Full opinion text
ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF SPECIAL MASTER DOWNES, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendations of Special Master on: (A) Coordinated Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; (B) Arco’s, Unocal’s and Dauphin’s Motion and Brief on Jurisdiction; (C) Moving 1997 Defendants’ Memorandum to Dismiss Relator’s Complaints for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; and (D) Relator’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment with Authority Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, on Issue of Public Disclosure Under 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. The Court, having considered the briefs and materials in support of the Special Master’s recommendations and the objections thereto, having heard oral argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised, FINDS and ORDERS as follows: BaCkground As set forth in the Special Master’s Report, the subject motions are directed at 73 cases filed under the qui tarn provisions of the False Claims Act by Relator Jack J. Grynberg, in which he accuses over 300 gas pipelines and other gas measurers of mismeasuring gas produced from federal and/or Indian lands (“the 1997 qui tarn cases”). Beginning in June of 1997, Relator commenced filing the instant qui tarn suits in Federal District Courts in Colorado, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas, Michigan, California, and New Mexico. In October of 1999, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred 66 cases to this Court for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Subsequently, additional cases were transferred, bringing the total now pending to 73. The complaints in each of these cases asserts that all of the Defendants named therein employ a series of mismeasurement techniques that allows them to knowingly un-derreport or cause others to underreport the heating content and volume of gas, and that this conduct has resulted in an underpayment of federal royalties over a 10-year period. Relator’s complaints are brought under the “reverse false claim” provision contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). In April of 1995, Relator filed a qui tarn action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against forty-four defendants, alleging that they had defrauded the federal government by underpaying royalties on gas purchased from federally owned or Indian lands. Relator asserted that the underpayments were the result of mismeasurement of gas volume and improper analysis of gas heating content. The 1995 Qui Tam Complaint identified a number of mismeasurement techniques, and asserted that each of the defendants employed one or more of them. Relator amended the 1995 Qui Tam Complaint to add defendants and mismeas-urement techniques. An Amended Complaint filed on December 7, 1995, and a Second Amended Complaint, filed on May 13, 1996, each named several new defendants, ultimately bringing the total number of defendants sued in the 1995 action to 70. On March 27, 1997, United States District Judge Thomas F. Hogan dismissed the 1995 qui tarn action without prejudice for failure to plead fraud with particularity and for improper joinder of parties. There were 63 defendants in the 1995 qui tarn action at the time the order of dismissal was entered. The bulk of the allegations in the qui tarn actions currently pending before this Court accuse the named Defendants in each case of knowingly utilizing specifically identified techniques to measure gas volume and analyze gas heating content in a manner that produces an artificially low wellhead price. Because federal royalties are based on the wellhead price, the use of these mismeasurement techniques also allegedly results in an underpayment of royalties to the United States. The Special Master found that twenty of the alleged mismeasurement techniques are common to all 73 cases, while other mismeasurement practices are case specific. Each Complaint asserts that each of the named Defendants utilized each of the mismeas-urement techniques identified therein. A few of the cases name only one Defendant. The rest identify multiple Defendants that are alleged to be affiliated companies acting in concert through the same employees and personnel. Following a massive and complex discovery process limited to jurisdictional issues, the parties filed the instant motions, accompanied by hundreds of pages of briefs and thousands of pages of exhibits. The Special Master heard two full days of oral argument. The Defendants’ motions to dismiss contend that Relator has failed to comply with the qui tam jurisdictional provisions contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). Specifically, Defendants argue that Relator’s 1997 Qui Tam Complaints are based upon public disclosures of allegations or transactions from one of the sources listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A), and that he is not an original source, as that term is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Additionally, the Defendants assert that Relator has failed to comply with and/or violated the disclosure and seal provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). Relator’s cross-motion contends that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that Relator has met the requirements of § 3730(e)(4) as a matter of law. Section 3730(e)(4) of the False Claims Act provides: (A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. (B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information. Special Master’s Findings Regarding Public Disclosure The Special Master reviewed the various categories of documents proffered by Defendants as constituting public disclosures. He first determined that numerous documents from the technical literature on gas measurement were not public disclosures within the statute’s meaning. Though the articles did indicate that commonly employed methods of measurement were not the most accurate, the Special Master rejected them as qualifying public disclosures because the documents did not place anyone’s conduct “in a questioning light” and/or did not “disclose any transaction in which the representations of any particular gas measurer were different than the true facts.” (Report at 1156.) Similarly, he declined to accept as public disclosures the documents related to a 1988-89 investigation by the United States Senate into gas mismeasurement on federal and Indian lands because they named only “Koch Oil” (Report at 1157), a company already dismissed from these proceedings. “The fact that these documents, while noting widespread fraud, specifically identify only one company” was “central” to his conclusion. Id. After reviewing case law from various circuits, the Special Master determined that, “generally speaking, public disclosure of widespread wrongdoing in an industry does not trigger the statutory public disclosure bar as to every industry member.” (Report at 1162.) The Special Master then turned to whether documents from Relator’s 1995 qui tarn litigation (“1995 Qui Tam Action Documents”) met the statutory requirements for public disclosures. He determined that these documents do qualify as public disclosures from one of the listed sources, rejecting Relator’s assertion that such a finding would undermine the policies underlying the