Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER OF COURT GIBSON, District Judge. SYNOPSIS This matter comes before the Court on the following motions: Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint by Erden Fikri, Dinesh Mathur, Vincent Fiorica, Terry Wahl, David R. Davis, Sanders Ergas, P. James Ridella, Bhaskaran Murali, Will H. Farthing, Brian Gunnlaugson, Richard Cartwright, Denise Weisbrodt, William M. Carney, Harvey Slater, George H. Benz, Jr., Stewart M. Flam, R. Joseph Federowicz, Dickey McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., UPMC Health System and UPMC Lee Regional (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “Lee Defendants”) (Document No. 136), their Brief in Support (Document No. 137) and their Revised Exhibits in Support (Document No. 142); Motion to Amend the Caption by Richard Saluzzo, Jacob Kolff, Bruce Duke, Narendra Pai, William Fritz, Paul Weygandt, William M. Carney, Robert D. Fry, Conemaugh Health System and Memorial Medical Center (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “Conemaugh Defendants”) (Document No. 138); Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment with Respect to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint by Conemaugh Defendants (Document No. 139), their Brief in Support (Document No. 140) and their Appendix to their Brief in Support (Document No. 141); Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Injunctive Relief and for the Court’s Assumption of Supplemental Jurisdiction (Document No. 146) and his Brief in Support (Document No. 147); Conemaugh Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Injunctive Relief and for the Court’s Assumption of Supplemental Jurisdiction (Document No. 151) and their Brief in Support (Document No. 152); Lee Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Injunctive Relief and for the Court’s Assumption of Supplemental Jurisdiction (Document No. 154) and their Brief in Support (Document No. 155); and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint by Lee Regional Health Systems, Inc. and Lee Regional Health System Foundation, Inc. (Document No. 161) and their Brief in Support (Document No. 162); and Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Lee Regional Health Systems, Inc. and Lee Regional Health System Foundation, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 163). For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motions are granted, except the Motion to Amend the Caption which is rendered moot, and Plaintiffs Motions are denied. JURISDICTION Jurisdiction is proper in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on federal question jurisdiction and § 1367 based on supplemental jurisdiction. PARTIES For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion and Order the Court has broken the Defendants into three groups based on their representation. The Lee Defendants, the Conemaugh Defendants, and Lee Regional Health Systems, Inc. and Lee Regional Health System Foundation, Inc. The main purpose of the breakdown is for ease of reference when the Court must refer to all of the Defendants in a particular group. The Court may, however, at times refer to a Defendant individually, refer to all Defendants or refer to a different, but clearly identified, group of Defendants as necessary in the circumstances. BACKGROUND I. MATERIAL FACTS Plaintiff began his medical career in New Jersey with the Garden State Medical Staff. Untracht v. West Jersey Health System, et al., 803 F.Supp. 978, 980 (D.N.J.1992). In April 1990, Plaintiffs Garden State Medical Staff privileges were suspended. Id. In addition, his staff privileges at the remaining West Jersey Health System divisions were also suspended. Id. Plaintiff filed at least four lawsuits in state and federal court related to this turn of events. Id.; (Doc. No. 141, Exs. 19, 20, 22, 24). Plaintiffs federal lawsuit in New Jersey alleged violations of § 1983, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (hereinafter “HCQIA”), Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Id. at 981. The lawsuit was dismissed by the New Jersey District Court. Untracht v. West Jersey Health System, et al., 803 F.Supp. 978, 978 (D.N.J.1992), aff'd Untracht v. West Jersey Health Systems, 998 F.2d 1006 (3d Cir.1993); see also Untracht v. Weimann, 141 Fed.Appx. 46, 47-49 (3d Cir.2005) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of Un-tracht’s Complaint and holding that the Complaint, which claimed violations of § 1983 resulting from defendants’ alleged violations of his due process and equal protection rights by denying his reappointment application, was inextricably intertwined with his prior adjudication). Plaintiff subsequently went to work for Corning Hospital' in New York. (Doc. No. 147, p. 3). After a short time at Corning Hospital, Plaintiff applied for privileges at hospitals in the Johnstown, Pennsylvania area. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—Pl. Aff. ¶20). Plaintiff applied for clinical privileges at UPMC Lee Regional Hospital (hereinafter “Lee”), Conemaugh Memorial Medical Center (hereinafter “Conemaugh”) and Windber Medical Center (hereinafter ‘Windber”). (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—Pl. AfO 20). Plaintiff was granted staff privileges at Lee in late 1994. (Doc. No. 133, p. 6, ¶ 29). Although Plaintiff alleges he was recruited by Lee in order to help them compete against Conemaugh, he admits he applied for and was granted privileges at Conemaugh in early 1995, only a few months later. (Doc. No. 133, p. 6, ¶¶ 25, 29). By 1996, Windber had also granted Plaintiff staff privileges. (Doc. No. 147, p. 4 & Ex. 1—Pl. Aff. ¶¶ 20, 22). Plaintiff was reappointed at Lee in 1997. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—Pl. Aff., ¶ 22). He was reappointed at Conemaugh in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 and at Windber in 1998, 2000 and 2002. Id. At the 2000 and 2002 reappoint-ments by Conemaugh and Windber, Plaintiff informed the respective hospitals of the actions Lee was taking against his clinical privileges that began in 1999 and provided each hospital with full documentation about every allegation that Lee had raised against him. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—Pl. Aff. at ¶ 23). After reviewing the allegations, Conemaugh and Windber both reappointed him without restrictions in 2000 and 2002. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—Pl. Aff.1HI23, 24). A. LEE When Plaintiff reapplied for surgical privileges at Lee in January of 1999, the Department of Surgery Chairman, Dr. Fikri, did not recommend a reappointment. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A—p. 8). As a result, the Lee Medical Staff Credentials Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “Credentials Committee”) hired Dr. Mil-burn Jessup to provide an outside review of Plaintiffs cases. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p.8). Dr. Jessup offered a report dated September 1, 1999, in which he found that Plaintiff displayed poor judgment in two of the nine cases submitted to him for review, both of which involved fatalities. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). Upon receipt of Dr. Jessup’s report, the Credentials Committee reviewed his recommendations. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). By letter dated November 15, 1999, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Lee informed the Plaintiff that his surgical privileges were being renewed for an abbreviated appointment term through July 2000 with certain requirements for continuing peer review and a request for a series of supervised operations by surgeons at UPMC Presbyterian Hospital. (Doc. No. 133, pp. 8-9, ¶ 42); (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). Plaintiff was required to have a second surgeon present when pancreatic or liver resections were conducted. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). This became a requirement that was imposed on all surgeons at Lee at the time. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). On February 23, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania (Case No. 2000-646) (hereinafter “Untracht I”), against, two of the Defendants in this federal action, UPMC Health System, Inc. (hereinafter “UPMC”) and Lee. (Doc. No. 142, Ex. A). The Complaint sought to enjoin UPMC and Lee from carrying out the peer review activities outlined in the November 15, 1999 letter to Plaintiff from the Chairman of the Board of Directors at Lee and sought money damages for the alleged breach of Lee’s Bylaws by UPMC and Lee. Id. By letter dated March 10, 2000, the Lee Board of Directors (hereinafter referred to as the “Lee Board”) modified its actions relating to Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 137, p. 8). The Lee Board granted Plaintiff unrestricted clinical privileges for a two-year period retroactive to February 1, 1999. (Doc. No. 137, p. 8). The Lee Board also requested that prior to Plaintiffs next re-credentialing in January 2001, Plaintiff arrange to have a series of major surgeries monitored by a surgeon not employed by Lee. (Doc. No. 137, p. 8). By letter dated March 23, 2000, signed by Lee’s Medical Director, the Chairman of the Credentials Committee and Lee’s President, Plaintiff was informed that Dr. George Benz had been selected to monitor six to ten of Plaintiff’s major abdominal surgeries. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). The letter also informed Plaintiff that because of concerns Plaintiff had previously raised concerning peer review activities by the Lee Surgical Quality Review Committee, future issues involving Plaintiffs care of patients at Lee would be referred to Dr. Benz for review. (Doc No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). Dr. Benz was to submit a written and verbal report to the Credentials Committee prior to its consideration of Plaintiffs next recredentialing in January 2001. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 8). Throughout the period between May 2000 and February 2001, Dr. Benz observed Plaintiff perform six surgeries and reviewed the medical records of six other patients on whom Plaintiff had performed surgery. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, pp. 8-9, 14-18). On April 8, 2001, following the review of Plaintiffs cases, Dr. Benz wrote a letter to Terry Wahl, M.D., the Medical Director of Lee, in which he recommended that a second board certified surgeon be involved with Plaintiff in all major abdominal procedures. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 9). Dr. Benz’ recommendation was based upon his review of the records, as well as his personal observation of six operative procedures, four of which were major abdominal surgeries. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p.9). On May 7, 2001, after Plaintiff had an opportunity to review Dr. Benz’ recommendation, his request to appear before the Credentials Committee to rebut the recommendation was granted. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 18). Subsequent to reviewing Plaintiffs thirty-three page letter, submitting it to Dr. Benz for comment and listening to Plaintiffs oral argument, the Credentials Committee recommended to the Lee Medical Staff Executive Committee (hereinafter the “Executive Committee”) that Plaintiffs grant of clinical privileges be subject to the second surgeon requirement recommended by Dr. Benz. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 18). Lee further selected Dr. Harvey Slater to “review the reviewers.” (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 9). Dr. Slater reviewed the cases under a “totality of circumstances basis.” (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 10). Dr. Slater believed that the cases should not be reviewed in isolation and, in light of all the matters that he reviewed, believed the recommendation to be appropriate. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 10). On July 25, 2001, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for damages against Erden Fikri, M.D., Vincent Fiorica, M.D., Terry Wahl, M.D., David R. Davis, and Lee in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania (Case No. 2001-2718) (hereinafter “Untracht II”). (Doc. No. 142, Ex. B). All Defendants in Untracht II are Responding Defendants in this federal action. (Doc. No. 142, Ex. B). This lawsuit set forth virtually identical factual allegations and claims against the individually named defendants as were contained in Untracht I, and reiterated causes of actions against Lee and UPMC despite the existence of Untracht I. (Doc. No. 142, Ex. B). By letter dated July 13, 2001 from Lee’s President and CEO, David R. Davis, Plaintiff was informed that the Executive Committee had voted to recommend to the Board of Directors that Plaintiffs clinical privileges be subject to the restriction that a second surgeon be involved in all major abdominal surgeries. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 1). The letter also informed Plaintiff that under the Medical Staff Bylaws, Plaintiff could request a hearing before a panel of physicians prior to the recommendation being forwarded to the Board. Id. On August 8, 2001, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Preliminary Injunction in Un-tracht I seeking to enjoin Lee and UPMC from taking action to impose or enforce the condition that he have a second surgeon present for major abdominal surgeries. (Doc. 142, Ex. C). On September 17, 2001, Lee and UPMC filed, in Untracht I, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Preliminary Injunction, or in the Alternative to Stay Proceedings Pending Exhaustion of Plaintiffs Internal Remedies Under Lee’s Medical Staff Bylaws. (Doc. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2). By letter dated August 14, 2001 to the President of Lee, Plaintiff requested a hearing under Lee’s Medical Staff Bylaws. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 1). Dr. Ian Katz, Dr. Johnnie Barto and Dr. John J. Seeber, were appointed by Lee as a hearing panel (hereinafter the “Hearing Panel”). (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 1) These medical staff members did not actively participate in consideration of the matter at the Medical Staff Committee level and were not in direct economic competition with Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 1). Both parties accepted the Hearing Panel before the proceedings began. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 1). The Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County issued an Order dated November 20, 2001, “staying all proceedings before the Court pending completion of the internal remedies afforded Plaintiff under [] Lee Hospital’s Medical Staff Bylaws.” (Doc. No. 142, Ex. D). Additionally, the Court enjoined Lee from filing a report with the National Practitioner Data Bank (hereinafter “NPDB”) until permitted to do so by the Court. (Doc. No. 142, Ex. D). On or about November 30, 2001, the internal hospital hearing requested by Plaintiff began. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 2). The appointed hearing officer was Daniel W. Rullo, Esquire, who presided over the hearings. (Doc No. 155, Ex. A, p. 1). Hearings were held on December 1, 2001, December 4, 2001, December 14, 2001, January 4, 2002, January 5, 2002, January 12, 2002, and January 23, 2002. (Doc No. 155, Ex. A, n. 1-2). Plaintiff was represented by legal counsel at these hearing sessions. (Doc No. 155, Ex. A, n. 1-2). During these first eight hearing sessions, Hearing Officer Rullo made certain rulings on the admissibility of evidence and other procedural issues. (Doc. No. 137, p. 11). As part of the proceedings, testimony about surgeries performed by Plaintiff after the recommendation that a second surgeon be present at all major abdominal surgeries performed by Plaintiff had been rendered was introduced and extensively rebutted by Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 1). On March 11, 2002, in Untracht I, Plaintiff filed a Motion on Pending Internal Fair Hearing, requesting the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County to review and overturn certain rulings that had been made by Hearing Officer Rullo in the internal Lee hearings. (See Doc. No. 142, Ex. E). By Order dated March 19, 2002, Plaintiffs motion was denied and the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County stated that it would “not intervene in the ongoing hearing process.” (Doc. 142, Ex. E). Thereafter, further internal hearing sessions were held on March 22, 2002, April 17, 2002, April 24, 2002, and May 2, 2002. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, n. 2). Plaintiff represented himself at these sessions after he and his attorneys ended their attorney-client relationship. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, n. 1): On June 20, 2002, despite the stay of all proceedings by the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County in Untracht I, Plaintiff, for the third time, sought judicial intervention into the internal Lee peer review process by filing a Motion to Order Defendants to Produce Documents, Compel Testimony, and Comply With Accepted Standards of Review. (See Doc. No. 142, Ex. E). On July 17, 2002, the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County denied Plaintiffs Motion and again stated it would not intervene in Lee’s ongoing internal hearing process. (Doc. No. 142, Ex. F). Further internal hearing sessions were held at Lee on May 2, 2002, August 14, 2002, August 15, 2002, October 8, 2002, November 14, 2002, November 20, 2002, December 16, 2002, and January 15, 2003. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, n. 2). A total of nineteen hearing sessions were held. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 2). In the midst of these final internal hearing sessions, on or about November 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed a writ of summons in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania (Case No. 2002-3825) against Dr. Benz, Dr. Ridella, Dr. Fiorica, Dr. Ergas, Dr. Farthing, Dr. Gunnlaugson, Ms. Weisbrodt, Mr. Davis, Lee, UPMC and Dr. Slater. (Doc No. 141, PI. Depo., Ex. 31) (hereinafter “Untracht III.”). This was the third lawsuit filed by Plaintiff in Cambria County dealing with the same series of events. (Id.; See Doc. No. 142, Ex. A, B). On March 7, 2003, following completion of the nineteen hearing sessions, the Hearing Panel unanimously found that the recommendation of the Credentials Committee and Executive Committee that Plaintiff have a second surgeon for all major abdominal surgeries was proper; was supported by substantial evidence; and should be implemented. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 23). In accordance with Hearing Officer Rullo’s interpretation of the Lee Bylaws, the Hearing Panel’s only options were to accept or reject the recommendation that a second surgeon be present with Plaintiff whenever he performed major abdominal surgery. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 1). The Hearing Panel unanimously accepted the recommendation. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, p. 23). The Hearing Panel found that Plaintiff often lacked sound medical judgment, had not been inclined to accept criticism and may not recognize his limitations or the limitations of the facility in which he operates. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A, pp. 22-23). Plaintiff appealed the Hearing Panel’s recommendation to the Lee Board. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2); (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15). An appellate review panel was appointed by the Lee Board to review Plaintiffs appeal (hereinafter the “Appellate Review Panel”). (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2). The Appellate Review Panel met on April 9, 2003, and reviewed the evidence and transcript from the hearing sessions and the report of the Hearing Panel. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15—Letter from Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lee to Plaintiff dated June 24, 2003, p. 1). The Appellate Review Panel concluded that Plaintiffs behavior could not be corrected by merely requiring a second surgeon. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 1). The Appellate Review Panel recommended that, for the protection of Lee’s patients, Plaintiffs application for reappointment should be denied and his staff privileges should be terminated. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2). ' On May 5, 2003, the Lee Board adopted the recommendation of its Appellate Review Panel. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15, p. 1). By letter dated May 6, 2003, Plaintiff was advised of the Lee Board’s decision to consider terminating his staff privileges. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15, p. 2). The Lee Board then directed a joint committee of the Board and medical staff (hereinafter the “Joint Committee”) to consider the Appellate Review Panel’s recommendation that Plaintiffs staff privileges be terminated. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2; Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15, p. 1). After Plaintiff and the medical staff submitted written responses, further evidence, and oral arguments, the Joint Committee recommended that Plaintiffs staff privileges be terminated. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2); (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15, p. 2). At the conclusion of Lee’s fair hearing proceedings, on June 24, 2003, the Lee Board voted to terminate Plaintiffs staff privileges. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15, pp. 1-2); (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2). The Lee Board notified Plaintiff of its decision by letter dated June 24, 2003. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 15, pp. 1-2); (Doc. No. 155, Ex. A to Ex. B, p. 2). On July 25, 2003, in Untracht I, Lee filed a Motion to End Injunction, Lift Stay or Grant Other Relief. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. B). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Continue. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. C). On September 4, 2003, the Honorable F. Joseph Leahey, of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County denied Plaintiffs Motion to Continue in Untracht I and entered an Order vacating the Order dated December 20, 2001 that enjoined Lee and the other defendants in Untracht I from reporting the internal actions and outcomes to the Pennsylvania State Medical Board of Medical Examiners and the NPDB. (Doc No. 147, Ex. 13). On or about September 17, 2003, Lee made a NPDB submission reporting that Plaintiff was denied privileges for continuing problems with poor judgment and failure to provide proper patient care. (Doc. No. 137, p. 17). On December 22, 2003, two Orders were entered, one in Untracht I and one in Untracht II, sustaining Defendants’ Preliminary Objections which dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint in Equity against Lee and UPMC with prejudice and also dismissed all the other claims against the various defendants. (Doc. No. 155, Ex. G). B. CONEMAUGH When Plaintiff was up for reappointment at Conemaugh in 2000 and 2002 he provided Conemaugh with full documentation of Lee’s ongoing allegations. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—PI. Aff., ¶ 63). Upon review of that documentation, Conemaugh reappointed him to its medical staff in 2000 and in February of 2002. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1-Pl. Aff., ¶ 31). Plaintiff experienced no problems or adverse action at Conemaugh until November 22, 2002 when Plaintiff operated on an 85 year old Jehovah’s Witness who was suffering from colorectal cancer. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—PI. Aff. ¶ 25). The patient, Earl Esherick (hereinafter “EE”), died and on November 27, 2002, Plaintiff was informed that his clinical privileges at Conemaugh were being suspended because of this patient’s death. (Doc. 147, Ex. 1—PI. AffA 25). The next day, Thanksgiving 2002, Plaintiff called Dr. Saluzzo and informed him that Plaintiff felt the patient’s death was the fault of the anesthesiologists. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1— PL AffA 25). As a result of events in the operating room that led to the patient’s death, and Plaintiffs attempts to blame the anesthesiologists, the Conemaugh Credentials Committee voted to revoke his clinical privileges on December 17, 2002. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—Pl. AffA 33). The Conemaugh Credentials Committee based its recommendation on four findings: 1) Plaintiff mismanaged the care of EE; 2) Plaintiffs poor judgment was responsible for the death of EE; 3) Plaintiff behaved unprofessionally and non-collegially by attempting to shift blame for EE’s death back to the anesthesiologists and others; and 4) Plaintiff violated a Conemaugh Medical Staff bylaw by not signing a third-party release. (Doc. No. 133, p. 18, ¶ 86). On December 19, 2002 Plaintiff informed EE’s family of the wrongdoing Plaintiff felt occurred in the deceased patient’s care, including that the anesthesiologists were at fault, and Plaintiff assisted the family in finding an attorney to sue to protect their rights. (Doc. No. 133, p. 19, ¶ 88). In response to Conemaugh’s vote to revoke his privileges, Plaintiff participated in Conemaugh’s fair hearing process. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—Pl. Aff. ¶ 25; Ex. 10). The hearings were conducted between March 10, 2003 and May 21, 2003. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—PI. Aff. ¶ 25; Ex. 10). During the Conemaugh fair hearing process, Plaintiff called witnesses and presented evidence and Conemaugh made a determination to suspend and/or revoke his staff privileges. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1— PI. Aff., p. 8, ¶ 38). The Conemaugh hearing panel determined revocation of Plaintiffs privileges was warranted based on the unprofessional nature of Plaintiffs communications with EE’s family. (Doc. No. 133, p. 19, ¶ 92). Subsequently, Attorney Alan H. Perer, the attorney contacted by Plaintiff on behalf of EE’s family, filed suit of behalf of the personal representative of EE’s estate against Conemaugh and Plaintiff (no anesthesiologist or other doctors), alleging negligence on the part of Plaintiff and negligence on Conemaugh’s part in granting clinical privileges to Plaintiff. (Doc No. 133, p. 20, ¶ 96; Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—PI. Aff. ¶ 43). The parties agreed to binding high-low arbitration, which meant that Conemaugh and Plaintiff would have to pay regardless of the outcome and the arbitration was only to determine in what amount. (Doc. No. 133, p. 20, ¶ 97). The arbitration was held March 10, 2005. (Doc. No. 147, Exs. 8, 9). Despite the fact the arbitrator awarded $375,000 to the deceased patient’s personal representative, Plaintiff elects in his pleadings to this Court to characterize this as a ruling in his favor. (Doc. No. 133, p. 20, ¶ 97; Doc. No. 147, p. 20). On or about June 9, 2003, Conemaugh made submissions to the NPDB regarding Plaintiff on the basis of substandard and inadequate care, poor clinical judgment and unprofessional behavior. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 22). C. WINDBER Plaintiff had privileges at Windber, which is located ten miles from Lee and eight miles from Conemaugh. Mapquest, www.mapquest.com, (last visited July 27, 2006). Windber never had any problems with Plaintiffs patient care. (Doc. 147, Ex. 1—PI. Aff., ¶ 61). Plaintiff informed Windber of the actions taken against his clinical privileges at Lee and after review of the allegations, Windber reappointed him without restrictions in 2002. (Doc. 147, Ex. 1—PI. Aff., ¶ 24). In August of 2002, however, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned his privileges at Windber. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1—PI. Aff., ¶ 60; Doc. No. 137, Ex. B—PL Depo., p. 52, lines 10-16). When Plaintiff resigned his clinical privileges at Windber, no disciplinary actions were pending at the facility, nor were any disciplinary actions planned. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 1-PI. Aff., ¶ 62; Doc. No. 137, Ex. B—PL Depo., p. 52, lines 19-25). D. DISTRICT COURT AND REMAINING STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS On May 14, 2003, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against thirty-six defendants, including individual physicians and health care professionals, a university, a law firm, two lawyers, an anesthesiology group, two health systems, four medical facilities and 20 John Doe Defendants. (Doc. No. 1). The Complaint contained 522 Paragraphs and 15 counts alleging Sherman Act violations, Section 1983 civil rights violations, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, negligence, perjury and defamation. (Doc. No. 1). On May 14, 2003, Plaintiff also filed a Petition for Temporary Injunction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 2). A supporting brief was filed by Plaintiff on May 20, 2003. (Doc. Nos. 3, 4). All of the Defendants filed a timely Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Petition for Temporary Injunction. (Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17). All of the Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss, Motions to Strike and Motions to Transfer Venue, as well as Briefs in Support of those Motions. (Doc. Nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 35). These were filed between June 9-12, 2003. Id. On June 26, 2003, Plaintiff, without leave of Court, filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 52). The Amended Complaint did not bolster the allegations against the Defendants, nor did it cure the defects in the original Complaint. Id. This Amended Complaint consisted of 114 pages, 15 causes of action and 655 Paragraphs. Id. Between July 7 and 11, 2003, Defendants again filed Motions to Dismiss and/or Strike Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Motions to Transfer. (Doc. Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65). On July 25, 2003, the Honorable Timothy J. Savage, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered an Order granting the Defendants’ Motions to Transfer and transferred the case sub judice to the Western District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 80). On December 29, 2003, in the case sub judice Plaintiff filed a Motion to Supplement the Pleadings and a Motion and Brief for Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief. (Doc. Nos. 86, 87, 88). On January 5, 2004, Plaintiff revived the November 13, 2002 writ of summons which was filed a year earlier in Untracht III and, yet again, filed a Complaint against several of the Defendants named in this federal court action, and some who were named in the previous state court actions, and asserted causes of action including defamation as a result of testimony and documents provided , at the Lee internal fair hearings. (Doc. No. 136, p. 5). On March 11, 2004, in the case sub judice Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint and Brief in Support. (Doc. No. 98). On May 28, 2004, this Court entered a Case Management Order setting the deadlines for the case, including that discovery would close on January 7, 2005. (Doc. No. 103). Defendants sent out timely discovery requests and scheduled and conducted Plaintiffs deposition on December 20, 2004 and December 21, 2004. (Doc. No. 141, Ex. 1). Plaintiffs deposition was to be concluded at the end of December 2004/first week of January 2005; prior to the close of discovery, but at Plaintiffs request, the discovery deadline was extended until February 14, 2005. (Doc. Nos. 112, 116). Discovery was stayed on February 10, 2005 pending the Court’s decision on certain motions. (Doc. No. 126). Those motions were decided on April 7, 2005. (Doc. No. 131). Discovery, therefore, was completed on April 11, 2005. On April 7, 2005, this Court issued an Order granting defendants’ Motion to [Sjtrike the Amended Complaint and granting Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which he did on April 25, 2005. (Doc. No. 131). The motions currently pending before the Court were filed after the close of discovery between June 13, 2005 and October 21, 2005. ANALYSIS II. LEGAL STANDARD The Lee and Conemaugh Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 136, 139). The Conemaugh Defendants’ Motion (Document No. 139) is so captioned and the Lee Defendants’ Brief in Support (Doc. No. 137) indicates the alternative in the first sentence of the Introduction. (Doc. Nos. 137, 139). Plaintiff responds to the Motions with a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support. (Doc. Nos. 146, 147). Additionally, both Plaintiff and Defendants filed extensive exhibits with their Motions and Briefs in Support including: depositions; affidavits; prior state court pleadings and orders; and letters and other documentation related to the actions taken at Lee and Conemaugh. (Doc. Nos. 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 151, 152, 154, 155). Accordingly, the Court treats the motions before it as motions for summary judgment. A motion to dismiss may be converted to a motion for summary judgment if the materials submitted warrant a conversion and the parties had adequate notice. In Re Rockefeller Center Properties Inc. Securities Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir.1999). The Third Circuit has held that the parties have adequate notice where some of the motions to dismiss are framed in the alternative as motions for summary judgment. Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 578-79 (3d Cir.1996). In the case sub judice the Court has no question that the parties had notice that the Motions to Dismiss would be treated, in the alternative, as Motions for Summary Judgment. The Motions to Dismiss were denoted as Motions for Summary Judgment in the alternative in either the caption of the Motion or the first sentence of the Introduction of the Brief in Support. (Doc. Nos. 137, 139). Plaintiff responded with a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment indicating it was clear to him Motions for Summary Judgment had been filed by the Defendants. (Doc. No. 146). Finally, the parties attached extensive exhibits to their Motions. (Doc. Nos. 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 151, 152, 154, 155). Accordingly, the Court treats the motions as Motions for Summary Judgment except in two instances where a Motion to Dismiss is a more appropriate manner in which to address the issue. A. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): the district court [is] required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.1989); D.P. Enters., Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir.1984). In determining whether a claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a court looks only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the record. Moreover, a case should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it clearly appears that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistently with the plaintiffs allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); D.P. Enters., 725 F.2d at 944. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.1994). The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that the complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Electronics Inc. v. U.S., 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.1991)). B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate only when it is demonstrated that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-32, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-57, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue of material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Oritani [Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 638 (3d Cir.1993) ]. Troy Chem. Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 125-126 (3d Cir.1994). As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. See generally 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725, pp. 93-95 (1983). This materiality inquiry is independent of and separate from the question of the incorporation of the evidentiary standard into the summary judgment determination. That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs. Any proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law are not germane to this inquiry, since materiality is only a criterion for categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal elements of the claim and not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986). III. DISCUSSION A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR CLAIM PRECLUSION 1. Defendant’s Assertion of Collateral Estoppel or Claim Preclusion Defendants assert that all claims before the Court in the case sub judice are barred by collateral estoppel or claim preclusion because Plaintiff should have asserted such claims in one of his previously filed and dismissed state court cases. The cases' to which Defendants refer are Untracht I and II, both of which were dismissed on the basis of preliminary objections. (Doc. No. 142, Ex. G). Defendant judicially admits in Untracht I and Untracht II that “[t]he federal action includes all of the same claims presently before this Court.” (Doc. No. 155, Ex. 2, p. 3). However, the Orders dismissing Untracht I and Untracht II do not specify on which preliminary objection the cases were dismissed and Defendants do not clarify this for the Court. (Doc. No. 142, Ex. G). Furthermore, the Defendants present no argument to the Court suggesting that the preliminary objections were an adjudication on the merits. See Parking Auth. of the City of Wilkes-Barre v. Ten East South Street Co., 788 A.2d 1096, 1100-01 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) (holding dismissal on preliminary objections was not an adjudication on the merits and collateral estoppel did not apply). Since the preliminary objections on which the cases were dismissed are relevant to whether this Court can apply collateral estoppel or claim preclusion and since no argument is made that the preliminary objections constituted an adjudication on the merits, viewing the facts before it in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court cannot dismiss Plaintiffs claims on this basis. 