Full opinion text
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRITZNER, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. (Clerk’s No. 30), and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Zuhdija Napreljac (Clerk’s No. 31). Plaintiff Zuhdija Naprel-jac is represented by Bruce H. Stoltze. Defendant John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., is represented by Paul D. Seyferth, Joseph H. Knittig, Brent N. Coverdale, Thomas W. Foley, and Mary E. Funk. A hearing on the pending motions was held on August 18, 2006. These matters are fully submitted and ready for disposition. The juxtaposition and interplay of the facts and the law related to the claims and arguments presented compel a detailed factual and legal analysis. SUMMARY OF MATERIAL FACTS I. Introduction. Plaintiff Zuhdija Napreljac is an alien resident from Bosnia living in Waukee, Iowa, who holds a green card, making him eligible to reside and work in the United States. Napreljac worked at the Embassy Suites, a Des Moines hotel owned by Defendant John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. (hereinafter, “JQH”), from September 2000 until his termination on September 24, 2003. Napreljac was an engineer for JQH. A “position description” lists the physical demands for the position as follows: Heavy work: Exerting 50 to 100 pounds of force occasionally (Occasionally: activity or condition exists up to 1/3 of the time), and/or 25 to 50 pounds of force frequently (Frequently: activity or condition exists from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time), and/or 10 to 20 pounds of force constantly (Constantly: activity or condition exists 2/3 or more of the time) to move objects. Pl.’s App. 14. Napreljac’s duties included collecting trash around the hotel on a rotating basis with other engineers, inspecting and repairing items in hotel rooms, and conducting other general maintenance tasks around the hotel. For a portion of 2003, Napreljac was the person performing the hotel’s Holi-Care program, a maintenance program focusing on long-term maintenance tasks in the hotel rooms, such as caulking around plumbing fixtures and repairing larger objects. When Napreljac was able, he performed this maintenance for three rooms daily, but when physical restrictions were imposed on Napreljac following certain workplace injuries, these duties were not performed. Engineers like Napreljac report to the hotel’s chief engineer to obtain work tasks. For a time during Napreljac’s employment, the' chief engineer position was vacant, so Napreljac reported to Scott Johnston. Johnston was a lead engineer but performed the duties of the chief engineer. Kevin Beaver was the director of housekeeping and was responsible for the cleanliness of the hotel. Beaver drafted work orders filled by engineers and returned as proof repairs were completed. Although the Holi-Care program was typically managed by the chief engineer, Beaver was trusted with its oversight for a portion of Napreljac’s employment. Jayne Schmeling became the hotel’s human resources manager on September 8, 2003, just over two weeks before Naprel-jac’s employment ended. Schmeling’s duties included recruiting and hiring new employees, administering the hotel’s payroll, and providing orientation for new employees. Jane Postier had previously served as the human resources manager at the Embassy Suites and another hotel, but Postier had shifted her focus away from the Embassy Suites when Schmeling was hired. Because Schmeling was a new hire, Postier was training Schmeling when Na-preljac was terminated. Shannon Kaufman began at the hotel in 1998, became assistant general manager in 2000, and was promoted to general manager in 2003. As general manager, Kaufman oversaw certain aspects of the hotel’s budget and administered operations of the entire hotel. She was vested with the power to hire employees and was the sole person capable of terminating employees. She was not involved in the decision to hire Napreljac but was responsible for his termination. II. Napreljac’s Employment at JQH. Napreljac enjoyed favorable performance reviews from the beginning of his employment. A December 2000 review indicated he was “highly successful.” In September 2001, he was again rated “highly successful.” His third and final review, created in August 2002, reflected a “successful” rating. Napreljac’s next review was to occur sometime in September 2003 but had not yet been completed at the time of his termination. Throughout his employment, Kaufman “never had any problems with” Napreljac, describing him as a good worker. Kaufman Dep. 128:1-17, Apr. 5, 2006. Napreljac’s co-workers’ opinions are in accord. See Johnston Dep. 29:14-30:5, Apr. 6, 2006; Postier Dep. 37:24-38:3, Apr. 6, 2006; see Def.’s App. 289 (evaluating Napreljac as “industrious and ... interested in moving forward”). A. Napreljac’s Workplace Injuries in November 2001 and August 2003. On November 9, 2001, Napreljac injured his neck and back while moving a wet piece of carpet at work. He underwent neck surgery in January 2002 related to this injury. When he returned to work in February 2002, he was subject to a twenty-five pound lifting restriction and a reaching restriction that his physicians believed was necessary for four weeks. A letter prepared by a physician on May 23, 2002, indicates Napreljac’s neck injury had reached “maximum medical improvement” by May 1 but warranted an 8 percent impairment rating, and that his back injury was “degenerative in nature” and did not “warrant an impairment rating.” Pl.’s App. 30. Records indicate continued pain from this injury. Notes from treatment in August 2002 indicate Napreljac suffered pain but that certain functional tests were invalid because Napreljac exhibited “sub-maximal effort.” Pl.’s App. 32. A film of Napreljac’s spine evaluated in February 2003 was normal but pain lingered. A bone scan and another test performed in March 2003 were normal, excepting deficiencies consistent with his surgery. Notes prepared in June 2003 indicate Na-preljac continued to experience discomfort but was able to work on a full-time basis. During this time frame, Napreljac’s “boss told [him] to do whatever [he] felt like being able, capable of doing, and whatever [he] couldn’t do, [he] was supposed to write a note about it.” PL’s Dep. 76:5-8, Feb. 23, 2006. Napreljac would leave work early if he felt pain. Napreljac’s physicians released him from all work restrictions on March 6, 2003. Still, there were some aspects of his work he could not complete without help. The record does not reveal what specific duties he was incapable of performing, but Napreljac testified that if he needed help, “[he] would ask others for help, and they would always have someone help [him].” Pl.’s Dep. 77:16-20, Feb. 23, 2005. On August 1, 2003, when Beaver noted deficiencies in certain repairs Napreljac performed, Napreljac reported “some parts of his job were too hard and that he could not do the work.” Pl.’s App. 22. On August 4, 2003, Napreljac injured his back at work. Notes prepared by Naprel-jac’s treating physician indicate chronic neck and back pain, but tests designed to determine if workplace restrictions were appropriate were invalid because of insufficient effort on Napreljac’s part. Napreljac returned to work on August 5, 2003 but could not lift over ten pounds, bend more than ten times per hour, or push or pull over ten pounds of force. He was to undergo physical