Full opinion text
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (granting Docket # 49). LARSON, Chief United States Magistrate Judge. Introduction Plaintiff Cammerin Boyd filed suit on July 21, 2003, against Defendants Oakland Police Officers Sena and McQuinn, the Oakland Police Department, and the City of Oakland, regarding an alleged incident on July 23, 2002. All parties consented to this Court’s jurisdiction, as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 636(©) and Civil Local Rule 73. Plaintiff was killed in an incident with the San Francisco Police Department on May 5, 2004. Plaintiffs counsel Marylon M. Boyd is also his mother. After Plaintiffs untimely death, Ms. Boyd was appointed administrator of his estate. Cammerin Boyd remains the named plaintiff. Before the Court is the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to offer sufficient admissible evidence to defeat summary judgment, and grants Defendants’ motion. Factual Background The parties have not agreed upon a set of undisputed facts. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges facts, which Defendants deny. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that on July 23, 2002, Mr. Boyd, a twenty-nine year old African American male who was a double amputee, was legally driving his late model Mercedes Benz on Birch Street in Oakland. According to the Plaintiff, Defendant Officers Sena and McQuinn of the Oakland Police Department stopped Mr. Boyd’s car. Plaintiff asserts that the officers approached with their guns drawn and, shouting racial epithets, they dragged him from his car. The officers then allegedly made Mr. Boyd walk without his prosthetic devices, removed his clothing from the waist down, and conducted a body cavity search of Mr. Boyd in the public street. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officers then placed Mr. Boyd in handcuffs and forcefully threw him in the back of their patrol car, where he waited for 30 minutes while they searched his car. Plaintiff asserts that the officers then falsely ticketed Mr. Boyd and towed his car, leaving him at the scene. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed suit on July 21, 2003. This Court construes Plaintiffs Complaint to allege seven causes of action, including: (1) violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, (2) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, including a Monell claim against the Department and City, (3) conspiracy, (4) negligence, (5) assault and battery, (6) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, (7) false arrest and false imprisonment. Defendants City of Oakland, Oakland Police Department, and Officers Sena and McQuinn, filed their Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint on March 11, 2004, denying all of Plaintiffs claims and asserting affirmative defenses. The Court has given Plaintiff ample opportunity to plead the case. At Plaintiffs request, the Court twice continued the matter in order to allow Plaintiff more time to conduct discovery. The Court ordered a third continuance after the death of the Plaintiff, Mr. Boyd. On August 12, 2004, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to quash Plaintiffs discovery request regarding the observations of a witness to the incident in San Francisco on May 5, 2004, in which the Plaintiff was shot and killed. Although a conspiracy between the Oakland and San Francisco Police Departments was not plead in the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court allowed Plaintiffs discovery request. On the other hand, Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to produce initial disclosures. On March 25, 2005, the Court ordered Plaintiff to do so or face sanctions. On February 4, 2006, Defendants moved for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment. In an untimely memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that summary judgment is not appropriate because triable issues of material fact exist in this case. Plaintiffs evidentiary support for this assertion is discussed below. A hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was held on March 22, 2006. The Court grants the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment against all of the Plaintiffs claims, as discussed below. ANALYSIS I. The declaration of Marylon M. Boyd, Plaintiffs primary evidence, is inadmissible, with the exception of paragraph five’s description of Cammerin Boyd as “extremely upset,” which is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule in FRE 803(3), and paragraph six, which is partially admissible to the extent that it states Ms. Boyd’s personal observations, rather than her legal conclusions and assertions made without personal knowledge. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on all of the essential elements of his or her claim. Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir.2003). A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir.2002). “Authentication is a ‘condition precedent to admissibility’ ... We have repeatedly held that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing to FRE 901(a)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that affidavits submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment must: (1) be made on the personal knowledge of an affiant who is competent to testify to the matters stated therein, (2) must state facts that would be admissible in evidence, and (3) if the affidavit refers to any document or item, a sworn or certified copy of that document or item must be attached to the affidavit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Orr, 285 F.3d at 774 n. 9; William W. Schwarzer et ah, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Pro. Before Trial (2004) § 14:161. This rule applies to declarations as well as affidavits. Schwarzer, supra, at § 14:161 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1746, “[djecla-rations made under penalty of perjury have the same effect as an affidavit”). A declarant must show personal knowledge and competency to testify by the facts stated. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.1995) (declarations on information and belief are entitled to no weight where declarant lacks personal knowledge). The matters must be known to the declarant personally, as distinguished from matters of opinion or hearsay. Id. A declarant’s mere assertions that he or she possesses personal knowledge and competency to testify are not sufficient. Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999 (9th Cir.1990). A declarant must show personal knowledge and competency “affirmatively,” under Rule 56(e), for example, by “the nature of the declarant’s position and nature of participation in matter.” Id. A court must determine admissibility by applying the Federal Rules of Evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir.2002) (unauthenticated documents cannot be considered). Plaintiffs primary evidence that the Defendant Officers violated Mr. Boyd’s rights is a declaration by Marylon M. Boyd, who is Cammerin Boyd’s attorney, mother and administrator of his estate. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Summary Judgment (hereafter “PI. Opp. to SJ” 6: 21-26, 7: 1-5); See also Declaration of Marylon M. Boyd in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter “Boyd Declaration”). The Boyd Declaration is attached to Plaintiffs untimely memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. A. Paragraph one is inadmissible because it is merely Plaintiffs counsel’s assertion of personal knowledge and competency to testify, which are insufficient to render the declaration admissible. Paragraph one of the Boyd Declaration is a statement by Ms. Boyd that she is an attorney and has personal knowledge of the matters stated therein, and if called upon, can testify competently to all matters attested to. Boyd Declaration ¶ 1, at 1: 18-21. The Defendants do not object to this paragraph. See Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiffs Evidence re: Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter “Def. Objections”). A declarant must show personal knowledge and competency to testify by the facts stated. Bank Melli, 58 F.3d at 1412. The matters must be known to the declarant personally, as distinguished from matters of opinion or hearsay. Id. Here, Ms. Boyd in paragraph one of her declaration does not show personal knowledge or competency to testify. Ms. Boyd’s mere assertions of personal knowledge and competency to testify are insufficient to establish these assertions to be true. Thus she fails to demonstrate that either paragraph one or the contents of the Boyd Declaration overall are admissible. B. Paragraph two is inadmissible, as Ms. Boyd lacks personal knowledge and is not competent to testify to the matters therein. Paragraph two of the Boyd Declaration states: The only evidence Defendants presented in support of them motion is the declaration of their Counsel, Maria Bee, stating that Plaintiff did not produce witnesses Lorenzo Walker, Antonio Avales, Brandon Jackson, and Kellie Blumin for deposition. Kellie Blumin is with the Public Defender’s office and Defendant did not notice her deposition nor subpoena her for deposition. She was not present at the scene of the incident. She is knowledgeable about the number of pri- or complaints of unreasonable force and other complaints against defendants McQuinn and Sena. With respect to other witnesses, I have appeared in this action informing the Court of the difficulty of producing witnesses to testify against police officers because of their understandable fear of retaliation from the police, particularly in the neighborhood where the incident occurred. Boyd Declaration ¶ 2, at 1: 21-26, 2: 1-5. Defendants object to the declaration as hearsay under Federal Rules of Evidence (hereafter “FRE”) 801 and 802, regarding the portion of paragraph two discussing Kellie Blumin — where she works, that she was not at the scene, and what she allegedly knows about prior complaints against Defendant Officers. Def. Objections at 2: 8-9. The objected-to portion of paragraph two is not based on the personal knowledge of Ms. Boyd, thus she is not competent to testify to it. Rather, it is hearsay at best. As no hearsay exception applies here, these statements in paragraph two are not admissible as evidence in support of Plaintiff's claims. C. Paragraphs three and four are inadmissible. They present the hearsay statements of four witnesses, as relayed by Ms. Boyd, who did not witness the events and who spoke with the witnesses well after the events ended which renders this information outside the scope of Ms. Boyd's personal knowledge and, therefore, her competency to testify. Paragraphs three and four of the Boyd Declaration offer Ms. Boyd's account of the statements of four individuals who Ms. Boyd asserts were witnesses to the Defendant Officers' alleged misconduct, and whom Ms. Boyd later located and interviewed. She claims they are afraid to come forward as witnesses for fear of retaliation by the police. Boyd Declaration ¶ 3-4, at 2: 6-25, 3: 1-5. Defendants object to paragraph 3, lines 2:6-16 as hearsay under FRE 801 and 802, and Plaintiff's statement that she interviewed the four witnesses named therein "within minutes of the incident occurring," as, by her owii admission, she did not arrive at the scene until 5:15 p.m. Def. Objections at 12-16. Defendants also object on the grounds that Ms. Boyd has no personal knowledge of the time that the incident occurred. Id. at 2: 16. Paragraphs three and four are based not on the personal knowledge of Ms. Boyd, but on the hearsay statements of the four alleged witnesses. Ms. Boyd is not competent to testify as to this evidence. There is no basis for a hearsay exception here, so these statements are not adthissible. Therefore, paragraphs three and four are not admissible as evidence in support of the Plaintiff's claims. D. Paragraph five of the Boyd Declaration, containing Cammerin Boyd's statements to his mother/attorney, is inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802, and no hearsay exceptions apply to render it otherwise admissible. "The Confrontation Clause limits the conditions under which hearsay evidence can be admitted, but it does not bar such evidence completely." People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1993). Hearsay evidence which is sufficiently reliable, either because it falls within a `firmly rooted hearsay exception' or is supported by `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,' does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id. (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)). 1. Cammerin Boyd's statements to his mother/attorney are not admissible as an excited utterance because the lengthy, logical, and coherent nature of the statements tends to show that his reflective faculties were not dominated by nervous excitement-which renders the statements inadmissible as lacking the spontaneity required of an excited utterance. FRE 803(2) provides that an excited utterance is not excluded by the hearsay rule and is defined as "[all statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). The elements required to establish an excited utterance include: (1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render normal reflective thought processes inoperative, (2) a statement that is a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought, which (3) relates to the occurrence or event. U.S. v. Alarcon-Simi, 300 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.2002) (citing U.S. v. McLennan, 563 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir.1977)); FRE 803(2). "The excited utterance exception is `firmly rooted'. . . ." Ignacio, 10 F.3d at 615. The Ninth Circuit stated the principle behind the admission of a spontaneous statement as follows: "[1J]nder certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so the utterance which then occurs is spontaneous and sincere. .. ." U.S. v. Alarcon-Simi, supra, at p. 1175 (quoting Wigmore, Evidence § 1745, at 193 (Chadbourn rev.1976)); See also U.S. v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir.1975) (quoting 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1747, at 135 (3d ed.1940)). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an excited utterance is reliable and thus admissible when it "has been offered in a moment of excitement-without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one's exclamation." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). However, "[m]erely being `upset' clearly does not meet the standard for admissibility under Evid.R. 803(2) because it does not show that [the declarant's] statements were not the result of reflective thought." State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 303, 612 N.E.2d 316 (1993). "When a hearsay statement is offered under this exception, the trial court must make a preliminary fact determination that the declarant was so excited or distraught at the moment of the utterance that he did not reflect (or have an opportunity to reflect) on what he was saying." U.S. v. McLennan, supra, at p. 948. To determine whether a declarant was under the stress of excitement when he made the statement, courts consider not only the lapse of time between the event and the statement (whether the declarant had time to think about his actions), but also the apparent state of mind of the declarant, the nature of the startling event, the declarant's age (child victims of sexual abuse are generally allowed more time between the event and the statement), and whether the declarant had a motive to fabricate. See People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, supra, at pp. 614-15; U.S. v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1365 (9th Cir.1989); U.S. v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir.1995). Courts in Hawaii, Utah, and Idaho have held that "lengthy, narrative statements are not admissible as excited utterances." State v. Machado, 109 Hawai'i 445, 127 P.3d 941, 947-48 (2006); West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1, 4 (Utah Ct.App.2000); State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 326, 986 P.2d 346 (Idaho Ct.App.1999). Machado involved an incident of domestic violence iii which the victim's live-in boyfriend allegedly grabbed, choked, stepped on and threatened to kill the victim, brandishing a knife at her. Machado, 127 P.3d at 943-44. The victim screamed, struggled and managed to escape the apartment. Id. A neighbor heard the commotion and called 911. Id. at 943. The victim also called 911 and the police arrived within ten minutes. Id. at 944. The victim spoke with a police officer, to whom she detailed the struggle and death threats. Id. 943. At trial, she recanted, leaving the prosecution to put the police officer on the stand to testify as to her statements regarding the attack and threats to kill her. Id. at 946-47. The officer testified to the victim’s statement as follows: Approximately at 10:00 p.m., [the defendant] arrived home and [the victim] attempted to lock him out of the residence. He then attempted to gain entry by removing a screen on the kitchen window. Seeing this, she allowed him to enter the residence. Once within the kitchen area, [the defendant] grabbed her from behind, holding her in a — what she said was a choke hold with his right arm. There was a struggle, he held her with her — okay, after he got her in a choke hold, he stated — her words were that he stated that, “Don’t fuck with me.” There was a struggle. He grabbed her with his left hand and pulled on her hair, and wrestled her to the ground. While they were struggling on the ground, she had bit him on the left — on his left arm. After they were on the ground, she somehow got out of his hold. He then stepped on her head. And he reached for a steak knife within the dish rack there on the counter. After obtaining the steak knife, he stated that “Don’t fuck with me, I’ll kill you.” He then placed the knife on the dish rack. She then kicked him in the groin area, at which time he released her. She stood up, attempting to leave the kitchen area. He grabbed her from behind, spun her around, and grabbed her by the throat. There was a slight struggle. She got up. She got loose from that and contacted the police. Machado, 127 P.3d at 943-44. Hawaii’s Intermediate Court of Appeals, which first reviewed the case, affirmed the trial court, holding that the statements were admissible as an excited utterance, based on the neighbor’s testimony as to the occurrence of the startling event, the police officer’s testimony that the victim was “pretty hysterical or pretty emotional” when he took her statements, and the court’s assessment that her statements “related to” the startling event. Id. at 945. In its review of the case, the Hawaii Supreme Court noted that “[o]ther courts have held that lengthy, narrative statements are not admissible as excited utterances” and quoted from a Utah case as follows. [I]n West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1, 4 (Utah Ct.App.2000), the Utah Court of Appeals distinguished between an excited utterance and the ongoing discourse of an excited individual, holding that it was error to allow a police officer to recount her entire 30 to 45 minute interview with the alleged domestic abuse victim, rather than limiting admission of the officer’s testimony to particularized utterances of the victim. In reaching this conclusion, that court noted that the excited utterance exception is limited to “truly spontaneous outbursts.” Machado, 127 P.3d at 947-48. The court in West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1, 4 (Utah Ct.App.2000), supra, also stated that “[t]he classic example of an excited utterance is a witness’s exact recollection of the declarant’s spontaneous ‘sound bite’ — an uncoached blurting out— made while the declarant observed the exciting event or closely thereafter.” Hutto, 5 P.3d at 4. Examples given included “You’re a dead man,” “Daddy shot Mommy. Mommy is dead,” “Oh my god,” “It won’t turn, Mom” (referring to a steering wheel), “Oh, God ... It wasn’t your fault,” and “That son-of-a-bitch cut me.” Id. (citations omitted). Id. The court in Hutto “emphasized that not every statement made by an excited person is an excited utterance for purposes of the hearsay rule.” Id. at 6-7. “Emotionalism in recounting a distressing event hours, days, or even years later is not uncommon, but it does not make the recounting an excited utterance.” Id. at 7 n. 8. The Hawaii Supreme Court in Machado also quoted from an Idaho case as follows. In another domestic dispute case, State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 986 P.2d 346 (Idaho Ct.App.1999), the Idaho Court of Appeal found that the trial court had erred in admitting a victim’s statements to a police officer which “were not an exclamation or burst of words in sudden reaction to a startling occurrence[,] but a lengthy recitation of the circumstances surrounding the fight [with her boyfriend] and a request to press charges.” Machado, 127 P.3d at 948 (citing State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 326, 986 P.2d 346 (Idaho Ct.App.1999)). In Hansen, the declarant made a lengthy statement to police ten minutes after an alleged incident of domestic abuse by her boyfriend. State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 326, 986 P.2d 346 (Idaho Ct. App.1999). The declarant described herself to the police detective to whom she made the statement as being “madder than she had ever been.” Id. at 327, 986 P.2d 346. The Idaho Court of Appeal found that the declarant’s “anger ... could have provided a motivation to fabricate or exaggerate in [the declarant’s] version of events.” Id. at 326, 986 P.2d 346. It held that “[t]he ten-minute interval between the conclusion of [the declarant’s] fight with [her boyfriend] and her arrival at the police station was sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication.” Id. The court in Hansen further held that “[the declarant’s] protracted narrative to [the police officer] ... cannot be viewed as the sort of spontaneous reaction that carries indicia of reliability