’s version of the facts with respect to the position that was offered to her. Rather, Glazer’s simply contends that Howell offered Podkovieh another position, albeit conditioned on her willingness to relocate to Cedar Rapids, Iowa. B. Procedural Background On October 15, 2004, Podkovieh filed a three-count complaint in this court against Glazer’s Distributors of Iowa, Inc., Glazer’s Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., Douglas Howell and Michael Coffman, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil .Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (hereinafter “Title VII”), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (hereinafter “PDA”); the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et. seq. (hereinafter “FMLA”); and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Chapter 216 (hereinafter “ICRA”). More specifically, in Count I, Podkovieh asserts claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination against Glazer’s Distributors of Iowa, Inc. and Glazer’s Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. In addition, Count I asserts the previously-named defendants retaliated against Podkovieh for reporting the sexual harassment and discrimination. In Count II, Podkovieh asserts certain violations of the FMLA. Particularly relevant to the current motion is the plaintiffs claim that the defendants refused to restore the plaintiff to her job or an equivalent position upon the expiration of her FMLA leave. Count III mirrors the allegations set forth in Count I, asserting claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination, but pleads these facts as state-law claims under the ICRA. Following the filing of the plaintiffs initial complaint, on December 13, 2004, the defendants filed an answer, generally denying the plaintiffs’ allegations and asserting myriad affirmative defenses (Doc. No. 3). Thereafter, on May 26, 2006, the defendants filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 22). The plaintiff filed her Resistance to the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2006 (Doc. No. 25). The defendants filed their Reply to the Plaintiffs Resistance on July 18, 2006 (Doc. No. 30). Neither party requested oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the court deems the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as fully submitted on the parties’ written submissions. Accordingly, this matter is ready for a determination by this court. II. LEGAL ANALYSIS The court will now turn its attention to a brief survey of the standards applicable to the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and then to the application of those standards to the critical issues involved in this case. A. Standards For Summary Judgment The parties here agree generally on the standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defending party may move, at any time, for summary judgment in that party’s favor “as to all or any part” of the claims against that party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As this court has explained on a number of occasions, applying the standards of Rule 56, the judge’s function at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Bunda v. Potter, 369 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1046 (N.D.Iowa 2005); Steck v. Francis, 365 F.Supp.2d 951, 959-60 (N.D.Iowa 2005); Lorenzen v. GKN Armstrong Wheels, Inc., 345 F.Supp.2d 977, 984 (N.D.Iowa 2004); Nelson v. Long Lines Ltd., 335 F.Supp.2d 944, 954 (N.D.Iowa 2004); Soto v. John Morrell & Co., 315 F.Supp.2d 981, 988 (N.D.Iowa 2004); see also Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir.1996); Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir.1990). In reviewing the record, the court must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. See Matsu-shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377. Procedurally, the moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4R1 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir.1998); Reed v. Woodruff County, Ark., 7 F.3d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1993). When a moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment is required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.CivP. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Rabushka ex. rel. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 562 (8th Cir.1997); McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.1995); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir.1995). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if it has a real basis in the record. Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 394 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under, the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment,” i.e., are “material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1326; Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 394. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1492 (8th Cir.1997). Ultimately, the necessary proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that “summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases.” See Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994). This exceptional deference shown the nonmoving party is warranted, according to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, “Because discrimination cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence. ...” E.E.O.C. v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc) (citing Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341; Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir.1999)), and because “intent” is generally a central issue in employment discrimination cases. Christopher v. Adam’s Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Gill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-6, Fesüts, Mo., 32 F.3d 376, 378 (8th Cir.1994)). Nonetheless, this exercise of judicial prudence “cannot and should not be construed to exempt” from summary judgment, employment discrimination cases involving intent. Christopher, 137 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir.1995)). The fact remains that “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendants intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Furthermore, “where the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate.” Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Crain v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir.1990)). The court will apply these standards to the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the court must first observe that stating the legal principles of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases is a simple task. Applying those principles to the paper record that forms the judicial crucible that decides which plaintiffs may proceed to trial and which get dismissed is far more daunting. Missing in the standard incantation of summary judgment principles is the role of experience. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881). Thus, experience teaches that thoughtful deliberation of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases is grounded in the consideration of each case through a lens filtered by the following observations. Employment discrimination and retaliation, except in the rarest cases, is difficult to prove. It is perhaps more difficult to prove today — more than forty years after the passage of Title VII — than during Title VII’s earlier evolution, and a dozen years after the passage of the FMLA, both of which are at issue here. Today’s employers, even those with only a scintilla of sophistication, will neither admit discriminatory or retaliatory intent, nor leave a well-developed trail demonstrating it. See, e.g., Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697-98 (7th Cir.1987). Because adverse employment actions almost always involve a high degree of discretion, and most plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are at will, it is a simple task for employers to concoct plausible reasons for virtually any adverse employment action ranging from failure to hire to discharge. This is especially true, because the very best workers are seldom employment discrimination plaintiffs due to sheer economics: Because the economic costs to the employer for discrimination are proportional to the caliber of the employee, discrimination against the best employees is the least cost effective. See, e.g., id. Rather, discrimination plaintiffs tend to be those average or below-average workers — equally protected by Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, or the FMLA — for whom plausible rationales for adverse employment actions are readily fabricated by employers with even a meager imagination. See, e.g., id. Consequently, with both the legal standards for summary judgment and the teachings of experience in hand, the court turns to consideration of the parties’ arguments for and against summary judgment. B. Arguments Of The Parties 1. The defendants’ argument in support of summary judgment In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendants attack nearly every aspect of the plaintiffs complaint. First, with respect to the plaintiffs claims under the FMLA, the defendants contend Podkovich was not eligible for FMLA leave, and therefore, is precluded from bringing such a claim. The defendants point out, that as a threshold matter, even if an employee meets all the prerequisites in order to be eligible for coverage under the statute, that employee may be excluded from eligibility if she was “employed at a worksite at which the employer employs less than 50 employees and the total number of employees within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(a), 2611(2)(b)(l). With respect to Podkovich, the defendants contend that, under the FMLA and corresponding guidance, Pod-kovich’s worksite was Sioux City and that there is no dispute Glazer’s employed less than fifty employees within seventy-five miles of Sioux City. The defendants contend that if Podkovich’s worksite is defined as anywhere but Sioux City, Congress’s purpose underlying the 50/75 provision will be undermined, and that summary judgment is warranted on this ground. Moreover, the defendants claim Podkovich is precluded from relying on a theory of equitable estoppel because she is unable to set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate detrimental reliance on any statements by Glazer’s that her leave was covered and protected by the FMLA. In the alternative, if the merits of Pod-kovich’s FMLA claims are reached, the defendants argue that her claims still must fail because her position was eliminated. The defendants point out that as long as an employer can show a lawful reason for not restoring an employee on FMLA leave to her position, the employer is justified in its actions. Thus, argue the defendants, because Podkovich’s position was legitimately eliminated based on the negotiations with Diageo, her claim necessarily fails and summary judgment is warranted. In addition, the defendants aver that Pod-kovich’s FMLA claims fail on the merits for a second reason — namely, that she failed to return to work after exhausting her twelve weeks of FMLA leave. The defendants contend that Podkovich’s twelve weeks of FMLA leave ended on October 10, 2003, but that Podkovich did not return to work until November 7, 2003. Thus, because Podkovich did not return from her leave within twelve