Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION PRATT, Chief Judge. On March 25, 2005, Plaintiff Terry Harrington (“Harrington”), individually and in his capacity as the father of Nicole Antoinette Harrington, filed a Complaint and Jury Demand (Clerk’s No. 1) against Pot-tawattamie County, the City of Council Bluffs, David Richter (“Richter”), Joseph Hrvol (“Hrvol”), Daniel Larsen (“Larsen”), Lyle Brown (“Brown”), and various John Does, alleging the following claims: 1) Fabricated and Perjured Testimony— § 1983 Civil Rights Violations; 2) Withheld Evidence — Brady and Giglio Violations; 3) Conspiracy under the Color of State Law to Deny Constitutional Rights; 4) State Claim — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 5) State Claim — Malicious Prosecution; and 6) State Claim — Loss of Parental Consortium. Harrington Clerk’s No. 1. On May 4, 2005, Plaintiff Curtis W. McGhee, Jr. (“McGhee”), filed a similar action against Pottawattamie County, Council Bluffs, Hrvol, Richter, Matthew Wilber (‘Wilber”), Larsen, Brown, and David Dawson (“Dawson”), alleging thirty-two counts, including § 1983 violations; Malicious Prosecution; False Arrest and Imprisonment; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Conspiracy; Unconstitutional Customs and Policies; and Defamation. McGhee Clerk’s No. 1. On October 10, 2006, having previously consolidated both of the above-captioned cases, along with a defamation case filed by Harrington, for purposes of discovery, United States Chief Magistrate Judge Thomas Shields ordered the trials of both cases consolidated. The Magistrate Judge ordered that McGhee’s defamation claim be consolidated with Harrington’s defamation and slander claims made in Case No. 4:03-cv-90616, and that trial on those matters should be bifurcated from the trial on Harrington and McGhee’s various constitutional and other state law claims. See McGhee Clerk’s No. 103; Harrington Clerk’s No. 97 (Order Consolidating Cases for Trial) (“[T]he underlying facts and the common thread throughout the testimony of all liability witnesses who will testify is essentially the same.”). Currently pending before the Court are several motions, including Motions for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Pottawattamie County, Hrvol, Richter, and Wilber, in each of the above-captioned actions (McGhee Clerk’s No. 95; Harrington Clerk’s No. 93); a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, filed by Defendants Larsen, Brown and the City of Council Bluffs in the Harrington case (Clerk’s No. 90); a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed by Defendants Dawson and the City of Council Bluffs in the McGhee case (Clerk’s No. 99); and a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, filed by Defendants Larsen, Brown, and the City of Council Bluffs in the McGhee case (Clerk’s No. 100). Each Plaintiff has resisted the respective motion and the matters are fully submitted. In light of the fact that both cases arise from fundamentally the same factual backgrounds, and in light of the fact similar arguments are raised in each of the motions, the Court finds it prudent to deal with all pending motions in one order. Additionally pending before the Court is McGhee’s Motion for Leave to File Surre-ply Brief on County and Prosecutors’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk’s No. 133). Defendants filed a resistance to the Motion and a Request to Strike the Surre-ply accompanying it (Clerk’s No. 137). Defendants argue that the Surreply is redundant and merely continues arguing points raised in McGhee’s resistance. While admittedly the Local Rules do not provide for the filing of a surreply, they also do not prohibit the consideration of a surreply in the Court’s discretion. Having reviewed the surreply, filed in response to Defendants’ Reply Brief, the Court finds that consideration of the document will aid the Court in resolution of the pending Motions for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, McGhee’s Motion for leave to file the document is GRANTED. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On approximately July 5, 1977, Captain John Schweer (“Schweer”) retired from the Council Bluffs, Iowa Police Department. On or about July 12,1977, Schweer went to work as a night security guard for three car dealerships in Council Bluffs: McIntyre Oldsmobile; Bluffs Toyota; and O’Neill Datsun. At around 9:30 a.m. on Friday, July 22, 1977, Schweer’s body was found on the railroad tracks near O’Neill Datsun. Schweer had died of a 12-gauge shotgun wound to the right chest. A lone 12-gauge shotgun shell was found on the premises of McIntyre Oldsmobile. The shell was a green Remington paper shotgun shell containing size # 4 shot, the same size pellets found in Schweer’s body. Additionally, the live shell found at McIntyre Oldsmobile had paper wadding, a component that Remington stopped using in approximately 1966, and similar to that found at the murder scene. Defendants Brown and Larsen, detectives with the Council Bluffs police department at the time of the murder, were assigned as lead investigators on the Schweer murder. County Attorney Richter and Assistant County Attorney Hrvol worked closely with Brown, Larsen, and the Council Bluffs Police Department during the investigation, and both participated in witness interviews prior to any arrests being made in the case. Early in the Schweer investigation, Defendants learned that, on or about July 20, 1977, Schweer had written a note to McIntyre Oldsmobile employee David Edwards, stating that he had witnessed a man trying to get into one of the trucks on the lot the night before. When Schweer approached the man, the man ran away. Schweer recommended that flood lights be placed in that portion of the dealership lot. Additionally, Defendants learned that Schweer had a conversation with Council Bluffs Police Officer Ron Cady in the early morning hours of July 21, 1977. Schweer told Cady that he had seen a man carrying what he thought was a rifle or a car jack at O’Neill Datsun, and that he believed the man and his dog were still in the area. Plaster casts of footprints and dog prints were taken in the area around Schweer’s body following the murder. On July 23, 1977, Council Bluffs Police Officer Richard Moore reported that he and Officer O.G. Chapin had found shoe and dog prints west of the area where Schweer’s body was found that were of the same type and shape as those found at the crime scene. Moore also noted that a fit person could get from the murder scene and completely across the nearby 1-29 interstate in four minutes. On July 25, 1977, Brown wrote a report of an interview with James Burke (“Burke”), an employee at the Northwestern Bell office located due west of where Sehweer’s body was found. Brown reported that Burke told police that he had seen a man of average build running in a westerly direction between the Northwestern Bell building and 1-29 