therapy three times weekly and perform certain therapeutic exercises. A memorandum prepared by Johnston on August 5 indicates Napreljac “complain[ed] of back problems and work overload” and could not do some tasks such as move furniture or reach overhead. Pl.’s App. 23. Restrictions put in place on August 7 barred Napreljac from lifting over five pounds, pushing or pulling over ten pounds of force, and bending more than five times each hour. Napreljac was placed on “light duty” status at JQH. JQH materials define light duty work as follows: The Company offers a light-duty program to help Associates injured on the job with temporary conditions to get back to work sooner. The light-duty program allows temporarily disabled Associates to return to work before they are ready to return to their original positions or duties. The light-duty program is set up as a transitional program for workers who are expected to return to full duty at their original jobs. It is not intended to accommodate Associates with non-temporary disabilities. PL’s App. 5 (emphasis added). When on this program, Napreljac picked up litter for about one hour each morning and then folded towels in the hotel’s laundry department. This work was typical for engineers on light duty. JQH had few problems accommodating Napreljac’s physical restrictions, including his inability to perform the Holi-Care program; he was merely assigned to tasks within his physical restrictions. Napreljac relayed that he was not told he was doing his job improperly and, in his opinion, was capable of adequately performing his job duties. B. Napreljac’s Incident on September 18, 2003, and the Resulting Investigation. On September 18, 2003, Napreljac began work at 8:00 a.m. His first task was to pick up litter around the hotel’s property using a litter collecting device and a trash can resting on a cart equipped with wheels. At around 8:30 a.m., Napreljac claims he was descending a staircase located at the east loading dock of the hotel when he hurt his back. Whether Napreljac aggravated an old injury, was injured anew, or was not injured at all, as well as the timing, extent, and nature of his injuries is of considerable debate. Sometime around 8:30 .a.m., Kaufman directed Johnston to deliver a note to Na-preljac about an appointment with a physician scheduled for September 25, 2003. Johnston found Napreljac on the east loading dock at around 8:45 a.m. Napreljac was picking up litter. After handing Napreljac the note, Johnston recalled the following exchange: A: .... When I gave — -when I handed him the note, he immediately said that his back had been bothering him that day. I first asked him if he would like to go home for the day. He told me no. And then I said, “Well, how bad is your” — you know, just small talk — “How bad is your back hurting?” He told me, “Oh pretty bad.” You know, “Where is it,” hurting stuff like that. And I said “Well, hopefully this doctor that we are sending you to will be able to correct your problems.” Johnston Dep. 39:2-14; see Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bureau Hr’g Tr. 39:12-16 (“He told me that his back had been hurting him a lot lately. He said it even hurts to walk. And I, I just, I talked to him about a doctor’s appointment. I said, T hope your doctor’s appointment on the 25th that they can resolve your accident, or give you some sort of help whether it be cortisone shots, medicine, or chiropractic therapy.’ ”). Johnston does not remember Napreljac saying he received any injuries on the east loading dock steps, and Na-preljac did not say he was injured while walking down the steps. The two smoked cigarettes and went on with their job duties. Napreljac went back into the hotel and continued folding towels. The exchange between Johnston and Napreljac lasted ten to fifteen minutes. When Napreljac arrived in the hotel’s laundry facility, Beaver — Napreljac’s supervisor in the laundry facility — asked Na-preljac how he was doing, an apparent routine. Beaver testified Napreljac “said he didn’t feel too good, that he hurt his back, slipped and fell.” Beaver Dep. 23:10-11, Apr. 10, 2006; see also Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bureau Hr’g Tr. 36:21-31. When Beaver asked where Na-preljac had fallen, Beaver recalls Naprel-jac indicated he had fallen on the loading dock. Beaver recollects Napreljac said his fall occurred at around 8:30. Napreljac did not ask to see a doctor, did not ask to leave work, and did not ask to make a workers’ compensation claim; instead, he folded towels. Napreljac denies having told Beaver that he had fallen. JQH employees are trained to immediately report to a supervisor any injuries incurred at work. Because Beaver oversaw the area where Napreljac was working, Napreljac’s report of any incident would correspond with his training. Shortly after Beaver and Napreljac conversed, Beaver spoke with either Postier or Schmeling (he does not recall) to begin an accident investigation. Schmeling recalled receiving a call from Beaver, relaying Napreljac had slipped and fallen. Upon receiving the call, Schmeling and Postier went to where Napreljac was working, one of them bringing a form to document the accident. Postier recalled the following upon arrival at the hotel’s laundry: And so we went to check on [Napreljac], and I approached [Napreljac], you know “What happened?” And he said “five fallen,” you know. And, you know, ‘Where? Show us. How did you fall, and what happened?” And so then when we went out to the back dock, the stair area where he said it had happened.... Postier Dep. 10:21-11:5; see Postier Dep. 11:10-12:8. Schmeling’s recollection is in accord. Q: What did he say? A: He indicated by grabbing his back that his back hurt, and he agreed to take us to the location of where it happened. Schmeling Dep. 10:9-12, Apr. 6, 2006. When the quartet arrived at the loading dock, Napreljac was asked to demonstrate how he had fallen. At this point, witnesses’ memories begin to diverge. Schmeling testified as follows: Q: What did he say happened? A: He said that he was picking up trash on the back loading dock. He was going down the steps. He took a step, and that caused his back to hurt. Q: Did he say anything else about how it happened? A: He demonstrated going down the steps. A: He was on the steps. He showed us the loading dock steps, and he showed us that he was going down the steps. So he demonstrated going down the steps. He took a step with his right foot and said that when he took the step that his lower back — that he felt pain in his back. Schmeling Dep. 10:13-17; 11:15-21. She recalled that Napreljac did not initially say he was collecting litter but when asked said he was. According to Schmeling, Na-preljac did not demonstrate or say that he had fallen. Schmeling became suspicious of Naprel-jac’s story because, when [she] had received the call from [Beaver] ... he said he had fallen.... And when [Napreljac] talked about and demonstrated what he had done, he had not fallen. He said he stepped wrong. So there was some confliction [sic] as to whether did you fall or did you not fall. And he indicated he stepped wrong when we were investigating. Schmeling Dep. 16:9-16. Schmeling reported these discrepancies to Kaufman: A: .... He said he had fallen. And when we did the investigation, he said he did not fall, that he stepped wrong. Q: Did you tell her that in your opinion it was a false report of a worker compensation injury? A: I don’t