Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER DUFFEY, District Judge. This matter is before the Court on Defendant Richard Stogner’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (“Stogner MSJ”) [256], Defendant Joe Stone’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (“Stone MSJ”) [257], Defendant Vernon Jones’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (“Jones MSJ”) [259], Defendant Marilyn Boyd Drew’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (“Drew MSJ”) [262], and Defendant Morris Williams’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (“Williams MSJ”) [263]. I. INTRODUCTION This case concerns alleged discriminatory employment practices in DeKalb County. The claims are brought by three white managers and one black manager. The white managers, Becky Kelley, Michael Bryant and John Drake, claim they were discriminated against and suffered a hostile work environment based on their race. The black manager, Herbert Lowe, claims he suffered illegal retaliation because he refused to participate in discrimination against white county managers. The allegations center around employment practices that allegedly commenced with the change in DeKalb County leadership in 2001. Defendant Vernon Jones, a black male, was elected DeKalb County’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) in November 2000 and assumed office on January 1, 2001. Typical of administration changes in government, a number of organizational and reporting structure changes occurred when Jones become the CEO. Plaintiffs allege these structural changes were implemented, in part, to enact a plan to replace white county managers with black county managers in order to increase the overall number of minorities in county government managerial positions, and that this was done to benefit Defendant Jones politically. Plaintiffs allege this plan directly impacted the Parks and Recreation Department (“Parks Department” or “the department”) and them personally. They claim Defendants’ discriminatory policies caused them to suffer adverse employment actions, created a hostile work environment with the goal of coercing them to terminate their employment, and generally constituted actionable racial discrimination. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Parties On January 1, 2001, Kelley, Bryant and Drake were managerial employees of the Parks Department. Plaintiff Becky Kelley, a white female, had been employed by DeKalb County since 1976. Sixteen years after becoming a county employee, in 1992 she was appointed as the Director of the Parks Department with authority over the department’s operation and programs. Kelley was serving in this position when Jones assumed his duties as CEO in January 2001. Plaintiff Michael Bryant, a white male, was hired by DeKalb County in 2000 as the Deputy Director of Revenue Management and Support in the Parks Department, and he reported to Kelley. He was serving as Deputy Director on January 1, 2001, when Jones became CEO. Plaintiff John Drake, a white male, was hired by DeKalb in 1975 and became the Assistant Director of the Purchasing and Contracting Department in 1997. He was serving in this position on January 1, 2001. Plaintiff Lowe, a black male, started employment with DeKalb County on September 16, 2002. He was hired as the Deputy Director of Strategic Management and Development for the Parks Department. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, all of whom were senior managers either in De-Kalb County generally or the Parks Department specifically, played central roles in a plan to discriminate against white Parks Department managers. There are five Defendants alleged to be involved in the plan to discriminate against Plaintiffs. Defendant Vernon Jones, a black male, is the elected DeKalb County CEO. Defendant Richard Stogner, a white male, was hired by Jones as his executive assistant. Stogner assumed his position when Jones took office. Defendant Joe Stone, a black male, is the DeKalb County Director of Human Resources with overall supervisory authority over human resources, hiring, assignment and other personnel functions within the county. Defendant Morris Williams, a black male, is the Assistant County Administrator with supervisory responsibility for a variety of county departments, including the Parks Department. Defendant Marilyn Boyd Drew, a black female, was first hired in April 2001, initially as the Parks Department’s Director of Recreation Services, but was promoted ten months later to the position of Acting Director of the Parks Department, replacing Plaintiff Kelley. Drew became the permanent Director of the department a month later. Plaintiffs Bryant Drake and Kelley allege that once Defendants took their management positions under Jones, they began a systematic effort to adversely affect Plaintiffs’ work duties and environment, which was calculated to force the white Plaintiffs to terminate their county employment so that black managers could be hired to replace them. Plaintiff Lowe alleges he opposed the plan to discriminate against white managers, and Defendants responded by engaging in administrative maneuvers which resulted in the abolishment of his position. Defendants, he alleges, engaged in unlawful retaliation against him for his opposition to illegal discrimination. The alleged impact on each Plaintiff is discussed separately. B. Discrimination Alleged Plaintiff Kelley Kelley had served as the Director of the Department of Parks and Recreation for nine years when Jones became the CEO. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Kelley did not perform her job duties well and to the satisfaction of her superiors. Almost immediately after Jones assumed office, Kelley claims he began to confront her. On one occasion, Jones became very angry with Kelley on a phone call. A second confrontation occurred when, in a private meeting in Jones’s office, Jones yelled and screamed at Kelley and approached her in such a way that Kelley believed Jones was going to hit her. At this meeting, Jones imposed restrictions on Kelley’s duties as Director of the Parks Department, including prohibiting her from communicating with the press and from speaking to members of the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”), responsibilities Kelley had been performing in her capacity as Director. Kelley stated that on two occasions Defendant Stogner told her that “she didn’t understand the geopolitical issues of DeKalb County and that she could not relate to powerful black men.” Kelley’s Director responsibilities were, as she viewed it, further limited after January 2001. Before January 2001, she was, as department Director, responsible for reviewing applicants seeking employment in her department. After January 2001, she was prohibited from interviewing candidates unless Defendant Williams was present. Consistent with this changed policy, in early 2001, Kelley and Williams interviewed candidates for the Deputy Director of Recreation in the Parks Department. Kelley considered a white male to be one of the top candidates for the position, but Williams told Kelley they could not recommend a white candidate to Jones because he would not accept a white candidate. The white candidate was not recommended. Kelley