Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER WILLIAM C. CONNER, Senior District Judge. Plaintiff Lydia B. Cotz, proceeding pro se, brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York Human Rights Law, against defendants the Village of Montebello (the “Village”), Debra Mastroeni (“Mastroeni”), Santos Luciano (“Luciano”), the Town of Ramapo (“Ramapo”), Leslie Lampert (“Lampert”) and Bradley Weidel (“Weidel”) (collectively, “defendants”) for violations of her federal and state constitutional rights and Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (the “ADA”), as well as for common law claims of slander and assault. Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts. For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motions are granted. BACKGROUND Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record reveals the following relevant facts. Plaintiff is an attorney admitted in the State of New Jersey and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and has practiced law for more than six years. (Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 12-13, 103).) Plaintiffs Complaint, Amended Complaint and submissions in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, although confusing at times and consisting of well over one thousand pages, appear to allege seven distinct incidents (or series of incidents) from which plaintiffs various causes of action arise. (See generally Complt.; Am. Complt; PI. Aff.) I. The “Late 1993 or 1994” Traffic Stop The earliest incident of which plaintiff complains occurred in late 1993 or 1994 and involves a traffic stop conducted by Thomas Donnelly (“Donnelly”), a Ramapo police officer. (See PI. Aff. ¶7; Complt. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Donnelly, while off-duty, pulled her over while she was driving on Route 59 in Tallman, New York after allegedly observing plaintiff illegally cross a double-yellow line. (See id.) Plaintiff claims that he “forced her into a dark[ ] parking lot, where he blocked the only exit[,] ... threatened to arrest [pjlaintiff ’ and ultimately issued her a traffic summons. (See id.) According to plaintiff, “[w]hen [she] told him [that] she was going to report him to his superiors, he laughed and said ‘my father-in-law is the chief .... You can’t touch me.’ ” (See id.) Although plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint with the Ramapo Police Department, the Department has no record of her complaint, and the traffic summons was never prosecuted. (See PI. Aff. ¶ 7.) II. Domestic Visitation Disputes The next series of incidents of which plaintiff complains dates back to the 1980s extending to 1999, and concerns the involvement of the Ramapo Police Department in the domestic disputes between plaintiff and her former husband regarding his visitation with their sons. (See Complt. ¶¶ 9-15.) Plaintiff and James Peikon (“Peikon”) were divorced in 1987 (see PL Aff., Ex. 10; Complt. ¶ 9), and the Family Court of the State of New York awarded plaintiff sole custody of the children ■ and awarded Peikon visitation with the child on alternate weekends commencing on January 24, 1998. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. J; Complt. ¶ 9.) On several occasions, however, plaintiff refused Peikon visitation with their sons when plaintiff did not believe it was in her sons’ best interest. (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 11; Complt. ¶¶ 9-15.) On such occasions, Peikon called the Ramapo Police Department to assist him in enforcing the court’s visitation order. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. J; Complt. 11¶ 9-15.) According to plaintiff, in response to Peikon’s calls for police assistance, the Ramapo Police Department “took it upon themselves to interpret and try to enforce the [visitation order of the family court] by attempting to intimidate [p]laintiff into surrendering her children using threats of arrest and jail.” (See Complt. ¶ 9.) Specifically, in the summer of 1997, plaintiff and Peikon had frequent disagreements as to the particular weekends during which Peikon had visitation. (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 8.) On one such occasion, Peikon came to plaintiffs house to pick up their sons, and plaintiff refused to allow her sons to leave the house because she believed that Peikon did not have visitation on that particular weekend. (See id.) Peikon called the police for assistance and, according to plaintiff, Donnelly responded and tried to gain entry into plaintiffs home without a warrant or consent. (See id.) Although plaintiff claims that she and her current husband, George J. Cotz (“Cotz”), were able to prevent Donnelly from gaining entry, the record does not indicate whether plaintiff ultimately complied with Donnelly’s demands or any other fact relating thereto. (See id.) Plaintiff also alleges that,- on December 27,1997, she refused to allow her son to go to a Giants football game with Peikon because the weather was bad and the child was not feeling well. (See Complt. ¶ 15.) Peikon called the police for assistance, and Mark A. Emma (“Emma”), a police officer of the Ramapo Police Department, responded. (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 9; Complt. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff claims that Emma attempted to gain entry into her home and threatened to arrest plaintiff if she did not allow her son to go with Peikon. (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 9; Complt. ¶ 15; G. Cotz Aff. ¶¶ 3-4.) At the time, plaintiff had just finished showering and was wrapped only in a towel, and Emma threatened,to “take her to the station ‘just as [she] was.’ ” (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 9; Complt. ¶ 15; G. Cotz Aff. ¶¶ 3-4.) In fear of arrest, plaintiff acquiesced and allowed her son to leave with Peikon. (G. Cotz Aff. ¶ 4.) Approximately seven months later, on July 24, 1998, plaintiff called Peikon and informed him that their son was sick and that Peikon’s visitation the next day would be cancelled or at least delayed. (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 12; Complt. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff claims that her son had chest pains and that they were waiting to hear back from the child’s cardiologist and to receive the results of a chest x-ray. (See PI. Aff. ¶ 12; Complt. ¶ 13; G. Cotz Aff. ¶ 5.) The next day, however, Peikon went to plaintiffs house and plaintiff refused to allow her son to go with him. (See id.) Peikon then drove to the Ramapo police station for police assistance, and he returned with Donnelly, Emma and Officer Byrnes. (See id.) According to plaintiff, Donnelly “proceeded to ring the door bells, ... bang on doors, call at windows and kick doors in an effort to get [p]laintiff to speak to him.” (See Complt. ¶ 13; Pl. Aff. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff claims that when she opened the door to her house, Donnelly put his body in the doorway and entered “her premises ... and refused to leave.” (See id.) Plaintiff also claims that the Ramapo Police Department attempted to retrieve the child’s medical records from the hospital where he was being treated in an attempt to verify his medical condition. (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 12; G. Cotz Aff. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that, “[u]pon information and belief, from before 1990 until January 1999, the [Ramapo Police Department] had a policy ... [or custom] of using the threat of criminal contempt charges, primarily directed at women/mothers, to enforce their interpretation of visitation orders.” (See Complt. ¶ 11.) In fact, prior to 1998, the Ramapo Police Department did not have a specific policy regarding its handling of domestic visitation or custodial disputes. {See Specht Affm., Ex. C (Dolan Aff. ¶ 3).) However, on September 9, 1998, in light of the constant police involvement in plaintiff and Peikon’s visitation disputes, the Chief of Police issued a memorandum to the Ramapo Police Department in which he stated that plaintiff and her former husband were improperly using “the police as tools in their matrimonial dispute.” {See id. (Dolan Aff. ¶ 6); PI. Aff., Ex. 44.) Accordingly, the memorandum' instructed officers to refrain from intervening in their visitation disputes “where no crime other than a violation of a visitation order was alleged[,] but rather[,] take a report and then suggest to the parties that they seek redress from the court that issued the order that was allegedly violated.” {See Specht Affm., Ex. C (Dolan Aff. ¶ 3); PI. Aff., Ex. 44.) The memorandum stated: Based upon a review of the reports submitted by officers who have had to respond to 49 Mile Road with respect to the domestic situation at this location, it has become clear that the department is being used by both parties to leverage their individual positions. A court order exists which defines child visitation provisions between Cotz and Peikon. It is usually an allegation of a violation of the agreement which generates police involvement. Officers responding to a domestic related call involving these persons should refrain from- making an arrest based upon an assertion that the visitation order is or was violated. Further, officers should not pursue or engage in activities to evidence any assertion that a violation occurred. As an example, do not enter or even ask to enter a premise to verify that a child is sick or not at home. Each party knows well the stipulations of their court order.. If either alleges a violation, simply take the report along with their statements and refer the complainant to Family Court. Arrest is only an option if an officer is acting on a lawful warrant. Even if it is clear that one of the parties is in contempt of a court order, an information should be filed and submitted to the appropriate court. The “no-arrest” position of the department does not apply if the conduct by either party requires action pursuant to our domestic violence policy, i.e., HADARM offenses. If it is criminal contempt, it gets paper only. (See PI. Aff., Ex. 44.) The Ramapo Police Department expanded this policy on January 27, 1999 to apply to domestic visitation and custody disputes of all complainants. (See Specht Affm., Ex. C (Dolan Aff. ¶ 7); PI. Aff., Ex. 43.) The policy, which is still in effect, instructs an officer “not to make an arrest where the only dispute is whether or not a party violated a visitation or custody order, but to refer the parties back to the court issuing the order after taking each side’s statements.” (See id.) The policy is designed to avoid excessive entanglement with domestic disputes that a family court can handle more effectively and to help conserve police resources for other matters. (See Specht Affm., Ex. C (Dolan Aff. ¶ 8).) III. 2001 Strip Search Incident The next incident of which plaintiff complains occurred in September 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on September the 11th. (See Complt. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff and her husband attended a public hearing at the Ramapo Town Hall regarding a proposal to construct a power plant in the town. (See PI. Aff. ¶37; Complt. ¶29.) The security at the meeting was more rigorous than usual as a result of the recent terrorist attacks. (See id.) All attendees, including plaintiff and Cotz, were required to enter through a metal detector, which was monitored by two Ramapo police officers, one of which was Officer Kirk Budnick (“Budnick”). (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that when she approached the metal detector, Budnick threatened to strip search her. (See Specht Affm., Ex. H (PI. Dep. at 288); PI. Aff. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff immediately called Michael Specht, Ramapo Town Attorney and counsel of record in the present action, and plaintiff thereafter entered the building without further incident. (See PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 37;, PL Aff. ¶ 37; Complt. ¶ 29.) IV. Plaintiff’s Police Complaints Regarding Her Neighbor Next, plaintiff alleges that the Ramapo Police Department failed to properly handle the complaints filed by her and Cotz regarding disputes that they have had with their neighbor, Joseph A. Verboys (“Verboys”). {See Complt. ¶¶ 17-28.) Specifically, in November 1998, plaintiff called the Ramapo Police Department for assistance when she and Verboys had a disagreement regarding his right to trim arid cut certain trees growing along their common property boundary. {See id..¶ 17; PL Aff. ¶ 31.) Police Officer Kevinson and Sergeant Michael Colbath of the Ramapo Police Department responded and, according to plaintiff, instructed Verboys to “ignore” plaintiffs objections. {See id.) Plaintiff alleges that although Colbath was not called to respond to the dispute, he responded nonetheless because he is a personal friend of Verboys. {See Pl. Aff. ¶ 31, Ex. 48 (Colbath Dep.' at 32).) Plaintiff alleges that subsequently, on October 31, 2000, Verboys “harassed and assaulted” her and her daughter by walking his Rottweiler on a leash near her daughter’s school bus stop, which was immediately adjacent to plaintiffs property. {See Complt. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff called the Ramapo Police Department, which dispatched Police Officer Robert Collins (“Collins”). {See id.) At this time, Collins apparently had a discussion with Verboys regarding plaintiffs allegations. {See id. ¶ 20.) The next day, however, Verboys repeated his conduct from the previous day, and plaintiff again called the Ramapo Police Department, which dispatched Collins. {See id.) The same day, plaintiff and Cotz also went to the Ramapo police station and requested “to have criminal charges filed against [Verboys], or to press charges themselves.” {See id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that the officers on duty initially refused “to prepare criminal charges” against Verboys, but “[a]fter nearly five hours at the [station],” they finally acquiesced. {See id. (emphasis re-, moved).) On November 2, 2000, Collins was assigned to plaintiffs daughter’s bus stop to détermine whether Verboys was engaging in harassing or criminal behavior. (See id. ¶ 24.) Although Verboys walked his Rottweiller in direct view of Collins and in the vicinity of plaintiff and her daughter, the Ramapo Police Department found that Verboys’s actions were neither harassing nor criminal in any way. (See id.; Specht Affm., Ex. D (Collins Dep. at 48-44).) Plaintiff claims, however, that Verboys was notified that the police were on watch and, as a result, he acted differently on this day than on the previous occasions when plaintiff had called the police. (See Complt. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges: Not only did [Verboys] act as though he was he [sic] aware that he was under observation but, upon information and belief, he was told of the observation by his friend, PO Colbath [who] worked the 11:00 [p.m. to] 7:00 [a.m.] shift (on the night of November 1-2, 2000), and would have been in the station when Collins was given the observation assignment. [ ]Colbath is a family friend of (Verboys] (their parents are also friends) and [ ]Colbath has, for several years before and including 2000, rented [Verboys’s] house at Beach Haven, [New Jersey] in the summer. Upon information and belief, [] Colbath called [Verboys] and alerted him to Collins[’s] observation. (See id. ¶¶ 24-25.) The charges filed against Verboys were ultimately dismissed. (See id. ¶ 28.) Executive Assistant District Attorney Michael Eaton supervised the investigation and after “speaking to [plaintiff] and other witnesses, [he] determined that the acts complained of, if they in fact occurred, were not criminal in nature .... ” (See Specht Affm., Ex. E (Eaton Aff. ¶4).) Following the dismissal of the charges, Verboys filed a civil action for malicious prosecution against the Ramapo Police Department, plaintiff and Cotz. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. E; Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PL Dep. at 161); Specht Affm., Exs. F, H (Pl. Dep. at 273, 276).) Although Verboys’s claim against the Ramapo Police Department was dismissed, a New York state jury awarded him a $20,000 verdict against plaintiff and Cotz, which was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division. (See id.) According to plaintiff, Verboys continued to harass her “[o]ver the course of 2001, 2002 and 2003” and, as a result, she sought an order of protection against Verboys in the Ramapo Justice Court. (See Complt. ¶ 33; Specht Affm., Ex. C (Dolan Aff. ¶ 14).) After both Ramapo Justices recused themselves, the matter was transferred to Town Justice Joel J. Flick of Clarkstown, New York who issued an order of protection against Verboys. (See Complt. ¶¶ 33, 35; Pl. Aff., Ex. 52.) Verboys was charged with harassment and he subsequently accepted an Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal. (See id.) Plaintiff claims that thereafter, the Ramapo Police Department “refused to enforce the [o]rder of [protection” in response to several complaints by plaintiff concerning incidents in which Verboys allegedly: (1) “stopped his car in the street and stared at [p]laintiff ... ”; (2) “passed her at the bus stop[] in a truck[] and yelled ‘bitch’ at her”; and (3) “pulled a dump truck [onto her street,] cutting off her daughter’s school bus, on three successive days.” (See Complt. ¶ 34.) According to the Ramapo Police Department, its officers conducted thorough investigations of plaintiffs complaints and found that staring at plaintiff and calling her a “bitch,” while demeaning, were not criminal acts nor violative of the order of protection. (See Specht Affm., Ex. C (Dolan Aff. ¶ 15).) In addition, with respect to the dump truck incident, the police interviewed plaintiff and at least one of the school bus drivers and reviewed a video tape provided by plaintiff. (See id.) It determined that “no proof existed that Mr. Verboys committed this act intentionally, let alone in an effort to harass [plaintiff].”. (See id.) According to the Ramapo Police Department, plaintiff was informed at this time that “if Mr. Verboys committed an actual violation of the order of protection, or any other offense, he would be arrested and charged, but that [they] felt that the actions she described did not rise to that level.” (See id. (Dolan Aff. ¶ 16).) V. Tree Trimming Allegations Plaintiff next complains of incidents of harassment involving the Ramapo Highway Department and its attempt to trim trees on plaintiffs property that were blocking view of a stop sign. (See Complt. ¶¶ 36-39; PI. Aff. ¶¶ 42-43.) Plaintiff alleges that in August 2001, a highway department crew “attempted to enter [her] property through a gate on her stone wall, and she asked them what they were doing on her property.” (See Complt. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff claims that upon her inquiry, the crew left, “but made some sort of report to the [Ramapo Police Department], who arrived and questioned [p]laintiff about this ‘incident.’ ” (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that “[u]pon information and belief, in similar circumstances, the [Ramapo Highway Department] has simply called other members of the community to advise them to cut branches down.” (See id.) Three years later, in August 2004, “a crew from the [Ramapo Highway Department] was again dispatched to [the same] corner ... to trim the same trees on [plaintiffs property that obstructed the same [stop] sign in 2001.” (See id. ¶ 37; PI. Aff. ¶ 42; Speeht Affm., Ex. H (PL Dep. at 300).) According to plaintiff, the crew again “attempted to enter [p]laintiff s property[ ] through the same gate on her stone wall, but she told ’them not to trespass.” (See Complt. ¶ 37; Speeht Affm., Ex, H (PL Dep. at 300).) Both at her deposition and in her affidavit, she claimed that they then left without incident. Plaintiff thereafter called the Ramapo Highway Supervisor and the Ramapo Attorney,- Beth Módica (“Módica”), and informed them that she would have her landscaper trim the trees, which they both indicated was fine. (See id.) However, plaintiff claims that while she was on the phone with Módica, her home [was] surrounded by [four] [Ramapo Highway Department] trucks, a foreman’s vehicle, two [Ramapo Police Department] patrol cars, at least ten ... men from [the Ramapo Highway Department] and [two] police officers, including Lt. Bakker. All of the vehicles had flashing lights on, the road was blocked and traffic was stopped. [The Ramapo Highway Department] crewmen were festive and laughing. (See Complt. ¶ 38; Speeht Affm., Ex. H (Pl. Dep. at 300-03).) Plaintiff approached one of the officers and said “you guys are just, you guys are going crazy again.” (See Speeht. Affm., Ex. H (PL Dep. at 303).) One of the,officers immediately ordered everyone to leave the area, and both the Highway Department crew and police officers left. (See id.) VI. Plaintiff’s Removal from the Polling Place and the Alleged Denial of Her Right to Vote Plaintiff next alleges that she was unlawfully removed from the polling place during the March 2005 Village Trustee election at which she was serving as a poll watcher and thereafter prohibited from voting in that same election. (See Complt. ¶¶ 42-75.) She claims that she was removed from the polls in retaliation for her political activity and her previous public criticism of Mastroeni, the Election Commissioner, who directed Ramapo police officers to remove her. (See Complt. ¶¶ 43-47; PI. Aff. ¶¶ 44^46, 50.) Specifically, during the March 2003 Village mayoral election at which plaintiff also served as a poll watcher, plaintiff criticized Mastroeni for allegedly failing to prevent a poll watcher, who was the husband of a mayoral candidate, from electioneering at the polling place. (See Complt. ¶ 45; PI. Aff. ¶ 45; Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 20).) Also, at the conclusion of the 2003 election, Mastroeni instructed plaintiff to- leave the polling place when the officials began tallying the votes, which plaintiff claims, as a poll watcher, she had the right to participate in or at least observe. (See PI. Aff. ¶45.) Furthermore, plaintiff was the campaign manager for the incumbent candidate in the March 2005 election, and she claims that Mastroeni may have aligned herself with the opposing party and was therefore motivated to remove- plaintiff, “the incumbent’s campaign manager and articulate supporter,” from the polls. (See Complt. ¶ 43; Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 20); PI. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 7.) As in the 2003 Village election, Mastroeni, as Election Commissioner, had “ultimate authority” over the Village election on March 15, 2005, which was held during the hours of noon to nine o’clock p.m. at Village Hall. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. G (Kelly Dep. at 60-61); Complt. ¶ 48.) Mastroeni was present throughout the election and was responsible for overseeing the election and maintaining order at the polls. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. G (Kelly Dep. at 60-61); PL Aff., Ex. 70 (Mastroeni Dep. at 46).) An exceptionally large number of voters turned out for the election, and voters waited on -long lines to cast their ballots. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. I (Borders Dep. at 49); id. at Ex. K (Desiderio Dep. at 16); Pl. Aff., Ex. 123 (Berliner Dep. at 9).) At around 12:15 p.m., plaintiff arrived at Village Hall to begin her shift as a poll watcher. (See Complt. ¶ 50; Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 28-29).) As required by New York Election Law, Mastroeni requested to inspect plaintiffs poll watcher certificate. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 29).) Plaintiff had left the certificate at home, and Mastroeni instructed her to go home to retrieve it. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 29, 31).) At approximately 12:30 p.m., plaintiff returned to Village Hall with her certificate and presented it to Mastroeni. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 31-32, 38).) Upon her return, plaintiff searched the room for a location from where she could hear the Election Inspectors call out each voters’ name as they signed in to vote. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 41).) Traditionally, poll watchers have a list of all the registered voters and they keep track of those who voted. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 27-28, 52-53); id., Ex. G (Kelly Dep. at 26-27).) The Election Inspectors were stationed at two tables towards the rear of the room, and behind the tables were the voting machines. (See Complt. ¶ 53; Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 33-34, 45-47).) Plaintiff decided to stand between these two tables, leaning against the left table, thereby reducing the space between the tables through which the voters must pass to get to the voting machines. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 45-47, 51-52).) Although there were six tables with seats at which the poll watchers were expected to sit, plaintiff remained standing because (1) she claims that she had difficulty hearing the Election Inspectors call out the voters’ names from those seats and (2) she has a back ailment that causes her severe pain when she sits for certain periods of time. (See Complt. ¶ 51; Pl. Aff. ¶ 51; Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 118-19); M. Burke Aff., Ex. G.) However, Mastroeni and all four Election Inspectors testified that plaintiff “paraded” around the Election Inspectors which impeded the flow of voters, particularly in light of the heavy voter turnout. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. D) (Mastroeni Dep. at 155-60, 162-63, 165, 206, 219, 288) (testifying that plaintiff “paraded around the back of the inspectors” and walked “around all over the place impeding the route of the voters”); id. Ex. E (Luciano Dep. at 104-05, 161-64) (testifying that plaintiff was behind the registration tables and blocking the voting machines); id. Ex. K (Desiderio Dep. at 37-38, 42) (testifying that plaintiff attempted to go behind the Election Inspectors table and that she heard plaintiff, among other people, yelling and shouting); id. Ex. H (Sorrillo Dep. at 52-53) (testifying that all four of the Election Inspectors at one point told plaintiff that she could not be behind their table); id. Ex. I (Borders Dep. at 52-55, 60) (testifying that the Election Inspectors were frustrated with plaintiff because she was walking around the election area and impeding the flow of voters and the ability of the Inspectors to perform their jobs); id. Ex. J (Whalen Dep. at 41-42, 67) (testifying that plaintiff was being disruptive and impeding the movement of the voters). Mastroeni also testified that plaintiff aggressively spoke to the Election Inspectors when she discovered that they did not have a voters’ list that she could use. (See id. Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 165, 206).) Plaintiff maintains, however, that she simply stood by the Election Inspectors and did not cause any sort of disruption. (See Pl. Aff. ¶ 5 1; see generally Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 38-73.)) Similarly, Robert Berliner, a voter present at the polls, testified that he saw plaintiff at approximately 12:30 p.m. for several minutes just standing by the Election Inspectors and did not see her behaving in a disruptive manner. (See Pl. Aff., Ex. 122 (Berliner Dep. at 8), Ex. 125 (Berliner Dep. at 23).) However, plaintiff admits that she remained standing and, on one occasion, walked behind the Election Inspectors’ table, which was directly in front of the voting machines. (See Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 16 (in response to the Village of Montebello, Mastroeni and Luciano).) Mastroeni approached plaintiff and requested that she sit and not remain standing. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 47-48).) Plaintiff refused to comply with Mastroeni’s request, insisting that she was not required to sit, and asked Mastroeni why she had to sit when “[Mastroeni herself] was allowed to stand during the election with the deputy clerk.” (See id.; Complt. ¶ 56; M. Burke Aff., Ex. G.) According to plaintiff, she also explained to Mastroeni that she had a back ailment that prevented her from sitting for long periods of time and that she could not hear the Election Inspectors when seated. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 47-48); Complt. ¶ 56; Pl. Aff., Ex. 107.) At some point, Luciano, who was serving as an .Election Inspector, approached plaintiff and stated, “Who do you think you are, you know, ... if you were a guy I’d take you outside and beat the crap out of you.” (See Complt. ¶ 59; Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 56); Pl. Aff., Ex. 102 (Luciano Dep. at 255).) Mastroeni claims that, after plaintiff refused to comply with her request, she called the New York State Board of Elections (“BOE”) in Albany, New York and talked to Pat Murray (“Murray”), an attorney for BOE. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 222-21).) Mastroeni claims that she described plaintiffs behavior to Murray, and Murray advised Mastroeni that she had the authority to remove plaintiff from the polling place. (See id. (Mastroeni Dep: at 223-25).) However, the phone records of Village Hall show calls to Albany at 12:57 p.m. and 2:21 p.m., thus it is unlikely that Mastroeni called Albany before calling the Ramapo Police Department which responded to the Village prior to the first call to Albany. (See PI. Aff. ¶¶ 60, 65, Ex. 119a.) In any event, Mastroeni approached plaintiff a second time and requested that she sit, but plaintiff again refused to comply. (See id. (Mastroeni Dep. at 226); id. Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 54).) Mastroeni then called the Ramapo Police Department for assistance. (See id. Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 186-87); Complt. ¶ 61.) The first police officer, Shawn Bakker (“Bakker”), arrived at 12:46 p.m., and Mastroeni immediately approached him near the vestibule at the entrance of the polling place. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 67, 77-80); PI. Aff. ¶ 65.) As plaintiff walked over to them, she heard Mastroeni yell that she wanted plaintiff removed from Village Hall. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 72, 76).) Two additional police officers arrived shortly after Bakker, including Lampert. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 77-80, 87); id. Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 254).) When Lampert arrived, she and Mastroeni left the election area and went upstairs. (See id.) While Mastroeni and Lampert were upstairs, Mastroeni explained to Lampert that plaintiff was being disruptive and impeding the flow of the voters. (See id. Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 255); id. Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 19).) Mastroeni also indicated that she had the authority to request that plaintiff be removed from the polling place. (See id. Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 270).) In the presence of Lam-pert, Mastroeni called Murray, counsel at the BOE, and requested the specific citation of the statute that provides the Village Clerk with the authority to maintain order and request police assistance in connection therewith. (See id. (Mastroeni Dep. at 256, 261).) Lampert testified that she also spoke with Murray for several minutes at this time. (See id. Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 70).) Mastroeni then located the statute in her compilation of the New York State Election Law and provided a copy to Lampert. (See id. Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 255-56, 266, 269); id. at Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 31-32).) After about fifteen minutes, Mastroeni and Lampert came back downstairs to the vestibule area where plaintiff was standing, and Lampert directed her to gather her belongings and leave Village Hall. (See id. Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 88-89).) Plaintiff asked why she was being removed from the polls arid' Lampert said, “Miss Mastroeni is in charge of the elections and she’s authorized to make the decision to remove you .... ” (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 89-90).) Plaintiff then explained to Lampert that she- could-not hear the Election Inspectors when seated and that she had a back problem that prevented her from sitting for periods of time. (See id. Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 20-21); Complt. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff also repeatedly told Lam-pert to call Brower, but Lampert ignored plaintiffs request because she thought it unlikely that the police Captain would ask plaintiff to instruct her to call him. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 90-91); id. Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 14-15).) She testified that “[i]f he wanted me to call him, he would have [had] somebody call me on the radio.” (See id. Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 15).) Plaintiff eventually gathered her belongings and left Village Hall. (See id. Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 92-93)). ■ After plaintiff left Village Hall, she called the BOE and asked to speak with an attorney. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 97-99, 100).) The call was directed to Murray, the attorney to whom Mastroeni spoke previously. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 102).) Plaintiff and Murray knew each other from previous discussions regarding the Village’s election procedure. (See id.) Plaintiff explained to Murray that she had been removed frorii the polling place at Village Hall and that she was barred from returning to vote. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 101, 106).) Murray then revealed to plaintiff that Mastroeni had previously called her to determine whether she had the authority to remove a particular individual who was being disruptive. (See id., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 101-02).) Murray indicated to plaintiff that she advised Mastroeni that, as the Election Commissioner, she had the authority to remove anyone who she reasonably believed was disrupting the election. (See id.) Plaintiff stated to Murray, “[D]id she tell you that it was over her telling me to sit as opposed to stand[?]” (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 102).) According to plaintiff, Murray was surprised that plaintiff was removed merely because she refused to sit and suggested that she would attempt to mediate the situation. (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 102, 105).) Plaintiff then went to the Ramapo Police Department to file a complaint regarding her removal from the polls. {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 105-06).) Eichner, who was on duty, brought plaintiff to a room where the officers typically take civilian complaints, and plaintiff demanded that she be allowed to write her own report. {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 108-09).) Although Eichner did not allow plaintiff to write it herself, he transcribed plaintiffs statement. {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 109); M. Burke Aff., Ex. G.) She informed him that she was removed from the polls and barred from voting in the election. {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 106— 07).) The report states in part: When I returned to Mrs. Cotz in the lobby of the police station[,] I asked Mrs. Cotz if she had a chance to vote, she stated no. When I asked Mrs. Cotz how long was she in the polling location!,] she stated that she did not have to answer that. I advised her that I would record her accounts of the incident. ... That Debra Mastroeni violated her civil rights and harassed Mrs. Cotz by saying that she would throw Mrs. Cotz out for standing up, got up in her face screaming and told her to leave the building and not to continue to be a Poll Watcher. She didn’t get a chance to vote. Debra Mastroeni didn’t care. Mrs. Cotz told Debra Mastroeni that she was going to call the police then Debra Mastroeni called the police.... While speaking with Mrs. Cotz[,] she was continually interrupting our conversation by making calls on her cell phone. She stated that she was going to sue everyone including the police. At one point while speaking on her cell phone[,] she stated that Leslie Lampert was going to get her ass kicked. From one minute to the next[,] Mrs. Cotz was calm then excited. {See M-. Burke Aff., Ex. G.) After Eichner took plaintiffs statement, she left the station at approximately 2:30 p.m. {See Silver-man Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 106-07).) • After leaving the Ramapo Police Department, plaintiff received a phone call from Murray who indicated that Mastroeni “was not going to allow [her] back in____” {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 114).-) Plaintiff then went to see Warren Berber (“Berber”), the attorney for the Village, who worked with plaintiff on political campaigns and was apparently friendly with her. {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 113, 117-18).) After plaintiff informed him of the situation, of which he already may have had knowledge, he said that he was going to call Mastroeni. {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 118-20).) He left the room apparently to do so, and when he came back, he told plaintiff to “go back and vote.” {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 122).) After meeting with Berber, and upon advice from her attorney, plaintiff went to the New York State Police located in Thiells, New York and filed a report regarding her removal from the polls. {See id. (Pl. Dep. at 126-27, 129); Complt. ¶ 72.) Plaintiff claims that a State Trooper called the Ramapo Police Department and Village Hall and advised plaintiff to contact “the District Attorney’s Office and file criminal charges.” {See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (Pl. Dep. at 130-32).) In her affidavit, she alleges that they informed her that she could not return to vote, but this is wholly unsubstantiated. {See Pl. Aff. ¶ 71.) In addition, she claims in her Complaint that the Troopers informed her that the Village’s “behavior was ‘a serious violation of law.’ ” (See Complt. ¶ 72.) Thereafter, at 10:00 p.m., plaintiff returned to the Ramapo Police Department with a video camera and recorded her .conversations with the officer on duty. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. G.) At this time, the officers allowed plaintiff to file her own written complaint regarding her removal from the polls. (See id.) Plaintiff then returned ho.me. and did not contact anyone else in regard to the incident at Village Hall. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 132-34).) At the time plaintiff was removed from the polling place, plaintiff had not voted, and although plaintiff alleges that Mastroeni and Lampert informed plaintiff that she could not later return to vote, (See Complt. ¶ 67), her deposition testimony reveals something very different. She testified: A. Lieutenant Lampert. She didn’t tell me — no, I told Lieutenant Lam-pert I didn’t vote yet and she said to me I don’t care, get your stuff and get out.... Q. Did anyone else tell you [that] you couldn’t vote? A. I want to qualify what Lampert said to me because [sic] Lambert didn’t say to me you cannot vote. I told her wait a second, I haven’t voted yet. And she said I don’t care, get your stuff, get out before I arrest you. Q. Did anyone else tell you to leave before voting? A. Well, Debbie [Mastroeni] told me to leave before voting. Q. Did Debbie tell you that you could not vote? A. She didn’t use those words, no, no. Q. Well, did she say anything to you that lead you to believe that she was not going to allow you to vote? A. Yes. Q. Miss Mastroeni? What did [she] say? A. She didn’t say, not to me — I’m sorry, let me amend my answer. Not to me. She said something later ... to somebody else. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 106-07) (emphasis added).) Then, in remarkable fashion, plaintiff, in her Rule 56.1 Statement and her affidavit, states: I didn’t raise [the issue of voting] because I was so astounded and upset at the idea that I was being ejected from the polls. It didn’t occur to me that I never voted for my candidates until a few minutes after I was removed, and then I spent the rest of the day and evening trying to obtain authority from Ms. Mastroeni to return. (See PL Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 57; Pl. Aff. ¶ 57.) Her latest version that she never requested to vote prior to or during her removal is consistent with the testimony of all the other witnesses, including the Election Inspectors, Lampert and Mastroeni. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 291-303); see id. Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 48, 78); M. Burke Aff., Ex. I (Lampert Aff. ¶ 7); Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. I (Borders Dep. at 112-13); id. Ex. J (Whalen Dep. at 57, 67-68).) Furthermore, Lampert testified that pri- or to plaintiffs removal, she and Mastroeni decided that, in the event that plaintiff were to ask to vote, they would allow her to. (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. F (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 48).) Lampert also testified that she never told plaintiff that she could not return to vote. (See id. (Lampert 6/28/06 Dep. at 48, 78).) In addition, Mastroeni testified that the New York State Police called her ánd she indicated that plaintiff was permitted to return to the polls to vote. (See id. Ex. D (Mastroeni Dep. at 296, 364).) Similarly, she spoke with Berber who advised plaintiff to “go back and vote.” (See id. (Pl. Dep. at 122).) Kelly also testified that plaintiff never mentioned that she was prohibited from voting in the election when they spoke about the incident at the polls. (See id. Ex. G (Kelly Dep. at 62-63).) Additionally, plaintiffs police complaint, which was transcribed by Eichner immediately after the incident, states: Mrs. Cotz asked me to take her back to the polling loeation[, and] then said, [“N]o I know who I want to take me back, Charlie Hulse.... When I told Ms. Cotz that she could go back and vote[,] she got up from a chair she was sitting in, stepped towards me, pointed her index finger at me and said loudly[,][”]are you telling me, you[’]re telling me I can go back and vote[!][Y]ou can’t tell me anything[,] it’s my rights! ... Mrs. Cotz was further advised that I would send two police officers with her, she then stated that she only wanted one officer. When I reminded Mrs. Cotz that she was the one that wanted the police escort[,] she stated one of them is probably that “[N]azi Lampert” and she didn’t need a police escort. In an effort to avoid any further incidents at the polling location!]] I posted PO Bassett until about 1545 hours. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. G.) Ultimately, plaintiff did not return to vote because she claims that she “feared” that she would have been arrested upon her return to the polls. (See Complt. ¶ 68.) Plaintiff appears to rely solely on Murray’s statement that Mastroeni “was not going to allow [her] back in ....” (See Silverman Not. Mot. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. C (PI. Dep. at 114-15).) Plaintiff testified that when Murray communicated this to plaintiff, she understood that plaintiff had not yet voted. (See id.) VII. Allegations Regarding Weidel The next and last two incidents of which plaintiff complains involves alleged confrontations between plaintiff and Lieutenant Weidel who is a resident of the Village and lives approximately one-quarter of a mile from plaintiffs residence. (See Am. Complt. ¶ 4; M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PI. Dep. at 308).) Specifically, during a 2005 Village election candidates’ forum, which took place at the Suffern Library and was opened to the general public, plaintiff made comments critical of the .Ramapo Police Department’s traffic enforcement in the Village and opined that the Village should contract with the Suffern Police Department in lieu of the Ramapo Police Department. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PI. Dep. at 307, 309-11); Am. Complt. ¶ 6.) Weidel was at the meeting, and plaintiff claims that he immediately rose from his seat, yelled that plaintiff had no basis for her statements and then “stormed out of the meeting.” (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PI. Dep. at 311); id. Ex. H (Weidel Aff. ¶ 5); Am. Complt. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n information and belief, [her] position on this issue was a factor in the way she was treated by the ... [Ramapo Police Department] and Lampert on election day [in] 2005.” (See Am. Complt. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff claims that “[o]n information and belief, ... Weidel was on duty on March 15, 2005 and was involved in making the decision to remove [p]laintiff from the polls and bar her return to vote.” (See Am. Complt. ¶ 8; M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PI. Dep. at 314-15).) When Weidel’s defense counsel asked plaintiff at her deposition for the basis of this belief, she testified: A. Well, I think when I came into the [police department on election day], I think I asked if he was there.... Yeah, I think, I think I, I asked Eichner if Weidel was there. Like who was there. Like which supervisors. Because I wanted to talk to a supervisor. And Brower had obviously left or something. And I said well, who’s here, is Weidel here? And they said yes, but he’s unavailable .... Q. Did you learn from anybody if Lieutenant Weidel had been involved in any decisions regarding the March 15th, 2005 election incident? A. I have not learned that yet. (See M.. Burke Aff., Ex. F (Pl. Dep. at 315).) After plaintiffs deposition, Weidel’s attorney, Burke, by letter dated May 11, 2006, requested that plaintiff withdraw the claim against Weidel regarding the election incident. (See id. Ex. D.) He wrote: Based on your allegations against my client [in your “First Amendment to Complaint”], your sworn testimony and a review of the relevant case law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11[,] it is' respectfully requested that you voluntarily withdraw all your claims against Bradley Weidel. 