on July 19, 1977, at about 11:30 p.m. According to Burke, the man was wearing overalls, and had a shotgun and a dog with him. Burke also reported that Schweer drove up to him that same evening and asked if he had seen a man running in the area. A July 28, 1977 report by Council Bluffs Police Sergeant Larry Williams states that when Williams and Richter reinterviewed Burke, they obtained substantially the same information as Brown had reported. When Larsen heard that a man with a dog had been seen in the area of Schweer’s murder, he thought of Charles Richard Gates (“Gates”). Gates was a white male, aged approximately 47, whose sister, Marcella Oamek was married to a Captain on the Council Bluffs Fire Department. Gates was known to carry a shotgun while walking his dogs. Council Bluffs police picked up Gates and photographed him. A police report states that Gates was questioned by Council Bluffs police officers a few days after the murder, but there is no report detailing that interview. A July 28, 1977, police report reflects that Council Bluffs police, along with Richter, interviewed David Waide (“Waide”), who worked in the area of the murder. Waide was shown a photograph of Gates and positively identified him as the man Waide saw walking his dogs in the area. Waide had last seen Gates on July 19, 1977. Another report of the same date reflects that Council Bluffs Police Officer L.L. Diamond and Hrvol canvassed the neighborhood near the scene of the murder. One Mrs. Shea told them that she had seen a man in overalls and a hat walking dogs. The report states that Mrs. Shea gave a “perfect description of Gates, a previous suspect in [the] case.” Information obtained from Mrs. Akins, another neighborhood resident, “concurred] exactly” with Mrs. Shea’s information, though Mrs. Akins had seen the individual as recently as July 22,1977. Larsen did a background check on Gates and wrote a report of his findings on August 12, 1977. According to the report, Gates’ neighbors described him as a “spooky type individual” who constantly walked his three dogs and was “strictly a loner.” Larsen reported that Gates drove a white car painted to look like a police vehicle that had a set of “top lights consisting of backup or turn signal type lights made for larger type trucks” which gave the appearance of lights on a police car. Larsen additionally reported that Gates had been a suspect in the 1963 homicide of a female co-worker at a printing company in Omaha. Larsen wrote in his report that Gates had been given a polygraph and that the tester opined that Gates was not truthful in his denials of owning a shotgun or having shot Schweer. Larsen’s report recommended further investigation of Gates. According to the Complaints, there is no documentation anywhere in the Schweer murder file indicating that Gates’ home was searched, that footprint comparisons were made, or indicating why Gates was ultimately eliminated as a suspect. Regardless, at some point the investigation began to focus on a “car theft ring,” rather than on Gates. On September 1, 1977, two cars were stolen in Fremont, Nebraska: a 1977 Cadillac (“Cadillac”) from Sid Dillon Oldsmobile and a 1976 Lincoln (“Lincoln”) from Diers Ford. The suspects in the thefts were three black youths driving a black Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme with Douglas County, Nebraska, license plates. Police believed that the thieves visited the dealerships during business hours, took the keys for the cars and replaced them with “dummy” keys, and then returned after hours to steal the cars (referred to hereinafter as a “key-switch scheme”). The thefts were reported by the Nebraska State Patrol to the Council Bluffs Police on September 5, 1977. Larsen checked the Council Bluffs Police records and found that a Black Oldsmobile Cutlass (“black Cutlass”) had been reported stolen from Bluffs Toyota shortly before Schweer started working as a night watchman. Also on September 5, 1977, the Lincoln was discovered abandoned in Omaha, but a t-shirt had been left in the vehicle with “Contact Band” written on the front and “Jones” on the back. On September 9, 1977, Lincoln Nebraska police stopped three black teenagers — -Kevin Mack (age 16), Roderick Jones (age 17), and Candice Pride (age 16) — in the stolen Cadillac. Jones admitted that the t-shirt that had been found in the abandoned Lincoln was his t-shirt. Kevin Mack, a/k/a Kevin Hughes (hereinafter “Hughes”) had a long criminal record, but denied that he stole the Cadillac he was found driving. He told Fremont, Nebraska police that three other individuals — Terry Harrington, Anthony Houston, and “Cub” (later identified as Curtis McGhee) had stolen the cars from Fremont, as well as the black Cutlass from Council Bluffs and another Lincoln from a dealership in Omaha. Hughes told police that Houston had given him permission to drive the Cadillac, and that the other set of keys found in the Cadillac belonged to the real car thieves. After being notified by Nebraska authorities that Hughes might have information on the Schweer murder, Larsen and Brown traveled to Lincoln to interview Hughes. According to the Complaints, Hughes was told that police knew he was involved in the car theft ring, and that police knew that he and his fellow car thieves were responsible for Schweer’s murder. Hughes was purportedly told that he would not be charged with murder if he gave authorities someone else, and that there was a $5,000.00 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of Schweer’s murderer or murderers. Additionally, Hughes was told that authorities would help him with numerous pending charges if Hughes helped them on the Schweer case. Hughes first told Larsen and Brown in a written statement that he saw an individual named Dennis Jackson and a “light-skinned man” (later identified as Steven Frazier) at a car wash in Omaha. Hughes stated that Frazier told him he had stolen his Lincoln Continental from McIntyre Oldsmobile and had killed a security guard to get it. As no Lincoln was stolen from McIntyre Oldsmobile on the night of the murder, Larsen and Brown told Hughes they knew he was lying. At some point in time, Hughes also told investigators that Arnold Kelly was involved in the Schweer murder. Subsequent police investigation, however, revealed that Kelly was in the Kansas City Job Corp at the time and could not have been involved in Schweer’s murder. According to the Complaints, the Defendants began pressuring Hughes to implicate Harrington, McGhee,’ and Houston (the same individuals Hughes accused of various car thefts) in the Schweer murder. Hughes initially told investigators that he did not think the three were capable of murder, but he eventually told authorities that while he was not personally involved, Harrington and others told him that they had killed Schweer. When authorities accused Hughes of lying, Hughes admitted that he was lying. On September 30, 1977, Hughes