Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DAVIS, District Judge. Plaintiff Vine Street, LLC (‘Wine Street”) brought this action against Defendants James R. Keeling, as independent executor of the estate of David Bart Keeling, Sr., deceased (“Keeling Estate”), Maytag Corporation (“Maytag”), Borg-Warner Corporation (“Borg-Warner”), Fedders Corporation (“Fedders”), and Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”) (Borg-Warner, Fed-ders, and Maytag referred to collectively as “Defendants” or “the remaining Defendants”). The matter came for trial on the merits without a jury and was taken under submission. After considering the testimony, exhibits, arguments of counsel, and supporting memoranda, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). BACKGROUND Vine Street is a Texas corporation owned by various individual members of the Roosth family and managed by the Roosth Production Company, of which Steven C. Roosth is Vice President. Vine Street owns 914 West Glenwood Boulevard (“West Glenwood property”) and 1604 South Vine Avenue (“South Vine property”), adjoining land parcels in Tyler, Texas. From 1949 through 1996, the Roosth Group, composed of individuals and trusts related to the Roosth family, and the Ge-necov Group,- composed of individuals and trusts related to the Genecov family, jointly owned the West Glenwood property and at some point during this period owned and/or managed that property under the name B.M. & R. Interests. In 1961, the Roosth and Genecov Groups constructed a new building on the West Glenwood property specifically for use as a “Norge Laundry & Cleaning Village” facility by College Cleaners, a Tyler-area business owned and operated by David Bart Keeling, Sr. (“D.B.Keeling, Sr.”). The construction included installation of sewer lines and other building utilities. Beginning in March 1961, the Roosth and Gene-cov Groups leased the West Glenwood property to “D.B. Keeling, d/b/a College Cleaners and Washeteria and Laundry” to use as a laundromat and cleaners. The facility housed Norge-manufactured commercial laundry equipment, including thirty washing machines, ten dryers, and six-to-eight coin-operated, self-service, automatic dry-cleaning machines. College Cleaners continuously operated the facility through a group of successive lease agreements with the Roosth and Genecov Groups’ respective trustees until November 1975. During this same period, the South Vine property was used as a gasoline service station. Though both properties had subsequent lessees and uses, the West Glenwood property was not used for dry-cleaning operations before 1961 or after 1975, and the South Vine property was not used as a service station after 1980. In 1996, the Roosth and Gencov Groups partitioned all their jointly-owned properties, including the West Glenwood property and transferred ownership of the property to Steven Roosth, one of the Roosth family trustees. In 1998, the Rite-Aid pharmacy chain considered purchasing the West Glenwood and South Vine properties and commissioned a series of environmental site assessments. Rite-Aid ultimately declined to purchase the properties, and it is unknown why. In May 2001, Steven Roosth entered a contract with the M.M. Mitchell Family Partnership, LP, to purchase the then-vacant South Vine property. In anticipation of the acquisition, Steven Roosth commissioned an environmental assessment team to sample the soil and groundwater underlying the South Vine property for the presence of petroleum hydrocarbons. The assessment team found evidence of another substance in the soil and groundwater: tetrachloroethylene (also known as perchloroethylene, trichloroethylene, “PCE,” or “PERC”), a non-naturally-occurring, dense non-aqueous phase liquid chemical commonly found in dry-cleaning fluids. After further sampling of additional up-gradient locations on the South Vine property, the assessment team determined that the adjoining West Glenwood property was the source of the PERC contamination. The data indicated the presence of a PERC plume in the soil and groundwater, with the highest concentrations located near the exit of an underground drainage line at the former dry-cleaning facility. In July 2001 — during the environmental assessments and after discovery of the contamination on both properties — Steven Roosth and the Mitchell Family Partnership amended the contract for sale of the South Vine Property. The nature of this amendment was not disclosed to the Court. In November 2001, Steven Roosth assigned Vine Street the right of purchase of the South Vine property. Soon thereafter, the Mitchell Family Partnership transferred ownership of the South Vine property to Vine Street by warranty deed. In February 2002, Steven Roosth transferred the West Glenwood property to Vine Street, retroactive to January 1, 2002. In March 2002, Vine Street notified what is now the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) of the contamination, applied to participate in the TCEQ’s voluntary cleanup program, and retained environmental consultants to prepare a comprehensive assessment of the contamination and a plan for its remediation. The TCEQ admitted Vine Street into the voluntary cleanup program in April 2002. Vine Street commenced this action in May 2003 by suing the Keeling Estate to recover the costs of such cleanup and remediation. In 2004, Vine Street added Maytag, Fedders, and Borg-Warner as defendants. Defendants each at one time or another exerted ownership over Norge, a leading manufacturer of dry-cleaning and laundry equipment from 1961 through 1975. Vine Street asserts that each Defendant is liable because each, through the Norge Division, pixmded defective equipment to D.B. Keeling, Sr. Vine Street contends that defective design of “water separators” in the laundromat’s coin-operated Norge dry-cleaning machines led to the discharge of PERC-laden wastewater into the West Glenwood property’s sewage drainage pipes, which allowed the PERC to corrode those pipes, escape into the surrounding soil, and contaminate the West Glenwood property and surrounding lots. The Roosth and Gencov Groups have assigned Vine Street their legal rights and interests in all existing and potential causes of action relating to the environmental contamination of properties conveyed to the Groups in the 1996 partition agreement. The assignment is retroactively effective as of the date of the partition agreement. Vine Street seeks: (1) recovery of its “costs of response” to the PERC contamination, under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) (42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq.), and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (the “SWDA”) (THSC §§ 361.001, et seq.); (2) a declaration of Defendants’ responsibility for future response costs Vine Street incurs in monitoring and cleaning up the contamination under CERCLA Section 113(g) (42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)), the federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq.), and the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code (“TCPRC”) §§ 37.001, et seq.); (3) recovery of its attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in litigating this suit; and (4) all other costs and expenses of suit, including pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rates permitted by applicable law. The Court has jurisdiction over Vine Street’s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) and over Vine Street’s state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. LIABILITY CERCLA Liability Congress enacted CERCLA to encourage timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites by placing cleanup costs on those responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous condition. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir.2005). CERCLA also encourages private parties to assume financial responsibility for such cleanups by allowing them to seek recovery from others. Key Tronic v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n. 13, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994). Federal courts interpret CERCLA liberally, consistent with Congress’s “ ‘overwhelming remedial’ statutory scheme.” This Court has already ruled that Vine Street may seek recovery of its response costs through an implied right of contribution under CERCLA Section 107(a). Section 107(a) provides: Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section— (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances ... (4) ... from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for ... (B) any ... necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.... 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Thus, Vine Street must prove: (1) that the site in question is a “facility,”(2) that there was a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, (3) that the release or threatened release caused Vine Street to incur “necessary costs of response,” and (4) that the particular Defendant is a responsible person (“PRP”) under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The question of liability in this case centers around the determination of whether the Defendants are responsible persons under the statute, so the other elements are only briefly discussed. A. The West Glenwood laundromat building and property on which it sits are “facilities” A “facility” is “(A) any building, structure, installation, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer ...) ... or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located....” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). PERC derivatives — perchloroethylene, trichloroethylene, and tetrachloroethylene— are all hazardous substances under CERC-LA. Steven Rooth’s 2001 environmental study uncovered the presence of these substances on the South Vine and West Glen-wood properties, and further studies establish their continued presence. Thus, the building and the property on which it sits are areas where a hazardous substance has come to be located, and they are both “facilities.” B. There was a “release” of a hazardous substance from the West Glenwood property “Release” means “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.” 42 U.S.C. 9601(22). Release is construed broadly and does not have a quantitative requirement. Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 669. Vine Street’s hydro-geological and forensic expert, Dr. Keith O’Brien, testified that a release of PERC occurred from the laundromat building on the West Glenwood property. O’Brien based this testimony on his analysis of the property’s historical uses, the groundwater’s directional flow, the property’s topography and stratigraphy, and the PERCcontaminated soil and groundwater samples from various monitoring wells. Based on his experience investigating hundreds of PERC-and petroleum hydrocarbon-contaminated sites, O’Brien testified that the only area locations where PERC was likely to have been used were the West Glenwood laundromat and the South Vine service station. Dr. Bruce Dale, a professor of chemical engineering at the University of Michigan with expertise in biochemical engineering, corroborated O’Brien’s testimony. Dale testified that because (1) impermeable concrete and asphalt largely cover the West Glenwood and South Vine properties’ surfaces, and (2) the PERC would have quickly evaporated if spilled on the properties’ few patches of earth, the PERC could not have reached the monitoring well locations by seeping into the ground from surface spills. Vine Street’s sanitary engineering expert, Dr. Peter Krasnoff, testified that a cast-iron pipe, or “building drain” carried the building’s PERC-laden wastewater to the cleanout location on the side of the building and then to a clay-pipe “sewer lateral” line that took the wastewater to the municipal wastewater collection system. Krasnoff further testified that if permitted to accumulate, PERC corrodes low-grade rubber of the type found in the building dram’s joints, causing that rubber to swell, lose its structural strength, and fail in a manner of weeks or months. Vine Street’s several expert and fact witnesses testified that the dry-cleaning machines’ design and construction made discharge of PERC into the sewer system an inherent aspect of the machines’ operation and made PERC’s leakage into the soil and groundwater inevitable. Defendants’ expert in material science and engineering, Dr. Lee Swanger, reviewed the Norge manuals and generally corroborated Krasnoff s understanding of the machines’ dry-cleaning process. Swanger disagreed with Krasnoff and Dale about the water’s composition that the separator actually discharged to the sewer. Based on his expertise, Swanger concluded that a properly-maintained water separator would emit wastewater containing at most only .015% PERC — a concentration far too low to allow the PERC to settle on the building drain’s rubber joints However, Swanger’s testimony is less credible than Vine Street’s experts’ and fact witnesses’ testimony. Though Swanger claimed expertise in the separation and equilibrium of liquids, his primary expertise is in the area of mechanical engineering, with a focus in the automotive industry. Swanger lacks Krasnoff s experience in wastewater engineering and the design of wastewater equipment as they relate to liquid/liquid separation systems. Further, Swanger could not cite to a peer-reviewed published source supporting his methodology in determining that a properly-maintained Norge water separator would function with 99.985% efficiency. The Court finds that the water separators of the Norge dry-cleaning machines at the West Glenwood laundromat discharged PERC to the sewer in such quantities as to corrode the building drain’s rubber joints, leak into the subsurface, and contaminate the surrounding soil and ground water. Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that there was a “release” of PERC at the West Glenwood property. C. The release caused Vine Street to incur “necessary costs of response” The release or threatened release of the hazardous substance must “cause[ ] the in-currence of response costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); see, e.g., Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 668 (synthesizing the section’s distinct clauses into one element). Response costs are costs incurred in relation to assessing, monitoring, cleaning, and removing released hazardous substances, minimizing damage to the public health or environment from the hazardous substances, and achieving a permanent remedy. Vine Street submitted updated post-trial invoices of costs for physical site assessments, drilling monitoring well borings and taking soil samples, continued on-site and laboratory stratigraphic and groundwater evaluation and testing, project consultant work, application for the TCEQ cleanup program and TCEQ fees, and various municipal fees related to sewer access and waste disposal. Such costs' — or at least those costs incurred after Vine Street’s consultants discovered PERC on the South Vine property — are necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the environmental threat from the PERC’s release. These activities constitute a removal action under CERCLA Section 101(23). Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir.1988). Because the statute expressly provides for recovery of costs of a removal action, a CERCLA plaintiff need not show that it incurred actual cleanup costs in order to recover. See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.1986); Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 825 F.Supp. 1575, 1581-82 (S.D.Fla.1993). Thus Vine Street has demonstrated that it incurred response costs through this removal action. In addition, “necessary costs” are costs expended in response to an actual and real threat to public health or the environment, as opposed to a merely theoretical threat. Vine Street submitted substantial evidence regarding PERC’s potential detrimental health effects, which include headache, nausea, central nervous system impairment, liver and kidney cancers, and leukemia. Defendants offered no argument to rebut Vine Street’s evidence that the PERC’s established release constitutes an actual and real public health threat. Nor did Defendants present evidence to suggest Vine Street’s site investigations and assessments were for purposes other than responding to that actual and real threat. Therefore, Vine Street has demonstrated that it incurred necessary response costs as required under CERCLA. D. Borg-Wamer is a “Responsible Person” under the statute; Fedders is not a “Responsible Person” under the statute The primary element at issue in this case is whether the Defendants are responsible persons under the statute. Vine Street alleges that Borg-Warner and Fedders are each arrangers as defined by the statute. To satisfy arranger liability, Vine Street must demonstrate (1) the Defendants are persons; (2) who by contract, agreement or otherwise; (3) arranged for the disposal; (4) of hazardous substances; (5) owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity; (6) at a facility; (7) owned or operated by another party or entity; (8) containing such hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). The Court has previously determined that PERC is a hazardous substance; that the property at issue is a facility as defined by the statute; and that PERC was found on the property at issue. In addition, it is undisputed that Borg-Warner and Fed-ders are “persons” for purposes of the statute; and that the property at issue was owned or operated by another party. The remaining elements — two, three, and five — are discussed herein. 1. By contract, agreement, or otherwise/imputation of liability To satisfy the requirements of arranger liability, Vine Street must first establish some legal mechanism to link Borg-Warner or Fedders to acts that constitute “arrangement.” Vine Street alleges only that Borg-Warner and Fedders are “successors in interest to Norge.” Thus, Vine Street concedes that because neither Borg-Warner or Fedders directly arranged for the PERC’s disposal, the Court must impute Norge’s CERCLA liability (if any exists) to each of those Defendants in order to hold them liable. a. Borg-Warner’s liability for Norge The parties dispute whether Norge itself constructed, marketed, delivered, or installed the dry cleaning machines at issue, as well as whether Norge employees actually plumbed the machines to the sewer and instructed College Cleaners personnel as to the machines’ use. However, Borg-Warner admits that it owned Norge as an operating division during the time that Vine Street alleges Norge engaged in these activities. These alleged activities are the gravamen of Vine Street’s allegations that Borg-Warner and Fedders arranged for disposal of PERC. Thus, Borg-Warner’s potential liability stems from the fact that it owned the Norge Division during the period when the alleged activities occurred, not from any alleged status as a corporate successor. b. Imputing Norge’s liability (if any) to Fedders Fedders admits that it owned Norge as an operating division, but not during the time of the alleged “arrangement.” Fedders correctly states that “there is no evidence or even a claim that Norge machines were sold to College Cleaners after 1961 or that any Norge entity had anything to do with the College Cleaners location after 1961.” Vine Street neglected to articulate its theory of Fedders’s successor-in-interest liability. Therefore, Vine Street does not dispute Borg-Warner and Fedders’s contention that “Fedders could only be liable to Plaintiff under CERCLA ... if (1) Borg[-]Warner is first liable to Plaintiff under [CERCLA] and (2) Fedders is deemed to have successor liability for [the] conduct of Borg[-]Warner.” (i) Applicable law Courts unanimously recognize corporate successor liability under CERCLA. Borg-Warner and Fedders agree that most circuits apply a federal common law of CERCLA successor liability, that district courts within the Fifth Circuit also apply this “majority rule,” and that though the Fifth Circuit has never directly spoken to the issue of CERCLA successor liability, the Court should adopt such rule here. According to Borg-Warner and Fedders’s agreed formulation, the general corporate successor liability rule is that a corporation that acquires the assets of another corporation is liable for the transferor’s obligations only when (1) the asset purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the transferor’s liabilities; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or de facto merger; (3) the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the transferor; or (4) the parties entered into the transaction fraudulently to escape liability. Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir.1985). This formulation, as a generally-recognized traditional rule of corporate law, is applied to CERCLA. Borg-Warner and Fedders agree that the relevant inquiry is whether Fedders expressly or impliedly assumed Borg-Warner’s liabilities for Borg-Warner’s pre-1968 conduct. Borg-Warner and Fedders also agree that the answer to whether Fedders agreed to assume Borg-Warner’s liabilities hinges on their 1968 agreement to transfer Borg-Warner’s interests in Norge (the “1968 Norge Purchase Agreement”) and their 1981 settlement covering certain Norge-related “product liability claims” (the “1981 Settlement Agreement”). One court found “many precedents for the proposition that CERCLA liability can be assumed by a pre-CERCLA agreement so long as the agreement contains ‘language broad enough ... to say that the parties intended to transfer either contingent environmental liability, or all liability.’ ” The Iron Mountain II court also found that federal courts “universally have held that language transferring ‘all liabilities’ is sufficiently broad to include environmental liability” and likewise have held that the only exception to this principle is “where other clauses in or attachments to the agreement make it clear that the parties did not intend to include environmental liabilities.” Iron Mountain II, 987 F.Supp. at 1241 (citing cases) (ii) Application Borg-Warner contends that a collection of “key sentences” from Section 6 of the 1968 Norge Purchase Agreement “are broad enough to” demonstrate that Fed-ders assumed Borg-Warner’s CERCLA liabilities. The first sentence Borg-Warner references from the section (“Sentence 1”) provides: Buyer hereby assumes and agrees to perform, and agrees to indemnify and hold Seller free and harmless from all obligations which shall arise after the Closing Date under, any contract, license, lease commitment, sales order or purchase order which either is listed or referred to in any Exhibit hereto or relates to the business of [the Norge] Division but is not required to be listed in any Exhibit hereto pursuant to the provisions hereof. Sentence 1 is irrelevant to whether Fed-ders is liable to Vine Street for Borg-Warner’s imputed pre-1968 conduct because it only refers to Borg-Warner’s contractual obligations and does not mention Borg-Warner’s liabilities. There is no reasonable argument that the provision refers to Borg-Warner’s liabilities. The second sentence Borg-Warner quotes (“Sentence 2”) states: Buyer will also assume, and will indemnify and hold Seller free and harmless from, all liabilities of Seller, absolute or contingent, under any warranty, guarantee, finance company recourse obligations (including those listed in any Exhibit hereto), indemnity or other obligation given or incurred in connection with the sale, lease or service of products of [the Norge] Division in the ordinary course of business of [the] Division prior to the Closing Date and as to which suit has not been commenced pri- or to the Closing Date. Under this provision, Fedders expressly assumes some of Borg-Warner’s liabilities that arise under warranties, guarantees, finance company recourse obligations, indemnities, and other obligations that Borg-Warner incurred in connection with the sale of Norge products prior to the closing date. Borg-Warner makes no argument that these liabilities encompass Vine Street’s CERCLA and the SWDA claims against Borg-Warner. Vine Street does not invoke any theory of recovery based on breach of warranty, guarantee, or other obligation. To the extent that Fedders assumed Borg-Warner’s liabilities under Sentence 2, the scope of those assumed liabilities is far too narrow to encompass Vine Street’s claims. Sentence 2 cannot serve as a basis for Fedders’s CERCLA successor liability. Finally, Borg-Warner quotes the following sentence (“Sentence 3”): In addition, Buyer hereby agrees to indemnify Seller against and hold it harmless from, all liability arising out of suits, proceedings, demands, judgments, expenses (including counsel fees) and costs which Seller may suffer or incur by reason of the failure of Buyer so to pay, perform and discharge such obligations and liabilities of Seller or injury or loss suffered or alleged to have been suffered by any customer of products sold by [the Norge] Division arising out of the sale to Buyer of the business, properties and assets contemplated by this Agreement or by any person out of any action taken by Buyer on or after the Closing Date. As mentioned, Vine Street does not allege that it suffered harm from any action Fed-ders took “on or after” July 1,1968. Thus, the portion of Sentence 3 referring to “injury or loss suffered or alleged to have been suffered ... by any person out of any action taken by Buyer on or after the Closing Date” cannot be the source of Fedders’s CERCLA successor liability. Likewise, none of the parties allege that Borg-Warner has “suffer[ed] or incurred]” any “liability arising out of suits, [etc.]” by reason of Fedders’s “failure ... to pay, perform and discharge such obligations and liabilities” of Borg-Warner that “ar[ose] out of the sale to [Fedders] of the business, properties and assets contemplated by” the 1968 Norge Purchase Agreement. Borg-Warner contends only that Fedders succeeds to whatever CERC-LA “arrangement” liability Borg-Warner may have — not by virtue of Fedders’s failure to perform an obligation, but by Fed-ders’s express assumption of such liability. Thus, this portion of Sentence 3 cannot be the source of Fedders’s CERCLA successor liability. Sentence 3 articulates Fedders’s promise to indemnify and hold Borg-Warner harmless from “all liability arising out of suits ... which [Borg-Warner] may suffer or incur by reason of ... injury or loss suffered or alleged to have been suffered by any customer of products sold by [the Norge] Division [that arises] out of the sale to [Fedders] of the business, properties and assets contemplated by” the 1968 Norge Purchase Agreement. This language covers liability arising out of Borg-Warner’s sale of Norge itself and is not broad enough to make Fedders liable to Vine Street for products that Norge sold years before the agreement. Even if the 1968 Norge Purchase Agreement and 1981 Settlement Agreement shifted the ultimate risk of Borg-Warner’s liability to Fedders for any “arrangement” that Vine Street establishes Norge committed under CERCLA or otherwise obligate Fedders defend Borg-Warner, these agreements do not reflect Fedders’s express or implied assumption of Borg-Warner’s CERCLA liability as a corporate successor. Vine Street has articulated no legal mechanism through which Fedders may be held liable for Norge’s alleged acts of arrangement, and Fedders did not assume this liability as a corporate successor. Therefore, Fedders is not an arranger and is not liable to Vine Street under CERCLA. 2. Defendant arranged for disposal To establish arranger liability, Vine Street must next demonstrate that Borg-Warner “arranged” for the disposal of hazardous substances. For the Court to find that Borg-Warner arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances, there must be “some nexus between” Borg-Warner and the PERC’s disposal. See Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 929 (5th Cir.2000); N.J. Turnpike Auth., 197 F.3d at 105; Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir.1992). a. Applicable law The Fifth Circuit rejects “a bright-line test for determining when one is an arranger” and liberally interprets the term “arranged.” Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 929. Determining arranger liability is a fact-intensive inquiry. Morton Int’l Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.2003). Courts therefore engage “in a case-by-case analysis of arranger liability, relying upon many factors,” none of which are necessarily dispositive, to determine whether a sufficient nexus exists. Sea Lion, Inc. v. Wall Chem. Corp., 974 F.Supp. 589, 595 (S.D.Tex.1996); see S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 406-07 (11th Cir.1996). Some of these factors include whether the defendant (1) engaged in a transaction for the purpose of waste disposal, (2) owned or possessed the waste, (3) had some actual involvement in the decision to dispose of the waste, or, alternatively had an obligation to control the disposal of the waste, (4) and/or controlled the waste’s disposal regardless of whether it owned or possessed the waste. Vine Street I, 361 F.Supp.2d at 606. There is no Fifth Circuit precedent as to which factors must be considered or what priority they should receive. See Morton Int’l, 343 F.3d at 677. The Court’s ultimate decision as to arranger liability must be based on “the totality of the circumstances.” Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 929. In addressing a SWDA arranger liability-provision almost identical to CERCLA’s, the Texas Supreme Court held that “the courts’ inquiry should focus on the degree of the defendant’s actual control over the decision regarding the specific method or manner of disposal.” R.R. St. & Co., Inc. v. Pilgrim Enter., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex.2005) (“R.R. Street I ”). In R.R. Street II, Pilgrim, a dry-cleaning company, sought to recover soil and groundwater cleanup costs for its numerous dry-cleaning facilities whose sewer lines had leaked PERC. Id. at 237. Street, Pilgrim’s dry-cleaning equipment supplier, designed, manufactured, and distributed Pilgrim’s dry-cleaning equipment; sold both the equipment and PERC directly to Pilgrim; supervised the equipment’s installation; periodically performed equipment inspections; and routinely advised Pilgrim to discard PERC-eontaminated wastewater into the sewer. Id. at 236-37; R.R. St. & Co. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 81 S.W.3d 276, 289 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001) (“R.R. Street I ”), rev’d on other grounds, 166 S.W.3d at 255. In determining the arranger liability, the court noted that looking to actual control “provides some degree of uniformity under the law, while at the same time allowing courts to consider the totality of the circumstances presented in any given case.” R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 244. Applying this standard, the Texas Supreme Court found that these activities were insufficient to create a nexus between Street’s conduct and the PERC’s disposal because “Street did not actually control the specific method and manner in which Pilgrim disposed of the separator water” and had no “obligation with regard to waste disposal decisions” Id. at 246 (emphasis added). Pilgrim remained free to ignore Street’s advice and thus “never ceded ultimate control over this aspect of its operations” or the “authority to make disposal decisions.” Id. Similarly, in Berg v. Popham, the Bergs alleged that the water separators on their Norge dry-cleaning machines flushed PERC-laden separator water into the local sewer lines, causing leaks and soil contamination. 113 P.3d 604, 606 (Alaska 2005) (“Berg II"). Articulating the applicable standards for the Ninth Circuit, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska environmental statute requires an arranger to have “substantial or integral ... actual involvement in the decision to dispose of waste.” Id. at 610. The court stated that actual involvement “can encompass involvement in deciding how to dispose of waste or in facilitating such disposal,” which can, “in turn, include actions such as designing, installing, or connecting a system that disposes of waste on behalf of a third party.” Id. The court believed the “actual involvement” standard to be broader than the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that a CERCLA arranger own or possess the hazardous substance or have authority to control its disposal. Id. at 609 n. 20. Nevertheless, the court held that the “actual involvement” standard comports with most federal interpretations of CERCLA arranger liability. Id. at 609-10 & n. 27 (citing Gen. Elec., 962 F.2d at 286). Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit held the Bergs’ allegations that Norge required the PERC’s use in the dry-cleaning equipment, designed the layout of the equipment, and installed equipment with separator systems that “facilitated spillage, leakage and direction of [PERC] into the city sewer system” sufficient to overcome Maytag’s motion to dismiss. Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotes omitted)(“Berg II ”). In California Department of Toxic Substances v. Payless Cleaners, the Peters owned property from which PERC was released when a dry-cleaning business operated a Norge Village franchise on the property. 368 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1074 (E.D.Cal.2003). The Peters brought a third-party complaint against Maytag, alleging that Norge manufactured and provided the dry-cleaning equipment and PERC used on the property, installed machines that discharged PERC-laden waste-water through floor-piping connected to the local sewer, and determined the facility’s layout, specifically considering the location of floor drains for wastewater disposal. Id. at 1074-77. On a motion to dismiss, the court found that Norge’s alleged design of the machines and instruction-manual directions on wastewater disposal, by themselves, could not establish Norge’s actual control over the ultimate decision on how to dispose of the PERC. Id. at 1080. However, the court denied dismissal, finding that Norge’s alleged role in designing the facility’s layout (which required the machines’ connection to the floor-piping system) and subsequent annual inspections could establish such control. Id. On such facts, “the Peters did not exercise independent decisionmaking regarding the disposal, but rather, at the very least, shared this control with [Norge].” Id. Moreover, the court found Norge’s alleged physical installation and connection of the machines to the floor-piping system even more compelling to establish its control over the disposal. Id. b. Application In the instant case, James Keeling was a College Cleaners employee in 1961. Keeling’s job was to collect laundry from various drop-off points for delivery to the main plant for commercial dry cleaning. Though Keeling did not actually work at the West Glenwood laundromat, he was the witness most familiar with the laundromat’s operations. Despite Borg-Warner’s attempts to characterize Keeling’s recollections as unreliable, Keeling gave a generally consistent and detailed description of Norge’s involvement with the laundromat. Norge representatives likely approached D.B. Keeling, Sr. at a dry-cleaning convention about opening up a self-service Norge Laundry & Cleaning Village. In the early 1960s, Norge advertised Norge Laundry & Cleaning Villages nationally as investment opportunities for local businessmen. The Roosth and Genecov Groups constructed the West Glenwood laundromat building for College Cleaners according to Norge’s designs and layout specifications and under Norge’s supervision. All of the washers, dryers, and dry-cleaning machines at the facility were Norge machines. Although College Cleaners may have bought the actual equipment from an independent Norge dealer or distributor, the facility itself sported Norge colors, signs, and logos. Before the facility’s grand opening, Keeling helped unload the actual dry-cleaning machines that Norge mechanics delivered to the facility. Keeling witnessed these workers install the equipment and plumb the machines to drains leading to the building’s sewer lines. Keeling also witnessed Norge workers fill the machines’ solvent circulation tank system with initial supplies of PERC, which they had brought, and test the machines to ensure they functioned correctly. Norge advertised the laundromat’s grand opening in the Tyler newspapers, and, because the laundromat was Texas’s first Norge Laundry & Cleaning Village, three or four Norge corporate representatives attended the facility’s grand opening and instructed customers on how to operate machines. During the laundromat’s operative years, Norge trained the attendants who maintained the equipment and required those attendants to wear smocks bearing the Norge colors and logo. Keeling recalled no spills or intentional disposals of PERC that occurred and indicated College Cleaners personnel handled the rather expensive PERC with a high degree of care. There is no evidence that the machines suffered from a manufacturing defect or were improperly maintained. Norge’s level of input into and control of the facility’s design and layout, its installation of the equipment and plumbing of the machines to