Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAMILTON, District Judge. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in these two environmental cases came on for hearing before the court on November 1, 2006. The court had previously decided two motions for summary judgment and/or for judgment on the pleadings. Because of the overlap in the facts, administrative records, and claims, the court ordered consolidated summary judgment briefing and argument on the remaining claims. For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART defendants’ motion for summary judgment. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Defenders of Wildlife, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, and the Vermont Natural Resources Council (collectively “Defenders” plaintiffs) are non-profit environmental and conservation organizations headquartered throughout the United States. Defenders filed their case, 04-4512 PJH, on October 26, 2004, asserting five claims for relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553, the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq., against defendants Mike Johanns, the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), Dale Bos-worth, the Chief of the United States Forest Service, and the United States Forest Service, an agency within the USDA. Defenders plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint on February 17, 2005. Defendants American Forest & Paper Association and American Forest Resource Council (collectively “defendant-intervenors”) intervened on May 23, 2005. On October 14, 2005, this court granted in part and denied in part Defenders defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and/or for judgment on the pleadings as to three of the five claims in 04-4512 PJH. The court denied summary judgment as to two of the claims, and granted it as to one. Thus, following the motion, four claims remained. Subsequently, on October 17, 2005, the State of California intervened in the Defenders case, and filed a complaint stating two claims (which overlap with surviving claims in both the Defenders and Citizens cases). Plaintiffs Citizens for Better Forestry, Environmental Protection Information Center, Center for Biological Diversity, the Ecology Center, Gifford Pinchot Task Force, Kettle Range Conservation Group, Idaho Sporting Congress, Friends of the Clearwater, Utah Environmental Congress, Cascadia Wildlands Project, Kla-math Siskiyou Wildlands Center, Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project, Headwaters, the Lands Council, and Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund (collectively “Citizens” plaintiffs) are also non-profit environmental and conservation organizations headquartered throughout the United States. They filed their complaint in case number 05-1144 on March 21, 2005, and a supplemental complaint on November 7, 2005 (following this court’s summary judgment order in the Defenders case), alleging ten claims under NEPA, the APA, and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) against defendants USDA and the Forest Service. Defendants American Forest & Paper Association and American Forest Resource Council intervened in the Citizens case as well. On April 21, 2006, the court granted Citizens defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed six of the ten claims in the Citizens case. Accordingly, there are also four remaining claims in the Citizens case. Because the Citizens and Defenders cases were both assigned to the undersigned judge, the cases were never formally related or consolidated. However, because of the overlapping nature of the eight surviving claims in the two cases, on May 10, 2006, the court ordered consolidated briefing on the final summary judgment motions as to the remaining claims. Thus, when the court refers to “plaintiffs and defendants” in this order, it is referring collectively to the plaintiffs and defendants in both cases. Additionally, on November 21, 2006, after the hearing on the motions, the court ordered supplemental consolidated briefing on the NEPA and ESA claims, which was completed on December 19, 2006. CLAIMS/ISSUES In their cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties consolidated the surviving claims in the two cases and presented five issues for the court’s resolution: (1) Whether the USDA violated NEPA in failing to analyze the environmental effects of the decision to replace existing NFMA regulations with the 2005 Rule and categorically excluding the 2005 Rule from NEPA; (2) Whether the USDA violated ESA by failing to consult with expert agencies regarding the potential impacts of the 2005 Rule on threatened and endangered species; (3) Whether the USDA violated the APA by failing to provide sufficient public notice and opportunity for comment on the 2005 Rule; (4) Whether the USDA violated the APA by failing to provide public notice and allow public comment on the 2004 Interpretive Rule; and (5) Assuming there is a violation of one of the statutes, what is the appropriate remedy or relief? FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The National Forest System and the NFMA The National Forest System (also referred to as “NFS”), which at 192 million acres comprises approximately eight percent of the United States landscape, includes 155 national forests and 22 national grasslands. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 729, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998). The National Forest System is administered by the Forest Service (also referred to as “FS”), an agency of the USDA. In 1976, Congress enacted the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (“NFMA”) to reform Forest Service management of the National Forest System. The NFMA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to develop land and resource management plans for units of the National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). When the Secretary develops these plans, the NFMA requires him to comply with NEPA, which in turn encompasses a duty to prepare environmental impact statements (“EIS”). See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1). The NFMA envisions a two-stage approach to forest planning. Inland Empire Pub. Lands v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.1992)); Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir.1998). First, the NFMA requires the Forest Service to develop a comprehensive forest plan (“forest plan”), which may also be referred to as a Land Resource Management Plan (“LRMP”), and as mentioned above, an EIS for the entire forest. Id.; 36 C.F.R. § 219(a),(b). The forest plan establishes basic guidelines and sets forth the planning elements that will be employed by the Forest Service in future actions in that forest. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir.1994). “Once the [Forest Plan] is approved, direct implementation of the LRMP occurs at a second stage, when individual site-specific projects are proposed and assessed.” Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 757. A site-specific project or decision “must be consistent with the LRMP for the larger area.” Neighbors, 137 F.3d at 1376-77. The NFMA also imposes substantive requirements on the Forest Service at both stages. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3). These requirements have been promulgated as regulations. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 219, et seq. Among the NFMA’s substantive requirements is the duty to provide for the diversity of plant and animal communities. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). B. The 1982 Rule (also referred to as 1982 Planning Regulations) In 1982, the USDA promulgated regulations to protect wildlife and fish, soils, water, outdoor recreation, and other public resources. The 1982 Planning Regulations included a species viability provision, which provided that “[f]ish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area.” See 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) & (6) (1982). To implement or facilitate this provision, the 1982 Planning Regulations required the Forest Service to select certain wildlife species to be monitored as proxies for the health of broader wildlife populations of the specific ecosystems. These proxy species are referred to as “management indicator species” or “MIS.” Id. at § 219.19(a)(1). C. The 2000 Rule (also referred to as 2000 Planning Regulations) Several attempts were made to revise the 1982 Planning Regulations prior to 2000. In 1998, a Committee of Scientists convened meetings across the country regarding such revisions, and invited public participation. In 1999, the Committee provided recommendations to the USDA. Subsequently, on November 9, 2000, the USDA adopted a final rule revising provisions for managing wildlife and other resources in the national forests. The 2000 Planning Regulations had thus been open to public notice and comment for a period of several years. The 2000 Planning Regulations were intended to “simplify, clarify, and otherwise improve the planning process; to reduce burdensome and costly procedural requirements; to strengthen and clarify the role of science in planning, and to strengthen collaborative relationships with the public and other government entities.” 65 Fed. Reg. 67514, 67514. In issuing the 2000 Rule, the USDA noted that “[m]any things ha[d] changed since the publication of the 1982 rule,” including an increased understanding of concepts such as “sustainability and ecosystem management.” Id. at 67516. Additionally, since 1982, “[t]he Forest Service has ... gained a great deal of experience developing, implementing, amending, and revising the existing 127 land and resource management plans under the rule.” Id. Accordingly, the 2000 Rule embodied a number of changes to the 1982 Rule, including changes to species viability requirements, the role of science in the planning process, and in the framework for forest planning. 65 Fed.Reg. 67579; 36 C.F.R. § 219.35 (2000). The 2000 Rule also included a transition provision, which is at issue in these motions. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.35. The dispute primarily concerns whether the transition provision provided that the 1982 Planning Regulations would remain in effect for site-specific plans until the 2000 Planning Regulations became effective. Previously, at least with respect to the prior motions in these cases, the parties appeared to agree that pursuant to the transition provision, the 1982 Planning Regulations were to continue to govern site-specific Forest Service decisions until November 9, 2003. However, that no longer appears to be the case. The parties now disagree as to whether the transition provision required application of the 1982 Planning Regulations to site-specific decisions during the transition period. This issue is discussed in greater detail in conjunction with the pertinent APA claim. Subsequently, in 2001, the USDA determined that the Forest Service was not sufficiently prepared to implement the 2000 Planning Regulations, proposed a new rulemaking, and postponed the effective date of the 2000 Planning Regulations until May 2002. See 66 Fed.Reg. 27552. Thereafter, on May 20, 2002, the USDA again extended the transition date of the 2000 Planning Regulations, and published an “interim final rule” that provided that until revised planning regulations were promulgated, Forest Service officials could continue to amend or revise forest plans pursuant to the 1982 Planning Regulations if they chose to do so, instead of the 2000 Planning Regulations. 67 Fed.Reg. 35431-34. D. The 2002 Proposed Rule (also referred to as the “2002 Rule”) On December 6, 2002, the USDA published the 2002 Proposed Rule, which differed from the 2000 Planning Regulations. 67 Fed.Reg. 72770. In issuing the 2002 Rule, the USDA attempted to redress perceived inadequacies of the 2000 Rule. It concluded that “[a]lthough the 2000 rule was intended to simplify and streamline the development and amendment of land and resource management plans, ... the 2000 rule is neither straightforward nor easy to implement,” and it “did not clarify the programmatic nature of land and resource management planning.” Id. at 72770. The USDA asserted that the purpose of the 2002 Rule was “to improve upon the 2000 Rule by providing a planning process which is more readily understood, is within the agency’s capability to implement, is within the anticipated budgets and staffing levels, and recognizes the programmatic nature of planning.” Id. The agency noted that while the 2002 Rule “retain[ed] many of the basic concepts in the 2000 rule, namely sustainability, public involvement and collaboration, use of science, and monitoring and evaluation,” the 2002 Rule “attempted to substantially improve these aspects of the 2000 Rule by eliminating unnecessary procedural detail, clarifying intended results, and streamlining procedural requirements.” Id. at 72772. Public comment on the 2002 Proposed Rule was open until April 7, 2003. On September 10, 2003, the USDA published another “interim final rule,” again extending the transition date of the 2000 Planning Regulations. 68 Fed.Reg. 53294. This interim rule noted that while it was anticipated that the 2002 Rule would be promulgated by the end of 2003, that the promulgation might not occur prior to the expiration of the prior interim rule, and therefore, provided that, for site-specific decisions, the effective date of the 2000 Planning Regulations was “extended from November 9, 2003, until the Department promulgates the final planning regulations published as proposed December 6, 2002.” 68 Fed.Reg. 53297 (emphasis added). E. The 2004 Interpretive Rule While the USDA was still in the process of reviewing the 2002 Proposed Rule, the department asserted that “considerable uncertainty” had arisen regarding the effect of the 2000 Planning Regulations and its transition provision. On September 29, 2004, the USDA issued an “interpretive rule” that provided that the 1982 Planning Regulations were no longer in effect. 