Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION THOMAS F. HOGAN, Chief Judge. This is a lamentable case in which the Court has been called upon to determine whether the plaintiffs may pursue monetary damages and declaratory relief against the former Secretary of Defense and other high-ranking military officers who the plaintiffs allege are liable for torture and abuse inflicted on them while detained by the United States military during ongoing hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pending before the Court are the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages (the “Amended Complaint”). Despite the horrifying torture allegations, after a searching and careful review of the relevant case law, and thorough consideration of the parties’ legal briefs and the arguments presented during the hearing held on December 8, 2006, the Court has determined that the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, Colonel Janis Karpinski, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, and Colonel Thomas Pappas shall be granted in part and denied in part as moot, and the motion to dismiss filed by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the United States shall be granted in its entirety, thereby resolving all claims pending before the Court. BACKGROUND Nine plaintiffs filed these lawsuits claiming they are innocent civilians who were tortured and abused while detained by the United States military at various locations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-25; Pis.’ Consol. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots, to Dismiss 4 (“Pls.’s Opp’n Br. _”). Plaintiffs Arkan Mohammed Ali, Thahe Mohammed Sabar, Sherzad Kamal Khalid, Ali H., and Najeeb Abbas Ahmed are Iraqi citizens (collectively referred to as the “Iraqi plaintiffs”) who were detained at Abu Ghraib prison or other military facilities in Iraq. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-25. Plaintiffs Mehboob Ahmad, Said Nabi Siddiqi, Mohammed Karim Shirullah, and Haji Abdul Rahman are Afghani citizens (collectively referred to as the “Afghani plaintiffs”) who were detained at military facilities in Afghanistan. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-25; Pis.’ Opp’n Br. 4. The plaintiffs were detained for varying durations ranging from one month to one year, and several plaintiffs were detained on multiple occasions. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-25. Each plaintiff ultimately was released from custody without ever being charged with a crime. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The plaintiffs assert that they were tortured and otherwise subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading acts during their detentions. Pis.’ Opp’n Br. 4. To be more explicit, Mehboob Ahmad alleges that a chain was used to hang him upside-down from the ceiling, in which position he remained for several hours while “military personnel slapped and pushed him in order to cause his body to swing ... resulting in his loss of consciousness, then, after providing him with medical attention and reviving him, again hanging him upside-down from the ceiling with a chain for several more hours, again leading to loss of consciousness.” Am. Compl. ¶ 174. Mr. Ahmad also was manacled to a chain used to pull him upward and drop him to the ground, repeatedly pushed and kicked, subjected to electrical shocks until he lost consciousness, stripped and anally probed, and forced to hang by his arms while hooded and an aggressive dog “grab[bed] and pull[ed] at his arms and legs.” Am. Compl. ¶ 174. Said Siddiqi was forced to remain in a push-up position while doused with water and then beaten if he failed to sustain the position, stripped naked and photographed, anally probed, deprived of water for prolonged periods, and detained in a room flooded with water. Am. Compl. ¶ 178. Mohammad Shirullah was assaulted in the head “so fiercely and repeatedly” that he ruptured an eardrum, and was forced to remain in painful physical positions for prolonged periods, such as sitting in a space with no back support while his wrists and legs were tied and his eyes and ears were covered. Am. Compl. ¶ 182. Haji Rahman alleges that interrogators used a chain to force his arms upward while they were handcuffed behind his back and he was in a kneeling position with blackout goggles on, loud noises and bright lights were used to deprive him of sleep, he was anally probed multiple times, stripped naked in front of other people and photographed, and forced to wear blackout goggles and sound-deadening headphones for prolonged periods to induce sensory deprivation. Am. Compl. ¶ 186. Arkan Ali was beaten to unconsciousness, forcibly restrained and stabbed with a knife in his forearm, burned or shocked, locked for days in a phone-booth-sized wood box while stripped naked and hooded, urinated on, shackled with his hands behind his head while his head was stepped on and the shackles pulled, denied sleep and then dragged face down and beaten for falling asleep, chained to a metal container while kicked, spit on, choked, and threatened with a guard dog, threatened with death by having a gun placed to his head and a round chambered, mock executed by threat of being run down by a military vehicle, threatened with slaughter by sword, and denied food and water. Am. Compl. ¶ 190. Thahe Sabar was severely beaten while handcuffed, hit in the genitals, forced to “run through a gauntlet of 10 to 20 uniformed soldiers who were screaming at [him] and beating [him] with wooden batons,” electrically shocked, sexually assaulted by soldiers who inserted their fingers in his anus and fondled his buttocks and penis, placed before a mock firing squad with simulated gunfire, placed in a cage of live lions, hooded and shackled in such a way as to cause breathing difficulties, bleeding and loss of consciousness, deprived of food or fed spoiled food that caused vomiting, denied access to toilets while shackled so he soiled his pants, and subjected to the desecration of the Quran. Am. Compl. ¶ 195. Sherzad Khalid was randomly kicked and punched while shackled and hooded, subjected to simulated anal rape by having a water bottle pressed against the seat of his pants, threatened with sodomy by use of a wooden pole, restrained and hooded in such as way as to impair his breathing and vision, shackled to a fence with his hands behind him in extreme temperatures without food or water, put in a cage of live lions, and placed before a mock firing squad. Am. Compl. ¶ 200. Ali H. was shot when arrested and had the bullets removed without anesthesia, shackled for prolonged periods with his hands behind his back and feet spread, denied medical treatment after sustaining a life-threatening shrapnel wound during a mortar attack while detained, dragged to and from locations after abdominal surgery, refused bandage changes thereby leading to infection, and forced to sleep unsheltered