weeks, the defendants argue she had no right to reinstatement or any other remedy available under the FMLA. Additionally, the defendants claim that, once again, Podkovich cannot rely on a theory of estoppel because she cannot prove detrimental reliance on Glazer’s assertions that her leave lasted until November 7, 2003, because she was incapacitated and could not return to work, regardless of the length, or lack thereof, of her FMLA leave. Moreover, with respect to Podkovich’s claim that she was discharged because she took FMLA leave, the defendants argue Podkovich cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. This is so, aver the defendants, because she cannot establish a causal connection between her FMLA leave and her subsequent termination. At best, the only evidence tending to establish a causal link is the temporal proximity between Podkovich’s FMLA leave and her termination. This, state the defendants, is not enough to survive a motion for summary judgment. In the alternative, assuming Podkovich can establish a prima facie case, under the burden-shifting analysis applied to such claims, the defendants allege they have articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge and that she cannot demonstrate Glazer’s stated reason is pretextual in nature. As such, the defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted on all aspects of Podko-vich’s FMLA claim. With respect to Podkovich’s claim that she was retaliated against for making a complaint of sexual harassment, the defendants contend summary judgment is warranted on both Podkovich’s claim under Title VII and her claim under the ICRA. The defendants argue Podkovich’s claims of retaliation fail for the same reasons that her FMLA retaliation claim fails. Specifically, the defendants contend Podkovich cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she cannot assert sufficient facts demonstrating a causal nexus between her discharge and her complaint of sexual harassment. Additionally, the defendants again contend they have set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Podkovich’s discharge and that she cannot sufficiently prove pretext. As such, the defendants argue summary judgment is appropriate. The defendants assert these same arguments with respect to Podkovich’s pregnancy discrimination claim, and argue summary judgment should be granted on that claim as well. 2. The plaintiff’s arguments in resistance Predictably, the plaintiff contends there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was eligible for FMLA leave and therefore, entitled to bring a claim under the FMLA. First, the plaintiff argues her worksite, for the purposes of FMLA leave was in Des Moines, not the Sioux City branch location, as the defendants contend. This is so, according to Podkovich, because the Code of Federal Regulations indicates that when an employee has no fixed worksite, for FMLA purposes, the worksite is construed to be the office to which the employee reports and receives assignments. In Podkovieh’s case, the majority of her assignments and reports came from and were sent to the Des Moines office. Because more than 75 people were employed at the Des Moines site, Podkovich contends there is no question that she was eligible for FMLA leave. Alternatively, Podkovich avers that the defendants are estopped from asserting she was not eligible for FMLA leave. Podko-vich argues Glazer’s represented to her, on numerous occasions, that she was qualified to take FMLA leave and eligible for FMLA benefits. Because she detrimentally relied on these representations, Podko-vich avers the defendants are estopped from asserting ineligibility as an affirmative defense. Thus, the plaintiff argues there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was eligible for FMLA leave or whether the defendants are es-topped from challenging as such. Accordingly, Podkovich contends summary judgment is precluded. Podkovich also challenges the defendants’ argument that because she used more than twelve weeks of leave, Glazer’s was under no obligation to reinstate her. Podkovich essentially relies again on an equitable estoppel theory, asserting that she was repeatedly told her FMLA leave expired on November 7, 2003, by Glazer’s representatives. In addition, Podkovich argues she never filled out or received a copy of the leave form filed for her second term of leave. Thus, she contends she was not provided with the requisite written documentation designating her leave as FMLA. Additionally, Podkovich asserts that she detrimentally relied on the date provided by Glazer’s and even though she was sick, asserts she could have attempted to return to work or made different arrangements if she had known the date was incorrect. Further, Podkovich argues she has adequately set forth a prima facie case of an FMLA substantive violation. With respect to the causal connection between her termination and the exercise of her rights, Podkovich argues that the temporal proximity of her return from FMLA leave and her immediate termination sufficiently demonstrate a causal link. This is so, according to Podkovich, in light of the fact she was terminated immediately after she sought to return to work after her FMLA leave had expired. In addition, Podkovich asserts she has generated a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the pretex-tual nature of Glazer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason because the Diageo negotiations concluded nearly two months before she attempted to return back to work. Under this premise, Glazer’s had no continued obligation to provide her with continued FMLA leave and group health coverage, but did so anyway. Podkovich argues these facts create a sufficient