was told by Stogner to offer the position to Defendant Drew, a black candidate. Stogner suggested to Kelley that by offering Drew the position, Kelley could “get in good” with Williams. Drew was offered the position, and she was hired on April 30, 2001. Once Drew was hired, Jones and Williams began to exclude Kelley from discussions and decisions regarding the Parks Department and its operation. Specifically, she was not informed of or consulted about hiring in her department. Stogner commented to Kelley that Jones wanted “to showcase black parks and showcase black employees,” which she understood as Stogner’s explanation regarding why she was being excluded from department planning discussions and decisions. On February 12, 2002, Jones issued an executive order implementing significant structural changes in the Parks Department. The order had a significant impact on Kelley and her duties. She was removed as Director of the department and reassigned to a group to coordinate the county Greenspace program. The transfer did not affect her salary and benefits. Defendant Drew, hired just a few months earlier, was appointed Acting Director to replace Kelley. Kelley’s Greenspace assignment was a significant change in her duties and authority. She was not given a title, and her reporting chain was changed. Rather than reporting to the CEO’s office, as she had done as the Director of the Parks Department, as a member of the Greenspace group she reported to an Assistant County Administrator. Drew also attempted to place Kelley in a small windowless office that had been used as a storage area. As the Greenspace coordinator, Kelley’s input was ignored and her recommendations rebuffed to such an extent that she did not consider herself to have any authority or job responsibilities. She described her job as one that ultimately was reduced to “coloring maps.” About seven months later, on September 25, 2002, she submitted her resignation effective on October 9, 2002. Plaintiff Bryant When Drew was installed as Director of the Parks and Recreation Department, she implemented changes in department assignments. Specifically, in June 2002, shortly after she was appointed Director, Drew changed Bryant’s job responsibilities by assigning him the duties ordinarily performed by the Director of Recreation. Although Bryant’s job was limited to the recreation area, he maintained his title of Deputy Director of Revenue Management and Support. His salary and benefits remained the same. In March 2002, Bryant complained about what he believed was an excessive salary a black contractor was paying to his wife. The contractor’s company had been hired by the Parks Department to perform services at a county golf course. Drew removed from Bryant responsibility for golf and tennis contracts and reassigned the fiscal and contracting duties for those contracts to Drake. Day-to-day operational responsibility for the golf and tennis contracts was assigned to Detrick Stanford, a black employee who reported directly to Drew. On or about August 5, 2002, about 60 days after his duties changed, Bryant was moved out of the department’s offices in Decatur and reassigned to an office in Tucker, Georgia. Bryant claims his supervisory duties and support also were adversely impacted by Drew. He claims his requests for staffing, information, computers and other requests made to assist in the performance of his duties were not honored. Bryant claims employees he supervised were assigned duties without his input or knowledge, and he was excluded from meetings and discussions regarding the areas for which he was responsible. While Drew solicited and received input from black employees, white employees, Bryant claims, were isolated from decision making. Bryant was not given a performance report before this lawsuit was filed, and the absence of a report affected his receipt of a merit salary increase. Bryant claims that Drew threatened to terminate him and actually drafted letters suspending him, which she carried around the office in such a way that they were visible to Bryant in order to let him know she had drafted the letters. Bryant was not suspended or terminated. Bryant’s title remains Deputy Director of Revenue Management and Support Services although he performs only those limited duties assigned to him by Drew. In October 2003, Marvin Billups, a black male, was given the position of Director of Recreation Services, although Bryant actually performs the tasks that are included in the Director of Recreation Services job description. Plaintiff Drake Plaintiff Drake has been employed with DeKalb County for 31 years and has served as the Assistant Director of the Purchasing and Contracting Department since 1997. On February 12, 2002, Jones transferred Drake to the Parks and Recreation Department as its Acting Assistant Director. Drake negotiated a salary increase in connection with his transfer, and his other benefits remained the same. Drake was interested in being appointed permanent Director of the Parks Department after Kelley was transferred to the Greenspaee program in February 2002. Stogner, however, told him that while he was qualified for the Director position when it was open in 1992, Jones had made “too many political commitments” to consider Drake for Parks Department Director. Drake was told that he was transferred to the Parks Department to “prop up” Drew, who was made the new Director. Drake could not compete for the position of permanent Director of the Parks Department because of the manner in which the position was advertised and who was allowed to apply. The permanent Parks Department Director position was advertised only as an intra-departmental promotion, meaning that only those who were Parks Department employees could apply. Applications were required to be submitted between February 25, 2002 and March 8, 2002. Drake’s transfer to the Parks Department as its acting Assistant Director was designated by Jones to be effective on March 16, 2002, eight days after the application period closed. According to Drake, after Drew was appointed Acting Director of the Parks Department, she aggressively reduced his job responsibilities, removing from him those responsibilities typically delegated to the Assistant Director and effectively reducing his duties to those of a lower level Deputy Director. When Drew became Director, she also required all Parks Department Deputy Directors to report directly to her instead of to him in his capacity as Assistant Director of the Department. Drew also removed Drake as the Parks Department’s representative to the county bond program group, of which he had been a member since 1986. Although he was Drew’s Assistant Director, Drew did not consult with him regarding the reorganization of the department, and she neglected to consult with him when his subordinates were hired. Drew excluded Drake from discussions regarding DeKalb County’s golf course management and revenue results and operations, even though the golf courses were included in Drake’s area of responsibility. Plaintiffs Kelley, Bryant and Drake offer this conduct as evidence that Defendants treated them differently than black employees, and that this different treatment was discriminatory. While Defendants’ conduct often