next told police that he was present on the night of the murder. He was brought to Council Bluffs to meet with the 1977 Defendants at the scene of the murder. The Complaints allege that, although authorities knew that Hughes was a liar, they nonetheless “worked with” him to create a case against Harrington and McGhee by editing Hughes’ story to eliminate those items that could be proved false and by providing Hughes with more details of the crime to make his story more credible. Indeed, the Complaints allege that in his September 30,- 1977 statement, Hughes claimed to have gone to McIntyre Oldsmobile on the night of the murder with Houston, but ultimately dropped Houston from his story after Defendants told Hughes that Houston was in jail on the night of the murder and could not have been present at the Schweer murder. Hughes’ story in 1977 also changed in other ways. He first claimed that Schweer was killed with a pistol, but later said the murder weapon was a 20-gauge pump shotgun. Accordingly to the Complaints, Defendants told Hughes that a 12-gauge shotgun shell was found near a To-ronado parked in front of the new-car showroom at McIntyre Oldsmobile, and Hughes then changed his story to say a 12-gauge shotgun was used to murder Schweer, and that the plan was to steal the Toronado that evening. Ultimately, Hughes claimed that he, Harrington, and McGhee drove around the three Council Bluffs car dealerships the night of the murder. They parked Harrington’s green 1970 Oldsmobile 98, and Harrington, who had the keys to the Toronado, retrieved a shotgun from the trunk, wrapped it in a tan leather jacket, and proceeded to walk from his vehicle to the Toronado, along with McGhee. Hughes stated that he sat in the backseat of Harrington’s car listening to music and smoking cigarettes. Hughes claimed that he heard a shot and then saw Harrington, McGhee and Houston (though Hughes later omitted Houston from the scenario) come running back to the car from behind McIntyre Oldsmobile. At some point, Hughes changed his story to more aptly reflect the fact that Schweer’s body was found closer to O’Neill Datsun. Though Schweer’s Toyota Land Cruiser was found near his body with the lights on and the door open, Hughes never mentioned seeing or hearing Schweer or his vehicle, nor did Hughes ever state that Harrington or McGhee told him that Schweer had come upon them during then-attempt to steal the Toronado. Hughes also stated in his September 30, 1977 statement that Harrington wrapped a tan leather jacket around the gun before going to steal the Toronado. In an October 1977 search of Harrington’s mother’s home, authorities seized a reddish-maroon vinyl jacket, which was later given to the Iowa Bureau of Investigation to be tested for gunpowder residue. Michael Petersen, the Iowa Bureau of Investigation technician who examined the jacket, found no evidence that Harrington’s jacket had been wrapped around a shotgun at the time of its firing. Petersen did, however, state that two particles of debris from the surface of the jacket were unburned, smokeless gunpowder. The particles were destroyed by the testing and thus were not subject to independent testing by either Harrington or McGhee. Petersen did not match the particles to the gunpowder found in the shotgun shell found at McIntyre Oldsmobile after the murder, or with gunpowder found on the victim. There was also no attempt to rule out the possibility that the particles could have come from a .410 shotgun owned by Harrington and retrieved during the search. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants then undertook a scheme to coerce other “witnesses” into corroborating Hughes’ story. While Hughes initially told authorities that he was watching television with Pride on the night of the murder, he later stated that McGhee and Harrington picked him up in Omaha before the murder. Eventually, Hughes stated that others, including Candice Pride and another individual named Clyde Jacobs, were present when Harrington and McGhee picked Hughes up in Omaha. Hughes also initially stated that Harrington and McGhee picked him up at around 11:00 p.m. Harrington’s high school football coach, however, had seen him at an Ohio Players concert in Omaha at approximately that time. Hughes later stated that Harrington and McGhee picked him up around midnight, rather than at 11:00 p.m. On October 17, 1977, Larsen wrote a report indicating that Roderick Jones had admitted being with Hughes on several occasions when the key-switch scheme was used to steal cars from dealerships. According to the Complaints, Brown told Jones that they knew McGhee, Harrington, and Hughes had killed Schweer and that Jones should say he saw them together on the night of the murder or risk being charged with auto theft and murder. In a taped statement made after being placed in a room with Hughes, Jones said that everything he knew came from Hughes, and that he was with Hughes and Clyde Jacobs when Harrington and McGhee picked up Hughes on the night of the murder. Later at the trials, Jones stated that Pride was also present when Harrington and McGhee picked up Hughes. Though Jones’ taped statement indicated that McGhee and Harrington picked up Hughes in the late part of July, he testified at McGhee’s trial that it was sometime in the middle of July, and testified at Harrington’s trial that it was the evening of July 21, 1977. Likewise, Jones’ taped statement indicated that Hughes was picked up around 11:30 p.m., but at McGhee’s 1978 trial he claimed it was around 11:00 p.m. or midnight, and at Harrington’s trial he said that he was at the same Ohio Players concert as Harrington and saw Harrington and McGhee pick Hughes up around midnight or 12:30 a.m. Clyde Jacobs was brought to Council Bluffs numerous times by Larsen, Brown and Hrvol for questioning, sometimes with Jones and Pride. Jacobs originally stated that Harrington and “another colored guy” picked up Hughes, but testified at McGhee’s trial that Harrington and McGhee picked Hughes up at “12 something.” At Harrington’s trial, Jacobs stated that Harrington and McGhee picked up Hughes at “11 something” and also stated that he had been at the same Ohio Players concert as Harrington. Candice Pride was dating Hughes in the fall of 1977. According to the Complaints, Pride was told that her boyfriend, Hughes, would be charged with murder if she did not corroborate his story about being picked up by Harrington and McGhee on the night of the murder. On October 12, 1977, Pride signed a statement indicating that in the latter weeks of July 1977, she, Jones, Hughes and others were together in a parking lot when Harrington and McGhee picked up Hughes at around 10:45 p.m. In an April 1978 statement to McGhee’s lawyer, however, Pride stated that she didn’t think she was in Omaha in July 1977, that she was not involved with Hughes at that time, and that she did not see Harrington and McGhee pick up Hughes. At the McGhee