inference of pretext because they tend to show that the Diageo contract was not the real reason behind Glazer’s decision to terminate Podkovich. Additionally, Podkovich points to the fact that although she was allegedly terminated two months before her leave expired, she was not advised of this decision until she attempted to return to work. Because Glazer’s waited two months before advising her of termination, Podkovich contends the Diageo deal was not the true reason for her termination and that Glazer’s was simply lying in wait to terminate her. Podkovich additionally asserts that further indicia of pretext is the fact that Coffman refused to return her telephone calls while she was on FMLA leave and that at the meeting held in Des Moines, when she inquired as to why she was being terminated, no one mentioned the Diageo deal, only that her position had been eliminated. These factors, according to Podkovich, generate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of causation and pretext. With respect to her retaliation claims under Title VII and the ICRA, Podkovich contends a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she was discharged in retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment, thereby precluding summary judgment on these claims. While the defendants argue the amount of time that elapsed from the timing of Podkovich’s complaint and the date she was terminated negate any inference of causation and pretext, Podkovich disagrees based on the alleged threat that was communicated to both her and her boyfriend. Essentially, taking the facts in a light most favorable to her, Podkovich contends both she and her boyfriend were told they would be fired if word got out about the true reason Wan-derscheid left the company. In addition, she avers that she was treated negatively after she made the report. Finally, on the same date she was terminated, it was revealed to her boyfriend that it had become common knowledge amongst Glazer’s employees that Wanderscheid left the company as a result of Podkovich’s sexual harassment complaint. These facts, according to Podkovich, are sufficient to generate a question of fact with respect to the causation and pretext elements. Finally, with respect to her pregnancy discrimination claim, Podkovich again argues there is sufficient evidence in the record to defeat a motion for summary judgment. She argues that, taking the facts in a light most favorable to her, causation and pretext have been established. First, she points to the temporal proximity between her termination and her pregnancy. Additionally, she contends that Coffman, her supervisor, inquired about her due date and made statements suggesting that Podkovich needed to be available for the holiday show, even though it closely coincided with her predicted date of delivery. Further, Podkovich relies on her allegations that Coffman treated her differently after learning she was pregnant. For example, Podkovich argues that Coffman refused to assist her with physically demanding and strenuous work like he had when Podkovich had not been pregnant. Moreover, Podkovich notes that Coffman became increasingly critical of her performance after learning of her pregnancy and began writing her up for performance issues as she progressed in her pregnancy. Prior to when she was out on leave, Podkovich never received a write-up from Coffman. Further, Podko-vich points to her assertions that after she took leave for the second time in August, Coffman refused to return any of her phone calls, even though she had been advised to call and check in on a weekly basis. Podkovich argues these facts are sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issues of causation and pretext and that, therefore, summary judgment on her pregnancy discrimination claim is inappropriate as a result. Having identified all of the pertinent undisputed and disputed facts, the court will now proceed to address the merits of the parties’ respective arguments. However, a brief overview of the FMLA is first necessary in order to facilitate the court’s discussion. C. Eligibility To Bring FMLA Claim The FMLA was enacted, in part, “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families ... [and] to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons ... in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The Act entitles eligible employees of covered employers to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave each year because of, among other things, “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). As part of the balance Congress struck between the interests of employers and the interests of employees, the FMLA includes a small employer exception that excludes from the Act’s coverage employers with fewer than fifty employees. Id. § 2611 (4) (A) (i). A separate exception was granted for small operations — that is, a potentially large company with a relatively small satellite office in a particular area. Specifically, the statute excludes from coverage any employee whose employer employs less than fifty employees within seventy-five miles of that employee’s “worksite.” Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). According to the House Committee Report, the 50/75 provision “recognizes the difficulties an employer may have in reassigning workers to geographically separate facilities.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-135(1), at 37 (1991). “Where a plaintiff does not qualify as an ‘eligible employee,’ the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the FMLA case.” Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir.2004). It is the plaintiff who bears the burden of showing the existence of an FMLA claim. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 930 (11th Cir.2003). With these eligibility restrictions, Congress recognized that only about 40 to 50 percent of all employees would be covered by the Act. S. Rep. No. 102-68, at 24 (1991); H.R. Rep. No. 102-135(1), at 37 (1991). 1. Definition of “worksite” Congress granted the Secretary of Labor the authority to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2654. Based on the Secretary’s guidance, an employee’s work-site is ordinarily the location to which the employee reports. 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a). In cases where there is no such identifiable report site, “then the location designated as the employee’s worksite is the site from which the employee’s work is assigned.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a). The regulation proceeds to clarify the “work-site” of an employee with “no fixed work-site,” such as salespersons, as the office the salesperson reports to and from which assignments are made. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(2). The assignment test has been determined to focus on the “day-today instructions received by the sales representatives, notwithstanding centralized payroll and certain other centralized managerial or personnel functions.” Cialini v. Nilfisk-Advance Am., Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-3954, 2000 WL 230215, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Feb.28, 2000) (citing Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 143 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir.1998)). Central to the reporting element is “the location of the personnel who were primarily responsible for reviewing sales reports and other information sent by the sales representatives, in order to record sales, assess employee performance, develop new sales strategies, and the like.” Id. at *5 (citing Ciarlante, 143 F.3d at 148). One important caveat contained in the regulations with respect to sales representatives, however, is that “an employee’s personal residence is not a worksite in the case of employees such as salespersons who travel a sales territory and who generally leave to work and return from work to their personal residence, or employees who work at home, as under the new concept of flexiplace.” Id. In these types of situations, the “worksite” for FMLA purposes is the office to which they report and from which assignments are made. Id. Courts have applied the Secretary’s guidance in varying contexts and arrived at differing results. Compare Cialini, 2000 WL 230215, with Collinsworth v. Earthlink/Onemain, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-2299GTV, 2003 WL 22916461 (D.Kan. Dec.4, 2003). For example, in Cialini v. Nilfisk-Advance America, Inc., the court granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment based on its conclusion that a foreign employer’s North American facility in Pennsylvania was not the “work-site” of outside sales representatives based on the following set of facts. Cialini, 2000 WL 230215, at *6. First, instead of reporting to the Pennsylvania facility, the sales representatives reported to one of three regional sales managers located in California and Rhode Island. Cialini, 2000 WL 230215, at *1. These regional managers conducted initial interviews with applicants in the field and final interviews were conducted at the Pennsylvania facility. Id. Training was held in Pennsylvania, where personnel records were maintained and checks issued. Id. Representatives turned in weekly call and expense reports, the originals of which were sent to Pennsylvania for a random cross-sampling by the national sales manager. Id. at *2. Copies were forwarded to the regional managers, who reviewed them, tracked each salesperson’s progress with leads, set up ride-alongs on a quarterly or trimesterly basis, provided hands-on field training, set yearly budgets and sales targets, and evaluated field performance. Id. Regional managers also determined when and whether each representative attended trade shows. Id. It was the national sales manager’s testimony that regional managers were ultimately responsible for creating assignments and receiving reports from sales representatives. Id. at *4. Therefore, the court concluded that the Pennsylvania location was not the salesperson’s “worksite” for purposes of the FMLA, primarily because the Pennsylvania location functioned merely as a centralized facility for administration, at least with respect to the employees at issue. Id. at *6. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. In contrast to, yet reconcilable with, Cialini is Collinsworth v. Earthlink/One-main, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-2299GTV, 2003 WL 22916461 (D.Kan. Dec.4, 2003). There, the plaintiff worked for Earthlink both from her home and in its Overland Park, Kansas office. CollinswoHh, 2003 WL 22916461 at *3. The defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting the plaintiff was ineligible to bring an FMLA claim because Earthlink had never employed more than fifty employees within seventy-five miles of its Overland Park location. Id. at *2. In her affidavit in response to the employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff maintained that (1) her work assignments were communicated to her via electronic mail, telephone conference and facsimile from Earthlink’s Pasadena, California location; (2) work assignments over a period of time were forwarded to supervisors in Pasadena; (3) she reported to supervisors in California and (4) was required to travel there at intervals to meet with them. Id. at *4. Upon review, the court found the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was an “eligible employee” under