outdoors in extreme temperatures while injured. Am. Compl. ¶ 205. Najeeb Ahmed was subjected to: [A] scheme to humiliate, sexually assault, and physically injure Plaintiff Ahmed, by throwing him to the ground, stepping on his neck and legs, sitting on his back and feet, tying him with extremely tight restraints on his wrists, then calling a group of 10 to 12 U.S. soldiers to come into the room. The soldiers taped toy animals to Plaintiff Ahmed’s head and shoulder and chanted racial epithets at him. A soldier kicked the soles of [his] feet. A soldier put a gun to his head. Another approached him in a menacing way and then spat in his face. A soldier stepped on his head. When Plaintiff Ahmed begged for water because he was sweating and suffering from chest pains, a solder approached him, exposed his penis, told Plaintiff Ahmed to drink, and then unzipped Plaintiff Ahmed’s pants. Soldiers shone a bright beam of light in Plaintiff Ahmed’s face. During all these proceedings, soldiers videotaped and photographed Plaintiff Ahmed .... Am. Compl. ¶ 209. These are only some of the many examples of abuse allegedly inflicted on the plaintiffs, as described in their Amended Complaint. Each plaintiff avers that he suffered various injuries resulting from the torture and abuse, both physical and psychological. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 175, 179, 183, 187, 191, 196, 201, 206, 210. The Iraqi plaintiffs filed lawsuits against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Colonel Thomas Pappas, who was Commander of the 105th Military Intelligence Brigade, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who was Commander of the Coalition Joint Task Force-7, and Colonel Janis Karpinski, who was Commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade. Pis.’ Opp’n Br. 3. The Afghani plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Rumsfeld alone. Id. All claims lodged against Rumsfeld seek to impose liability both individually and in his official capacity, whereas the claims against the other defendants seek to impose only individual liability. Id. The plaintiffs originally filed their lawsuits in four different jurisdictions in the United States: the District of Connecticut, the Northern District of Illinois, the District of South Carolina, and the Southern District of Texas. By an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation dated June 17, 2005, the cases were transferred to this Court for coordinated and consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. On January 5, 2006, the plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint. Two months later, each of the four defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. In response, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated opposition on May 19, 2006, to which the defendants replied on July 21, 2006. The parties presented oral arguments in support of their respective positions on December 8, 2006. The Court also authorized the filing of briefs amici curiae by concerned retired military officers and military law and history scholars, as well as J. Herman Burgers and Theo van Boven. Both briefs filed by amici curiae were submitted in support of the plaintiffs’ opposition to the motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs advance six causes of action, five of which are premised on tort liability for violations of (1) the Fifth Amendment right to due process, (2) the Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, (3) the law of nations prohibition against torture, (4) the law of nations prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and (5) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 (“Geneva Convention IV”)- Am. Compl. ¶¶ 235-263. The plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action seeks declaratory relief for violations of the law of nations, Geneva Convention IV, and the United States Constitution. Id. at ¶¶ 260-63. With regard to the constitutional violations, the plaintiffs argue that the Court should infer causes of action for tort liability pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Am. Compl. 238, 243; Pis.’ Opp’n Br. 35-58. The remaining tort claims involving violations of the law of nations and Geneva Convention IV are asserted pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, as well as directly under Geneva Convention IV. Pis.’ Opp’n Br. 4. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants are liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries because the defendants “issued orders and authorizations that caused the widespread torture and— wholly independent of those orders — failed in their legal duty to stop and prevent the torture and abuse of detainees they knew or had reason to know were being committed by subordinates under their command.” Id. at 1. According to the plaintiffs, “[e]ach Defendant had command and control over some or all of the military personnel who tortured and abused Plaintiffs.” Id. at 6. The defendants seek dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted. Pappas’ Mot. Dismiss 1; Rumsfeld’s Mot. Dismiss 1; Karpinski’s Mot. Dismiss 1; Sanchez’s Mot. Dismiss 1. The defendants mount a multi-pronged attack, arguing that dismissal is warranted on the grounds that special factors counsel against recognizing a Bivens remedy for the alleged constitutional violations, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the alleged constitutional violations, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity under the so-called Westfall Act for alleged violations of the law of nations and Geneva Convention IV, and Geneva Convention IV does not confer judicially enforceable rights on the plaintiffs. Pappas’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 13^10; Rumsfeld’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3-33; Karpinski’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10-34, 45; Sanchez’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 10-36. In addition to these challenges, which were uniformly raised by each defendant, Karpinski and Sanchez also argue separately that the plaintiffs’ claims raise nonjusticiable political questions. Karpinski’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 34-44; Sanchez’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 5-10. Rumsfeld further argues that the plaintiffs lack standing to seek declaratory relief because they failed to show that they face a real and imminent threat of detention in the future. Rumsfeld’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 36-38. Finally, Colonel Pappas argues that the Bivens tort claims against him should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to connect him to the alleged constitutional violations and all claims should be dismissed because the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut lacks personal jurisdiction over him. Pappas’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 41-43. LEGAL STANDARDS When adjudicating the defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint and construes in the plaintiffs’ favor all reasonable inferences drawn from those alleged facts. Scandinavian Satellite Sys., AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 291 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C.Cir.2002); Artis v. Greenspan, 158 F.3d 1301, 1306 (D.C.Cir.1998); E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 625 (D.C.Cir.1997); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987). As the Supreme Court has explained: When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test. Moreover, it is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The liberal construction afforded the plaintiffs’ complaint does not, however, require the Court to give credence to asserted inferences that lack factual support or legal conclusions proffered in the guise of factual allegations. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Furthermore, although the general standards that apply to the Court’s review of 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions are similar in most respects, the rules implicate distinct legal challenges. “Rule 12(b)(1) presents a threshold challenge to the court’s jurisdiction, whereas 12(b)(6) presents a ruling on the merits with res judicata effect.” Haase, 835 F.2d at 906. Thus, a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction will be successful only if the plaintiffs fail to carry their burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has the statutory and constitutional power to adjudicate the claims. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), on the other hand, will be successful if the defendants show that the plaintiffs can prove no facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Harris v. Ladner, 127 F.3d 1121, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1997). DISCUSSION I. WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD INFER BIVENS REMEDIES FOR ALLEGED TORTS COMMITTED BY THE DEFENDANTS The Court first considers the defendants’ challenges to the plaintiffs’ claims for constitutional violations. The plaintiffs seek to have this Court fashion new non-statutory damages remedies pursuant to Bivens for alleged torts committed in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution by military officials who detained them. The defendants counter that “special factors” counsel against inferring a Bivens cause of action and qualified immunity shields them from liability. In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could invoke the federal question jurisdiction of federal courts to recover money damages against federal officials who violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights. 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that federal agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they searched his home and arrested him without probable cause and a lawful warrant, thereby subjecting him to humiliation and mental suffering. Id. at 389-90, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Although Congress had not expressly legislated authority for private lawsuits against government officials who violated the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court nonetheless inferred a cause of action and remedy directly under the Constitution based on the principle that “ ‘where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.’ ” Id. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). Bivens therefore stands for the proposition that a plaintiff who can establish the violation of a constitutional right for which a damages remedy is an appropriate form of relief may invoke the authority of federal courts to vindicate that right against the offending official. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (stating that “Bivens established that compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interested could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts”). Although inferring a Bivens cause of action serves the desired public policy of deterring individual federal officials from violating the Constitution, it would be fair to say that recognizing such a claim is clearly disfavored, as demonstrated by the fact that, in the 35 years or so since Bivens was decided, the Supreme Court has “extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional conduct.” Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.”) (emphasis omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court observed some time ago that its “decisions have responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.” Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988). Notwithstanding this sentiment, the plaintiffs ask the Court to extend Bivens to claims asserted by nonresident aliens allegedly tortured and abused while detained by the United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan during ongoing hostilities incident to war. A. Whether the Plaintiffs Assert a Constitutionally-Protected Right The threshold question for the purpose of a Bivens analysis is whether the plaintiffs assert a right protected by the Constitution. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 234, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (stating that the analysis of whether a Bivens remedy is appropriate “proceeds in three stages[,]” the first of which asks whether the “petitioner asserts a constitutionally protected right”). The plaintiffs claim that the defendants violated rights protected by both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 235-46. The defendants refute this claim and argue that the plaintiffs may not assert a right protected by the Fifth Amendment because that amendment does not apply extraterritorially to nonresident aliens detained in Iraq and Afghanistan where the United States lacks sovereignty and is engaged in a war. Pappas’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3 — 13; Pappas’ Reply Br. 1-7; Rumsfeld’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 19-26; Rumsfeld’s Reply Br. 5-9; Karpinski’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 28-36; Karpinski’s Reply Br. 15-18; Sanchez’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 11, 20-24; Sanchez’s Reply Br. 13-17. The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs may not assert a right protected by the Eighth Amendment because that amendment applies only to prisoners convicted of crimes, which is not the case here. Pappas’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 13; Rumsfeld’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 19; Rumsfeld’s Reply Br. 6; Karpinski’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 29 n. 23; Sanchez’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 20-21. If, as the defendants claim, the plaintiffs cannot assert constitutionally-protected rights, then creating a Bivens remedy is unwarranted. No matter how appealing it might be to infer a Bivens remedy to vindicate injuries caused by federal officials committing abuses as severe as those alleged here, which otherwise might not be fully redressed, the reality is that several controlling cases compel the inescapable conclusion that the plaintiffs in this case are not entitled to such a cause of action because the Fifth and Eighth Amendments do not apply to them. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950), United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990), Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), and the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C.Cir.2007), each make clear that the Constitution’s reach is not so expansive that it encompasses these nonresident aliens who were injured extraterritorially while detained by the military in foreign countries where the United States is engaged in wars. Eisentrager is the most instructive of these cases because, like the instant case, it involved nonresident aliens detained abroad during a war and is the seminal case holding that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to such aliens. In Eisen-trager, twenty-one German prisoners filed writs of habeas corpus in this jurisdiction challenging their imprisonment for violating the laws of war by failing to cease active hostilities after Germany surrendered. 339 U.S. at 765, 70 S.Ct. 936. They were tried and convicted in China by an authorized American military commission and repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences. Id. at 766, 70 S.Ct. 936. They filed habeas corpus petitions alleging that their trial, conviction, and imprisonment violated the Fifth Amendment, as well as the Geneva Convention that governs the treatment of prisoners of war, among other asserted legal infirmities. Id. at 767, 70 S.Ct. 936. The district court dismissed their petitions, id., but the D.C. Circuit reversed and reinstated them after concluding that constitutional provisions “apply directly to acts of Government, or Government officials, and are not conditioned upon persons or territory.” Eisen-trager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965 (D.C.Cir.1949), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255. From that conclusion followed the D.C. Circuit’s determination that “a distinction between citizens and aliens cannot be made in respect to the applicability of constitutional restrictions upon the power of government.” Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fifth Amendment applied to the German prisoners and flatly rejected the D.C. Circuit’s rationale for reinstating their petitions because that rationale “dispensed with all requirement of territorial jurisdiction based on place of residence, captivity, trial, offense, or confinement” and “gave our Constitution an extraterritorial application to embrace our enemies in arms.” Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784, 70 S.Ct. 936. The Supreme Court first reasoned that: [E]ven by the most magnanimous view, our law does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world between citizens and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance, nor between resident enemy aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens who at all times have remained with, and adhered to, enemy governments. Id. at 769, 70 S.Ct. 936. The Supreme Court went on to observe that the alien historically has been treated hospitably and “accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.” Id. at 770, 70 S.Ct. 936. The Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms, however, that “in extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act.” Id. at 771, 70 S.Ct. 936. The Supreme Court also emphasized the peril in which the alien’s status is placed by virtue of his nationality and allegiance to an enemy nation at war with the United States. Id. at 771-72, 70 S.Ct. 936. The Supreme Court recognized that “in war ‘every individual of the one nation must acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his own enemy — because the enemy of his country.’ ” Id. at 772, 70 S.Ct. 936 (quoting The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Crunch) 155, 161, 3 L.Ed. 520 (1814)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[i]t is war that exposes the relative vulnerability of the alien’s status. The security and protection enjoyed while the nation of his allegiance remains in amity with the United States are greatly impaired when his nation takes up arms against us.” Id. at 771, 70 S.Ct. 936. The Supreme Court further explained that: The alien enemy is bound by an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards him as part of the enemy resources. It therefore takes measures to disable him from commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention because they are a duty to his sovereign. Id. The Supreme Court therefore set the enemy alien apart and acknowledged that nonresident enemy aliens historically lacked any standing to maintain an action in United States courts for the duration of ongoing hostilities. Id. at 776, 70 S.Ct. 9B6. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the German prisoners and offered the following discussion about the factors it found significant: We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that these prisoners are entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. To support that assumption we must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States. We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States. Id. at 777-78, 70 S.Ct. 936 (emphasis added). It is clear from this passage that the Supreme Court found the extraterritoriality of all events relating to the prisoners’ status, as well as the fact that they were enemies of our country, to be sine qua non. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security ... upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States.” Id. at 785, 70 S.Ct. 936. As the defendants correctly point out, two subsequent Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed the principle that the Fifth Amendment does not apply extraterritorially to nonresident aliens, regardless of whether they are considered enemies. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court endorsed Eisentrager’s holding and noted that its “rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was emphatic.” 