appears to be neutral and characteristic of action taken by the new management of a political subdivision, Plaintiff Lowe offers evidence that he was advised of Jones’ intention to eliminate white managers to allow the hiring of additional black managers. Plaintiff Lowe On September 16, 2002, after Drew became the permanent Director of the Parks Department, Lowe, a black male, began work as the department’s Deputy Director of Strategic Management and Development. After he was hired, he was told of a plan to increase the number of black managers in the Parks Department, including the position to which he was hired. Lowe claims that Stone told him that if white individuals had expressed an interest in the Deputy Director position to which Lowe was hired, they would not have been considered. Lowe stated that he was told by Jones, Stone, and Drew that it was Jones’ agenda to eliminate white managers from the Parks Department so that the number of black department managers would be increased. Lowe claims specifically that when Drew welcomed him to DeKalb County, she told him that white managers were being eliminated from the Parks Department because the CEO’s agenda was to get reelected, and Stone was making sure the CEO’s agenda was executed. Jones told Lowe that the white employees in the Parks Department needed to be removed, and the whole department needed to be reorganized. Lowe claims Jones told him on several occasions that he wanted a “darker administration.” He also told Lowe that he wanted Kelley, Bryant, and Drake out of the Parks Department and that Jones referred to Drake as a “white bastard.” Drew told Lowe to “dig up dirt” on white employees in the Parks Department and to make sure white employees were not publicly visible nor in positions where they would have the opportunity publically to accept awards that were received by the Department. Drew told Lowe to withhold information from white employees, including Plaintiffs Kelley, Bryant and Drake, so they would be kept in the dark and made to appear incompetent at their jobs. Drew told Lowe she transferred Bryant into a recreation function knowing he was not experienced in the recreation area, and he thus would be perceived as incompetent in his duties. She told Lowe not to discuss important issues with Bryant because she wanted to keep Bryant in the dark so that he would fail. Drew instructed Lowe not to speak with Plaintiffs Kelley, Bryant, or Drake and the “old white women” in the recreation division. Lowe claims that Jones, Stone, Drew and Williams each told him that there was a plan to remove white managers in DeKalb County, that the plan was referred to as a “reorganization,” and that there were ways to get rid of employees without firing them. Lowe told Defendants that he would not participate in their plan to eliminate white employees, and he did not carry out orders given to him that were designed to discriminate against them. Jones told Lowe he was not being a “team player,” and stated further that Lowe did not appreciate or understand what Jones was trying to accomplish with his agenda. Eventually, Lowe told Jones he wanted out of the Parks Department, and if he was not moved he would resign. Thereafter, around May 2003, Lowe’s office was moved into Jones’ executive suite on the sixth floor of DeKalb County’s offices. Although Lowe continued to work for the Parks Department, Lowe also assisted Jones with special projects. On July 23, 2003, Drew hired Marvin Billups, a black male, as the Deputy Director of Strategic Management and Development, the same title and position held by Lowe. Billups’s employment in this position was characterized as time-limited, meaning the appointment was only up through and including December 31, 2003. Although this position already existed and was being filled by Lowe, because the duplicate position was “time-limited,” it was not required to be publically advertised as an open position, and it was not required to be processed through DeKalb County’s competitive hiring process. Before Billups’ duplicate Deputy Director position expired, Billups was named Deputy-Director of Recreation. Although his title changed, Billups continued to perform the same tasks as he did in his Deputy Director of Strategic Management and Planning position. On December 3, 2003, Jones submitted his budget for the County to the Board of Commissioners. The budget eliminated funding for Lowe’s Deputy Director position, and therefore the budget effectively proposed its elimination. On January 27, 2004, the Board of Commissioners adopted the budget and Lowe’s position was dissolved. Of the 600 positions in the budget, Lowe’s position was the only one that was abolished. Because Billups had recently been transferred out of the eliminated position into another one which was funded, he maintained his employment with the county and continued to perform the tasks he performed in the eliminated position. Thus, as a practical matter, Lowe was terminated, Billups was not, and Billups continued to perform the Strategic Management and Planning functions of Lowe’s position, but under his new Deputy Director of Recreation job title. On February 3, 2004, Stogner offered Lowe the position of Parks Maintenance Coordinator. This position was at a lower salary and stature. Lowe refused to accept it and resigned. The account set out in this section sets forth Plaintiffs’ version of the facts in this case. Defendants do not contest the changes in the Plaintiffs’ job titles and positions, nor do they contest that certain changes were made in Plaintiffs’ job titles and positions. Defendants, however, deny they made each of the statements the Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants made, particularly those that Plaintiffs offer as evidence of Defendants’ intention to reduce the number of white managers in the county and in the Parks Department specifically. Defendants deny treating Plaintiffs differently from the way black managers were treated. Defendants deny wrongfully limiting Plaintiffs support or input, and they deny that they requested Plaintiff Lowe or any other person to participate in an effort to discriminate against white managers. They deny that their actions were taken with racial animus or hostility toward white managerial employees. They deny that any of the Plaintiffs were given inferior or less prestigious jobs when they were transferred, and they deny engaging in any effort to cause Plaintiffs to terminate their employment with the county. III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 24, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants. (Compl.[l].) Plaintiffs’ claims include: violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); intentional race discrimination in violation of § 1983 through 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II); conspiracy to deprive civil rights (Count III), retaliation (Count IV); violation of first amendment rights (Count V), and attorney’s fees (Count VI.). (Id. at ¶¶ 89-123.) On October 1, 2004, Defendants filed their Answers to the Complaint. (Answers [10][11][12][13].) On June 1, 2005, Defendants filed their first motions for summary judgment. After the motions were filed, the Court concluded that limited, additional discovery was warranted from March 22, 2006 through May 31, 2006. [Order Denying Motions for Summary Judgment [235], at 14.] Having concluded that the summary judgment motions were redundant and unmanageable, the Court ordered that each Defendant file, after completion of the extended discovery period, a single motion for summary judgment addressing the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs. (Id. at 19.) On June 21, 2006, Defendants filed their Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment, and they are now properly before the Court. (Motions for Summary Judgment [256][257][259][262][263]). III. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.1999). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-movant must demonstrate that summary judgment is inappropriate by designating specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir.1999). The non-moving party “need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings.” Id. The Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and must resolve all reasonable doubts in the non-movant’s favor. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Am., 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir.1990). “[Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury....” Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282. “If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246. But, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” summary judgment for the moving party is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Each Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on every one of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs generally complain about their frustrations in the workplace and that none of their complaints are supported by evidence that Defendants intended to discriminate against white managers. Ordinarily, whether conduct constitutes discrimination is an issue best suited for a jury. The question that is presented to the Court in Defendants’ summary judgment motions is whether Defendants have asserted legal arguments that allow them to avoid a jury considering, in whole or in part, the conduct Plaintiffs allege. B. Motions for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims 1. Plaintiffs’ Conspiracy Claim Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 fails because it is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. “Under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, a corporation’s employees, acting as agents of the corporation, are deemed incapable of conspiring among themselves or with the corporation.” Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th Cir.2000). The doctrine applies to both private corporations and public entities. Id.; see also Baker v. Chandler, 161 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1381 (S.D.Fla.2001). “The ... doctrine holds that acts of corporate agents are attributed to the corporation itself, thereby negating the multiplicity of actors necessary for the formation of a conspiracy. Simply put, ... a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting under the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves.” McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir.2000). The issue presented is whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to prevent Defendants from being capable of conspiring with one another. The Court holds that it does. Dickerson is particularly instructive in the context of a conspiracy claim involving a public entity. In Dickerson, the plaintiff sued his county employer for demoting him in violation of his constitutional rights, asserting a variety of claims, including a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a civil rights action under § 1983, and race discrimination claims under § 1981 and Title VII. Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 764. The Eleventh Circuit addressed whether, under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, the defendant county and its employees could engage in a civil conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs civil rights under § 1985(3). Id. at 765. The Dickerson court held that the county and its employees were a single legal entity, incapable of conspiring among themselves, and held that the intracorpo-raté conspiracy doctrine barred the plaintiffs conspiracy claim. Id. at 770. Plaintiffs argue that two exceptions to the intracorporate doctrine apply in this case to permit their conspiracy claims. These exceptions are: (1) the independent personal stake exception; and (2) the series of discriminatory acts exception. Plaintiffs rely only on Dickerson, which discusses both of the exceptions. In Dickerson, the Eleventh Circuit observed: “[0]ther circuits also have either held or considered holding corporate agents capable of conspiring in civil rights cases when those agents ... have an ‘independent personal stake’ in the corporate action, or engage in a series of discriminatory acts as opposed to a single action.” Id. at 770. The Court went on to hold that “[b]ecause none of these exceptions would apply based on the facts of this case, we do not reach the issue of whether to adopt them in this circuit. ” Id. (emphasis added); see also Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1190-91 (11th Cir.2001) (Marcus, J.) (applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to plaintiffs claim for diserimina-tory failure to promote white employees because the actions related to defendants’ performance of their official, not personal, duties and therefore they were acting as the city itself, not eonspiratorially); Baez v. Seminole County Sch. Bd., No. 6:05CV802ORL31KRS, 2005 WL 2105961, at *9 (M.D.Fla.2005) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit and district courts within its Circuit have applied the doctrine to civil rights cases). The Dickerson court expressly declined to hold the exceptions were applicable to this circuit. Plaintiffs rely on Dickerson as their only authority that the exceptions apply, and they have not cited any Eleventh Circuit decisions after Dickerson to persuade this Court that the exceptions should be applied in this case. See McMillan v. DeKalb County, No. 1:04-cv-3039-BBM (N.D.Ga. Feb. 14, 2005) (Martin, J.) (dismissing a nearly identical conspiracy count on the basis of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine therefore applies, Defendants are incapable of conspiring with themselves, and Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim under § 1985 fails as a matter of law. Summary judgment is granted to each Defendant on this claim. 2. Statute of Limitations for the Equal Protection and Intentional Race Discrimination Claims (Counts I & II) Each Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs’ equal protection and race discrimination claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. They argue that because Plaintiffs must assert their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute of limitations is two years, and therefore Bryant’s transfer claim, Drake’s transfer and failure to promote claims, and Kelley’s transfer and hostile work environment claims are time-barred. Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations for § 1981 claims applies, and limitations period applicable to § 1981 claims is four years — not two. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a “violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Compl., at ¶ 100.) This pleading form is required because the Eleventh Circuit has held in cases involving claims against government defendants that § 1983 provides the exclusive damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981. Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 893 (11th Cir.2000). “Congress created a catchall 4-year statute of limitations for actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, that do not contain statutes of limitations provisions.” Palmer v. Stewart County Sch. Dist., 178 Fed. Appx. 999, 1002-03 (11th Cir.2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1658 and Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004)). Section 1981 was amended after December 1, 1990, and is likely covered by the catchall provision. Section 1983, however, does not have a statute of limitations provision, and it was not enacted or amended after December 1, 1990. Id. at 1003. Plaintiffs argue that since their claims are, at their core, § 1981 actions, the four-year limitations period should apply. Defendants argue the operative statute is § 1983, the vehicle for enforcing § 1981 claims against public defendants. The statute of limitations for § 1983, claims is “the statute of limitations given by state law, which, in Georgia, is two years.” Id. (citing Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir.1986)); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Thus, Defendants argue the Plaintiffs’ equal protection and race discrimination claims — based on § 1981 and brought under § 1983 — are barred. Plaintiffs rely on Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., to support their argument that all § 1981(b) claims are governed by the four-year statute of limitations — even those brought through § 1983. While Jones supports the conclusion that the four-year catchall limitations period applies to § 1981 actions against private persons, the Supreme Court has been equally clear that where § 1983 is effecting the remedy for a civil rights violation, federal statutory law under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “is fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims. The federal interests in uniformity, certainty and the minimization of unnecessary litigation all support the conclusion that Congress favored this simple approach.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1984). Plaintiffs seek to discredit the reasoning in Wilson by relying on a footnote in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 123, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005), a case brought under the Federal Telecommunications Act. The Abrams footnote reads: The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is generally the applicable state-law period for personal injury torts.... It may be, however, that this limitations period does not apply to respondent’s § 1983 claim. In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), which provides a 4-year, catchall limitations period applicable to “civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress enacted after” December 1, 1990. In Jones, we held that this 4-year limitations period applies to all claims “made possible by a post-1990 [congressional] enactment.” Since the claim here rests upon violation of the post-1990 TCA, § 1658 would seem to apply. Abrams, 544 U.S. at 123 n. 5, 125 S.Ct. 1453. Plaintiffs’ reliance on the footnote is misleading. A more comprehensive reading of Abrams discredits the interpretation advanced by Plaintiffs. The respondent in Abrams argued that the rule that “ § 1983 claims are governed by the state law statute of limitations for personal-injury torts, does not apply to § 1983 actions to enforce statutes that themselves contain a statute of limitations.” Id. at 124, 125 S.Ct. 1453. He urged that “the limitations period in the federal statute displaces the otherwise applicable state statute of limitations.” Id. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning: This contention cannot be reconciled with our decision in Wilson, which expressly rejected the proposition that the limitations period for a § 1983 claim depends on the nature of the underlying right being asserted. We concluded instead that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is “a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims.” We acknowledged that “a few § 1983 claims are based on statutory rights,” but carved out no exception for them. Id. (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit applied this reasoning in Palmer, 178 Fed.Appx. at 1002. In Palmer, the plaintiff asserted claims under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 against the defendant school district and Dr. Betty Ray, individually and in her official capacity. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants racially discriminated against her in pay and benefits. Id. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the school district and Ray on the plaintiffs Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 claims because the claims were time-barred. Id. at 1001. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred in holding her § 1981 claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 1002. She argued that the four-year catchall statute of limitations applied. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the four-year catchall statute of limitations applied to statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, that do not contain their own statute of limitations provision. Because § 1981 was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court raised the question whether the four-year catchall provision might apply. Id. The critical issue as to which limitations period applied, in the Court’s mind, was whether the plaintiffs cause of action against Ray in her individual capacity arose under the 1991 Act amending § 1981, or whether it arose under the original version of § 1981. The court remanded the case for consideration of that issue. Id. The Court then noted “[a]s previously stated, a § 1981 claim against a state actor must be brought under § 1983. Therefore, [plaintiff] has no cause of action under § 1981, except against Ray in her individual capacity.” Id. The court noted that the two-year state statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims, holding that “with the exception of the dismissal of the § 1981 claim against Ray in her individual capacity, we affirm the dismissal of the [claims] as time-barred.” Id. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that “[s]ection 1983 provides the sole cause of action against state actors for violating § 1981.” Id. (citing Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 892-94 (11th Cir.2000)); see also AUI, LLC, v. DeKalb County, No. 1:05-cv-2273-BBM (N.D.Ga. Aug. 28, 2006) (Martin, J.) (holding that plaintiffs cause of action properly arises under § 1983, not § 1981, since § 1983 is the exclusive remedy against state actors for violations of § 1981 and applying the two-year statute of limitations to plaintiffs claims); Marshall v. Daleville City Bd. of Educ., No. 1:05cv386-WHA, 2006 WL 2056581, at *2 (M.D.Ala. July 24, 2006) (“Section 1981 claims against state actors must be brought pursuant to § 1983 ... Therefore, the statute of limitations for a § 1981 claim asserted pursuant to § 1983 is governed by state law.”). Because Plaintiffs bring their claims for violation of § 1981 through § 1983, as they must against state actors, the Court concludes that the two-year statute of limitá-tions for § 1983 actions applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. Applying the two-year limitations period, Defendants argue that Bryant’s transfer claim, Drake’s transfer and failure to promote claims, and Kelley’s demotion and hostile work environment claims are barred. They argue: (1) Plaintiff Kelley was transferred to the Greenspace program in February 2002. Because the Complaint was filed on August 24, 2004, more than five months after the two-year statute of limitations expired, Kelley’s discriminatory transfer claim is barred; (2) Kelley’s hostile work environment fails because an act contributing to the hostile work environment must have occurred within the limitations period, and Kelley does not identify any evidence of any such act occurring after August 24, 2002. The Court agrees that Kelley has not alleged sufficient facts occurring within the limitations period to support her demotion claim, and summary judgment is granted on Kelley’s demotion claim. Kelley does, however, allege an act contributing to her alleged hostile work environment which occurred within the limitations period. She alleges she was constructively discharged, which occurred when she gave her resignation on September 25, 2002. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (holding, in the context of the timing of filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, that if an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment maybe considered for purposes of determining liability). “Constructive discharge negatively affects an employee’s job status, and therefore constitutes an adverse employment action. In other words, where working conditions are so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign, the employer’s conduct is an adverse employment action.” Akins v. Fulton County, 420 F.3d 1293, 1300-01 (11th Cir.2005); see also Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 805 (11th Cir.2005) (“[T]he doctrine of constructive discharge enables an employee who has resigned to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment action by showing that the resignation was an involuntary response that was the product of intolerable working conditions — that is that he had only a choice between retirement and discharge.”); Van Der Meulen v. Brinker Int’l, 153 Fed.Appx. 649 (11th Cir.2005); Mitchell v. Overbey, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17489, at *19 (M.D. Ga 2005), aff'd by Mitchell v. Pope, 189 Fed.Appx. 911, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 17868 (11th Cir. July 14, 2006) (holding that because plaintiffs constructive discharge occurred within the 180-day limitations period for filing an EEOC complaint, the complaint for hostile work environment and constructive discharge was timely filed, and the Court would consider all of the allegations pertaining to any acts by defendants contributing to the hostile work environment). Because Kelley offers evidence that her constructive discharge, an act contributing to her hostile work environment, occurred within the limitations period, the Court finds that her hostile work environment claim is not time-barred. See Scott v. Lee Cty. Youth Dev. Ctr., 232 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1296-97 (M.D.Ala.2002) (noting that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, in theory, Plaintiffs should be able to contend their constructive discharge was a component act of their hostile work environment). Drake was transferred to the position of Assistant Director of Parks and Recreation in February 2002. The Director of Parks and Recreation position opening was posted on February 25, 2002 and closed on March 8, 2002. Defendant Drew was promoted to the position on March 16, 2002. The Complaint was filed on August 24, 2004. The Court agrees that both Drake’s discriminatory transfer and failure to promote claims accrued more than two years after the Complaint was filed and are time-barred. Bryant was assigned to his Recreation Services duties on June 10, 2002. The Complaint was filed on August 24, 2004, therefore Bryant’s discriminatory transfer claim also is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs seek to avoid these statute of limitations bars by arguing that their claims are tolled by the discovery rule and the continuing tort doctrine. They rely on Mullinax v. McElhenney for the preposition that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim does not begin to run on the date the acts occurred, but rather when the Plaintiffs realize (a) they are injured, and (b) that Defendants inflicted the injury. 817 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1987). Bryant, Drake and Kelley claim they did not learn until 2004 that they were injured by Defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct. When a § 1983 action accrues is a matter of federal law. Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716. “The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, a § 1983 action does not accrue until the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know that he has been injured ... [and] until the plaintiff is aware or should have been aware who has inflicted the injury.” Id. The discovery rule does not save Plaintiffs’ claims here. Kelley testified she believed, at least by February 2002, that she had been discriminated against because of her race. (Kelley Dep., attached to Ex. to PI. SMF Vol. 1 as Ex. J, at 131-32.) Drake testified that when he was passed over for promotion and transferred, he “certainly thought at that time that race was an issue.” (Drake Dep., attached to Ex. to PI. SMF as Ex. K, at 157.) Bryant testified that when his office was moved to Tucker, around May of 2002, he thought he was being discriminated against. (Bryant Dep., at 438-440.) The necessary conclusion reached here is that Kelley, Bryant and Drake all were aware, before August 24, 2002, they had been injured because of Defendants’ actions, knew who had made the adverse employment decisions affecting them, and believed the adverse action taken was race discrimination. Plaintiffs Kelly, Drake and Bryant next argue that the statute of limitations does not bar these claims because they constitute continuing torts, and the limitations period does not accrue until the elimination of the continuing tort — the pattern of mistreatment — which continued beyond August 24, 2004. The continuing tort doctrine tolls the limitations period where the injury resulting from a tortious act is not immediately apparent, and the victim could not in the exercise of ordinary care have learned of it. Everhart v. Rich’s, 229 Ga. 798, 802, 194 S.E.2d 425 (1972). In Everhart, plaintiffs claimed personal injury and property damage caused by a set of draperies sold by the defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that they became ill years after hanging the draperies in their bedroom. They claimed that when they became ill, they first discovered that billions of particles had broken loose from the draperies, the particles had been carried through the house,' and it was these particles that caused their physical injury and property damage. Their action was based on the Defendant’s alleged failure to warn of the danger from the particles. The Defendant argued the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Georgia Supreme Court in Everhart held that when continued exposure is caused by a continued failure to warn, the tort is of a continuing nature. Where a tort is continuing in nature, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until “such time as the continued tortious act producing injury is eliminated, e.g. by an appropriate warning in respect to the hazard.” Everhart, 229 Ga. at 802, 194 S.E.2d 425; see also Ballew v. A.H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325, 1327-28 (11th Cir.1982) (overturning district court’s grant of summary judgment based upon statute of limitations defense in a personal injury case involving an intrauterine device implanted in plaintiff because of continuing nature of tort and absence of warning). The Georgia law continuing tort theory simply does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims. The continuing tort theory applies where a plaintiff could not have discovered the injury the plaintiff alleges to have suffered, such as where a doctor leaves a sponge inside a patient during surgery or where draperies release invisible and harmful particles into the air without the plaintiffs knowledge. The continuing tort doctrine does not apply to Kelley’s wrongful transfer claim, Drake’s transfer and failure to promote claims and Bryant’s transfer claim because they each were aware of the injury more than two years before the Complaint was filed. See Everhart, 229 Ga. at 802, 194 S.E.2d 425; Harrison v. Beckham, 238 Ga.App. 199, 204, 518 S.E.2d 435 (1999) (“Georgia courts have consistently held that in a continuing tort a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the injury and the cause thereof.”) Plaintiffs Kelley, Drake and Bryant also rely on two federal cases from this district applying a continuing tort theory in a different context. In Coleman v. Miller, an African-American plaintiff sued the governor and the State of Georgia for civil rights violations under § 1983, among other statutes, claiming the Georgia state flag, which displayed the Confederate battle emblem, violated his equal protection, First Amendment, and other civil rights. 885 F.Supp. 1561, 1568 (N.D.Ga.1995). The defendants in Coleman argued that Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury barred the plaintiffs claims. The district court held, without elaboration or explanation, that under the continuing tort doctrine, the claims were not time-barred. Id. The Court does not find the decision in Coleman helpful on this issue. The facts of the case are not well-developed, and the greater weight of the authorities and the Court’s reasoning based on them results in the conclusion that the continuing tort principle does not apply here. Plaintiffs also rely on S.W. Daniel, Inc. v. Urrea, 715 F.Supp. 1082 (N.D.Ga.1989). In S.W. Daniel, the defendant special agent, in an action for malicious interference with business and contractual relations, argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 715 F.Supp. 1082 (N.D.Ga.1989). The plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant had engaged in a series of actions designed to interfere with their business and contractual relations during a criminal trial against them beginning in July 1984 and continuing through November of 1986. Id. at 1084. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s false testimony during pretrial hearings, which occurred less than two years from the filing of the complaint, was one such criminal activity on which the Plaintiffs claims were based. The plaintiffs argued that they had alleged a continuing tort which ended less than two years before filing of the complaint, and thus their claims were not time-barred. The S.W. Daniel court noted that whether the defendant’s earlier actions of seizing documents, foreclosing a supplier, and censuring advertisements constituted a continuing tort was a question of federal law and that “a cause of action for a continuing tort accrues when the wrongful conduct terminates. The continuing tort principle addresses itself to persistent wrongful conduct, not mere persistent injury accruing from an earlier wrong.” Id. at 1087. Typical examples of persistent wrongful conduct — as applied to persistent tort injury — are persistent denials of medical care and conduct constituting a pattern of mistreatment, such as refusing to provide psychiatric or other medical care, shower, telephone or visiting privileges to a prisoner. The court observed that “[o]ther wrongs which cause harm into the future, but nevertheless result from a single act of misconduct, are not continuing torts in the absence of continuing illegal acts.” Id. Acknowledging this distinction, the S.W. Daniel court found there was no continuing tort. Id.; see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (holding no continuing tort occurred where plaintiff alleged an “ongoing violation” of his civil rights, because “[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination” and that plaintiff must identify the alleged discriminatory acts that continued until termination of his employment). Plaintiffs Kelley, Drake and Bryant do not allege a continuing tort under federal law. Discriminatory transfer, failure to promote, demotion and hostile work environment claims all are based, as here, on individual, discrete acts of alleged discrimination. While Plaintiffs allege persistent discrimination over a period of time, that is not sufficient to invoke the continuing tort exception to the application of the statute of limitations. “The proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 498 (noting that while the complaint did allege a variety of unusual incidents occurring within the limitations period, including one where plaintiff was physically attacked by the education department chairman, these incidents were not independent acts of discrimination). Plaintiffs’ blanket conclusory statements that they did not learn until 2004 that they were injured by Defendants’ discriminatory conduct, are not enough to avoid the limitations period bar. The evidence further shows that they knew before August 24, 2002, of the injuries they allege to have suffered, who caused the injuries and the suspected motivation behind the conduct. Kelley’s transfer claim, Drake’s transfer and failure to promote claims, and Bryant’s reassignment claims are time-barred and are required to be dismissed. Summary judgment is granted to each Defendant on these claims. 