Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MORROW, District Judge. On December 23, 2005, Saro Daghlian commenced this putative class action against DeVry University, Inc., DeVry Inc., and Does 1 through 100 (collectively, “DeVry” or “defendants”) in state court. Daghlian alleges that defendants failed to inform students, including him, that academic units earned at DeVry probably would not transfer to other educational institutions, and that students who sought further education elsewhere would have to earn the units anew. Daghlian filed a first amended complaint on January 11, 2006, which asserted four causes of action: (1) violations of the California Education Code; (2) violations of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (3) false advertising in violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq.; and (4) unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. Defendants removed the action to federal court on February 17, 2006. They now move to dismiss all causes of action in plaintiffs first amended complaint. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The first amended complaint contains the following factual allegations, which are accepted as true for purposes of this motion: Defendant DeVry University provides career-oriented undergraduate and graduate degree programs in technology, business, and management. In addition to an online program, it offers courses at seventy-five locations, including nine campuses in California. Defendant DeVry Inc. is one of the largest publicly held for-profit higher education companies in North America. It is the holding company for DeVry University and a number of other educational institutions. Plaintiff Saro Daghlian was a student at DeVry University from April 2002 until October 2005, attending the Electronics Computer Technology program at the West Hills Campus. Prior to enrolling, Daghlian met with a DeVry recruiter, who represented that DeVry was an accredited college where students were able to obtain degrees. The recruiter told Daghlian that unlike technical colleges that give students certificates that cannot be used towards advanced degrees, academic credits from DeVry were transferrable to a wide variety of other academic institutions. The recruiter did not give Daghlian any documents explaining that DeVry credits were not likely to be accepted by other colleges, and that he would have to start his education over if he chose to attend another college. In reliance on DeVry’s representations, Daghlian signed an enrollment agreement in the presence of the recruiter. He has since incurred approximately $40,000.00 of educational debt. II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard Governing Motions To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed.R.CivProc. 12(b)(6). A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir.1989). For this reason, a court should not dismiss a complaint if it states a claim under any legal theory, even if a plaintiff erroneously relies on a different theory. Haddock v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 777 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir.1985). In other words, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court’s review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint. See Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir.1996); Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir.1995). The court may also consider material that is properly submitted as part of the complaint or that is a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir.2003); Gumataotao v. Director of Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 236 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir.2001); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). The court must accept plaintiffs factual allegations as true, and construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.1996); Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1995). It need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981). B. First Cause Of Action Alleging Education Code Violations Daghlian’s first cause of action alleges that defendants failed to comply with various provisions of the Private Postsecond-ary and Vocational Education Reform Act of 1989 (the “Reform Act”), which is part of the California Education Code. Daghlian contends that defendants violated Education Code § 94816(b) by failing to provide written notification to students that credits earned at DeVry would probably not transfer to other colleges or universities. He also asserts that, as part of their recruiting effort, defendants actively misled students to believe that the credits would transfer to other institutions, in violation of Education Code § 94832. Finally, Daghlian alleges that defendants breached Education Code § 94814, which requires that institutions give students and other interested persons, prior to enrollment, a brochure or catalogue that sets forth all material facts that are reasonably likely to affect their decision to enroll. 1. Whether Plaintiff Has A Private Right Of Action To Sue For Violation Of Education Code §§ 94814, 94816, And 94832 Defendants argue that Daghlian lacks standing to enforce Education Code §§ 94814, 94816, and 94832, because these sections are not listed in § 94985(b), the Reform Act provision that confers a private right of action to sue for violations of specific sections of the act. Defendants contend that in amending § 94985, the California Legislature “expressly chose to exclude a private right of action as a remedy for violations of Sections 94814, 94816, and 94832,” and therefore that Daghlian’s first cause of action must be dismissed. Daghlian disputes this, focusing on § 94985(b)(6). That section states: “Notwithstanding any provision of the contract or agreement, a student may bring an action for a violation of this article or for an institution’s failure to perform its legal obligations and, upon prevailing thereon, is entitled to the recovery of damages, equitable relief, or any other relief authorized by this article, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal. Educ. Code § 94985(b)(6). Based on the legislative history of § 94985, the purpose of the Reform Act and subsequent amendments, Daghlian contends that this provision should have been subdivision (c), and that its placement under subdivision (b) was a legislative drafting error. He asks that the court overlook this “blatant” error, and find that he has a private right of action to sue under Education Code §§ 94814, 94816, and 94832. a. Principles Of Statutory Construction The parties have not cited, nor has the court found, any case that directly addresses the question presented here. To resolve the issue, therefore, the court must interpret the pertinent provisions of the Reform Act, following California’s rules of statutory construction. See In re First T.D. & Inv., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 527 (9th Cir.2001) (“With the exception of the bankruptcy and district courts below, no state or federal court has had occasion to interpret [Cal. Prof. & Bus.Code] § 10233.2. We therefore apply California’s rules of statutory construction,” citing Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Butler, 904 F.2d 505, 510 (9th Cir.1990) (applying California’s rules of statutory construction to interpret California Civil Code § 877)); In re Anderson, 824 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir.1987) (“We can find no relevant California cases which discuss the problems raised in this appeal. We are bound by California rules of construction in our independent interpretation of the California statutes at issue, however”). See also Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir.1986) (“Where the state’s highest court has not decided an issue, the task of the federal courts is to predict how the state high court would resolve it”). Under California law, “the ‘ultimate task’ in statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain the legislature’s intent.’ ” In re First T.D. & Inv., 253 F.3d at 527 (quoting People v. Massie, 19 Cal.4th 550, 569, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113, 119 S.Ct. 1759, 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999)). See also S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 336 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir.2003) (“‘Of primary importance the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law,’ ” quoting San Diego Union v. City Council, 146 Cal.App.3d 947, 953-54, 196 Cal.Rptr. 45 (1983) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. San Diego Community College Dist., 28 Cal.3d 692, 697, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856 (1981) (“In construing a statute ‘we begin with the fundamental rule that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law’ ” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Generally, “ ‘the words of the statute provide the most reliable indication of legislative intent.’ ” In re First T.D. & Inv., 253 F.3d at 527 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1152, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291 (1997)). In interpreting the words of a statute, a court “should give the language ... ‘its usual, ordinary import and accord[] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” Id. (quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-87, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 (1987)). See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.3d 402, 407, 267 Cal.Rptr. 589, 787 P.2d 996 (1990) (“ ‘[I]n arriving at the meaning of a [[statutory or] constitutional provision], consideration must be given to the words employed, giving to every word, clause and sentence their ordinary meaning,’ ” quoting State Board of Educ. v. Levit, 52 Cal.2d 441, 462, 343 P.2d 8 (1959)); Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 28 Cal.3d at 697, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856 (“An equally basic rule of statutory construction is, however, that courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). (“[W]here the language of a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one of which in application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted.” Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. State of Cal., 108 Cal.App.3d 307, 313-14, 166 Cal.Rptr. 489 (1980) (citations and internal quotations omitted)). If the meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, “a court may consider extrinsic evidence of the legislature’s intent, ‘including the statutory scheme of which the provision is a part, the history and background of the statute, the apparent purpose, and any considerations of constitutionality.’” In re First T.D. & Inv., 253 F.3d at 527 (quoting Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural Exam’rs, 17 Cal.4th 763, 776, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641 (1998)). If, on the other hand, “the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the statutory analysis ends.” Viceroy Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482, 490 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.3d 785, 800, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934 (1990)) (“When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it ” (internal citations omitted, emphasis original)). See also Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 Cal.3d at 407, 267 Cal.Rptr. 589, 787 P.2d 996 (“If doubts and ambiguities remain then, and only then, are we warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid.... When, however, ‘the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature..(citations omitted)). This “ ‘plain meaning’ rule does not, [however,] prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is consistent with other provisions of the statute.” Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 (1988). The meaning of a statute should be construed in context, and the various parts of the statutory enactment should be harmonized to the extent possible. Id.; see Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224 (1973) (“When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear. Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, “[l]iteral construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute.” Lungren, 45 Cal.3d at 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299. With these principles in mind, the court turns to the language of the statute. b. The Reform Act In enacting the Reform Act, the California legislature sought “to promote the effective integration of private postsecond-ary education into all aspects of California’s educational system and to foster and improve the educational programs and services of these institutions while protecting the citizens of the state from fraudulent or substandard operations.” Cal. Educ. Code § 94705. It also intended “to provide for the protection, education, welfare of citizens of California, its postsecondary education institutions, and its students by providing for all of the following: (a) Ensuring minimum standards of instructional quality and institutional stability for all students in all types of institutions and thereby encouraging the recognition by public and private institutions of completed coursework and degrees and diplomas issued by private institutions, to the end that students will be provided equal opportunities for equal accomplishment and ability. (b) Establishing minimum standards concerning the quality of education, ethical and business practices, health and safety, and fiscal responsibility to provide protection against substandard, transient, unethical, deceptive, or fraudulent institutions and practices. (d) Prohibiting misleading literature, advertising, solicitation, or representations by private educational institutions or their agents. (f) Protecting the consumer and students against fraud, misrepresentation, or other practices that may lead to an improper loss of funds paid for educational costs, whether financed through personal resources or state and federal student financial aid. (h) Recognizing and encouraging quality nongovernmental accreditation, while not ceding to that or any other nongovernmental process the responsibility for state oversight for purposes of approval, if the accreditation process fails either to protect minimum