drains leading directly to the building’s sewer lines, its workers’ installation and testing of the facility’s equipment, its corporate representatives’ degree of participation in the facility’s opening, its training of the facility’s attendants, its requirements for displays of signs, colors, and logos, and College Cleaners’ own identification of the facility as a “Norge Laundry & Cleaning Village” — a term which Norge itself seems to have accorded specific meaning — indicate that College Cleaners and Norge had a franchise- or franchise-like agreement. That College Cleaners may have bought the actual machines through a distributor does not change this finding; Norge apparently required distributors to whom it furnished equipment to help facilitate franchise agreements. Given Norge’s substantial involvement in the design of its franchise and the machines’ actual installation, College Cleaners had no practical choice as to how to dispose of the wastewater, irrespective of whether it had any reason to suspect that the wastewater would inherently contain PERC. Flushing the wastewater to the sewer was not a recommendation or advice, unlike Street’s activities in R.R. Street II, but rather an integral part of Norge’s design for the dry-cleaning system. Norge’s activities here demonstrate that it had the authority to and did exercise actual control over the specific method and manner of the PERC’s disposal. Norge was actually involved in deciding how to dispose of that wastewater and the PERC contained therein. Moreover, there is at least some evidence that Norge actually knew its water separators would discharge PERC. Later Norge dry-cleaners models’ wastewater hoses apparently had “ ‘trap[s]’ to prevent solvent flow to the floor drain,” and the machines’ manuals instructed that “under no circumstances [should one] alter the hose or omit the [hose’s] formed loop.” The manuals instruct that in the case of low solvent mileage, one should check the water separator drain hose for proper positioning. A defendant’s “knowledge that hazardous waste disposal is an inherent or inevitable part of the process” the defendant has arranged “demonstrates that the defendant knowingly (if not personally) contributed to the hazardous-waste contamination .... [and] may suffice to establish liability.” Morton Int’l, 343 F.3d at 679 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384). The later manuals permit the unrefuted inference that, at least as early as 1964, Norge engineers actually knew of and attempted to compensate for the separators’ inefficiency and tendency to discharge PERC with the wastewater. This further strengthens the nexus between Norge and the PERC disposal. Finally, James Keeling’s unrebutted testimony that Norge supplied and initially filled the dry-cleaning system with PERC also strengthens the nexus because it establishes that Norge owned or possessed at least some of the actual hazardous substance that entered the sewers. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the nexus between Norge and the PERC disposal establishes that Norge arranged for that disposal. Because Borg-Warner was Norge’s corporate parent at the time of Norge’s critical acts that gave rise to the arrangement, the Court concludes that Borg-Warner arranged for the PERC’s disposal. 3. Owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity The final element at issue regarding arranger liability is whether Norge must have actually owned the PERC or whether it could have been owned by another party or entity. Borg-Warner and Vine Street construe the statutory language differently. Vine Street contends that the phrase in the definition of arranger, “by any other party or entity,” modifies the preceding words “owned or possessed by such person,” and thus any person is liable who arranges for disposal of a hazardous substance “owned or possessed by such person, or by any other party or entity.” In other words, Vine Street construes the phrase to mean that Norge did not have to actually own the PERC that went into the dry-cleaning machines in order to be an arranger. Borg-Warner construes the phrase to modify the words “disposal or treatment:” “any person who ... arranged for disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances ... by any other party or entity,” when (and only when) “such person” “own[s] or possess[es]” the hazardous substances. Borg-Warner’s construction mandates that the arranger owned or possessed the substance and that the arranger not have performed the disposal or treatment itself. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1080 (9th Cir.2006). According to the Ninth Circuit, this construction apparently requires deletion of the two commas that offset “by any other party or entity.” Id. Borg-Warner argues that the statute is unambiguous and thus the Court’s “efforts to construe or interpret the statute are unnecessary or inappropriate.” But court after court has observed how CERC-LA is a statute rife with ambiguities. Even a cursory examination reveals how Congress’s grouping of phrases and clauses renders Section 107(a)(3) susceptible to differing interpretations. In the face of such ambiguity, “[Section 107(a)(3) ] must be given a liberal judicial interpretation consistent with CERCLA’s overwhelmingly remedial statutory scheme.” Many courts have ruled that a CERCLA arranger need not have owned or possessed the hazardous substance at issue, but none of these courts’ rulings analyzed the statutory construction issue. Other courts have more recently ruled just the opposite, but again without firmly addressing the underlying statutory construction issue. Two decisions directly address this particular issue of statutory construction. In American Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, the First Circuit stated that “[t]he sentence structure of § 9607(a)(3) makes it clear that” the section requires the arranger to have owned or possessed the hazardous substance. 381 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir.2004) (“The clause ‘by any other party or entity* clarifies that, for arranger liability to attach, the disposal or treatment must be performed by another party or entity....”). The Rhode Island District Court concluded that the appellants — a group of waste hauling companies that had contracted with other companies to pick up, haul, and dump waste on a farm — were arrangers because their conduct “constituted active participation as a broker in the disposal of their customer’s waste.” Id. at 10, 23. The First Circuit rejected the appellees’ argument that CERCLA arrangers need not have owned or possessed the hazardous substance and distinguished cases involving officers of hazardous-waste-generating corporations who controlled waste-disposal decisions and who sought to avoid liability by arguing they did not personally own or possess the waste. Id. at 24. The First Circuit nevertheless affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the appellants were “brokers” who had constructive possession based on their control over the waste and could not escape liability by claiming they were essentially middlemen. Id. at 25. The First Circuit refused to read “ownership or possession” to support a loophole permitting such an escape. Id. In Pakootas, the appellants sought to enforce the EPA’s order that the appellees conduct a study of a site where the appel-lees’ waste came to be located. 