FCA. The Special Master further found that the nature of the dismissal of Relator’s 1995 qui tarn case has no bearing upon the question of whether the pleadings and orders entered therein constitute public disclosures of allegations or transactions under § 3730(e)(4)(A). Having determined that the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents are public disclosures of allegations or transactions from one of the sources listed in the FCA, the Special Master next addressed the question of whether and to what extent Relator’s 1997 qui tarn cases are based upon those public disclosures. He found that “if the gist of the fraudulent scheme has been publicly disclosed in a source listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A), a subsequent qui tarn action alleging a substantially identical fraudulent scheme against the same or related defendants is barred unless the relator qualifies as an original source.” (Report at 1166.) The Special Master concluded that, at least as to the 56 “Overlapping Defendants,” the 1997 qui tarn cases are based upon the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents. The more difficult question for the Special Master relates to the impact of the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents on the Defendants in the 1997 qui tarn cases which were not expressly named in the 1995 action (“Unnamed Defendants”). The Special Master determined that the publicly disclosed allegations against the defendants in the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents also constitute public disclosures of allegations as to affiliated corporations named as Defendants in the 1997 qui tarn cases. His finding is based on Relator Grynberg’s having specifically asserted in his 1995 Qui Tam Complaint that the defendants’ affiliates were participants in the fraud; accordingly, the prior public disclosure undoubtedly placed the government on the trail of the alleged fraud. (Report at 1168-70.) Defendants argued that these materials trigger the public disclosure bar not only with regard to the defendants named in the 1995 qui tarn action and their affiliated companies, but also with regard to all companies sued in the 1997 qui tarn cases. The Special Master disagreed, rejecting Defendants’ assertion that Relator’s 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents clearly alleged universal fraud by all purchasers of gas from federal and Indian properties. Even so, the Special Master found no case in which allegations against specifically identified wrongdoers, accompanied by averments of universal fraud directed at such a large and multifaceted group as “gas purchasers,” have been held to trigger the public disclosure bar against all group members. (Report at 1172.) He determined that cases dealing with similar, but not identical, generalized allegations of fraud against large industry groups have concluded that such allegations constitute public disclosures only as to those industry members specifically identified in the allegations. (Report at 1172-73) (citing, e.g., Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir.1994); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1999); and Friedman v. Rite Aid Corp., 152 F.Supp.2d 766 (E.D.Pa.2001)). The Special Master determined that “[tjhose few cases that extend the public disclosure bar to companies not expressly identified in the public disclosure itself involve very small groups of alleged wrongdoers and/or entities performing services at government owned and controlled facilities.” (Report at 1172) (citing, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568 (10th Cir.1995); United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675 (D.C.Cir.1997); and United States ex rel. Harshman v. Alcan Elec. and Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir.1999)). The Special Master ultimately concluded that although the allegations in Relator’s 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents trigger the public disclosure bar of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) as to all Defendants named therein, as well as affiliated companies acting in concert with them, its reach does not extend to all unnamed purchasers of gas from federal and Indian lands throughout the United States. (Report at 1173.) Finally, the Special Master turned to other categories of public disclosure. In the main, he found that many of these categories qualified as public disclosures of allegations or transactions, but only named defendants already identified through Relator’s 1995 qui tarn litigation. Others qualified, but identified companies not sued by Grynberg and were deemed by the Special Master to be irrelevant. Some public disclosures did raise the bar as to some companies not also identified by the 1995 litigation. The remainder of the documents, nearly all of which identified particular companies, were rejected by the Special Master on one or more grounds: (1) insufficient proof that the documents had been disclosed to the public; (2) Gryn-berg’s allegations were different than what the documents alleged; (3) no evidence that various litigation documents had actually been filed in court; (4) the given document did not put a defendant’s conduct in a questioning light; and (5) the disclosure did not come from a source listed in § 3730(e)(4), particularly a report on Gryn-berg’s allegations by an agency of the State of Alabama. Special Master’s Findings Regarding Original Source Status Having found the public disclosure bar triggered as to some of the 1997 qui tam cases before this Court, Relator can survive Defendants’ § 3730(e)(4) motions as to those cases only if he demonstrates that he is an original source of the information underlying his allegations or there are at least triable issues of material fact regarding his status as an original source. The Special Master found two primary factors controlling the “direct and independent knowledge” requirement for original source status. The first of these factors is the source of the Relator’s knowledge regarding the information supporting his allegations. Application of this factor is more difficult where, as here, a relator claims original source status based upon information derived from an independent investigation, rather than from information obtained as a whistle-blowing insider. The second factor is the extent to which the information supporting Relator’s allegations was already in the public domain. “In the context of an independent investigation, the public information factor assures that the relator brings something of real value to the table.” (Report at 1199.) In sum, the Special Master determined that “in order to demonstrate original source status based upon an independent investigation, a relator must show that: (a) a substantial amount of the knowledge of the key information underlying the allegations in the complaint is first-hand, and not derived from the knowledge or labors of others; and (b) he or she was the first to uncover a material element of the fraud (ie., either the true state of facts or the misrepresented facts) that had not previously been in the public domain.” (Report at 1201.) The Special Master further found a relationship between the direct and independent knowledge and the voluntary disclosure requirements of § 3730(e)(4)(B). “[I]n assessing whether a relator