Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER MARRERO, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION. ..697 TT. FACTS . .697 REMOVAL OF ANTONIA AND HER SIBLINGS.697 FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS AFTER THE REMOVAL.699 ANTONIAS STAY AT THE CHILDREN’S CENTER.700 1. Conditions of the Children’s Center.700 2. Antonia’s Stay at the Children’s Center from January 22-23, 2003.701 ANTONIA’S TRANSPORTATION TO THE FOSTER HOME.706 TIMING OF THE INJURY.708 ANTONIA’S STAY AT THE FOSTER HOME.708 1. Phone Conversation Between Seda and Cartagena.709 2. Events on January 25, 2003 .710 TIT. CLAIMS .711 IV. LEGAL STANDARD. V. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST CITY . A. CLAIMS ARISING FROM ANTONIA’S REMOVAL FROM HER PARENTS’ CUSTODY. (M rH t- 1. Rooker-Feldman’s Procedural Requirements Are Met. CO t — { 2. Rooker-Feldman’s Substantive Requirements Are Met. uj t — I o B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CLAIMS AGAINST KINSEY, RIVERA, AND VORHEES. C. LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO ANTONIA AT ACS FACILITY UNDER COUNT TWO. —J] H SO 1. Kinsey, Rivera, and Vorhees. M to 2. Webb-Alexander. —3 M to 3. Unnamed Defendants. *vj tO rf*. D. LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO ANTONIA AT ACS FACILITY UNDER COUNT FOUR . CD 1. Whether the City Can Be Liable Absent a Constitutional Violation by a Named Defendant. U5 t- 2. Whether the Constitutional Violations Were a Result of an Official Policy or Custom. “0] to a. Inadequate Training. to b. Inadequate Supervision . to c. Inadequate Hiring. “si CO 3. State Law Claims. ■O CO E. CITY LIABILITY FOR FOSTER AGENCY DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS . CO CO t- VI. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST FOSTER AGENCY DEFENDANTS. ''St* A. WHETHER PHILLIPS AND GREEN HAVE STANDING TO BRING INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS UNDER § 1983 . cO t~ B. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS. i£) CO t* 1. Whether CHB and Seda Were Acting under Color of State Law_ <0 CO l> 2. Whether CHB and Seda Had the Requisite Deliberate Indifference OO CO E> C. STATE LAW CLAIMS.741 1. Whether CHB and Seda Acted Negligently.741 2. Proximate Cause..742 3. Qualified Immunity under Social Services Law § 419.743 VII. ORDER . .744 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Antonia Phillips (“Antonia”) by her parents, Gertral Green (“Green”) and Antonio Phillips (“Phillips”), as well as Green and Phillips individually (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought this action asserting federal constitutional and state law violations. The case arose out of the removal of Antonia from Green’s and Phillips’s custody by New York City employees and the severe injuries Antonia sustained allegedly after her removal, either during her stay at a New York City facility for children awaiting placement in a foster home, or during her subsequent placement in a foster home. Plaintiffs have sued (1) the City of New York (the “City”) and several of its employees (collectively, the “City Defendants”) who were involved in the decision to remove Antonia from her parents’ custody and who cared for her prior to foster care placement; (2) Catholic Home Bureau (“CHB”), a private, not-for-profit foster care agency that contracts with the City to provide foster care placement services, and its employee Maria Seda (“Seda”) (collectively, the “Foster Agency Defendants”); and (3) Cielo Cartagena (“Cart-agena”), the foster mother with whom Antonia was placed in foster care. The City Defendants and the Foster Agency Defendants have each moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part. II. FACTS A. REMOVAL OF ANTONIA AND HER SIBLINGS Antonia was born on May 17, 2002 to Green and Phillips. On September 9, 2002, Green informed the staff at the Baruch Houses, where she then resided with Phillips, Antonia, and her two other children, Alicia (born June 30, 1998) and My-kle (born July 17, 1997), that Phillips had hit Mykle with a belt, causing marks. Staff at the Baruch Houses contacted the City’s Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), and on September 11, 2002, an ACS caseworker filed a petition for neglect against both Green and Phillips in Manhattan Family Court. On November 18, 2002, Family Court Judge Sara P. Schechter (“Judge Schechter”) issued an order (the “November 18, 2002 Order”) determining that Phillips had used excessive corporal punishment and provided inadequate guardianship. Judge Schechter also issued an Order of Protection directing Phillips to stay out of the home and away from the children. The November 18, 2002 Order granted an “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal,” paroling the children to Green under ACS supervision on the condition that she comply with all court directives, including enforcing the Order of Protection and attending counseling and parenting classes. Shortly thereafter, the case was assigned to an ACS court-ordered supervision unit and defendant Kakilia Kinsey (“Kinsey”) was assigned as ACS caseworker. In December 2002 and January 2003, Kinsey documented growing concerns about Green’s care of the children, specifically: that she had given Antonia away to another person; that she claimed to be employed at a Payless Shoe store but that the manager had never heard of her and there was no record of Green in the company’s computer; that Phillips had visited with the children despite the Order of Protection; that Green was smoking marijuana in the apartment; that Antonia was allegedly staying for a few days with godparents, who denied caring for her; and that Green did not produce Antonia at ACS’s request. Although Plaintiffs do not dispute that Kinsey documented these concerns, they dispute the “validity” of her concerns. However, Plaintiffs do not cite to any evidence to support their version of this dispute in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(e) and Local Rule 56.1(d). On the afternoon of January 22, 2003, ACS convened a meeting after learning that Green had given Antonia away to another person, Raquel Simmons (“Simmons”), and that Green had called the police to accuse Simmons of kidnapping. The meeting was attended by Green, Antonia, Simmons, Kinsey, defendant ACS Supervisor II Jesus Rivera (“Rivera”), defendant ACS Child Protective Manager Kim Vorhees (“Vorhees”), and others. At the meeting, Green and Simmons exchanged verbal insults, and the two women gave differing accounts of how long Simmons had been caring for Antonia: Green said a short time, while Simmons said since October 2002. That meeting caused Vorhees to become concerned about violations of the November 18, 2002 Order, the whereabouts of Antonia, and the ability of ACS to comply with the November 18, 2002 Order and supervise the Green home when the children were not there. After consultation with an ACS deputy director, Vo-rhees made the decision to remove all three children from Green’s care. This decision was made on that day, sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. B. FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS AFTER THE REMOVAL On January 24, 2003, a preliminary hearing occurred in Family Court, after which Judge Sehechter signed an order (the “January 24, 2003 Order”) directing temporary removal of the children based on Green’s failure “substantially to observe the terms of [the November 18, 2002] order.” (Order dated Jan. 24, 2003, attached as Ex. D to Affidavit of Suzanne M. Hal-bardier, dated Dec. 2, 2005 (“Halbardier Aff.”), at FC0131; see also Def. Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs dispute that Green was given notice of the January 24, 2003 proceedings. Although the transcript of the hearing indicates that Green’s counsel was present, Green herself was not, and Green’s counsel stated during the hearing that her client did not know she was supposed to be in court that day. Neither party has offered any explanation as to how Green’s counsel, but not Green herself, received notice of the hearing, or as to why Green’s counsel did not inform her of the proceeding if she was aware that Green did not know about it. The City Defendants agree that Green should have received notice, but contend that this requirement was satisfied because Rivera gave her oral notice at the time of Antonia’s removal that they were going to court the next day and that she had to “show up” “in order to have any chance upon (sic) getting her child back.” (City Def. Rule 56.1 Response ¶ 6; Deposition of Jesus Manuel Rivera, dated Feb. 7, 2005 (“Rivera Dep.”), attached as Ex. F to Halbardier Aff., at 178.) According to Plaintiffs, ACS policies require, upon removal of a child from custody, immediate written notice in the form of a “701B notice,” which gives the parent or custodian the right to a hearing by the next court business day following removal. Plaintiffs also contend that the hearing should have been conducted on January 23, 2003, not January 24, 2003. Plaintiffs contend that ACS had a policy, mandate, guideline, or regulation that a petition was to be filed within 24 hours after an emergency removal without a court order. Thus, since the removal was carried out on Wednesday January 22, 2003, the petition should have been filed no later than Thursday, January 23, 2003. Rivera testified that such a petition should be filed within 24 hours or the next business day. The City Defendants agree that ACS workers were directed to go to court within 24 hours but dispute that this was a “regulation” or “mandate,” pointing out that the relevant statute in 2003 required a hearing within three days. The City Defendants also point out that Kinsey did go to court on Thursday, January 23, 2003, but that a delay ensued, allegedly on account of confusion as to which type of petition needed to be filed, thus causing the hearing to occur on Friday, January 24, 2003 instead. The City Defendants also dispute that Judge Schechter would have made any different determination on Thursday than she would have on Friday. After further hearings and fact finding, Judge Schechter signed an order on March 28, 2003, finding that Green had indeed violated the terms of the November 18, 2002 Order by giving Alicia and Antonia to caretakers without informing ACS, actively misrepresenting the children’s whereabouts to ACS, and smoking marijuana in the children’s presence. On April 8, 2003, the Family Court signed an Order of Neglect against Green. The children remain in foster care. C. ANTONIA’S STAY AT THE CHIL-DRENS CENTER At 8:40 p.m. on the evening of January 22, 2003, Rivera and Kinsey brought Antonia and her siblings to ACS’s Pre-Placement Services (the “Children’s Center”), where children who have been removed from a parent or guardian are brought and medically cleared for placement. 1. Conditions of the Children’s Center The City Defendants describe the Children’s Center as having various forms of security, including a metal detector at the main entrance through which children enter, the requirement that all persons entering the building must display an ACS identification badge or sign in at the security desk, and another entrance monitored by a security guard. Also according to the City Defendants, children are present only on the second and third floors, except for when they enter and leave on the first floor; at least one security guard is posted at all times on the second and third floors; nurses’ units are on the second and third floors; children and teenagers are always accompanied by a staff member; and if any unaccompanied children or strangers are ever present on the second or third floor, ACS employees and security guards are trained to intervene and contact a supervisor. Plaintiffs dispute these facts by challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit upon which they rest. Specifically, the City submitted an affidavit of Willie Maye (“Maye”), the Director of Pre-Placement Services at ACS. According to Plaintiffs, Maye’s affidavit does not indicate that he had personal knowledge of the ACS facility’s conditions as they existed when Antonia was there on January 22-23, 2003, and that the description he provided matches the conditions as they existed on those days. It is true that Maye’s affidavit does not expressly state that it is made “on the basis of personal knowledge.” However, Maye had been the Director of Pre-Placement Services at ACS since May 22, 2001 and prior to that time and since March 21, 1999 had been Deputy Director. (See Affidavit of Willie Maye, Jr., dated Dec. 1, 2005, ¶ 1, attached as Ex. L to Halbardier Aff.) Maye further indicated that from his position as Director, he was familiar with the management, security, and oversight of children in the facility’s care. (Id. ¶ 1.) The Court finds no adequate basis upon which a rational factfinder could reasonably infer that Maye’s position — which he held during the relevant time frame — and his sworn statement that he was familiar with the management and security of the Children’s Center would not give him sufficient personal knowledge of the facility. Accordingly, the Court has considered Maye’s affidavit. The ACS employees who directly care for the children at the Children’s Center are called childcare workers or “Children’s Counselors.” According to Maye, prior to working at the Children’s Center, these employees prepare an employment application and submit to a criminal background check. Maye also stated that the Children’s Counselors are required to undergo training during their employment, including training on signs of child abuse and shaken baby syndrome. They are also cleared through the State Central Register, as are all ACS employees. Although Plaintiffs dispute that the Children’s Counselors assigned to Antonia on January 22-23, 2003 had any such training or background checks, other than these concluso-ry statements, Plaintiffs do not offer any material evidence suggesting otherwise. Plaintiffs also point out that the childcare workers do not receive training prior to employment by ACS, and that the in-house training is “sporadic,” consisting of only four sessions in one year that each lasted one and one-half to two hours. According to the City Defendants, a supervisor is on duty for each shift at the Children’s Center; the shifts are 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., 4:00 p.m. to midnight, and midnight to 8:00 a.m. The supervisor’s office is on the third floor. The nursery (for infants) is on the second floor, and children between six to twelve years of age also stay on the second floor, but in a different area. According