494 U.S. at 269, 110 S.Ct. 1056. Verdugo-Urquidez involved Fourth Amendment violations asserted by a citizen of Mexico who was arrested there for various narcotics offenses and transported to the United States for prosecution. Id. at 262, 110 S.Ct. 1056. After his arrest, agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) searched and seized property in Mexico without a warrant. Id. The Supreme Court declined to apply the Fourth Amendment extraterritorially to the nonresident alien and cited Eisentrager with approval. Id. at 269, 275, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (“Indeed, we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.”). Although the plaintiff in Verdugo-Urquidez was held in the United States against his will, the Supreme Court stated that “this sort of presence — lawful but involuntary — is not the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country.” Id. at 271, 110 S.Ct. 1056. Likewise, in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court reiterated that “certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders” and favorably cited both Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment does not extend to nonresident aliens outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. 533 U.S. at 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Thus, at the very least, it is considered settled law that nonresident aliens must be within the sovereign territory of the United States to stake any claim to the rights secured by the Fifth Amendment. The D.C. Circuit’s timely decision in Boumediene, which was issued last month, removes any doubt about whether this Circuit views the Constitution as conferring any rights on nonresident aliens detained abroad. In Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit addressed the question of federal court jurisdiction over habeas petitions “filed by aliens captured abroad and detained as enemy combatants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba[.]” 476 F.3d at 984. After summarizing the state of the law, the D.C. Circuit first determined that the recently-enacted Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366,120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (“MCA”), applied to the detainees’ habeas petitions. Id. at 986-88. The D.C. Circuit next considered the detainees’ argument that the MCA provision barring federal court jurisdiction over their habeas petitions was an unconstitutional violation of the Suspension Clause. Id. at 988-94. The D.C. Circuit dispelled any notion that the detainees could invoke the Suspension Clause as a constitutional right when it stated that “[precedent in this court and the Supreme Court holds that the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence within the United States.” Id. at 991 (citing Eisen-trager as “the controlling case”). The plaintiffs do not address Eisentrager or its progeny to any satisfaction; instead, they latch on to the theory that nonresident aliens possess “fundamental rights” under the Constitution in territories subject to the United States’ control. Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 16-24. For support, the plaintiffs rely principally on a line of cases known as the Insular Cases and further argue that the correct test is whether recognizing a particular constitutional right would be “impracticable and anomalous,” which the plaintiffs derive from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957), a plurality decision in which the Supreme Court held that civilian wives who were citizens of the United States could not be subjected to courts martial for murdering their military husbands overseas during a time of peace. Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 19-20; 354 U.S. at 40-41, 74, 77 S.Ct. 1222. The plaintiffs further contend that this “impracticable and anomalous” test was recognized by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urqui-dez, which was cited with approval in a footnote in Rasul 1 and subsequently adopted by the district court in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.D.C.2005), vacated and dismissed, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C.Cir.2007). Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 19-20 (arguing that “Justice Harlan’s crucial concurrence ... set forth the analysis that should govern”). The Court is not persuaded that the plaintiffs’ asserted “fundamental rights” standard and “impracticable and anomalous” test hold sway. As a preliminary matter, the Insular Cases are truly historical cases decided predominantly at the beginning of the Twentieth Century and generally involved islands the United States acquired as territories by annex or treaty, such as the Philippines, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Reid, 354 U.S. at 14, 77 S.Ct. 1222. The Supreme Court summarized these cases as follows: In a series of decisions that have come to be known as the Insular Cases, the Court created the doctrine of incorporated and unincorporated Territories, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S.Ct. 743, 45 L.Ed. 1041 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 21 S.Ct. 762, 45 L.Ed. 1074 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 21 S.Ct. 827, 45 L.Ed. 1086 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901). The former category encompassed those Territories destined for statehood from the time of acquisition, and the Constitution was applied to them with full force. See, e.g., Rass-mussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 25 S.Ct. 514, 49 L.Ed. 862 (1905); but see Hawaii v. Mankichi 190 U.S. 197, 23 S.Ct. 787, 47 L.Ed. 1016 (1903). The latter category included those Territories not possessing that anticipation of statehood. As to them, only “fundamental” constitutional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants. Although the question whether certain rights were or were not fundamental continued to provoke debate among the Members of the Court, it was clear that the Constitution was held not to extend ex proprio vigore to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 n. 30, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976). Accordingly, the fundamental rights analysis drawn from these cases has been applied only to aliens residing in incorporated and unincorporated territories of the United States. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Boumediene, “in each of [the Insular] cases, Congress had exercised its power under Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution to regulate ‘Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,’ U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.” 