2. Plaintiffs Assertion of Collateral Estoppel First, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in his favor against Conemaugh based on his assertion that Conemaugh is judicially estopped by a statement it made in its Answer in the malpractice case filed by EE’s estate against Plaintiff and Cone-maugh (hereinafter the “Malpractice Case”) and by the position it took in the March 10, 2005 arbitration proceeding that it was not negligent in credentialing Plaintiff through November 22, 2002. The statement in Conemaugh’s Answer in the Malpractice Case to which Plaintiff refers reads as follows: “[I]t is denied that [Conemaugh] was negligent in credentialing Dr. Untracht. To the contrary, when Dr. Untracht was credentialed, [Conemaugh] carefully and in compliance with all hospital, state and federal regulations, did appropriately evaluate the information that was provided by Dr. Untracht requesting surgical privileges. Dr. Untracht at the time that his credentials were granted appeared to be a competent surgeon up to and including November 22, 2002 [the day of EE’s operation]. At all times, [Conemaugh] exercised reasonable care in conducting an investigation into the credentials, skill, judgment and ability of Dr. Untracht up to and including November 22, 2002; The hospital did not know, nor did it have any reason to believe that there were any serious concerns or problems associated with the surgery and practice of Dr. Untracht from the time he was credentialed up to and including November 22, 2002. Further, at all times, [Conemaugh] acted in an appropriate fashion with regard to all patients ... it is denied that [Cone-maugh] had any information prior to the surgery performed by Dr. Untracht on Earl Esherick on November 22, 2002, that would have warranted a suspension or other action with regard to the privileges of Dr. Untracht.” (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 6—Conemaugh’s Answer and New Matter to EE Complaint). Plaintiffs contention, that Conemaugh should be judicially estopped as a result of its September 7, 2004 Answer in the Malpractice Case and the position it took in the March 10, 2005 arbitration proceeding that it was not negligent in credentialing Plaintiff through November 22, 2002, makes no sense. (Doc. No. 147, p. 16). First, Plaintiff never adequately explains what Conemaugh should be judicially es-topped from asserting. Presumably he wants to bind Conemaugh to its denial of the allegation that Conemaugh was negligent in credentialing Plaintiff. To begin, whether Conemaugh was negligent in credentialing Plaintiff between 1995 and November 22, 2002 is simply not an issue in the case sub judice. Furthermore, whether Conemaugh was negligent in credentialing Plaintiff between 1995 and November 22, 2002 is not an issue to which the doctrine of judicial estoppel is applicable. The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a litigant from asserting a position that is inconsistent with one previously taken before a court or agency. Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir.1996). Application of the doctrine involves a three-part test: 1) whether the party’s present position is irrevocably inconsistent with the position it asserted in the prior proceeding; 2) whether the party changed its position in bad faith; and 3) whether the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to address the affront to the court’s authority or integrity. Dam Things from Denmark; a/k/a Troll Company ApS v. Russ Berrie & Co. Inc., 290 F.3d 548, 559 n. 15 (3d Cir.2002). Here, the basic requirement of inconsistency is not satisfied because there is nothing inconsistent between Conemaugh’s defense in its Answer in the Malpractice Case or in the March 10, 2005 arbitration proceeding that it was not negligent in credentialing Plaintiff between 1995 and November 22, 2002 and Plaintiffs removal from Conemaugh’s medical staff subsequent to November 22, 2002. Additionally, the fact that Conemaugh took a position in the March 10, 2005 arbitration of the Malpractice Case that it had not been negligent in credentialing Plaintiff between 1995 and November 22, 2002 has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the issue of whether Plaintiff was negligent in his treatment of EE, an 85-year old patient, on November 22, 2002. Furthermore, Conemaugh’s position that it was not negligent in credentialing Plaintiff between 1995 and November 22, 2002 has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with whether he acted unprofessionally in accusing others of negligence. Conemaugh’s assertion that it acted properly when it initially credentialed Plaintiff does not constitute an admission by Conemaugh that Plaintiff acted properly thereafter. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for Conemaugh to assert Plaintiff acted improperly, whether negligently or unprofessionally, on or after November 22, 2002. Since there is no irreconcilable inconsistency, the doctrine of judicial estop-pel is not applicable. Additionally, there is no evidence that Conemaugh’s assertions were accepted or adopted by any court in the course of the litigation so as to evidence bad faith on the part of Conemaugh for deviating from those assertions. Id. (citing Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999)). Finally, judicial estoppel is an extraordinary remedy that , should be used only when a party’s inconsistent behavior would result in a miscarriage of justice. See Dam Things, 290 F.3d at 559-60. Plaintiff makes no argument regarding how failing to apply judicial estoppel in the case sub judice would result in a miscarriage of justice. Second,Plaintiff asserts the March 10, 2005 arbitration result is entitled to collateral estoppel effect. (Doc. No. 147, pp. 20, 23). Plaintiff is incorrect in his assertion, the March 10, 2005 arbitration result is not entitled to collateral estoppel effect. Collateral estoppel requires that the following four factors be met: 1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; 2) the issue was actually litigated; 3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; and 4) the party precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior action. Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir.1995). Although the issue of Plaintiffs negligence was likely at the forefront of the matters litigated in the arbitration proceeding, Judge Murphy did not offer any explanation as to why he reached the decision he did. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 9). Judge Murphy simply entered an award in favor of the Malpractice Case defendants, which resulted in the Malpractice Case plaintiff receiving the “low” end of the high-low arbitration, in the amount of $375,000. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 9). In short, Plaintiff requests that the Court declare res judicata “Judge Murphy’s finding that Plaintiff did not mismanage the care of Patient EE.” (Doc. No. 146, p. 4). Plaintiff blatantly misrepresents to the Court the arbitration Judge’s “holding” on this issue. Plaintiff interprets a judgment against him in the amount of $375,000 to mean that Judge Murphy-made a “finding” that he did not mismanage the care of EE. No such finding was made. The reasoning behind Judge Murphy’s decision to award Plaintiff $375,000, the low side of the high-low binding arbitration is not disclosed by Judge Murphy. (Doc. No. 147, Ex. 9). Nowhere does Judge Murphy find, state or imply that Plaintiff did not mismanage the care of EE. (Doc No. 147, Ex. 9). The Court cannot and will not declare res judicata a finding that simply does not exist. B. ANTITRUST CLAIMS 1. Antitrust Standing To prove antitrust standing a plaintiff must show that: 1) he has suffered the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent; and 2) the injury flows from that which makes the defendant’s acts unlawful. Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir.1993). The factors to be employed in a standing analysis include: 1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the intent by the defendant to cause the harm, with neither factor alone conferring standing; 2) whether the plaintiffs alleged injury is of the type for which the antitrust laws were intended to provide redress; 3) the directness of the injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal application of standing principles might produce speculative claims; 4) the existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violations; and 5) the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537-45, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). “In addition to establishing that he has suffered an antitrust injury, the plaintiff must prove that he is the most efficient enforcer of the laws.” Baglio v. Baska, 940 F.Supp. 819, 828 (W.D.Pa.1996) (citing Alberta Gas Chem. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1249 (3d Cir.1987)). “Antitrust standing goes beyond the Constitutional standing requirement of ‘injury in fact’ and is not satisfied by the mere allegation of a causal connection between an alleged antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiff.” Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 883 F.Supp. 1016, 1045 (E.D.Pa.1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 624 (3d Cir.1996). “ ‘An antitrust plaintiff must prove that the challenged conduct affected the prices, quantity or quality of goods of services,’ not just his own welfare.” Mathews, 87 F.3d at 641 (quoting Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir.1991)). Recovery by a private plaintiff on an antitrust claim can only be had where the loss “stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff lacks antitrust standing and, therefore, may not bring a claim under the Sherman Act. (Doc. No. 137, pp. 44-46; Doc. No. 152, pp. 9-11; Doc. No. 161, p. 4; Doc. No. 162, p. 5). The Plaintiff cites Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268 (3d Cir.1999) to argue that he has antitrust standing suggesting that his circumstances are comparable to Dr. Angelico’s. The Court does not agree. To begin, in Angelico, with regard to the first element, the Third Circuit assumed that Dr. “Angelico’s allegation that the defendants acted in concert and with anti-competitive motive, i.e., conspired [was] true ... [and his] harm clearly resulted from the conspiracy that prevented him from competing in the market and thereby earning a living.” Angelico, 184 F.3d at 274. This Court will make no such assumption in the case sub judice. Other than bare allegations, Plaintiff offers no evidence of a conspiracy, an essential part of an antitrust violation, between any of the Defendants. In fact, Plaintiff offers evidence to the Court that disproves a conspiracy. First, Plaintiff offers evidence that while the adverse actions were being taken against him at Lee he notified Conemaugh and Windber and that, upon review, each hospital renewed his clinical privileges multiple times. (Doc. 147, Ex. 1-PI. Aff., ¶ 22, 23, 24, 31). According to Plaintiffs own evidence, after being put on notice of the adverse actions taking place at Lee, Conemaugh and Windber renewed Plaintiffs clinical staff privileges in 2000 and in 2002. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs evidence establishes that Conemaugh only began adverse action against Plaintiff following the death of EE, one of Plaintiffs patients at Conemaugh, more than three years after Plaintiffs problems at Lee arose. Id. at ¶25. Finally, Plaintiff admits he never suffered adverse action at Windber and, in fact, voluntarily resigned from Windber. (Doc. 147, Ex. 1-PI. Aff. ¶ 60; Ex. B—PI. Depo., p. 52 lines 10-16). The evidence provided by Plaintiff demonstrates that Lee and Conemaugh were not acting in concert, i.e., conspiring, but were actually acting quite independently. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Defendants Lee and Conemaugh acted in concert and with an anticompetitive motive, i.e., conspired. Therefore, Plaintiff does not raise a genuine issue of material fact on the first element of antitrust standing, that his alleged harm clearly resulted from a conspiracy to prevent him from competing in the market. Additionally, the Third Circuit found in Angelico, when addressing whether Dr. Angelico’s injury was of the type the antitrust laws were meant to redress, that the injury Dr. Angelico suffered was being shut out of competition for anticompetitive reasons and that such an injury was among those the antitrust laws intended to prevent. Angelico, 184 F.3d at 274 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 64 F.3d 869 (3d Cir.1995), the other case cited by Plaintiff in an attempt to support his position that he has antitrust standing, the Third Circuit held that Brader had suffered the type of injury the antitrust laws intended to protect because he had been completely shut out of the market by a purported group boycott. Id. at 877 (emphasis added). In stark contrast, Plaintiff did not suffer the injury of being shut out of competition in the market. Although Plaintiffs privileges at both Lee and Conemaugh were eventually revoked Plaintiff had privileges at Windber which were not revoked or restricted and which he admits he voluntarily resigned. (Doc. 147, Ex. 1-PI. Aff. ¶ 60; Ex. B—PL Depo., p. 52, lines 10-16). Thus, Plaintiff was not, in fact, shut out from competing in the market by Defendants’ actions. Rather, Plaintiff had an active avenue of competition, his staff privileges at Windber, that he chose to voluntarily foreclose. The Court finds that voluntary foreclosure of one’s own opportunities for competition is not the type of antitrust injury for which the antitrust laws were designed to provide redress. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks antitrust standing and may not bring a claim under the Sherman Act. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of all Defendants on Plaintiffs Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 claims. 