to the City Defendants, teenagers stay on the third floor. Plaintiffs dispute that teenagers stay only on the third floor and contend that a sixteen-year-old was on the second floor at some point during Antonia’s stay. Specifically, an ACS nurse, Carmen Nieves (“Nieves”), who worked at ACS on January 23, 2003, testified that the third floor remains closed until 5:00 p.m., that teenagers are placed on the third floor only if there are “enough teenagers,” and that ACS records indicate that on January 23, 2003, a sixteen-year-old was on the second floor at some point to be seen by the nurses, and she did not know what the teenager did after being medically cleared. The deposition testimony on this point is somewhat ambiguous; however, it is clear that at some point on January 23, 2003, the nurses at the Children’s Center took vital signs for a sixteen-year-old on the second floor. According to the City Defendants, a supervisor is present during each shift to address any problems such as sick children or staffing issues; a security guard is stationed between the nursery and the nurse’s station; the childcare workers and their supervisors are trained to notify the nurse on duty of any illnesses or problems with a child, are trained to prepare an accident report if any child is injured during a shift, and are trained to report any unusual incidents to their supervisor. Plaintiffs dispute these facts, again on the ground that there is no indication that the affiant, Maye, had personal knowledge of the conditions as they existed on January 22-23, 2003. Plaintiffs also contend that Maye did not indicate that accident reports are required if a child is injured, or that childcare workers actually report any unusual incidents to their supervisors as a matter of custom. The City Defendants assert that there has never been a report of a “shaken baby” or a serious injury to a child at the Children’s Center. Maye, who, as indicated, has been the ACS Pre-Placement Services Director since May 22, 2001, and prior to that time Deputy Director from March 21, 1999, attested that he was not aware of any non-accidental or serious injury at the facility during his tenure. Plaintiffs again claim that there is no evidence that such reports are required. 2. Antonia’s Stay at the Children’s Center from January 22-23, 2003 Antonia, Alicia, and Mykle arrived at the Children’s Center at 8:40 p.m. on January 22, 2003. Rivera and Kinsey stayed with them in the waiting area while paperwork was completed. At about 9:00 p.m., Antonia was brought to the nurse’s station on the second floor and examined by Pola Albano (“Albano”), a Certified Pediatric Nurse Practitioner employed at the Children’s Center since 1999. The examination ended at about 10:00 p.m. Albano found that Antonia had a fever of 100.2 degrees, which was measured with a rectal thermometer, and a mild upper respiratory infection. She observed no bruises or discoloration on Antonia. Antonia was happy, active and alert, not in distress, sat without support, and was not vomiting or having diarrhea. Albano medically cleared Antonia for placement in a foster home. Antonia was transferred to the nursery and was logged in at approximately 10:28 p.m. ACS Children’s Counselor Stacie Dal-rymple (“Dalrymple”), who has worked at the Children’s Center for over seven years and whose duties included ensuring the children’s safety, as well as bathing, clothing, and feeding them, was on duty in the nursery during the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift on January 22, 2003. Dalrymple wrote in the Children’s Center nursery log book that, according to the nurse, Antonia had a fever and needed a lot of fluids, and that she drank Prosobee. Dalrymple recalled that Albano had instructed her to give Antonia “lots” of fluids but not formula. Although Plaintiffs dispute that Dal-rymple received training for her job duties, the deposition testimony to which they point actually indicates that Dalrym-ple received training. Two childcare workers, Milana Maksu-mov (“Maksumov”) and Gertha Charles (“Charles”), who have worked at ACS for four and six years, respectively, were on duty during the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift on January 23, 2003 and received information about the children in their care from the previous shift workers. They were trained to bring a child experiencing any complications, vomiting, or other suspicious behaviors to the nurse. At the end of the shift, Charles’s practice was to talk to incoming workers and update them on the children. According to the City Defendants, during the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift on January 23, 2003, Antonia slept through the night and was resting comfortably, and the staff observed no cuts or bruises on her. Plaintiffs dispute these facts, asserting that the City Defendants’ allegations are based on “unsworn” hearsay “from a non-party with no personal knowledge.” (PI. Rule 56.1 Response (City) ¶ 27.) The document upon which the City Defendants rely is part of a portion of the file maintained by ACS’s Office of Confidential Investigations; it is dated January 29, 2003, and consists of a paragraph summarizing the facts just indicated, with the name “Jillian O’Brian” typed underneath, and below that, in handwriting, the words “Staff at Children’s Center.” Plaintiffs, relying on Charles’s own deposition, point out that at the beginning of this shift, Antonia was asleep in a crib, but as of the end of the shift she had been taken from her crib and placed in a stroller. Although Charles does not recall whether Antonia woke from her sleep or was crying during the night shift, according to Charles, crying is at least one reason childcare workers would move a child from a crib to a stroller during the night. Plaintiffs contend that the Children’s Center was understaffed. According to Plaintiffs, there should have been three staff members that night instead of two, the Center was significantly understaffed, Charles’s supervisors were aware of this, and it was a condition that existed most of the time. First, Charles indicated that it was a busy night for the two childcare workers because there were nine children at the Children’s Center that night, with two childcare workers. A child got sick during the night and had to go to the hospital, and Charles mistakenly wrote down that the child who got sick was Antonia. Charles indicated that this type of mistake “could have been, yeah” the kind that she would make because she was so busy. (Deposition of Gertha Charles, dated June 7, 2005 (“Charles Dep.”), attached as Ex. A to Second Vanderpuye Aff., at 47-50.) In addition, Charles testified to the following: Q: ... [Bjased upon the log, could you tell me how many children were present? A: Right now, let’s see, ... [counting] ... 