has ‘direct and independent knowledge of the information’ on which his allegations are based, the ‘information’ to be considered is that which was voluntarily provided to the government prior to the filing of the qui tam case.” (Report at 1202.) The Special Master found that “from a quantitative standpoint, a majority of Relator’s knowledge of the information on which he relies to support the allegations in his 1997 Qui Tam Complaints is secondhand or comes from publicly available sources.” (Report at 1214.) However, he agreed with Relator that the quality of his discovery and investigation is more significant, ie., “the extent to which a relator’s first-hand knowledge, possibly aided to some degree by deductions drawn from innocuous public information, was instrumental in allowing him or her to uncover the material elements of the alleged fraud and to complete the fraud equation.” Id. After a thorough analysis of the components of the alleged “fraud equation,” the Special Master concluded that the combination of speculation, information derived from publicly available materials, and second-hand knowledge compiled from third party interviews is not sufficiently “direct and independent” under the Tenth Circuit case law to qualify Relator as an original source. (Report at 1218.) The Special Master separately analyzed Relator’s original source status with respect to the qui tam cases against the Transwestern, Questar, and KN groups, finding Relator’s claim of such status to be stronger against these Defendants. (Report at 1220.) “The key question is whether Relator’s direct and independent knowledge of how these Defendant groups measure gas [is] sufficient to complete, or at least significantly assist in completing the equation of fraud that Relator has posited in his Complaints against them.” Id. The Special Master recognized that Relator’s allegations against these Defendant groups are based, at least in part, upon Relator’s own testing and analysis and/or personal business records. With little guidance from case law, the Special Master determined that if Relator’s contribution in terms of direct and independent knowledge was substantial, then portions of the fraud equation may be completed with information derived from innocuous public sources. (Report at 1223.) Ultimately, he concluded that Relator has not met his burden of demonstrating that he is an original source of the allegations in his Complaints against these Defendant groups. Special Master’s Findings Regarding Disclosure and Seal Requirements Section 3730(b)(2) of the False Claims Act states: A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information. The Special Master first addressed the parties’ dispute as to whether these written disclosure and seal requirements are “jurisdictional” or “procedural.” (Report at 1226.) Having determined that there is no controlling Tenth Circuit precedent on the issue, the Special Master concurred with “a substantial body of federal case law from other Circuits” which has “uniformly rejected attempts to read § 3730(b)(2) as implicating a court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” the import being that violation of those requirements does not mandate dismissal. (Report at 1227-28.) The Special Master further found that the criteria qualifying a disclosure for consideration in assessing compliance with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) are two-fold: (a) the disclosure must be in writing; and (b) it must be served in accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. (Report at 1230.) He concluded that only certain documents offered by Relator meet this two-fold test (“the A series of exhibits”). Id. Having identified the types of materials properly considered under § 3730(b)(2), the Special Master addressed whether there was a violation of the disclosure requirement in this case. He determined that while a relator’s § 3730(b)(2) disclosure should include much of what he will rely upon to support his contentions and allegations, the plain language of the statute does not contemplate an evaluation of the evidentiary quality of a relator’s disclosure. (Report at 1232.) Noting an apparent lack of precedent, the Special Master rejected the assertion that the disclosure requirement is a mechanism for Defendants to challenge a relator’s disclosure on qualitative grounds. The Special Master analyzed the plain language of the statute and the purpose sought to be achieved by Congress in requiring such disclosure. He concluded, At least where the government itself is not seeking dismissal under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), ... a relator complies with his duty to provide a copy of the complaint and written disclosure of “substantially all of the material evidence and information in his possession” if: (a) the complaint and written disclosures contains substantially all of the evidence and information that the relator relies upon to support the qui tarn claim; and (b) the government is able effectively to exercise its right of intervention. (Report at 1235.) Applying this standard to the cases at issue here, the Special Master found that no prejudice to the government has been demonstrated and that Relator made a meaningful effort to disclose a substantial portion of the evidence and information on which he was relying. (Report at 1236.) Finally, the Special Master addressed whether Relator Grynberg violated the seal requirement and, if so, whether dismissal is an appropriate remedy. The Defendants argue that Relator violated the seal requirement by discussing the existence and substance of his 1997 Qui Tam Complaints with various potential victims and attorneys during the seal period. The Special Master found evidence in the record to support the Defendants’ allegations, but agreed with Relator that the sanction of dismissal is unwarranted. Because the Defendants had been “tipped off’ by Relator’s 1995 Qui Tam Complaint, he concluded that Relator Grynberg’s various efforts to “shop” his claims to other alleged victims did not frustrate the purpose of the seal provision or impede the government’s investigation. The Special Master’s findings and conclusions resulted in the recommendation for dismissal of just over half of the cases pending before the Court in this multi-district litigation. Standard of Review Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs this Court’s review of the Special Master’s Report and Recommendations. The Court must afford the parties an opportunity to be heard and may adopt or affirm, modify, or wholly or partly reject the Master’s Report and Recommendations, or may resubmit the matter to the Master with instructions. Fed. R. Crv. P. 53(g)(1). The Court must decide de novo all objections to the Master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(3) & (4). Discussion With respect to the Report and Recommendations related to the requirements of § 3730(e)(4), the Coordinated Defendants assert three reasons for the Court to modify the Special Master’s determination that the public disclosure bar had not been raised as to ninety-nine of the Defendants: (1) the Report did not consider that gas measurement facilities are extensively regulated by the federal government, and that both producers and pipelines have direct contractual relationships with the Department of the