know if I would have used that language. I don’t believe he had hurt himself to how he said he had hurt himself. Q: Why do you believe [that]? A: First he said he hurt himself by falling, and we determined that he didn’t fall, because he changed his story. He changed his story to say that he stepped wrong. Schmeling Dep. 45:22-46:20; accord Schmeling Dep. 57:6-8. Schmeling admitted that the sole basis for her belief that Napreljac had fallen was Beaver’s call and a memo Beaver had prepared. According to Beaver, Napreljac “explained ... and pointed out, but he would not — he could not do a demonstration because his back hurt,” but he did “walk[] down the stairs and kind of explain[ ] how he was doing it.” Beaver Dep. 28:13-21. Beaver elaborated, A: .... [H]e demonstrated to us as he was walking down the stairs grabbing on the handrail where he slipped and fell about halfway down the stairwell. A: He went down to about midway to show us where he slipped and fell. Q: Okay. But he continued to assert that he had fallen down in that demonstration? A: Yes. Q: Did he indicate that he had grabbed the handrail as he was walking down and had fallen while holding on to the handrail? A: He indicated that he was holding the handrail. Q: When he was — when he had fallen? A: When he was going down. Q: Did he indicate whether he had fallen all the way down and hit the stairs, then, when he fell? A: He mentioned that he had fell [sic] to his right side, onto his right side at the end of the stairs. Q: He had fallen to his right side; is that correct? A: When he landed on the floor. Beaver Dep. 29:17-30:25; see PL’s Supp. App. Ex. Z, at 02:35-02:50 (containing Beaver’s demonstration). Beaver did not remember Napreljac saying he was engaged in any particular sort of activity— such as picking up litter — but merely said he slipped when descending the stairs. According to Beaver, Napreljac maintained throughout his demonstration that he had fallen. Postier’s recollection varies: A: It was kind like [sic] he said he stepped and then went like that (indicating). And I said, “Did you grab” — you know, because I remember the railing was right there. And I remember I was thinking, did you grab the railing, you know, to grab yourself? “No, no, no, no. I, you know, slipped and went like this” (indicating). And then it was — you know, hurt the back, hurt the back. A: The way I remember it is that he showed us the step that he said that he fell [sic] and then (indicating), you know, with the other leg, went like that (indicating). Q: All right. And did he demonstrate that he fell all the way to the ground? A: No. Q: What did he demonstrate? He just demonstrated that he went back? A: Yes. Q: Did he demonstrate how he caught himself from falling? A: No. And that’s when I had asked him. “Did you, you know, grab the railing?” “No, no.” Q: Well, when he was demonstrating this to you on those steps, did he say that he fell, or did he say that he stepped wrong? A: At first it was fell, and then it turned into slipped. “I slipped. I slipped,” because when — I was like, “Did you grab onto the railing, you know, when it happened?” “No, no, no, I slipped.” Postier Dep. 12:16-24; 24:24-25:24; Pl.’s Supp.App. Ex. Z, at 05:06-05:26 (containing Postier’s demonstration). Postier concluded Napreljac changed his story from saying he had “fallen” to saying he had “slipped” as the investigation proceeded. After the demonstration, Schmeling testified that she, Napreljac, Beaver, and Postier began filling out an accident report form. Accident report forms are intended to guide investigations and prevent similar incidents in the future. JQH’s accident report form is comprised of five sections. Section one is labeled “accident data” and contains blanks to indicate the employee involved, the location and time of the accident, and the identity of any witnesses. Section two contains spaces for the “analysis of facts and root cause(s) determination” and provides room for the employee to describe the accident, equipment used in the accident and the body parts injured, as well as what is determined to be the “root cause.” Section three lists “corrective action” taken. The first three sections are to be completed by the employee’s supervisor. Section four contains a box for an “action plan to eliminate root cause(s)” and is to be completed by an accident investigator. Section five lists certain employee information supplied by the human resources department. The accident report form prepared by JQH after Napreljac’s September 18 incident has sections one, two, and five completed. Schmeling completed sections one and two of the accident report form. Under “description of the accident,” the following language appears: “R lower back — radiating pain of [sic] buttocks & leg R — employee stated made worse from previous injury of 8/4/08.” Def.’s App. 196. In the box labeled “employee description of accident,” Schmeling wrote “walking down the steps picking up garbage.” Def.’s App. 196. And under “activity/job at time of accident,” the form states Napreljac was “picking litter on steps [and] stepped wrong.” Def.’s App. 196. The accident report form does not indicate Napreljac slipped or fell. According to Postier, the form was not inconsistent with what Na-preljac said or demonstrated. The accident report form contains a signature below the space for the employee’s description of the accident. Whether it is Napreljac’s signature is an issue of dispute. Testimony from Schmeling in a separate proceeding indicates she, Postier, and Beaver witnessed Napreljac sign the form. At her deposition, however, Schmeling testified that only she and Post-ier witnessed Napreljac sign it. Beaver and Postier deny seeing Napreljac sign the form, and Napreljac denies the signature is his. Kaufman, the hotel’s general manager, was kept informed. I went to, I believe, both ... Schmeling and ... Postier, and they were handling the investigation with [Beaver]. I asked what had happened, and they said that [Napreljac] had hurt himself on the stairs. At that point then they started filling out the accident [report form]. I went and talked to [Beaver] about it, you know, how did this come about, spoke to [Beaver]. [Beaver] told me what he — the conversation they had had. And then I went to the video. Kaufman Dep. 53:7-17. As with many areas of the hotel, a security camera records events on the loading dock. The parties have submitted a copy of the video footage created on the morning of September 18. Pl.’s Supp.App. Ex. Y. Neither the quality nor the continuity of the tape is pristine. It is grainy and records about one frame every second. Nevertheless, JQH employees had much to say after reviewing the tape. Kaufman testified that the tape showed Napreljac in the hotel’s parking garage picking up litter a little after 8:00 a.m. Napreljac is next seen in the employee’s smoking area — by the east dock — smoking and picking up litter. Beaver testified that the videotape is inconsistent with Na-preljac’s story because it “[sjhowed that [Napreljac] was nowhere on- — -not on the back dock at [around 8:30], the time that he said he slipped and fell on the back dock. And later the [sic] day it showed him going down the stairs with ease and then jumping into another employee’s car and moving the car for her.” Beaver Dep. 36:8-13. From what Postier could see, “it looked like ... he did not slip or fall. And he [later] hopped into an employee’s vehicle and went and parked