Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..............376 II. BACKGROUND..............377 A. Social Security Benefits for Humanitarian Refugees..............377 Humanitarian Immigrants to Become United States Citizens..............378 C. Delays in the LPR and Naturalization Process..............379 1. Delays for Refugees..............379 2. Delays for Asylees..............379 D. Alleged Inadequacy of Existing CIS and FBI Policies..............380 E. Termination of Benefits..............380 JURISDICTION..............380 A. Plaintiffs Have “Presented” Claims for Continued Enrollment in the SSI Program..............381 B. No Practical Purpose Would Be Served By Exhausting Administrative Remedies..............381 1. Plaintiffs’ claims are collateral to their claim for benefits..............382 2. Plaintiffs have made out a colorable showing of irreparable harm..............382 3. Requiring Plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile..............382 IV. THE MERITS..............384 A. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim..............384 1. The Welfare Reform Act’s Plain Language..............384 2. The Framework for Statutory Construction..............384 (a) The plain language of the statute supports a finding that the time limitation is a substantive element of eligibility..............384 (b) An examination of relevant legislative history also supports a finding that the time limitation is a substantive element of eligibility..............384 (i) Congressional policy with respect to welfare and immigration..............386 (ii) Congress addressed the problem facing Plaintiffs and not to indefinitely extend SSI benefits..............387 2. The cases relied upon by Plaintiffs are distinguishable..............389 3. Plaintiffs do not have an entitlement to the procedures for applying for LPR status or naturalization..............389 4. Conclusion..............391 B. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim.. CO to I — 1. The Standard of Review for Equal Protection. CO co W (a) treatment claims require intent to Discriminate. CO CD (b) Intra-Alien classifications warrant only 2. Plaintiffs have stated a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause . lO 05 CO (a) Unequal treatment as a result of unintended backlogs does not violate equal protection. lO 05 CO (b) Intentional and arbitrary implementation of the expedited policy constitutes a violation of equal protection. CO Plaintiffs have an intentional decision by CIS. CO go (ii) Plaintiffs have alleged CIS’s decision to expedite is based on an arbitrary factor. CD 05 CO C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under the APA. CO 05 CO 1. Plaintiffs State an APA Claim Against CIS. C5 05 CO 2. Plaintiffs State an APA Claim Against the FBI. O © ^ 3. Whether Alleged FBI Delays Are Attributable to CIS. D. Issue Preclusion. CM © ^ 1. The Ngwanyia Case . CJ © TP 2. Issue preclusion apples only where an issue was necessary to the adjudication of a prior case. 4^ o CO 3. None of the issues necessary to the adjudication of Ngwanyia are identical to issues in this case. 4^ o 4^ V. CONCLUSION.404 I. INTRODUCTION Before the Court is a claim by humanitarian refugees and asylees that they are entitled to continue to receive supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits beyond the seven-year limit set by Congress. The case raises substantial issues of national policy. On the one hand, Plaintiffs’ claims implicate a core belief that America continues to be a welcoming home for the “huddled masses” escaping the horror of tyranny. On the other hand, the claims also raise issues of domestic social policy and the allocation of governmental resources among competing populations in need. Which branch of government gets to decide the issue, what process is used to decide it, and the ultimate outcome of the case all say much about the American legal and political system in the dawn of the 21st Century. Plaintiffs in this case are a proposed class of some 50,000 refugees and asylees who have lost or are at risk of losing their SSI benefits as a result of alleged delays in their applications for legal permanent residency (“LPR”) status and naturalization. These humanitarian immigrants, like any United States citizen, qualify for SSI benefits if they are impoverished and either elderly, disabled, or blind. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. However, unlike United States citizens, their eligibility for SSI benefits is limited to a seven-year period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2). Plaintiffs are humanitarian immigrants who qualify for SSI benefits but have had those benefits subject to termination because of the expiration of the seven-year period of eligibility. Plaintiffs maintain these terminations are unlawful because they result from administrative delays in the processing of their applications for naturalization. Plaintiffs allege that typical members of the proposed class are Russian Jews and other religious minorities who fled the former Soviet Union, Iraqi Kurds who fled persecution under the Saddam Hussein regime, Cubans fleeing the Castro regime, Hmong immigrants from the highlands of Laos who served on the side of the U.S. military during the Vietnam war, persecuted minorities in Somalia, and persons from various regions of the former Yugoslavia displaced by the Balkan wars. Plaintiffs allege that the termination of SSI benefits puts their very survival at stake, as they receive SSI benefits because they are all both impoverished and either disabled, blind, or elderly. For example, Shmul Kaplan, the first named plaintiff in the case, is an 80-year old Holocaust survivor. His disabilities include an amputated right leg and a badly fractured and deformed left leg. Mr. Kap-lan was persecuted in the former Soviet Union because of his Jewish religion. He entered the United States in 1996 and was granted asylum the following year. In 1998, he applied for LPR status, but Defendants did not rule on his application until September 2003, five years later. Because he was not able to obtain American citizenship within seven years, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) terminated his SSI benefits in 2004. Mr. Kaplan cannot even apply for naturalization until June 2007, over ten years after he was granted asylum, and well past the expiration of his seven-year eligibility for SSI benefits. Plaintiffs bring essentially two actions in this matter. The first is against the SSA, claiming that Plaintiffs are entitled to continue receiving SSI benefits even after the seven-year period of eligibility has expired. In the first action, Plaintiffs argue that the SSA has deprived them of their entitlement to SSI benefits without affording due process. Through this first action, Plaintiffs seek restoration of their SSI benefits and an injunction prohibiting further termination of SSI benefits to humanitarian immigrants. Plaintiffs bring the second action against the Department of Homeland Security’s Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). In the second action, Plaintiffs allege that there are procedural deficiencies in the processing of their applications for naturalization. They assert that the different timeliness in the processing of humanitarian immigrants’ applications violates the Equal Protection Clause. They also assert that CIS and the FBI have unreasonably delayed the processing of their applications, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Through this second action, Plaintiffs seek an injunction compelling the defendants to timely process their applications and other declaratory relief. Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (doc. no. 22). Given the importance of the issues raised by Plaintiffs and the claims of irreparable harm, the Court has considered the case on an expedited briefing schedule. As set forth in more detail below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiffs’ first action, but deny the motion as to the second action. The Court finds it has jurisdiction to hear the first action against the SSA, as it is appropriate to waive the requirement that Plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies. Plaintiffs’ due process claim, however, must be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not have a property interest in any SSI benefits after the seven-year limitation imposed by Congress. As to the second action, on the other hand, Plaintiffs have stated two viable claims. First, they have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on their allegations that different applicants receive different treatment because of CIS’s arbitrary implementation of an expedition policy. Second, Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim of unreasonable delay against CIS and the FBI under the APA. Finally, the Court finds that the APA claim against CIS and the FBI is not precluded by a settlement in a prior case. II. BACKGROUND A. Social Security Benefits for Humanitarian Refugees As a general rule, aliens are not eligible for SSI benefits. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1). Congress has carved out, however, certain exceptions to this general rule. One such exception applies to refugees, asylees, Am-erasians, and Cuban and Haitian entrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A). These humanitarian immigrants are eligible to receive SSI benefits for seven years: from the date of entry for refugees and Amera-sians, and from the date of the grant of protected status for asylees and Cuban or Haitian entrants. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A). Of course, if humanitarian immigrants obtain American citizenship before the applicable seven-year limitation expires, and are otherwise still eligible, then they can continue to receive SSI benefits just like any other American citizen. In such case, the seven-year limitation no longer applies. However, if they do not receive citizenship, their SSI benefits are terminated at the end of the applicable seven-year period. B. Procedure for Humanitarian Immigrants to Become United States Citizens For humanitarian immigrants, obtaining citizenship is a two-step process. First, they must apply for and become an LPR. Refugees may apply for LPR status after residing in the United States for one year as a refugee. 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1). Asy-lees may apply for LPR status one year after a final grant of asylum status. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(l)(ii). Cuban and Haitian entrants may apply for LPR status after residing in the United States for one year as a parolee. See Pub.L. No. 89-782, 80 Stat. 1161 (Nov 2, 1966), as amended; Pub.L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998), as amended. Amerasians are admitted with LPR status. Pub.L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (Dec. 22, 1987), as amended. Second, humanitarian immigrants must apply for naturalization. All classes of immigrants must wait until ninety days prior to the five-year anniversary of the effective date of their becoming LPRs before they may apply for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a)-(b); 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.4, 334.1, 334.2. Put another way, after receiving LPR status, an immigrant must wait four years and nine months before applying for naturalization. The effective date for calculating the four-year and nine-month waiting period for naturalization is calculated differently for different immigrant classifications. The effective date of a refugee’s LPR status is backdated to the date of entry into the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(e). Accordingly, refugees with LPR status may apply for naturalization four years and nine months after entry into the United States. Amerasians are admitted with LPR status. Like refugees, therefore, they can apply for naturalization four years and nine months after entry. The effective date for asylees, on the other hand, is backdated to no more than one year before the grant of LPR status. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(f). Thus, if an asylee enters the United States and does not receive LPR status until three years after entry, she must wait six years and nine months before applying for naturalization. Once a humanitarian immigrant applies for naturalization, the sole authority to naturalize that immigrant as a citizen of the United States lies with the Secretary of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1421(a). An LPR seeking naturalization bears the burden of proving his eligibility to receive citizenship by establishing residency; an understanding of the English language and the history, principles, and form of government of the United States; and good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1427(a) & (e), 1429; 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.5, 316.10. In 1997, Congress for the first time required completion of a full criminal background investigation by the FBI as part of the inquiry into an applicant’s “moral character,” before CIS could confer citizenship by naturalization. Pub.L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2448. To give effect to this congressional mandate, CIS adopted a regulation that it will not begin any naturalization examination until receipt of the FBI’s final report of its full background check. See 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b). C. Delays in the LPR and Naturalization Process Plaintiffs bring this case because a huge backlog of unprocessed applications has built up at CIS, resulting in the termination of their SSI benefits before CIS can consider or decide their applications. The parties agree this problem results from the increased volume of applications, particularly the large volume of applications to adjust humanitarian immigrants’ status to LPR and applications for naturalization. The parties also agree that another significant component of the backlog is the time taken by the FBI in processing background checks through its National Name Check Program. 