Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION WALTON, District Judge. Plaintiff Carol Smith brings this action against Hope Village, Inc. (“the defendant” or “Hope Village”), a privately-operated facility that “provide[s] halfway house services to offenders in the District of Columbia,” for compensatory and punitive damages arising from the murder of her daughter, Erika Smith, by Anthony Kelly, a convicted felon and former Hope Village resident. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 7. On July 26, 2006, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of the complaint, the plaintiffs wrongful death claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(c). Order at 6. Currently before the Court is the defendant’s motion (“Def.’s Mot.”) for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative for summary judgment, on the plaintiffs remaining claim, a survival action filed on behalf of her daughter’s estate. Def.’s Mot. at 1. Also before the Court is the plaintiffs motion (“PL’s Mot.”) to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which asks the Court to reconsider its July-26, 2006 Order dismissing the plaintiffs wrongful death claim. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment and grants the plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment. I. Background The plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of her complaint. In August 1996, Anthony Quentin Kelly was convicted “for pointing a loaded gun at the head of a woman, threatening to kill her and her husband, and driving a stolen car,” Pl.’s Opp. at 4; see also Compl. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp., Exhibit (“Ex.”) 3 (Presentence Report for Anthony Kelly) (“Presentence Report”) at 2, and sentenced to a ten year and six month term of incarceration in federal prison, PL’s Opp. at 4. Kelly is a repeat offender with a long and checkered criminal history, including an arrest for escaping from a halfway house, an indictment for making felony threats, and multiple prior convictions for, inter alia, burglary and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Pl.’s Opp. at 5; see also Presentence Report at 3-6 (detailing Kelly’s criminal record); Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 8 (January 28, 2003 memorandum from Assistant United States Attorney Michael Britton to attorney John McCarthy) (“Britton Memo”) at 2-3 (summarizing Kelly’s criminal record and stating that “[h]e has been convicted of thirteen crimes[J eleven felonies and two misdemeanors[,] ... which stem from six separate criminal cases”); Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 9 (Affidavit of Dr. Mario Paparozzi, Ph.D.) (“Paparozzi Aff.”) ¶ 50 (stating that “[t]he record shows that Anthony Kelly was a known violent criminal offender who frequently engaged in theft, burglaries, and other property crimes, as well as violent crime, including with a loaded gun”); Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 25 (June 27, 2001 decision of United States Parole Commission) (“Parole Decision”) at 1 (noting Kelly’s prior convictions). On December 12, 2001, after serving approximately five years of his sentence, Kelly was transferred from prison to Hope Village, a halfway house located in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶ 9; Def.’s Mem. at 3; Pl.’s Opp. at 4. Hope Village is a private facility that contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), among other entities, to provide transitional services and housing to various correctional populations, including felons such as Kelly who have been convicted of violent crimes. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 10; see also Pl.’s Opp. at 4 (stating that “[Hope Village] is a private, for-profit, community-based correctional facility ... responsible for supervising criminal offenders while it was determined whether they would be released on parole”); Paparazzi Aff. ¶ 16 (stating that “halfway houses are required to provide correctional and paroling authorities with the information necessary to make determinations regarding release or reincarceration by closely watching and reporting how inmates adjust as the restraints and degree of supervision of prison confinement are lessened”). According to the plaintiff, “[t]he purpose of programs like [Hope Village] [is] to provide an opportunity for offenders to demonstrate, while under constant scrutiny, that they might safely be returned to the community ... without reasonable fear for the safety of local citizens.” Pl.’s Opp. at 9; see also Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 6 (BOP January 2000 Comprehensive Sanctions Center Statement of Work) (“SOW”) at 0 (stating that “[t]he mission of [facilities such as Hope Village] is to protect society by confining offenders in the controlled environments of ... community-based facilities that are safe, humane, eost-effieient[,] and appropriately secure, [while] providing] work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens”); Paparazzi Aff. ¶ 16 (stating that “[t]he primary mission of ... private correctional organizations[ ] like Hope Village ... is to ensure public safety while safely transitioning inmates from incarceration back to their communities, or returning inmates to prison when they are not fit for community release”). In order to accomplish these goals, halfway houses such as Hope Village are required, upon the admission of each resident, to “review available documents[ ] [such as] Judgment/Commitment Order[s] from the sentencing [c]ourt[s], criminal records, [and] presentence investigation reports[ ] for any indication that an offender has a history of ... violent or escape behavior.” SOW at 36; see also Pl.’s Opp. at 8; Paparazzi Aff. ¶ 26 (stating that halfway houses must “take into account the specific history and characteristics of each individual inmate in order to provide adequate supervision and monitoring, and to protect the community from foreseeable conduct”). While at Hope Village, Kelly remained an inmate under the care and custody, if not the direct supervision, of the BOP. Paparazzi Aff. ¶ 19 (stating that “Anthony Kelly was an inmate under the care and custody of the [BOP] when he was serving his sentence at Hope Village”); see also SOW at 0 (stating that facilities such as Hope Village “provide[ ] comprehensive community-based services for offenders ... who are in the custody of the BOP, United States Attorney General, or under the supervision of the United States Probation Office”); Paparazzi Aff. ¶ 17 (stating that “[i]nmates placed in halfway houses are still under the custody of the prison system governing the jurisdiction of their sentence”). Kelly resided at Hope Village from December 2001 until March 2002. Def.’s Mem. at 3; Pl.’s Opp. at 5. During this four-month period, the plaintiff alleges (1) that Hope Village was negligent in its supervision of Kelly, “failing to review or take into account [his] history of violence and escape,” PL’s Opp. at 8, and overlooking or disregarding his numerous violations of the conditions of his confinement there; and (2) that through this negligence and inaction, Hope Village was ultimately responsible for Kelly’s improper and untimely release into the community, where he was free to commit violent criminal acts. Id. at 5-19; Compl. ¶¶ 10-12. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that during Kelly’s tenure at Hope Village, he “openly violated the terms of his conditional release to [Hope Village] by failing to secure employment as required, submitting to [Hope Village] facially false (and inadequate) documentation to facilitate his release to the community, and spending his days of ‘confinement’ roaming the community freely, committing acts of crime.” Pl.’s Opp. at 5; see also Compl. ¶¶ 10-12. The plaintiff asserts that although these violations were known or should reasonably have been known by Hope Village, the facility “never disciplined Kelly, never reported his actions to the appropriate federal agencies, and never recommended his return to federal custody for violating the conditions of his release to the halfway house.” Pl.’s Opp. at 6 (emphases omitted); see id. at 8 (alleging that Hope Village “failed to review or take account of Kelly’s history of violence and escape ... [or] report to the government significant verifiable facts regarding Kelly’s noncompliance with employment and payment obligations”); see also Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 19 (opining that “had Hope Village reported Kelly’s violations [to the BOP] when they occurred ... Kelly would have been returned to prison and his parole date rescinded”). The plaintiff also contends that Hope Village negligently contributed to Kelly’s parole when it, inter alia, “knowingly submitted erroneous documentation to the government that Kelly had met all conditions for release ... executed] the documentation which permitted Kelly to be released[J ... [and] reeommend[ed] to federal authorities that Kelly be released to the community.” Pl.’s Opp. at 6. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that Hope Village failed, in a manner that amounts to massive and large-scale institutional indifference and incompetence, to provide basic levels of facility security and resident oversight or to otherwise “exercise reasonable care to ensure that its residents did not, as a result of [Hope Village’s] own action or inaction, cause harm to innocent members of the community.” Id. at 7; see also id. at 7-17 (describing numerous and endemic failures to properly supervise residents), 18 (alleging that “[Hope Village’s] failures ... pervaded every aspect of the company’s operation, from its hiring and staffing decisions to its monitoring protocols to its reporting functions”). Significantly, the defendant does not attempt to rebut, nor does it even address, any of the plaintiffs allegations regarding either (1) the failure of Hope Village to properly supervise Kelly or report his repeated violations of the conditions of his release; (2) the role of Hope Village in improperly recommending and facilitating Kelly’s release into the community; or (3) the general inability of Hope Village “to abide by comprehensive rules and requirements designed to ensure the accountability of [Hope Village] and its residents! ] and the protection of the outside community,” Pl.’s Opp. at 7, including the pervasive inadequacy of facility security, daily monitoring and supervision of residents, and staffing levels and training. See generally Def.’s Mem.; Def.’s Reply; see also Def.’s Mem. at 3 (contending that “[t]he matters at issue in this [m]otion are purely legal”); Def.’s Reply at 1 (identifying as the central issue of the case whether “a halfway house owe[s] a duty to unknown parties with whom it has no relationship for harm caused by an offender previously housed at the halfway [house] approximately [five months] prior to the offender’s harmful act”). One example of Hope Village’s alleged failure to properly supervise Kelly is particularly instructive. Hope Village residents are required to secure full-time, gainful employment during their time at the facility, subject to ongoing verification by Hope Village staff, as part of their transition back into the community. Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 7 (Hope Village Policies and Procedures Manual) (“PPM”) at 74; see also SOW at 43^44. Among other conditions related to this requirement, residents (1) may not be employed by family members; (2) must always be available by phone at their work site; (3) must account for all hours spent at work; and (4) must remain at Hope Village to see their employment counselor on any day on which they are not actively employed. PPM at 74-77. Furthermore, Hope Village policy states that “[i]f the resident’s work day is cut short ..., they must return immediately to the facility.” Id. at 76. Failure to comply with any of these conditions should result in the creation of an incident report and a possible recommendation to the BOP that the resident’s parole status be rescinded and that he be reincarcerated. See PPM at 77 (stating that if Hope Village discovers that a resident has violated the terms of his employment, “an incident report must be immediately initiated”); see also id. at 74, 76; Pl.’s Opp. at 16. In addition, any resident who “fails to remain at [his] approved place of employment ... during the hours specified by the terms of their employment” is considered to be on “escape.” SOW at 94; see also PPM at 125 (stating that “[a]n escape is defined as any unauthorized absence from a program assignment without a verifiable or justifiable reason”). In the event of an escape, Hope Village is required to “immediately notify” the BOP if the escaped resident is not located within twenty minutes. SOW at 95. Hope Village must also “prepare an incident report and conduct a disciplinary hearing in the [escapee’s] absence.” Id. Residents who have been placed on “escape” status are also documented in a written incident report and are subsequently subject to reincarceration. Id. at 94-95; see also Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 5 (Deposition of Joseph Wilmer) (“Wilmer Dep.”) at 111-12 (stating that if a resident “signed out for 40 hours ... and [gets] paid for 32, something’s wrong because [he’s] missing for 8 hours.... [T]hat’s an escape!, and if the resident has no legitimate explanation for the discrepancy, he would] be written up for an escape, [there would be a] recommendation of termination, and then [the case] goes to the [BOP] to see what they’re going to do”). Kelly supposedly secured a full-time landscaping position in January 2002, shortly after he arrived at Hope Village. Pl.’s Opp. at 13. However, the plaintiff alleges, and the defendant does not dispute, that Kelly failed to comply with the terms of his employment in a number of ways. Pl.’s Opp. at 10-17. First, the plaintiff contends that Kelly’s purported employer was his stepfather, an arrangement forbidden by Hope Village policies. Id. at 13, 16; see also Pl.’s Stmt, at 7 (alleging that “[Hope Village] staff failed to make any inquiry regarding the relationship between Kelly and his purported employer”). Second, the plaintiff claims that the “documentation provided by Kelly to prove his employment was facially inadequate,” PL’s Stmt, at 7, and reflected only thirty-two hours of work during Kelly’s entire time at Hope Village, Pl.’s Opp. at 16; Wilmer Dep. at 250-56 (examining Kelly’s pay stub, which reflected four days of eight-hour employment over a two-week period). Under the relevant regulations, this discrepancy alone was, or should have been, sufficient to put Hope Village on notice that Kelly was not working his full allotment of hours and that he should be considered to be on “escape” status. SOW at 94-95; see also Pl.’s Opp. at 16 (stating that “the pay stubs and subsistence receipts! ] in Kelly’s file ... were so inadequate as to have required further inquiry and ultimate recommendation that Kelly be terminated from the program for escape”) (citation omitted). Third, the plaintiff alleges that in actuality, “Kelly did not work a single day [while at Hope Village],” but rather “left [the facility] each morning, went around the corner, got into a stolen car, and drove around the community until he returned each evening.” Pl.’s Opp. at 13-14. Nevertheless, at no point “[d]uring his tenure [at Hope Village] ... [did Kelly] incur any incident reports.” Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 10 (March 8, 2002 Final Progress Report) (“Final Progress Report”) at 2. Indeed, the plaintiff contends that Hope Village (1) did not properly verify Kelly’s employment; (2) failed to continue to monitor Kelly’s employment situation through on-site visits, telephone calls, and other means of contact; and (3) never “attempted to confirm that Kelly was still working when ... recommendpng] his release to the community.” Pl.’s Opp. at 15 (emphasis added); see id. at 12-17 (detailing deficiencies); Pl.’s Stmt, at 6 (alleging that “Hope Village failed to verify Anthony Kelly’s employment consistent with the Statement of Work or the standard of care for community-based correctional facilities”). The plaintiff further asserts that had Hope Village monitored Kelly’s employment situation in a manner consistent with its own stated policies and procedures, “Kelly’s violations would have been detected and he would not have been released, but rather returned to prison.” Pl.’s Opp. at 15; see also Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 16 (Deposition of Coretta Nichelle Brown-Speight) (“Brown Speight Dep.”) ¶ 16 (stating that Hope Village residents “who said they were working but who were found not to be working ... [were] always sent back to jail”); Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 46 (opining that “the paroling authority would have rescinded Kelly’s parole date based on these violations!,] and ... Kelly [likely] would not have been eligible to be released into the community for 12 to 18 months”). Instead, Hope Village “issued a favorable report for Kelly and took the final steps necessary to facilitate his release by the government.” Id.; see also Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 10 (March 8, 2002 Final Progress Report) (“Final Progress Report”) at 1-2 (stating that Kelly “[m]aintained [his] employment [at his landscaping job] until his departure” and finding that “[h]is prognosis for the future is favorable”); Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 11 (March 4, 2002 Request for Parole Certificate by Hope Village for Anthony Kelly) at 1; Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 12 (February 6, 2002 Release Plan from Hope Village to Community Supervision Officer Jerry Doh) (“Release Plan”) at 1 (stating that Kelly’s “[e]mployment [p]attern ... [is][s]table”). On March 7, 2002, Kelly was discharged from Hope Village and released into the community, where he was placed under the supervision of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”). Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Stmt, at 3; see also Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 48. It is undisputed that the level of scrutiny with which an offender is supervised following his release on full parole is more relaxed and less restrictive than the conditions of his confinement as a halfway house resident. Pl.’s Opp. at 38; see Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 21 (remarking upon the “more liberal monitoring” of offenders by the CSOSA relative to a halfway house). Following Kelly’s discharge, he allegedly embarked on a crime spree including “several auto thefts throughout the [District of Columbia metropolitan] area, the burglary of a gun store in Montgomery County[,] [Maryland], armed robberies in Takoma Park[,] [Maryland], sex assaults in Montgomery County[,] ... and the murder of a tourist in Washington[,] D.C.” Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 13 (July 20, 2006 Affidavit of Detective Michael Brent) (“First Brent Aff.”) ¶ 3; see also id. ¶¶ 4-18. The parties do not dispute that the CSOSA “improperly supervised Anthony Kelly after his discharge from [Hope Village].” Pl.’s Stmt, at 4; see also Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 7. According to the plaintiff, the CSOSA did not “take[ ] the necessary measures to detect Kelly’s violations and reincarcerate him, and [did not] super-visee ] Kelly as it would an individual who was likely to commit additional serious crime.” Pl.’s Stmt, at 6; see also Def.’s Mem. at 11 (discussing the plaintiffs claims that the CSOSA negligently supervised Kelly after his release from Hope Village); Def.’s Reply at 10 (same). On the night of August 6, 2002, five months after his release, Kelly broke into the house of Gregory Russell in Silver Spring, Maryland, armed with a .32 caliber revolver. Compl. ¶ 14; see also First Brent Aff. ¶ 1; Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 14 (October 19, 2006 Affidavit of Detective Michael Brent) (“Second Brent Aff.”), Ex. A (Summary of Anthony Kelly’s Involvement in the Russell/Smith Murder Investigation) (“Investigation Summary”) at 1-2. Erika Smith, the plaintiffs nine-year-old daughter, was present in the house with Russell, her natural father. Id. Kelly shot Erika Smith once at point-blank range and shot Russell eight times, killing them both. Id. After a multiple-state manhunt, Kelly was captured by authorities in College Park, Maryland, on September 5, 2002. Compl. ¶ 15; see generally Investigation Summary. He was then indicted in Montgomery County Circuit Court on May 15, 2003, Compl. ¶ 15, and charged with the murders of Smith and Russell, as well as various other crimes including “two rapes, burglary, and armed robbery,” First Brent Aff. ¶ 19. The plaintiff brought this wrongful death and survival action against Hope Village on March 28, 2005, alleging that the facility had, “by virtue of its negligent acts and/or omissions, directly and proximately caused the premature and wrongful death of Erika Smith ... [by] prematurely and negligently releasing] [Kelly] from its custody.” Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages as well as “[p]unitive damages ... for [the] [defendant’s conscious, willful, wanton, and reckless disregard for the rights of innocent members of the community.” Id. ¶¶25-26. On July 26, 2006, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiffs wrongful death claim, concluding that the claim was “time-barred by the statute of limitations contained in ... the District of Columbia’s wrongful death statute.” Order at 2 (citing D.C.Code § 16-2702 (2001)). The defendant has now moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the plaintiffs remaining claim, arguing that (1) it did not owe any legal duty to the plaintiff for injuries resulting from the criminal act of a third party, Def.’s Mem. at 6-8; (2) the murder of the plaintiffs daughter was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Hope Village’s allegedly negligent conduct, id. at 8-10; (3) the plaintiffs asserted injury was too remote in time and space, and too unrelated to the defendant’s conduct, to be proximately caused by Hope Village’s alleged negligence, id. at 12; and (4) any duty that Hope Village might have had to protect the community from harm done by Kelly was extinguished upon Kelly’s March 2002 discharge from the facility and subsequently superseded by the intervening negligence of the CSOSA and by Kelly’s own criminal acts, id. at 10-12. In turn, the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court’s July 26, 2006 order, contending that the Maryland statute of limitations properly governed the time limit for filing her wrongful death claim. Pl.’s Mot. at 1-2. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment and grants the plaintiffs motion for reinstatement of her wrongful death claim. II. Standards of Review A. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings Courts will grant judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Longwood Village Rest., Ltd. v. Ashcroft, 157 F.Supp.2d 61, 66 (D.D.C.2001) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “[I]f there are allegations in the complaint which, if proved, would provide a basis for recovery[,]” the Court cannot grant judgment on the pleadings. Bradley v. Smith, 235 F.R.D. 125, 126 (D.D.C.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]ll factual doubts [must therefore be] resolved in favor of the plaintiff[ ].” Chang v. United States, 338 F.Supp.2d 20, 21 (D.D.C.2004) (citation omitted). The standard of review under Rule 12(c) is thus essentially the same as that for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plain v. AT & T Corp., 424 F.Supp.2d 11, 20 n. 11 (D.D.C.2006). B. Motions for Summary Judgment Courts will grant a motion for summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on a Rule 56(c) motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). The Court must therefore draw “all justifiable inferences” in the non-moving party’s favor and accept the non-moving party’s evidence as true. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party, however, cannot rely on “mere allegations or denials.” Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, “conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data will not create a triable issue of fact.” Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 908 (D.C.Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the Court concludes that “the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,” then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, in a negligence action, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “no reasonable jury could find that [the plaintiff] established each of the elements of negligence.” Briggs v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 843, 2007 WL 895796, at *3 (D.C.Cir. Mar. 27, 2007) (citation omitted). C.Motions to Alter or Amend Judgment A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) is subject to the Court’s discretion and “need not be granted unless the [Court] finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor is it a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier.” Fresh Kist Produce, LLC v. Choi Corp., 251 F.Supp.2d 138, 140 (D.D.C.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Messina, 439 F.3d at 759 (stating that Rule 59(e) motions may not simply “rely on the same arguments ... originally made” by the moving party) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “While the [Cjourt has considerable discretion in ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion, the reconsideration and amendment of a previous order is an extraordinary measure.” Fresh Kist Produce, 251 F.Supp.2d. at 140 (citing Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1996) (per curiam)); see also Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 184 Fed.Appx. 9, 13 (D.C.Cir.2006) (noting “the high standard for relief under Rule 59(e)”). III. The Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment Hope Village contends that it is not responsible for the death of the plaintiffs daughter as a matter of law. Def.’s Mot. at 1. Specifically, it argues that it cannot “be held liable for the alleged, unforeseeable criminal act of a third party that occurred ... five months after the third party at issue (1) left [the][d]efendant’s facility, custody, and supervision, and (2) was placed under the sole supervision of government agencies who are not parties to this lawsuit.” Def.’s Mem. at 3 (emphasis omitted). The defendant further states that the plaintiffs theory of liability “reshape[s] the law of causation and create[s] massive, expanded liability for alleged tort-feasors where neither duty nor causation exist.” Def.’s Mot. at 1. In response, the plaintiff asserts that “[mjyriad state and federal cases, in the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions, have found both the existence of a duty[ ] and liability! ] on facts similar to those at issue here,” and that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that it is entitled to either judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs action. Pl.’s Opp. at 1-2. Moreover, she claims that “[ajccording to [the defendant], no halfway house ever could be held liable for the consequences of its own negligence, reckless conduct, or deliberate indifference once an offender is released on parole and walks out its doors.” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). As discussed below, the Court agrees with the plaintiff. Where, as here, diversity of citizenship is the jurisdictional basis for a case being brought in federal court, “the substantive tort law of the District of Columbia controls.” Novak v. Capital Mgmt. and Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 907 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]o establish negligence [in the District of Columbia,] a plaintiff must prove a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and damage to the interests of the plaintiff, proximately caused by the breach.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Beretta USA., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 641 n. 3 (D.C.2005) (en banc) (same); Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 916 A.2d 257, 270-71 (2007) (same). The defendant challenges the first and third elements of this framework: whether Hope Village owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, and whether its allegedly negligent conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, i.e., the murder of her nine-year-old daughter. Def.’s Mem. at 6-12. “The existence of ... a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff[ ] is a question of law, to be determined by the [CJourt.” In re Sealed Case, 67 F.3d 965, 968 (D.C.Cir.1995) (citations omitted); Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 388 Md. 407, 879 A.2d 1088, 1092 (2005) (same). By contrast, “[i]n most cases, the existence of proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury,” McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C.Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and “only if it is absolutely clear that the [defendant’s] negligence could not have been a proximate cause [of the harm asserted by the plaintiff] is it a question of law,” Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C.Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 840-41, 116 S.Ct. 1813, 135 L.Ed.2d 113 (1996) (holding that “[t]he issues of proximate causation and superseding cause involve application of law to fact, which is left to the factfin-der”) (citation omitted); Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 102 (D.C.Cir.2005) (observing that “the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for the jury”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Sanders v. Wright, 642 A.2d 847, 849 (D.C.1994) (stating that “[t]he question becomes one of law ... when the evidence [that would be] adduced at trial will not support a rational finding of proximate cause”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court will examine the parties’ arguments regarding duty and proximate causation in turn. A. Duty and Foreseeability 1. Does Hope Village Owe a Duty of Care to the Community? Hope Village argues that it does not owe any legally cognizable duty to the plaintiff, or to any parties with whom it has no pre-existing relationship, for injuries resulting from Kelly’s criminal conduct. Def.’s Mem. at 6-8. It further contends that the plaintiff cannot make the heightened showing necessary in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the criminal acts of a third party were sufficiently foreseeable by Hope Village such that a duty arose to guard specifically against them. Id. at 6, 8-10. The Court disagrees. In the District of Columbia, as in many other jurisdictions, courts “ha[ve] been reluctant to see a defendant held liable for harm caused by the criminal act of a third party.” Workman v. United Methodist Comm. on Relief of the Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, 320 F.3d 259, 262 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citations omitted); see also Doe v. Dominion Bank of Wash., 963 F.2d 1552, 1558 (D.C.Cir.1992) (stating that “[a]s a general rule, a private person does not have a duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third person”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Horridge v. St. Mary’s County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 382 Md. 170, 854 A.2d 1232, 1246 (2004) (holding that “a breach of duty by the defendant would result in his liability in the third party criminal activity context only if the breach enhanced the likelihood of the particular criminal activity which occurred”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, there is an exception to this “general rule of nonliability at common law” if there exists, as there does here, “a [specific] relationship of control between the defendant and the intervening criminal actor.” Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 749 F.2d 77, 81 (D.C.Cir.1984) (using as an example a case “in which a hospital negligently caused the release of a potentially violent patient”) (citing Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C.Cir.1975)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965) (stating that “[t]here is no duty ... to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless ... a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct”); Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297, 1302 (1985) (adopting the “analytical framework” of Section 315). In particular, it is well-settled that “[o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.” White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In White, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that its inquiry into whether a mental hospital owed a duty of care to protect the community from its dangerous patients was “made easy by well-established principles of tort law.” Id. Adopting Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the White Court concluded that “as the custodial ward of criminally insane patients, [the hospital] assumes a duty to take ... reasonable care to prevent harm to others.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court further observed that “[all] institutions, such as prisons and mental hospitals, that have custody over dangerous persons have a duty to members of the public to exercise reasonable care to control their inmates or patients.” Id. Hope Village, which contracts with state and federal agencies to house and supervise convicted criminals, including violent felons, serving as the offenders’ transition point between prison and full parole, is clearly one such institution. SOW at O. Therefore, to the extent that the criminal offenders within its care are, by dint of their history of violent crime or other, similar indicia, foreseeably “likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled,” Hope Village has an identical duty “to exercise reasonable care to control [its residents].” White, 780 F.2d at 103 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319) (internal quotation marks omitted). And just as the Circuit concluded in White that St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, “as part of [its] duty to protect the public, ... was obligated to take steps to prevent the escape of its dangerous patients,” id. (also stating that the plaintiff in that case “could properly seek recovery for a breach of this duty by [St. Elizabeth’s]”), so too is Hope Village obligated to prevent the negligent release of its residents into the community at large and to otherwise “make reasonable efforts to prevent [its] ward[s] from causing physical harm to others,” Johnson v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 03-2548, 2006 WL 2521241, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug.30, 2006). In such situations, when an institution such as Hope Village has voluntarily assumed custody over dangerous individuals, “[u]nless persons injured by [that institution’s] failure to properly perform its functions can recover for their injury, society’s ability to insure that the [institution] conscientiously performs its duties is rendered haphazard at best.” White, 780 F.2d at 103 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2. Was the Murder of the Plaintiff’s Daughter Reasonably Foreseeable? Here, the defendant does not specifically take exception with the plaintiffs position that Kelly is an individual who it “[knew] or should [have known] to be likely to cause bodily harm to others” as an abstract and general matter. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319); see Pl.’s Opp. at 28-32; see generally Def.’s Mem. (failing to address the issue of Kelly’s dangerousness); Def.’s Reply (same). Rather, Hope Village argues that the specific harm done to the plaintiff by Kelly— the murder of her nine-year-old daughter — “was a wholly unforeseeable act for which [it] bears no responsibility.” Def.’s Mem. at 10; see also id. (asserting that the plaintiff presents “no evidence ... that [the][d]efendant was on notice of a substantial risk of harm to the [pjlaintiff or her daughter”). In response, the plaintiff claims that, given Kelly’s history of violence and burglary, as well as his failure to adhere to the conditions of his release while a resident at Hope Village, “a reasonable jury could find it reasonably foreseeable that [he] would break into a home in the Washington metropolitan area carrying a loaded weapon — -a circumstance likely to lead to serious physical harm or death to anyone inside that residence” — if released prematurely into the community. Pl.’s Opp. at 29; see also id. at 28 (contending that Hope Village “reasonably should have foreseen that members of the local community would be harmed by inadequately supervised offenders, released with favorable recommendations to the correspondingly liberal supervision of parole authorities”). “It is axiomatic that under a negligence regime, one has a duty to guard against only foreseeable risks.” Novak, 452 F.3d at 911-12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also McKethean v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 588 A.2d 708, 717 (D.C.1991) (holding that when a defendant is sued for the criminal act of a third party, “[t]he defendant will be liable only if the criminal act is so foreseeable that a duty arises to guard against it”); but see Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 103 (D.C.Cir.2005) (stating that “[t]he defendant may be held liable for harm that is foreseeably attributable to his conduct as well as for unforeseeable harm attributable to his conduct, unless it appears that the chain of events is highly extraordinary in retrospect”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s negligent acts or omissions resulted in an injury directly attributable to “the acts of a ‘third-party’ criminal offender,” Pl.’s Opp. at 19, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that “the requisite duty of care required for negligence is a function of foreseeability, arising only when foreseeability is alleged commensurate with the extraordinary nature of intervening criminal conduct.” Beretta, 872 A.2d at 641 (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnotes omitted); see also Workman, 320 F.3d at 262 (stating that “[i]n the District of Columbia, a defendant may be liable for harm caused by the criminal act of another only if the crime was particularly foreseeable”) (citation omitted). Thus, under District of Columbia law, whether the defendant is liable “when the [plaintiffs alleged] harm is caused by the criminal act of a third party ... depends on a heightened showing of foreseeability.” Novak, 452 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Beretta, 872 A.2d at 641 (stating that “[w]here an injury is caused by the intervening criminal act of a third party, [the District of Columbia Court of Appeals] has repeatedly held that liability depends upon a more heightened showing of foreseeability than would be required if the act were merely negligent”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 642 (noting “the demanding nature of the requirement of precise proof of a heightened showing of foreseeability in the context of an intervening criminal act involving the discharge of weapons”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted); Shadday v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 477 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir.2007) (noting that District of Columbia law “requires a ‘heightened showing of foreseeability’ of plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on a third party who failed to prevent a criminal’s attack”) (citing cases). Although this standard “is a demanding one, and the proof [offered] must be precise, ... [t]he plaintiff is not ... required to show previous occurrences of the particular type of harm [suffered by the plaintiff].” Novak, 452 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, “the requirement [of a heightened showing of foreseeability] can be met instead by a combination of factors which give the defendant an increased awareness of the danger of a particular criminal act.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Dominion Bank, 963 F.2d at 1561 (stating that “[an] insistence that [the plaintiff must] show the previous occurrence of a particular type of crime ... [is] at odds with [the District of Columbia’s] multi-factored, anti-talismanic approach to foreseeability”). Nevertheless, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the criminal act was so foreseeable that a duty arises to guard against it.” Beretta, 872 A.2d at 641 (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted); see also Workman, 320 F.3d at 265 (observing that “[District of Columbia] courts have repeatedly spoken of the heightened foreseeability requirement in terms of duty”) (citing cases). In addition, “[i]f the relationship between the parties strongly suggests a duty of protection, then specific evidence of foreseeability is less important.” Novak, 452 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court has already concluded that Hope Village has a duty to take reasonable care to protect the community at large from bodily harm done by dangerous criminal offenders within its custody. See White, 780 F.2d at 103. It is also undisputed by Hope Village that “Kelly was a career criminal with a long history of burglary, theft, violent crimes (including possession and use of a loaded weapon), and escape from a halfway house.” Pl.’s Opp. at 31; see generally Def.’s Mem.; Def.’s Reply. Thus, because Hope Village “[has taken] charge of a third person whom [it] knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled[,][it] is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319, and “specific evidence of foreseeability is less important” in this instance than it would be if Hope Village did not possess such a duty, Novak, 452 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Hope Village’s duty to protect the community from the criminal acts of Kelly stems from its willingness to assume control over him despite its knowledge, or constructive knowledge, of his “[dangerous [propensities.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319; see also Texas Home Mgmt. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 37 (Tex.2002) (finding that because the plaintiff proffered “evidence that [an intermediate care facility] was aware of [its resident’s] dangerous propensities[,] ... [the facility] should have foreseen the danger inherent in [allowing the resident to visit his mother in another city, outside of the facility’s control]”). Such a duty has therefore been established in a very broad sense with respect to Hope Village and the community at large, and the “relational component” ordinarily required in order to find the defendant potentially liable for a criminal act committed by Kelly or other violent residents of the facility has been satisfied. Workman, 320 F.3d at 263 (citation omitted). However, in light of the “precise proof of a heightened showing of foreseeability” demanded in this jurisdiction when a defendant is sought to be held liable for “an intervening criminal act involving the discharge of weapons,” Beretta 872 A.2d at 643 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it remains incumbent upon the plaintiff to provide some “specific evidence of foreseeability” with regard to the particular criminal act at issue in this case, Novak, 452 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court will therefore evaluate not only whether the relationship between Hope Village and Kelly was such that Hope Village knew or should have known that he was generally capable of