9. Q: Nine children? A: Yes. Q: And how many staff member were assigned? A: We only had two. That’s what I’m going to answer, two. Q: Did you request additional staff that night? A: If I requested? Q: Yes. A: I don’t have to request them. My supervisor will know, you know, if we are understaffed. If we are under, it’s mostly two. We can’t help it. Q: Okay. So if you’re understaffed, they only assign two? A: Yes, they understaffed, but usually we have — we have the babies, we have the toddlers and we also have the little ones. Mostly there is two staff there. Sometimes we pull them. If I want to take a baby to the nurse or take the baby to change diapers, you know, we will ask one of them to help the other. (Charles Dep. at 9-10.) In addition, Plaintiffs contend, based on Dalrymple’s testimony, that in general there should have been a ratio of one staff member to three children at the Children’s Center, and thus if there were nine children, there should have been three staff members. The City Defendants point out that Dalrymple described only the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift this way. In addition, some evidence suggests that several children left during the night, leaving four or five children for most of the shift. (See Log, Jan. 22, 2003, 12:00 AM — 8:00, attached to Ex. K to Halbardier Aff. at NYC 2940.) Childcare worker Esther Boone (“Boone”) worked the next shift (8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) on January 23, 2003. In a deposition, Boone testified that she has worked at ACS for three years and has received training in connection with her work at the Children’s Center. Her duties include monitoring each child to make sure that the children do not hurt themselves, and to read to and interact with them. If a child is vomiting, has diarrhea, or is sick in some other manner, the Center’s policies required that the child see the nurse. According to Boone, Antonia was asleep when she came on duty. Boone spoke with Charles, the worker from the previous shift, about the babies. Boone testified in her deposition that when she arrived at her shift at 8:00 a.m., she was the only childcare worker there. Boone requested assistance from her supervisors, but it is unclear exactly when such assistance arrived. Boone testified that childcare workers Allison Porter (“Porter”) and Sybil Deans (“Deans”) were sent to assist, and that she obtained help within ten to fifteen minutes. However, other evidence in the record, relied upon by the City Defendants, suggests that Porter did not arrive until 9:50 a.m. It is unclear' when Deans arrived. Thus, the record is ambiguous as to how long Boone was alone on the shift. Six children were present during Boone’s shift, although whether the six children were present throughout the entire shift is unclear. Porter changed Antonia, and recalled that Antonia was in a good mood, was laughing and playing, and was given juice to drink. Porter left the nursery at around 11:40 a.m., at which point Antonia was still awake and playing. Boone fed Antonia juice and changed her diaper prior to taking her lunch break. Plaintiffs dispute these facts as misleading, but it is unclear exactly they dispute. Plaintiffs point to exhibits and deposition testimony suggesting that Boone, Porter, and another childcare worker, Alicia Felipe (“Felipe”) each changed Antonia’s diaper at various points between 8:00 a.m. and 12:30 p.m., and that Antonia may have been in the stroller at some points during this time period. Around 12:30 p.m., Antonia was taken to the nurse’s station by a childcare worker for a daily vital sign check. Nurse Carmen Nieves (“Nieves”), who has been a registered nurse since 1977, was told by the childcare worker that Antonia had a good appetite, was voiding and sleeping well, and was awaiting placement. Nieves wrote in her notes that Antonia “appears comfortable ... very alert ... in no apparent distress.” (ACS Integrated Progress Notes, attached as Ex. J to Halbardier Aff., at NYC 0960.) Nieves took Antonia’s temperature under the armpit, which could be a few degrees different from a rectal reading, and found that it was 96.9 degrees. Nieves remembered that Antonia did not look like she was sick, and that the only unusual thing she noticed was that Antonia had clubbing in her feet. Antonia then returned to the nursery with the childcare worker. Felipe took Antonia out of the stroller and played with her; Antonia was smiling, playfully energetic, and fully alert; Felipe changed her diaper; and Antonia crawled around. During the afternoon, Boone recalled playing with Antonia, who was happy and laughing at Boone’s funny faces. Boone noticed nothing unusual about Antonia’s condition. Deans also interacted with Antonia, who laughed when Deans tickled her. It is undisputed that during this time, Antonia did not interact with any other children. That afternoon, Boone tried to feed Pro-sobee to Antonia, but Antonia spit it up, so she gave her water and juice instead. Plaintiffs contend that Antonia did not merely spit up but instead vomited. Plaintiffs’ evidence for this contention consists of (1) Boone testifying that Antonia spit up, and then agreeing when asked if Antonia “regurgitated,” and (2) the Foster Agency Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’ experts defining “regurgitation” to mean “vomiting.” (Deposition of Dr. Cindy Christian, dated Sept. 9, 2005 (“Christian Dep.”), attached as Ex. B to First Vanderpuye Aff., at 150; Deposition of Dr. Steven Lloyd Kugler, dated Aug. 11, 2005 (“Kugler Dep.”), attached as Ex. C to First Vander-puye Aff., at 128.) However, Boone stated that Antonia did not vomit, that her understanding of “regurgitate” means “to bring back; to bring up something,” and that Antonia “didn’t take enough to vomit.” (Deposition of Esther Boone, dated June 7, 2005, attached as Ex. S to Halbardier Aff., at 37-39.) The Court declines to resolve whether or not, on the basis of Boone’s ambiguous testimony, a reasonable factfin-der could draw a “justifiable inference” that Antonia had vomited, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), because this issue ultimately has no bearing on the Court’s determination of the instant motions. Dalrymple worked the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift on January 23, 2003. When she arrived, Dalrymple brought Antonia to the nurse’s station to have her temperature checked, and to see if she could give her formula since Antonia had been drinking only juice. Plaintiffs contend that these allegations are misleading, because a child would be brought to the nurse’s station a second time only if the child were in distress. Albano was present and took Antonia’s temperature, which she recalled was 99 degrees and which she considered normal. In addition, Albano held Antonia and observed that she was happy, active and alert. However, Plaintiffs point out that Albano did not document Antonia’s temperature or any of these observations. Dal-rymple returned with Antonia to the nursery from the nurse’s station, fed Antonia formula, and changed her diaper. She recalled that Antonia was a “nice baby” who was physically fine during the shift and did not cry. Plaintiffs dispute the veracity of Dalrymple’s testimony but point to nothing in her statements or other evidence to support their contention. Lorraine Pitts (“Pitts”), who has worked for ACS for four years, was present in the nursery with Dalrymple on the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift on January 23, 2003. According to the City Defendants, Antonia was happy, smiling, and laughing, and did not vomit during the time Pitts was with her. Plaintiffs dispute these allegations based on Cartagena’s testimony that the bag that came with Antonia had clothing with vomit on it, as well as Pedialyte, which is given to infants