1. Delays for Refugees Delays at the LPR and naturalization stages can push refugees past the seven-year period of eligibility in two ways. First, if the LPR application takes more than three years and nine months to be processed, the time when the refugee may file her naturalization application will be postponed, giving the CIS and FBI scant time to process her naturalization application before expiration of the seven-year eligibility. Second, even if a refugee can timely file a naturalization application, CIS and the FBI often take significantly more than two years to process naturalization applications. 2. Delays for Asylees Asylees are at a greater risk of being terminated because the effective date of their LPR status is only backdated to one year prior of the grant of LPR status, although the seven-year eligibility period starts to run from the grant of asylum. Accordingly, if it takes CIS three years and three months to process an LPR application that was promptly filed one year after the grant of asylum, an asylee cannot even apply for naturalization until the seventh anniversary of the grant of asylum, when SSI benefits will already be subject to termination. D. Alleged Inadequacy of Existing CIS and FBI Policies As a general matter, CIS processes applications by date of filing: a first-come, first-served system. 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(1); INS Operations Instructions OI 103.2(q). Under this system, applicants must wait years before their application comes to the top of the pile and receives consideration. Plaintiffs allege that, in light of the consequences that such backlogs cause to humanitarian immigrants receiving SSI benefits, CIS and the FBI’s method of processing applications is inadequate and unreasonable. Plaintiffs acknowledge that CIS claims to make exceptions to the first-come, first-served procedure upon a showing of “emergent circumstances.” INS Operations Instructions 01103.2(q). Moreover, Plaintiffs acknowledge that CIS claims to have an expedition policy targeted at the applications of SSI recipients. Specifically, INS Operations Memorandum 22 states that “due to increasing naturalization application receipts and current naturalization processing times, many, if not most [LPRs receiving SSI benefits], will not be able to complete the naturalization process before the termination of benefits.” INS Operations Memorandum 22, p. 2 (Oct. 6, 1997), Ex. 18 to Pis.’ Mot. for P.I. (“Memorandum 22”). Memorandum 22 directs that such applicants should be given priority in processing. Plaintiffs maintain, however, that Memorandum 22 is ineffective for two reasons. First, allegedly, the policy is not widely known by the applicants. CIS does not inform immigrant service agencies, the public, or SSI recipients of its existence. Nor is Memorandum 22 published in the Federal Register or codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. Second, even when the policy is invoked by an applicant, Plaintiffs allege that CIS implements it unevenly, honoring some expedite requests while ignoring others. E. Termination of Benefits The SSA issues a yearly reminder notice to humanitarian immigrants receiving SSI benefits indicating when their eligibility period began and that it will end seven years from that date. At the end of the seven-year period, the benefits are automatically terminated. III. JURISDICTION Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over the SSA, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiffs argue that requiring them to exhaust their administrative remedies in this case would be impractical and futile. As such, according to Plaintiffs, exhaustion is not required. Jurisdiction over claims to SSI benefits is provided under the Social Security Act, which states that “[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action .... ” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added). The requirement in Section 405(g) that there be a final decision: consists of two elements, only one of which is purely “jurisdictional” in the sense that it cannot be “waived” by the Secretary in a particular case. The waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 232, 234 (3d Cir.1998). A. Plaintiffs Have “Presented” Claims for Continued Enrollment in the SSI Program. The presentment requirement has been interpreted “liberally.” Linguist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 887 (8th Cir.1987); Morrell v. Harris, 505 F.Supp. 1063, 1068 (E.D.Pa.1981). For example, in Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano, the Third Circuit considered the government’s interpretation of a Social Security Act provision that grandfathered into the SSI program a class of blind individuals. 568 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.1977). In considering whether jurisdiction was appropriate, the Third Circuit determined that the presentment requirement had been met because “all the plaintiffs are Supplemental Security Income recipients whose benefits have been reduced or terminated.” Id. at 344. The Third Circuit reiterated Liberty Alliance’s liberal interpretation of the presentment requirement in Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 817-18 (3d Cir.1983), superseded by statute and vacated, 469 U.S. 977, 105 S.Ct. 376, 83 L.Ed.2d 312 (1984). In Kuehner, a class of Pennsylvania residents receiving SSI benefits who had “been notified that those benefits have been or are about to be terminated,” alleged that the SSA used the wrong medical standard when terminating their benefits. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the SSA from continued use of the wrong standard. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. The Third Circuit, however, reversed because, as in Liberty Alliance, “all the claimants were benefit recipients whose benefits had been reduced or terminated.” Id. at 817. Like the plaintiffs in Liberty Alliance and Kuehner, Plaintiffs here have met the presentment requirement. They have previously established entitlement to SSI benefits, which entitlement has been or is at risk of being terminated. B. No Practical Purpose Would Be Served By Exhausting Administrative Remedies. The general requirement that plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review is intended to promote efficiency in the administrative process: Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). There is no need to apply the exhaustion requirement when doing so would not promote such efficiency. As the Supreme Court has explained: The ultimate decision of whether to waive exhaustion should not be made solely by mechanical application of the Eldridge factors, but should also be guided by the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement. The purposes of exhaustion would not be served by requiring these class members to exhaust administrative remedies. This case is materially distinguishable from one in which a claimant sues in district court, alleging mere deviation from the applicable regulations in his particular administrative proceeding.... These claimants stand on a different footing from one arguing merely that an agency incorrectly applied its regulation.... Nor did this policy depend on the particular facts of the case before it; rather, the policy was illegal precisely because it ignored those facts. Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 485, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). The Third Circuit has also noted “the practical considerations militating against the requirement that claimants go through the motions of administrative review when a court is addressing a claim that the agency applies an illegal standard.” Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 65 (3d Cir.1989). These practical considerations provide the overriding framework as courts consider the three factors that are balanced in carrying out the exhaustion analysis: (1) whether the claims are collateral to a claim for benefits; (2) whether exhaustion will result in a color-able showing of irreparable harm; and (3) whether exhaustion would be futile. Id. at 64. 1. Plaintiffs’ claims are collateral to their claim for benefits. “[Cjlaims of systemwide misapplication or invalidity are collateral to the claims for individual benefits.” Bailey, 885 F.2d at 65. In the social security context, the clearest example of cases in which plaintiffs’ claims are collateral to their claims for individual benefits are those in which plaintiffs present constitutional issues. “Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Here, Plaintiffs seek not just to adjudicate the merits of their individual requests for SSI benefits. Rather, more ambitiously, they seek to correct how federal agencies are implementing a statute nationwide. Plaintiffs seek constitutional remedies under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as the provisions of the APA. Because the award of individual benefits through a determination of eligibility is not the subject of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs claims are collateral to their claim for benefits. 2. Plaintiffs have made out a colorable showing of irreparable harm. In previous Social Security cases, the Third Circuit “has found that the fact that claimants have severe mental or physical conditions and few resources other than the requested benefits justifies a finding of irreparable harm and a waiver of the exhaustion requirement.” Bailey, 885 F.2d at 65 (citing Wilkerson v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 117, 121-22 (3d Cir.1987)). The Supreme Court has also noted that in certain instances “[t]he ordeal of having to go through the administrative appeal process” may also contribute to the irreparable harm. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. 2022. In this case, all plaintiffs are, by definition, impoverished and elderly, blind or disabled. To deprive them of continuing SSI benefits will significantly affect their health. Requiring them to exhaust administrative remedies while deprived of their subsistence income is simply not practical. Hence, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a colorable showing of irreparable harm. 3. Requiring Plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies would be futile. There is no reason to believe that if Plaintiffs appealed their claims for continuation of their SSI benefits through the administrative process that they would achieve any success. Thus, exhaustion would be futile. This conclusion is true for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs present claims involving constitutional questions, and a “constitutional question is beyond the Secretary’s competence.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 76, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976). In cases that present questions of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has waived the administrative exhaustion requirement. See id.; Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457. Second, the SSA has considered and acted on Plaintiffs’ claims and has arrived at a final position regarding those claims. The SSA has established procedures for humanitarian immigrants to challenge the termination of their SSI benefits due to the expiration of the seven-year limitation. See SSA-POMS § SI 00502.106.C.3.a, Ex. 15 to Pls.’ Mot. for Prel. Inj. Those procedures only allow an SSA officer to evaluate a challenge based on United States residency on August 20, 1996, or lawful presence in the United States on August 22, 1996. They do not allow the officer to continue SSI benefits based on the claims Plaintiffs bring in this case. See id. In Liberty Alliance, the class members had filed claims with the SSA and, although it had not “finally passed on each of those claims, [the SSA had] taken a final position in one of them ... at the highest administrative level, on a legal issue common to all of the class members.” 568 F.2d at 344. Defendants have argued that they should be given a similar chance here to make a decision at the highest administrative level. Although it is true that no Plaintiff in this action has individually exhausted administrative remedies at the highest level, the SSA’s own procedures demonstrate that the SSA has taken a “final position” with respect to Plaintiffs’ eligibility. Moreover, as in Liberty Alliance, the “instant suit was not filed until ... negotiations between [Plaintiffs’ attorneys] and the Social Security Administration over the proper interpretation of [the Welfare Reform Act] had proven fruitless.” See id. Third, it is doubtful that the SSA would change its final position through the administrative review process, which was designed to consider the denial of individual SSI claims. As the Supreme Court observed thirty years ago in similarly rejecting the need for a claimant to raise an issue in the administrative process: “It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge.” Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330, 96 S.Ct. 893. Thus, the Court will proceed to examine the merits of the motion to dismiss. IV. THE MERITS Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants’ actions violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution as well as the APA. The Court will consider these claims seriatim. A. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim It is well established that the Constitution prohibits the deprivation of a property right without due process of law. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Property rights are not created by the Constitution but must be located in an independent source, such as a statute. Id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. In the context of government benefits, a claim of entitlement is “grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them.” Id. Once a plaintiff establishes a protected property right, “the question remains what process is due” prior to a deprivation of that interest. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The first task, then, is to determine whether Plaintiffs have a property interest in SSI benefits beyond the applicable seven-year limitation. Central to this determination is the answer to the following question: Is the seven-year limitation a substantive component of a humanitarian immigrant’s entitlement to SSI benefits? Or, alternatively, as Plaintiffs suggest, is the limitation a procedural device to ensure that humanitarian immigrants receive SSI benefits beyond seven years only if they have “diligently sought citizenship”? Pis.’ Brf. at 34-35. Whether the seven-year limitation is substantive or procedural holds the key to Plaintiffs’ due process claim. 1. The Welfare Reform Act’s Plain Language The relevant statute reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in paragraph (2), an alien who is a qualified alien ... is not eligible for any specified Federal program (as defined in paragraph (3)).” 8 U.S.C. § 1612. Paragraph (3) includes the SSI program. Id. § 1612(a)(3)(A). Congress then carved out a “time-limited exception” for refugees and asylees: With respect to the specified Federal programs described in paragraph (3), paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien until 7 years after the date-— (i) an alien is admitted to the United States as a refugee ...; (ii) an alien is granted asylum ...; (hi) an alien’s deportation is withheld (iv) an alien is granted status as a Cuban and Haitian entrant ...; or (v) an alien is admitted to the United States as an Amerasian immigrant Id. § 1612(a)(2)(A). 2. The Framework for Statutory Construction The Third Circuit has laid the framework to follow in discerning the meaning of a statutory provision: Our analysis of this issue of statutory construction must begin with the language of the statute itself. Where statutory language is clear, and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.... Congress says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. In re American Pad & Paper Co., 478 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the statutory language contains some ambiguity, the Court may then look outside the text to the relevant legislative history. See id. (a) The plain language of the statute supports a finding that the time limitation is a substantive element of eligibility. The statute at issue here is clear upon its face. It bars SSI benefits to aliens, but then makes an exception to that bar by extending SSI benefits to humanitarian immigrants for seven years. Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that Congress intended the seven-year limitation to be a procedural proxy to ensure the diligence of humanitarian immigrants in applying for naturalization. In fact, nothing in the statutory language references the diligence of humanitarian immigrants at all. (b) An examination of relevant legislative history also supports a finding that the time limitation is a substantive element of eligibility. Even assuming, arguendo, that the statutory language here contained some ambiguity that required a look outside the text, the legislative history of the seven-year limitation also supports a finding that the time limitation is a substantive element of eligibility, for two reasons. First, the legislative history shows that in imposing a time limitation, Congress sought to promote self-sufficiency, remove SSI benefits as an incentive to immigration, and control financial costs to taxpayers. Congress was not concerned with the diligence of aliens applying for naturalization. Second, even when confronted with the problem of agency delay leading to the termination of benefits, Congress specifically chose not to extend SSI benefits based on a substantive requirement of diligence. Instead, Congress simply extended SSI benefits by an additional two years. (i) Congressional policy with respect to welfare and immigration Prior to 1996, humanitarian immigrants were entitled to SSI benefits on the same basis as United States citizens. Provision of such benefits was consistent with the United States’ treaty obligations, which pledged the United States to provide benefits to refugees equal to those provided to citizens of the United States. See 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. In 1996, however, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (the “Welfare Reform Act”), which included the time limitation at issue in this case. Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2301 (Aug. 22, 1996). When passing the Welfare Reform Act, Congress registered the following statements concerning national policy with respect to welfare and immigration: (1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes. (2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that— (A) aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and (B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States (5) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility ... to assure that aliens be self-reliant .... (6) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits. 8 U.S.C. § 1601. These express statements show that promoting self-sufficiency and removing benefits as an incentive to immigration appear to be what motivated Congress to act. Congress sought to address these “compelling governmental interests” when it limited the provision of SSI benefits to humanitarian immigrants. City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 607 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036, 120 S.Ct. 1530, 146 L.Ed.2d 345 (2000) (affirming constitutionality of Welfare Reform Act because, “[although reasonable individuals certainly can disagree on the wisdom of controlling immigration through such a policy, we must conclude that the provisions of the Welfare Reform Act are rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal of discouraging immigration that is motivated by the availability of welfare benefits.”)- The legislative history also demonstrates that when Congress passed the Welfare Reform Act it aspired, quite simply, to reduce the rising costs of operating federal benefits programs. For example, in the year before passage of the Act, the Social Security Commissioner testified before Congress about how certain proposals to limit SSI benefits to legal aliens would address “concern about the growth in the number of aliens on the SSI rolls, particularly in this time of limited Federal resources.” Proposals to Reduce Illegal Immigration, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1995 WL 110439 (F.D.C.H. Mar. 14, 1995). The Commissioner further testified that “[t]he number of SSI recipients who are aliens has been increasing steadily. In December 1994, there were a little more than 738,000 aliens receiving SSI benefits. This is double the number of aliens receiving benefits 5 years ago. Alien recipients now constitute nearly 12 percent of the total number of SSI recipients.” Id.; see also SSI: Problem Areas and Possible Reforms, Hearing on SSI Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 1995 WL 128208 (F.D.C.H. Mar. 27, 1995) (“Another factor underlying the growth of SSI ... is the rapid growth of aliens on the rolls.”). When passing the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, which removed aliens’ general eligibility for welfare benefits, Congress also registered its