Interior; (2) allegations of gas mismeasurement were so widespread and identified so many companies that the government was taken to the trailhead of the alleged fraud; and (3) the Report overlooked that Grynberg’s complaints could be “based upon” public disclosures through reports of “transactions,” even if those reports do not place a defendant’s conduct in a questioning light. Relator contends that the Special Master erred in the following respects: (1) in concluding that private litigation involving common law claims as to a very small number of natural gas mismeasurement techniques and a limited number of companies constitutes a public disclosure of all Relator’s numerous qui tam claims against all of those companies and all of their affiliates; (2) in concluding the “1995 Qui Tam Action Documents” constitute a public disclosure as to all of the Defendants named in that 1995 case and all of those Defendants’ affiliates; (3) by inappropriately making factual determinations on the issue of original source in the course of resolving the pending motions for summary judgment; and (4) in establishing a new legal standard for determining whether a relator qualifies as an original source, contrary to Kennard v. Comstock Resources, Inc., 363 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir.2004) and other prevailing False Claims Act authority. Public Disclosure Relator Grynberg contends that the Special Master erred in finding that certain documents from private litigation constitute public disclosure of his current qui tam claims against those certain Defendants. Specifically, Relator argues that a qui tam action is not based upon an earlier public dissemination unless the public disclosure identified the same facts that give rise to the clear inference of fraud, identified the same defendants, and expressly alleged that the fraud was perpetrated upon the Federal Government. However, the Court finds that Tenth Circuit authority does not support Relator’s position. “Based upon,” in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), means “supported by.” United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1545 (10th Cir.1996). “It refers to the degree of similarity between the allegations or transactions that are set out in the qui tam complaint and the allegations or transactions that have been publicly disclosed.” (Report at 1166.) The nexus necessary to fulfill the “based upon” requirement is “substantial identity” between a relator’s allegations and a public disclosure. United States ex rel. King v. Hillcrest Health Center, Inc., 264 F.3d 1271, 1279 (10th Cir.2001). Under this test, even qui tam actions only partially based upon publicly disclosed allegations or transactions may be barred. United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1051 (10th Cir.2004). Furthermore, the fact that a relator’s qui tam complaint incorporates additional or somewhat different details does not defeat the public disclosure bar. See, e.g., MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1546-47. The Tenth Circuit has explained that this “based upon” test is designed to operate as a “quick trigger” for the more exacting original source inquiry. Id. at 1545. The Court agrees with the Special Master that Relator’s suggested approach is inconsistent with the “quick trigger” concept. A qui tam action is based upon a public disclosure if the allegations in the disclosure have already set the government squarely on the trail of the alleged fraud. See United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1995). The Court agrees that “[a]n allegation that a named purchaser of gas at the wellhead is underpaying because it intentionally mismeasures volume and heating content is sufficient to alert anyone with a financial stake in gas acquired by the same purchaser that their interests are in jeopardy.” (Report at 1176-77.) As this Court has previously determined, it is the alleged filing of reports of undermeasured gas that is the gravamen of Relator’s present allegations, not the use of any particular measurement technique. Admittedly, there are differences between the allegations in Grynberg’s private litigation and the averments in the 1997 Qui Tam Complaints. However, these private lawsuits also accused the opposing parties of stealing gas by mismeasuring volume and/or heating content through use of one or more of the same mismeasurement techniques at issue in the 1997 qui tam cases now before this Court. Accordingly, the Special Master correctly concluded that to the extent that the Grynberg Private Litigation Documents constitute public disclosures of allegations or transactions from a statutory listed source, they trigger the original source inquiry only as to those specific companies. Likewise, because the testimony found in Document 133 questioned the propriety of Exxon’s gas measurement practices, and pointed out that Exxon’s practices could result in an under-measurement of gas volume, it would place the government on the trail of • the similar, but expanded allegations of gas mismeasurement against Exxon in 99 MD 1621. Therefore, the Special Master correctly concluded that 99 MD 1621 is at least based in part upon the publicly disclosed allegations and transactions in Document 133 and thus triggers the public disclosure bar. Relator further disputes that his 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents constitute public disclosures of any of the allegations or transactions on which his 1997 qui tarn cases are based. First, Relator argues that the judge presiding over his 1995 qui tarn action made a binding determination that the contents of the 1995 Qui Tam Complaint and amendments thereto were too vague and imprecise to be deemed disclosures of “allegations or transactions” of fraud, within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A). Thus, Relator contends, the principle of issue preclusion prevents this Court from finding otherwise. Second, Relator argues that the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents do not constitute a public disclosure because they fail to link any of the defendants with a particular mismeasurement technique. The Court disagrees with both contentions. Relator cites no authority which equates Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)’s technical requirements for pleading fraud with particularity to that which constitutes an “allegation or transaction” under § 3730(e)(4)(A). Relator’s assumption is at odds with the different purposes underlying Rule 9(b) and the public disclosure bar of the FCA. “The primary purpose of Rule 9(b) is to afford defendant fair notice of the plaintiffs claim and the factual ground upon which it is based.” Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 987 (10th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). In contrast, the purpose of the public disclosure bar is to prevent parasitic suits when information in the public domain is sufficient to set the government on the trail of fraud. More importantly, as stated previously, it is not the identification of each specific technique of mismeasurement, but rather the allegation that Defendants underpay royalties to the federal government by intentionally mismeasuring gas volume and heating content which operates as a “quick trigger” of the public disclosure bar. Relator Grynberg also objects to the Special Master’s ruling that the public disclosure bar was raised as to defendants not specifically named in the 1995 qui tarn action. In Sandia, supra, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the relator’s argument that his complaint was not based upon the public disclosures at issue because the disclosures did not specifically identify defendant Sandia as a wrongdoer. The appellate court pointed out that the disclosures in the General Accounting Office report and Congressional hearing detailed the mechanics of the allegedly wrongful practice, revealed that at least two of Sandia’s eight sister laboratories were employing it, and indicated the United States Department of Energy’s acquiescence. Under these circumstances, concluded the court, the public disclosures sufficiently alerted the government to the likelihood that Sandia would also engage in the alleged fraud. Sandia, 70 F.3d at 571. Sandia demonstrates that there is no per se rule in the Tenth Circuit that the public disclosure must name the later qui tarn defendant. Nevertheless, after reviewing case law from various circuits, the Special Master determined that Sandia established an exception to the general rule that public disclosure of widespread wrongdoing in an industry does not trigger the statutory public disclosure bar as to every industry member. (Report at 1158-62.) Similarly, the identification of one or a few defrauders in an industry does not operate as a public disclosure of unlawful conduct by other, unrelated companies. Exceptions to this general rule appear to be limited to situations where the proposed public disclosure asserts fraud by a small group of businesses who are easily identifiable through information in the public domain and/or widespread fraud by a narrow or discrete group of companies having unique contractual relationships with the federal government that allow for substantial government oversight. As the Sandia court observed in distinguishing Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir.1994), a case relied on by Relator Grynberg: “When attempting to identify individual actors, little similarity exists between combing through the private insurance industry in search of fraud and examining the operating procedures of nine, easily identifiable, DOE-controlled, and government-owned laboratories.” Sandia, 70 F.3d at 572. Thus, the Special Master recognized authority for the principle that the public disclosure bar can be raised as to defendants not named in a prior public disclosure where the allegations in the publicly disclosed documents allow for easy identification of unnamed wrongdoers by the federal government. This principle is consistent with the axiom that a qui tam action is based upon the allegations in a prior public disclosure if the disclosure squarely places the government on the trail of the alleged fraud. (Report at 1168.) The Special Master concluded that, because Relator Grynberg’s 1995 qui tam action and 1997 qui tam cases both specifically allege concerted action among affiliated companies, and because the affiliates of the defendants named in the 1995 qui tam action represent a relatively small group of companies readily identifiable from easily accessible information, the publicly disclosed allegations against the defendants in the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents also constitute public disclosures of allegations as to affiliated corporations named as Defendants in the 1997 qui tam cases. The Special Master declined to extend the public disclosure bar to all unnamed purchasers of gas from federal and Indian lands throughout the United States, however, finding that the purpose of the FCA is best served by applying the public disclosure bar only to those wrongdoers expressly identified in the publicly disclosed allegations, affiliates acting in concert with expressly identified wrongdoers, and groups of alleged wrongdoers who, although not individually named in the public disclosure, are quickly and easily identified because of the group’s small size and/or the group’s close connection to government owned and controlled facilities. Contrary to Relator’s argument, Defendants contend that the public disclosure bar has been raised as to all Defendants in Grynberg’s 1997 qui tam cases. Defendants argue, first, that all of Relator’s cases fall within the exception to the general rule recognized by the Special Master. In support, Defendants assert the following: the ninety-nine remaining Defendants have been sued for mismeasuring natural gas from federal and Indian lands, that the measurements occur at government controlled and approved facilities called “facility measurement points” or “points of royalty settlement,” and that these points are located on federally or tribally owned lands; at these measurement facilities, “Gas Measurers” have direct contractual relationships with the federal government (they are either federal or Indian lessees or pipelines holding federally-issued rights-of-way); and both legislative branch and executive branch inspectors had actually inspected, as a part of an investigation or required routine regulatory inspections, the measurement equipment at the very meters which are the subject of Gryn-berg’s allegations. Under these circumstances, the Court agrees with Defendants that the public disclosures would apply to all of the 1997 qui tam Defendants because the allegations concerned “widespread fraud by a group of companies having unique and direct contractual relationships with the federal government that allow for substantial government oversight.” (Report at 1162.) The activities of Relator’s “Gas Measur-ers” have long been subject to close oversight by the Interior Department. Although this group potentially involved hundreds, if not thousands of companies, all potential wrong-doers were readily identifiable by the government without the assistance of Mr. Grynberg. Mr. Gryn-berg has not assisted the government in narrowing this large group by providing “significant independent information that is not already in the public domain.” See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 682 (D.C.Cir.1997). Rather, Relator Grynberg has simply sued nearly all “Gas Measur-ers” in the industry, speculating that the fraud is widespread, if not universal. Relator adds no value to the government by researching the publicly available names of the industry’s members. As set forth previously, the Tenth Circuit test for determining whether a relator’s complaint is “based upon” publicly disclosed “allegations or transactions” is whether “substantial identity” exists between the publicly disclosed allegations and the qui tam complaint. MK-Ferguson, 99 F.3d at 1545. “The False Claims Act can thus bar a qui tam action that is only partly based upon publicly disclosed allegations or transactions. Moreover, this ‘based upon’ analysis is a threshold inquiry ‘intended as a quick trigger’ to reach the ‘original source’ analysis.” Id. (citing Precision, 971 F.2d at 552). The Court disagrees with the Special Master’s application of this test to the ninety-nine remaining Defendants which were not named in the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents or the Senate Committee Documents, or affiliated with a named Defendant. Instead, the Court finds that the principles set forth in United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp. lead to the conclusion that Relator’s 1997 Qui Tam Complaints are based upon these prior public disclosures as to all Defendants named therein. In Sandia, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report examining the research and development (R & D) activities at three out of nine multiprogram laboratories, including San-dia National Laboratory, owned by the United States government and operated by private or university contractors under the Department of Energy’s (DOE) administrative oversight. 