standards of quality or to acknowledge legitimate innovative methods in post-secondary education....” Id. The Reform Act defines “private postsec-ondary education institutions” as “any person doing business in California that offers to provide or provides, for a tuition, fee, or other charge, any instruction, training, or education” under certain specified circumstances. Id., § 94739(a). The Act creates a Bureau for Private Postsecondary and Vocational Education (the “Bureau”) in the Department of Consumer Affairs, which is charged with the duty of “approving and regulating private postsecondary educational institutions.” Id., § 94770. See also id., § 94774 (detailing the Bureau’s functions and responsibilities). The Reform Act is codified in the Education Code, Title 3, Division 10, Part 59, Chapter 7. Article 6, which encompasses Education Code §§ 94800 through 94848, is titled “General Standards for All Post-secondary Institutions Approved Under This Chapter.” Section 94800 requires that all institutions comply with certain minimum standards — specifically, that they remain financially capable of fulfilling commitments to students; that they award students appropriate degrees, diplomas, or certificates upon satisfactory completion of training; and that they provide instruction as part of their educational program. Id., § 94800. Section 94814 mandates that institutions “provide to students and other interested persons, prior to enrollment, a catalog[ue] or brochure containing ... all ... material facts concerning the institution and the program or course of instruction that are reasonably likely to affect the decision of the student to enroll, as prescribed by rules and regulations adopted by the [Bureau].” Id., § 94814(a). Failure to disclose this information renders a written contract between the institution and a student unenforceable. Id., § 94814(b). Section 94816 requires that “[e]ach institution offering a degree program designed to prepare students for a particular vocation, trade, or career field and each institution subject to Article 7 (commencing with Section 94850) ... provide to each prospective student a statement in at least 12-point type that contains the following [language]: ‘NOTICE CONCERNING TRANSFERABILITY OF UNITS AND DEGREES EARNED AT OUR SCHOOL Units you earn in our __(fill in name of program) program in most cases will probably not be transferable to any other college or university. For example, if you entered our school as a freshman, you will still be a freshman if you enter another college or university at some time in the future even though you earned units here at our school. In addition, if you earn a degree, diploma, or certificate in our __ (fill in name of program) program, in most cases it will probably not serve as a basis for obtaining a higher level degree at another college or university.’ ” Id., § 94816. This disclosure must be signed by both the student and the institution, and dated. Id. Section 94832 prohibits institutions and their representatives from “makfing] or causing] to be made any statement that is in any manner untrue or misleading, either by actual statement, omission, or intimation.” Id., § 94832(a). It also requires that “[n]o institution or representative of an institution ... engage in any false, deceptive, misleading, or unfair act in connection with any matter, including the institution’s advertising and promotion, the recruitment of students for enrollment in the institution, the offer or sale of a program of instruction, course length, course credits, the withholding of equipment, educational materials, or loan or grant funds from a student, training and instruction, the collection of payments, or job placement.” Id., § 94832(b). c. Section 94985 Article 13 is titled “Administrative and Judicial Procedures.” Sections 94965 and 94975 of the article govern administrative actions. Id., § 94950(a). “Sections 94952 and 94955 authorize the Bureau and the Attorney General to seek various forms of judicial relief in order to enforce this chapter.” Id., § 94950(d). Section 94985, the provision at the center of the parties’ dispute, “authorizes civil remedies for individual students in addition to those available under other provisions of law.” Id., § 94985(f). Subdivision (a) declares that “[a]ny institution that willfully violates any provision of Section 94800, 94810, 94814, or 94816, Sections 94820 to 94826, inclusive, Section 94829, 94831, or 94832 may not enforce any contract or agreement arising from the transaction in which the violation occurred, and any willful violation is a ground for revoking an approval to operate in this state or for denying a renewal application.” Id., § 94985(a). Subdivision (b) gives a private right of action to “[a]ny person who claims that an institution is operating in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, or Section 94915, or [that] an institution is operating a branch or satellite campus in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94857.” Id., § 94985(b) (stating that such person “may bring an action, in a court of competent jurisdiction, for the recovery of actual and or statutory damages as well as an equity proceeding to restrain and enjoin those violations, or both”). The cited provisions require institutions to secure Bureau approval before operating or granting degrees in the state. A prospective plaintiff who intends to sue under § 94985(b) must satisfy various pre-suit notice requirements. Paragraph (b)(1) requires that anyone intending to sue give notice to, and make a demand on, the institution at least thirty-five days pri- or to filing an action alleging violation of §§ 94831(a), 94900(a), 94915, or 94857(a). See id., § 94985(b)(1). It also requires that the prospective plaintiff give the Bureau notice of intent to sue. The institution may avoid suit by filing an application for Bureau approval within thirty days of receiving notice. If a suit if filed, however, and the court finds that the institution has violated any of §§ 94831(a), 94900(a), 94915, or 94857(a), it must grant certain remedies specified in subdivision (b)(2). See id, § 94985(b)(2). Paragraph (b)(3) declares that “[a]ny violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of 94900, Section 94915, and subdivision (a) of Section 94857 shall constitute an unfair business practice within the meaning of Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code.” Id., § 94985(b)(3). Paragraph (b)(4) provides that a certification from the Bureau that the institution has not been approved gives rise to “a conclusive presumption that the institution has violated this subdivision.” Id., § 94985(b)(4). Paragraph (b)(5) states that “[a]ll fines and other monetary amounts that an institution is ordered to pay pursuant to this subdivision may be collected from the institution itself and from the individuals who own the institution, whether or not the institution is organized as a corporation.” Id., § 94985(b)(5). Finally, paragraph (b)(6) provides: “Notwithstanding any provision of the contract or agreement, a student may bring an action for a violation of this article or for an institution’s failure to perform its legal obligations and, upon