69 Fed.Reg. 58057. The 2004 Interpretive Rule provided in pertinent part: The transition provisions as originally enacted, and now twice amended, explicitly refer to the 1982 planning rule as the rule “in effect prior to November 9, 2000.” At the same time, given the extension of the effective date of paragraph (d), within which site-specific decisions must comply with the 2000 planning rule (68 FR 53294), it is clear that site-specific decisions entered into during the transition period are not to comply with the substantive provisions of the 2000 planning rule. This interpretive rule clarifies that until a new final rule is promulgated, the transition provision of the 2000 planning rule, as amended by the May 2002 interim final rule remain in effect, including the requirement of § 219.35 paragraph (a) of the transition provisions that responsible officials consider the best available sci ence in implementing national forest land management plans and, as appropriate, plan amendments. Pursuant to paragraph (b), the provisions of the 1982 planning rule may continue to be used only for plan amendments and revisions upon election of the responsible official. Appropriate plan amendments and projects proposed during the transition period should be developed considering the best available science in accordance with § 219.85 paragraph (a). 69 Fed.Reg. at 58056 (emphasis added). On October 26, 2004, shortly after publication of the 2004 Interpretive Rule, Defenders plaintiffs filed their complaint. F. The 2005 Rule (also referred to as 2005 Planning Regulations) Subsequently, on January 5, 2005, the USDA published the 2005 Rule, which it asserted was the result of the public comments received through April 7, 2003, to the 2002 Rule. 70 Fed.Reg. 1023. By the USDA’s admission, the 2005 Rule “embodies a paradigm shift in land management planning.” 70 Fed.Reg. at 1024. The nature and scope of the changes effected by the 2005 Rule are at issue in most of the claims discussed below. Defendants characterize the rule as “carrfying] forward the major themes” contemplated in the 2002 Proposed Rule insofar as the plans under the rule “will be more strategic and less prescriptive in nature.” Id. at 1023. Plaintiffs, however, claim that the 2005 Rule constitutes a significant departure from prior rules. Plaintiffs take particular issue with the rule’s elimination of species viability and diversity requirements, the increased discretion on the part of local agency officials, and the new role that science plays in agency decisions. The parties’ specific arguments regarding the changes are set forth in greater detail below. Unlike prior rules, the 2005 Rule was not open to any additional public notice and/or comment. Moreover, unlike prior rules, the 2005 Rule was issued without the preparation of an environmental impact statement or environmental analysis under NEPA, and additionally, without the preparation of a similar type of assessment under ESA, after the agency concluded that neither was required. In concluding that NEPA analysis was not required, the USDA determined that the 2005 Rule would “not have environmental effects” because it simply “provide[d] a starting point for project and activity NEPA analysis.” 70 Fed.Reg. at 1031. The agency concluded that the 2005 Rule was strategic rather than prescriptive in nature, and implied that because the plans under the 2005 Rule were “strategic and aspirational in nature and generally will not include decisions with on-the-ground effects that can be meaningfully evaluated,” the rule did not require NEPA consultation. Id. at 1031-32. The agency further determined that “the decision to adopt, amend, or revise a plan, ... is typically not the point in the decisionmak-ing process... likely to have a significant effect on the human environment.” Id. Additionally, at the same time the agency published the 2005 Rule, it also issued another new rule that categorically excluded from NEPA’s procedural requirements, all proposals to develop, amend, or revise land use plans which did not approve particular projects or site-specific activities. 70 Fed.Reg. 1032, 1062; see also Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation, § 7:10 (2006 Suppl.). The USDA noted that this represented a shift from its prior approach to NEPA compliance, see 70 Fed. Reg. at 1032, but concluded that the proposed exclusion “clarified that plan development, plan amendment, or plan revisions, ... do not significantly affect the environment, and thus are categorically excluded from further NEPA analysis, unless extraordinary circumstances are present.” Id. at 1033. The agency observed that it had “c[o]me to understand” that the approach of preparing EAs and EISs in conjunction with planning rules was both “impractical” and “inefficient” and that “environmental effects of projects and activities cannot be meaningfully evaluated without knowledge of the specific timing and location of the projects and activities.” 70 Fed.Reg. at 1062. Unlike the 2005 Rule itself, the agency opened up the new categorical exclusion, or CE, to public notice and comment until March 7, 2005. It is unclear when the CE became effective; however, it is now contained in the Forest Service Handbook (“FSH”), at § 31.2(16). See February 15, 2007 FSH. In addition to concluding that the 2005 Rule was not likely to have a significant effect on the environment, the agency also determined that the rule fell within a categorical exclusion such that it did not require NEPA analysis or an impact statement. Specifically, the agency determined that it satisfied an earlier categorical exclusion set forth in the 2004 FSH, at § 31.12, which excluded from EA or EIS documentation requirements, “rules, regulations, or policies to establish Service-wide administrative procedures, program processes, or instruction.” 70 Fed.Reg. at 1053-54. The agency concluded that the 2005 “rule clearly falls within this category of actions and the Department has determined that no extraordinary circumstances exist that would require preparation of an EA or an EIS.” Id. at 1054. The court notes, though, that it does not appear that the agency was relying on the new CE described above, which was simultaneously issued with the 2005 Rule. Although the court was unable to determine the precise effective date of that new CE, it could not have been invoked by the agency for the 2005 Rule because public notice and comment on that CE was still pending at the time the 2005 Rule became effective. Moreover, the new CE is not contained in the section of the FSH actually relied on by the agency, § 31.12, in support of its actions. As noted, the USDA also concluded that neither consultation nor an assessment of the rule’s impact on endangered or threatened species was required pursuant to ESA. See Fed.Reg. at 1035. In determining that consultation was not necessary, the agency reasoned that the 2005 Rule “simply establishes a process for planning,” and “is not an action having a direct effect on threatened or endangered species.” Id. The USDA nevertheless apparently undertook some type of outside review in making this determination, although the extent of review and the identity of the reviewer are not clear from the record. See Huber Decl., Exh. 1. In a June 17, 2004 memorandum to the USDA, George C. Iverson (connection unknown), who appears to be a private consultant, noted that the agency sought outside review and advice regarding ESA compliance. Mr. Iver-son concluded that based on his review of the draft final rule, the 2005 Rule “will have no effect to threatened, endangered, or proposed species or to designated or proposed critical habitat.” Id. Specifically, Mr. Iverson found: It is clear that the draft final rule, in itself, does not predetermine management activities for specific project areas or land management plan decisions, nor does it authorize, fund, or carry out any habitat or resource disturbing activities. It does not make any land use allocations, nor does it establish specific standards or guidelines for management of resources. The final rule, being strictly a procedural document, will not directly result in changes in the management of any particular National Forest or Grassland or in the activities permitted or conducted on those lands. Moreover, because of the procedural nature of the draft final rule, there is no reasonable basis for assessing or quantifying the specific effects of any subsequent actions, as such effects will depend upon decisions made during future programmatic and project planning and it is premature to speculate on the specific nature or effects of those decisions. Id. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards 1. Motions for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. An issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence, or if it is created by evidence that is “merely colorable” or that is “not significantly probative.” Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court may not weigh the evidence, and is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 2. Actions under the Administrative Procedure Act The general review provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., apply in cases asserting violations of the NFMA, ESA, and NEPA. Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir.2002); Hells Canyon Alliance v. United States Forest Serv., 227 F.3d 1170, 1176-77 (9th Cir.2000); Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir.2002); Ecology Center v. United States Forest Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 924-25 (9th Cir.1999). In fact, “[t]here is no right to seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act in the absence of a relevant statute whose violation forms the legal basis of the complaint against the governmental action.” Wright & Miller, 14A Fed. Prac. & Proc., Juris.3d § 3659 (2006). Arbitrary and capricious review cannot be conducted under the APA independent of another statute. Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir.1996). Under the APA, “[a] person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a particular statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Agency action includes the “whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). The APA applies except to the extent that a statute precludes judicial review, or agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). An agency action may be set aside under the APA only if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 573 (9th Cir.1998). The APA limits judicial review to review of “final” agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. For an action to be “final” under the APA, it should mark the conclusion of an agency’s decision-making process, and should also be an action by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal conclusions flow. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). B. Parties’ Motions The issues raised by these motions have been extensively briefed by the parties. In addition to the voluminous papers submitted in conjunction with the instant motions, as noted, the court also determined that supplemental briefing was necessary. However, the supplemental briefing provided little of the guidance sought by the court both because the parties have chosen to frame the issues according to their own self-interest and because the answers are not apparent. In addition to a review of the materials and arguments submitted by the parties, the court has undertaken its own extensive review of the law, including the statutes and regulations, pertinent secondary authorities, and Ninth Circuit cases. The court has reviewed several dozen Ninth Circuit cases in order to compare the underlying regulation or agency actions challenged, the procedures followed by the agencies, and the environmental consequences of the challenged actions. This review has confirmed the court’s conclusion that these cases present very difficult questions. None of the existing Ninth Circuit cases are, factually, entirely on point with this case, which involves a challenge to the enactment of a broad, nationwide programmatic environmental rule. Nevertheless, there are a number of controlling Ninth Circuit cases that involve smaller scale programmatic and/or policy actions, which the court has looked to for guidance in resolving the issues presented. Additionally, the court has also found guidance in the relevant statutes and then-purposes generally, and also in the procedural protections afforded by the statutes. Because these cases and authority are primarily relevant to the ESA and NEPA claims, the court discusses this authority in conjunction with those claims. The court begins with two of the five issues, for which the answers were clear— the APA claims. 1. USDA’s Promulgation of the 2005 Rule Violated the APA a. Scope of the APA Claim It is necessary to revisit an issue that this court dealt with previously in the last round of summary judgment motions. Previously, plaintiffs alleged in two separate claims that the 2005 Rule violated the APA. In one of the claims, plaintiffs contended that the 2005 Rule differed substantially from the 2002 Proposed Rule, for which public comment was sought, and that it was promulgated without observ-anee of the procedure required by the APA, and was, therefore, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. In the other claim, plaintiffs contended that the 2005 Rule violated the APA because it abandoned the previous resource standards and species viability requirements contained in the 2002 Proposed Rule in favor of an “ecosystem diversity” without a substantial basis in the record for doing so. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b) (2005 Planning Regulations). The court dismissed the claim that the 2005 Rule differed substantially from the 2002 Proposed Rule as unripe. In doing so, the court determined that it was a substantive claim — in other words, it challenged the substance of the 2005 Rule insofar as it differed from prior rules and regulations. Because it presented a substantive as opposed to procedural challenge to the 2005 Rule, the court noted that it was not ripe because plaintiffs were not challenging a site-specific project. See, e.g., Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 759; see also Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain, 303 F.3d at 1071 n. 6; Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.2002); Laub v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Kern v. BUM, 284 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.2002)) (“recog-niz[ing] the distinction between substantive challenges which are not ripe until site-specific plans are formulated, and procedural challenges which are ripe for review at the time of violation ”) (emphasis added); see also Ohio Forestry Ass’n, 523 U.S. at 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665. However, the court concluded that the latter claim was ripe because it was simply a procedural claim in which