70 F.3d at 569. The report included a section which focused on the “taxing” of nuclear waste funds by two of the laboratories during fiscal years 1988 and 1989. Concluding that those funds should be used only for research involving the storage and disposal of radioactive waste, the report noted that the Los Ala-mos and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories had taxed the waste fund for their discretionary R & D projects in 1989. The report further indicated that the DOE knew some of its laboratories were “taxing” nuclear waste funds for use in discretionary research and did not condemn the practice. Id. A subsequent congressional hearing “shed further light on the national laboratories’ practice,” although the hearing did not specify that Sandia was “taxing” nuclear waste funds. Id. at 570. At the time of the GAO report and congressional hearing, Mr. Fine was employed by the DOE’s Office of Inspector General, where his duties included auditing Sandia. He continued to investigate the activities of Sandia and other government contractors following his retirement in 1991. In 1992, Mr. Fine filed a qui tarn action alleging that Sandia improperly taxed the nuclear waste funds during fiscal years 1991 and 1992 and used the diverted funds in generic, discretionary R & D activities. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Fine’s complaint, holding that “the general allegations regarding the laboratories’ ‘taxing’ of nuclear waste funds contained in the 1990 GAO report and the 1991 congressional hearing were sufficient to constitute ‘public disclosures’ of the practice.” Id. On appeal, the relator insisted that his complaint was not based upon the public disclosures at issue because the disclosures merely described the Energy Department’s nine national laboratories’ general practice of improperly using money from a “nuclear waste fund,” whereas his complaint specifically identified Sandia as engaging in the practice. Id. at 571. The Tenth Circuit disagreed. “Because these disclosures detailed the mechanics of the practice, revealed that at least two of Sandia’s eight sister laboratories were engaged in it, and indicated the DOE’s acquiescence, we conclude that they sufficiently alerted the government to the likelihood that Sandia would also ‘tax’ nuclear waste funds in the future.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals considered the goal of the FCA’s jurisdictional scheme to find “the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own.” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C.Cir. 1994)). We analyze Mr. Fine’s claim in the context of Congress’ twin goals of rejecting suits which the government is capable of pursuing itself, while promoting those which the government is not equipped to bring on its own.... Because the GAO report and the congressional hearing set the government squarely on the trail of the alleged fraud without Mr. Fine’s assistance, we believe it would be contrary to the purposes of the FCA to exercise jurisdiction over his claim. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether the government has been set on the trail of fraud in the face of detailed allegations of widespread fraud in an industry, the issue is not whether a public disclosure names names; instead, the issue is whether, once alerted by the public disclosure to the nature of the wrongdoing, the federal government can identify the wrongdoers through whatever means are at its disposal. United States ex rel. Gear v. Emergency Med. Assoc. of Illinois, Inc., 436 F.3d 726, 729 (7th Cir.2006) (“Industry-wide public disclosures bar qui tarn actions against any defendant who is directly identifiable from the public disclosures.”). Like the GAO report in Sandia, the Senate investigation, hearing, and report, and certainly Relator’s 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents, put the government on notice of “widespread theft through mis-measurement of oil and gas by purchasers of gas” from wells on federal and Indian lands. (Report at 1157.) These public disclosures “identified various mismeasurement practices” and a “vast opportunity for theft.” Id. Because the Senate disclosures indicated that information concerning other unnamed companies had been turned over to the Department of Justice, the Court can presume that any further investigation would have looked at any company measuring gas from federal or Indian lands. While, admittedly, this group of “Gas Measurers” is much larger than the group of laboratories at issue in Sandia, these companies are readily identifiable by the government. The Court finds that Relator Grynberg is an “opportunistic plaintiff’ who has little or no significant information to contribute of his own. Rather, Mr. Grynberg merely speculates that the fraud is occurring industry-wide, naming nearly the entire industry in this action and hoping that discovery will reveal the necessary evidence to support his vast claims. His present qui tam complaints are clearly “based upon” the prior public disclosures of widespread fraud. The holding in United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, supra, further supports this Court’s findings. In Findley, the relator sued “all employees’ clubs of the [Bureau of Prisons] and the United States Department of Justice that earn revenue from the provision of vending services on federal property.” 105 F.3d at 678. The relator specifically named one club of employees who worked at the prison camp in Boron, California, alleging that its members were unlawfully retaining money from vending machines in employee and visitor rooms at the prison, money he alleged should have been paid into the Treasury. The court found that the relator’s complaint was based upon three public disclosures. The first was a forty-year-old government report disclosing that it was doubtful that federal employees clubs could lawfully retain the profits received from vending machines on government premises. The report mentioned only the clubs of the United States Postal Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. at 685. The second was a 1974 Senate report regarding amendments to the Randolph-Sheppard Act which noted that federal employee welfare and recreation groups had long retained money from vending machines on federal property, despite suggestions that the practice was unlawful. The third was a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which referenced these two documents. Id. at 686. None of these disclosures specifically mentioned either the club at FPC-Boron or even the more general class of clubs at Bureau of Prisons facilities. To determine the meaning of “based upon,” the Findley court took guidance from the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc. wherein the court explained that “[a]s a matter of common usage, the phrase ‘based upon’ is properly understood to mean ‘supported by.’ ” Findley, 105 F.3d at 682 (quoting Precision, 971 F.2d at 552). The D.C. Circuit further noted, “[T]he Tenth Circuit reasoned that its limited interpretation of who could sue under the statute protected the incentive for private citizens with first-hand knowledge to expose fraud, but also prohibited civil actions brought by opportunists who do not contribute anything significant to the exposure of the fraud.” Id. Upon review of the language, structure, history and purpose of the FCA, the Findley court concluded that “Congress sought to limit qui tam actions ‘to those in which the relator has contributed significant independent information [that is not already in the public domain].’ ” Id. (quoting Springfield Terminal Ry., 14 F.3d at 653). The relator in Findley argued that allowing the public disclosure bar to be raised by generic allegations of wrongdoing by employees’ clubs would “frustrate the purpose of the qui tam provisions by foreclosing suits by whistleblowers who have identified specific instances of fraudulent conduct.” Id. at 686. The D.C. Circuit, however, found this concern untenable. “When the publicly disclosed transaction is sufficient to raise the inference of fraud ...., there is little need for qui tam actions, which tend to be suits that the government presumably has chosen not to pursue or which might decrease the government’s recovery in suits it has chosen to pursue.” Id. at 687. “The disclosures recognize that the practice occurs throughout the federal government, thus their relevance cannot be confined to specific agencies.” Id. Those disclosures “specifically identify the nature of the fraud — illegal retention of monies owed to the government and unauthorized administrative approval of the practice — as well as the federal employee actors engaged in the allegedly fraudulent activity.” Id. The court found that Findley’s complaint substantially repeated what the public already knew and “add[ed] only the identity of particular employees’ clubs engaged in the questionable and previously documented generic practice” from the universe of “easily identifiable federal employee organizations that provide vending services on federal property.” Id. The Court finds that the consolidated cases before it are more closely akin to Findley than to Cooper, a ease on which the Special Master relied in concluding that the public disclosure bar had not been raised as to previously unnamed Defendants. Like Findley, with its disclosures regarding generically labeled “federal employee welfare and recreation groups” on federal property — a class numbering in the hundreds — -these cases are presaged by public disclosures alleging gas mismeas-urement on federal and Indian lands, both by many identified companies and by more generically described groups such as “gas measurers,” “gas pipelines,” or the “natural gas industry.” Like Findley, the complaints here alleged that a class of defendants engaged in identical fraud. And the Defendants here are “easily identifiable” actors in gas measurement on federal and Indian lands because of their contracts with and/or oversight by the Department of the Interior. The Court concludes, therefore, that because Relator Grynberg’s 1997 Qui Tam Complaints merely echo publicly disclosed, allegedly fraudulent conduct that “already enables the government to adequately investigate the case and to make a decision whether to prosecute,” the public disclosure bar applies to all Defendants. Id. at 688. Cooper stands in contrast. There the relator had repeatedly seen his claims for insurance reimbursement denied by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida (“BCBSF”), which always asserted it was an insurer secondary to Medicare. Cooper, 19 F.3d at 564. After researching his benefits and the law governing payment of his claims, he learned that this conduct might be occurring at other insurance companies. Other public disclosures discussed widespread Medicare Secondary Payer (“MSP”) fraud and named certain insurance companies, but none named BCBSF. The court ruled that the public disclosure bar had not been raised by these disclosures, reasoning that to require “allegations specific to a particular defendant be publically disclosed before finding the action potentially barred encourages private citizen involvement and increases the chances that every instance of fraud will be revealed.” Id. at 566. Unlike Mr. Grynberg and the relators in Findley, Mr. Cooper did not begin with an assertion of widespread fraud, then go in search of defendants. Cooper sued only one defendant with allegations arising out of years of direct dealings with the company. Unlike Findley and the present cases, BCBSF was not operating on federal property, subject to routine government inspections, and in a direct contractual relationship with the government. No evidence in Cooper showed the government could know (without the help of a public disclosure) which entity was supposed to be acting as Cooper’s primary insurer; the evidence in the present cases shows that the government knew exactly who was measuring gas produced from federal and Indian lands. Relator Grynberg’s 1997 qui torn cases against hundreds of “Gas Measurers” on federal and Indian lands are clearly based upon the public disclosures of widespread fraud, not on significant independent information regarding specific companies. Having determined that the 1995 Qui Tam Action Documents and the Senate Select Committee Documents raise the public disclosure bar as to all Defendants named in Relator’s 1997 qui tam cases, the Court need not address whether other documents the Special Master rejected as qualifying public disclosures also raise the bar. However, it should be noted that the Court agrees with Defendants’ argument that a particular disclosure on its own does not have to place a defendant’s conduct in a questioning light. “[T]he public disclosure of the material elements of the fraudulent transaction bars qui tam actions even if the disclosure itself does not allege any wrongdoing.” Sandia, 70 F.3d at 572. More recently, the Tenth Circuit has held that the public disclosure bar is raised where “[a]ll of the material elements of the fraudulent transaction were already in the public domain.” United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1051 (10th Cir.2004) (emphasis added). The relator must possess substantive information about the particular fraud, rather than merely background information which enables a putative relator to understand the significance of a publicly disclosed transaction or allegation. If a relator merely uses his or her unique expertise or training to conclude that the material elements already in the public domain constitute a false claim, then a qui tam action cannot proceed. Findley, 105 F.3d at 688 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court also notes its disagreement with the Special Master’s rejection as a public disclosure of an administrative report of an audit and investigation by the State of Alabama (“the Evaluation Report”) naming certain companies, including Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., Shell, Exxon, Offshore Group, Inc., Callon Petroleum, Legacy Resources Co., Scana Petroleum Resources, Mobile Gas Company, and