prevailing thereon, is entitled to the recovery of damages, equitable relief, or any other relief authorized by this article, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Id., § 94985(b)(6). Section 94985 has no subdivision (c). The section contains eight additional subdivisions, (d) through (k). d. Analysis Defendants argues that subdivision (b) of § 94985 creates a private right of action only for violations of §§ 94831(a), 94900(a), 94915, 94857(a), and that Daghlian’s action is barred as a consequence. They contend the fact that the legislature specifically cited §§ 94814, 94816, and 94832 in subdivision (a) “vitiates any claims that the Legislature inadvertently failed to provide a remedy for these sections” in subdivision (b). Defendants assert the inclusion of § 94831 in both subdivisions (a) and (b) is evidence that “if the Legislature had intended to provide a private and public right of action for violations of Sections 94814, 94816 and 94832 of the Reform Act, it” could have done so, and “would have treated these sections in the same way that it treated Section 94831.” Daghlian counters that “[a] plain reading of the legislation demonstrates, without a doubt, that the relocation of a student’s private right of action as section 94985(b)(6) rather than section 94985(c) was inadvertent drafting error.” He contends that paragraph (b)(6)’s use of the word “article” shows that it is an “omnibus” clause that reflects a legislative intent to afford students a private right of action to enforce any provision of the Reform Act. Daghlian argues that the legislative history of Assembly Bill 201, which amended § 94985 in 2001, supports this interpretation. He asserts that the purpose of A.B. 201 was to reform certain aspects of California’s Student Tuition Recovery Fund, and that nothing in the legislative history suggests that the bill “was [designed] to eradicate, minimize or even change substantive student rights.” Daghlian contends that limiting students’ private right of action to §§ 94831(a), 94900(a), 94915, and 94857(a) would undermine the purpose of A.B. 201 and the objectives of the Reform Act. He also maintains that defendants’ construction creates internal inconsistencies in the legislative scheme and that if the provision governing students’ private right of action is denominated paragraph (b)(6) rather than subdivision (c), subdivisions (d), (g), (h), (k), and the rest of subdivision (b) would be meaningless. i. Language Of § 94985(b)(6) A plain reading of § 94985(b)(6) indicates that the California legislature intended to grant students a broad private right of action. Without specifying particular sections of the Reform Act, the provision authorizes students to bring suit to enforce “a violation of this article or [to redress] ... an institution’s failure to perform its legal obligations.” Cal. Educ. Code § 94985(b)(6). This right cannot be waived; students may sue “Notwithstanding any provision of a contract or agreement.” Id. In addition, the provision affords students a wide range of remedies, including legal damages, equitable relief, attorneys’ fees, “or any other relief authorized by this article.” Id. Defendants urge a narrower construction of paragraph (b)(6). Emphasizing the phrase “Notwithstanding any provision of a contract or agreement,” they argue that the provision means only that “clauses in contracts that seek to void all private claims under the Education Code ... are against public policy.” Defendants take the opening clause out of context. The balance of the paragraph clearly provides that students may bring an action for “a violation of this article or an institution’s failure to perform its legal obligations.” Id. See Dyna-Med, Inc., 43 Cal.3d at 1386-87, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 (in construing a statute, a court should “accord[ ] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose”). Paragraph (b)(6)’s use of the word “article” stands in stark contrast to prior paragraphs’ references to specific “subdivisions.” See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code §§ 94985(b)(1)(A) (plaintiff must “[njotify the institution alleged to have violated subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857, of the particular alleged violations”), 94985(b)(4) (“A certification, issued by the bureau ... shall establish a conclusive presumption that the institution has violated this subdivision ” (emphasis added)), 94985(b)(5) (“All fines and other monetary amounts that an institution is ordered to pay pursuant to this subdivision may be collected from the institution itself and from the individuals who own the institution, whether or not the institution is organized as a corporation” (emphasis added)). The use of the open-ended phrase “or an institution’s failure to perform its legal obligations” also distinguishes paragraph (b)(6) from prior paragraphs, all of which make clear that they address only an institution’s operation without Bureau approval in violation of §§ 94831(a), 94900, 94915, or 94857(a). See id., § 94985(b). The repetition of the phrase, “subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857” in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5), and its absence from paragraph (b)(6), strongly suggests that the California legislature did not intend to limit the applicability of paragraph (b)(6) to private claims under these particular sections. See, e.g., id., §§ 94985(b)(1)(A) (plaintiff must “[njotify the institution alleged to have violated “subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857 of the particular alleged violations”), 94985(b)(1)(B) (same), 94985(b)(1)(C) (same), 94985(b)(1)(E) (same), 94985(b)(1)(F) (same), 94985(b)(1)(G) (same), 94985(b)(2) (same), 94985(b)(2)(B) (same), 94985(b)(2)(E) (same), 94985(b)(3) (same), 94985(b)(4) (same). ii. Context Of § 94985 Reading § 94985 in context also supports Daghlian’s position that the private right of action provision should have been denominated subdivision (c), rather than paragraph (b)(6). See Lungren, 45 Cal.3d at 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 (“The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible,” citing Dyna-Med, Inc., 43 Cal.3d at 1386-87, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323. Like paragraph (b)(6), subdivisions (e) through (k) are relatively broad in scope, referring to causes of actions under “this section” or “this article.” Subdivision (e), for example, confirms that “[t]he remedies provided in this article supplement, but do not supplant, the remedies provided under any other provision of law.” Cal. Educ. Code § 94985(e) (emphasis added). Subdivision (f) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions “brought under this section.” Id., § 94985(f) (emphasis added). See also id., §§ 94985(g) (referring to “any right or remedy ” (emphasis added)), 94985(h) (governing the assignment of any “cause of action for a violation of this article ” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, like paragraph (b)(6), many of these subdivisions address suits by “students,” in contrast to paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5), which concern suits by “any