plaintiffs asserted that the record defendants compiled in support of the 2005 Rule was insubstantial and therefore insufficient under the APA. In other words, plaintiffs alleged a procedural injury based on the agency’s failure to compile a sufficient record prior to amending and/or rescinding prior species viability and resource standards. In their opening papers on the current summary judgment motions, defendants argue that with respect to the APA claim, plaintiffs improperly rely in part on their substantive NFMA claim(s) that the court already held were not ripe. They assert that plaintiffs have intertwined their dismissed substantive NFMA claim(s) with their procedural APA claim(s). Plaintiffs counter that they are not arguing the dismissed claims. They note that defendants did not challenge in prior motions another one of their asserted claims — their claim that the agency violated the APA’s notice and comment proceedings by deleting the NFMA-required resource protection standards in the 2005 Rule without allowing public comment. They assert that resolution of the instant APA claim does not require resolution of the dismissed substantive NFMA claims, and that “[t]he issue before the court is whether the 2005 Rule’s elimination of resource protection standards contained in the 2002 Proposed Rule was a significant departure from the proposed rule requiring new APA notice and comment. ” Plaintiffs note that the NFMA provisions requiring resource protection standards will be relevant. In reply, defendants again assert that “[plaintiffs’ true complaint continues to be that the NFMA requires detailed rules on certain subjects in the 2005 Rule.” They argue that “[t]he court has dismissed plaintiffs’ substantive claims for sound jurisdictional reasons, and plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent this ruling should not be condoned.” Having reviewed the arguments and the relevant law, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding this claim are proper, and that they do not attempt to revive the dismissed claim. Instead, the pertinent legal standards require plaintiffs to compare and contrast the 2005 Rule with prior rules in analyzing whether the 2005 Rule was a “logical outgrowth” of prior rules. The court is mindful of the fact that plaintiffs cannot allege a substantive claim — that is, one that challenges the substance of the 2005 Rule — because, under Ninth Circuit law, such a claim is not ripe until there is a challenge to a site-specific project. Therefore, any of plaintiffs’ arguments that challenge the substance of the 2005 Rule were disposed of in this court’s prior orders. Accordingly, the court limits its review to plaintiffs’ procedural arguments only. However, that review does appropriately require some comparison of the 2005 Rule with prior rules to determine if it is a significant departure or a logical outgrowth of rules for which proper notice was given. In conclusion, the court considers whether the 2005 Rule violates the APA because the agency failed to provide adequate notice and to permit public comment on it, and because the agency did not compile a sufficient evidentiary record. b. Legal Standards In a procedural challenge under the APA, the court “determine[s] in the first instance the adequacy of the agency’s notice and comment procedure, without deferring to the agency’s own opinion of the adequacy of the notice and comment opportunities it provided.” National Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.2002) (“NRDC IF). “A decision made without adequate notice and comment is arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.” Id. Before promulgating rules, an agency “must provide notice sufficient to fairly apprise interested persons of the subjects and issues before the agency.” Id. (citing National Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir.1988) (“NRDC I”)). Agencies do, however, have authority to promulgate final rules that differ from the proposed rule on which the public was invited to comment. See NRDC I, 863 F.2d at 1429. “Indeed, it is the expectation that the final rules will be somewhat different and improved from the rules originally proposed by the agency,” and “every alteration in a proposed rule [need not] be reissued for notice and comment.” NRDC II, 279 F.3d at 1186. However, “a final rule which departs from a proposed rule must be a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule.” Id. “The essential inquiry focuses on whether interested parties reasonably could have anticipated the final rulemaking from the [proposed rule].” Id. “In determining this, one of the salient questions is whether a new round of notice and comment would provide the first opportunity for interested parties to offer comments that could persuade the agency to modify its rule.” Id. “[W]here ... the proposal makes no mention of an important component of the final rule enacted, the final rule is not the ‘logical outgrowth’ of the proposal.” Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F.Supp.2d 994, 1011 (E.D.Cal.2005). In other words, where an agency’s change in position from a proposed rule is “not foreshadowed in proposals and comments advanced during the rulemaking,” it will not be considered a “logical outgrowth” because it may catch interested parties by surprise. See NRDC II, 279 F.3d at 1188. Additionally, where the final rule constitutes a “fundamental policy shift” as opposed to “a natural drafting evolution,” it is not a “logical outgrowth.” Id. An agency’s “duty to identify and make available technical studies and data that it has employed in reaching the decisions to propose particular rules” is integral to its notice requirement. Kern County Farm, Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2006). “An agency commits serious procedural error when it fails to reveal portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in time to allow for meaningful commentary.” Id. However, “nothing prohibits an agency from adding supporting documentation for a final rule in response to public comments.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[a]fter publishing a proposed rule, agencies often receive new information, which in turn improves the accuracy of agency action.” Id. It further noted that: It is perfectly predictable that new data will come in during the comment period, either submitted by the public with comments or collected by the agency in a continuing effort to give the regulations a more accurate foundation. The agency should be encouraged to use such information in its final calculations without thereby risking the requirement of a new comment period. Id. “Accordingly, the public is not entitled to review and comment on every piece of information utilized during the rulemak-ing.” Id. “Instead, an agency, without reopening the comment period, may use ‘supplementary data, unavailable during the notice and comment period, that expands on and confirms information contained in the proposed rulemaking and addresses alleged deficiencies in the preexisting data, so long as no prejudice is shown.’ ” Id. (citing Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1402 (9th Cir.1995)). c. Parties’ Arguments Plaintiffs argue that the USDA performed a “bait and switch” with the 2005 Rule. They contend that because the 2005 Rule differed so substantially, in fact constituted a “paradigm shift” from the 2002 Rule, that a new notice and public comment period was required. They argue that the numerous changes from the 2002 Rule to the 2005 Rule were not “logical outgrowths” and were not foreseeable by the public. Specifically, plaintiffs take issue with the 2005 Rule’s elimination of resource protection standards, its creation of an “environmental management system” or “EMS,” and its addition of a provision regarding the alteration of forest plans. As for the resource standards, plaintiffs assert that the 2005 Rule not only eliminated certain NFMA and other standards from the 2002 Rule, but also omitted any reference to the word “standard.” Plaintiffs offer several examples of resource standards that were eliminated from the 2005 Rule, including: • the identification of lands not suitable for commercial logging and the standards by which such identification could be made. Cf. Proposed Rule, 67 Fed.Reg. at 72802; 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1037,1057,1059; • limitations on clearcutting and other logging methods and related standards. Cf. Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 72796; 2005 Rule, 70 Fed.Reg. at 1059; • NFMA-required standards regarding the diversity of plant and animal communities. Cf. Proposed Rule 67 Fed. Reg. at 72784 & 72800-802; 2005 Rule, 70 Fed.Reg. at 1059,1046. Plaintiffs especially take issue with the changes to the diversity standards. They note that there was extensive public comment on the pertinent provisions of the 2002 Rule. They further note that the proposed diversity provisions were so controversial that in 2003, the USDA held a workshop solely on those provisions. Plaintiffs contend that the 2005 Rule’s diversity provision is “an affront to every member of the public who took the time to review the [proposed rule] and provide thoughtful comments.” They argue that there was no way that the public could have anticipated the changes reflected by the 2005 Rule. Plaintiffs also contend that the 2005 Rule’s adoption of the EMS was unforeseeable. According to plaintiffs, under the 2005 Rule, an EMS is “each national forest’s ... centerpiece of the planning process, requiring future forest plans, plan revisions, and plan amendments to be completed in accordance with [it].” See 36 C.F.R. § 219.5(a). They note that the term did not even appear in the 2002 Rule. In support of their argument that the EMS was novel to the 2005 Rule, plaintiffs cite to a briefing paper in which the USDA noted that “[s]o far as we know, ... no federal or state agency has applied EMS to land management activities. In private industry, we are aware of several forest products companies who use EMS for their woodland operations.” AR C1423 at 6-7; 14-15. Plaintiffs argue that, contrary to what they anticipate to be defendants’ argument, the EMS provisions were not added to address public comments. Plaintiffs further argue that the 2005 Rule’s provision regarding the alteration of forest plans was unforeseeable based on the 2002 Rule. Cf. 2005 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(b)(3)(4); 2002 Rule, 70 Fed.Reg. at 1043. They note that this, too, is a significant change because “[t]he amount of logging allowed under a forest plan is a critical part of that plan.” According to plaintiffs, the 2005 Rule is unprecedented in that, unlike the 2002 Rule, it allows the logging level set in the forest plan to be changed at the local responsible official’s discretion at any time and does not require a plan amendment or revision. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(b)(4). They also contend that the 2005 Rule allows the prior monitoring program to be altered ministerially; whereas, under the 2002 Rule, the program was to be developed with public participation. Defendants respond that the 2005 Rule did not substantially differ from the 2002 Rule, and that the public had notice of the changes made to the 2005 Rule. Defendants do not specifically address plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the resource standards. They do, however, address the specific arguments regarding the EMS and the alteration of the forest plans. Defendants argue that “the final 2005 Rule did not add anything new, but reduced complexity from the [2002 Rule].” According to defendants, the USDA simply moved details contained in the 2002 Rule to the Forest Service Manual and Handbook. They argue that the “practical effect ... of this change in location of these standards is minimal at best.” According to defendants, the shift was made to give the Forest Service greater flexibility in management. As for the EMS, defendants point to the 2002 Rule and preamble’s references to “the increased roles of ‘adaptive management’ and ‘monitoring and evaluation’ in forest planning.” 67 Fed.Reg. 72772-73; 72781-82. They argue that because the EMS is a “form of adaptive management,” the public was on sufficient notice. They also contend that the addition of the EMS provision simply “makes explicit what other law requires or strongly suggests.” Concerning the forest plan provisions contested by plaintiffs (which defendants refer to as plaintiffs’ “administrative corrections” claim), defendants argue that the provisions were expressly contemplated by the 2002 Rule. See 67 Fed.Reg. at 72803. They further argue that plaintiffs have misconstrued the 2002 Rule’s provisions regarding changes in timber management projects, and that the 2005 Rule’s related provisions cannot be considered a substantive change. Plaintiffs respond that the 2005 Rule’s elimination of the resource standards was “an abrupt removal” as opposed to a simplification. Plaintiffs also contend that defendants cannot rely on vague “general direction” language in the preamble to the proposed rule as sufficient notice regarding the 2005 Rule’s new direction. Plaintiffs further suggest that the movement of details from the proposed rule to the agency handbook was significant because directives in the handbook, unlike regulations, are not necessarily legally enforceable and are easier for the agency to change. As for the EMS, plaintiffs respond that neither the proposed rule, its preamble, public comments, nor prior regulations, so much as mention EMS. They cite to authority relied on by defendants for the proposition that “something is not a logical outgrowth of nothing.” See Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509, 1513 (D.C.Cir.1994). They argue that the 2002 Rule’s reference to “adaptive management” was not sufficient notice, and the fact that the USDA must define EMS even for this court demonstrates the inadequacy of the notice. As for the alterations to the forest plans, plaintiffs respond that the 2002 Rule did not contemplate the revisions to the 2005 Rule. Plaintiffs assert that the 2002 Rule merely permitted routine, non-policy corrections to be made to forest plans without public notice, unlike the 2005 Rule, which permits changes in timber management projections and monitoring programs to be made without public notice. Plaintiffs argue that there is a substantial difference between: (1) making adjustments to the monitoring methods used to carry out an established monitoring