suffering from vomiting or diarrhea, and that Pitts packed the bag. Pitts testified that she packed the bag with Prosobee, not Pedia-lyte. At about 8:00 p.m. on January 23, 2003, Pitts learned that Antonia’s placement was ready. Another childcare worker, Ruby Browning (“Browning”), dressed Antonia. Antonia left the nursery at 8:15 p.m. Pitts and Browning took Antonia and her belongings downstairs together to the waiting area, where another worker, Amanda Audige (“Audige”) was waiting, and they gave Antonia to Audige. On the record before the Court, there is no evidence that during the time that Antonia was at the Children’s Center, incident reports concerning her were prepared, or that any one reported any unusual incidents. Moreover, there is no indication that any children staying at the Children’s Center were receiving psychotropic drugs on January 22 or 23, 2003. All of the ACS childcare and medical staff who worked with Antonia were cleared by the New York State Central Child Abuse Registry and underwent criminal background checks before working at the Children’s Center. There is no evidence before the Court that any of these employees has ever been accused of or involved in injuries to children under their care, whether accidental or non-accidental. Plaintiffs contend that these facts are misleading because the background checks are limited to “official reports and convictions” (PI. Rule 56.1 Response (City) ¶ 41); however, Plaintiffs do not present any evidence of unofficial accusations or suggest what additional information such background checks might include. D. ANTONIA’S TRANSPORTATION TO THE FOSTER HOME Defendant Shemain Webb-Alexander (“Webb-Alexander”), who has worked for ACS for three years, asserted that she works in intake and transports children to foster homes, and that no baby has ever been injured while she was transporting children. She has never been convicted of a crime or disciplined for any reason. Audige was in the waiting room with Antonia the entire time Webb-AIexander finished getting ready to transport Antonia to the foster home. Once Antonia was ready, Webb-AIexander carried her to the transport van and placed her in a car seat. Webb-AIexander sat next to Antonia in the row behind the driver. A teenager who was also being transported was in the van and sat in the back row. The van left the Children’s Center at 8:56 p.m. on January 23, 2003. During the ride, Antonia began to cry a bit. Webb-AIexander reached into the duffle bag and fed Antonia five to six ounces from an eight-ounce bottle of milk. Antonia did not cry again, and she did not vomit during the ride. Again, Plaintiffs dispute the “veracity” of these allegations, but cite to no contradictory statement or other evidence to support their challenge. There were no accidents or bumps during the van ride, and Webb-AIexander asserted that she did not remove Antonia from the car seat during the ride. They reached the foster home at 9:39 p.m. on January 23, 2003, at which time Webb-AIexander took Antonia out of the car seat and handed her to Cartagena. At the foster home, Webb-AIexander accompanied Cartagena inside the apartment. The parties dispute whether Antonia vomited at this point. According to the City Defendants, Webb-AIexander noticed that there was some milk on Antonia’s chin from when she had fed her, and she told Cartagena that she had just fed Antonia. Cartagena, however, testified that Antonia vomited in front of Webb-Alexander when Webb-AIexander took her into the foster home, at which point Webb-AIexander explained that the baby had just drank milk. According to the City Defendants, while in Cartagena’s apartment Webb-AIexan-der observed Antonia’s face, and saw no marks or bruises; Antonia was smiling and appeared to be happy in the home while Gonzalez, the foster father, held her. Plaintiffs dispute the veracity of these facts, adding that Cartagena testified that she observed red marks around the infant’s eyes when she was dropped off. Webb-AIexander observed a crib where Antonia was to sleep, and left the foster home at 9:55 p.m. Plaintiffs and the Foster Agency Defendants, relying on Cartagena’s deposition and affidavit, agree that when Webb-AIex-ander brought Antonia up to Cartagena’s apartment, Cartagena observed that Antonia had little red dots around her eyes. According to the Foster Care Defendants’ expert Dr. Cindy Christian (“Christian”), these dots were “petechiae” — bruises that are signs and symptoms of inflicted head trauma. (See Aff. of Cindy Christian, M.D., dated Dec. 1, 2005, ¶ 5(c) (submitted in support of Foster Agency Defendants’ Motion); see also Christian Dep., at 29-31.) The City Defendants dispute that Antonia had such marks, pointing out that Webb-AIexander did not notice any such bruises or marks, and additionally contending that Cartagena has provided differing descriptions of Antonia’s condition at that time. Webb-AIexander told Cart-agena that Antonia had been “medically seen” or “medically cleared” at ACS before she was brought to Cartagena. (CHB R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 13; see Deposition of Shemain Webb-Alexander, dated Feb. 16, 2005, attached as Ex. N to Declaration of Glen Feinberg, dated Dec. 1, 2005 (“Fein-berg Decl.”), at 38; Statement of Webb-Alexander, undated, attached as Ex. V to Halbardier Aff., at NYC 1545.) Webb-Alexander did not tell Cartagena that Antonia had any medical condition requiring emergency treatment, and stated that she should bring Antonia to the doctor the following Monday as a matter of routine. The City Defendants add that Webb-Alexander, in both a statement to her supervisor and in her deposition, indicated that she told Cartagena to contact the assigned caseworker the next day for more information on Antonia. E. TIMING OF THE INJURY Exactly when and where Antonia was injured is disputed. The City Defendants assert that Antonia was injured while in the custody of the foster parents; Plaintiffs and the Foster Agency Defendants contend that Antonia was injured — and indeed sustained an inflicted head trauma — • while still at the ACS pre-placement facility. Each party has an expert who will testify to its respective version of the timing. However, solely for purposes of their summary judgment motion, the City Defendants assume that the injury occurred before Antonia was given to the foster parents. Many of the disputed details of Antonia’ s stay at the ACS facility — such as whether she cried during the shift, whether she had a fever, whether she vomited, and whether her bag was packed with Pedia-lyte or Prosobee — are largely relevant to the timing of her injuries. Since the City Defendants concede, solely for purposes of summary judgment, that the injury occurred prior to Antonia leaving the ACS facility, these disputes are thus essentially irrelevant to the City Defendants’ position at this juncture. F. ANTONIA’S STAY AT THE FOSTER HOME Cartagena and Gonzalez were foster parents selected and approved through CHB. Both had received clearances from the State Central Register, and neither had a criminal history prior to their approval as foster parents. They had received training on shaken baby syndrome. They also signed an agreement with Catholic Home Burean, which included guidelines on safety and care of children in their care. It is undisputed that CHB conducted a thorough investigation into Cartagena’s and Gonzalez’s qualifications as foster parents, and that Cartagena and Gonzalez completed the required training and were duly licensed as foster parents. During the night of January 23, 2003 to the morning of January 24, 2003, Antonia cried, slept poorly, and did not want to drink formula. Cartagena also testified that on January 24, 2003, Antonia did not want to drink formula and vomited “a very little bit in terms of the way she had done it the first time.” (Deposition of Cielo Cartagena, Mar. 22, 2005 (“Cartagena Dep.”), attached as Ex. F to First Vander-puye Aff., at 50.) 