contemplated by” the excited utterance rule. Id. The court in Machado applied the reasoning employed by the Utah and Idaho courts to find that the victim’s extensive statement, relayed through the police officer, was not a “ ‘truly spontaneous outburst’ ... [r]ather, it was a specific and inclusive rendition of the circumstances leading up to the incident and the incident itself.” Id. The court in Machado compared the victim’s extensive recital with the brief statements in State v. Moore, 82 Hawaii 202, 921 P.2d 122 (1996). In Moore, the court held that a wife’s statements to police implicating her husband were admissible as an excited utterance. Machado, 127 P.3d at 948. The wife in Moore had been shot by her husband, who pulled up behind a police car with his injured wife as his passenger. Id. While awaiting an ambulance, the injured wife said, “He shot me,” “He’s a good man[,] I told him I was leaving him,” “He’s distraught,” and “Keep him away from me ... get him away from me.” Id. The court in Machado noted that the declarant’s statements in Moore were “brief and disjointed remarks” that “lacked coherence.” Id. It further noted that the declarant in Moore had been shot five times, her assailant was still nearby, she had a collapsed lung, was perspiring and her voice was barely audible. Id. By comparison, the statements from the victim in Machado “involved a lengthy narrative of the events of an entire evening” which the court found to be “detailed, logical, and coherent.” The court in Machado concluded that the nature and the circumstances of the statements made by the victim there did not justify the conclusion that she was still “under the stress of excitement.” Id. Thus, it held that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s statement as an excited utterance. Id. In the instant case, paragraph five of the Boyd Declaration offers Ms. Boyd’s account of statements made to her via telephone by Cammerin Boyd, as follows. The incident began on July 23, 2002, at or about 3:50 to 4:00 p.m. on Birch Street at 102nd Street in Oakland. At about 4:45 I received a telephone call from my son Cammerin Boyd. He was extremely upset. He told me that Officers Sena and McQuinn without any justification or basis for stopping him, nearly crashed into his car by driving at a high rate of speed and turning directly towards him blocking him and forcing him to stop. He told me that Sena and McQuinn jumped out of their car and ran up to his car with their guns drawn telling him to “get the fuck out the car now”. As he opened the door one of the officers grabbed his arm and pulled him out of the car. Both of them were screaming profanities at him and telling him they were going to blow his “fucking brains out”. He said the officers called him a “nigger” and repeatedly asked him if he had any drugs on him. Even though he told the officers over and over that he did not have any drugs and that he was disabled and that he wore prosthesis [sic] on both legs, Sena and McQuinn forced him to walk to the back of their car while hand cuffed [sic]. While pressed up against the back of their car one of the officers pulled down his pants and his underwear exposing his nude buttocks and scrotum parts of his body to the plane [sic] view of the public. They also exposed his prostheses. When no drugs were found they forcefully threw him into the back seat of their car and then proceeded to search his car. They left him handcuffed in the back seat of their car for over an [sic] half hour. When they did not find any contraband in his car they called a tow truck to tow away his car. When they found out that he was not on parol [sic] they issued a citation falsely stating that he did not have a drivers [sic] license, even though his drivers [sic] license was in his wallet and on his person. They also falsely cited him for an expired registration when his registration was current. They took his wallet and left him stranded at the scene even though he was mobility impaired and had no money. Boyd Declaration ¶ 5, at 3: 6-25, 4: 1-4 (attached to PI. Obj. to SJ). Plaintiff asks the Court to admit these statements by Mr. Boyd under FRE 803(2) as an excited utterance. PI. Opp. to SJ at 7:15. Defendants contend these statements should be excluded on the grounds that they do not meet the requirements of FRE 803(2), and are therefore inadmissible hearsay under FRE 801 and 802; inadmissible multiple hearsay under FRE 805; and unduly prejudicial under FRE 403. Def. Objections at 2: 17-21. Here, the admissibility of paragraph five of the Boyd Declaration as an excited utterance under FRE 803(2) hinges on the analysis of the second element: whether Mr. Boyd was so excited or distraught at the moment of the utterance that he did not reflect, or have an opportunity to reflect, on what he was saying. McLennan, 563 F.2d at 948. The instant case is similar in key respects to State v. Machado, 109 Hawai'i 445, 127 P.3d 941 (2006), supra. In Machado, the declarant, a domestic violence victim, made an extensive narrative statement which that court found to be “detailed, logical, and coherent,” and which the court contrasted with admissible excited utterances from another case, which were “brief and disjointed.” Machado, 127 P.3d at 948. Like the statements in Machado, Cammerin Boyd’s statement is an extensive narrative that is detailed, logical, and coherent, rather than brief and disjointed. Like the victim in Machado— and unlike the wife who had been shot five times in Moore — Mr. Boyd was not in a life threatening situation when he made his statement, and there is no evidence to show that he was physically injured. Like the court in Machado, this Court finds that the nature and the circumstances of the statements made by Cammerin Boyd do not justify the conclusion that he was “under the stress of excitement.” The reasoning of the court in West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App.2000), supra, is instructive as well. The court in Hutto distinguished between an excited utterance and the ongoing discourse of an excited individual. Hutto, 5P.3d at 4. It stated that “[t]he classic example of an excited utterance is a witness’s exact recollection of the declarant's spontaneous ‘sound bite’ — an uncoached blurting out” such as, “You’re a dead man.” Id. at 4. Emphasizing that “the excited utterance exception is limited to ‘truly spontaneous outbursts,’ ” the court ruled that “it was error to allow a police officer to recount her entire 30 to 45 minute interview with the alleged domestic abuse victim, rather than limiting admission of the officer’s testimony to particularized utterances of the victim.” Id. Here, it is clear that Mr. Boyd’s recital is quite different from the examples of “truly spontaneous outbursts” described by the court in Hutto, as well as the examples from the Ninth Circuit, set forth above. Mr. Boyd’s statement, recounted in Ms. Boyd’s declaration, is a lengthy, chronologically ordered recitation of his version of events. In contrast to the examples of admissible excited utterances, which on average consist of a few words, Mr. Boyd’s statement totals more than 380 words. Although Mr. Boyd was described as being “extremely upset” when he made the declaration to his mother/attorney, the declaration itself demonstrates the distinction between an excited person and an excited utterance. To characterize it in the language of the court in Hutto, Mr. Boyd’s