3. Bryant, Drake, and Kelley’s Hostile Work Environment Claims Defendants next argue that Bryant, Drake, and Kelley have failed to put forth sufficient evidence to sustain a claim for a racially hostile work environment. To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the employee, such as the employee’s race; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.2002)). Defendants first challenge the third element of a hostile work environment claim, arguing that Bryant, Drake, and Kelley have failed to put forth evidence, aside from their own speculation, that any of the acts they complain of were race-based. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the acts complained of by Plaintiffs were motivated by race. The evidence that Defendants targeted Bryant, Drake, and Kelley based on their race is unusually compelling. For example, Lowe testified that Stone told Lowe after he was hired that other white persons, even if they had been interested in his job, would not have been considered for his job. (PI. SMF, at ¶ ; Lowe Dep., attached to Ex. to PI. SMF as Ex. N, at 127.) Drew, upon welcoming Lowe to DeKalb County, told him that they were eliminating the existing white people in the Parks Department and replacing them with black managerial employees because the CEO’s agenda was to get reelected, and Stone was making sure the agenda was executed. (PI. SMF, at ¶ 17; Lowe Dep., at 139-40.) Jones stated to Lowe on multiple occasions that he wanted a “darker administration.” (PI. SMF, at ¶ 17, Lowe Dep., at 381.) Jones also referred to Plaintiff Bryant as a “white bastard.” (PI. SMF, at ¶¶ 18-19; Lowe Dep., at 354.) Defendant Drew told Lowe that she did not trust the white employees in her department and asked him to “dig up dirt” on white employees. (PI. SMF, at ¶ 18; Lowe Dep., 476-77.) Lowe also testified that Drew told Lowe that she transferred Bryant into a position involving recreation because Bryant did not know anything about recreation, and thus Drew believed Bryant would be perceived as incompetent. Drew told Lowe not to speak with Drake about important issues because she wanted to keep him in the dark hoping he would fail in his recreation position. (PI. SMF, at ¶ 18; Lowe Dep., at 515.) Before department meetings, Drew would meet with Lowe to discuss how she could frame issues so as to annoy Bryant and Drake. (Lowe Dep., at 516.) Defendants Jones, Stone, Drew and Williams, on separate occasions, each told Lowe that there was a plan to discriminate against white employees in DeKalb County, and that Defendants called the reassignment of Plaintiffs’ duties a “reorganization.” Defendant Stone told Lowe there were ways to get rid of employees without firing them. (Lowe Aff., attached to Ex. to PI. SMF as Ex. C, at ¶¶ 10-11.) The evidence of the large increase in black employees in the departments over which Jones had control during his tenure, and the corresponding reduction, albeit slight, in the number of white employees, constitutes corroborating evidence of racially motivated conduct. (PL SMF, at ¶¶ 73-79.) Plaintiffs have met their burden to come forward with evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude the acts complained of by Plaintiffs were motivated by race. Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs have not shown the fourth hostile work environment element — that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment. The Eleventh Circuit, in Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir.1999), observed: “[establishing that harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter an employee’s terms or conditions of employment includes a subjective and an objective component.” Id. at 1246. That is, considering all the circumstances, “[t]he environment must be one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and that the victim subjectively perceives to be abusive.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The Mendoza Court identified “four factors that should be considered in determining whether harassment objectively altered an employee’s terms or conditions of employment: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance.” Id. (citing Allen v. Tyson Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 647 (11th Cir.1997)). Courts are required to view the conduct in context, not as isolated acts, and make a decision based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. “Only when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the employment and create an abusive working environment is the law violated.” Barrow v. Ga. Pacific Corp., 144 Fed.Appx. 54, 56 (11th Cir.2005) (quotations and citations omitted). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Bryant, he has put forth the following evidence regarding his hostile work environment claim: Bryant’s responsibilities were significantly reduced by Drew in June when she issued her memorandum of temporary assignments (Pl. SMF, at ¶ 138); Drew treated white subordinates differently than black employees, at one time requiring a white employee to write a memo of explanation when she brought her grandchild in the office while not requiring black employees to do the same (Id. at ¶ 139); Drew isolated white deputy-directors from decision making while seeking increased input from black deputy directors (Id. at ¶ 141); Drew required white employees to schedule appointments to speak with her while giving black employees free access; Drew gave preference to black employees to attend conferences; Drew gave preference to black employees for leadership positions; and Billups, a black employee with less tenure, was hired at a higher salary than Bryant. (Id.) Bryant further alleges in support of his hostile work environment claim that Drew’s actions included: denying Bryant’s staffing requests, withholding staffing, information and computers from him, denying him comp time when Bryant had surgery, refusing to allow Bryant to return to work after his surgery when he requested and making him wait an additional week to return, assigning subordinates duties without his knowledge, excluding him from meetings and discussions, failing to prepare his performance evaluation which would allow him to get a raise, intentionally framing discussions in meetings to frustrate and annoy him, and threatening Bryant by preparing suspension letters for him and carrying them so that Bryant saw their contents. (Id. at 142-43, 147, 149-50.) Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Drake, the following acts contributed to his hostile work environment: Drew removed from Drake the responsibilities of an assistant director — the second most senior manager in the Parks Department — and instead treated him as a lower-level deputy director; Drew told all department deputy directors to report direetly to her instead of Drake — a policy inconsistent with his job description; Drew removed Drake as the Parks Department’s representative to the bond program — a responsibility he had since 1986; Drew did not allow Drake to participate in the hiring of deputy directors, even though he was the Assistant Director; Drew did not seek input from Drake regarding the reorganization of the Parks and Recreation Divisions; Drew hired Drake’s subordinates without his knowledge or input; Drew restricted Drake from speaking to the media, giving this responsibility instead to Lowe, Drake’s subordinate; Drew delegated to Lowe the responsibility to run the Parks Department when Drew was gone, instead of allowing Drake, the Assistant Director to exerc