1. Phone Conversation Between Seda and Cartagena At about noon on Friday, January 24, 2003, Cartagena called and spoke with CHB employee Seda about Antonia. The parties have not provided the Court with a description of Seda’s position and responsibilities at CHB; however, the Court notes that Seda testified in deposition that she was an administrative assistant to the intake coordinator. (Deposition of Marina Seda, dated March 23, 2005 (“Seda Dep.”), attached as Ex. M to Feinberg Deck, at 5-6.). The substance of the conversation is disputed, both in terms of what Cartagena relayed to Seda, and how Seda responded. According to the Foster Agency Defendants, Cartagena told Seda that Antonia was “gemeriquiando” — a Spanish word meaning fussy, moaning, and groaning— (CHB. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 22), that she woke many times during the night, and that she vomited. In response, according to the Foster Agency Defendants, Seda told Cartagena to take Antonia to the hospital “as soon as possible.” (Id. (quoting Seda Dep. at 27).) Plaintiffs assert that Cartagena relayed to Seda not only the above details, but additionally that Antonia’s bag contained dirty clothes with vomit on them, that Antonia had arrived dirty and soiled, that Antonia was very skinny and looked sick, that something was wrong with Antonia, and Antonia had red markings around both her eyes. Yet, according to Plaintiffs, Seda did not advise Cartagena to take Antonia to a hospital or even a doctor immediately; rather, she told her to do so only as a matter of routine, within 48 hours of receiving Antonia. The Court’s own examination of Seda’s and Cartagena’s deposition testimony reveals that the record comports with both sides, and the differences in the two sides’ accounts results from selectively quoting the record. Seda testified that Cartagena stated that Antonia was “very fussy, that she was vomiting and that she was up the night with her,” and “generally just that she was moaning ... gemeriquiando,” and that she “barely slept.” (Seda Dep. at 26-27.) Cartagena related that she had been told Antonia could drink regular milk, but that the baby had arrived with formula as well; in response, Seda stated that Cart-agena should “use what they gave her and ... take her to the hospital or to the doctor as soon as possible and there they would give her a letter for WIC and WIC would give her the right milk.” (Seda Dep. at 27-28 (emphasis added).) Yet Seda also testified that when she told Cartagena to take the baby to the doctor as soon as possible, Cartagena informed her that she had been told that Antonia was medically cleared and did not have to go to the doctor until Monday. (See id. at 29.) Seda understood “medically cleared” to mean that Antonia “is fine, that she is stable ... she is okay.” (Seda Dep. at 29-30.) When Seda was asked in her deposition if there was “any reason why you did not tell [Cartagena] to take the child to the doctor immediately,” she responded that “[rjoutine would state that it is within 18 hours, this is in training and it is something understood, so as soon as possible within that time frame. And the child, from what she described, seemed normal for a child who had been yanked away from the family. They are fussy, they cry, they are not comfortable.” (Id. at 28.) Later in the deposition, Seda recalled that Cartagena may have also told her that Antonia had red marks around her eyes. (See id. at 29.) She further related that Cartagena told her that Antonia had arrived dirty and soiled, with a bag containing dirty clothes with vomit on them, that she was very skinny and looked sick, and that something was wrong with Antonia. (See id. at 82-83.) Finally, Seda testified that she “felt the child was sick” but did not know what was wrong. (Id. at 85-86.) Similarly, the Court’s examination of Cartagena’s testimony reveals that Cart-agena testified that called she Seda because Antonia had arrived with formula, but the documentation with her indicated that she was to receive milk, and she did not want to give Antonia milk that would harm her stomach. (See Cartagena Dep., at 37, 39.) By Cartagena’s account, she told Seda that Antonia “was crying; that she was sad,” and Seda responded that “perhaps the baby missed her mother.” (Id. at 37.) Also according to Cartagena, Seda informed her that she needed to go to WIC, “[s]o that they could take her blood and they could give her the milk that she needed to have.” (Id. at 37-38.) Seda did not contact CHB’s medical unit about the conversation she had with Cart-agena, nor did she refer Cartagena to the medical unit. Plaintiffs point out that Seda testified that she is aware that when a child is not taking food and vomiting, there is a danger of dehydration. 2. Events on January 25, 200S On January 25, 2003, Cartagena and Gonzalez took Antonia and their young child Jean Gonzalez with them in the family van to perform various errands. In the afternoon, they stopped at a tax preparation office, and Cartagena went inside while Gonzalez remained in the van with Antonia. At some point while in the van with Gonzalez, Antonia became limp and unresponsive. All parties agree that at this point, Antonia had become “obtund-ed,” or nearly comatose. The Foster Agency Defendants pinpoint the time as shortly before 2:00 p.m., while Plaintiffs estimate that Cartagena found Antonia unresponsive at about 1:20 p.m. to 1:25 p.m. Hospital records indicate the time of the event as 1:30 p.m. Cartagena and Gonzalez drove Antonia directly to Bronx-Lebanon hospital, which was approximately 2.6 miles away. However, Plaintiffs point out that Cartagena and Gonzalez did not know the location of the nearest hospital and did not arrive at the hospital until 2:10 p.m. The City Defendants also contend that they arrived at the hospital at 2:10 p.m. The Foster Agency Defendants do not specify the exact time of Antonia’s arrival at the hospital, but assert that it was within 10 minutes after Antonia became obtunded. In support, they point to Cartagena’s affidavit, in which she averred that they arrived at the hospital “in less than ten minutes.” (Cart-agena Aff., dated Nov. 30, 2005, attached as Ex. H to First Vanderpuye Aff.). Cart-agena also testified in deposition that she arrived at about 2:00 p.m. (See Cartagena Dep. at 73.) Hospital records indicate that Antonia was seen in triage at 2:10 p.m. (See Bronx Lebanon Hospital Records, attached as Ex. A to First Vanderpuye Aff., at BL-3.) At Bronx Lebanon Hospital, Antonia was diagnosed with severe injuries, including a head injury. She was thereafter transferred to Montefiore Hospital. The City Defendants contend that these injuries were