declaration does not represent an “uncoaehed blurting out,” but rather the “ongoing discourse of an excited person.” Further still, Ms. Boyd’s recital of Cam-merin Boyd’s declaration is not actually in the first person. It is not the “witness’s exact recollection of the declarant’s spontaneous ‘sound bite’ ” as an excited utterance is defined under Hutto. Rather, it appears to be Ms. Boyd’s recounting of everything Cammerin Boyd said to her by telephone. In this way, the purported declaration in the instant case is quite similar to the police officer’s testimony recounting a 30-45 minute interview with the alleged victim in Hutto, which that court found had been erroneously admitted as an excited utterance. Under Hutto, this Court finds that it would be error to allow Ms. Boyd to recite her recollection of Cammerin Boyd’s lengthy, organized statement as an excited utterance. In other words, Cammerin Boyd’s statement to his mother/attorney is not admissible as an excited utterance because its lengthy, organized nature shows that Mr. Boyd was not making a spontaneous outburst, and because that statement appears to be a recounting of an extended conversation with an excited person, rather than a witness’ exact recollection of the declarant’s spontaneous outburst. This Court reaches the same result in the instant case as the court in State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 326, 986 P.2d 346 (1999), supra. The court in Hansen ruled that the declarant’s statement, alleging domestic abuse by her boyfriend, was inadmissible as an excited utterance because the declarant was angry at her boyfriend, which provided a motive to lie; the ten-minute lapse of time between the end of the alleged incident and the statement allowed “sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication;” and the statement itself was a “protracted narrative” rather than “an exclamation or a sudden burst of words in sudden reaction to a startling occurrence.” Id. at 326-27, 986 P.2d 346. In applying the decision in Hansen to the instant case, the Court turns first to an examination of the evidence as to the lapse of time between the alleged incident and Mr. Boyd’s statements to his mother/attorney. Ms. Boyd asserts in her motion in opposition to summary judgment that “Cammerin Boyd spoke to Marylon Boyd immediately after he was strip searched, within five minutes.” PI. Opp. To SJ at 7: 1-3. However, under FRE 602, a witness must have personal knowledge of the subject matter attested to. Fed.R.Evid. 602. Ms. Boyd was admittedly not present at the alleged event and therefore has no personal knowledge of when it ended. Her assertion is thus inadmissible under FRE 602. The Plaintiffs other offers of evidence yield the following information. First, Mr. Boyd’s declaration states that he was pulled over by police “at or about 3:50 or 4:00 p.m.” Boyd Declaration ¶ 5. Second, the police traffic citation appears that it may list the time as 4:25 p.m. Plaintiffs Exhibit A. Third, the Towed Vehicle Report lists the time as 4:40 p.m. Plaintiffs Exhibit B. Fourth, Ms. Boyd reported a 4:45 p.m. phone call from Mr. Boyd. Boyd Declaration ¶ 5. The dispositive inquiry is whether, within the time frame alleged, Mr. Boyd had the opportunity for reflection. Cammerin Boyd’s declaration gives the sequence of the alleged events as follows: he was pulled over, dragged from his car, questioned about drugs, and made to walk to the squad car, where he was strip searched. He was then placed in the squad car by himself for 30 minutes while the officers searched his car. Finally, he was issued a traffic citation, his car was ordered towed, and the police left the scene. Given this order of alleged events, the “16:25” on the traffic citation (Exhibit A) indicates the time when the citation was written, which was at the conclusion of the officer’s alleged manhandling of Mr. Boyd. This leaves 20 minutes between the end of the alleged incident and Mr. Boyd’s declaration via telephone at 4:45 p.m. The putative sequence of events raises other questions as well. According to the declaration, the police ordered Mr. Boyd’s car to be towed at the end of their interaction. Does “16:40” on the Towing Report indicate the time at which the tow truck driver arrived at the scene and began to write a report, or does it indicate the time at which the tow truck driver finished loading the car onto the truck, just before driving away? What was Mr. Boyd doing while the tow truck driver arrived and loaded Mr. Boyd’s car onto the tow truck? Was Mr. Boyd sitting on the curb waiting? In addition, did the 80 minutes that Mr. Boyd spent in the squad car allow him an opportunity for reflection? The answers to these questions cannot be found in Plaintiffs offer of evidence. Based on the comparison of Plaintiffs Exhibits A and B with paragraph five of the Boyd Declaration, there appears to have been at least a 20-minute lapse. At a minimum there was sufficient time for the tow truck to arrive, the driver to complete the paperwork, and, presumably, to load Mr. Boyd’s car onto the truck and tow it away. Further, for 30 minutes, Mr. Boyd allegedly sat by himself in the back of the police squad car. Based on its examination of the available evidence, this Court finds that Mr. Boyd had ample opportunity for reflection. Thus, in the instant case, the facts surrounding Mr. Boyd’s statements to his mother/attorney are quite similar to the facts in Hansen, swpra. Like the declar-ant in Hansen who was angry with her boyfriend, Cammerin Boyd was described as being “angry” with the police, which gave him a motive to lie. Here, the lapse of time between the alleged incident and the statement appears to have been 20 minutes or more — which is longer than the 10 minutes in Hansen, and the 5 minutes in Burton (cited in Hansen) which were found to have permitted time for reflection and fabrication. Finally, like the declar-ant’s statements in Hansen, Mr. Boyd’s statements were a “protracted narrative” rather than “an exclamation or a sudden burst of words in sudden reaction to a startling occurrence.” Thus, under Hansen, as under Machado and Hutto, this Court concludes that Mr. Boyd’s statements to his mother were not made while he was under the stress of excitement such that his reflective capacity was stilled, and therefore, Mr. Boyd’s statements to his mother/attorney are not admissible as an excited utterance under FRE 803(2). The discussion of the nature of the statement itself — its length, coherence, and level of detail — as an indicator of whether the declarant was “under the stress of excitement” may be an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. However, this approach is fully consistent with the principles behind the excited utterance hearsay exception as analyzed in Ninth Circuit opinions. 2. Cammerin Boyd’s statements to Ms. Boyd via telephone are not admissible as a present sense impression because of the lack of corroboration, the presence of two motives to distort, and lack of spontaneity — all of which are indicators of unreliability. Federal Rule of Evidence (hereafter “FRE”) 803(1) provides that a present sense impression is an exception to the hearsay rule, and is defined as “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” Fed.R.Evid. 803(1). Under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay is admissible only “if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception ... [or upon] a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” ... [T]here is no case law holding that the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay is ‘firmly rooted.’