Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER BROWNING, District Judge. THIS MIATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant Robert Vigil’s Motion to Set Aside Verdict and for Judgement of Acquittal on Count 24 of the Fifth Superseding Indictment Under Fed. R.Crim.P. 29 or in the Alternative for New Trial on Count 24, filed October 5, 2006 (Doc. 411)(“Motion to Acquit”). The Court held a hearing on this motion on December 1, 2006. The primary issues are: (i) whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Vigil attempted to extort property from George Everage through the wrongful use of fear of economic harm and under color of official right; (ii) whether the jury’s verdict finding Vigil guilty of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act is invalid as a matter of law because the victim of the attempted extortion, Ever-age, never acquired a property interest from which to extort; (iii) whether the evidence the United States presented at trial established a nexus between Vigil’s conduct and interstate commerce; and (iv) whether Vigil’s conviction offends due process because the Hobbs Act does not provide adequate notice that the conduct the United States alleged violates the Act. Because the Court finds that the evidence is sufficient to convict Vigil under either of the alternate theories upon which the Court instructed the jury, that Everage’s reasonable belief in some form of economic profit resulting from a contract with the New Mexico State Treasurer’s Office (“NMSTO”) established a property interest, that the attempted extortion possessed the requisite nexus to interstate commerce, and that Vigil’s conviction does not offend due process, it finds that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Vigil attempted to extort property from Everage, and will therefore deny the motion. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Much of the factual evidence pertinent to this motion is not in dispute. Vigil does not seriously contend that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Vigil intended to extort Everage or that he took some steps toward extorting Everage. The issue is whether, as a matter of law, Vigil’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Hobbs Act. 1. Evidence of Vigil’s Motive to Commit the Crime. The United States contends that it presented evidence at trial of several factors that motivated Vigil, while serving as the New Mexico State Treasurer, to transfer funds to Michael Montoya, the former State Treasurer who preceded Vigil. See United States’ Response to Motion to Set Aside Verdict and For Judgment of Acquittal on Count 24 of the Fifth Superseding Indictment Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 as the Evidence is Insufficient to Sustain a Conviction at 3, filed October 19, 2006 (Doc. 412). First, there is evidence that, in 1999, after Vigil was unsuccessful in his bid to run for Governor of New Mexico, Montoya hired Vigil as his Deputy State Treasurer. See Transcript of Trial at 158:10-15 (Montoya)(taken September 13, 2006)(“Sept. 13 Transcript”). There is also evidence that, later, when Vigil ran for the position of Treasurer, Montoya, in combination with Angelo Garcia and Kent Nelson, provided Vigil significant monetary and other support. See id. at 242:22 — 243:12. There was evidence presented that Montoya and Garcia kept a record of these expenditures, that they shared this record with Vigil, and that they indicated to Vigil that they, and Nelson, had mutually contributed to cover these expenses. See id. at 258:6-14; 263:2-6. The United States further asserts that it presented evidence that Vigil failed to report these contributions on his campaign finance report forms and knew that Montoya possessed documents through which he could prove Vigil received this money. See United States’ Response at 4. Montoya testified that he showed these documents to Judy Espinosa, the NMSTO’s public relations officer, and Espinosa confirmed that she confronted Vigil about what she believed were contributions missing from his campaign finance reports. See Sept. 13 Transcript at 285:2-286:24 (Montoya); Transcript of Trial at 49:11-14 (Espino-sa)(taken September 19, 2006)(“Sept. 19 Transcript”). In addition, there was also evidence presented that Montoya pressured Vigil by threatening to run against him in the next election. See Sept. 13 Transcript at 283:10-15 (Montoya). The jury heard a recorded conversation in which Vigil told Garcia that, if the NMSTO was going to contract with George Everage for securities lending, the NMSTO needed to ensure that Samantha Sais, Montoya’s wife, receive a job as part of the transaction. See Transcript of Recorded Conversation at 7 (taken February 23, 2005)(Government’s Exhibit 589-T)(“Exhibit 589-T”). This statement was followed by Vigil’s acknowledgment that “[Montoya] is all over there telling everybody he’s running for Treasurer.” Id. Similarly, during a conversation with Nelson on May 2, 2005, Vigil indicated that he felt he could prevent Montoya from running for State Treasurer by securing Sais a job in the securities-lending project. See Transcript of Recorded Conversation at 38-39 (taken May 2, 2005)(Government’s Exhibit 592-T). 2. Securities Lending Everage testified that he proposed to Vigil that the NMSTO initiate a securities-lending program to earn additional income on the office’s securities inventory. See Transcript of Direct Testimony of George Everage at 23:7-19 (Everage)(taken September 15, 2006)(“Everage Direct Examination”). Everage indicated that Vigil was initially reluctant because of his awareness that other state agencies had enjoyed varying degrees of success implementing similar programs. See id. at 24:24-25:3. In response to Vigil’s concerns, Everage suggested that the NMSTO could use multiple securities-lending agents, and bid the project out to the various agents to create competition and to ensure the NMSTO a better yield on its lending activity. See id. at 25:17-21. Everage estimated that the NMSTO could earn between one and three million dollars annually through the securities-lending program. See id. at 31:19-23. Everage understood, however, that the securities-lending program had the potential to not make money or to make less money than he estimated. See id. at 149:10-15; Transcript of Cross-Examination and Re-direcb-Examination of George Everage at 13:21-14:1 (Everage)(taken September 18, 2006)(“Everage Cross-Redirect”). To institute the securities-lending program, Everage recommended that the NMSTO create a position — securities-lending oversight manager (“SLOM”) — -to oversee the securities-lending agents and to ensure the agents complied with the NMSTO’s investment policy. See Everage Direct Exam at 27:15-22. Everage stated that when he proposed the securities-lending plan to Vigil, he told Vigil that a NMSTO employee could handle the SLOM position’s duties “in-house,” or the NMSTO could contract with a third-party to act as the SLOM. Id. at 32:4-12. Ever-age represented that Vigil decided to issue a contract for the SLOM position, because the NMSTO did not have the budgetary resources to have an in-house employee perform the job functions. See id. at 36:9-14. Everage also understood that the New Mexico Legislature never allocated the NMSTO funds to have the SLOM position funded in-house. See Everage Cross-Redirect at 37:12-15. Upon learning that the NMSTO would contract the