the FMLA based on the location of her “worksite,” and denied the employer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. Thus, these two cases reveal that, at least for FMLA purposes, the “worksite” location necessarily will turn upon the facts and circumstances of each individual employee. However, these two illustrative cases can be reconciled by virtue of the fact they both rely on the proposition that in order to be considered as an employee’s worksite, the individual’s contacts with that location must be based on something more than mere centralized management functions. Based on the foregoing cases and conclusions, it is the opinion of this court that, taking the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, as this court must, it is apparent that the case at bar is nearly identical to the facts at issue in Collins-worth. For instance, although Podkovich’s physical worksite was in Sioux City and she had an office available to her there, Podkovich has offered evidence showing that her training, job assignments and authorizations came from Des Moines. In addition, Podkovich regularly reported to her supervisors in Des Moines, who reviewed her sales and she was required to travel there at intervals in order to meet with her supervisors. Thus, as in Collinswovth, Podkovich has brought forth sufficient evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she is an eligible employee under the statute. Therefore, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiffs “worksite” for purposes of the FMLA was Des Moines. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(2); Collins-worth, 2003 WL 22916461 at *4. This is true particularly in light of the fact that Podkovich’s contacts with the Des Moines location did not occur solely as a result of centralized managerial functions. Accordingly, the defendants’ dispositive motion, with respect to this ground, is hereby denied. 2. Estoppel Although the court has previously determined summary judgment is not warranted based on the defendants’ argument that Podkovich was not an “eligible employee,” the court will proceed to address the plaintiffs alternative argument against summary judgment — that of equitable estoppel. Essentially, the plaintiff argues Glazer’s should be equitably estopped from asserting an affirmative defense that Podkovich was not an eligible employee because company representatives and associates repeatedly represented to her that she was not only eligible to apply for, but also to take, FMLA leave. “The principle of [equitable] estoppel declares that a party who makes a representation that misleads another person, who then reasonably relies on that representation to his detriment, may not deny the representation.” Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 659 (8th Cir.1992); see also Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984) (referring to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to define equitable estoppel as warranted in situations where one person has misrepresented facts and another person reasonably relies on the misrepresentation to his or her detriment). The doctrine of equitable estoppel has previously been applied to estop employers from asserting an affirmative defense contesting an employee’s entitlement to FMLA leave. See Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 493-94 (8th Cir.2002) (citing Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 724-25 (2d Cir.2001) (affirming the district court’s decision to estop an employer from asserting an affirmative defense challenging an employee’s FMLA eligibility when the employer’s unintentional misleading behavior caused the employee to justifiably and detrimentally rely on the FMLA leave); Woodford v. Cmty. Action of Greene County, Inc., 268 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir.2001) (authorizing equitable estoppel where an employer initially provided notice of eligibility for leave and later seeks to challenge it); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir.2000) (recognizing a district court’s ability to equitably estop employers from asserting an affirmative defense contesting an employee’s entitlement to FMLA leave in situations where the employer’s words or conduct have misled the employee into relying on the leave)). In the present case, taking the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, at no time prior to the institution of this lawsuit did Glazer’s ever advise Podkovich that she was not eligible for FMLA leave, or even imply that there was uncertainty with respect to her eligibility. Rather, it is clear from the record that Glazer’s treated Podkovich, at all times prior to the lawsuit, as an eligible employee. With respect to her first period of FMLA leave that began in March of 2003, Glazer’s provided Podkovich with a Leave Request and Response form, which Podkovich used to request FMLA leave. Glazer’s then utilized the form to document that Podkovich’s leave had been approved and would be counted against her FMLA entitlement. Although Glazer’s did not provide, nor did Podkovich fill out documentation for her second term of leave, numerous company representatives, according to the testimony of Podkovich, represented to her that she was entitled to FMLA leave and advised her as to when her FMLA leave would expire. Moreover, contrary to the defendants’ assertions, there is sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Podkovich relied on these statements. Not only did she take leave under the guise of being protected by the FMLA in March, months later, she again took what she thought was qualified FMLA leave time. Although the defendants attempt to undermine Podko-vich’s alleged detrimental reliance by asserting