[] Therefore, the focus is on whether there is a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness with respect to this statement. U.S. v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). “There is no mechanical test for determining reliability nor a prescribed list of reliability elements ... and ‘courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors.’ ... The reliability of the out-of-court statements cannot be established ‘by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence.’ ” Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). Corroboration, motive to lie, and contemporaneity or spontaneity are all recognized indicia of reliability. See Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir.1985) (corroboration is an indicium of reliability); U.S. v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.2002) (motive to lie is an indicium of reliability); U.S. v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir.1980) (the contemplation of litigation is a motive to lie), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980), overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc); State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 326, 986 P.2d 346 (1999) (anger is a motive to lie); Barker, 761 F.2d at 1402, supra, (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970)) (contemporaneity/spontaneity is an indicium of reliability). In the instant case, given that the present sense impression is not a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, per U.S. v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir.2002), the Court must assess whether Mr. Boyd’s statement to Ms. Boyd, his mother and attorney, had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Based on the facts of the instant case, and given courts’ “considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors,” per Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir.2000), this Court will apply the relevant indicia of reliability to assess whether Cammerin Boyd’s statements contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to render the statements admissible as a hearsay exception. (i) The lack of corroboration of Cam-merin Boyd’s version of events weighs against finding his declaration to be reliable. “Corroboration is a recognized indicium of reliability ...” Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir.1985) (citing U.S. v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.1978)) (holding that testimony of another witness is an important corroborating factor). In Barker, one Bill Pifer, after learning that he would soon die of throat cancer, came forward and told police of a double homicide that he had witnessed. Id. at 1398. Pifer led police to the remains of the victims and identified the murderers as members of a motorcycle gang to which he belonged. Id. Pifer died before trial, but had testified under oath and on videotape. Id. The testimony was corroborated by the victims’ remains, the testimony of co-defendants, and the admissions of other co-defendants. Id. at 1402. The court in Barker concluded that “[t]he reliability of Pifer’s testimony is strongly supported by the fact of independent corroboration for each of its essential elements ... by physical evidence discovered at the burial site and by the testimony of both [co-defendants] Green and Moran.” Id. at 1402. After considering other factors relevant to the facts in that ease, the court in Barker held that Pifer’s videotaped testimony bore adequate indicia of reliability and was thus admissible. Id. at 1403. In the instant case, the Plaintiff offers copies of two documents as corroboration for the version of events in Cammerin Boyd’s declaration. Plaintiffs Exhibit A appears to be a photocopy of a citation issued to Cammerin Boyd. See PL Opp. to SJ, Exhibit A. Ms. Boyd asserts that Plaintiffs Exhibit A “corroborates Cam-merin’s statement that he was stopped by Sena and McQuinn.” Boyd Declaration at 4: 23-24. The copy of the citation provided by the Plaintiff is difficult to read; it may list “23 Jul 02” as the date, and “16:25” as the time. See PI. Opp. to SJ, Exhibit A. For the sake of argument, the Court will assume, without so finding, that it does so read. Plaintiffs Exhibit B is entitled “Towed Vehicle Report,” which clearly lists the date as “23 Jul 02” and the time as “16:40.” See PL Opp. to SJ, Exhibit B. Each of these documents supports Cammerin Boyd’s assertion that he was ticketed and his car was towed between approximately 4:25 and 4:40 p.m. on July 23, 2002. However, neither document provides any support for Mr. Boyd’s version of his encounter with the police, and thus they do not provide substantive corroboration of Mr. Boyd’s declaration. Ms. Boyd next asserts that there are witnesses who can corroborate Mr. Boyd’s version of events. Boyd Declaration ¶ 2-4. Ms. Boyd requested that she be allowed to testify as to the statements made to her by alleged witnesses, who, she asserts, have not come forward due to fear of reprisal by the police. Boyd Declaration %2-A. Ms. Boyd declares that she interviewed three such witnesses “within minutes of the incident occurring.” Id. at ¶ 4. However, she also says that she arrived at the scene of the alleged incident at 5:15 p.m., half an hour after she purportedly received the phone call from Mr. Boyd, informing her of the alleged incident. Id. at ¶ 5. There is no evidence as to how long after the alleged incident ended Cammerin Boyd called his mother. Thus, assuming that Ms. Boyd’s 5:15 arrival time in paragraph five is accurate, Ms. Boyd could not have spoken with the witnesses “within minutes of the incident.” Under Federal Rule of Evidence 802, Ms. Boyd’s request to testify as to their statements to her is barred by the hearsay rule. No hearsay exception applies to the statements made by the witnesses to render them otherwise admissible as evidence. Therefore, they do not corroborate Cammerin Boyd’s declaration. Ms. Boyd also asserts that the deposition testimony of Chief Word corroborates Cammerin Boyd’s version of events on July 23, 2002. PL Opp. to SJ at 5: 1-3. Ms. Boyd cites page 71, lines 5-12 and page 72, lines 1-12 of Exhibit D, Chief Word’s deposition. Id. However, the statements on page 71, lines 5-12 of that deposition constitute Chief Word’s answer to a question about a hypothetical set of facts posed by Ms. Boyd. As such, these statements do not provide evidence to corroborate Cammerin Boyd’s declaration. Next, Chief Word’s statements on page 72, lines 1-12 are part of a discussion of a newspaper article in which Chief Word was quoted as stating “I don’t think the public understands when we say strip search. They think we took all his clothes off in the street, and that’s not what happened,” in reference to the Defendant Officers’ stop of Cammerin Boyd on July 21, 2002. Exhibit D 72: 1-7. Ms. Boyd then asked “What did you base that information on to make that quote?” Id. at 8-9. Chief Word replied, “My discussions with my staff. And what they told me actually occurred was not some full-blown stripping off of clothes and searching the body.” Id. at 10-12. This testimony shows that Mr.