476 F.3d at 992. No case was brought to the Court’s attention in which the fundamental rights analysis was applied to nonresident enemy aliens lacking any voluntary territorial contact with our country. Significantly, Justice Black’s plurality opinion in Reid, which garnered the support of four justices, announced in the most unmistakable terms the “judgment that neither the [Insular Cases ] nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion.” 354 U.S. at 14, 77 S.Ct. 1222. Furthermore, Justice Black’s opinion essentially rejected Justice Harlan’s impracticable and anomalous standard: The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government. If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes. But we have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it which are not there. Id. (emphasis added). Admittedly, Justice Black’s opinion is not binding — and even less so is Justice Harlan’s concurrence— but it does signal an intent to limit the holdings in the Insular Cases. It also is important to note that Justice Harlan’s “impracticable and anomalous” test was discussed only in the context of exercising power over American citizens abroad, not aliens: For Ross and the Insular Cases do stand for an important proposition, one which seems to me a wise and necessary gloss on our Constitution. The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution “does not apply” overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place. In other words, it seems to me that the basic teaching of Ross and the Insular Cases is that there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition precedent to exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it subject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous. Id. at 74, 77 S.Ct. 1222 (second emphasis added). So the plaintiffs’ assertion that “six Justices categorically rejected any suggestion that the Constitution does not apply outside the United States” must be placed in its proper context. Pis.’ Opp’n Br. 19. Reid dealt only with rights applicable to United States citizens overseas. Because the plaintiffs are not United States citizens, “[they] can derive no comfort from the Reid holding.” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270, 110 S.Ct. 1056. Moreover, Justice Harlan’s concurrence suggests that even American citizens overseas may not be entitled to “all the guarantees of the Constitution,” Reid, 354 U.S. at 74, 77 S.Ct. 1222, which certainly does not bode well for nonresident enemy aliens, who most assuredly would have a more tenuous right to invoke the Constitution’s protections, if they have any right at all. Again, as the D.C. Circuit stated in Boumediene, nonresident aliens “without property or presence in the United States” have no constitutional rights. No. 05-50636, slip op. at 18. The citation to Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid is only the first stop on the circuitous route that is the plaintiffs’ argument in favor of an “impracticable and anomalous” standard. The plaintiffs next rely on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, which they urge “endorses” the Insular Cases and sets the stage for the majority opinion in Rasul I. Reliance on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence also is unavailing, however, because in Ver-dugo-Urquidez a majority of the Supreme Court acknowledged that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Insular Cases applied only to aliens in unincorporated territories of the United States, whereas aliens in foreign nations with no ties to the United States had an “even weaker” claim to the Constitution. 494 U.S. at 268, 110 S.Ct. 1056. Thus, the majority in Verdu-go-Urquidez intimated that nonresident aliens lacking any territorial contact with the United States were entitled to something less than the fundamental rights afforded by the Insular Cases. Id. Nor is a vague footnote in Rasul I persuasive authority to support extending the fundamental rights doctrine to extraterritorial nonresident aliens. The plaintiffs in Rasul I, like several of the plaintiffs here, were detained by the United States military during ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan. 542 U.S. at 470, 124 S.Ct. 2686. Unlike the plaintiffs in the instant case, however, the plaintiffs in Rasul I were not nationals of countries at war with the United States and were detained at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba,, a place over which the Supreme Court found the United States exercised complete jurisdiction and control. Id. at 480, 124 S.Ct. 2686. At issue in Rasul I was the question whether “the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ‘ultimate sovereignty.’ ” Id. at 475, 124 S.Ct. 2686. The Supreme Court found that, because the habeas statute drew “no distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee’s citizenship.” Id. at 481, 124 S.Ct. 2686. Because the Supreme Court’s examination of the issue resorted to the statutory authority for habeas petitions, and did not involve a substantive constitutional analysis, the decision has little practical applicability to the questions facing this Court, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ assertions that Rasul I effected a limitation on Eisentrager. As one defendant observed, “plaintiffs attempt to create binding Supreme Court precedent based solely on a footnote, citing to a concurring opinion that cites to yet another concurring opinion.” Pappas’ Reply Br. 6. This Court agrees and notes that the viability of the plaintiffs’ theory would require the Court to wholly ignore binding precedent, which it is not willing to do. Although the plaintiffs are correct that the district court in In re Guantanmo Detainee Litigation inferred from Rasul I that constitutional rights were available to detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, no other case supports that conclusion and, more importantly, that decision was vacated and dismissed by Boumediene, which also vacated and dismissed the decision in Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311, 320-21 (D.D.C.2005), where the district court rejected the detainees’ attempt to “cling to an expansive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Rasul as authority for this novel proposition.” The only other recent decision in this court that considered the issue was Hamdan II, in which the district court relied on Eisen-trager to hold that a nonresident alien detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base had no constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus because the detainee lacked “the geographical and volitional predicates necessary to claim a constitutional right to habeas corpus.” 464 F.Supp.2d at 18 (stating that “the detention facility lies outside the sovereign realm, and only U.S. citizens in such locations may claim entitlement to a constitutionally guaranteed writ”) (internal citation omitted). The plaintiffs’ final argument in support of their claim to Fifth Amendment protection asks the Court to find that Iraq and Afghanistan are territories over which the United States exercises control sufficient to warrant extending constitutional rights to nonresident aliens there. Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 24-29. The United States is presently engaged in a war in both countries, a fact of which this Court takes judicial notice. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 301, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937) (“Courts take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge.”). With the exception of various agreements and orders that govern the United States’ military personnel, property and assets, and ensure freedom of action required to conduct military operations, the plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that the United States exercises plenary control or sovereign authority over Iraq or Afghanistan. Pis.’ Opp’n Br. 24-29 (citing CPA Order No. 17 (Revised), Status of the CPA, MNFI, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, § 2 (June 27, 2004) (originally issued June 26, 2003) and the Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, May 23, 2005). Daily news accounts reveal otherwise and the Court expresses skepticism about whether United States sovereignty can ever be established simply by virtue of our Armed Forces’ presence in a country with which we are at war and where hostilities are ongoing and no victor has been declared. The plaintiffs’ asserted facts show only that the United States military has secured control over its own resources and ability to conduct military operations. The Court finds this insufficient to demonstrate the exercise of sovereignty such that the Constitution should be extended to all Iraqi and Afghani nationals resident there. More to the point, the D.C. Circuit noted in Boumediene that the determination of sovereignty is reserved for the political branches. No. 05-5062, slip op. 20 (citing Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380, 69 S.Ct. 140, 93 L.Ed. 76 (1948)). Finally, with regard to the plaintiffs’ assertion of a constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment, that claim fails not only because the plaintiffs are precluded from invoking the Constitution for the reasons already discussed, but also because the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted criminals. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (“An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was intended to protect those convicted of crimes.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (citing Ingraham and explaining that the Eighth Amendment comes into play only after a formal adjudication of guilt, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment covers the imposition of punishment absent such an adjudication); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (“The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause ‘was designed to protect those convicted of crimes,’ and consequently the Clause applies ‘only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.’ ” (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401)). Even assuming the Eighth Amendment applied to nonresident enemy aliens, the plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because they were never convicted of a crime, whether a war crime or otherwise. As a result, they have not asserted a right under the Eighth Amendment that warrants the creation of a Bivens remedy. B. Whether “Special Factors” Counsel Against Inferring a Bivens Remedy While the creation of a Bivens remedy is foreclosed when no constitutionally-protected right is asserted, as is the case here, the same result also will obtain when there are “special factors counselling [sic] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” 403 U.S. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Special factors counseling hesitation “relate not to the merits of the particular remedy, but ‘to the question of who should decide whether such a remedy should be provided.’ ” Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C.Cir.1985) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983)). According to this principle, courts should avoid creating a new, nonstatutory remedy when doing so would be “plainly inconsistent” with authority constitutionally reserved for the political branches. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). Moreover, even when authority is not constitutionally reserved for the political branches, there nevertheless might be reasons that favor allowing Congress, rather than the judiciary, to prescribe the scope of relief available to the plaintiffs. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380-90, 103 S.Ct. 2404. “Where, for example, the issue ‘involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised,’ its resolution ‘is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.’ ” Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 380, 103 S.Ct. 2404). In addition, “the concept of ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress’ has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent.” Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460. The defendants argue that special factors counseling hesitation exist in this case because inferring a Bivens cause of action would interfere with “core” executive and legislative functions by calling into question judgments made by the political branches regarding national security and military affairs. Pappas’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 14-22; Rumsfeld’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 7; Sanchez’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 11. The defendants claim that a Bivens remedy would interfere with military decision-making by imposing judicial oversight on military strategy and policies relating to the appropriate circumstances according to which enemy aliens are detained during a war. Pappas’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 14-22; Rumsfeld’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 15; Karpinski’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 23; Sanchez’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 13-17. The defendants also note that the federal courts have refused to extend Bivens into other forms of tort liability that are less sensitive and intrusive than would be the case here, and the Supreme Court has only twice determined that the judiciary was in a better position than the political branches to fashion a private cause of action under the Constitution. Pappas’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 16-18; Rumsfeld’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3-4; Karpinski’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 17-18, 20-22; Sanchez’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 12. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). The plaintiffs, as well as amici, contest the notion that a Bivens remedy would impose judicial oversight over military decision-making and chill military effectiveness on the battlefield, arguing instead that “providing an effective remedy for the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights would be wholly consonant with longstanding military laws and regulations and would not entangle the Court in any inappropriate inquiry.” Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 36. See also Br. Amici Curiae of Concerned Retired Mil. Officers and Mil. Law and Hist. Scholars In Supp. of Pis.’ Consol. Opp’n 5-23. The plaintiffs assert that Congress has not explicitly declared that plaintiffs are barred from recovering damages against military officials and there currently is no comprehensive remedial scheme to redress their injuries. Id. The plaintiffs argue that they “seek only the enforcement of the non-discretionary requirements of the Constitution in accord with the laws and regulations that have constrained the conduct of U.S. military detention operations for decades, and that manifestly prohibit the kinds of torture and abuse alleged here.” Id. at 36-37. The Court cautions against the myopic approach advocated by the plaintiffs and amici, which essentially frames the issue as whether torture is universally prohibited and thereby warrants a judicially-created remedy under the circumstances. There is no getting around the fact that authorizing monetary damages remedies against military officials engaged in an active war would invite enemies to use our own federal courts to obstruct the Armed Forces’ ability to act decisively and without hesitation in defense of our liberty and national interests, a prospect the Supreme Court found intolerable in Eisentrager: Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779, 70 S.Ct. 936. Although the Supreme Court’s concern was voiced in the context of granting writs of habeas corpus to enemy aliens, the same reasoning is equally applicable here. The discovery process alone risks aiding our enemies by affording them a mechanism to obtain what information they could about military affairs and disrupt command missions by wresting officials from the battlefield to answer compelled deposition and other discovery inquiries about the military’s interrogation and detention policies, practices, and procedures. Military discipline and morale surely would be eroded by the spectacle of high-ranking military officials being haled into our own courts to defend against our enemies’ legal challenges, which might leave subordinate personnel questioning the authority by which they are being commanded and further encumber the military’s ability to act decisively. Commanders likely would hesitate to act for fear of being held personally liable for any injuries resulting from their conduct. These are only some of the many reasons why “[executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security.” Id. at 774, 70 S.Ct. 936. Moreover, the Supreme Court advised in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987), that it is irrelevant whether Congress has provided an adequate remedy for a plaintiffs injuries if “congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate.” 483 U.S. at 683, 107 S.Ct. 3054. In both Stanley and Chappell, the Supreme Court held that the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers, in conjunction with recognition of Congress’ constitutionally-vested authority over military affairs, required the judiciary to abstain from inferring Bivens remedies against military officials for injuries arising out of, or in the course of, activities incident to military service. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84, 107 S.Ct. 3054 (reaffirming Chappell and holding that the same special factors counseled against creating Bivens remedies for injuries arising out of activities incident to military service); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304-305, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (“The special nature of military life — the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel — would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to command.”). The D.C. Circuit has decreed that the same rationale applies when courts consider whether to infer Bivens remedies against military officials for constitutional violations involving aliens abroad. See Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208-209. In Sanchez-Espinoza, the D.C. Circuit considered on appeal claims filed by plaintiffs who were Nicaraguan citizens seeking redress against United States government officials, among others, for injuries inflicted by Contra forces fighting the Nicaraguan government. 770 F.2d at 204-205. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by financing, supporting, and assisting the Contra forces’ acts of terrorism, including torture, murder, rape, and summary execution. Id. at 205, 208. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the constitutional claims were properly dismissed by the district court because the claims involved considerations that rendered it more appropriate for Congress to decide whether a damages remedy should be available: We have no doubt that ... considerations of institutional competence preclude judicial creation of damage remedies here. Just as the special needs of the armed forces require the courts to leave to Congress the creation of damage remedies against military officers for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of soldiers, see Chappell v. Wallace, ... so also the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad. The foreign affairs implications of suits such as this cannot be ignored — their ability to produce what the Supreme Court has called in another context ‘embarrassment of our government abroad’ through ‘multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.’ Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of geopolitics rather than personal harm, we think that as a general matter the danger of foreign citizens’ [sic] using the courts in situations such as this to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist. Id. at 208-209 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The same considerations are at play in this case and counsel hesitation in the creation of Bivens causes of action and remedies against the defendants. It is established beyond peradventure that military affairs, foreign relations, and national security are constitutionally committed to the political branches of our government and “the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C.Cir.2005) (“Absent precedent, there could still be no doubt that decision-making in the fields of foreign policy and national security is textually committed to the political branches of government.”). Although it may be the case that standards appropriate for judicial application are available to resolve whether certain acts constitute torture, in the unique factual circumstances presented here that legal determination invariably would place the Court in the position of inquiring into the propriety of specific interrogation techniques and detention practices employed by the military while prosecuting wars. Some methods undoubtedly might be deemed improper and unlawful, but others might not — and still others might occupy a place on the periphery between the two. Military, executive, and congressional officials might arrive at a different conclusion from the judiciary about where on the spectrum a particular interrogation technique falls and whether it was, or is, properly used to obtain info