Podkovich would have had to take leave “no matter what,” because she was so ill, such an allegation is not sufficient to warrant summary judgment in light of the other facts and circumstances of the case. Simply because Podkovich was arguably too sick to work does not axiomatically disprove detrimental reliance. Rather, it is clear, taking the facts in a light most favorable to Podkovich, that she did rely on the company’s representation that she qualified for FMLA leave because she did not look into pursuing other options to secure her leave time. Rather, she assumed her leave was covered and that her position was protected under the FMLA. This is further demonstrated by the fact that Podkovich called in during the first week of November to coordinate her return on November 7, 2003, the date that was provided to her by Glazer’s representatives. Thus, these facts, if proved, could lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is appropriate in this case. Thus, summary judgment is also not warranted with respect to Podkovich’s FMLA claims on this ground. D. The Substantive FMLA Claims 1. FMLA claims generally As mentioned elsewhere in this opinion, the FMLA entitles eligible employees to take a total of twelve weeks of leave during a twelve-month period due to “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). When an employee completes her FMLA leave, she is generally entitled to be restored to the position she occupied before she took leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). However, an employee’s restoration rights are limited, such that no employee taking FMLA leave is entitled to “any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B). Because the FMLA grants valuable leave and restoration rights to eligible employees, it also secures these rights against unlawful infringement. The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under” the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). A violation of this provision creates what is commonly known as the interference/entitlement theory of recovery. 29 U.S.C. § 2617; see, e.g., Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960 (10th Cir.2002). The FMLA also makes it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). A violation of this provision creates what is commonly known as the discrimination/retaliation theory of recovery. 29 U.S.C. § 2617; see, e.g., Smith, 298 F.3d at 960. 2. Podkovich’s interference claim As alluded to in the preceding discussion, the “interference” or “entitlement” theory, which arises from § 2615(a)(1), states that “it shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA],” and from § 2614(a)(1), which provides that “any eligible employee who takes leave ... shall be entitled, on return from such leave (A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1) and 2614(a)(1). The “interference” or “entitlement” theory “is derived from the FMLA’s creation of substantive rights”. Consequently, “[i]f an employer interferes with the FMLA-created right to ... leave or to reinstatement following the leave, a violation has occurred.” Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 401 (6th Cir.2003) (citing King v. Preferred, Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir.1999)). To prevail on her interference claim, Podkovich must establish that Glazer’s denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. The FMLA is structured to grant leave rights to qualified employees. Perhaps even more importantly, however, the FMLA also grants the right to restoration upon completion of the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A). However, as the Eighth Circuit has recently noted, an employee who takes FMLA leave does not have unlimited restoration rights upon returning from leave. Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 977-78 (8th Cir.2005). As mentioned above, the FMLA specifically states an employee taking FMLA leave is not entitled to “any right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (“An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period. An employer must be able to show that an employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstatement is requested in order to deny restoration to employment.”). In Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hospital, the Eighth Circuit thoroughly discussed the appropriate interpretation of the FMLA: [T]he FMLA envisions employees taking leave and returning to work as valuable rights working in concert with each other, i.e., the FMLA does not require an employer to retain an employee on FMLA leave if that employee has no right to return to work. The reason is the FMLA does not provide leave for leave’s sake, but instead provides leave with an expectation an employee will return to work after the leave ends. Therefore, the FMLA’s plain language and structure dictates that, if an employer were authorized to discharge an employee if the employee were not on FMLA leave, the FMLA does not shield an employee on FMLA leave from the same, lawful discharge. This interpretation also tracks the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the FMLA. The Department of Labor, acting under its congressional authority to implement the FMLA, see 29 U.S.C. § 2654, permits employers to lawfully interfere with employees’ rights to take FMLA leave. For example, the FMLA regulations state, “If an employee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA leave and employment is terminated, the employer’s responsibility to continue FMLA leave, maintain group health plan benefits and restore the employee cease at the time the employee is laid off, provided the employer has no continuing obligations under a collective bargaining