- Boyd was searched in some way by the Defendant Officers on July 23, 2002. To this extent, Chief Word’s deposition corroborates Cammerin Boyd’s declaration that a search of some sort did occur. However, while Chief Word could not remember the details of what he was told about the search, he did recall that his staff specifically told him that Mr. Boyd was not subjected to the public removal of both his outer clothing and undergarments. To this extent, Chief Word’s deposition not only fails to corroborate Cammerin Boyd’s declaration, it actually refutes the substance of Mr. Boyd’s declaration alleging that he was stripped naked below the waist and subjected to a body cavity search in public. Finally, Ms. Boyd asserts that a copy of the Plaintiffs government tort claim, filed with the City of Oakland, corroborates Cammerin Boyd’s version of events. PL Opp. to SJ at 5: 1-3. This document contains Mr. Boyd’s allegations against the City of Oakland in relation to the alleged incident on July 23, 2002, with no evidence in support of those claims. See PI. Opp to SJ, Exhibit C. These are the same allegations set forth in the case at bar, the repetition of which does not provide admissible evidence to corroborate Mr. Boyd’s declaration. In sum, the Plaintiffs admissible evidence to corroborate Cammerin Boyd’s declaration consists of Exhibits A and B, and the declaration of Chief Word. These offers of proof establish that Mr. Boyd was searched and cited, and his car towed. However, none of this evidence tends to establish that the encounter with the police happened in the abusive, discriminatory manner that Mr. Boyd asserted. Plaintiffs other offers of proof also fail to corroborate Mr. Boyd’s declaration: not one of the purported witnesses to the alleged incident was produced despite ample time for discovery, and the claim filed with the City of Oakland was a repetition of the allegations made in this case and was entirely lacking in proof thereof. The corroborating evidence in the instant case is substantially less than that in Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir.1985), supra, in which the declarant’s statements were found to be reliable based on the victims’ remains, the testimony of codefendants, and the admissions of other co-defendants. Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir.1985), supra. In contrast, here the corroborating evidence is scant. That which is admissible does not corroborate the substance of Mr. Boyd’s declaration. Plaintiff fails to provide any corroborating evidence to support Cammerin Boyd’s version of events on July 23, 2002. Given that corroboration is an indicator of reliability, the lack of corroboration for Mr. Boyd’s declaration weighs against finding that declaration to be reliable, and thus it is inadmissible as a present sense impression. (ii) The presence of two motives for Cammerin Boyd to fabricate or exaggerate weighs against finding his declaration to be reliable. Motive or incentive to lie is an indicium of reliability. U.S. v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980), overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). See also U.S. v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.2002). In Ponticelli, the declarant made his declaration to his attorney, which the appellate court concluded “implies that [the declar-ant] was considering the legal significance of his declarations at the time he made them.” Ponticelli, 622 F.2d at 991-92. The fact that the declarant in this case made his statements while perhaps contemplating litigation constitutes a motive to lie, which the Court weighs against finding the declaration to be reliable. Id. In State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 326, 986 P.2d 346 (1999), supra, the declarant was described as being “madder than she had ever been” upon reporting an alleged incident of domestic abuse. State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 326-27, 986 P.2d 346 (1999), supra. The court in Hansen found that the declarant’s “anger ... could have provided a motivation to fabricate or exaggerate in [the declarant’s] version of events.” Id. at 326, 986 P.2d 346. In the instant case, Cammerin Boyd, like the declarant in Ponticelli, made his declaration to his attorney, Ms. Boyd, who is also his mother. This raises the possibility that this declaration was made in contemplation of litigation, which, like the declarant in Ponticelli, gives Mr. Boyd a motive to lie, which weighs in favor of finding his declaration to be unreliable. In addition, like the declarant in Hansen, Cammerin Boyd was “angry” at the police and thus had a motive to fabricate or exaggerate his version of events. Like the court in Hansen, this Court finds that anger as a motive to lie weighs against Mr. Boyd’s declaration to be reliable. (iii) The evidence regarding the lapse of time between the alleged incident and the declaration, plus the extensive narrative nature of the declaration, undermine the notion that Cammerin Boyd’s statements were spontaneous and made without an opportunity for reflection, and weigh in favor of finding his declaration to be unreliable. A court may consider spontaneity or contemporaneity as an indicium of reliability. U.S. v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir.1980) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980), overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). A present sense impression must be “nearly contemporaneous with the incident described and made with little chance for reflection.” Bemis v. Edwards, 45 F.3d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir.1995). “The underlying rationale of the present sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to [the declarant’s] defective recollection or conscious fabrication.” ... The present sense impression exception is rightfully limited to statements made while a declarant perceives an event or immediately thereafter, and we decline to expand it to cover a declarant’s relatively recent memories. The opportunity for strategic modification undercuts the reliability that spontaneity insures. U.S. v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir.2004) (emphasis added). In deciding admissibility of a declaration as a present sense impression, where the lapse of time between the event and the declaration is not established by the attorney who seeks to introduce the evidence, a court is entitled to conclude that the declarant had sufficient time for reflection. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d at 992, supra. In addition to viewing the contemplation of litigation as a motive to lie, the court in Ponticelli also placed weight on the fact that the declarant’s attorney failed to establish the lapse of time between the declarant’s arrest (the event upon which the contemporaneity assessment was based) and the declaration. Id. Thus, it held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that [the declarant] had a chance for reflection and misrepresentation in making the proffered statements.” Id. The court in Ponticelli found the presence of a motive to lie (the contemplation of litigation), coupled with the opportunity to do so (given that the lapse of time between event and declaration was not established), formed a sufficient basis upon which to find the declarant’s statements to be unreliable and thus inadmissible. Id. Here, as in Ponticelli, Plaintiffs attorney did not proffer admissible evidence to establish the lapse of time between the event and the statements. As established above, Ms. Boyd’s assertion that it was “within five minutes” is inadmissible because Ms. Boyd was not present at the alleged incident and does not have personal knowledge as to when it ended. Where the lapse of time is not established, as in Ponticelli, it is reasonable for this Court to conclude that Mr. Boyd, like Mr. Ponti-celli, “had a chance for reflection and misrepresentation in making the proffered statements.” Ponticelli, 622 F.2d at 992. Further, the Court’s examination of the evidence, as established above, reveals a lapse of roughly 20 minutes between the end of the alleged incident and the declaration. Whether the lapse of time is unknown or whether it was 20 minutes, either provides sufficient basis for this Court to conclude that Mr. Boyd had sufficient time for reflection, and therefore, that his statements were not spontaneous. Hence, these statements are neither reliable nor admissible. This conclusion is further supported by analysis of the nature of the statements, similar to that applied to the excited utterance hearsay analysis above. The nature of Mr. Boyd’s declaration shows that it was not a statement made spontaneously and without reflection. Rather than being a burst of words describing what he was presently perceiving or had perceived immediately beforehand, Mr. Boyd’s declaration consists of a lengthy, detailed, narrative account. The coherence and structure of this account shows that Mr. Boyd “was reflecting on the event” rather than spontaneously reacting to a present sensory experience. The nature of Cammerin Boyd’s statement as an extensive reflective narrative weighs against finding his declaration to be spontaneous — an element without which the declaration cannot be deemed reliable. Analysis under recognized indicia of reliability, including corroboration, motive to lie, and spontaneity, reveals that each indicator weighs against finding Cammerin Boyd’s statements to his mother, who is also his attorney, to be ■ reliable for the purposes of admission as a present sense impression. Mr. Boyd’s declaration lacked corroboration of his version of events. Mr. Boyd had two motives to lie — the contemplation of litigation and anger at the police. The lapse of time between the alleged altercation with the police and Mr. Boyd’s declaration was not established by his attorney and appears to have allowed him an opportunity for reflection. This opportunity for reflection negates the requisite spontaneity — a conclusion that is reinforced by the nature of his statement, which was a lengthy, orderly narrative account, rather than a burst of words blurting out what he was presently perceiving. Having assessed the statement by the relevant indicia of reliability, this Court finds that Cammerin Boyd’s statements are unreliable and thus are inadmissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. 3. Only the description of Cammerin Boyd as “extremely upset” is admissible under FRE 803(3), as it reflects his then-current emotional state of mind rather than his memory or belief about the cause of that state of mind. FRE 803(3) provides for an exception to the hearsay rule for “[a] statement of a declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition ... but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the ... declarant’s will.” Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). The state-of-mind hearsay exception does not permit the witness to relate any of the declarant’s statements as to why he held the particular state of mind, or what he might have believed that would have induced the state of mind. If the reservation in the text of the rule is to have any effect, it must be understood to narrowly limit those admissible statements to declarations of condition-“I’m scared” -and not belief-‘T’m scared because [someone] threatened me.” U.S. v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 810 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis omitted). In the instant case, nearly all of Cammerin Boyd’s declaration to his mother and attorney relates to his memory or belief as to why he was in the described condition. As such, these statements are inadmissible under FRE 803(3). The only admissible portion is the description that he was “extremely upset,” because this describes his then-current emotional state. 4. Cammerin Boyd’s statements to his mother/attorney are not admissible under FRE 807 because the statements lack particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. FRE 807, the “catchall” exception to the hearsay rule, provides that, A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (©) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by the admission of the statement into evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 807. The “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” required by Rule 807 are not present where the statement of the declarant is “plainly self-serving and no corroboration [is] available.” Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir.1985). As established above, the Court finds Cammerin Boyd’s statements to be inadmissible under FRE 803(1), the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, because the statements lacked particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, due to a lack of corroboration and the presence of motives to lie, including the contemplation of litigation. As Mr. Boyd’s statements lack “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under FRE 803(1), so do they lack “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” under FRE 807. To put it another way, like the statements ruled inadmissible in Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir.1985), supra, Mr. Boyd’s statements are self serving (e.g. made in contemplation of litigation, as established above) and lack corroboration. Thus, this Court finds Mr. Boyd’s statements to be inadmissible under FRE 807, the catchall exception to the hearsay rule. E. The portions of paragraph six that contain Ms. Boyd’s personal observations of Cammerin Boyd’s condition are admissible; However, her legal conclusions and assertions made without personal knowledge are inadmissible under FRCP 56(e). Paragraph six of the Boyd Declaration offers a brief recounting of Cammerin Boyd’s version of events. Boyd Declaration ¶ 6 at 4: 5-13. The above analysis of the admissibility of Mr. Boyd’s statements under specified exceptions to the hearsay rule applies here as well. The noteworthy difference between the statements relayed in paragraph five to Ms. Boyd via telephone, and those conveyed in paragraph six to Ms. Boyd in person, is that in the latter case, the time lapse between the alleged incident and the statements is even longer. This adds more weight against admissibility. The Court therefore finds Cammerin Boyd’s statements in paragraph six to be inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802. No hearsay exception applies to render them otherwise admissible. Paragraph six of the Boyd Declaration also offers Ms. Boyd’s account of her observations upon arriving at Cammerin Boyd’s location at 5:15 p.m. on July 23, 2002. Id. As established above, legal conclusions are inadmissible as are matters not within the personal knowledge of the declarant. FRCP 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir.2002). Ms. Boyd’s descriptions such as “excessiv