violent behavior, but whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Hope Village’s allegedly negligent acts which facilitated the release of Kelly could lead ultimately to the tragic murder of the plaintiffs daughter. See Smith, 413 F.3d at 108 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “[w]hether a particular harm is foreseeable ordinarily turns upon the level of generality at which the harm is defined”); Dominion Bank, 963 F.2d at 1563 (Williams, J., concurring) (stating that when determining foreseeability, “the level of generality at which the risk is articulated will affect the probability” that it is deemed reasonably foreseeable). Put another way, the Court must not only conclude, as it has done, that Hope Village owes a duty of care to the community at large, but that the plaintiff and her daughter, as residents of the Washington metropolitan area, constituted part of that community such that a duty was owed to them for protection against Kelly’s foreseeable criminal acts. See Peavy, 89 S.W.3d at 38 (holding that “[i]f the party in charge of the dangerous person knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers that person posed, then persons foreseeably exposed to such danger may be owed a duty of care”) (citation omitted). Here, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has demonstrated through “a combination of factors” that Hope Village was or should have been aware of the danger that Kelly would engage in criminal acts of violence — and, particularly, criminal acts of violence to which the plaintiffs daughter might foreseeably have fallen victim — upon his allegedly premature release from the halfway house. Novak, 452 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether the criminal acts of a third party are reasonably foreseeable by a defendant, “it is a matter of balancing the magnitude of the risk against the utility of the [defendant’s] conduct,” and factors to be considered include “the known character, past conduct, and tendencies of the person whose intentional conduct causes the harm, ... the gravity of the harm that may result, ... [and] the burden of the precautions which the [defendant] would be required to take.” District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 34 n. 3 (D.C.1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. f (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Kelly had a long criminal history, including multiple incidents of burglary and violent conduct, about which Hope Village was or should have been on notice. See Presentence Report at 3-6 (detailing Kelly’s criminal record); Britton Memo at 2-3 (same); Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 50; see also Doe, 524 A.2d at 34 (stating that “[evidence of prior incidents is generally admissible to show a defendant’s notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition that causes an injury”) (citations omitted). The plaintiff offers undisputed expert testimony which shows that “[the] combination of property [crime] and violent crime” evident from Kelly’s record made him “particularly dangerous because it renders it likely ... that, given the opportunity, Kelly would commit crimes that would place him in direct contact with unsuspecting victims, often in their homes, producing crimes that cause serious injury or death.” Pa-parozzi Aff. ¶ 50. It is also true, and wholly undisputed by the defendant, that Kelly, by virtue of his status as a convicted violent felon, coupled with his specific criminal history, would be highly likely to commit further criminal acts if released from Hope Village before demonstrating that he had “acquire[d] the [necessary] tools for self-improvement and law-abiding behavior.” SOW at 2; see Paparozzi Aff. ¶ 49 (assessing Kelly’s “criminal and social history, coupled with institutional assessments classifying him as potentially impulsive and a pathological liar as well as an alcoholic,” and “placing] him in an extremely high risk of recidivism category”); see also id. (comparing Kelly’s risk profile “to ten other randomly selected offenders with similar profiles” and finding “that all ten had gone on to commit serious crimes”). Furthermore, as the plaintiff points out, “[t]he very reason [Hope Village] was required to supervise and monitor Kelly and other inmates so closely was that reasonable care was necessary to ‘protect[ ] the public’ from offenders who might commit harm to others.” Pl.’s Opp. at 28 (quoting SOW at 40); see SOW at 0 (stating that the mission of transitional facilities like Hope Village “is to protect society by confining offenders in ... controlled environments ... that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure”). The stringent institutional precautions supposed to have been in place at Hope Village were mandated precisely for the purpose of guarding against the risk posed to members of the community at large by Kelly and other violent criminal offenders during the transitional period prior to their complete release into the community. The defendant therefore cannot seriously contend, in light of these precautions, that the prospect that violent inmates residing at Hope Village might commit serious crimes if improperly controlled, left unsecured, or pre@maturely released was “totally unforeseeable.” Def.’s Mem. at 9. It is not reasonable to believe that an entity such as Hope Village, which possesses a duty to protect the public from the violent propensities of those individuals under its control who it “knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled,” White, 780 F.2d at 103 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted), should be taken completely by surprise if, through its alleged negligence, one of those individuals is prematurely released into the community and then commits exactly the sort of crime which the facility was tasked with preventing in the first place. See id. at 106 (finding that the patient in that case “had a long history of violent assaults and was committed to [the defendant hospital] to protect the public from the very type of behavior that led to [the plaintiffs] injuries”). Accordingly, the Court concludes that it was reasonably foreseeable that a convicted felon with Kelly’s history of armed violence and burglary, who society deemed it necessary to be placed under the close care and supervision of a transitional, community-based facility for the protection of the public, might commit a violent crime in the course of illegally entering a stranger’s home if negligently and prematurely released into the community. At the very least, “[e]ven under [the District of Columbia’s] heightened showing of foreseeability, [the plaintiffs] evidence [has] created an issue on which reasonable people might differ, precluding the entry of judgment as a matter of law for the [defendant].” Dominion Bank, 963 F.2d at 1562 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Hope Village argues that the Court’s acceptance of the plaintiffs theory of liability would result in a “nearly universal duty of care on [the][d]efendant’s part for an indeterminate period of time.” Def.’s Reply at 3; see also id. at 9 (contending that “[defendants in numerous similar custodial situations ... would be deemed to owe a perpetual duty to the whole world”). The Court’s conclusion, however, is not nearly so expansive, nor does it represent the sort of uncharted foray into the extreme boundaries of tort liability that the defendants insinuate. See Def.’s Reply at 9. Instead, the Court simply recognizes that there is no need to pinpoint with precise accuracy which individuals are owed a duty by the defendant, so long as it can identify a class of individuals who might foresee-ably be injured as a result of the defendant’s failure to properly supervise or control its dangerous residents. Cf. Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755, 769 (1986) (observing that “[w]ith a drunk driver on the highways, it is strictly a matter of chance who may become his victim ... [but] potential victims [certainly] include those persons in the class of motorists on the same highway”). “In order for [an] actor to be negligent with respect to the [plaintiff], [its] conduct must create a recognizable risk of harm to the [plaintiff] individually, or to a class of persons — as, for example, all persons within a given area of danger — of which the [plaintiff] is a member.” Dudley v. Offender Aid and Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 241 Va. 270, 401 S.E.2d 878, 882-83 (1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 cmt. b (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “one who takes charge of ... a dangerous person incurs a ... duty to ... [all] those who are directly and fore-seeably exposed to the risk of bodily harm as a result of the defendant’s failure to control his dangerous charge.” Id. 401 S.E.2d at 883. The scope of this “area of danger” can and will vary with the circumstance. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Virginia’s formulation of the appropriate inquiry is aptly expressed: If a dangerous prisoner escapes custody, penniless and on foot, in a remote, unpopulated area, and is soon recaptured, the class of potential victims foreseeably at risk during the time of his escape may be very small indeed. By contrast, if a dangerous prisoner is allowed, by a defendant’s negligence, to run at large in a city throughout the nighttime hours, the class of potential victims at risk may extend to all who are present within the area to which the prisoner will foresee-ably have access during his period of freedom. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court is in accord: Arguably, the [individual] who will kill wildly (rather than specifically identifiable victims) is the one most in need of confinement. In negligent release cases, a defendant’s duty generally has not been limited to readily identifiable victims, [because] ... [c]itizens outside of the ‘readily identifiable’ sphere but still within the ‘foreseeable zone of danger’ are potential victims a [defendant] should consider if [it] has a duty to them and a means of adequately protecting them. Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1331 (1997) (citation omitted); see also Peavy, 89 S.W.3d at 38 (stating that foreseeability must be analyzed “in terms of the known danger and the ability to control the third party’s conduct”) (citations omitted). The Court entirely agrees with the approach articulated in these cases. Here, the plaintiffs daughter was a resident of the District of Columbia metropolitan area. Compl. ¶ 6. Her father’s house was located only a few miles from Hope Village, easily accessible to Kelly by personal use of car or public transportation. Id. ¶ 14. She was thus an indisputable part of the local community into which Kelly was released, members of whom Hope Village had a duty to protect from foreseeable harm by its residents. Where a dangerous prisoner such as Kelly is released into the community, “the class of potential victims at risk may extend to all who are present within the area to which the prisoner will foreseeably have access during the period of his freedom.” Dudley, 401 S.E.2d at 883. It is patently clear to the Court, for the reasons stated above, that this description encompasses the plaintiffs daughter. In any event, whether the plaintiffs daughter falls within the class of people who were foreseeably at risk of being harmed by Kelly is, at the very least, a disputed issue of material fact not appropriate for summary judgment. See District of Columbia v. Carlson, 793 A.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C.2002) (stating that “foreseeability ... is nearly always a question of fact for the jury”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Doe, 524 A.2d at 34 (concluding that “the probative evidence presented by [the plaintiffs] of a criminally active environment raised a factual issue of foreseeability ... sufficient for submission to the jury”) (footnote omitted); Torres v. Dep’t of Correction, 50 Conn.Supp. 72, 912 A.2d 1132, 1146 (2006) (finding that “[bjecause genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the harm suffered was foreseeable and whether the plaintiff and her decedent were foreseeable victims, summary judgment in inappropriate on the issue of whether a duty exists in the present case”). Thus, in concluding that Hope Village owes a duty to the community at large to take reasonable care to prevent the dangerous felons under its control from causing foreseeable bodily harm to others, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319, including “tak[ing] steps to prevent the escape [or negligent release] of its dangerous [residents],” White, 780 F.2d at 103, the Court is in no way countenancing “limitless notions of duty and foreseeability,” Beretta, 872 A.2d at 643 (citation omitted). Rather, “[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately about fairness,” District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33 (D.C.1987) (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted), and both fairness and public policy considerations demand that Hope Village owe a duty of care to individuals such as the plaintiffs daughter who fall within the class of people who might foreseeably be harmed by dangerous offenders within the facility’s custody and control. See Thomas v. City Lights School, Inc., 124 F.Supp.2d 707, 709 (D.D.C.2000) (stating that determining “whether a duty exists ... involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution”) (quoting Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1976)) (internal quotation marks and other citations omitted); cf. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d at 39 (noting that “there is ... an important interest in protecting the public from dangerous individuals who are already subject to the state’s supervision and control”). Ruling otherwise would render Hope Village utterly immune from liability for the sort of negligence alleged in this case. See White, 780 F.2d at 103. District of Columbia precedent supports this conclusion. Broadly, courts applying District of Columbia law have refused to hold a defendant liable for the criminal acts of a third party only when it is clear that “there are no factors which created a situation where the intervening criminal act should have been reasonably anticipated and protected against.” Clement v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 634 A.2d 425, 429 (D.C.1993) (finding that drug store owed no duty of care to employee murdered while leaving the store at closing time) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); se