SLOM position, Everage informed Vigil that, if and when the securities-lending program was implemented, Everage would like the opportunity to bid on the contract for the SLOM position. See Everage Direct Examination at 36:22-23. Everage, in association with several other NMSTO employees — Vigil, Assistant State Treasurer Ann Marie Gallegos, Deputy State Treasurer Elaine Olah, the NMSTO’s counsel, Dave Romero, and the NMSTO’s Investment Advisor, Mark Ca-navan — drafted a request for proposals (“RFP”) for the SLOM position. See id. at 43:6-16; Notice of Request for Proposals for Securities Lending Oversight Manager (Government’s Exhibit 512)(“SLOM RFP”). Among the provisions included in the RFP for the SLOM position was a prohibition against subcontracting work the SLOM would perform on behalf of the NMSTO. See Everage Direct Examination at 46:8-14; SLOM RFP, Part II.C ¶ 4. The RFP for the SLOM position also indicated that the State Treasurer could terminate any contract between the NMSTO and the SLOM at will. See Ever-age Cross-Redirect at 22:2-4; 22:11-14; SLOM RFP, Professional Service Contract ¶ 5. Finally, the RFP established that the SLOM would be paid a fee calculated as a percentage of the value of securities that the NMSTO’s lent. See Everage Cross-Redirect at 35:17-23; SLOM RFP, Professional Service Contract ¶ 2. Everage testified that, when he informed Vigil that he was interested in applying for the SLOM position, Vigil indicated that he had a friend whose wife needed a job and inquired if Everage would be willing to hire her should he receive the SLOM contract. See Everage Direct Examination at 37:5-12. Everage learned that this woman was Sais. See id. at 38:3-9. Everage testified that Vigil told him that Sais “was being a pain in his ass,” and that he would appreciate Everage assisting him in “get[ting] her off his ass.” Id. at 41:13-15. 3. SLOM Contract. At Vigil’s request, Romero performed an evaluation and determined that the NMSTO could legally award the SLOM contract to a former state employee. See id. at 49:13-24. On April 15, 2005, Ever-age left his position at the NMSTO with the intention of seeking the SLOM contract. See id. at 43:17-22; 44:1-4. On April 29, 2005, Everage met with Sais in Albuquerque to discuss her professional background and qualifications. See id. at 53:8-14. Based on this meeting, Everage concluded that Sais did not have any knowledge regarding securities lending, and decided that he did not wish to hire her. See id. at 59:24-60:10. In addition, during their April 29, 2006 conversation, Sais represented to Everage that Vigil owed favors to Montoya and that Montoya was contemplating running against Vigil for State Treasurer in 2006. See id. at 60:17-21. Subsequent to his meeting with Sais, Everage called Vigil to discuss the results of the meeting. See id. at 61:3-6. Everage testified that, based on this conversation with Vigil, it was his understanding that, if he did not hire Sais, he would not be considered for the SLOM position. See id. at 61:8-9. Everage submitted a bid for the SLOM contract on May 3, 2005; his bid did not include any role for Sais as part of his contract performance. See id. at 62:12-17. Everage acknowledged that, at the time he submitted his application for the SLOM position, he did not have a vested right in the SLOM contract, and that Vigil had the authority to cancel the NMSTO’s request for proposals and/or not to proceed with the securities-lending program. See id. at 77:20-78:6. Everage faxed an addendum to his bid for the SLOM contract to the NMSTO on May 12, 2005. See id. at 81:7-8. This addendum characterized Sais as a subcontractor, indicated that Sais would send her resume directly to the NMSTO, and represented that Everage would employ Sais as a subcontractor if the NMSTO specifically approved the use of a subcontractor. See id. at 81:20-24. Everage also drafted a Memorandum of Understanding documenting the terms of his agreement with Sais. See Everage Cross-Redireet at 26:14-17. Everage testified that he and Sais never signed the Memorandum of Understanding and the NMSTO never sent him an amended version of the contract authorizing the use of subcontractors. See Everage Direct Examination 130:7-14; Everage Cross-Redireet at 28:10-12. Everage testified that, at some point between May 12, 2005 and May 30, 2005, someone from the NMSTO called him and told him that the NMSTO would send him the responses to a request for proposals regarding securities-lending that the NMSTO had distributed to securities-lending agents. See Everage Direct Examination at 85:24-86:2. Everage also stated that he received from the NMSTO a contract for the SLOM position that had changed the conditions of the original proposal he had submitted to the office and requested that he sign and return the contract. See id. at 86:15-18. Everage signed the contract and returned it to the NMSTO along with a request that Vigil sign a copy of the contract and return it to Everage. See id. at 88:4-9. Everage testified that, when he signed the contract and returned it to the NMSTO, he believed that the contract had been consummated. See id. at 91:7-14. Everage testified that, accordingly, the NMSTO sent him the bid proposals of three securities-lending agents and that he reviewed and evaluated these agents’ applications for the securities-lending agent position. See id. at 93:17-22; 94:3-5. Finally, Everage also indicated that he had been invited to attend a June 16, 2005 meeting that had been scheduled so that NMSTO’s securities-lending evaluation committee could consider the securities-lending agents’ applications. See id. at 97:17-21. On June 10, 2005, Everage met with Sais for a second time in an attempt to negotiate a fee-sharing arrangement for fees generated through the SLOM position. See id. at 102:7-9. At the conclusion of this meeting, Everage made a final determination that he would not be able to employ Sais. See id. at 105:14-18. Following this meeting, on June 13, 2005, Ever-age spoke to Vigil by telephone. See id. at 105:19-23. Everage indicated to Vigil that he had offered Sais forty percent of the SLOM’s net proceeds, and Vigil replied: “No, no just deal with this George, we can’t, we can’t deal with net, it can’t work.” Transcript of Recorded Conversation at 2 (recorded June 13, 2005)(Government’s Exhibit 591-T). It was Everage’s understanding as a result of this conversation that Vigil was unhappy that Everage and Sais could not reach some arrangement, and Everage felt that Vigil was threatening to cancel his contract with the NMSTO if Everage and Sais could not resolve their disagreement. See Everage Direct Examination at 111:11-12; 112:9-12; Everage Cross-Redirect at 80:4-7. At Vigil’s advice, Everage followed up his conversation with Vigil by calling Gallegos. See Everage Direct Examination at 122:8-9. After speaking to Gallegos, Ev-erage considered his prospects of working as the SLOM to be extinguished. See id. at 122:14-16. Everage documented his concerns regarding what he perceived as Sais’ attempt to extort the NMSTO in a letter to Vigil dated June 13, 2006. See id. at 122:24-123:1. In the letter to Vigil, Everage summarized his position: “I would hope that the threat made by you and Ms. Gallegos, that is, if Ms. Sais’s demands are not met by [Everage], that the existing SLOM contract will be repudiated and a new RFP issued and by implication that [Everage] will likely not be reselected as SLOM