program that requires various sorts of information about the forest to be gathered and reported, which was the subject of the 2002 Rule; and (2) changing the overall substance of that monitoring program and the level of information it requires, which is what the 2005 Rule does. See 67 Fed.Reg. 72790. Defendants essentially reiterate their original arguments in reply. Regarding the EMS, defendants argue that it is an “internal practice that USDA can impose on itself through the Forest Service Directives system with the same effect,” and “because it is purely discretionary and can be accomplished ... without including it in the planning rules,” it therefore was not a legally significant change to the 2005 Rule. They again argue that it was a “logical outgrowth” of the 2002 Rule. d. Analysis The relevant law is clear that an agency cannot promulgate without notice and comment a final rule that constitutes a “paradigm shift” from the proposed rule for which there was notice and comment. The USDA admits that the 2005 Rule represented such a shift. See 70 Fed.Reg. at 1024. The numerous changes between the 2002 Rule and the 2005 Rule included, among other things, the 2005 Rule’s elimination of resource protection standards, its creation of an EMS, and its addition of the provision regarding the alteration of forest plans. The court finds that these changes did not constitute “logical outgrowths” of the proposed rule; nor were they “natural drafting evolution[s].” See NRDC II, 279 F.3d at 1188. As for the 2005 Rule’s resource standards, the court cannot conclude that the changes to the clearcutting, logging methods and standards and the diversity standards were foreshadowed by the 2002 Rule, exempting the 2005 Rule’s provisions from public notice and comment. As plaintiffs noted, the diversity standards themselves were the subject of much public controversy, and the changes to the 2005 Rule, which were not insignificant, required providing the public with an opportunity to evaluate them. Regarding the creation of the EMS, the 2005 Rule’s adoption of this management system was similarly not foreshadowed by the 2002 Rule. Because the 2002 Rule did not even mention the system by name, the addition of the EMS to the 2005 Rule cannot be considered an evolution of prior drafting as defendants have suggested. Finally, the 2005 Rule’s change to the decisionmaking procedures regarding permissible logging also cannot be considered a logical outgrowth of the 2002 Rule. The 2002 Rule anticipated public participation with respect to the monitoring of logging; whereas, by contrast, the 2005 Rule shifted the monitoring entirely to the agency’s discretion and removed public oversight. As with the first two changes, this provision likewise cannot be considered a mere technical evolution of the 2002 Rule. Accordingly, the USDA was required to afford interested parties the opportunity to comment on the changes, and its failure to do so violated the APA. 2. Promulgation of the 2004 Interpretive Rule did not Violate the APA a. Legal Standards When issuing a legislative or substantive rule, an agency must follow the notice and comment procedure described in the APA, unless it first publishes a specific finding of good cause documenting why such procedures “are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Hemp Indus. Assoc. v. DEA 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.2003) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)). However, the APA’s notice and comment requirement does not apply to interpretive rules. See id; Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir.2004) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)). “Interpretive rules merely explain, but do not add to, the substantive law that already exists in the form of a statute or a legislative rule.” Id. (noting that “[c]ourts have struggled with identifying the difference between legislative rules and interpretive rules”). “Legislative rules, on the other hand, create rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law pursuant to authority delegated by Congress.” Id. In distinguishing between legislative and interpretive rales, the Ninth Circuit has held that legislative rules have the “force of law,” while interpretive rules do not, and has adopted a three-part test for determining whether a rule has the “force of law”: (1) whether, in the absence of the rule, there would be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action; (2) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority; or (3) whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule. Id. (citing American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C.Cir.1993)). b. Parties’ Arguments Plaintiffs contend that with the 2004 Interpretive Rule, defendants sought to rescind the 1982 Planning Regulations as the governing authority for site-specific Forest Service decisions. Plaintiffs argue that the 2004 Interpretive Rule was really legislative, and that defendants sought to avoid the APA requirements for notice and comment by labeling the regulatory change an “interpretive rule.” In support, plaintiffs assert that the 2004 Interpretive Rule replaced detailed 1982 Planning Regulations, “requiring” consideration of species viability, with a generalized requirement that the Forest Service merely “consider” “the best available science” in making site-specific decisions. In this respect, plaintiffs assert that the 2004 Interpretive Rule was inconsistent with the 1982 Planning Regulations as well as the 2000 Planning Regulations. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that the interpretive rule effectively amended a pri- or regulation, and was therefore subject to the APA notice and comment requirements. Because defendants failed to provide public notice and permit comment, the rulemaking was therefore arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Defendants do not dispute that the 2004 Interpretive Rule was promulgated without notice and comment. Instead, they argue that the rule was not legislative, and therefore no notice or public comment was required. According to defendants, the 2004 Interpretive Rule merely “explained” that the site-specific provisions of the 1982 Planning Regulations, such as the species viability provision, were no longer in effect, but had been supplanted under the 2000 Planning Regulations’ transition provision, which dictated that site-specific activities were to be guided by the “best available” science principle. Defendants argue that according to the 2000 Rule’s transition provision, the 1982 Regulations no longer applied to site-specific projects. Because the 2004 Interpretive Rule merely “stated USDA’s understanding of the transition provision of the 2000 ... regulations and did not itself change the degree to which the 1982 ... regulations remained in effect,” defendants contend that it did not “amend” the prior 2000 Rule. In support of their interpretation of the 2000 Rule’s transition provision, defendants cite to the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 746-47 (10th Cir.2006), and the Second Circuit’s decision in Forest Watch v. United States Forest Serv., 410 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.2005), in which both courts interpreted the 2000 Rule’s