trial, however, Pride testified consistent with her October 12, 1977 statement, though she stated that Hughes was picked up at 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. At Harrington’s trial, Pride testified that Hughes was picked up around midnight. According to the Complaints, Hughes claimed that he had Harrington and McGhee drop him off at his girlfriend, Linda Lee’s house in Omaha after the murder. Hughes claimed that he arrived at Lee’s house at around 1:30 a.m. and that Lee saw Harrington’s car leave. Lee was interviewed by Larsen and Brown in October 1977, and she signed a statement indicating that Hughes came to her house after midnight one evening in the latter part of July, and that she saw Harrington and another black male in Harrington’s car that night. At McGhee’s trial, Lee was unable to say during what part of July she saw Hughes and whether it was before or after 1:00 a.m. At Harrington’s trial, Lee testified that Hughes came over after midnight twice on the same night in July 1977. The first time was after midnight, and the second time was around 2:00 a.m. Within a few days after Schweer’s murder, two workers at Transley Trucking, a business around 200 yards from where Schweer’s body was found, informed authorities that they had heard a loud noise like a firecracker between 3:00 and 3:30 а.m. on July 22, 1977. The medical examiner’s report placed the time of Schweer’s death at around 4:00 a.m. The pathologist who performed Schweer’s autopsy testified that Schweer died approximately fifteen minutes to one hour after being shot, and that it was “very possible” that Schweer died close to 4:00 a.m. On November 16 (Harrington) and 17 (McGhee), 1977, preliminary informations, signed by Brown and approved by Hrvol and Richter, were filed charging McGhee and Harrington with Schweer’s murder. McGhee and Harrington were each arrested the same day the respective informa-tions were issued in Omaha and were extradited to Pottawattamie County, Iowa, on or about December 22,1977. The cases were transferred to juvenile court on or about December 23, 1977, but were referred back to the County Attorney’s office on or about January 20, 1978. On February 17, 1978, a True Information was filed formally charging McGhee and Harrington with first degree murder. The evidence implicating McGhee and Harrington listed in the True Information was the Minutes of Testimony containing Hughes’ story. Plaintiffs allege that, due to credibility concerns about Hughes, the 1977 Defendants concealed at least eight Council Bluffs Police Department reports from Plaintiffs to deprive them of material, exculpatory evidence. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the two reports related to James Burke seeing a man with a dog and shotgun were concealed; that David Waide’s identification of Gates was concealed; that Larsen’s background report on Gates was concealed; that a report of the County Attorney’s Office’s consultation with an astrologer about Gates was concealed; that the report referencing Schweer’s note suggesting the installation of floodlights was concealed; and that a report in which Officer Kremer reported that Gates had been interviewed shortly after the murder was concealed. After arresting and filing True Informa-tions against the Plaintiffs for the murder of Schweer, the 1977 Defendants sought out prisoners who were in jail with McGhee to falsely testify against him. Ken Freeman was allegedly promised that he would not have to go back to the Ana-mosa prison if he agreed to testify against McGhee, but refused. Tyrone Pierce, an eighteen year old charged with burglary and car theft, was allegedly offered reduced charges for testimony against McGhee. After he was placed in a cell adjacent to McGhee’s, Pierce stated that McGhee admitted to killing Schweer. Pierce’s own charges were ultimately dropped. Larry Plater, a jail inmate awaiting transfer to a reformatory, claimed that McGhee told him a few days after the murder that he had been present when Harrington killed a police officer. Plater purportedly gave this testimony in exchange for a promise not to go to the reformatory. Eric Hartwell, an eighteen year old inmate serving a ten-year sentence at the Anamosa prison, contacted Larsen and Hrvol and told them that McGhee had told him that Harrington and another unnamed individual had gotten a 12-gauge shotgun out of the trunk, wrapped it in a jacket, and shot the “sheriff’ twice. Hartwell admitted that when incarcerated near McGhee, McGhee had a copy of the True Information which alleged this information, but Hartwell denied looking at it. Hartwell testified at McGhee’s trial that the information about an unknown individual was a “typo.” Hartwell’s sentence was subsequently reduced. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants did not tell them about any of the “deals” they had with jailhouse informants. On June 13, 1978, McGhee was convicted for the first-degree murder of John Schweer and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Harrington was convicted of the same crime and received the same sentence on August 4, 1978. According to the Complaints, Brown testified at Harrington’s 1978 trial, and at Harrington’s 1987 post-conviction review proceedings, that there were no early alternative suspects in Schweer’s murder. He did not indicate that Charles Gates was ever a suspect. At the depositions of Richter, Hrvol, Larsen, and Brown related to Harrington’s 1987 proceedings, each denied the existence of alternative suspects. James Cleary, Harrington’s attorney, testified in 2000 that, after making a global discovery request, he received documents, but none contained Gates’ name or indicated that Gates was a viable suspect. McGhee’s attorney in his 1987 post-conviction proceeding also claimed that he requested all files relating to Schweer’s murder from the Pottawattamie County Attorney’s Office, but that nothing in those materials mentioned Gates as a viable suspect. In McGhee’s first post-conviction review in 1987, McGhee served an interrogatory requesting the “names and addresses of all suspects in the case.” The answer was that no one “other than the plaintiff’ was a suspect. Likewise, McGhee served an interrogatory asking “[w]hat the result of the investigation of the report of a man and a dog seen in the vicinity of McIntyre Oldsmobile a night or two before John Schweer’s death?” The response to the interrogatory was that the “man and dog” was “never found or identified.” In 1987, McGhee also served an interrogatory requesting information about “witnesses used at trial who were promised leniency in exchange for their testimony against Curtis McGhee, and the specific promises made to each.” The reply was “[n]one.” Hrvol assisted in answering the interrogatories. In 1999, Anne Danaher, an employee of the Iowa prison where Harrington was incarcerated, got to know Harrington and his family. She requested the Council Bluffs