for securities lending, will not be acted upon.” Letter from George Everage to Robert Vigil at 2 (dated June 13, 2005)(Government’s Exhibit 521). See Everage Direct Examination at 126:7-13. The NMSTO responded to Everage’s June 13, 2005 letter in a letter dated June 23, 2005. See Everage Direct Examination at 128:21-129:1; Letter from Ann Marie Gallegos to George Everage (dated June 23, 2005)(Government’s Exhibit 528)(“Gallegos Letter”). The NMSTO’s letter asserted that, at the time of the letter’s writing, there was no legal contract in effect between Everage and the NMSTO. See Everage Direct Examination at 129:15-17; Gallegos Letter at 1. The letter further indicated that prior communications were an attempt to negotiate acceptable terms, not actual or implied threats, and that Everage “must surely recognize that in responding to the RFP, and including Ms. Samantha Sais as a proposed subcontractor, that [the NMSTO’s] evaluation of [Everage’s] proposal would include an evaluation of the knowledge, skills and abilities you [and Sais] both offer.” Gallegos Letter at 1. See Everage Direct Examination at 129:23-130:2; Everage Cross-Redirect at 66:2-5. The letter concluded: In any event, we must conclude negotiations or failing that, reissue the RFP and hope for more satisfactory responses. Should you fail to respond to this request by 5:00 p.m. July 8, 2005, we will consider your offer withdrawn and will proceed with the re-issuance of the RFP for a Securities Lending Oversight Manager. Gallegos Letter at 2 (bold emphasis in original). See Everage Direct Examination at 131:10-16. Everage noted that Romero was among the recipients carbon-copied on the letter. See Everage Direct Examination at 131:25-132:8. Everage responded to the NMSTO’s letter in a letter dated July 7, 2005. See Everage Direct Examination at 132:19-23; Letter from George Everage to Ann Marie Gallegos (dated July 7, 2005)(Government’s Exhibit 529)(“Everage Response Letter”). In the letter, which Everage’s wife, an attorney, assisted in drafting, Everage argued that there was a legal contract in effect between Everage and the NMSTO and that, in preparing the report evaluating the securities-lending agents that had submitted bids to the NMSTO, Everage had performed pursuant to that contract. See Everage Response Letter at 1; Ever-age Direct Examination at 133:20-134:6. Everage further maintained that his failure to employ Sais could not invalidate the contract because Sais was a subcontractor, the contract expressly prohibited subcontracting, and that the contract had never been amended or reformed to allow subcontracting. See Everage Response Letter at 1; Everage Direct Examination at 134:13-20. In a letter dated July 15, 2005, Romero responded to Everage’s letter alleging Everage’s legal analysis was flawed, and re-asserting that no contract existed between Everage and the NMSTO. See Everage Direct Examination at 139:1-9; Letter from Dave Romero to George Ev-erage (dated July 15, 2005)(Government’s Exhibit 530). Everage testified that he did not lose any money as a result of the NMSTO cancelling any SLOM contract he might have had. See Everage Cross-Redirect at 16:4-6. Everage did acknowledge, however, that he had indicated to Sais, in a tape-recorded conversation, that he lost $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 per month in projected earnings as a result of the NMSTO rescinding his contract. See id. at 17:1-2, 17:11-16. Everage emphasized that these were projected losses; he testified that “[tjhere was no money for me to lose. I never had it in my hand.” Id. at 20:10-11. 4. The Second RFP. On August 9, 2005, the NMSTO issued a revised RFP for the SLOM position. See Request for Proposals for Professional Services to Provide Securities Lending Oversight Manager Services to the Office of the New Mexico State Treasurer at 5 (Government’s Exhibit 532)(“Second SLOM RFP”). The Second SLOM RFP contained a provision that granted the NMSTO the discretion to bifurcate the SLOM position into two components and award separate contracts to: (i) a securities-lending manager; and (ii) an information technologies (“IT”) manager. See id., Part I.C. Andrew Perkins, a former contract employee at the NMSTO, submitted a bid in response to the Second SLOM RFP. See Transcript of Trial at 38:13-15 (Perkins)(taken September 18, 2006)(“Sept. 18 Transcript”). Perkins’ proposal indicated that he was partnered with Thomas Che-pucavage, an individual with a bachelor’s degree in information technology and professional experience as an information technology consultant with Accenture Consulting. See id. at 40:2-10. Perkins was aware, however, that two or more contracts could be awarded. See id. at 60:2-6. Several days after receiving Perkins’ response to the Second SLOM RFP, Gallegos contacted Perkins and informed him that the NMSTO had awarded the IT portion of the SLOM contract to Sais. See id. at 45:10-12. At a subsequent meeting at the NMSTO involving Vigil, Perkins, Sais, and Gallegos, Vigil informed Perkins that thirty percent of the fees generated through securities-lending would be allocated to Perkins’ firm, and that Sais would receive half of that thirty percent. See id. at 49:4-10. Perkins testified that he would have preferred to work with Chepucavage, but did not believe working with Sais was optional. See id at 50:20-51:5. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On July 25, 2006, a grand jury returned a Fifth Superceding Indictment charging Vigil with twenty-four counts of racketeering and extortion in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d), and the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 & 1952. See Fifth Superceding Indictment, filed July 25, 2006 (Doc. 259). The Court held a jury trial in this case from September 5, 2006 to September 30, 2006. On September 28, 2006, at the close of the United States’ evidence, Vigil moved, under rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss all charges. The Court took the motion under advisement, but indicated to the parties that it was inclined to submit all the counts to the jury. See Transcript of Trial at 147:2-149:1 (Court)(taken September 28, 2006). Subsequent to the Court reserving its ruling, Vigil chose not to present any evidence. The jury returned a verdict on September 30, 2006 finding Vigil not guilty on Counts One through Twenty-Three and guilty on Count Twenty-Four of the Fifth Su-perceding Indictment. See Verdict, filed September 30, 2006 (Doc. 408). Count Twenty-Four of the Fifth Superseding Indictment charges: Between May 2, 2005 and September 15, 2005, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the State and District of New Mexico, the defendant Robert Vigil, did knowingly and unlawfully affect and attempt to affect interstate commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in interstate commerce by extortion, in that the defendant Robert Vigil attempted to cause George Ever-age to provide money and property to another person, with Everage’s consent, induced by wrongful use and threat of use of economic harm and under color of official right, in connection with Ever-age’s efforts to work as the Securities Lending Oversight Manager for the New Mexico State Treasurer’s Office. On October 5, 2006, Vigil filed this motion requesting the Court, pursuant to rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, acquit him as a matter of law on Count Twenty-Four of the Fifth Superseding Indictment. In the alternative, Vigil moves for a new trial on that count. RULE 29 Rule 29(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a trial court to reserve decision on a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, made at the close of the government’s evidence, and to submit the case to the jury. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(b). If the court submits the case to the jury, and the jury returns a guilty verdict, the defendant may renew his motion within seven days after a guilty verdict. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c). The rule provides that, if the trial court decides to reserve its decision, “it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 29(b). STANDARD FOR DECIDING MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized the government’s burden to prove every element of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt as a constitutional imperative. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). This requirement, applied though the rules of evidence consistent with that standard, is a “historically grounded right[ ] of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.” Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895)). When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence underpinning a criminal conviction, courts must evaluate the direct and circumstantial evidence, together with all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the government, and determine whether a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir.2006). A court should “not overturn a jury’s finding unless no reasonable juror could have reached the disputed verdict.” United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1439 (10th Cir.1997). The court should let stand the conviction where a “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. McPhilomy, 270 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir.2001)(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge made after a defendant has presented his case-in-chief, the court is not limited to reviewing the government’s case-in-chief alone, but may review the entire record, including evidence that the defendant presents. See United States v. Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077, 1082 (10th Cir.2004). The court may not, however, weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. See United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir.2000). It is the jury’s responsibility to appraise witness credibility, weigh testimony, draw reasonable inferences, and reach a conclusion as to a defendant’s guilt. See United States v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041, 1044 (10th Cir.2004). The court’s duty is to “determine whether the evidence, if believed, would establish each element of the crime.” United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2001)(quoting United States v. Evans, 42 F.3d 586, 589 (10th Cir.1994)). Although the jury’s decision is afforded great deference, “the evidence, when viewed in its entirety, must generate more than a mere suspicion of guilt, and where such evidence is equally consistent with both guilt and innocence the conviction cannot be sustained.” United States v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1032 (10th Cir.2006)(quoting United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1513-14 (10th Cir.1990)). In reaching a conviction, juries have “wide latitude to determine factual issues and to draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence,” but inferences are reasonable only when, “with experience serving as the touehstone[,] ... there is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the facts in evidence.” United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1295 (10th Cir.2005)(internal citation omitted). Where an inference relates to an ultimate conclusion underpinning criminal liability, “a jury may draw [the] inference only where that inference can be made beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1295 n. 4 (quoting United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir.2000)). LAW REGARDING ALTERNATE THEORIES An indictment is duplicitous if it conjunctively charges two or more offenses in the same count. See United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 888 (10th Cir.2001). Where an indictment is duplicitous, the accused may request that a special verdict form, or “an augmented instruction requiring unanimity on one or the other of the acts charged within a count,” be used so as to ensure unanimity. United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1354-55 (10th Cir.1998). A defendant’s failure to timely challenge his indictment on duplicity grounds, however, waives any later challenge based on a failure to use a special verdict form. See United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d at 888-89. Accordingly, “[w]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). Charging a single offense involving a multitude of alternative methods and/or courses of action, however, does not necessarily render a charge duplicitous. See United States v. Wiles, 102 F.3d 1043, 1062 (10th Cir.1996); Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) (“A count may allege that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means.”). Still, courts recognize that, this situation, in the absence of a special verdict, presents the danger that a defendant may be convicted without the jury unanimously agreeing on the particular acts that constitute the basis of the offense in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1502 n. 7 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Fredette, 315 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.2003)(acknowledging the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity to convict a defendant in a federal jury trial); United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir.1994)(same)(citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972)(Powell, J., concurring)). Nevertheless, in the Tenth Circuit, a lack of a special verdict or particularized instruction does not undermine a guilty verdict, because “a general instruction on the requirement of unanimity suffices to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous on whatever specifications they find to be the predicate of the guilty verdict.” United States v. Sasser, 971 F.2d 470, 477 (10th Cir.1992). THE HOBBS ACT The Hobbs Act makes conduct unlawful which “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). The essence of a Hobbs Act violation is the wrongful means that a defendant employs to obtain the property in question, ie. “a lawful right to property or lawful authority to obtain property is not a defense to extortion; rather, if an official obtains property that he has lawful authority to obtain, but does so in a wrongful manner, his conduct constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act.” Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755, 769 (10th Cir.2006). On the other hand, government officials acting zealously within their statutory powers do not violate the Hobbs Act merely because the results of their actions are adverse to a particular entity or business activity. See id. at 769-70; Sinclair v. Hawke, 314 F.3d 934, 943-44 (8th Cir.2003)(noting “bank regulators do not become racketeers by acting like aggressive regulators”). Liability attaches only when a public official “obtains a ‘payment to which he was not entitled, knowing the payment was made in return for official acts.’ ” United States v. Kelley, 461 F.3d 817, 826 (6th Cir.2006)(quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992)). With regard to fear of economic loss, specifically, federal courts have acknowledged that this fear plays a legitimate role in many economic transactions. [F]ear of economic loss plays a role in many business transactions that are entirely legitimate; awareness of that fear and use of it as leverage in bargaining, in which each side offers the other property, services, or rights it legitimately owns or controls, is not made unlawful by the Hobbs Act. What the Act reaches is not mere hard bargaining but the exploitation of the fear of economic loss in order to obtain property to which the exploiter is not entitled. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 523-24 (3d Cir.1998)(quoting United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1062 (2d Cir.1986)(“Cupo I”), vacated in part on other grounds, 817 F.2d 947 (2d Cir.1987)). Finally, “economic loss” under the Hobbs Act is not limited to the loss of tangible property or existing relationships, “but may be no more than the [victim’s] right to make his business decisions free of threats and coercion, or other intangible rights.” United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir.1986). See United States v. Kelley, 461 F.3d at 826 (“Under the ‘fear of economic harm’ theory, the defendant receives payment from the victim because the victim believes that the defendant can exercise his or her power to the victim’s economic detriment.”); Capo I, 791 F.2d at 1062 (stating that concept of economic loss encompasses a lost opportunity to enter into a business relationship). ANALYSIS Vigil states that, to have violated the Hobbs Act, he must have: (i) wrongfully attempted (ii) to obtain property from Ev-erage (iii) with Everage’s consent (iv) by wrongful use of actual or threatened fear or under color of official right. See Motion to Acquit at 4. Vigil argues that, even when all the evidence presented at trial is considered in the light most favorable to the government, as the Court must, the facts of this case related to the NMSTO’s attempt to engage in securities lending do not constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act. See id. at 2. Specifically, Vigil argues that he did not employ wrongful methods in his negotiations with Everage, see id. at 6, and that Everage never acquired a property interest from which to extort, see id. at 7. In addition, Vigil also argues, apparently in the alternative that, if the factual evidence does constitute a Hobbs Act violation, the United States did not prove that Vigil’s conduct affected interstate commerce, as the Act requires, see id. at 13, and that conviction on the charges contained in Count Twenty-Four offends due process, because “[t]he Hobbs Act does not give fair warning that the facts of this particular count would violate its terms,” id. at 15. The United States contests each of Vigil’s legal and factual arguments. First, the United States counters that Vigil’s conduct was wrongful because Vigil had no lawful claim to the property that he demanded Everage pay to Sais. See United States’ Response to Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Verdict and for Judgment of Acquittal on Count 24 of the Fifth Superseding Indictment Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 or in the Alternative for a New Trial on Count 24 at 9, filed October 19, 2006 (Doc. 413)(“United States Response”). Second, the United States asserts that Everage had acquired a property interest in the proceeds Everage expected the SLOM position to generate, in the right to compete for government contracts on a level playing field, and in the right to conduct his business affairs free of coercion, and that to sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, “a victim need only fear that he or she may suffer an economic loss if the demands of the corrupt public official are not met.” Id. at 18. Third, the United States contends that it proved that Vigil’s conduct affected interstate commerce — pointing out that “[sjecurities lending involves, by its very nature, transactions based upon securities, which are themselves instru-mentalities of interstate commerce.” Id. at 20. Finally, the United States maintains that the facts of this case fall squarely within the scope of conduct the Hobbs Act prohibits and that the Hobbs Act provides adequate warning that the conduct in which Vigil engaged was illegal. See id. at 21. In addition to its legal and factual arguments, the United States alleges that Vigil has previously raised, and that the Court has previously rejected, each of the arguments Vigil raises in this motion. The Court acknowledges that each of the arguments was raised in some form at the conclusion of Vigil’s first and second trials. See Defendant Robert Vigil’s Motion to Dismiss Racketeering Acts Five Through Twenty-Six and Counts Seven Through Twenty-Eight of the Fourth Superceding Indictment Under Fed.R.Evid. 29 at 7-9, filed May 10, 2006 (Doc. 196); Defendant Robert Vigil’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Racketeering Acts Five Through Twenty-Six and Counts Seven Through Twenty-Eight of the Fourth Superseding Indictment Under Fed.R.Evid. 29 at 2-7, filed June 21, 2006 (Doc. 239); Transcript of Trial at 137:1-140:18 (Bowles)(taken September 28, 2006). On August 7, 2006, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion denying Vigil’s request to dismiss the attempted extortion charge in the face of arguments substantially similar to the ones Vigil presents in support of this motion. See Memorandum Opinion at 19-26, filed August 7, 2006 (Doc. 268). At the December 1, 2006 hearing on this motion, Vigil’s counsel did not contend that any of his arguments in support of this motion were entirely new, but maintained that, in the face of additional evidence and more precise presentation, they are now more fully developed. See Transcript of Hearing at 115:12-116:12 (Bowles)(taken December 1, 2006)(“Hearing Transcript”). In any case, the Court has carefully reviewed each argument in the context of the fully developed trial record and has continued to study additional law, and finds that a reasonable jury could conclude the evidence presented at trial constitutes a violation of the Hobbs Act as a matter of law. In addition, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude that securities lending involves interstate commerce. Finally, the Court finds that sustaining Vigil’s conviction will not offend due process. The Court will deny Vigil’s motion. I. THE JURY’S VERDICT IS NOT LEGALLY AMBIGUOUS REGARDING THE THEORY UPON WHICH THE JURY PREMISED VIGIL’S CONVICTION, AND THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION Vigil states that the United States charged two alternate theories of extortion in Count Twenty-Four: “by threat of economic harm and under color of official right.” Motion to Acquit at 10. Vigil suggests that, because no special interrogatories were used to determine which theory the jury premised its conviction, if there is insufficient evidence for either one of these theories, the verdict is ambiguous, and the Court must award Vigil a new trial. See id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 