Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER SILVER, District Judge. Petitioner Edward Harold Schad filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced to death in violation of the United States Constitution. (Dkt.l). The Amended Petition raised twenty-eight claims, including numerous subclaims. (Dkt.27). In an Order dated May 8, 2000, the Court found that Claims C, D, E, F, G, I (in part), K, N (in part), P (in part), T, U (in part), X, Z, AA (in part), and BB were procedurally barred, and that Claims S, Y, W, and Y were meritless. (Dkt.59.) The Court found that Claims A, B, H, I (in part), J, L, M, N (in part), O, P (in part), Q, R, U (in part), and AA (in part) were properly exhausted, and ordered Petitioner to file a memorandum regarding the merits of those claims. (Id.) Petitioner filed a merits brief. (Dkt.82.) Respondents filed an answering brief on the merits (Dkt.91), and Petitioner filed a reply (Dkt.98). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. BACKGROUND On December 14, 1978, Petitioner was indicted for first-degree murder. (ROA-PCR 2.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarized the facts of the crime as follows: On August 9, 1978, a badly decomposed body of an elderly male was found approximately nine miles south of Prescott, Arizona, adjacent to a roadway pull-off on U.S. Highway 89. The body was discovered after a highway department worker had detected the odor of decaying human flesh the previous day while driving past the pull-off. Although the worker and his coworker had stopped briefly to investigate the odor on August 8, the body was not actually discovered until the next day due to the fact that it was well concealed in the brush. After the corpse was discovered, the Yavapai County Sheriffs Department and the County Medical Examiner observed a small rope tied around the victim’s neck. It was later established that the cause of death was strangulation. Because of the advanced state of decomposition, the body was not identified until October 11, 1978, when it was established that the deceased was Lorimer “Leroy” Grove, a 74-year-old Bisbee resident. Grove had last been seen on August 1, 1978, in Bisbee, Arizona. On that morning, Grove left Bisbee driving a new Cadillac, pulling a camper-trailer. His ultimate destination was Everett, Washington, where he had intended to visit his sister. On August 3, 1978, a dark green Ford Fairmont was found abandoned 30 miles north of Flagstaff, Arizona, alongside U.S. Highway 89 by a Department of Public Safety Highway Patrolman. It was subsequently determined that the Fairmont had been rented by the defendant from a Ford dealership in Sandy, Utah, on December 31, 1977. Although the vehicle had been rented for the weekend, it was never returned and had been reported as stolen. The vehicle was turned over to the Coconio County Sheriffs Department and was impounded at a local towing yard. On September 12, 1978, two officers examined the vehicle in connection with an investigation of possible homicide charges against defendant. Several items belonging to the victim were found in the Fairmont, including a mirror device which was identified as being similar to one used by the deceased to hook the trailer to the automobile by himself. On September 3, 1978, defendant was stopped by a New York Highway Trooper, for speeding, while driving the victim’s Cadillac. When the defendant could not produce a registration on the vehicle, the officer asked for an explanation. Defendant replied that it wasn’t his car but that he was delivering it for a friend to an area five or ten miles from where the officer stopped him. Asked who was [sic] the friend was, defendant said he was an elderly gentleman by the name of Larry Grove. Defendant was arrested in Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 8, 1978, for parole violation. Defendant had been on parole from the Utah State Penitentiary where he had been serving a sentence for -second degree murder conviction. After defendant was arrested and taken into custody, the Cadillac was taken to the Salt Lake City Police Department impound lot where it was searched. Various personal items were found in the car which were identified as belonging to the victim. State v. Schad, 129 Ariz. 557, 561-62, 633 P.2d 366, 370-71 (1981) (Schad I). On October 5, 1979, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder. (ROA-PCR 56). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death. (M.E.12/27/79). The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Schad I, 129 Ariz. 557, 633 P.2d 366. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. Schad v. Arizona, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982). Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), which the trial court denied. Upon petition for review, however, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Schad, 142 Ariz. 619, 691 P.2d 710 (1984) (Schad II). Petitioner was retried, and on June 27, 1985, a jury again convicted him of first-degree murder. (ROA-PCR 196). On August 29, 1985, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to death. (M.E.8/29/85). Petitioner appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 423, 788 P.2d 1162, 1174 (1989) (Schad III). Petitioner sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 648, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). The Court also denied Petitioner’s motion for rehearing. 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S.Ct. 28, 115 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1991). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the trial court by filing both a preliminary petition for post-conviction relief (ROA-PCR 245) and a supplemental statement of grounds for relief (ROA-PCR 319). The court found most of the claims contained in both the preliminary and the supplemental PCR precluded. (M.E.3/27/96.) The court reviewed the merits of the remaining claims and dismissed the petitions. (M.E.6/21/96.) The court also denied Petitioner’s motion for rehearing. (M.E.7/24/96.) Petitioner filed a petition for review (ROA-PCR 347), which the Arizona Supreme Court denied without comment. On December 16, 1997, Petitioner filed a Preliminary Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. (Dkt.l.) He filed his Amended Petition on August 3, 1998. (Dkt.27.) LEGAL STANDARD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF Petitioner’s claims are governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). For properly preserved claims “adjudicated on the merits” by a state court, the AEDPA established a more rigorous standard for habeas relief. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (Miller-El I). As the Supreme Court has explained, the AED-PA’s “ ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ ... demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059). As set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the AEDPA provides two avenues of habeas relief: (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became final. Id. at 365, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir.2005) (“AEDPA limits the source of clearly-established federal law to Supreme Court cases”); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be of “persuasive value” in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 655 (collecting cases); see Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069. The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(l)’s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Id. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir.2004). Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In order for a federal court to find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25, 123 S.Ct. 357. According to the “demanding but not insatiable” standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029. In considering a challenge under 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct* and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Rice v. Collins, — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 969, 974, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006); Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. at 2325. However, it is only the state court’s factual findings, not its ultimate decision, that are subject to 2254(e)(l)’s présumption of correctness. As the Court noted- in Miller-El I, “AEDPA does not require petitioner to prove that a decision is objectively unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence. The clear and convincing evidence standard is found in § 2254(e)(1), but that subsection pertains only to state-court determinations of factual issues, rather than decisions.” 537 U.S. at 341-42,123 S.Ct. 1029. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its rationale. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir.2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir.2000) (Delgado II). In those circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed independently, a federal court nevertheless defers to the state court’s ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (citing Delgado II, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state court did not decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the claim be reviewed de novo, because in that circumstance “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1025-26 (9th Cir.2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir.2003). DISCUSSION Claim A: Petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the prosecution’s use of the testimony of John Duncan and by the failure to disclose impeachment material. Claim I: The prosecution’s failure to disclose impeachment materials regarding Duncan entitles Petitioner to a new trial. In Claim A, Petitioner alleges that prosecution witness John Duncan was acting as a police agent when he obtained incriminating statements from Petitioner. (Dkt. 82 at 7-16.) Therefore, according to Petitioner, the statements he made to Duncan were obtained in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) Petitioner also claims that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the State’s failure to disclose letters written to California authorities on Duncan’s behalf by a Utah detective and the prosecutor at Petitioner’s first trial. (Id. at 16-22.) Claim I alleges that the prosecutor’s misconduct in failing to disclose the letters requires a new trial. (Id. at 36-38.) 1. Background. In September 1978, John Duncan and his wife were temporarily residing with Wilma Ehrhardt, Petitioner’s live-in girlfriend, in Sandy, Utah, a suburb of Salt lake City. Petitioner first met Duncan on the night of September 7, 1978, after Petitioner returned to Sandy driving a new 1978 Cadillac. (RT 6/21/85 at 746, 755.) According to Duncan, Petitioner told him that the Cadillac was stolen. (Id. at 818-20, 836.) On the morning of September 8, 1978, Duncan called Salt Lake City Detective Kenneth Halterman with information about the stolen Cadillac. (Id. at 634, 819.) Officers staked out the Cadillac and later that morning arrested Petitioner when he entered the vehicle. (Id. at 624-28.) Later that day, Ehrhardt went to the jail and retrieved Petitioner’s wallet. (Id. at 667, 846.) Duncan observed that the contents of the wallet included credit cards and receipts bearing the name Leroy Groves, as well as a traffic citation issued to Petitioner by a New York State Trooper. (Id. at 823-24.) Duncan again contacted Detective Halterman and turned over the materials from Petitioner’s wallet. (Id. at 640-41, 823.) On September 9, 1978, Detective John Johnson interviewed Petitioner, who indicated that he came into possession of the Cadillac by swapping vehicles with an elderly man in Virginia. (Id. at 682-83.) Petitioner denied any knowledge of the stolen credit cards found in his wallet. (RT 6/21/85 at 684.) He then invoked his Miranda rights. (See RT 8/28/79 at 47.) On September 11, 1978, Duncan visited Petitioner in jail. (RT 6/21/85 at 820.) According to Duncan, during their conversation Petitioner urged him to destroy the credit cards and receipts and stated that he would “deny being in any area of Arizona or the State of Arizona, particularly Tempe, Arizona and Prescott, Arizona.” (Id. at 825.) At Petitioner’s first trial, defense counsel sought to suppress Petitioner’s statement to Duncan. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. (M.E.9/26/79.) The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that admission of the statement violated his Sixth Amendment rights, finding that “[t]he police did not direct Duncan’s activities nor did they pay Duncan for the information.” Schad I, 129 Ariz. at 565-66, 633 P.2d at 374-75. The court observed that “[although Duncan wanted ‘some help from the police’ with regard to his California parole violation, this help did not amount to more than a promise from Detective Halterman that he would write a letter to Duncan’s judge in California relating Duncan’s assistance in the investigation” and there “was obviously no ‘quid pro quo’ for Duncan’s assistance.” Id. The court further found that “there were no concerted actions on the part of the police aimed at priming Duncan as a witness against defendant at trial, as evi-denee[d] by the unwillingness of the authorities to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from defendant during the suggested jail visit.” Id. The court concluded that, “Regardless of Duncan’s motivations in aiding the police, we cannot say that the police ‘actively entered into the picture’ so as to give rise to an agency relationship.” Id. At Petitioner’s second trial, Detective Halterman testified that he did not suggest the visit and that Duncan was not paid for his activities. (RT 6/21/85 at 671-72.) Defense counsel again sought to suppress Petitioner’s statement to Duncan, and the court again held an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 793-816.) Duncan testified that he had initiated contact with Detective Halterman and that the idea to speak with Petitioner was his, not Halter-man’s. (Id. at 807-11.) Duncan testified, however, that he believed that Halterman or another officer had made special arrangements for the visit to take place. (Id. at 803-04.) He testified that he initially chose to contact Detective Halter-man because he had assisted Duncan in obtaining his release after Duncan was arrested pursuant to a fugitive warrant. Duncan also testified that, “at least 10 days after” the jail visit, Detective Halter-man offered to write a letter on his behalf to a California judge. (Id. at 812.) Also testifying at the evidentiary hearing was Lieutenant Donald Judd, of the Coconino County Sheriffs Department, who stated that in telephone conversations with Detective Halterman, Halterman had referred to Duncan as an “informant” or “confidential informant.” (Id. at 794-95.) The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In his ruling, the judge rejected the argument that Duncan was actually a confidential informant, observing that, “The Halterman testimony was rather clear, was extremely clear and unequivocal relative to the witness Duncan’s not being, term of art, a confidential informant” and that in referring to Duncan as an informant Lieutenant Judd had simply reported the phrase used by Halterman. (Id. at 815.) The judge also noted that Detective Halterman’s involvement in Duncan’s release occurred “long before the Schad case ever came to light and that the help that, minimal as it was, that he had either offered or perhaps even given to Mr. Duncan, occurred after Duncan, except for testifying, after his information, 10 days after the Schad case was over for Duncan.” (Id.) The judge concluded: “It’s abundantly clear to the court that Mr. Duncan was not an agent of the police and was not such a person as would be used by the police and such a person as would be required to give Miranda warnings to defendants.” (Id. at 815-16.) On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court was unpersuaded by the “new evidence” presented at the second evidentiary hearing. The court explained: Halterman denied suggesting a visit with the defendant. In fact, Duncan testified it was his idea. The record is less clear on who arranged the visit. Duncan stated that he thought that Detective Halterman or someone from the police department arranged his visit. Nevertheless, the evidence established that the police did not tell Duncan to visit Schad or what questions he should ask. Furthermore, the homicide investigation had yet to focus on Schad because Detective Halterman did not learn that the owner of the Cadillac was dead until a month after Duncan’s visit. Finally, Duncan’s release pending extradition was arranged prior to the Schad case coming to light for reasons separate and apart from Duncan’s subsequent assistance in this case. It is unnecessary to review the relevant case law. We do not find the defendant’s evidence any more compelling than the last time. The record supports the judge’s ruling. We find no error in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. (citations omitted). 2. Sixth Amendment violation. This Court must determine if, as alleged by Petitioner, the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. As discussed by the Arizona Supreme Court, id. at 414, 788 P.2d at 1165, and acknowledged by the parties, with respect to this aspect of Claim A applicable federal law includes that set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), which hold that once a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, the government is forbidden from “deliberately eliciting” incriminating statements, and in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), which applies the principles of Massiah to information obtained by jailhouse informants. As Respondents note, also applicable to this claim is the line of Supreme Court cases establishing the principle that the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel attaches only when formal judicial proceedings are initiated against an individual by way of indictment, information, arraignment, or preliminary hearing.” United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 185 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)); see Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-31, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 673 n. 4 (9th Cir.2000) (collecting cases). This line of cases also stands for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense specific,” meaning that “a defendant’s statements regarding offenses for which he has not been charged [a]re admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses.” Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-76, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991)); see United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir.2003); Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir.1995). Based upon these principles, it is evident that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated when Duncan spoke with him because formal proceedings against Petitioner had not yet been initiated. Petitioner was arrested on September 8, 1978, on a parole violation and suspicion of possessing a stolen car. The jailhouse conversation with Duncan occurred three days later. Mr. Grove’s body was identified one month later, on October 11, 1978. Petitioner was indicted for first-degree murder on December 14, 1978. In his reply, Petitioner argues that his right to counsel had attached because he was the “focus” of the murder investigation at the time of his conversation with Duncan. (Dkt. 98 at 19-20.) Even if true, this is of no significance. As the Ninth Circuit noted, simply being the target or the focus of an investigation is not sufficient to trigger a suspect’s Sixth Amendment rights: In sum, the Supreme Court, this court, and every other circuit to consider a similar issue has adhered to the rule that adversary judicial proceedings are initiated “by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” This is a clean and clear rule that is easy enough to follow: Initiating any of these specific proceedings “marks the commencement of the ‘criminal prosecutions’ to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.” We are loath to engraft some new, pre-in-dictment proceeding onto the rule, thereby making it no longer clean and clear—and outside the clear boundaries the Supreme Court has established. Hayes, 231 F.3d at 675 (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690, 92 S.Ct. 1877). Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained in Gouveia, “we have never held that the right to counsel attaches at the time of arrest.” 467 U.S. at 190, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (explaining that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings because the Sixth Amendment right “exists to protect the accused during trial-type confrontations with the prosecutor”). The decision of the Arizona Supreme Court denying Petitioner’s claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by admission of Duncan’s testimony was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this aspect of Claim A. 3. Brady violation. The prosecutor at Petitioner’s first trial, Steven Jaynes, wrote two letters to California authorities on Duncan’s behalf, one prior to Duncan’s testimony and one at the end of the trial. (Dkt. 82, Ex’s 9 and 10.) Petitioner alleges that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the failure of Jaynes, and of the prosecutor at the second trial, Frank Dawley, to disclose these letters, as well as a letter written on Duncan’s behalf by Detective Halterman. (Id. at 16-22, 36-38.) Respondents concede that prosecutors Jaynes and Dawley should have disclosed the letters, but contend that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the lack of disclosure. (Dkt. 91 at 25-26; see Dkt. 98, Ex. B.) As Petitioner notes, there is no state court decision addressing this aspect of Claim A, so this Court’s review of the issue is de novo. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” The duty to disclose includes impeachment as well as exculpatory material. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The government violates its obligation under Brady where (1) the evidence in question was favorable to the accused, (2) the government willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence, and (3) prejudice resulted from the suppression (i.e., the evidence was “material”). Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Evidence is material for Brady purposes “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375); see Banks, 540 U.S. at 699, 124 S.Ct. 1256; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936. With respect to the third prong of a Brady violation, the Supreme Court has explained that materiality does not require a showing that the defendant would have been acquitted had the suppressed evidence been disclosed. Id. at 434-35. Instead, a Brady violation occurs if “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435. In the instant case, the second prong of a Brady violation—suppression of the letters written on Duncan’s behalf—is not contested. The Court also finds, contrary to Respondents’ position, that the first prong has been satisfied. The letters were favorable to the accused, in that they would have served as additional impeachment of Duncan’s credibility. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court concludes, however, that Petitioner has not satisfied the third component of a Brady violation; he has not shown that disclosure of the letters would have “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. First, the case against Petitioner was based on circumstantial evidence linking him to Mr. Grove’s murder. This evidence was independent of Duncan’s testimony about Petitioner’s statements, and its validity would not have been affected by additional impeachment of Duncan’s credibility. See Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir.2000) (while the witness’s testimony was important, there was sufficient evidence apart from it “to carry the case to the jury”) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)). Moreover, Duncan was not the principal witness against Petitioner, nor was his testimony “the glue that held the prosecution’s case together.” Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir.2005) (suppressed impeachment evidence is more likely to violate Brady where a witness is central to the government’s case). In Horton, for example, the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a ha-beas petition, holding that the state had violated Brady by failing to disclose a deal which would have provided immunity for the prosecution’s star witness, who testified that the petitioner had confessed to robbing and murdering a drug dealer. Id. at 573, 579. Also, as Respondents note, the impeachment value of the letters themselves was limited because they were written at the time of Petitioner’s first trial and there was no evidence that Duncan was receiving benefits for his testimony at Petitioner’s retrial six years later. Finally, Duncan’s credibility was significantly impeached during his testimony at the second trial. On direct examination, Duncan acknowledged that he was presently in jail on a petty theft charge and that his criminal record included a conviction for grand theft auto (RT 6/21 /85 at 818). He also acknowledged that he had contacted Detective Halterman about the