non-accidental and the result of child abuse. To support this assertion, the City Defendants point to: (1) the November 2004 determination of the Family Court, in a proceeding charging derivative child abuse of Cartagena’s and Gonzalez’s five-year-old daughter, that Gonzalez intentionally inflicted severe physical abuse on Antonia while in his care; (2) a letter from Eli Newburger, a pediatrician serving as an expert for the City Defendants; and (3) a description proffered by Dr. Steven Kugler (“Kugler”), Plaintiffs’ expert, of Antonia’s injuries as non-accidental. Plaintiffs contend that these allegations are misleading, because the testimony of Kugler and CHB’s expert Christian suggest that Antonia’s injury occurred 48 to 72 hours prior to the time that Cartagena took Antonia to the hospital, and thus occurred while Antonia was still in the custody of the ACS pre-placement facility. III. CLAIMS In their Corrected Second Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”), Plaintiffs assert several causes of action. Count One asserts that Antonia was removed from the care and custody of Green without due process. Count Two asserts both that (1) the defendants negligently placed and supervised Antonia in a foster home, and (2) Antonia was assaulted by the defendants. Count Three asserts a claim by Green and Phillips for “tortious interference with and violations of substantive due process,” specifically that the injuries sustained by Antonia at the hands of the defendants deprived the parents of their constitutional rights to the care and custody of Antonia. Count Four asserts claims against the City, ACS (even though ACS is not named as a defendant), and Catholic Home Bureau under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and state law for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of its employees. Count Five is a request for punitive damages, and Count Six is a request for attorneys’ fees and costs. IV. LEGAL STANDARD In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining whether genuine issues of material fact exist, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). “ '[I]f there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper.’ ” Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir.2000)). The nonmovant, however, cannot create a genuine issue of fact through “conclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation.” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir.1998). “When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994). In the face of a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party cannot “get to a jury without 'any significant probative evidence tending to support’ [the existence of a disputed fact].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). V. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST CITY DEFENDANTS A. CLAIMS ARISING FROM ANTO-NIAS REMOVAL FROM HER PARENTS’ CUSTODY Counts One and Three allege due process violations arising from Antonia’s removal from the care and custody of her parents. Count One alleges that the removal violated Green’s and Antonia’s procedural due process rights, while Count Three asserts a substantive due process claim by Green and Phillips, specifically that the removal of Antonia deprived the parents of their constitutional rights to the care and custody of Antonia. The City Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final removal and custody orders issued by the Family Court. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits “that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir.2005); see also Sindone v. Kelly, 439 F.Supp.2d 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y.2006). The doctrine derives from the mandate that under statutes governing the federal judiciary, district courts are “empowered to exercise original, not appellate, jurisdiction.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 83-84. In 2005 the Supreme Court, observing that federal courts, including the Second Circuit, had incorrectly interpreted Rook-er-Feldman to encompass and even supersede ordinary preclusion principles, held that the doctrine was not coextensive with preclusion but rather, “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. In light of Exxon, the Second Circuit reexamined Rooker-Feldman in Hoblock and set out four requirements for its application, two procedural and two substantive. Procedurally, the federal court plaintiff must have lost in state court, and the state court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Substantively, the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment, and the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that state court judgment. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. If these four conditions apply, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit. 1. Rooker-Feldman’s Procedural Requirements Are Met Here, Rooker-Feldman’s two procedural requirements are met: Plaintiffs lost in state court when the Family Court signed the January 24, 2003 Order granting remand of Antonia to ACS, and that judgment was rendered prior to commencement of this federal lawsuit. Plaintiffs argue that, for Rooker-Feldman purposes, there is no judgment rendered before commencement of district court proceedings, because state court custody proceedings are ongoing and there has been no final termination of parental rights. However, Plaintiffs are not challenging a petition for termination of parental rights, but the removal of Antonia from Green’s custody, which arose out of ACS workers’ concerns over violations of the November 18, 2002 Order and was authorized by the Family Court in its January 24, 2003 Order directing removal of the child pending further proceedings, which Order has become final. The Court pauses to address this point further because Family Court proceedings related to the claims at issue in this action remain pending, and that fact merits further explication in light of Hoblock’s caution that Rooker-Feldman “has no application to federal-court suits proceeding in parallel with ongoing state-court litigation.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. The Second Circuit observed in Hoblock that although Rooker-Feldman’s timing requirement will usually be straightforward, in that most commonly the federal suit will commence after the state suit has unequivocally terminated, “federal suits challenging interlocutory state judgments may present difficult questions as to whether ‘the state proceedings have “ended” within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman on the federal questions at issue.’ ” Id. at 89 (quoting Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir.2005)). In making this observation, the Second Circuit cited to Federación, a First Circuit case that examined at length how Rooker-Feldman applied to interlocutory state court judgments. The First Circuit concluded that Rooker-Feldman did indeed bar a federal suit that would have required the federal district court to review and reject an interlocutory determination of a Puerto Rican court that federal law did not preempt the state court proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, the Federación court noted that all Exxon states is that Rooker-Feld-man bars a federal lawsuit where “ ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended.’ ” See Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291, 125 S.Ct. 1517) (emphasis added). Federacion explored the meaning of “after the state proceedings ended,” and concluded that for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, state proceedings will have “ended” in three situations, which are not limited to situations of a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (“ § 1257”), even though Rooker-Feldman arose out of § 1257. Id. First, a state proceeding has “ended” when the highest state court in which review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved. Id. Second, a state proceeding has “ended” if the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks further action. For example, if a lower state court issues a judgment and the losing party allows the time for appeal to expire, then the state proceedings have ended for Rooker-Feldman purposes, even though this judgment is usually not ap-pealable under § 1257. Id. Third, a state proceeding has “ended” if all federal questions have been finally resolved in the state court proceedings, but state law or purely factual questions remain. Id. at 25. In other words, “Rooker-Feldman applies where the state proceeding has ended with respect to the issues that the federal plaintiff seeks to have reviewed in federal court, even if other matters remain to be litigated.” Id. at 26 (emphasis in original). Although Federacion’s analysis of this issue concerning when a state court proceeding has “ended” has not been formally adopted by the Second Circuit, this Court is persuaded by Federacion’s reasoning and concludes that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Family Court’s removal Order. Although state court proceedings regarding termination of parental rights are ongoing, the issue that Plaintiffs seek to have adjudicated here is whether Antonia’s initial removal effectuated by the January 24, 2003 Order was wrongful. State court proceedings as to this issue have ended. The January 24, 2003 Order was issued, and the time to appeal that Order expired. Thus, the state court removal Order falls into Federation's second situation: the state court issued an Order on January 24, 2003 directing removal of Antonia, pending further hearings, and Plaintiffs did not challenge that Order but let the time to appeal expire. To the extent that the removal proceedings had not “ended” in that the January 24, 2008 Order stated that it was subject to further factfinding, such factfinding occurred and the Family Court issued an order on March 28, 2003, finding that Green had indeed violated the November 18, 2002 Order and thus that Antonia’s removal was appropriate. This March 28, 2003 order also was not appealed, and the time to do so has expired. Additional factual questions remain as to whether termination of parental rights and adoption are appropriate in this case, but the initial removal decision was fully assessed by the state court and found to be proper. State court proceedings as to this issue have ended, and thus Rooker-Feldman’s procedural requirements are satisfied. 2. Rooker-Feldman’s Substantive Requirements Are Met With regard to Rooker-Feldman’s substantive requirements, Plaintiffs argue that their due process claims do not arise out of the state court orders because the wrongful act they complain about is not the removal of Antonia, but rather, the alleged due process violations, or specifically, the “misconduct of the defendants in violating their own due process requirements.” (PI. Mem. at 12.) In other words, since the allegedly unconstitutional removal occurred prior to the January 24, 2003 Order, the wrongful conduct had already occurred and the state court order merely ratified or acquiesced in the constitutional violation complained of, but did not cause it. In this regard, Plaintiffs cite Hoblock, which explained that “[a] federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears to complain only of a third party’s actions, when the third party’s actions are produced by a state court judgment and not simply ratified, or left unpunished by it.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88 (emphasis added). Whether an injury is caused by a state judgment is “the core requirement” of Rooker-Feldman, from which the other requirements derive. Id. at 87. Thus, the key inquiry is the source of the injury. In a case where, as here, a plaintiff purportedly challenges a third party’s actions, the challenge is to determine whether the third party’s actions are caused by the state court judgment, or are simply ratified by it. The formula laid out by the Second Circuit in Hoblock for determining whether a federal suit complains of injury from a state court judgment or from third party actions, is the following: [A] federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears to complain only of a third party’s actions, when the third party’s actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it. Where a state-court judgment causes the challenged third party action, any challenge to that third-party action is necessarily the kind of challenge to the state judgment that only the Supreme Court can hear. Id. at 88 (emphasis added). In some circumstances, that a third party’s actions are not caused by a state judgment is clear. For example, if a public employee is fired by his agency, brings a state court suit for employment discrimination, loses, and then sues in federal court, the federal court has jurisdiction, because the injury complained of is the termination from employment by the agency — the injury was not caused by the state court judgment, even though the state court in essence “ratified” the injury by not finding for the plaintiff. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88; see also Sindone, 439 F.Supp.2d at 274 (holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar police officer’s § 1983 claim for termination of employment, because the source of the injury was his dismissal by the police department and not the state court judgment affirming the police department’s actions). Of course, the claim might still be barred under ordinary preclusion principles, but the federal court nonetheless has jurisdiction to consider the action. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88 n. 6. Likewise, in some circumstances, that a third party’s actions are caused by a state judgment is equally clear. For example, where a plaintiff challenges a Board of Elections’ refusal to tally votes, if in refusing to tally votes the Board is “acting under compulsion of a state-court order,” the injury is caused by a state court judgment even though the plaintiffs purportedly complain of actions by a third party. Id. at 88. Similarly, in Galtieri v. Kelly, the plaintiff sued a pension fund administrator under § 1983 for due process violations in garnishing his pension; however, Rooker-Feldman barred the suit because the pension fund administrator was acting pursuant to an earlier state court order directing that the pension be garnished for alimony payments. 441 F.Supp.2d 447, 454-55 (E.D.N.Y.2006). In an example particularly relevant to this case, Hoblock posited: [sjuppose a state court, based purely on state law, terminates a father’s parental rights and orders the state to take