it.” Postier Dep. 14:21-24. Postier testified that “it seemed like there was some misrepresentation” because of discrepancies between what Napreljac had reported and what the videotape showed. Postier Dep. 23:9-17. Schmeling’s review of the tape showed Na-preljac was not picking up litter but instead “went down the stairs and hopped into an employee’s van and helped the employee move the van.” Schmeling Dep. 17:8-22. Schmeling testified that after moving the van, Napreljac went back up the steps and into the hotel. According to Schmeling, the video did not show Naprel-jac walking down the steps at 8:30 a.m. but instead at 8:17 or 8:18 a.m. Kaufman also testified Napreljac is not seen on the videotape on the east loading dock at 8:30 a.m. Consolidating this testimony, JQH believes the video surveillance footage is inconsistent with Napreljac’s recollection in three key respects. First, JQH argues the video does not show Napreljac falling or slipping. Second, JQH claims the tape does not show Napreljac on the east loading dock stairs at 8:30 a.m. picking up trash. Third, JQH asserts the tape shows Napreljac “hopped” into a vehicle to park it, showing he was not injured. Kaufman and Schmeling asked Naprel-jac whether he wished to see a physician, and Napreljac answered in the affirmative. Thus, Napreljac was transported to Dr. Maurice Minervini’s office for treatment. When Napreljac returned from Dr. Miner-vini’s office that afternoon, he met with Kaufman and Schmeling. Before the meeting, Kaufman had determined Na-preljac would be suspended pending the completion of her investigation. Kaufman believed a suspension was appropriate because she “could not see on the tape where Mr. Napreljac was on the stairs at the time or when on the stairs [he] ever slipped, fell, winced.” Kaufman Dep. 59:13-18. Further, Kaufman had not yet received word from Dr. Minervini regarding Napreljac’s condition and wanted to review the physician’s findings before making a decision. Schmeling testified that when Napreljac became aware his conduct may have been videotaped, he “back-pedaled” and changed his story “[a] little bit from slipping and falling to stepping wrong and then — it seemed from [Napreljac’s statement that] T did not hurt myself today’ that he was thinking it hurt from before.” Schmeling Dep. 80:21-81:7. Kaufman suspended Napreljac and arranged a meeting with him on September 24, 2003. By September 24, Kaufman had reviewed Dr. Minervini’s notes from Naprel-jac’s visit. Dr. Minervini indicates Naprel-jac said he “was walking down some steps and hurt [his] back,” and that while he was “going down steps and picking up garbage with a stick, he stepped with R foot and felt extreme pain in R mid low back radiating to both legs.” Def.’s App. 197; see also Def.’s App. 201. This description accurately reproduces what Napreljac recalls telling Dr. Minervini. Dr. Minervini believed Napreljac could return to work on September 19 — the day after the injury— if he lifted no more than five pounds, but no more than five times per hour, and pushed or pulled no more than five pounds of force. Dr. Minervini recommended Na-preljac sit twenty-five percent of his day and that he see an orthopedic surgeon. He diagnosed Napreljac with a mild lumbar strain, with October 2, 2003, as the “anticipated date of maximum medical improvement.” Def.’s App. 199-200. After consolidating information from several sources, including Beaver’s memo, Johnston’s memo, the accident report, the video, and conversations with Johnston, Beaver, Postier, and Sehmeling, Kaufman concluded Napreljac had been untruthful about how he had hurt himself on the stairs. She summarized her findings as follows: Q: .... Was it your determination from your investigation that [Na-preljac] had not fallen on any stairs? A: Correct. Q: Was it your determination that he had not injured his back in any way on September 18th of 2003? A: That he had not been on the stairs where he had fallen, slipped, winced, whatever. Q: And so it was your determination that to the extent that he was claiming that he had aggravated his previous back injury on September 18th of 2003 that was untrue? A: Correct. Q: Was it your conclusion that he had not aggravated his back in any way, then, on September 18th of 2003? A: I concluded that he lied about going down the back dock steps and that he had fell [sic] down, winced or misstepped in any manner. Kaufman Dep. 115:20-116:16. Kaufman specifically denied terminating Napreljac as a result of an impending workers’ compensation claim. Q: And after Mr. Napreljac made a worker compensation injury report, you terminated him? A: .... I terminated him due to what information I had from the tape, the doctor, the witnesses.... I did not terminate him due to the fact that he had a workmen’s comp claim. We already had that going for years. I — he had been on restrictive duties or a claim pending on two different ones before this for a long time. And it never stopped us from making sure that he was okay, making sure that he had something to do and somewhere to go every single day.... A: .... I did not terminate him due to the fact that he made a workers’ compensation claim. I terminated him on what information I had on very numerous pieces put together. And, again, he was already pending with multiple workmen’s comp against — it was here nor there at the time. I was already using restrictions- — he already had restrictions against what he could do and for a long time. And it never stopped the hotel from making sure that he had a place to go every day. Did I terminate him due to filing a workmen’s compensation? No, I did not. Kaufman Dep. 140:1-13; 141:3-16. Napreljac was terminated on September 24, 2003. Kaufman, Schmeling, and Mark Leonetti, the assistant general manager, attended the termination meeting. A notice of termination completed by Schmel-ing and signed by Kaufman, contains the following explanation for Napreljac’s termination: Commission of any falsification or alteration of company records is just cause for immediate dismissal. Employee signed accident report stating he was injured. On 9-18-03 employee stated he injured himself while picking litter on the east side loading deck steps at approximately 8:30 a.m. Investigation proves employee was not injured while picking up litter on said date of 9-18-03 on said time of 8:30 a.m. Pl.’s App. 13. An “X” appears on a blank next to “[violation of company rules.” PL’s App 13. According to Kaufman, firing Napreljac was appropriate because he “lied [about] reporting the accident and signing the accident report,” and thereby falsified the accident report. Kaufman Dep. 34:20-35:3; see also Kaufman Dep. 145:16-146:12 (“[H]e lied stating where he was, what happened, what he had told [Beaver], what he stated in his accident [sic], and what he stated to the doctor and what was seen on the tape.”). Napreljac understood why he was being terminated, but when confronted with the notice of termination, refused to sign it. Napreljac contends his termination was a result of a “setup.” He alleges a false accident report form was prepared for the sole purpose of later proving the contents of the report were false. He claims his version of events has been consistent all along. For example, he points to similarities between Dr. Minervini’s notes prepared on September 18 and notes from a physician he saw on September 29, 2003. Compare Def.’s App. 197, 201 (noting Na-preljac told Dr. Minervini that “[he] was walking down some steps and hurt [his] back;” and that “while going down steps and picking up garbage with a stick, he stepped with R foot and felt extreme pain in R mid low back radiating to both legs”), with Def.’s App. 214 (noting Napreljac told a physician on September 29, 2003, that “[p]atient ... reports that his back was injured on 9/18/2003 8:30:00 AM---- Patient states: ‘[I] was walking down some steps and hurt my back’ ”). Napreljac contrasts this consistency to JQH employees’ depositions. To give one example, he argues Postier believed he slipped backwards and did not fall, and that Beaver testified Napreljac held a railing when he slipped, a contention Schmeling and Postier deny. At bottom, Napreljac claims he was not terminated as a result of falsities in an injury report but because of his disability, race, national origin, and because of a workers’ compensation claim that could have resulted from his September 18 injury. However, when Napreljac was asked to recall comments he heard or actions to which he was subjected suggesting discrimination based on his national origin, he testified as follows: Q: Did anybody who was one of your supervisors or managers at the hotel ever say anything to you about your being from Bosnia or about your race that offended you? A: No one said that to me. We were all okay while I was doing the job. PL’s Dep. 84:16-22, Feb. 8, 2006. When given the chance to explain why he believed he was terminated as a result of his national origin, Napreljac refused to answer. Q: ... Do you believe the hotel fired you because of your national origin? A: Can I not answer that question? Q: Why don’t you want to answer that question A: Just because. PL’s Dep. 91:9-14, Feb. 8, 2006. When interrogated about his disability discrimination claim, the following exchange occurred: A: [Wjhile I was working with them and while I was able to perform all of the job duties, I was good with them and they were good with me. But when, after I got injured and I could no longer work, they looked for reasons to get rid of me. Q: Do you believe the hotel fired you because of an alleged disability that you have, that you had at the time? A: I believe that to be 80 percent true. Q: Do you believe that it’s 80 percent the case that the hotel fired you because of an alleged disability? A: Yes, I do believe that. Q: What do you believe to be the other 20 percent of the reason for your having been fired? A: I don’t know. I don’t know. Pl.’s Dep. 83:21-84:2; 91:15-92:2, Feb. 8, 2006. With respect to Napreljac’s claim that he was terminated in retaliation for a potential workers’ compensation claim, he testified as follows: Q: Do you believe that one of the reasons you were fired in connection with your hotel employment related to your having made any sort of legal claim relating to a workplace injury? A: I [do]. Q: Do you believe that the fact that you wanted to have treatment for your previous worker compensation injury when you hurt your back had anything to do with your being fired? A: Yes, it did, because they were supposed to provide me with the doctor and provide me with treatment. And instead of treatment, I got fired. Q: Did they ever offer to allow you to continue to work with the restrictions that the physician placed on your condition as of September 18 of 2003? A: They did not allow me to go back. They suspended me immediately and gave me a slip of paper, just a plain piece of paper, that says I was suspended without any signature on it and without any explanations.... Pl.’s Dep. 133:5-10; 142:22-143:9; 147:19-148:4, Feb. 8, 2006. JQH argues Napreljac was not terminated for an unlawful reason but was fired because he made false statements as part of an investigation into a workplace injury. C. Napreljac’s Physical Capabilities Circa September 18, 2003. Because the parties contest whether Na-preljac suffered from a disability at the time of his termination, his physical abilities around the time of his termination are relevant. Since his termination, Napreljac has occasionally denied he was injured at all. When confronted with Dr. Minervini’s report prepared after his September 18 visit, he testified as follows: Q: Did you tell Dr. Minervini on September 18, 2003, quote, I was walking down some steps and hurt my back, end of quote? A: I could not have said that, because I did not injure my back. I maybe, I could have said that my back was feeling worse, and this document is not truthful and is only helping those against me. Pl.’s Dep. 88:6-15, Feb. 8, 2006. Napreljac contends both Dr. Minervini and JQH employees must have misunderstood him. Q: Well, is it possible, sir, that you also told one or more of your supervisors at the hotel something very similar to, quote, I was walking down some steps and hurt my back, end of quote? A: I said that in the same context I told the doctor, not that I was injured, but that I was feeling worse. Q: Is it your claim that the doctor misunderstood you or that she is misrepresenting what you told her? A: She probably misunderstood. Q: And is it also your view that your supervisors at the hotel may have misunderstood what you said? A: Maybe. Pl.’s Dep. 88:25-89:16, Feb. 8, 2006. At a deposition taken in connection with another proceeding, Napreljac testified as follows: Q: What injury date was reported, if you know? A: Do you mean the false one? Q: Yes. A: I believe it was September 18th or 19th, 2003. Q: Do you know the details of the alleged false injury report? A: I don’t. Q: Do you know what part of your body was said to be hurt? A: Back. Q: Your low back? A: Low back. Q: Did you sustain a low back injury on September 18th or 19th of 2003? A: No, I didn’t. I just felt worse since I already worked under restrictions. Q: And how did you find out, then, that Embassy Suites or somebody at the Embassy Suites was reporting a third injury? A: I know because I was present. I was — I was there when they were trying to actually report the injury that didn’t happen. All the people there were general manager, there was a manager of housekeeping there, and the representative from human resources, and they were trying to report the injury, and I was opposing because I — I said it wasn’t an injury, and I didn’t want it reported. Pl.’s Dep. 71:2-19; 72:6-17, Feb. 23, 2005. Other portions of his testimony suggest he was not injured anew, but aggravated a previous injury. Q: And it was your position that you had not sustained an injury on September 18 of 2002[sic]? A: I didn’t — I wasn’t injured. I just felt worse. Q:.... I was listening when you were talking ... about September 18, 2003, and my understanding was that you [said] there was not any incident, event, activity, whatever phrase you would like to use, that happened on that day that caused you injury. A: That day, I just felt worse. Pl.’s Dep. 73:19-25; 106:15-21, Feb. 23, 2005; see also PL’s Dep. 142:1-6; 146:16— 25, Feb. 8, 2006; PL’s Dep. 61:22-25, Jan. 17, 2005 (listing Napreljac’s November 2001 and August 2003 injuries as a compete catalog of workplace injuries); PL’s Supp.App. 76 (containing a letter from Dr. Minervini indicating Napreljac “occurred an aggravation of a preexisting back problem” on September 18); PL’s Second Supp. App. 130 (containing a letter from JQH’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier concluding “that there was no evidence of a new work related injury on September 18, 2003”). Napreljac explained how he felt “worse” as follows: Q: ... And during the day you didn’t get to feel any better? A: I felt worse. Q: Okay. But the change in your condition, do you point to anything that you were doing to say that made you feel worse? A: Can’t say exactly. Maybe a wrong step or something. Q: Okay. A wrong step doing what? A: As I was walking around picking up trash. It’s not the — it’s not the even surface. Q: Okay. Did you fall? A: No. Q: Did you stumble? A: No. Q: Just while you were walking around, you didn’t feel good? A: I did no — I did not because I was already feeling bad. Pl.’s Dep. 107:9-108:2, Feb. 23, 2005. Still other portions of the record indicate Napreljac’s September 2003 injury was a new injury. See Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n Compl. ¶ 14; see also Def.’s App. 208 (listing the September 2003 injury as a separate injury); Pl.’s App. 26 (same). Representations from Napreljac’s treating physicians are scattered regarding his physical abilities. For example, a letter from a physician drafted October 23, 2003, indicates Napreljac suffered significant pain. However, a November 24, 2003, letter suggests that if a pending MRI did not show changes from an MRI taken in 2000, his treating physician would conclude Na-preljac “had only a temporary aggravation, and [he] would not anticipate any permanent type of disability rating.” Pl.’s App. 36. An April 7, 2004, letter indicates Na-preljac was “released ... back to regular duty effective February 19, 2004,” because “he reached his maximum medical improvement at that point in time, and [his treating physician did] not feel he sustained any permanent impairment.” Pl.’s App. 37. A December 21, 2004, letter indicates Napreljac was told to seek treatment by his attorneys as a result of complaints of increased back pain. The letter references Napreljac’s February 2004 visit, noting Napreljac then had “multiple levels of degenerative disc disease,” but with a finding of a lack of neural entrapment. The physician wrote he was unsure why Napreljac sought treatment or “what the intent of his attorney was for sending him,” and that the only help he could offer was anti-inflammatory medication and directions to continue at-home exercises. PL’s App. 39. At his January 2005 deposition, Napreljac testified that he experienced neck and back pain. In February 2005, he recalled a recent visit to a physician who purportedly cautioned Napreljac against bending and lifting. On April 12, 2005, Napreljac’s attorneys referred him to a physical therapist for a functional capacity evaluation. Notes prepared thereafter conclude he was capable of working at a light physical demand level for an eight-hour day. A June 2005 letter indicates no need for continued medical treatment for Napreljac’s neck or back conditions but reflects Napreljac’s “physical capabilities [are] of light physical demand.” PL’s App. 42. Physicians attempting to pinpoint Na-preljac’s functional capacity have reportedly faced difficulty because Napreljac has not put forth full efforts to reach joint treatment goals. For example, in June 2002, a physician noted Napreljac “clearly has some non-physiologie factors suggesting symptom magnification or malingering that are contributing to his difficulties.” Def.’s App. 217. August 2002 treatment notes indicated a “submaximal effort” and that some functional tests were “invalid because of poor effort.” Pl.’s App. 32; see also Pl.’s App. 34 (citing “lack of effort” for invalid results in two tests). Likewise, in October 2003, a physical therapist wrote, “I feel that his condition is slowly improving, but I feel that subjective and objective measurements do not agree. He performs all ex’s without any problems, yet his subjective c/o do not change.” Def.’s App. 218. In response, Napreljac claims to have tried his best. Aside from records and letters created by medical professionals, other evidence sheds light on Napreljac’s physical abilities. In 2002, Napreljac purchased and remodeled a home. Napreljac testified he hired others to perform the bulk of the work for him and performed no work that would have violated restrictions imposed upon him while he was at JQH. While Sadifa Napreljac, Plaintiffs wife, recalled that he put siding on the house and helped build its front porch, she testified that those Napreljac hired performed most of the work. In addition to helping his wife operate a grocery store, Napreljac also performed construction work on the home where he now lives. While working on this house, Napreljac “tried doing what he [could]” and “[didn’t] understand that there are things he cannot do.” Sadifa Napreljac Dep. 45:10-16; see also Pl.’s Dep. 49:10-11, Feb. 8, 2006 (containing Napreljac’s confession that he did “[a]s much as [he] could on the whole house”). Napreljac helped pour concrete for the home’s driveway and did around sixty percent of the masonry work. He installed stone on the outside of the house and, with help, installed stones around the home’s three fireplaces. With the aid of a machine, he mixed mortar for the fireplaces but manually carried mortar to the location it was needed. For around nine months after his termination from JQH, Napreljac worked at another Des Moines hotel known as the 14th Street Inn. He was hired as a maintenance worker, but his role was supervisory in nature. Still, he attempted to help those he supervised as much as possible. Napreljac’s duties there were more physically demanding than his job at JQH. For example, Napreljac testified that as part of a remodeling project, he replaced drywall and painted. He did not lift or carry furniture because he was not capable of that task. At the time of his February 2006 deposition, Napreljac worked for a company located in the Des Moines area which delivered boxes of medications to pharmacies. Napreljac testified this job required him to lift boxes, but he was not able to estimate their weight. As of February 2006, Na-preljac had no medical restrictions limiting his ability to lift, but he attributes that to his lack of medical insurance, prognosticating that if he returned to a physician, he would receive restrictions. D. Napreljac’s Command of the English Language. There is considerable debate in the record regarding Napreljac’s ability to communicate in English. This disagreement is arguably relevant to Napreljac’s claims that he was terminated as a result of his national origin. Bosnian — not English — is Napreljac’s native language. However, JQH employees have consistently maintained that Na-preljac has a reasonable command of the English language. Schmeling, for example, testified that Napreljac “had a very good command of the English language,” “could understand English,” and was able to communicate effectively with JQH employees as part of the investigation leading to his termination. Schmeling Dep. 70:8— 21. Beaver testified Napreljac “had a good understanding of the English language.” Beaver Dep. 54:5-55:6. Other employees generally supported these views. E.g., Johnston Dep. 56:12-57:2; Def.’s App. 289 (containing a “New Employee Progress Report” indicating Na-preljac “has excellent English skills”); Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bureau Hr’g Tr. 27:14-19 (containing testimony from an unidentified JQH representative who “[was] not sure of the limit of his vocabulary!; b]ut as far as simple sentences and structure and understanding employee documents, yes,” he could understand English). Additionally, a transcription