2. Sherman Act § 1 Even if Plaintiff had antitrust standing, summary judgment is appropriate on his Sherman Act § 1 claim. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1. To establish a violation of § 1, a plaintiff must prove: 1) concerted action by the defendants; 2) that produced anti-competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets; 3) that the concerted actions were illegal; and 4) that he was injured as a proximate result of the concerted action. Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir.1993)). Absent proof of all of these elements, a Sherman Act § 1 claim cannot be maintained. Id. a. Concerted Action The essence of a § 1 claim is the existence of an agreement. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999 (3d Cir.1994). “For a section 1 claim, ‘a plaintiff must prove concerted action, a collective reference to the contract ... combination or conspiracy.’ ” Mathews, 87 F.3d at 639 (quoting Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir.1995)). A “ ‘unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement’ must exist to trigger section 1 liability.” Mathews, 87 F.3d at 639 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984)). Unilateral action simply does not support liability no matter what the motivation. Mathews, 87 F.3d at 639 (citations omitted). “Concerted action is established where two or more distinct entities have agreed to take action against the plaintiff.” Gordon, 423 F.3d at 207. “Accordingly, it requires proof of a causal relationship between pressure from one conspirator and an anticompetitive decision of another conspirator.” Id. A non-movant’s burden in defending against a summary judgment motion in an antitrust case is no different than in any other case. In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357-58. “When the question involves concerted action, the non-movant may rely solely on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to withstand summary judgment.” Gordon, 423 F.3d at 208 (citing In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357-58 (3d Cir.2004)). “Significantly, however, ‘antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences’ that can be drawn ‘from ambiguous evidence.’ ” Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int'l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 380 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538)). “To avoid deterring pro-competitive behavior, ‘certain inferences may not be drawn from circumstantial evidence in an antitrust case.’ ” Harrison, 423 F.3d‘ at 380 (quoting InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir.2003)). Mere complaints of concerted action simply are not enough. Gordon, 423 F.3d at 208. “There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action, meaning that the evidence reasonably tends to prove that the alleged conspirators had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” Id. (citations omitted); see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “Evidence of conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy, without, more, will not support an inference of conspiracy.” Id. (citations omitted). The reasoning behind this is that mistaken inferences in this context might result in chilling the exact conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d at 1001 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538). To survive a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588, 106- S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (citations omitted). Furthermore, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff must produce economically plausible evidence supporting the elements of his claim. Harrison, 423 F.3d at 380 (citing Matsu-shita, 475 U.S. at 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538). “If the plaintiffs theory is economically senseless, no reasonable jury could find in [his] favor, and summary judgment should be granted.” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468-69, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992); Harrison, 423 F.3d at 380. First, in the case sub judice Plaintiff simply provides nothing more than bald assertions of conspiracy between the doctors on staff at Lee and Lee; the doctors on staff at Conemaugh and Conemaugh; and Lee and Conemaugh. Plaintiffs assertions basically amount to the following: “Through the presentation of incorrect peer review information as to the standard of care to their [ ] Boards, Defendants [ ] Lee and Conemaugh, the named Defendant physicians and hospital agent coconspirators acquired a unity of purpose, common design and understanding, and a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement to exclude Plaintiff from the medical staffs to the public’s detriment.” (Doc. No. 133, p. 26, ¶ 121). More specifically, Plaintiff claims that they conspired to have him fired by: Lee having his 1998 reappointment withheld; Lee reviewing his past cases, where a pattern of excessive blood loss was apparent, and then alleging to its Credentials Committee that Plaintiff had poor surgical skills; Lee allegedly conducting a peer comparison profile the result of which, according to Plaintiff who has never seen the allegedly existing report, showed he was as good if not better than his peers but according to Plaintiff, Lee allegedly suppressed the report and asserted no such report was ever prepared; Lee allegedly turning the Executive Committee into a hearsay forum and not allowing Plaintiff to defend himself (an allegation Plaintiff makes in the face of clear evidence that over 13]é months 19 hearings that culminated in 3000 pages of transcript were held, in which Plaintiff was given a forum to defend himself); after problems with Plaintiffs performance were recognized, Lee obtaining Dr. Benz to review Plaintiffs cases allegedly “pursuant to standards different than those applicable to his peer group”; Lee allegedly implementing new Medical Staff Bylaws in January 2000 specifically to prejudice Plaintiff; Lee allegedly earmarking faulty surgical equipment for Plaintiffs exclusive use that it knew or should have known was likely to cause fatal complications to Plaintiffs patient; Lee allegedly through Dr. Fritz soliciting Conemaugh through Dr. Saluzzo and Dr. Weygandt to revoke Plaintiffs staff privileges in 2001; Lee allegedly requesting Conemaugh and Windber to reverse their favorable policies toward Plaintiff “as quid pro quo for [ ] Conemaugh to acquire [ ] Lee”; and the Conemaugh doctors allegedly conspiring to have him fired following EE’s death. (Doc. No. 133, pp. 8-13; 16-19). Plaintiff provides no evidence to substantiate these allegations. These mere complaints of concerted action simply are not enough. First, the actions of the doctors on staff at Lee who suggested peer review and those who participated in the peer review process and the subsequent action of Lee, in undertaking peer review in an effort to curtail risk and potential loss of life to its patients, fail to demonstrate that there was a conscious commitment by the medical staff to coerce Lee into accepting its recommendation and, therefore, does not exclude the possibility that Lee acted independently in its peer review activities. See Gordon, 423 F.3d at 209 (affirming grant of summary judgment where doctor did not raise a genuine issue of material fact that other doctors coerced the hospital into revoking his staff privileges and there was no evidence to exclude the possibi