Police Department file concerning Schweer’s murder. The withheld reports regarding Charles Gates were in the materials provided to her. Harrington brought a new post-conviction relief petition based in part on the fact that these reports had been withheld at trial. The Iowa district court denied Harrington’s petition, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Gates reports were withheld from Harrington in 1978, and that they were exculpatory in that they showed an alternative suspect for the murder. In its opinion, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that Hughes was “by all accounts a liar and a perjurer” and that admission of the Gates reports reasonably could have caused the jury to disregard or at least doubt Hughes’ account of the murder. The court found that Harrington’s due process rights were violated for the failure of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence, vacated his conviction for first degree murder, and granted Harrington a new trial. At the time of the Iowa Supreme Court’s reversal of Harrington’s conviction, Matthew Wilber was the Pottawatta-mie County Attorney, and had been for just under two months. Wilber had to determine whether to retry Harrington, and whether to oppose McGhee’s petition for new trial based on the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington’s case. Council Bluffs Police Detective David Dawson was assigned to work full-time on the case with Wilber, at Wilber’s request. Wilber claims to have spent hundreds of hours working on the case after the Supreme Court’s decision. Wilber found that the only person who placed Harrington or McGhee at the murder scene was Hughes, who had admitted in a 2000 deposition that his testimony against Harrington and McGhee was false. Likewise, Jones, Jacobs, Pride, and Lee had all recanted their stories, and Wilber found the jailhouse informants to be not credible. Wilber also claims that he believed that the murder occurred between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., and that Hughes’ time line was inconsistent with that determination. According to the Complaints, Wilber wanted to vindicate the law enforcement agencies involved in the prosecution of McGhee and Harrington by reconvicting both for Schweer’s murder. Hughes, who had recanted in 2000, was living in Omaha at the time. Wilber instituted proceedings to have Hughes arrested as a material witness, and Hughes was arrested on April 21, 2003, and was transferred to Pottawat-tamie County on April 23, 2003. On April 24, 2003, Hughes was interviewed by Dawson. Hughes was not Mirandized and feared that he would lose his job if he did not return to it soon. To obtain his release from custody, he told Dawson that he had lied in 2000 at Harrington’s post-conviction relief hearing when he said that his testimony at the 1978 trials was false. Wilber used this information to proceed with a criminal case against Harrington. On June 2, 2003, Hughes was scheduled to be deposed regarding Harrington’s retrial. The Complaints claim that Wilber undertook a plan to get Hughes to “take the Fifth” so that he could claim Hughes was “unavailable” as a witness and use Hughes’ 1978 testimony at any retrial. Wilber spoke to Hughes before Harrington’s counsel arrived for the deposition and told Hughes that he may have a right to an attorney, because if he lied under oath in 2000, he could be charged with perjury. Hughes told Wilber he wanted a lawyer and left before Harrington’s attorney arrived. McGhee was not represented by counsel that day, and his attorney for his post-conviction proceedings was never informed of what Wilber said to Hughes. Greg Steensland was appointed to represent Hughes, and told Wilber that Hughes would “take the Fifth” unless he was offered immunity. Wilber declined to grant Hughes immunity and Hughes “took the Fifth” when he was deposed in Harrington’s case on July 26, 2003. Wilber then argued in court that Hughes’ 1978 testimony would be read at Harrington’s retrial because Hughes was “unavailable.” Knowing that McGhee would likely be granted a retrial on the same basis as Harrington, Wilber told McGhee that he was prepared to retry him for Schweer’s murder. Wilber allegedly misrepresented some facts and concealed other facts in his discussions with McGhee’s attorney, a relatively inexperienced lawyer who had been represented on criminal charges by Wil-ber’s former law partner, Richter. Wilber informed McGhee’s attorney that he had a stronger case against McGhee than against Harrington, and would like to discuss the possibility of resolving McGhee’s case if McGhee would testify against Harrington. Wilber claimed that the “stronger evidence” against McGhee stemmed from McGhee’s attempt to induce Joseph Rogers to falsify an alibi for him for the night of the murder. Wilber also claimed that McGhee had admitted his involvement in Schweer’s murder to several jailhouse informants, including Tyrone Pierce, Aaron Gibbs, Eric Hartwell, and Larry Plater. Wilber told McGhee’s attorney that “[w]e have been able to locate, and speak to, each of these four individuals.” Pierce, however, had recanted his story in a 1988 post-conviction proceeding by Harrington. In an April 2003 interview with Plater by Detective Dawson, Plater did not recall McGhee telling him he was with Harrington when Schweer was killed and later admitted that McGhee made no such statement. Aaron Gibbs never claimed McGhee admitted involvement in Schweer’s murder. Wilber testified under oath that he did not believe Hartwell was a credible witness, but did not reveal this information to McGhee or his attorney. Wilber also told McGhee’s attorney that the polygrapher who examined Gates in 1977 had been interviewed and said that “contrary to the information contained in Dan Larsen’s [1977] police report, Gates actually passed his polygraph when questioned about his involvement in the shooting of John Schweer.” The polygrapher, Selma Mendyk, did not make such a statement. Wilber also told McGhee’s attorney in a letter dated June 5, 2003, that “Gates has been effectively eliminated as a suspect at this point in time.” Indeed, the Complaints allege that Dawson had gone to the Omaha Police Department and reviewed the 1963 murder file for which Gates had been a suspect. He discovered that a records check performed on Gates at that time indicated “ ‘Safe Keeping’ in connection with Assault with Gun (Mental) dated 6-22-55.” Dawson also took a taped statement from Gates on April 25, 2003. During that interview, Gates admitted that he may have walked dogs in the area of the murder. When asked where he was the night of the murder, Gates said, “that’s deep,” but didn’t answer. Gates could not recall what he told police in 1977 about his whereabouts on the night of the murder. On September 2, 2003, McGhee signed a letter agreement with Wilber and the Pot-tawattamie County Attorney’s Office. It provided that McGhee would