prepared by a physician following Napreljac’s 2001 injury reveals his treating physician’s opinion that he had “a good command of the English language and there did not seem to be any real difficulties in understanding and communicating.” Def.’s App. 184. Napreljac’s personal assessment of his abilities is more limited. He declares he “ha[s] trouble understanding legal concepts in English.” Napreljac Aff. ¶ 4, June 15, 2006. He claims that some words used in the accident report precipitating his termination were “confusing because of [his] limited abilities to communicate in English.” Id. ¶ 8. He also points to an errata sheet completed following a deposition where he indicated he did not fully understand a question posed. Napreljac testified he often requires an interpreter because he does not speak English well enough to communicate effectively. The record shows Napreljac required an interpreter to secure a bank loan but not to converse with potential employers about employment opportunities. Napreljac speaks English at his delivery job and spoke English while employed at the 14th Street Inn, and no interpreter was supplied at either job. JQH notes Napreljac denied needing an interpreter while at JQH, and that he actually spoke English well enough to serve as an interpreter for other Bosnian-speaking employees. Napreljac was able to read portions of employment application materials and a medical record written in English at his deposition. JQH further claims Napreljac spoke with newspaper reporters writing a story about one of his homes without an interpreter present. The resulting article extensively quoted Napreljac speaking in English. See Def.’s App. 287-288. Napreljac’s ability to speak English is thus an issue of considerable debate. III. Procedural History of This Litigation. On March 22, 2004, Napreljac filed complaints with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging discrimination based on disability, race, and national origin. Napreljac filed this action in the Iowa district court on December 8, 2004, which JQH removed to this Court on March 21, 2005. Napreljac does not separate his allegations into counts, but his claims are easily collected into four topics. But see Fed. R.Civ.P. 10(b) (“Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence ... shall be stated in a separate count ... whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.”). He first claims JQH discriminated against him on the basis of a disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Second, he alleges JQH discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin. Third, Napreljac alleges he was discharged in violation of public policy because he was terminated as a result of past and future workers’ compensation claims. Fourth, he accuses JQH of committing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each side has pending motions. Beginning with Napreljac’s, he claims entitlement to summary judgment on his disability discrimination and discharge in violation of public policy claims. In addition to seeking dismissal of Napreljac’s action in its entirety for alleged discovery abuses, JQH claims entitlement to summary judgment on each of Napreljac’s causes of action. DISCUSSION I. JQH’s Motion to Dismiss. JQH first moves to dismiss Napreljac’s action in its entirety, asserting the existence of a pattern of deceit in papers produced and testimony presented by Na-preljac, coupled with a pervasive “foot-dragging” strategy employed by Naprel-jac in disclosing information ultimately proven to be harmful to his position. Dismissal is urged because Napreljac’s conduct allegedly amounts to an “abuse of the judicial process.” JQH has presented no intermediate remedy between denying its motion and dismissing Napreljac’s case. Resisting, Napreljac agrees that “mistakes” have occurred in certain answers to discovery requests propounded by JQH but claims to have diligently supplemented responses and answered truthfully when deposed about sectors of the record JQH alleges contain false statements. A. Legal Standards for Sanctions for “Abuse of the Judicial Process.” JQH seeks dismissal of Napreljac’s action as an exercise of the Court’s inherent powers. The United States Supreme Court, commenting on the scope of inherent powers vested in federal courts, has noted that “[bjecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (“Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”). “A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123; accord Stevenson v. Union P. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir.2004); Keefer v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 238 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir.2000). As a result, the scope of sanctions is a matter typically committed to the discretion of district courts. Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 745-46; Martin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 251 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir.2001); Keefer, 238 F.3d at 940-41; Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 268 (8th Cir.1993). Assessing attorneys fees, Gas Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard Avista Energy, LLC, 458 F.3d 733, 739 (8th Cir.2006); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123; Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 751; Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 352 (8th Cir.2003), and imposing adverse inference jury instructions at trial, Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 746-50, are available remedies against a party abusing the judicial process. Dismissal of an action, a “particularly severe,” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (discussing Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765, 100 S.Ct. 2455), or “harsh” sanction, Keefer, 238 F.3d at 941, may be appropriate only after careful scrutiny of the record and a demonstration of truly “dilatory and contumacious conduct,” Keefer, 238 F.3d at 941, “because ‘ “the opportunity to be heard is a litigant’s most precious right and should be sparingly denied,” ’ ” Keefer, 238 F.3d at 940-41 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 186 F.3d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir.1999), in turn quoting Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir.1977)); accord Martin, 251 F.3d at 694. See generally Lindstedt v. City of Granby, 238 F.3d 933, 937 (8th Cir.2000) (collecting cases placing dismissal of an action within a court’s discretion). Exercising caution before euthanizing plaintiffs’ causes of action has grown from an essential and strong policy of deciding cases on their merits and against depriving individuals of an opportunity to present evidence in court. Carey, 186 F.3d at 1022 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, 522 U.S. 222, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)). Occasionally, however, a party’s conduct is so egregious as to warrant extinguishing that opportunity. See Keefer, 238 F.3d at 941 (dismissal appropriate when plaintiff willfully destroyed evidence undermining his credibility in the face of an oral court order and multiple discovery requests compelling its disclosure); Carey, 186 F.3d at 1020-22 (striking defendants’ pleadings, placing defendants in default, where “defendants repeatedly lied during the discovery process [by] denying the existence of conversations and documents which had in fact occurred and did exist,” and thus “seriously threatened the integrity of the trial as well as the judicial process in general”); Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 984 (8th Cir.1992) (affirming dismissal upon a finding that “manufactured evidence and perjured testimony had been introduced in an attempt to enhance the [plaintiffs] case through fraudulent conduct”); cf. Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 733-34 & n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (noting the “generous” decision of a district court which imposed attorneys’ fees and costs instead of striking the defendants’ pleadings after defendants failed to provide a list of officials involved in alleged civil rights violations of prisoners and failed to produce (and later lost) a videotape of the incident giving rise to litigation).- B. Discussion. Relying principally upon Martin v. Da-imlerChrysler Corp., JQH claims Naprel-jac’s conduct warrants dismissal. In Martin, the Eighth Circuit upheld the sanction of dismissal after the plaintiff engaged in “severe discovery abuses.” Martin, 251 F.3d at 692. There, the plaintiff brought a Title VII action in federal court in Missouri “alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation.” Id. at 692-93. During discovery, the defendant took the plaintiffs deposition and served her with interrogatories. Id. at 693. At her deposition, the plaintiff “twice testified that she had never been a party to another lawsuit, specifically denying that she had been involved in any litigation” against employers preceding the defendant. Id. The defendant subsequently learned the plaintiff had sued her former employer in two separate actions in Oklahoma “for sexual harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination.” Id. The defendant discovered the plaintiff “had retained several different attorneys to represent her” in her previous actions, “and appeared in person at a case management conference” in one such action. Id. The defendant’s interrogatories required the plaintiff to identify mental health professionals providing treatment for mental distress or other harm alleged caused by the defendant. Id. The plaintiff listed some providers in Saint Louis, Missouri. Id. The plaintiff later confirmed the list was an exhaustive collection of providers who had ever provided treatment for emotional distress and other mental problems. Id. The defendant then learned the plaintiff had received counseling and other treatment by mental health care providers in Oklahoma in connection with divorce and child custody proceedings. Id. Based on these “false discovery responses,” the defendant filed a motion for sanctions, seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint. Id. At oral argument, the plaintiff “admitted she had spoken to one of her Oklahoma attorneys, but had foggy or no recollections of the other two [attorneys], and of her appearance at the case management conference,” id. at 693-94, and “repeatedly claimed she had no knowledge of or involvement in the Oklahoma lawsuits.” Id. at 694. As a result of these discovery abuses, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs claims with prejudice. Id. Finding evidence that the plaintiff “gave perju-rious answers during her deposition and in her interrogatory responses” and concluding the plaintiffs “argument that she failed to understand that she was required to disclose [health care providers] who examined her in the course of her divorce proceedings [was] entirely without merit,” the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 694-95. JQH argues that because Napreljac’s conduct is analogous, the conclusion should be the same. The “pattern of deceit” JQH claims to have unearthed is divisible into three topics: concealment of Napreljac’s criminal history, which, JQH argues, “bears on his emotional and mental condition, as well as JQH’s defense of after-acquired evidence”; concealment of Napreljac’s “past problems with depression”; and “lie[s] about his work history.” Beginning with Napreljac’s criminal history, JQH argues “Napreljac swore in his interrogatory responses that he had no arrests or convictions,” when in fact he had been “arrested and convicted multiple times.” This involves an interrogatory from JQH that inquired whether “Plaintiff [has] ever been arrested or convicted of any crime(s) since January 1, 1995, to the present”; Napreljac answered “[n]o.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog. #8. This answer is untrue. Since January 1995, Napreljac has been convicted at least three times of operating while intoxicated and has been arrested for harassment and domestic assault. See Def.’s Supp.App. 1-10. JQH points to the following exchange at Napreljac’s deposition as evidence he has not been forthcoming regarding his criminal history: Q: Other than the two times you’ve been arrested for drunk driving in the State of Iowa, have you been arrested for anything else? A: I was not. Q: So the answer is you’ve never been arrested for anything other than the two drunk driving arrests you’ve just mentioned, correct? A: Correct. Q: Sir, do you recall having been convicted of a third drunk driving situation? A: I remember, yes. Pl.’s Dep. 123:18-124:2; 126:11-14, Feb. 8, 2006. Napreljac also agreed with the position that “there might be more arrests out there, [he] just can’t remember what they were.” Pl.’s Dep. 128:7-11, Feb. 8, 2006. He later recalled his harassment and domestic assault arrests. In his resistance, Napreljac concedes he answered JQH’s interrogatory incorrectly. However, he contends he “did not maintain his denial in a manner that could be described as a pattern of abuse or continual misrepresentation.” For example, he notes he admitted prior arrests and convictions at his deposition and provided JQH with supplemental discovery responses, including his criminal history drawn from an online database. Napreljac has also signed a release permitting JQH to obtain any of his records maintained at the Iowa Department of Corrections. At his deposition he explained the deficiencies to his interrogatory responses as follows: Q: Sir, why didn’t you tell us about the arrests or convictions that we’ve just been discussing in response to [interrogatory number eight]? A: Because at the time I was answering these questions my children were translating this to me, and they don’t understand the law so they didn’t know whether that was a crime or not. Pl.’s Dep. 131:15-24, Feb. 8, 2006. This explanation is consistent with other portions of his deposition. See, e.g., Pl.’s Dep. 101:12-20, Feb. 8, 2006. Second, JQH claims Napreljac concealed information about past mental health problems in an effort to maximize damages arising from his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. JQH argues that while Napreljac disclosed the identities of those who treated him for physical injuries sustained while working at JQH, he failed to identify professionals provided treating bearing on his emotional and mental health. Specifically, JQH argues Na-preljac failed to disclose treatment he received from a Dr. Majed W. Barazanji, who performed a physical on Napreljac in September 2005. Compare Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog. # 11 (omitting Dr. Bara-zanji from an interrogatory answer requiring Napreljac to disclose any “doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, therapist, general health practitioner, and/or any other