907 F.2d 380, 381 (2d Cir.1990)). Vigil maintains that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to reach a guilty verdict under either theory. See id. The United States agrees with Vigil that Count Twenty-Four charges attempted extortion through two alternative methods — by use and threat of economic harm and through actions under color of official right — and acknowledges that no special verdict was employed to determine which theory the jury used to reach its conclusion. See United States’ Response at 7. The United States counters, however, that in cases where a special verdict is not used, “a general verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient as to any one of the alternate theories of prosecution,” and that Vigil’s failure to make a timely challenge to his indictment on duplicity grounds waives a current challenge to the failure to use a special verdict. Id. The Court finds that the jury was properly charged as to the elements of a Hobbs Act violation and was entitled to return a verdict on either or both of the alternate theories presented. The Court also believes that, by failing to make a timely request for a special verdict regarding which theory the jury was premising its conviction, Vigil has waived his right to contest the ambiguity of the general verdict that the jury returned. Finally, the Court concludes that the use of a special verdict was not necessary because the evidence was sufficient to find Vigil guilty under either theory the government presented. A. THE JURY WAS ENTITLED TO FIND VIGIL GUILTY ON ANY OF THE ALTERNATIVE ELEMENTS OF A HOBBS ACT VIOLATION DESPITE COUNT TWENTY-FOUR’S CONJUNCTIVE PHRASING. The Court begins its analysis by noting that the Hobbs Act’s definition of “extortion” is written in the disjunctive—encompassing the taking of property “by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added). This language appears to support the parties’ contention that Count Twenty-Four charges extortion by alternate means. The Court notes, however, that Count Twenty-Four of the United States’ Fifth Superceding Indictment, unlike 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), is worded in the conjunctive. Paragraph two of Count Twenty-Four charges that Vigil attempted to cause Everage to provide money to Sais “by wrongful use and threat of use of economic harm and under color of official right.” Fifth Su-perceding Indictment, Count Twenty-Four ¶ 2, at 31, filed July 25, 2006 (Doc. 259)(emphasis added). Unlike the language of the Indictment, the Court’s jury instructions related to Count Twenty-Four tracked the language of the statute and charged the jury that they could find Vigil attempted to extort Everage “either (a) by wrongful use of actual or threatened fear, or (b) under color of official right.” Court’s Final Jury Instructions with Citations, Instruction No. 31, at 68, filed September 28, 2006 (Doc. 394)(“Jury Instructions”). On the other hand, the verdict form presented to the jury required that the jury find Vigil guilty or not guilty “as charged in Count Twenty-Four of the indictment.” Verdict at 5, filed September 30, 2006 (Doc. 408). Because Vigil focuses on the alternate methods through which a defendant may violate the Hobbs Act, he does not argue, and the Court does not believe, that these inconsistencies undermine Vigil’s conviction. The Tenth Circuit has described it as “hornbook law that a crime denounced in the statute disjunctively may be alleged in an indictment in the conjunctive, and thereafter proven in the disjunctive.” United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1192 (10th Cir.2000)(quoting United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 868-69 (10th Cir.1976)). See United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1246 (10th Cir.2002)(reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to see if either alternate theory would have supported a conviction in a case in which the indictment was worded in the conjunctive and the charging statute was worded in the disjunctive). Other Circuit Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue are in accord. See United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir.2002)(“The general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.”)(quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970)); United States v. Arlt, 15 Fed.Appx. 431, 436 (9th Cir.2001)(indicating that the district court’s jury instructions “property tracked the language of the statute” and holding “[a] jury may convict on a finding of any of the elements of a disjunctively defined offense, despite the grand jury’s choice of conjunctive language in the indictment”); United States v. Poarch, 878 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.l989)(stating that, when a criminal statute provided for alternate means of violation, and the grand jury returned an indictment with conjunctive language, “the government obtained a more difficult indictment that it was required to by the statute,” and “the government need only show that one of those acts was committed in order to prove guilt”). Thus, that the jury may have found Vigil guilty based on one alternative theory, when the United States charged in the conjunctive, does not violate Vigil’s Sixth Amendment right to unanimity. The Court acknowledges that the verdict form that the jury filled out directed the jury to find Vigil guilty or not guilty “as charged in Count Twenty-Four of the indictment.” Verdict at 5. The Court assumes, however, that the jury was cognizant of and followed the jury instructions. See Reed v. Landstar Ligon, Inc., 314 F.3d 447, 454 (10th Cir.2002)(“We presume the jury followed the district court’s instructions.”). In any case, for three reasons, the Court does not believe that the direction contained in the verdict form changes its result. Cf. United States v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir.2003)(stating that “we are aware of no case in which a verdict form by itself was held to constitute a constructive amendment” to an indictment). First, the Court instructed the jury that the Fifth Superceding Indictment was only the formal charge against Vigil and was not evidence of his guilt. See Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 19, at 23. Second, because of the indictment’s length, the Court did not read it to the jury, nor absolutely require that the jury read the indictment. See id. Rather, the Court’s instruction stated: “I urge each of you to carefully read the Indictment as you begin your deliberations in this case.” Id. Third, and most important, if the jury followed the verdict form to the letter, disregarding the Court’s alternative phrasing in Instruction No. 31 and analyzing Count Twenty-Four’s elements conjunctively, a presumption the Court declines to reach, the verdict certainly is not ambiguous. Under that scenario, the jury would have found Vigil guilty of attempted extortion because he threatened Everage with economic harm and because he acted under color of official right. And, as the Court concludes herein, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict under both theories. See discussion infra Part I.C. B. THE LACK OF A SPECIAL VERDICT DOES NOT INVALIDATE VIGIL’S GENERAL VERDICT ON GROUNDS OF AMBIGUITY. Vigil points out that no special interrogatories were submitted to the jury to establish under which theory it found Vigil guilty, and “[c]onsequently[,] if there was-insufficient evidence for one of these theories, then the verdict is ambiguous and a new trial must be granted.” Motion to Acquit at 10 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 907 F.2d at 381). The United States’ counters that, because Vigil failed to make a timely request for a special verdict, he may not now challenge his indictment on duplicity grounds or question the unanimity of the jury’s verdict with respect to either of the alternative theories presented. See United States’ Response at 7-8. The United States further contends that Vigil’s citation of United States v. Garcia cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, because the Supreme Court, in Griffin v. United States, has “expressly disapproved” of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s holding in United States v. Garcia. See United States’ Response at 8 (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 57-58 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 466). The Court notes that United States v. Garcia, although a persuasive appellate authority, is not binding precedent for courts in the Tenth Circuit. The Court also agrees with the United States that the Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin v. United States easts doubt on the validity of the Second Circuit’s essential holding in United States v. Garcia. Indeed, the Second Circuit has acknowledged that Griffin v. United States “effectively overruled” its decision in United States v. Garcia. United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 115 (2d Cir.2001). Finally, at the hearing on this motion, Vigil’s counsel acknowledged that the Supreme Court had overruled United States v. Garcia to the extent that the Second Circuit’s result invalidated a general verdict even when the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction premised on either alternative ground. See Hearing Transcript at 37:15-18 (Bowles). The petitioner in Griffin v. United States, Diane Griffin, along with two co-conspirators, was charged with conspiracy to defraud the federal government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See 502 U.S. at 47, 112 S.Ct. 466. The conspiracy was alleged to have two objects: (i) impairing the IRS’ efforts to calculate income taxes; and (ii) impairing the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (“DEA”) efforts to ascertain forfeitable assets. See id. At trial, evidence was presented connecting Griffins’ co-conspirators to both objects and implicating Griffin in the IRS scheme, but no evidence was presented connecting her to the DEA object. See id. at 47-48, 112 S.Ct. 466. The district court denied Griffin’s request for severance and special interrogatories, and charged the jury with an instruction that allowed it to convict Griffin if it found the evidence sufficient to connect her to either one of the conspiracy’s alleged objects. See id. at 48, 112 S.Ct. 466. The jury returned a general guilty verdict against all three conspirators. See id. In affirming Griffin’s conviction, the Supreme Court characterized it as well settled law that “a general jury verdict was valid so long as it was legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds — even though that gave no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis for the jury’s action.” Id. at 49, 112 S.Ct. 466. Moreover, as a matter of historical practice, this rule applied to “general verdicts returned on mul-ticount indictments where some of the counts were unsupported by the evidence ... [and to] a general jury verdict under a single count charging the commission of an offense by two or more means.” Id. at 50, 112 S.Ct. 466 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original). Acknowledging case law that had invalidated convictions involving general verdicts when one of the alternate grounds for conviction was unconstitutional, or otherwise illegal, the Supreme Court expressly refused to expand that jurisprudence to encompass cases where one of the alternate grounds was “merely unsupported by sufficient evidence.” Id. at 56, 112 S.Ct. 466. Rather, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional rule that, “[w]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” Id. at 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466. Vigil has not alleged, and the Court does not believe, that either alternate ground upon which his conviction may have been premised is unconstitutional, or otherwise illegal. Nor did he request the Court use special interrogatories to ascertain the precise basis for his guilt. Accordingly, consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Griffin v. United States, the lack of a special verdict does not make Vigil’s conviction ambiguous, and the conviction must be sustained if the evidence is sufficient with respect to either of the acts charged. The Court’s holding is also consistent with Tenth Circuit caselaw since Griffin v. United States. In United States v. Haber, the defendant challenged his conviction because the district court’s jury instructions permitted the jury to find him guilty of mail fraud “based upon either a scheme to defraud or a scheme to obtain money by false pretenses.” 251 F.3d at 888 (emphasis in original). Unlike Vigil, the defendant in United States v. Haber had requested a jury instruction explaining that the jury must unanimously agree as to the specific basis for conviction, but the district court refused “because the jury instructions already included a general exhortation that the verdict must be unanimous in order to convict.” Id. Citing Griffin v. United States as support for its holding, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Haber recognized that, “[i]n some circumstances, ‘a defendant can raise a late challenge to a duplicitous indictment if cause is shown that might justify the granting of relief from the waiver,’ ” but found no such circumstances applied in that case. United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d at 889 (quoting United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d at 1354). The Court finds the Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Haber instructive. Like the mail fraud charge against the defendant in United States v. Haber, Count Twenty-Four charges Vigil with one substantive crime provable under alternate methods of completion. Like the district court in United States v. Haber, the Court provided the jury with a general exhortation that to reach a verdict, it must reach a unanimous agreement on each count of the indictment. See United States v. Sasser, 971 F.2d at 477 (“[A] general instruction on the requirement of unanimity suffices to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous on whatever specifications they find to be the predicate of the guilty verdict.”); Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 39, at 79. Finally, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Haber drew support for its result on its conclusion that the United States had presented sufficient evidence to establish both alternative offenses of a scheme to defraud and a scheme to obtain money by false pretenses. See 251 F.3d at 889. Similarly, the Court believes that the evidence presented at Vigil’s trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under both theories the United States’ posited. See discussion infra Part I.C. C. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR A REASONABLE JURY TO REACH A CONVICTION BASED ON EITHER ALTERNATE THEORY. Vigil contends that the evidence the United States presented was insufficient to constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act under both the threat-of-economic-harm and under-color-of-official right theories. See Motion to Acquit at 10. In support of his conclusion, Vigil cites the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Garcia for the proposition that “when a ‘victim’ is a willing participant in order to materially benefit from some alleged extortion, the ‘victim’ is not acting out of fear, but rather out of a desire to improve its bottom line.” Motion to Acquit at 11. Because the Court believes that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in United States v. Garcia, and because the Court believes that, consistent with more recent federal appellate precedent, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Vigil threatened Ev-erage with economic harm and acted under color of official right, the Court disagrees with Vigil and finds that there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. 1. “Wrongful” Conduct. Vigil states that “[t]he core of the Hobbs Act that separates lawful from unlawful conduct is that the alleged act of extortion must be ‘wrongful.’ ” Motion to Acquit at 5. Because Congress has not expressly defined “wrongful” in 18 U.S.C. § 1951, Vigil cites the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 for the proposition that “ ‘wrongful’ means in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or Territory,” Motion to Acquit at 5 (quoting 48 Stat. 979, 980), and Black’s Law Dictionary as defining “wrongful” as “contrary to law.” Motion to Acquit at 5 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1606 (7th ed.1999)). Vigil does not cite, however, any authority indicating that Congress intended either of these definitions to apply to the term “wrongful” under the Hobbs Act. Indeed, at the hearing on this motion, Vigil’s counsel seemed to distance himself from this assertion and stated that, “to be wrongful, [a defendant has] to obtain something to which [he’s] not entitled.” Hearing Transcript at 18:21-23 (Bowles). Vigil’s counsel’s statement is consistent with the Supreme Court’s conclusion in United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973), that “ ‘wrongful’ has meaning in the [Hobbs] Act only if it limits the statute’s coverage to those instances where the obtaining of the property would itself be ‘wrongful’ because the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that property.” 410 U.S. at 400, 93 S.Ct. 1007. Nevertheless, in his memorandum in support of this motion, Vigil combines, without explication, the definitions he cites with the Supreme Court’s language in United States v. Enmons and concludes that “to be ‘wrongful’ the act attempted or carried out must be in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or a State and the alleged extortionist must have no lawful claim to the ‘property’ at issue.” Motion to Acquit at 5. The United States disputes Vigil’s interpretation of the meaning of “wrongful” and argues that the Hobbs Act’s legislative history “makes clear that Congress intended the Hobbs Act to have a broader scope than the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.” United States’ Response at 11. The United States cites to Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003)(‘Scheidler II”), and Evans v. United States, as cases in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress passed the Hobbs Act because of its dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s restrictive construction of the activities that were criminal under the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934. See Motion to Acquit at 11; Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 407, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (noting that the “Hobbs Act was subsequently enacted to supercede the Anti-Racketeering Act and reverse the result in [United States v. Local 807 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 62 S.Ct. 642, 86 L.Ed. 1004 (1942)]”); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. at 262, 112 S.Ct. 1881 (“[The Hobbs Act] was intended to encompass the conduct held to be beyond the reach of the [Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934] by our decision in United States v. Teamsters. ”). The Court finds the United States’ argument persuasive and believes that, to the extent that Vigil continues to argue that a defendant’s actions must be contrary to federal or state law to constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act, he has misunderstood the law. Rather, the Court understands the term wrongful to apply to scenarios where a defendant employs, or attempts to employ, one of the extortion methods enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) and has no lawful claim to the property that is the subject of the extortion (or, in the case of an attempt, the attempted extortion). Perhaps because Vigil’s motion does not argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient to find him guilty of extortion based on the “under-color-of-official-right” theory, see discussion infra Part I.C.3, both Vigil and the United States appear to limit the application of their “wrongful” conduct arguments to the “fear-of-economic-harm” theory. The United States cites United States v. Enmons for the proposition that “ ‘wrongful’ does not appear to apply to the ‘under color of official right’ portion of the definition.” United States’ Response at 9 (citing United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 399, 93 S.Ct. 1007). The Supreme Court in United States v. Enmons appears to limit its analysis regarding the meaning of “wrongful” to the first subset of methods in which the Hobbs Act can be violated — “actual or threatened force, violence, or fear.” See 410 U.S. at 399, 93 S.Ct. 1007; 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court has more recently stated that a public official is guilty of extortion pursuant to the under-color-of-offieial-right theory when that “public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled,” the Court believes the distinction is immaterial. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1881. The Court concludes that the term “wrongful” applies when a defendant attempts to extort property to which he has no lawful claim — irrespective of the extortion method employed — and, because Vigil’s claim to the property interests in this case are identical under either theory on which the jury may have premised his conviction, the jury was entitled to consider his conduct “wrongful.” As a supplemental argument, Vigil contends that his actions are not wrongful, because they cannot be characterized as anything more than “hard bargaining”— activity that the Hobbs Act does not criminalize. See Motion to Acquit at 6 (citing Capo I, 791 F.2d at 1062-63). Vigil asserts that, as State Treasurer, he had the authority to decide whether, and on what terms, to create the SLOM position, and that he was entitled to create the position in the manner he felt would be most advantageous to the NMSTO; he argues that those terms do not become criminal because Everage did not agree to them. See Motion to Acquit at 6-7. Vigil argues that, as State Treasurer, “he had every lawful right to suggest modifications of the terms of th