person.” Subdivision (g), for example, declares void and unenforceable “[a]ny provision in any agreement that purports to require a student to invoke any grievance dispute procedure established by the institution.... ” Id., § 94985(g) (emphasis added). Similarly, subdivision (h) provides that “[a] student may assign his or her cause of action for a violation of this article to the bureau, or to any state or federal agency that guaranteed or reinsured a loan for the student or that provided any grant or other financial aid.” Id., § 94985(h) (emphasis added). Subdivision (k) of § 94985 sets forth certain notification requirements for students who bring an action against an institution. It provides: “If a student commences an action or asserts any claim in an existing action for recovery on behalf of a class of persons, or on behalf of the general public, under Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code, the student shall notify the bureau of the existence of the lawsuit, the court in which the action is pending, the case number of the action, and the date of the filing of the action or of the assertion of the claim. The student shall notify the bureau as required by this subdivision within 30 days of the filing of the action or of the first assertion of the claim, whichever is later. The student shall also notify the court that he or she has notified the bureau pursuant to this subdivision. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no judgment may be entered pursuant to this section until the student has notified the bureau of the suit and notified the court that the bureau has been notified. This subdivision only applies to a new action filed or to a new claim asserted on or after January 1, 2002.” Id., § 94985(k). Plaintiff argues that defendants’ proposed construction of the statute, which would limit students’ private right of action to violations of §§ 94831(a), 94900, 94915(a), and 94857(a), would render subdivision (k) meaningless. The court agrees. Subdivision (b) sets forth a detailed pre-suit notification procedure that must be followed by a party who wishes to sue for violation of §§ 94831(a), 94900, 94915(a), and 94857(a). Subparagraph (b)(1) requires that, “[a]t least 35 days prior to the commencement of an action pursuant to this subdivision,” “[a]ny person,” including a student, who intends to sue must notify the institution of “the particular alleged violations,” and “[d]emand that the institution apply for the bureau’s approval to operate as required by subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857, whichever is applicable.” Id, §§ 94985(b)(1)(A), 94985(b)(1)(B). This notice must “be in writing, and ... be sent by regular mail and certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to the location of the institution that is allegedly operating in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857, whichever is applicable.” Id, § 94985(b)(1)(C). The institution then has thirty working days “from the receipt of the notice, to file an application for approval to operate with the bureau.” Id, § 94985(b)(1)(D). If, “within 30 working days after receipt of the notice, [it] applies for the bureau’s approval to operate as required by subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857,” the plaintiff is barred from bringing suit. Id, § 94985(b)(1)(E). If, however, “within 35 days after receipt of the notice, the bureau has not received an application from the institution, the bureau shall mail the plaintiff a certification that the institution has not applied or been approved to operate pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857.” Id, § 94985(b)(1)(F). Such certification “establish[es] a conclusive presumption that the institution has violated this subdivision.” Id, § 94985(b)(4). The prospective plaintiff must also “notify the bureau by mail and by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, that he or she intends to bring an action pursuant to this section against the institution.” Id, § 94985(b)(1)(G). Upon receipt of this notice, the Bureau must investigate the institution’s compliance or noncompliance with the approval provisions. See id (“Upon receipt of this notice, the bureau shall immediately investigate the institution’s compliance with subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857, whichever is applicable ... ”). If the investigation reveals “that the institution has violated the applicable section, the bureau shall immediately order the institution to cease and desist operations.” Id An institution that “continues to operate in violation of the bureau’s cease and desist order” can be fined $1,000 per day. Id Subdivision (b) allows an institution to avoid a suit for violation of §§ 94831(a), 94900(a), 94915, or § 94857(a), by applying for Bureau approval within thirty days of notification. It also imposes a responsibility on the Bureau to determine whether the institution has complied with the approval provision in question. These provisions make sense, as §§ 94831(a), 94900(a), 94915, and § 94857(a) all concern an institution’s obligation to obtain approval from the Bureau, not duties owed to students or other persons. Furthermore, because an institution’s failure to obtain approval from the Bureau before conducting operations affects all of its students, subdivision (b) requires that a -court that finds a violation “order the institution to cease all operations.” Id, § 94985(b)(2)(A). In addition, the court must “order the institution to pay all students who enrolled while the school was in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, or subdivision (a) of Section 94857 a refund of all tuition and fees paid to the institution and a statutory penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000).” Id., § 94985(b)(2)(B). In contrast to the notice provisions set forth in subdivision (b), subdivision (k) requires a student who “commences an action or asserts any claim in an existing action for recovery on behalf of a class of persons, or on behalf of the general public, under Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code” to inform the Bureau of the action. Id., § 94985(k). If, as defendants contend, a student’s private right of action is restricted to claims that an institution violated §§ 94831(a), 94900(a), 94915, and § 94857(a), there would have been no need for the legislature to have enacted subdivision (k). See id., § 94985(b)(1) (governing actions in which a “person ... claims that an institution is operating in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, or Section 94915, or an institution is operating a branch or satellite campus in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94857”); see also id., § 94985(b)(3) (“Any violation of subdivision (a) of Section 94831, subdivision (a) of Section 94900, Section 94915, and subdivision (a) of Section 94857 shall constitute an unfair business practice within the meaning of Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code”). Moreover, the notification requirements in subdivision (k) conflict with those in subdivision (b). Paragraph (b)(1) requires that a prospective plaintiff notify the Bureau that he or she “intends