Transcontinental Gas Pipeline. The Special Master found that the Evaluation Report, in addition to an explanation of the measurement techniques employed by these companies, also discusses many of the gas measurement issues raised in Relator’s 1997 Qui Tam Complaints. (Report at 1190.) The Special Master further found that, although the Report does not contain allegations of wrongdoing, it arguably discloses “transactions” from which wrongdoing can be inferred, particularly when combined with other public disclosures. Nevertheless, the Special Master concluded that the Evaluation Report did not qualify as a statutory source under § 3730(e)(4)(A) because it had not been issued by an agency of the federal government. (Report at 1191.) The Special Master was persuaded by the reasoning of United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734 (3rd Cir.1997), which held that state administrative reports and investigations do not qualify as public disclosures from any of the statutory listed sources. Id. at 745. Focusing on the statutory phrase “congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation,” the Special Master concluded that because the word “administrative” appeared in between two entities that are clearly federal — Congress and the GAO — the term must be understood to refer to only federal administrative investigations and reports, and not state reports. He added that his conclusion was supported by policy. Seeing the goal of public disclosure as one of putting the federal government on notice of fraud, the Special Master determined that “[rjeports generated by the myriad of state, county, and local administrative agencies that do not relate to joint state-federal programs are unlikely candidates to fulfill the notice function.” (Report at 80) (emphasis added). The Shell, Exson and Mobil Defendants separately objected to the Special Master’s findings on this issue, arguing that the Evaluation Report constitutes a public disclosure even under the Special Master’s reading of the limited precedent, and that the Special Master’s reading of the statute was overly restrictive. In United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982 (8th Cir.2003), the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Dunleavy court ruled more broadly than necessary in stating that a state agency disclosure may never qualify as an “administrative ... report, hearing, audit, or investigation” for purposes of § 3730(e)(4)(A). Id. at 989. Rather, the Hays court rejected the Third Circuit’s textual approach and concluded “that Medicaid compliance audits and audit reports conducted and prepared by the state agency authorized to administer this cooperative federal/state program are public disclosures within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A).” Id. at 988. These Defendants contend that, because the Alabama Evaluation Report related to a joint state/federal program, it should likewise qualify as a public disclosure. Defendants argue that the Special Master failed to consider applicable federal regulations and certain relevant facts contained in the Evaluation Report which indicate the Report was the product of a cooperative program. The Report clearly addresses the measurement of gas production in an area of cooperative federal and state offshore development. The Report’s Introduction states, “[I]t is imperative that all the hydrocarbon production from offshore state waters and certain federal blocks are accurately measured and that payments are received in full for all such production.” The Court finds that this state-generated report that investigates gas measurement of gas streams, including those from federal leases, would likely place the federal government on notice of fraudulent activities impacting the federal fisc. Furthermore, the Court finds that limiting the word “administrative” to only federal administrative reports, audits and investigations is inconsistent with the plain language of the phrase at issue as well as the language and interpretation of the remaining portions of § 3730(e)(4)(A). The immediately preceding phrase in that statutory section provides that public disclosures include any “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing,” and courts have consistently interpreted that phrase to include both state and federal litigation and administrative hearings. A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir.2000); United States ex rel. Reagan v. East Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 384 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. O’Keeffe v. Sverdup Corp., 131 F.Supp.2d 87, 91-92 (D.Mass.2001). Likewise, this section of the FCA also gives public disclosure status to “the news media” regardless of whether that media is national, state, or local. There is no reason to conclude that Congress intended to limit administrative reports, audits, and investigations to federal actions, while simultaneously allowing all state and local civil litigation, state and local administrative hearings, and state and local news media to be treated as public disclosures. To interpret the statute so narrowly would have the anomalous result of allowing public disclosure status to the most obscure local news report and the most obscure state and local civil lawsuit or administrative hearing, but denying public disclosure status to a formal public report of a state government agency, such as the Alabama Evaluation Report. The public disclosure bar is designed to limit qui tam jurisdiction “to those cases in which the relator played a role in exposing a fraud of which the public was previously unaware.” Findley, 105 F.3d at 678. If all state administrative reports, audits, or investigations were automatically excluded as public disclosures because they do not originate from the federal government, a primary purpose of the statute would be undermined in that relators would be empowered to copy the results of widely disseminated audits or investigations regarding fraud and nonetheless be permitted to proceed with their parasitic qui tam action merely because the federal government had not issued the report. Therefore, this Court rejects the Special Master’s findings with respect to the Alabama Evaluation Report. Finally, Relator Grynberg contends that he is being denied equal protection because he now must meet the “more exacting” original source standard in this re-filed qui tam action than he would have needed to satisfy in his 1995 qui tam case. “If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [a court] will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996). “Qui tam relators” are not a suspect class, and no one has a fundamental right to sue on the government’s behalf. Thus, the rational basis test applies. “Under the rational basis test, the court upholds the policy if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Copelin Brown v. New Mexico State Personnel Office, 399 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir.2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The policy behind the public disclosure bar provides the rational basis. “[Wjhere public disclosure of the fraud has already occurred, no incentive for a private qui tam suit is needed.” United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1546 (10th Cir.1996). The public disclosure bar, as construed by the Spe