452 F.3d at 1069. The EPA found that appellees arranged for the waste’s disposal. Id. Relying on dicta from a previous Ninth Circuit case to support the same construction of Section 107(a)(3) that Borg-Warner now proposes, the appellees argued that because they disposed of the waste themselves, they could not have “ ‘arranged for disposal’ of a hazardous substance ‘by any other party or entity.’ ” Id. at 1075 (emphasis added); see id. at 1081-82. The Ninth Circuit rejected the construction because it “would create a gaping and illogical hole” in “CERCLA[’s] liability regime by allowing a generator of hazardous substances potentially to avoid liability by disposing of wastes without involving a transporter as an intermediary.” Id. at 1081. Though the statute’s facial ambiguity makes this question a close one, the thrust of these decisions, taken in tandem with the general overriding purposes of CERC-LA, convinces the Court that Borg-Warner need not have actually owned or possessed the PERC to be held liable as an arranger. The Court should “not interpret section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute’s goals, in absence of a specific congressional intent otherwise.” “ ‘Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.’ ” Federal courts have developed a sophisticated case-by-case approach to fulfill this purpose by ensuring that only those parties with a sufficient connection or “nexus” to the transaction at issue are found to have “arranged for disposal or treatment” of hazardous substances. See Geraghty & Miller, 234 F.3d at 929; N.J. Turnpike Auth., 197 F.3d at 105; Gen. Elec. Co., 962 F.2d at 286. Moreover, a defendant’s actual ownership or possession of a hazardous substance may be a distinct factor in the nexus analysis. See Vine Street I, 361 F.Supp.2d at 606; Sea Lion, 974 F.Supp. at 595. Therefore, the PERC may be owned by the defendant or some other party or entity. In the present case, James Keeling’s unrebutted testimony demonstrates that Norge supplied the initial PERC disbursed by its dry-cleaning machines. In addition, James Keeling and David Bart Keeling, Jr. further testified that Polk Oil Company employee Sonny Lunsford regularly delivered College Cleaners its PERC supply, after the initial supply it received, via truck through a hose attachment. Borg-Warner did not attempt to rebut this evidence. Evidently, either Lunsford or Polk Oil Company must have had in their actual or constructive possession the PERC that was delivered to College Cleaners. This establishes that a person or entity other than Borg-Warner possessed the PERC that Vine Street claims was disposed of at the facilities. It was Norge’s machine that served as the vehicle for the distribution of PERC into the ground, and Norge exerted substantial control over the means and manner of the PERC’s disposal through its franchise-like operation of the dry cleaning facility. While Norge may not have been the only arranger in the process, it is certainly an arranger under the Court’s reading of the statute. L Conclusion Borg-Warner is a person who arranged for the disposal of PERC owned or possessed by another party at the West Glen-wood laundromat building. Therefore, Borg-Warner is an arranger and a responsible party under CERCLA Section 107(a)(3). Fedders, though a “person” in the technical sense, is not an arranger because it is not a successor-in-interest that assumed Borg-Warner’s liabilities. Because Vine Street did not allege any other basis to hold Fedders responsible for the contamination, Fedders is not a responsible party. F. Conclusion Because (1) the West Glenwood laundromat building and property on which it sits are facilities, (2) there was a release of a hazardous substance from the West Glenwood property, (3) the release caused Vine Street to incur necessary costs of response, and (4) Borg-Warner is a responsible party with respect to the facilities, the Court concludes that Borg-Warner is liable to Vine Street under CERCLA for the necessary response costs that Vine Street incurred consistent with the NCP. Because Fedders is not a responsible party, the Court concludes that Fedders is not liable to Vine Street under CERCLA. SWDA Liability The SWDA is the Texas solid waste counterpart to CERCLA. R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 238; Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 361.001 et seq. The SWDA’s cost-recovery provisions are structured similarly to CERCLA’s and are interpreted in a similarly liberal manner to give effect to the SWDA’s remedial purposes. R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 238; see also Vine Street I, 361 F.Supp.2d at 605. To establish a prima facie case of SWDA liability, Vine Street must show that: (1) the Defendant is a “person responsible for solid waste” as defined in THSC § 361.271; (2) Vine Street “conducts a removal or remedial action” approved by the TCEQ; (3) the removal or remedial action is “necessary to address a release or threatened release” of solid waste; (4) the costs of the action were “reasonable and necessary”; and (5) Vine Street made “reasonable attempts to notify the [Defendant ... of the existence of the release” and “intended to take steps to eliminate the release.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.344; see RR Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 240. Because of the substantially similar wording in the SWDA and CERCLA, the Court presumes, absent contrary indication, that the Texas Legislature intended to adopt the construction placed on the wording by federal courts. R.R. Street I, 81 S.W.3d at 290 (citing Blackmon v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962, 964-65 (1943)). Because Texas law is lacking in cases discussing the scope of arranger La-bility under the SWDA, Texas courts look to federal case law interpreting CERCLA for guidance in determining that scope. See id.; R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 241. Therefore, where the SWDA and CERCLA language is the same, the Court applies its interpretation regarding the CERCLA provision to the SWDA provision at issue. Texas rules of decision bind this Court’s interpretations of substantive Texas law. Thus, this Court is obligated to rule as the Texas Supreme Court would rule. A. Borg-Wamer is a person responsible for solid waste, Fedders is not Vine Street alleges that Borg-Warner and Fedders are “persons responsible for solid waste” because those Defendants “arranged for the disposal of solid waste at College Cleaners.” The SWDA’s “arranger status” provision is very similar to CERCLA’s “arranger status” language. R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 241. Under the SWDA, an “arranger” is a “person ... (3)[who] by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged to process, store, or dispose of ... solid waste owned or possessed by the person, by any other person or entity at ... (A) the solid waste facility owned or operated by another person or entity that contains the solid waste____” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.271(a)(3). 1. Person who by contract, agreement or otherwise The SWDA defines “person” almost identically to CERCLA, and the Court has already determined that Defendants are persons as defined by CERCLA. The language “by contract, agreement, or otherwise” is identical to CERCLA, and Texas courts have not squarely addressed this particular term. Therefore, the Court’s reasoning regarding successor liability is equally applicable to the SWDA, and Fed-ders is not liable under the SWDA as an arranger. 