to” commence an action against an institution. Id., § 98945(b)(1)(G). Although the paragraph does not specify a time limit, its use of the phrase “intends to” indicates that such notice must be given prior to filing suit. Subdivision (k), by contrast, states that “[i]f a student commences an action or asserts any claim in an existing action” under § 17200, he or she must inform Bureau of the existence of the lawsuit “within 30 days of the filing of the action or of the first assertion of the claim, whichever is later.” Id., § 94895(k). The student must also notify the Bureau of “the court in which the action is pending, the case number of the action, and the date of the filing of the action or of the assertion of the claim.” Id. Finally, subdivision (k) mandates that a student advise the court that he or she has notified the Bureau; if a student fails to do so, no judgment can be entered in the case. Id. None of these additional requirements appeal’s in subdivision (b). Even more significantly, subdivision (k) differs from subdivision (b) in that it does not require that the student give any notice or make any demand on the institution prior to filing suit or asserting the claim. Daghlian’s construction avoids potential inconsistency between these sections. If, as he asserts, students have a private right of action to challenge any “violation of this article or an institution’s failure to perform its legal obligations,” then certain student suits fall outside the scope of paragraph (b)(1). Subdivision (k) provides a mechanism by which the Bureau can learn of large student class actions brought against institutions under § 17200. It does not require the Bureau to issue a certification or to conduct its own investigation, however, since such suits do not implicate the approval process, but instead concern injury suffered by a particular group of students. Read in this way, subdivision (k) serves a purpose distinct from subdivision (b). See Moyer, 10 Cal.3d at 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224 (“When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear. Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Leslie Salt Co. v. San Franicsco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 614, 200 Cal.Rptr. 575 (1984) (“The meaning of the words of a statute or, to use the alternative approach favored by many courts, the intent of the Legislature, can only be determined with reference to the context in which the words are used; that is, with reference to such purpose as may be discerned from examining the entire enactment of which the words are part. A statutory phrase may be said to be clear and unambiguous if the meaning assigned to it is not in conflict with other language in the act” (citations and footnote omitted)). In sum, the language of the students’ private right of action provision, as well as the overall context of § 94985, suggest that it was erroneously numbered as the final paragraph of subdivision (b), and that the legislature’s failure to denominate it subdivision (c) was an inadvertent drafting mistake. iii. Purpose And Legislative History The history and purpose of the Reform Act, and amendments made subsequent to its enactment provide further support for Daghlian’s position. The statute states that one of its principal objectives is to “protect[] the citizens of the state from fraudulent or substandard operations.” Cal. Educ. Code § 94705. To this end, the legislature “[e]stablish[ed] minimum standards concerning the quality of education, ethical and business practices, health and safety, and fiscal responsibility to provide protection against substandard, transient, unethical, deceptive, or fraudulent institutions and practices” (id, § 94705(c)), and to “protect!] the consumer and students against fraud, misrepresentation, or other practices that may lead to an improper loss of funds paid for educational costs____” (id., § 94705(f)). In 1997, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 71, which made numerous substantive changes to the Reform Act. See 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 78 (A.B.71) (West). A.B. 71 added Chapter 7 to the act, which includes §§ 94814, 94816, and 94832. See 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 78, § 4. It also enacted § 94985, which provides: “(a) Any institution that willfully violates any provision of Section 94800, 94810, 94814, or 94816, Sections 94820 to 94826, inclusive, Section 94829, 94831, or 94832 may not enforce any contract or agreement arising from the transaction in which the violation occurred, and any willful violation is a ground for revoking an approval to operate in this state or for denying a renewal application. (b) Notwithstanding any provision of the contract or agreement, a student may bring an action for a violation of this article or for an institution’s failure to perform its legal obligations and, upon prevailing thereon, is entitled to the recovery of damages, equitable relief, or any other relief authorized by this article, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.... ” Id. See also Cal. Educ. Code §§ 94985(a)-(b) (2001). Subdivision (b) of the statute, as originally passed, gave students a broad right to sue under the Reform Act. See, e.g., Payne v. Nat’l Collection Systems, Inc., 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1040, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 (2001) (class action involving twenty-three plaintiffs for violation of Education Code §§ 94831, 94832, and 94838, Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500, and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act). In 2001, the California Legislature passed A.B. 201. See 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 621 (A.B.201) (West). A review of the legislative reports regarding A.B. 201 shows that its primary purpose was to reform the California’s Student Tuition Recovery Fund (“STRF”). The report of the April 17, 2001 hearing before the Assembly Committee on Higher Education notes: “Under the Act, STRF was created to attempt to make students financially whole in the event a school prematurely closes without completing a student’s term of education. STRF is paid into by certain qualified schools based on a formula that accounts for the number of students and the cost of tuition at the institution. The Act also gives the Bureau the ability to levy a special assessment, at virtually anytime in the fiscal year, upon these schools in the event STRF is insufficient to pay any necessary claims. Recent court cases (including Aguirre v. Hamilton — San Francisco Superior Court Case Number 308354) have ordered repayment from STRF to students who were owed monies as the result of the closure of several schools. Because the total repayments exceeded the funds available in STRF, the Bureau ordered further assessments that were to be paid immediately. The affected schools opposed this assessment and contend that the courts erred in their findings and subsequent order. The schools also contend that having all of the schools pay for the actions of the schools that closed is unfair. After much debate, the increased assessments were withdrawn. Subsequently, the Bureau, along