stolen Cadillac because Halterman had treated him favorably after arresting him as a fugitive. (Id. at 821-22). On cross-examination, defense counsel emphasized Duncan’s criminal record (Id. at 827-31), attacked his motives for assisting Detective Halterman (Id. at 832, 835), and noted that Duncan received a monetary reward from the bank for turning in the stolen credit cards (Id. at 836-37). Counsel also examined Duncan about the letter Detective Halterman had promised to write on his behalf to the California authorities (Id. at 837-39) and about Duncan’s discussions with prosecutor Jaynes concerning the possibility that Jaynes could assist him with his charges in California in return for Duncan’s testimony (Id. at 856-57). Given the nature of the impeachment to which Duncan was subjected during his testimony, any additional impeachment based upon the undisclosed letters would “merely duplicate the grounds for impeaching [Duncan] that were actually presented to the jury.” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1096. The undisclosed information was not of a different character than the evidence that was presented, and did not “provide the defense with a new and different ground of impeachment.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir.2005) (although the witness was impeached on the grounds of his plea deal, the prosecution’s failure to disclose an agreement by which the witness was foreclosed from seeking a psychiatric examination was material for Brady purposes); Horton, 408 F.3d at 580 (although witness’s testimony was impeached by evidence of drug use, lying to police, and assisting in the crime, withheld evidence of promised immunity was a “wholly different kind of impeachment evidence”). Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir.1997), relied on by Petitioner for the proposition that the state violates Brady when it withholds cumulative impeachment evidence, is distinguishable. In Carriger, the state withheld the'Department of Corrections file- of its principal witness, Dunbar, whose testimony that Carriger had confessed to the murder was the centerpiece of a case with weak physical evidence. Id. at 465-66. Adding to the significance of Dunbar’s credibility was the fact that Carriger’s defense was that Dunbar had committed the murder. Id. at 465. Dunbar’s file contained information revealing his “long history of lying to the police and blaming his crimes on others.” Id. at 479. Although the prosecution acknowledged that Dunbar was testifying under a grant of immunity and had a criminal record for burglary, it repeatedly vouched for his credibility, and Dunbar himself offered testimony about his nonviolent and truthful character—testimony that was emphatically contradicted by the information contained in the undisclosed file. Id. at 480-81. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the undisclosed information was cumulative and not material, noting that the jury had not been presented with “evidence of [Dunbar’s] long history of falsely blaming others for his misdeeds” or his violent tendencies. Id. at 481. At Petitioner’s trial, by .contrast, Duncan was impeached with the same category of information contained in the letters the prosecutors failed to disclose. Defense counsel elicited testimony from Duncan that Detective Halterman had offered to assist him with his legal situation in California (RT 6/21/85 at 832, 835) and that Duncan had sought similar aid from prosecutor Jaynes (Id. at 856-57). Counsel’s access to the letters themselves would not have substantially altered the quality of the impeachment to which Duncan was subjected, nor would the additional impeachment evidence afforded by the letters have “put the whole case in ... a different light.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim that his due process rights under Brady were violated by the prosecution’s failure to disclose the letters written on Duncan’s behalf. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim A or Claim I. Claim B: The prosecution failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process. Petitioner alleges that the state violated his due process right to a fair trial by failing to preserve and process various items of physical evidence found in the Ford and Cadillac and by failing to preserve items found near Mr. Grove’s body. (Dkt. 82 at 24-30.) Petitioner argues that as a result of the state’s failure to conduct a competent and complete homicide investigation, he was denied access to “potentially exculpatory evidence.” (Id. at 30.) According to Petitioner, the prejudicial effect of these investigative shortcomings was particularly egregious because the evidence against him was entirely circumstantial. (Id. at 22-24, 29). 1. State court ruling. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges based upon the destruction of evidence. (ROA-PCR 168.) The trial court denied the motion. (M.E.6/14/85.) However, the court agreed to provide, over the State’s objection, a so-called Willits instruction. (RT 6/27/85 at 1341.) On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the state’s failure to process and preserve evidence constituted a violation of his right to a fair trial. Schad III, 163 Ariz. at 415-16, 788 P.2d at 1166-67. In its analysis, the court first cited California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), for the proposition that the state has a duty to preserve evidence material to a suspect’s defense. Id. The court next explained that “a Willits instruction adequately protects a defendant’s due process rights where the state has destroyed or failed to preserve evidence unless the defendant is prejudiced or the state acted in bad faith." Id. at 416, 788 P.2d at 1167 (emphasis added). Finally, the court held that the Willits instruction given by the trial court “adequately protected the defendant’s rights.” Id. The court contrasted Petitioner’s trial with cases in which the destroyed items were the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Id. The court concluded by observing that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the destruction of evidence: [I]n the present case, the best that the defendant could hope for is that none of his fingerprints were on the mirror, clothing or other items. While this would have excluded the defendant from the set of persons whose prints were on these items, it would not have excluded the defendant from ever having handled any of these objects, nor would it have exonerated him of the alleged crime. The Willits instruction accomplished the most that the defendant could have proved—that his prints were not on these items. We find that the defendant’s rights were adequately protected. Id. 2. Analysis. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on the state to preserve evidence that “might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528. Under the Trombetta standard, “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528. To establish a due process violation when the government fails to preserve evidence that is only potentially exculpatory, the petitioner must demonstrate that the government acted in bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the evidence at issue does not meet the Trombetta standard of possessing an “exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed.” 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528. While a number of the items were of evidentiary interest, there is no indication that they possessed exculpatory value or that such value was apparent before the items were destroyed. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56, 109 S.Ct. 333, n* (in child molestation case, the possibility that destroyed semen samples could have proved exculpatory “is not enough to satisfy the standard of materiality in Trombetta”). The presence, let alone the exculpatory value, of fingerprints on beer cans found at a heavily used pullover near Mr. Grove’s body or on a device belonging to Mr. Grove but discovered in the locked trunk of a car used by Petitioner, or trace evidence on Mr. Grove’s heavily deteriorated shirt, is a matter of pure speculation. Because such evidence clearly falls into the “potentially useful” category, the Young-blood standard applies, and Petitioner has the burden to “show bad faith on the part of the police.” Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333; see Mitchell v. Goldsmith, 878 F.2d 319, 322 (9th Cir.1989) (failure to preserve evidence of which no more can be said than it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant, is not a denial of due process unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith). As noted above, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Willits instruction given by the trial court was adequate to vindicate Petitioner’s right to a fair trial under Trombetta. Schad III, 163 Ariz. at 416, 788 P.2d at 1167. Implicit in that holding was a determination that the state did not act in bad faith. Id. This Court must determine whether that holding involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Petitioner’s only argument in support of his claim that the police acted in bad faith is his characterization of the investigation as substandard for a homicide case. (Dkt. 82 at 28-29.) This characterization, if accurate, shows at most negligence, as opposed to bad faith, on the part on the investigators. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333; see Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 625-26 (9th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (officers’ failure to test for fingerprints in certain areas and failure to perform tests on semen samples did not demonstrate bad faith). In addition, as the court noted in Villafuerte, the police do not have a “constitutional duty to perform all tests desired” by a suspect. 111 F.3d at 625 (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59, 109 S.Ct. 333). Petitioner has not shown, or even alleged, that the police acted with “animus” or engaged in “a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528. The investigators’conduct bears no relationship, for example, to that described in Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.1989). In Miller, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a habeas petition. The court found that the petitioner had presented a colorable claim that the investigating officer acted in bad faith when he failed to collect the rape victim’s bloodstained jacket and failed to photograph scratches on the petitioner’s arms. Id. at 1121. The record contained evidence that the officer acted in bad faith: he referred to the petitioner using “an extremely dero-gative expletive,” lied about his knowledge of the bloody jacket, and tried to dissuade witnesses from testifying in the defendant’s favor. Id. The Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for a determination of the petitioner’s bad faith claim. Id. By contrast, Petitioner here has failed to make any showing that the officers conducting the investigation acted in bad faith when they failed to perform certain tests or destroyed items of evidence. See Gaus-vik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (to demonstrate bad faith defendant must “put forward specific, nonconclusory allegations that establish improper motive”). Petitioner has failed to meet his burden under Youngblood. The Arizona Supreme Court’s finding that the police did not act in bad faith, and consequently that Petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not violated, was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as set forth in Trombet-ta and Youngblood. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim B. The Court further finds that Petitioner has failed to allege a colorable claim of bad faith sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Miller, 868 F.2d at 1121. Claim H: The evidence produced at trial was not sufficient to sustain Petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction. (Dkt. 82 at 30-36.) Petitioner argues-that the State’s case “was based on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence” and that “no circumstantial evidence connected [Petitioner] to Mr. Grove’s death.” (Id. at 30.) Petitioner raised this claim in his preliminary PCR petition. (ROA-PCR 245 at 8-9.) The PCR court denied the claim as procedurally precluded. (M.E.3/27/96.) Because the state court did not address the merits of the claim, a de novo review is required. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d at 1167. There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). In making such a determination, a reviewing court is guided by a number of principles which reflect the doctrine that “deference [is] owed to the trier of fact.” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992). For example, “a federal habeas court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record— that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. In addition, it is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; see Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.1995). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “The question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir.1991) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781). While “mere suspicion or speculation cannot be the basis for creation of logical inferences ... [circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.1986); see United States v. Johnson, 804 F.2d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir.1986) (the government is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence). Moreover, “the government’s evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.” United States v. Talbert, 710 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam); see United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir.1991) (“The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict”); see Wright, 505 U.S. at 296-97, 112 S.Ct. 2482; Jackson, 448 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The Court has reviewed the evidence presented at trial and concludes that it was sufficient to support Petitioner’s convictions. As viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the following facts support Petitioner’s murder conviction. Leroy Grove, age 74, was last seen alive on August 1, 1978, in Bisbee, Arizona, as he was leaving on a trip to Washington state to visit his sister. (See RT 6/19/85 at 340; RT 6/20/85 at 565-70.) The next day, August 2, 1978, Petitioner was driving Mr. Grove’s Cadillac and using Mr. Grove’s credit card to purchase gasoline in Benson, Arizona. (RT 6/25/85 at 924.) On August 3, 1978, Petitioner purchased gas with Mr. Grove’s credit card at a station in New Mexico. (Id. at 923.) Also on August 3, 1978, a Highway trooper discovered an abandoned vehicle, a Ford Fairmont, hidden behind some trees off of Highway 89, twenty miles north of Flagstaff, Arizona. (RT 6/20/95 at 454-55.) The Fairmont had been rented by Petitioner on December 31, 1977, from a dealership in Sandy, Utah, and was never returned. (RT 6/20/85 at 414-16.) The vehicle contained items belonging to the children of Petitioner’s live-in girlfriend, Wilma Erhardt. (RT 6/21/85 at 784.) The vehicle also contained newspapers from Phoenix and Mesa dated July 31 and August 1, 1978, indicating that it had not been abandoned prior to the date on which Mr. Grove began his travels. (RT 6/25/85 at 971-72.) In the locked trunk of the vehicle officers located a mirror designed by and belonging to Mr. Grove. (See RT 6/19/85 at 342-43; 6/20/95 at 443-44, 495-96, 573; 6/25/85 at 889.) Petitioner had removed the Ford’s dealer plates and replaced them with Utah plates from Er-hardt’s vehicle. (RT 6/21/85 at 784-85.) The Utah plates were later found in the trunk of Mr. Grove’s Cadillac. (RT 6/25/85 at 963.) On August 8, 1978, a highway worker detected an odor of decomposition emanating from the area of a roadside pullover on Highway 89 approximately eleven or twelve miles south of Prescott. (RT 6/19/85 at 287-88.) The worker discovered Mr. Grove’s corpse the next day. (Id.) It was located beneath some brush on an embankment approximately fifteen feet below the edge of the pullover. (Id. at 302; RT 6/25/85 at 958-59.) The hands were at the side of the body and the feet were crossed. (RT 6/20/85 at 382.) A ligature measuring ten and one half inches had been tied around the neck; the circumference of the average male neck is at least fourteen inches. (Id. at 373.) Mr. Grove had been strangled to death; the hyoid bone in his neck was fractured. (RT 6/19/85 at 361-62.) The cause of death was homicide. (Id. at 363.) The state of decomposition indicated that the body had been there for at least four days and possibly as long as a week. (RT 6/20/85 at 375.) On September 3, 1978, Petitioner was stopped for speeding by a trooper in upstate New York; he was driving Mr. Grove’s Cadillac. (RT 6/20/85 at 551-56.) Petitioner told the trooper that he was driving the Cadillac on behalf of his friend Mr. Grove, an elderly man who was too old to travel; he was taking the car to Bridgeport, New York, where he would meet Mr. Groves. (Id. at 553.) On September 8, 1978, Petitioner was arrested in Salt Lake City, Utah, again driving Mr. Grove’s Cadillac. This time, he explained to authorities that he had obtained the vehicle in a trade with an elderly man in Norfolk, Virginia. (RT 6/21/85 at 682-83.) Prior to his arrest, he offered a third version of how he had come into possession of the Cadillac, telling Erhardt that he had obtained the vehicle through a trade with an old man in Columbus, Ohio. (Id. at 786-87.) As previously discussed, after his arrest Petitioner spoke with John Duncan. He indicated to Duncan that he would deny to the authorities that he had been in Tempe or Prescott. (Id. at 825.) He also asked Duncan to destroy the credit card evidence. (Id.) From August 2, 1978, to the time of his arrest, Petitioner used Mr. Grove’s credit cards as he traveled throughout the United States, making fraudulent purchases at locations in twenty-eight states. (RT 6/25/85 at 976.) He also forged a check to himself on Mr. Grove’s account and cashed it in Des Moines, Iowa, on August 7, 1978. Along with the credit cards, when Petitioner returned to Utah he was in possession of a ring owned by Mr. Grove. (See RT 6/21/85 at 643; RT 6/25/85 at 964-65.) Although Petitioner changed the license plates on the Ford Fairmont to prevent it from being traced as a stolen vehicle, he left the original plates on the Cadillac as he drove it throughout the country for more than a month. (See RT 6/21/85 at 624, 6/25/85 at 925.) This circumstance suggested that Petitioner was not concerned that the vehicle’s owner would report it as stolen. In challenging the quality of the evidence upon which his conviction was based, Petitioner theorizes that Mr. Grove was murdered by one of a number of alternative suspects, or that he strangled himself to death. Such speculation is unsupported by the trial record. It is also insufficient to merit relief under Jackson. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, pursuant to Jackson, “[t]he existence of some small doubt based on an unsupported yet unrebutted hypothesis of innocence is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise legitimate conviction.” Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir.1994). Based upon the information presented at trial, a rational juror could have found proof of Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim H. Claim J: Ineffective assistance of counsel—guilt phase. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1) his failure to locate Mr. Duncan’s wife, and (2) his failure to convince the court to admit evidence of the victim’s mental health. (Dkt. 82 at 38.) Petitioner raised these claims in his supplemental PCR petition (ROA-PCR 319), and the court rejected them (M.E. 6/21/96 at 1-2). As previously discussed, when a state court has addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim of federal constitutional error, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (per curiam); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 21, 123 S.Ct. 357. For a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), the applicable law is set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and. to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To prove deficient performance, a defendant must also overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694,104 S.Ct. 2052. Under the AEDPA, the state court’s decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that the state court’s ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to satisfy either Strickland or the AEDPA’s deferential standard. 1. Failure to locate Duncan’s wife. Petitioner contends that Duncan’s former wife, Sharon Sprayberry, possessed information that would have “completely impeached” Duncan’s testimony regarding the statements Petitioner made during their jailhouse conversation. (Dkt. 82 at 38.) In an affidavit dated May 11, 1995, Sprayberry said that Duncan’s visit to Petitioner was in fact arranged by Detective Halterman, that she was present at the conversation between Petitioner and Duncan, and, significantly, that “[d]uring the jail visit with Mr. Schad, Mr. Schad did not make any statements relating to a homicide in Arizona.” (ROA-PCR 319, Ex. 2.) The PCR court rejected Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to locate Sprayberry and secure her testimony. (M.E. 6/21/96 at 2.) The court explained that this failure was not prejudicial: The proposed testimony of Sharon Sprayberry is certainly not new—it is merely cumulative impeachment and it is therefore, not even particularly material. Even if the testimony of Sharon Sprayberry as presented in affidavit form in this proceeding were accepted as true, this court cannot imagine how the outcome of this trial would have been changed by offering this rather limited impeachment testimony in the face of the overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt from a variety of sources. This claim has no merit. (Id.) This Court agrees that Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present testimony from Sprayberry. The key information provided in the Sprayberry affidavit has little or no impeachment value because it does not contradict Duncan’s testimony. According to Duncan, Petitioner told him that he would deny being in Arizona, particularly Prescott and Tempe; Duncan did not testify that Petitioner said anything about a homicide. (RT 6/21/85 at 825.) Duncan’s testimony is therefore completely consistent with the statement in Sprayberry’s affidavit that Petitioner “did not make any statements relating to a homicide in Arizona.” (ROA-PCR 319, Ex. 2.) The remaining information in the affidavit consists primarily of inadmissible double hearsay relating what Duncan told Spray-berry about what Detective Halterman had told him. (Id.) Petitioner further contends that the PCR court employed the incorrect standard for evaluating prejudice under Strickland. (Dkts. 82 at 40-41, 98 at 40.) The court stated that it “cannot imagine how the outcome of this trial would have been changed” by presenting Sprayberry’s testimony. (M.E. 6/21/96 at 2.) According to Petitioner, this statement indicates that the court employed a higher, or “preponderance of the evidence,” standard for showing prejudice than that required by Strickland—i.e., a reasonable probability of a different outcome. (Dkt. 82 at 41.) The Court disagrees. While the PCR court’s formulation does not use the phrase “reasonable probability,” the most plausible reading of the statement, keeping in mind the presumption that courts are presumed to know and apply the law, see, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir.2002), is that in using the phrase “cannot imagine” the PCR court indicated that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different if Sprayberry had testified. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). In any case, even under a de novo review of the issue, this Court finds that Petitioner’s claim of prejudice lacks merit. Petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present testimony from Sprayberry. The PCR court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 2. Failure to properly present motions for the appointment of an expert on the victim’s mental health and for the admission of the victim’s mental health records. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a proper offer of proof regarding Mr. Groves’ mental health records. (Dkt. 82 at 45-49.) Petitioner also claims that counsel’s performance was ineffective based on his failure to move the trial court to reconsider its denial of his motion for the appointment of an expert witness regarding the victim’s mental health. (Id.) Trial counsel, in an attempt to support one of his defense theories—that the victim committed suicide by strangling himself to death—moved the court to appoint Dr. Otto Bendheim for the purpose of performing a “psychiatric autopsy” of Mr. Grove. (ROA-PCR 156.) In his motion, counsel indicated that Dr. Bendheim had reviewed Mr. Grove’s medical records and reached the “tentative conclusions” that at the time of his death “Mr. Grove was suffering from a depressive neurosis, schizophrenia and was psychotic,” that his mental health had recently deteriorated, and that “he was potentially very suicidal.” (Id. at 3.) The State filed a response in opposition to t