2. Arranged ... to dispose Both the Texas Supreme Court in R.R. Street II and the First Court of Appeals in R.R. Street I dedicated a substantial portions of their respective opinions to the issue of whether the defendant’s actions constituted “arrange[ment] for disposal” of PERC. Those courts found the defendant had not arranged for disposal because the defendant did not exercise sufficient “actual control” over the decision regarding the specific method or manner of disposal. R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 246. The plaintiff in Street was free to ignore the defendant’s advice. Id. As discussed in the application of CERCLA’s “arranged for disposal” requirement, Norge’s level of input into and control of the facility’s design and layout, its workers’ installation and testing of the facility’s equipment, its corporate representatives’ degree of participation in the facility’s opening, its training of the facility’s attendants, its requirements for displays of signs, colors, and logos, and College Cleaners’ own identification of the facility as a “Norge Laundry & Cleaning Village” — a term which Norge itself seems to have accorded specific meaning — indicate that College Cleaners and Norge had a franchise or franchise-like agreement. Unlike the plaintiff in R.R. Street, given Norge’s substantial involvement in the design of its franchise and the machines’ actual installation, College Cleaners had no practical choice as to how to dispose of the wastewater. Flushing the wastewater to the sewer was not a recommendation or advice, but rather an integral part of Norge’s design for the dry-cleaning system and the dry-cleaning facility. Norge’s activities here demonstrate that it had the authority to and did exercise actual control over the specific method and manner of the PERC’s disposal. Norge was actually involved in deciding how to dispose of that wastewater and the PERC contained therein. Therefore, Norge (and thus Borg-Warner) arranged for the disposal of the PERC. 3. Owned or possessed by the person, by any other party or entity The SWDA’s version of this element is worded exactly like CERCLA’s version. However, unlike in the case of CERCLA, here there exists authoritative precedent resolving the element’s construction. Looking to federal CERCLA case law for standards to determine the SWDA arranger status, the Texas Supreme Court held that “[w]hile ownership or possession [by the arranger] of the hazardous substance is a factor, it is not a prerequisite for arranger status.” R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 242 (citing Union Corp., 259 F.Supp.2d at 393 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381-82)). Such a pronouncement is authoritative. See United States v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir.1998) (state supreme court pronouncements on issues of substantive state laws control federal court decisions on such laws). Therefore, under the SWDA Vine Street need only have established that some entity owned or possessed the PERC. Vine Street has already established that Sonny Lunsford, the deliveryman for College Cleaners’s PERC supplier, possessed the PERC in the course of delivering the substance. Accordingly, Vine Street has shown that some definitive person or entity possessed the PERC used in the machines. I. Solid waste facility owmed or operated by another party or entity The term “solid waste facility” includes “all land, including structures, appurtenances, and other improvements on the land, used for ... disposing of solid waste.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(36). The one Texas case addressing the term’s definition did not give it any remarkable attention, and the statute does not indicate that word “used” connotes any particular method of operation or departure from the word’s plain meaning. See Seaway Prods. Pipeline Co. v. Hanley, 153 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tex.App.Ft. Worth 2004, no pet.) (reciting, but declining to analyze, the definition of “solid waste facility”). Disposal of the PERC occurred on and in the West Glenwood property and within the laundromat building. The property and building were used for the PERC’s disposal and thus are solid waste facilities. Likewise, it is undisputed that the Roosth and Genecov families owned the West Glenwood property and laundromat building during the period in question, and it is undisputed that College Cleaners operated the laundromat. Neither of these parties are the Defendants; therefore, the facility was “owned or operated by another person or entity.” In addition, the Court has already determined that the properties at issue contained PERC. Therefore, if PERC is a “solid waste,” the last element of arranger liability is satisfied. 5. Solid waste and the “domestic sewage exclusion” Since the other elements are met, if the PERC is “solid waste,” then Borg-Warner is a person responsible for solid waste. The SWDA requires that the substance at issue be “solid waste” as opposed to a “hazardous substance” as required by CERCLA. However, the SWDA’s definition of solid waste includes the term “hazardous substances.” Since the EPA lists perchloroethylene and trichloroethy-lene as hazardous air pollutants pursuant to Federal Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7412), they are hazardous substances for the SWDA’s purposes. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(ll)(A)(v); 40 C.F.R. § 61.01. The EPA identifies tetrachloroethylene as a toxic pollutant under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1317(a)), making it a “hazardous substance” under the SWDA as well. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(ll)(A)(iv); 40 C.F.R. § 401.15. Therefore, the PERC at issue in this case is a “solid waste” for purposes of the SWDA’s arranger liability, provided that none of PERC falls under the SWDA’s statutory or regulatory domestic sewage exclusion. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(34)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27); 40 C.F.R. § 261.4; see also R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 247-48. The SWDA’s statutory “domestic sewage exclusion,” found in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) and THSC § 361.003(34)(A)(i), excludes “solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage” from the definition of “solid waste.” See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.003(34)(A)(I); see also R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 247. The broader “regulatory” exclusion of 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 excludes both “domestic sewage” — defined as “untreated sanitary wastes that passes through a sewer system” — and “any mixture of domestic sewage and other wastes that passes through a sewer system to a publicly-owned treatment works for treatment” from the definition of “solid waste.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(1). Although not expressly required by the SWDA, courts have read “domestic sewage” under the statutory exclusion to mean “residential sewage.” R.R. Street II, 166 S.W.3d at 249; see also PRASA II, 888 F.2d at 184-86. Under the broader regulatory exclusion of “domestic sewage,” however, the argument that PERC is “domestic sewage” also fails. Because the PERC at issue leaked into the soil at the laundromat’s property, it leaked into the ground before it reached a publicly-owned treatment works facility and before it mixed with any residential sewage downstream. T