with the regulated schools and advocacy groups, have searched for an alternative to make STRF solvent in order to pay the recent claims. This bill seeks to ensure the solvency of STRF by requiring schools to disclose the status of their STRF payments and in case of a deficiency, formulate a plan to become current. Furthermore, it allows the Bureau to track litigation against regulated schools and eliminates some confusion around STRF responsibilities for third-party payers.” Cal. Bill Analysis, A.B. 201, Assembly Committee on Higher Education (Apr. 17, 2001). Although AB 201 was primarily concerned with reforms to the STRF, it did make other substantive changes to the Reform Act. As pertinent here, the bill amended § 94985 to add subdivisions (b) and (k). See 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 621, § 10 (A.B.201). Although the legislation did not alter the language of the students’ private right of action provision, it renumbered the provision paragraph (b)(6). The enrolled bill contains no subdivision (c). The legislative reports do not reflect any reason for the omission of subdivision (c) from the final version of § 94985. Nor do they reflect, expressly or implicitly, that, in amending § 94985, the legislature intended severely to restrict students’ private right of action. The April 17, 2001 report, for instance, summarizes the purpose of the bill as follows: “[T]his bill: 1) Requires that any audit or financial report required to be prepared under the act contain a statement signed by the individual who has prepared the report certifying that the institution has paid or not paid to the Bureau all amounts owed to the Student Tuition Recovery Fund (STRF). Requires that an institution that has not paid all amounts owed to the Bureau ... report within 30 days on its plan to become current in these payments. 2) Requires a student who brings an action or asserts any claim in an existing action for recovery on behalf of a class of persons to notify the Bureau of the existence of the lawsuit, the court in which the action is pending, the case number of the action, and the date of the filing of the action or of the assertion of the claim, within 30 days of the filing of the action. Further requires the student to notify the court that he or she has notified the Bureau pursuant to this provision, and prohibits a judgment from being entered pursuant to this provision until the student has complied. 3) Requires the Bureau to send to such student who applies for payment from STRF a written notice specifying the rights of the student under these provisions. 4) Requires the Bureau to submit an annual report to the chairpersons of the Assembly Committee on Higher Education, the Senate Committee on Education, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and the Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review on the collection and expenditure of moneys collected as special assessments under this bill, as prescribed.” Cal. Bill Analysis, A.B. 201, Assembly Committee on Higher Education (Apr. 17, 2001). Other legislative reports are similarly devoid of any indication that the Legislature intended to effect such a radical change. See, e.g., Cal. Bill. Analysis, A.B. 201 Assembly Committee on Appropriations (May 9, 2001); Cal. Bill. Analysis, A.B. 201 Senate Committee on Education (June 27, 2001); Cal. Bill Analysis, A.B. 201 Senate Committee on Business and Profession (Aug. 20, 2001); Cal. Bill. Analysis, A.B. 201 Assembly Floor (Sept. 13, 2001). The legislative history of A.B. 201, therefore, does not support defendants’ assertion that it is “clear ... the Legislature expressly chose to exclude a private right of action as a remedy for violations of Sections 94814, 94816, and 94832.” Not only is defendants’ proposed construction of the students’ private right of action provision at odds with the legislative history, it is also inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the Reform Act, which was to protect “students against fraud, misrepresentation, or other practices that may lead to an improper loss of funds paid for educational costs____” Cal. Educ. Code § 94705(f). Consequently, the purpose and history of the Reform Act militate against defendants’ literal construction of § 94985(b)(6). See Lungren, 45 Cal.3d at 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299 (“Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute”); Cossack v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal.3d 726, 732-33, 114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 P.2d 260 (1974) (“Statutes should be construed so as to be given a reasonable result consistent with the legislative purpose.... The court should take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction.... The apparent purpose of a statute will not be sacrificed to a literal construction” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Leslie Salt Co., 153 Cal.App.3d at 614, 200 Cal.Rptr. 575 (“The courts resist blind obedience to the putative ‘plain meaning of a statutory phrase where literal interpretation would defeat the Legislature’s central objective’ ” (citation and footnote omitted)). iv. Conclusion Citing White v. E-Loan, Inc., 409 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1187 (N.D.Cal.2006), defendants argue that even if paragraph (b)(6) was the result of a drafting error, generally the legislature, not the court, should correct the error. In White, a prospective borrower brought a putative class action against a lender, alleging violation of the Fair Credit Report Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d). Id. at 1183. The lender moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that § 1681m(h)(8)(A) authorized a private cause of action only for violation of § 1681m, not for violation of § 1681m(d). See id. at 1184 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8)(A) (“Section 1681n and 1681o of this title shall not apply to any failure by any person to comply with this section” (emphasis added))). The district court agreed with defendant that the word “section” clearly referred to § 1681m, not § 1681m(h), a “subsection.” See id. at 1185 (“As the Supreme Court recently discussed, Congress follows a convention when it uses organizational terms in statutes. A ‘section’ is broken down into sub-parts as follows: ‘subsections,’ which begin with ‘(a)’; ‘paragraphs,’ which begin with ‘(1)’ ... ”). Plaintiff contended that the appearance of the word “section” at the end of § 1681m(h)(8)(A) was merely “a scrivener’s error attributable to the fact that § 1681m(h) was enacted as Section 311 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act....” Id. After considering plaintiffs structural and policy arguments, the district court “acknowledge^] that there [was] no way to perfectly reconcile the contents of § 1681m(h)(8) with the remainder of § 1681m,” and noted that “[p]laintiffs may indeed be correct that the text of § 1681m(h)(8) is the result of a scrivener’s error.” Id. at 1187. It declined to correct the error, however, stating that “it is not for this Court to rewrite the words that Congress has chosen.” Id. (citing Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“If Congress enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent. ‘It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think ... is the preferred result.’ This allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected, and respective, constitutional roles. In the meantime, we must determine intent from the statute before us”)). White is neither controlling nor persuasive, since this case involves a state, rather than a federal, statute. As noted, when a federal court sitting in diversity interprets a state statute, it must apply state rules of statutory construction. In re First T.D. & Inv., 253 F.3d at 527; Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 904 F.2d at 510; In re Anderson, 824 F.2d at 756. See also Dimidowich, 80S F.2d at 1482 (“Where the state’s highest court has not decided an issue, the task of the federal courts is to predict how the state high court would resolve it”). Under California law, as under federal law, statutory construction begins with the words of the statute itself. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Cal.4th at 1152, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291. The ultimate task of statutory construction, however, is to “ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law,” S.D. Myers, Inc., 336 F.3d at 1179 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). In carrying out this task, California courts have corrected drafting errors. See Szold v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 127 Cal.App.4th 591, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 665 (2005) (after considering the text and legislative history of a statute, the court found that insertion of the word “of’ for “or” was an inadvertent drafting error and stated: “We interpret statutes so as to avoid giving effect to drafting errors,” citing People v. Superior Court (Blanquel), 85 Cal.App.4th 768, 771, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 429 (2000)); In re Chavez, 114 Cal.App.4th 989, 998, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 (2004) (“Our suspicion that the 1983 amendment was indeed a drafting error is strengthened by the fact that SB 813 was not focused upon penal laws but was a voluminous bill devoted in large part to educational reforms that required the simultaneous amendment of hundreds of code sections. Such circumstances can create a ‘dangerous potential for drafting errors.’ Given the legislative history and the surrounding circumstances we are convinced the 1983 amendment was a drafting error and was not enacted for any deterrent purpose,” citing People v. Alexander, 178 Cal.App.3d 1250, 1261-62, 224 Cal.Rptr. 290 (1986) (“Chapter 1635’s sudden inconsistent and incongruous treatment of PCP offenses ... strongly suggests confusion and errors in drafting the various amendments and reenacted statutes that made up the chapter. This suggestion is further strengthened when one considers the Act’s complex scheme of interrelated complementary statutes, the complicated task of updating the cross-references to reflect the new schedules, and the fact that chapter 1635 involved the simultaneous amendment of dozens of other statutes in the Business and Professions, Education, Government, Penal, Vehicle, and Welfare and Institution Codes. Certainly such circumstances created a dangerous potential for drafting errors” (footnotes omitted)); see Alexander, 178 Cal.App.3d at 1263, 224 Cal.Rptr. 290 (“The lack of intent to legalize sale of PCP becomes even more evident in light of the absurd consequences such legalization would have.... [W]e conclude that where, as here, it is obvious that the Legislature inadvertently deleted the sanctions against selling PCP because of a drafting error, such a ‘repeal’ cannot and does not reflect an intent to pardon illegal sales that were committed prior to the error”). The California Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that courts should not rewrite a statute unless necessary to effectuate the Legislature’s clear intent. See People v. Garcia, 21 Cal.4th 1, 5-6, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829 (1999) (“The parties’ briefs, lower court opinions and our own research have disclosed a number of possible resolutions of this postulated internal conflict, all based on the premise [that] the distinction between paragraphs (B) and (D) of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) is a result of ‘drafting error.’ As we demonstrate later, however, each such resolution would require the court to disregard one of the two assertedly conflicting paragraphs or to rewrite some of their provisions. Although we may properly decide upon such a construction or reformation when compelled by necessity and supported by firm evidence of the drafters’ true intent, we should not do so when the statute is reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that harmonizes all of its parts without disregarding or altering any of them,” citing People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765, 775, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752 (1985)). Here, the text of the students’ private right of action provision, the larger context of the statutory scheme, and the purpose and history of the Reform Act and amendments to it all suggest that the legislature’s renumbering of the provision as paragraph (b)(6), rather than subdivision (c), was a drafting error. Even were this not so, however, the court would conclude that, regardless of its placement, the language of the students’ private right of action provision clearly grants students a cause of action “for violation of this article,” and does not limit the right to any single section or subdivision. Cal. Educ. Code § 94985(b)(6) (emphasis added). See Szold, 127 Cal.App.4th at 596, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 665 (“In construing any statute, ‘[w]ell-established rules of statutory construction require us to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of law____ We first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent,’ ” quoting Whaley v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc., 121 Cal.App.4th 479, 484-85, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 (2004) (internal citations omitted; emphasis added)). Stated differently, even if the provision is properly numbered paragraph (b)(6), its use of the word “article” stands in contrast to use of the word “subdivision” in other paragraphs of subdivision (b). See Cal.Educ.Code § 94985(b)(1), (b)(5). Ordinary principles of statutory construction require that this difference be given effect. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564 (1999) (examining California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e), and concluding that because “[clauses (3) and (4) of section 425.16, subdivision (e), concerning statements made in public fora and ‘other conduct’ implicating speech or petition rights, include[d] an express ‘issue of public interest’ limitation,” while “clauses (1) and (2), concerning statements made before or in connection with issues under review by official proceedings, contain[ed] no such limitation,” the court had to give effect to the “variation in phraseolo