transition provision to require that, like the interpretive rule, the “best available science” be considered in implementing site-specific projects. In fact, according to defendants, the courts held that the 1982 Rule no longer applied to site-specific projects after implementation of the 2000 Rule’s transition provision. Id. Defendants argue that like the Bosworth court, this court should conclude that the interpretive rule was simply an interpretation of existing regulations and did not have the force and effect of law. Id. Defendants note that prior to Bosworth, “application of the 2000 Rule was somewhat inconsistent, as some courts did not examine the plain language of the 2000 Rule’s transition provision and acquiesced in misapplication of the provision by individual units of the Forest Service.” Bosworth, 443 F.3d at 746 n. 11. They contend that the interpretive rule was adopted in response to the inconsistent judicial results. See 69 Fed.Reg. 58055-56. In response, plaintiffs argue that the Second and Tenth Circuit decisions cited by defendants are not persuasive because the courts ignored evidence that the USDA intended that the 1982 Planning Regulations would apply to site-specific decisions during the transition period. Plaintiffs also contest the courts’ interpretation of the 2000 Rule’s transition provision. See id. They argue that the subpart to the transition provision, which referenced reliance on the “best available science,” was not the exclusive provision governing site-specific projects under the 2000 Rule. In support, plaintiffs cite to the 2000 Rule’s preamble. 65 Fed.Reg. at 67564. Plaintiffs reiterate their original position that the 2000 Rule’s transition provision required that the 1982 Rule remain in effect for site-specific decisions until the 2000 Rule became effective. In reply, defendants note that an interpretive rule can be used to clarify “regulatory ambiguities” in a legislative rule, and contend that is what the interpretive rule did. Defendants again rely on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bosworth regarding construction of the 2000 Rule’s transition provisions, in arguing that the 2004 Interpretive Rule did not amend the 2000 Rule. c. Analysis While this is somewhat of a close call given that the 2000 Rule’s transition provisions are hardly a model of clarity, the court finds in favor of the defendants, and concludes that the 2004 Interpretive Rule was more akin to a clarifying rule than a legislative rule. The language of the 2000 Rule’s transition provision does not clearly answer the question regarding which standards remained in effect for site-specific plans during the transition. That provision provided: (a) The transition period begins on November 9, 2000 and ends upon the completion of the revision process (§ 219.9) for each unit of the National Forest System. During the transition period, the responsible official must consider the best available science in implementing and, if appropriate, amending the current plan. (b) If, as of November 9, 2000, a plan revision or amendment has been initiated under the 1982 planning regulations in effect prior to November 9, 2000 (See 36 CFR part 219, revised as of July 1, 2000.) and if a notice of availability of a draft environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment is published by May 9, 2001 in the Federal Register, the responsible official may complete the amendment or revision process under the 1982 regulations or adjust the process to conform to the provisions of this subpart. c) If a review of lands not suited for timber production is required before the completion of the revision process, the review must take place as described by the provisions of § 219.28, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section. (d) Site-specific decisions made by the responsible official 3 years from November 9, 2000 and afterward must be in conformance with the provisions of this subpart. (e) Within 1 year of November 9, 2000, the Regional Forester must withdraw the regional guide. When a regional guide is withdrawn, the Regional Forester must identify the decisions in the regional guide that are to be transferred to a regional supplement of the Forest Service directive system (36 CFR 200.4) or to one or more plans and give notice in the Federal Register of these actions. The transfer of direction from a regional guide to a regional supplement of the Forest Service directive system or to one or more plans does not constitute an amendment, revision, or site-specific action subject to Forest Service NEPA procedures. (f) Within 3 years after completion of the revision process for a unit, the responsible official must complete the first monitoring and evaluation report as required in § 219.11(f). (g) Within 1 year of November 9, 2000, the Chief of the Forest Service must establish a schedule for completion of the revision process for each unit of the National Forest System. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35. On the one hand, the transition provision implies that the “best available science,” a standard which was new to the 2000 Rule, and clearly was not contained in the 1982 Rule, should govern the implementation and amendment of plans. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a). However, on the other hand, the transition provision also appears to simultaneously lack clarity regarding site-specific decisions, providing only that “[s]ite-specific provisions made by the responsible official 3 years from November 9, 2000 and afterward must be in conformance with the provisions of this subpart.” See id. at § 219.35(d); see also 65 Fed. Reg. at 67563 (commenting that “[f]or site-specific decisions, section 219.35(d) provides a three-year time period for transition between the existing regulations and the new rule”). That subpart to the transition provision, however, is not explicit regarding the standards to be applied to site-specific decisions during this transition. The 2004 Interpretive Rule itself, and the Tenth Circuit, which dealt with the ambiguity of the 2000 Rule’s transition provisions, have noted the confusion encountered by the courts in applying the provisions. See Bosworth, 443 F.3d at 745 (citing this court’s October 14, 2005 order among the many other courts to have confronted the issue); 69 Fed.Reg. at 58055 (noting that “[c]onsiderable uncertainty has arisen regarding the impact of the 2000 planning rule and the transition provisions”). The Bosworth court correctly noted that the USDA issued the interpretive rule to address this very confusion. Bosworth, 443 F.3d at 746. Guided by the language of the 2000 Rule’s transition provisions, in addition to the interpretive rule, the Bosworth court concluded that the 2000 Rule’s transition provision indeed required consideration of the “best available science” in implementing site-specific plans. Id. at 747. In fact, it noted that “this language [regarding consideration of “the best available science”] is the sole direction to the Forest Service regarding project-level actions.” Id. (emphasis added). It concluded that the transition provision “leaves little doubt that the Forest Service is limited to consideration of the best available science when approving a project during the transition peri