concerns regarding the public fisc: [A]liens have been applying for and receiving public benefits from Federal, State, and local governments at increasing rates.... Current eligibility rules for public assistance ... have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(3)-(4). On the other hand, Congress never stated — and there is no other legislative history to support this proposition — that in passing the Welfare Reform Act, Congress intended to encourage diligence in applying for naturalization. (ii) Congress addressed the problem facing Plaintiffs and chose not to indefinitely extend SSI benefits. One year after passing the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Congress confronted the very problem facing Plaintiffs in this case: administrative delays causing the termination of benefits. Faced with this problem, Congress did not choose to indefinitely extend benefits, even to those who diligently applied for naturalization. Instead, it extended the length of eligibility by two years. This extension, right or wrong, reflected Congress’s intent as to the appropriate length of time during which humanitarian immigrants would be eligible to receive SSI benefits prior to obtaining citizenship. As originally passed, the Welfare Reform Act extended SSI benefits to humanitarian immigrants for only five years. See Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2301. The risk that the SSI benefits of humanitarian immigrants could be terminated, due to the expiration of the five-year eligibility period before citizenship could be obtained, was immediately recognized by the executive branch. That the failure to timely bestow citizenship on humanitarian immigrants eligible for SSI benefits would have dire consequences appears to have been well understood at the time. President Clinton, in his signing statement, directed INS to remove “all -bureaucratic obstacles that stand in the way of citizenship for legal immigrants who are eligible.” Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3734, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2891, 2892; 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1487 (Aug. 26, 1996). Soon thereafter, Congress also recognized the problem created by the limited eligibility period for SSI benefits provided to humanitarian immigrants. In 1997, recognizing that many humanitarian immigrants would not be able to obtain citizenship within five years, Congress extended the eligibility period to seven years. See The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2) (A)(i)-(ii). Congress formally recorded its intention in enacting this extension: The 5-year exception in the welfare law was designed to allow refugees and asy-lees, who often arrive in the U.S. with few possessions, time to adjust to life here. However, because of delays in adjusting to permanent resident status, mandatory residency requirements before applying for citizenship, and recent increases in waiting times in the naturalization process, under the 5-year eligibility period many would become ineligible for welfare benefits despite their attempting to naturalize at their earliest opportunity. By extending the exception to allow these groups 7 instead of 5 years of eligibility, these noncitizens would be given more time to naturalize while continuing to receive welfare benefits without interruption. H.R.Rep. No. 149, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1182 (1997). Faced with the clear problem of humanitarian immigrants becoming “ineligible for welfare benefits despite their attempting to naturalize at the earliest opportunity,” Congress could have conditioned continued receipt of such benefits on a requirement of diligence. For example, Congress could have conditioned the continued receipt of SSI benefits on the timely filing of an application for naturalization, say, within seven years of receiving LPR status. Such a condition would ensure that humanitarian immigrants continued receiving SSI benefits, so long as they were diligent. Drafted this way, the seven-year limitation could be read as a procedural device rather than a substantive element of SSI eligibility. This is not the choice that Congress made. Congress elected instead to simply provide “more time” to receive SSI benefits. Congress did not extend SSI benefits indefinitely. This election is consistent with the policy statements that Congress expressed just one year earlier, when Congress stated that aliens should “not depend on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations” and that “the availability of public benefits [as] an incentive for immigration to the United States” should be discouraged. 8 U.S.C. § 1601. Congress believed that seven years was sufficient time “to adjust to life here” in the United States and become naturalized. H.R.Rep. No. 149, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1182 (1997). Although the result may be harsh upon some of the applicants, the Court is not free to second guess this policy choice by Congress. 2. The cases relied upon by Plaintiffs are distinguishable. Plaintiffs rely on Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), to support their contention that the seven-year limitation is procedural, not substantive, in nature. In Logan, the plaintiff timely filed a discrimination claim before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission. Id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. 1148. This filing triggered the Commission’s obligation to convene a fact-finding conference within 120 days. Id. The Commission, however, inadvertently scheduled the conference five days too late. Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that this failure to comply with the 120-day period deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs charge and dismissed the complaint. Id. at 427-28, 102 S.Ct. 1148. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint violated his due process rights. Logan, 455 U.S. at 438, 102 S.Ct. 1148. The Supreme Court first determined that the plaintiff had a legitimate claim of entitlement to use the state agency’s adjudicatory procedures to pursue his cause of action for discrimination. Id. at 428-29, 102 S.Ct. 1148. In so holding, the Supreme Court found that the 120-day limit was “a procedural limitation on the claimant’s ability to assert his rights, not a substantive element of the FEPA claim.” Id. at 433, 102 S.Ct. 1148. It then held that termination of the plaintiffs claim without considering its merits violated due process. Id. at 434, 102 S.Ct. 1148. Logan would help Plaintiffs if they could show that they were entitled to SSI benefits and that the seven-year limit was just a procedural limitation to terminate the SSI benefits of the undiligent, not a substantive element of their eligibility. As discussed above, however, Congress simply did not intend “to condition SSI benefits for humanitarian immigrants upon their diligent pursuit of citizenship.” Pis.’ Brf. at 38. Rather, the traditional tools of statutory construction show that the time limitation is part of the substantive definition of Plaintiffs’ entitlement to SSI benefits. In Logan, the 120-day limitation was a means to an end, not a definition of the plaintiffs entitlement itself. That is not the case here. The case of Shvartsman v. Apfel offers an instructive contrast in this regard. 138 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir.1998). In Shvartsman, the plaintiffs were LPRs who received food stamps and whose applications for naturalization were still pending when Congress passed the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. Id. at 1197. The food stamps program entitled qualified recipients to food stamps for twelve months, after which time benefits terminated automatically. Id. However, as the end of the twelvemonth period approached, recipients could engage in a streamlined “recertification process” to establish their continuing eligibility for food stamps. Id. When Congress passed the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, as with SSI benefits, it added for the first time a citizenship requirement to the food stamp program’s eligibility criteria. Shvartsman, 138 F.3d at 1197; 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1). The Act provided transition procedures for applying the new citizenship requirement, but if LPRs could not prove their citizenship in those procedures, their food stamps were terminated. 138 F.3d at 1197. In effect, LPRs receiving food stamps were cut off on August 22, 1997 unless they became citizens prior to that date, even if they had diligently pursued their citizenship. Id. The LPRs brought a class-action suit alleging that the statutory transition procedure, coupled with the agency delay in processing citizenship applications, violated their due process rights to a fair opportunity to prove continuing eligibility for food stamps. Shvartsman, 138 F.3d at 1197. Perhaps most salient to this case, the plaintiffs “emphasize[d] that they [did] not claim a property right directly in a continuous stream of benefits, which they eon-cede[d] would be a losing claim given the time-limited nature of the entitlement to Food Stamps.” Id. at 1198. Instead, citing Logan, the plaintiffs claimed a property interest only in the fair opportunity to establish their continuing eligibility for benefits by, in turn, establishing their eligibility for citizenship. Id. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument: The plaintiffs would have a stronger argument under Logan if they could establish a property entitlement to the Food Stamp benefits themselves; in that case, deprivation of the entitlement without a meaningful, fair opportunity to prove continuing eligibility could indeed violate due process. However, the plaintiffs concede that there is no such property right in continuing benefits, and their attempt to make access to the recertifi-cation procedures into a substantive right of its own is unavailing. Id. at 1200. Because the LPRs could not establish deprivation of a property interest, their due process claim failed. Id. Like the LPRs in Shvartsman, Plaintiffs here stand to lose their benefits because of agency delays in the processing of their applications for naturalization. Moreover, although they have not conceded the point, as in Shvartsman, Plaintiffs do not have an entitlement to benefits given the time-limited nature of their entitlement. Without a property deprivation, Plaintiffs have no argument under Logan. The principles of due process simply do not require that Plaintiffs be provided a fair opportunity to prove their eligibility for citizenship prior to the termination of their benefits. 3. Plaintiffs do not have an entitlement to the procedures for applying for LPR status or naturalization. At the hearing on this matter, Plaintiffs also claimed a property interest in the orderly and timely processing of their applications. This claim also fails. Plaintiffs claim that Logan supports an entitlement to “adjudicatory procedures.” 455 U.S. at 428-29, 102 S.Ct. 1148. Generally, courts have not countenanced claims to a property interest in processes, and as discussed above, the Seventh Circuit soundly rejected such a claim in Shvartsman. More importantly, in Mudric v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit specifically rejected an immigrant’s due process claim based on a claim of entitlement to the timely processing of his application. 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir.2006). In Mudric, a Serbian immigrant claimed that INS delays in processing his asylum application prevented him from receiving asylum, because by the time the INS processed his claim, conditions in Serbia had changed so as to no longer warrant asylum. Id. The Court held that the immigrant had neither an entitlement to asylum nor, more importantly, to have his “immigration matterf] adjudicated in the most expeditious manner possible.” Id. at 99. 4. Conclusion In interpreting a statute, the Court’s role is not to “assess the relative merits of different approaches” to the problem that Congress faced. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 13, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000). “Achieving a better policy outcome — if what [Plaintiffs] urge is that — is a task for Congress, not the courts.” Id. Nor is the Court licensed to soften the blows of Congressional action (or inaction). The Court’s role is, simply, to interpret the laws that Congress has passed, as discerned from examining the statute’s plain language and, where appropriate, the legislative history pursuant to the recognized tools of statutory construction. Here, such an examination leads to the inevitable conclusion that humanitarian immigrants have no legitimate claim of entitlement to SSI benefits past the seven-year limitation to establish a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to change the substance of that entitlement, they must petition Congress, not the Court. “It is axiomatic that a cognizable liberty or property interest must exist in the first instance for a procedural due process claim to lie.” Mudric, 469 F.3d at 98. Because Plaintiffs cannot allege the deprivation of a property interest, they cannot state a claim for violation of their rights to due process. This claim must be dismissed. Furthermore, because the remaining claims involve only the conduct of CIS and the FBI, dismissal of the SSA as a defendant in this case is warranted. B. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim Plaintiffs also allege that their rights to equal protection of the laws have been violated “because defendants’ actions have caused some humanitarian immigrants diligently pursuing citizenship to be cut off [from] SSI benefits, while other identically situated [humanitarian immigrants] have had their applications for citizenship processed in time to avoid an interruption of SSI benefits.” Pis.’ Brf. at 50. Plaintiffs allege three types of unequal treatment: (1) applicants who file in a year when the processing backlog is relatively low receive continuous benefits, while those who file in backlogged years have their benefits terminated; (2) applicants who file in a field office with a relatively small backlog receive continuous benefits, while those who file in a more-backlogged office are cut off from benefits; and (3) applicants who file in offices that expedite their applications, pursuant to Memorandum 22, receive continuous benefits, while applicants who file in other offices that do not are cut off from benefits. Id. 1. The Standard of Review for Equal Protection The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Although the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states, the principles of the Equal Protection Clause are equally applicable to the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). Moreover, “[i]t is undisputable that our constitution provides due process and equal protection guarantees to aliens as well as citizens.” DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir.1999). (a) Disparate treatment claims require intent to Discriminate. The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike” under the law. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Its purpose “is to secure every person ... against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). There are two manners in which a statute may be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. The first challenge involves a claim that the statute, on its face, expressly discriminates in an impermissible way. The second challenge involves a claim that the statute, while perhaps valid on its face, violates the Equal Protection Clause in its execution, because it results in intentional disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. In this case, Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge is not a facial attack of any particular CIS policy; rather Plaintiffs attack the unequal implementation of CIS policy among different aliens. The viability of a claim challenging the unequal implementation of a statute is well established. “[Discriminatory enforcement of a facially valid law is also unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.” Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). Public officials engage in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when they seek to enforce the law “on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor,” or when they seek to enforce the law in order “to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.” United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995, 110 S.Ct. 546, 107 L.Ed.2d 543 (1989). In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that required a license to operate a laundromat where such a license had been granted to only one out 200 Asians. 118 U.S. at 374, 6 S.Ct. 1064. The Supreme Court concluded that a law which is “fair on its face and impartial in its appearance” may nonetheless constitute “illegal discrimination between persons” “if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand.” Id. at 373-74, 6 S.Ct. 1064. Allegations that a statute has a disparate effect are not sufficient, on their own, to state an equal protection claim. A plaintiff must also show that the defendant intended to discriminate in a manner that led to the disparate effect. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (holding that equal protection claim failed because there was insufficient evidence that village’s refusal to rezone land to allow plaintiff to build racially integrated low-income housing was motivated by race-based discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 244-45, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (holding that equal protection claim failed, because the plaintiffs showed no discriminatory intent in police department’s use of verbal skills test that was failed, disproportionally, by African Americans). In other words, the alleged disparate effect must be the result of “purposeful” discrimination. Washington, 426 U.S. at 253, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (Stevens, J., concurring). (b) Intra-Alien classifications warrant only rational basis review. Although the Equal Protection Clause directs, in general, that all persons similarly situated be treated alike, it is, of course, the very nature of legislation to differentiate between different classes and then afford preferential treatment to one class over the other. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 39, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that “all laws classify”). Thus, the general rule is that legislation is presumed valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute, or its implementation, is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249. These are policy choices and provide the grist of legislative work. The general rule of rational basis review gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, in which case a statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if the challenged classification is suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). As Justice Stone explained, in his famous Carolene Products footnote, strict scrutiny of such classifications is warranted because “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (“[C]las-sifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Aliens as a class are a prime example of a “discrete and insular” minority.). Here, the classifications that Plaintiffs challenge do not draw lines between aliens and United States citizens. Rather, they distinguish between aliens and other aliens, namely, those that file applications at different times or in different offices from other aliens. Such classifications warrant only rational basis review by the Court. The Supreme Court addressed such intra-alien classification in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976). In that case, the Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1612, which discriminated among aliens by granting Medicare benefits only to elderly aliens who had LPR status and had resided in the United States for five years. Id. at 69-70, 96 S.Ct. 1883. After noting that Congress is not required to treat citizens and aliens alike in the provision of welfare benefits, id. at 78-80, 96 S.Ct. 1883, the Court narrowly framed the question raised by the plaintiffs’ challenge to the statute: “The real question presented by this case is not whether discrimination between citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliens — allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others — is permissible.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 1883 (emphasis in original). The Court answered that question by holding that discrimination between the classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare benefits was permissible, because the line Congress drew reasonably favored those aliens who could be presumed to have a greater affinity to the United States. Id. In arriving at this decision, the Supreme Court exercised extra caution in reviewing a federal statute that discriminated among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits: For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such dec