enter an Alford plea to second degree murder and be sentenced to 25 years with credit for time served. McGhee had already served nearly 26 years in prison for his conviction for the first-degree murder of Schweer. By entering an Alford plea, McGhee could maintain his innocence for Schweer’s murder, but finally be released from custody. The plea agreement provided that McGhee would stipulate to the Minutes of Testimony set forth in the 1978 True Information against him. McGhee did not admit the truth of the Minutes of Testimony. As part of the plea agreement, McGhee also agreed to cooperate in the re-prosecution of Harrington. The Pottawattamie County Attorney’s Office agreed that McGhee’s sentence should be vacated on the same basis as Harrington’s, and that he should be granted a new trial. It was expected that McGhee’s plea would not be presented to a court until after Harrington’s retrial, and Wilber retained the right to void the plea agreement if McGhee did not testify in accordance with the terms of the agreement. On the same date, Iowa District Court Judge Abel vacated McGhee’s 1978 conviction, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, and granted McGhee a new trial. Also on September 2, 2003, following the signing of the letter agreement, McGhee gave a deposition in regards to Harrington’s new trial. McGhee maintained his innocence during the deposition and stated he would take any deal just to get home. McGhee claimed that Harrington picked him up at his home the night of the murder, they picked up Hughes, and then Hughes and Harrington dropped McGhee off at his girlfriend’s home. McGhee was released from custody after his deposition and payment of a $15,000 bond. He remained subject to electronic monitoring and pretrial release supervision. On October 23, 2003, the judge in Harrington’s retrial permitted Harrington’s counsel to depose Hughes. Neither McGhee nor his attorney were in attendance, but Wilber was present. Hughes testified that he had lied in 1978 and that he had no knowledge of Harrington or McGhee being involved in the murder of Schweer. He stated that he would not testify as he did in 1978. Despite his knowledge that the Minutes of Testimony were based on Hughes’ now recanted 1978 story, Wilber appeared at a plea hearing for McGhee on October 24, 2003. There, Wilber stated that the [ 1978] Minutes of Testimony were true and provable, and the judge accepted McGhee’s Alford plea on that basis. Shortly after the plea was finished, Wilber issued a press release and gave a press conference announcing his decision to discontinue the prosecution of Terry Harrington for the murder of John Schweer. The press release read as follows: It is with regret that I am announcing my decision to discontinue the prosecution against Terry Harrington for the murder of John Schweer. Recent events have unfortunately made it impossible for us to proceed with the trial. As you are all undoubtedly aware, I am very limited on the information I can convey outside of an official court document or proceeding. I can tell you that I have filed a very detailed application to dismiss this case and that Chief Judge Charles Smith granted that application a short while ago. It is important to note that this dismissal is considered to be “without prejudice,” which basically means that should additional evidence come to light, or should evidence which is currently not admissible become admissible, our office could refile the charge of First Degree Murder against Mr. Harrington. I met with the children of John Schweer for about two hours this morning. They have asked me to let you know that they may be issuing a statement through a family representative but would prefer that they not be contacted directly by the media. They did ask me to let you know that, while disappointed in the outcome, they are supportive of the decision to discontinue the prosecution of this case at this time. The interesting irony of this case is that Terry Harrington was put in prison by his own friends and associates. If they are now choosing to change their sworn testimony there is little I can do to stop that. We play the cards we are dealt as best we can. In this case, there were multiple witnesses who changed their testimony from what was given in 1978, including the recent recantation of Kevin Hughes during his deposition yesterday morning. I want to thank Detective Dave Dawson (and the rest of the Council Bluffs Police Department for that matter) for his dedication to -this case. Detective Dawson was able to track down over 71 of our 82 witnesses and the 11 he couldn’t track down actually passed away during some point over the past twenty-six years. Detective Dawson did a fantastic job organizing this case after it sat in our closed files for over twenty-five years. After personally spending hundreds of hours on this case, I have no doubt that Terry Harrington committed the murder of John Schweer on July 22, 1977. The jury made the right decision in 1978, and the right man went to prison for over twenty-five years. That said, I also have no doubt that the admissible evidence which is left after twenty-six years is not sufficient to sustain a conviction against Mr. Harrington. The easy decision on this case would have been to let it drop when the Supreme Court granted Mr. Harrington a new trial earlier this year. I certainly had many people recommend that I take that easier path. That would not have been the right decision, however. I owed it to the family of John Schweer to do my best on this case to bring his killer to justice a second time. And while I am disappointed that I will not get the opportunity to put this ease before a jury, I am satisfied that nothing else could have been done, by my office or by the Council Bluffs Police Department. As for final justice for Terry Harrington, I will defer that honor to a higher power. On a related note, Curtis McGhee, a co-defendant of Mr. Harrington’s in this case, pleaded no contest today to a charge of Second Degree Murder for the death of John Schweer. Mr. McGhee was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years. Since Curtis McGhee had already served more than twenty-five years in prison since his original conviction in 1978, he was credited with time served and left the courthouse late this morning. Even though Mr. McGhee did not actually pull the trigger on the gun that killed John Schweer, our case against him was stronger than against Terry Harrington. Mr. McGhee had made admissions to at least three different people about being with Terry Harrington when Harrington shot a police officer in Council Bluffs. Those statements would likely not be admissible in a trial against Terry Harrington, but would certainly have come into evidence at a trial against Mr. McGhee. Mr. McGhee was offered a chance to plead to Second Degree Murder back in 1978 and, had he taken that deal back then, he would probably have been paroled over ten years ago. Matt Wilber, Pottawattamie County Attorney. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment has a special place in civil litigation. The device “has proven its usefulness as a means of avoiding full-dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby freeing courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways.” Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991). In operation, the role of summary judgment is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required. See id.; see also Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). “[S]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances.” Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 n. 5 (8th Cir.1975)). The purpose of the rule is not “to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try,” Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)), but to avoid “useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried,” Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Lyons v. Bd. of Educ., 523 F.2d 340, 347 (8th Cir.1976)). The plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The precise standard for granting summary judgment is well-established and oft-repeated: summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994). The court does not weigh the evidence nor make credibility determinations, rather the court only determines whether there are any disputed issues and, if so, whether those issues are both genuine and material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Wilson v. Myers, 823 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir.1987) (“Summary judgment is not designed to weed out dubious claims, but to eliminate those claims with no basis in material fact.”) (citing Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 1047, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.1975)). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(c), (e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added). An issue is “genuine,” if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. B. Motion to Dismiss A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may challenge either the facial sufficiency or the factual truthfulness of a plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir.1993). Regardless, jurisdictional issues are for the court to determine. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981). When considering a facial challenge, a court must presume that all of the facts alleged by the plaintiff in support of jurisdiction are true. See Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.1990) (“In the first instance, the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings, and the non-moving party receivefs] the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6). The general rule is that a complaint should not be dismissed ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” (citations omitted)). A court confronted with a factual challenge must weigh the conflicting evidence concerning jurisdiction, without presuming the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730. C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which provides: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The standard for determining a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as that employed in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See St. Paul Ramsey County Med. Ctr. v. Pennington, 857 F.2d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir.1988). Thus, when the Court considers a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, it “is constrained by a stringent standard. ... A complaint should not be dismissed ... unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 545-46 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir.1982) (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). In addition, the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and should not be dismissed simply because the court is doubtful that the plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. See id. at 546. Finally, when considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c), a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). III. LAW AND ANALYSIS As noted, for purposes of the present motions Defendants argue that, even assuming that all of the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs in their Complaints are true, they are still entitled to judgment on various bases, including absolute immunity, qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, and qualified privilege. The Court will address each argument in turn. A. Absolute Immunity Defendants Hrvol, Richter, Wilber, and Pottawattamie County argue that the following claims made by Plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity: Counts 9 (§ 1983 claim against Hrvol), 12 (§ 1983 claims against Richter), and 20 (§ 1983 claim against Wilber), filed by McGhee; Counts 1 (§ 1983 claims for fabricated and perjured testimony against Richter and Hrvol) and 2 (§ 1983 claim for withholding evidence against Richter and Hrvol), filed by Harrington; Counts 15 (§ 1985 Conspiracy claim against the 1977 Defendants) and 28 (§ 1985 Conspiracy claim against Wilber and Dawson), filed by McGhee; and Count 3 (§ 1985 Conspiracy claim against the 1977 Defendants), filed by Harrington. In essence, each of the asserted claims allege that the prosecutors Hrvol, Richter, and Wilber improperly-concealed exculpatory evidence; concealed the alleged coercion of witnesses; participated in court proceedings; coerced witnesses; participated in the Schweer murder investigation; and conspired with the respective police defendants to commit the alleged misdeeds against the Plaintiffs. Prosecutors may be entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions undertaken pursuant to their official duties. If the prosecutor is acting as advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution, then the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (hereinafter referred to as “Buckley /”). Absolute immunity insulates from liability prosecuto-rial functions such as the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case at trial, and other conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial process. Id.; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Qualified immunity, on the other hand, insulates a prosecutor when he pursues actions in an “investigatory” or “administrative” capacity. Buckley I, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. In determining whether a particular act fits within the common-law tradition of absolute immunity, the Supreme Court takes a “functional approach,” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991), examining “ ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’ ” Buckley I, 509 U.S. at 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (finding state court judge was not absolutely immune from damages suit for his administrative decision to demote and dismiss a court employee)); see also Buckley I, 509 U.S. at 260, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (holding prosecutor’s comments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial process because they do not involve presentation of case in court or initiation of prosecution); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984 (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for initiating prosecution and for actions taken in presenting state’s case). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that “the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934. The functional analysis requires the Court to draw a line between preparatory conduct that is merely administrative or investigative, preparatory conduct that is itself prosecutorial. For instance, some, but not all, of a prosecutor’s preparatory acts in initiating a prosecution and presenting a case are absolutely immune. See Buckley I, 509 U.S. at 270, 113 S.Ct. 2606; Burns, 500 U.S. at 492-96, 111 S.Ct. 1934; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984. The prosecutorial nature of an act does not, however, spread backwards, immunizing everything it touches. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 495, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (“Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive.”). Indeed, when performing functions such as investigative and administrative tasks — functions that are not seen as intimately associated with the judicial process — the overriding public policy justification of freeing the judicial process from intimidation and harassment no longer exists, such that the costs on society do not necessitate application of absolute immunity. While the legal distinction regarding the applicability of absolute immunity seems clear, it is substantially more easily stated than applied, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s clear statement that absolute immunity may attach to some decisions by prosecutors regarding obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating evidence: We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom. A prosecuting attorney is required constantly, in the course of his duty as such, to make decisions on a wide variety of sensitive issues. These include questions of whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether to file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what other evidence to present. Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984. Despite the difficulty in evaluating the function at issue, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that prior to the establishment of probable cause to arrest, a prosecutor generally will not be entitled to absolute immunity. Buckley I, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (“A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.”). Correspondingly, the fact that probable cause to arrest has been established “does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all actions taken afterwards.” Id. at 273 n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 2606. “Even after [the probable cause] determination, as the opinion dissenting in part, points out ... a prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’ that is entitled to only qualified immunity.” Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a “true anomaly” would be created by “denying absolute immunity for a state actor’s investigative acts made before there is probable cause to have a suspect arrested just because a prosecutor would be entitled to absolute immunity for the malicious prosecution of someone whom he lacked probable cause to indict”: That criticism ignores the essence of the function test. The reason that lack of probable cause allows us to deny absolute immunity to a state actor for the former function (fabrication of evidence) is that there is no common-law tradition of immunity for it, whether performed by a police officer or prosecutor. The reason that we grant it for the latter function (malicious prosecution) is that we have found a common-law tradition of immunity for a prosecutor’s decision to bring an indictment, whether he has probable cause or not. By insisting on an equation of the two functions merely because a prosecutor might be subject to liability for one but not the other, the dissent allows its particular policy concerns to erase the function test it purports to respect. In general, the dissent’s distress over the denial of absolute immunity for prosecutors who fabricate evidence regarding unsolved crimes ... seems to conflate the question whether a § 1983 plaintiff has stated a cause of action with the question whether the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions. Id. Thus, in evaluating whether the prosecutors were immune from liability for their allegedly wrongful actions, the Court must first evaluate whether the acts occurred before or after probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs existed. “Probable cause for an arrest exists if, at the moment the arrest was made, the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that an offense has been committed.” United States v. Rivera, 370 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir.2004) (citing United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir.1987)). In the analysis, law enforcement officers are given: “substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing inferences from factual circumstances,” but such latitude is not without limits. First, because the totality of circumstances determines the existence of probable cause, evidence that tends to negate the possibility that a suspect has committed a crime is relevant to whether the officer has probable cause. An officer contemplating an arrest is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) suggests that probable cause exists. In this sense, the Fourth Amendment requires that we analyze the weight of all the evidence — not merely the sufficiency of the incriminating evidence — in determining whether [law enforcement] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect]. Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir.1999) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “law enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so long as ‘law enforcement would not [be] unduly hampered ... if the agents ... wait[ ] to obtain more facts before seeking to arrest.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Everroad, 704 F.2d 403, 407 (8th Cir.1983)). “An officer need not conduct a ‘mini-trial’ before making an arrest, but probable cause does not exist when a ‘minimal further investigation’ would have exonerated the suspect.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). In analyzing whether probable cause for arrest existed, the Court must “ignore the officers’ subjective inte