0See id<) Plaintiff, however, did not comply with Burke’s request. Plaintiffs last set of allegations concern a confrontation between plaintiff and Weidel on May 30, 2005. (See Am. Complt. ¶¶ 9-14; M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (Pl. Dep. at 315-16).) Specifically, plaintiffs dog ran away and she and her husband went looking for it. (See Am. Complt. ¶ 9; M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PL Dep. at 316-17).) They posted lost-dog signs offering a reward at various locations, including a utility pole that was approximately one hundred feet from Weidel’s residence. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that Weidel was in his driveway at this time and, when he noticed plaintiff, he “walked into the street at the end of his driveway[ ] and stared at [p]laintiff in her car, then yelled at [plaintiff] ‘what are you doing.’ ” (See Am. Complt. ¶ 12; M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PL Dep. at 317).) Plaintiff testified that Weidel was “|j]ust like what are you doing here. What do you think you’re doing, like he had his hands on his hips.” (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (Pl. Dep. at 318).) According to plaintiff, Weidel was “attempting to intimidate [p]laintiff from her efforts to find her dog ....” (See Am. Complt. ¶ 12; M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (Pl. Dep. at 319, 320).) Plaintiff also testified that Weidel was not in uniform, and never asserted any sort • of official authority, threatened her with arrest, showed a badge or revealed any sort of weapon. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (Pl. Dep. at 318-21).) Plaintiff immediately called the police from her car to “make a report of harassment against Weidel,” and she then left the scene. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PL Dep. at 322-23); Am. Complt. ¶ 15.) The entire incident lasted thirty seconds. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. F (PI. Dep. ■ at 323).) According to plaintiff, when she first called the police, the dispatcher “balked” at her request to send an officer to her residence, but after “several phone calls,” the dispatcher finally agreed to send someone to take plaintiffs statement. (See Am. Complt. ¶¶ 15, 17.) The record contains the transcript of the dispatcher’s conversation with plaintiff, and it contains no evidence of flippant behavior on the part of the dispatcher. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. M.) It does, however, contain numerous instances of threatening statements by plaintiff. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. M.) For example, she stated: Plaintiff: I want a car down to my house soon or else I’m coming up there and raising hell because it’s going to end because you know I’m suing all of you.... And I wouldn’t talk too much to me either now because you’re going to be deposed also, by the way. And you know that, don’t you____I want a complaint of harassment right' now. I want a report made on [Weidel]. Listen, I’m not taking any crap from any of you anymore. The minute one of you looks at me cross-eyed I’m making a complaint because this is going before a Federal judge in a few months from now and I want him to know every single detail. Dispatcher: So why don’t you come in, why don’t you come in to the police station? Plaintiff: No because I’m running around now hanging up signs because my dog means everything to me. So I want your men, one of your men, ah-hah, I’m making a bona fide complaint against one of your men. If you don’t send one up you’re violating my rights again. (See M. Burke Aff., Ex. M.) Weidel also called the Ramapo Police Department to report the incident. (See id. Ex. L.) Sergeant Reilly and Officer Quinn from the Ramapo Police Department went to Weidel’s residence to take his statement and, immediately thereafter, went to plaintiffs residence to take her statement. (See id. Ex. L.) Plaintiff claims that her constitutional rights were violated because the Ramapo Police Department took Weidel’s statement prior to taking plaintiffs, which, according to plaintiff, is a violation of Ramapo Police Department policy. (See Am. Complt. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff brings several causes of action against the various defendants arising out of the facts outlined above. Discovery is now complete, but only after two years of highly contentious litigation inexcusably prolonged by petty bickering between plaintiff and her adversaries. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts. Although plaintiff styles her opposition as a cross motion for summary judgment, plaintiff makes no argument and provides no evidence that suggests that a motion for summary judgment in favor of plaintiff is warranted (or even sought). We have reviewed the entire record, which contains well over a thousand pages of affidavits, documentary evidence and deposition transcripts (largely consisting of arguments between plaintiff and her adversaries). Accordingly, this Court will now address the substance of defendants’ motions for summary judgment. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard It is axiomatic that “ ‘at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Kessler v. Westchester County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Accordingly, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, a motion for summary judgment may be granted only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” “A fact is considered ‘material’ for purposes of Rule 56 if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ ” Bush v. Fordham Univ., 452 F.Supp.2d 394, 404 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The burden rests on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At this stage of litigation, the court’s role is not to decide issues of material fact, but to discern whether any exist. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). In doing so, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences against the movant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “ ‘Once the moving party has made a properly supported showing sufficient to suggest the absence of any genuine issue as to a material fact, the nonmoving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, must come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in his favor.’ ” Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F.Supp.2d 336, 349 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995)). The nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bush, 452 F.Supp.2d at 405 (“In making its showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party may not rely on ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence’ to support its position, but must instead proffer ‘evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [plaintiff].’ ”) (quoting Dawson v. County of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir.2004)). Nonetheless, “summary judgment is appropriate only when application of the law to th[e] ... facts will reasonably support only one ultimate conclusion.” Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 437 (2d Cir.1999). II. State Law Claims As a preliminary matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs claims under state law must be dismissed because she failed to serve a Notice of Claim upon all the municipal defendants as required by New York General Municipal Law § 50 — i(l). We agree. Pursuant to New York law, “[s]er-vice of a notice of claim ... is a condition precedent to a. lawsuit against a municipality].” Davidson v. Bronx Mun. Hosp., 64 N.Y.2d 59, 61, 484 N.Y.S.2d 533, 473 N.E.2d 761 (1984); see also Williams v. Mahoney, 41 Fed.Appx. 519, 519 (2d Cir.2002). This doctrine applies with equal force to state law claims against municipal employees, see N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-i(1), as well as to claims under the New York Human Rights Law. See Santiago v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 434 F.Supp.2d 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (applying the Notice of Claim requirement to claims pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law); Falchenberg v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 375 F.Supp.2d 344, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (same). In the present case, it is undisputed that plaintiff has failed to comply with this condition precedent and has made no application to this Court for leave to serve a late Notice of Claim. (See Specht Affm., Ex. K; M. Burke Aff., Ex. C.) Accordingly, plaintiffs state law claims must be dismissed. However, even if plaintiffs state law claims were to survive, we would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them because, as set forth below, none of plaintiffs federal claims are sufficient to survive summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §• 1367(c)(3); Johnson v. Washington Mut. Bank F.A., — Fed.Appx. -, -, 2007 WL 419270, at *2 (2d Cir.2007); Clissuras v. City Univ. of N.Y., 90 Fed.Appx. 566, 567-68 (2d Cir.2004) (“In the absence of any viable federal claims, the district court was well within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law causes of action .... ”); Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 102-03 (2d Cir.1998). III. Statute of Limitations Defendants also argue, and have pled in their Answer, that several of plaintiffs claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the applicable three-year statute of hmitations which begins to run when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the harm. See Warren v. Altieri, 59 Fed.Appx. 426, 427 (2d. Cir.2003) (“ § 1983 action[s are] governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations as set out in N.Y. CPLR § 214, the provision applicable to actions for personal injury.”); see also Clissuras, 90 Fed.Appx. at 567; Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994). Plaintiff argues, however, that Her claims are timely pursuant to the “continuing violation doctrine.” (See PL Reply Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 8-10.) Accordingly, we first address whether plaintiffs claims are timely under the three-year statute of limitations without regard to the continuing violation doctrine, and we will then address whether the doctrine applies to those claims that plaintiff failed to bring within the allotted time. Plaintiff filed this action on March 18, 2005, and her earliest claim dates back to “late 1993 or 1994” when she was pulled over while driving on New York Route 59 by Donnelly, an officer of the Ramapo Police Department. See supra pp. 336-37. Since this incident occurred more than eleven years prior to plaintiffs commencement of this action, it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs next claim involves the Ramapo Police Department’s policy or custom in handling her domestic visitation disputes with her ex-husband, beginning as far back as the late 1980s. See supra pp. 337-40. It is undisputed, however, that the Ramapo Police Department implemented a new policy regarding its handling of plaintiffs domestic visitation disputes in 1998, after which plaintiff concedes that no incidents of police misconduct occurred with respect thereto. Furthermore, plaintiffs “youngest child with ... Peikon turned 18 in 2000, and there were no further opportunities for disputes regarding visitation issues.” (See Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 30.) Since the latest incident occurred no fewer than five years prior to the commencement of this action, these claims are also barred by the statute of limitations. Lastly, plaintiff claims that, in September 2001, Budnick threatened to strip search her as she was entering a town building. See supra pp. 340-41. Clearly, this incident occurred more than three years prior to plaintiffs commencement of this litigation so that this claim is also barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argues, however, that these alleged acts are actionable pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine. She claims: “All of the actions complained of ... relating to the [Ramapo Police Department] were reflections of a single illegal policy, custom, practice, and usage: to harass, annoy and frustrate Lydia [Cotz].” (See Pl. Reply Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 8.) In particular, plaintiff contends that the following “violations” are part of a continuing pattern of wrongdoing: (1) Donnelly’s 1993 traffic stop; (2) the Ramapo Police Department’s response to her visitation disputes in the 1980s and Nineties; (3) Bud-nick’s 2001' threat to strip search her; (4) the Ramapo Police Department’s failure to respond to her complaints regarding her neighbor in 1997 and then from approximately 2000 to 2003; and (5) Lampert’s removal of her from the polling place in 2005. Plaintiffs argument, however, is without merit. Under the continuing violation doctrine, a timely charge with respect to a constitutional violation in furtherance of an infirm policy .renders claims against other unlawful actions “taken pursuant to that policy timely, even if they would be untimely if standing alone.” Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 85 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir.1996); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703-04 (2d Cir.1994) (“[Under the continuing violation doctrine,] ‘the commencement of the statute of limitations period may be delayed until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of it.’ ”) (quoting Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d 1330, 1333 (2d Cir.1992)); Purdy v. Town of Greenburgh, 166 F.Supp.2d 850, 863-64 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (Conner, J.) Courts in the Second Circuit view continuing violation arguments with disfavor, and the doctrine’s applicability outside of the Title VII or discrimination context is uncertain. See Jackson v. New York, 381 F.Supp.2d 80, 88 (N.D.N.Y.2005); see also Wilkins v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Prob., No. 98 Civ. 6611, 2001 WL 262601, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 2001). An allegation of several unlawful acts, even similar ones, does not, in and of itself, establish a continuing violation. See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1052, 114 S.Ct. 1612, 128 L.Ed.2d 339 (1994). Rather, “[a] continuing violation exists where there is a relationship between a series of discriminatory actions and an invalid, underlying policy.” Conn. Light & Power, 85 F.3d at 96. To obtain the benefit of the continuing violation doctrine, a plaintiff must prove: (1) an underlying unconstitutional policy or practice; and (2) an action taken pursuant to that policy during the statutory period preceding filing the complaint. Id.; Gavigan v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 84 F.Supp.2d 540, 545 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Conner, J.). In the present case, however, plaintiff has established neither. Rather, she cites varied police activity: (1) occurring over the course of fifteen years; (2) undertaken by several different officers; (3) occurring under the supervision of d