Full opinion text
OPINION LIFLAND, District Judge. In these two consolidated patent infringement actions, Defendant generic drug manufacturers Kali Laboratories, Inc. (“Kali”), Par Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc., Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. (collectively “Par”), Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (collectively “Teva”), and Barr Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”), move for summary judgment against Plaintiff Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. (“Ortho-McNeil”). Ortho-McNeil asserts that Defendants have infringed, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, its patent covering the pain-relief drug it sells under the name-brand, Ultra-cet. Defendants dispute Ortho-McNeil’s infringement claims, and counterclaim that, in any event, Ortho-McNeil’s patent is invalid. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant summary judgment of non-infringement to Kali, and deny summary judgment of non-infringement to Teva/Barr. Furthermore, the Court will grant summary judgment of infringement in favor of Ortho-McNeil against Teva/ Barr. As for Defendants’ invalidity counterclaims, the Court will deny summary judgment of invalidity to Kali on the grounds of indefiniteness and the public-use bar. However, the Court concludes that Claim 6 of the '691 patent is invalid for anticipation, and for obviousness, and thus, will grant summary judgment of invalidity to Teva/Barr and Kali. I. Background A. Ortho-McNeil’s Patented Invention United States Patent No. 5,336,691 (“the '691 patent”) contains 15 claims, several of which disclose a pharmaceutical composition comprising the analgesic compounds tramadol and acetaminophen combined at various weight ratios. The '691 patent inventors found that when administered together, certain amounts of tramadol and acetaminophen exhibit “synergistic” effects. In other words, the analgesic effectiveness of the two drugs in combination is greater than the sum of their parts, as predicted by data demonstrating the individual effectiveness of each drug. Claim 6, the only claim Ortho-McNeil asserts as infringed, reads: “[A] pharmaceutical composition [comprising a tramadol material and acetaminophen, wherein the ratio of the tramadol material to acetaminophen is a weight ratio of] about 1:5.” '691 patent, col. 11,11.18-34. At first, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) rejected the '691 patent’s claims for obviousness in view of the patent covering tramadol, U.S. Patent No. 3,652,589 (“the '589 patent” or “the Flick patent”). (Kushan Decl., Ex. 10, at KAL 0016264.) The examiner pointed out that the Flick patent disclosed tra-madol’s “considerable therapeutic value when used in combination with other therapeutically active agents whereby frequently a synergistic effect is observed,” and reasoned that it therefore would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine tramadol and acetaminophen in varying amounts to achieve synergistic effects in treating pain. (Kushan Decl., Ex. 10, at KAL 0016264 (quoting '589 patent, col. 12,11. 45-48).) After the inventors counterargued that it was not obvious that tramadol and acetaminophen would exhibit synergistic analgesic activity in the particular weight ratios claimed, the PTO allowed the claims. (Kushan Deck, Ex. 10, KAL016272.) The '691 patent issued on August 9, 1994 to co-inventors Robert Raffa and Jeffrey Vaught, and was assigned to McNeilab, Inc., Ortho-McNeil’s predecessor in interest. On the basis of the '691 patent, Ortho-McNeil developed Ultracet, which contains one part tramadol hydrochloride (37.5 milligrams (“mg”)), to 8.67 parts acetaminophen (325 mg). Ultracet was approved for sale by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in 2001. B. Kali’s and Teva/Barr’s Abbreviated New Drug Applications In fall 2002, Kali filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with the FDA seeking approval to sell a generic version of Ultracet containing the identical 1:8.67 weight ratio of tramadol to acetaminophen. (Kushan Deck, Ex. 24.) Kali’s ANDA included a certification under section 505Cj)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) of the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 335 (“Paragraph IV certification”), alleging that the sale of its generic would either not infringe the '691 patent, or that the '691 patent was invalid, or both. Kali notified Ortho-McNeil of its Paragraph IV certification as required under 21 U.S.C. § 866(j)(2)(B), and Ortho-McNeil responded by filing an infringement suit against Kali under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). Kali denies infringing the '691 patent, and asserts, as affirmative defenses and in counterclaims, that the '691 patent is invalid as anticipated, for obviousness, for indefiniteness, and under the public-use bar. After discovery, Kali filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On April 22, 2005, the 30-month stay on FDA approval of Kali’s ANDA expired, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(III), the FDA approved the ANDA, and Kali began marketing its generic form of Ultracet. In a separate suit, Ortho-McNeil filed a Hatch-Waxman Act infringement action against Teva on February 25, 2004, after Teva filed an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification seeking to market a generic form of Ultracet. Like Kali, Teva responded by denying infringement, and by asserting a counterclaim alleging the invalidity of Claim 6. Teva/Barr now move for summary judgment on those grounds. On July 26, 2006, Barr began marketing its Ultracet generic after the 30-month stay on FDA approval expired. On July 10, 2006, the two cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes. C. The '691 Patent Reissue Application On January 20, 2004, during the discovery phase of its suit against Kali, and about one month prior to filing suit against Teva/Barr, Ortho-McNeil filed a reissue application with the PTO for the '691 patent, admitting that certain claims were anticipated by the prior art. Ortho-McNeil explained to the PTO that “it was not appreciated, by the inventors and the attorney prosecuting the underlying patent application [for the '691 patent], that a composition within the scope of at least claim 1 as issued appears to have been disclosed in at least [the Flick patent].” (Brown Deck, Ex. 10, Reissue Appl. Deck of Jan. 20, 2004.) The reissue application canceled all claims of the '691 patent, except for Claims 6 and 15, and applied for dozens of new claims. On August 1, 2006, the PTO reissued the '691 patent as U.S. Reissue Patent No. RE39,221 E (“the RE221 patent”). The RE221 patent retains Claim 6, only now recast as an independent claim, and adds 62 additional new claims. As required by the FDCA, Ortho-McNeil surrendered the '691 patent to the PTO. Because Claim 6 of the RE221 patent is “substantially identical” to Claim 6 of the '691 patent, the surrender of the '691 patent does not abate the current action. See 35 U.S.C. § 252. Ortho-McNeil amended its complaints in both actions to allege that Defendants’ ANDAs infringed Claim 6 of the RE221 patent, and Kali and Teva/Barr amended their counterclaims to allege the invalidity of Claim 6 of the RE221 patent. II. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56; Serbin v. Bora Corp., 96 F.3d 66, 69 n. 2 (3d Cir.1996). When evaluating a summary judgment motion, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Armour v. County of Beaver, 271 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted). The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests initially on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Huang v. BP Amoco Corp., 271 F.3d 560, 564 (3d Cir.2001). Once the moving party has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991) (noting that a motion for summary judgment is not defeated by mere allegations, general denials, or other “vague statements”). Rather, only disputes regarding facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the evidence is “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” summary judgment should not be granted. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster Bank of New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir.1996). III. Discussion Kali and Teva/Barr claim that, as a matter of law, Ortho-McNeil has failed to carry its burden of proving infringement, and that they have carried their burden of proving the invalidity of the '691 patent on grounds of anticipation. Kali also seeks summary judgment on its additional invalidity counterclaims of indefiniteness, obviousness, and the public-use bar. The Court’s first step in evaluating Defendants’ motions is to objectively construe the disputed limitations of Claim 6 to the extent necessary to settle the controversy, and without reference to Defendants’ allegedly infringing products. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed.Cir.1999). A. Claim Construction “[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude,” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (internal quotations omitted), and therefore an interpretation of the words of those claims is necessary in order to determine whether the invention is infringed, or invalid, see, e.g., Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“It is elementary in patent law that, in determining whether a patent is valid and, if valid, infringed, the first step is to determine the meaning and scope of each claim in suit.”). The proper construction of a disputed claim limitation is decided by the Court as a matter of law, Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241,1247 (Fed.Cir.2000), and is applicable to both the Court’s infringement and invalidity analyses, Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bar-nesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2001). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’ ” as viewed through the eyes of “a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)). In some cases, the ordinary and customary meaning of a limitation may be “readily apparent even to lay judges,” and thus, can be simply applied to a claim with the assistance of a dictionary. Id. at 1314. In most cases, however, the “meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is ... not immediately apparent,” and therefore the court must look to “ ‘those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.’ ” Id. (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed.Cir.2004)). “[Tjhose sources” can be divided into two general categories: intrinsic evidence and extrinsic evidence. Intrinsic evidence consists of the words of the claims themselves, the specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Key Pharms. v. Hereon Lab. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed.Cir.1998). Extrinsic evidence consists of any evidence outside of the patent record, id., such as, “expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises,” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir.1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Such evidence “may be helpful to explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution history” — in a nutshell, extrinsic evidence “ ‘aid[s] the court in the construction of the patent.’ ” Id. The Federal Circuit has stressed, however, that intrinsic evidence has primacy in the claim construction analysis; extrinsic evidence cannot be used to alter a construction of the claims mandated by the intrinsic evidence. Key Pharms, 161 F.3d at 716. “[I]f the meaning of a disputed claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence ... that meaning, and no other, must prevail.” Id. Despite the, at times, seemingly factual nature of this exercise, claim construction is purely a question of law. “Testimony about construction amounts to no more than legal opinion,” which the “court has complete discretion to” wholly adopt, use as guidance, ignore or exclude. Markman, 52 F.3d at 983. As a result, conflicts between expert testimony or between testimony and the intrinsic evidence does not create a question of fact that can preclude summary judgment. See id. As stated above, Claim 6 of the '691 patent reads: “[A] pharmaceutical composition [comprising a tramadol material and acetaminophen, wherein the ratio of the tramadol material to acetaminophen is a weight ratio of] about 1:5.” '691 patent, col. 11, 11. 18-34. The parties dispute the meaning of the limitations “about 1:5” and “pharmaceutical composition.” The Court will construe each in turn. 1. “About 1:5” a. The Parties’ Positions It is undisputed that, at a minimum, “about 1:5” is equivalent to “approximately 1:5,” and therefore permits some amount of deviation from exactly 1:5. The parties’ positions diverge, however, as to the amount of deviation “about” permits. Ortho-McNeil argues that “about 1:5” should encompass at least 1:3.6 to 1:7.1, because, in terms of efficacy, the ratios in this range are statistically equivalent to 1:5. Kali and Teva/Barr counter that “about” should only- encompass minor deviations from 1:5 resulting from “measurement error,” and that this range should span, at most, from 1:4.9 to 1:5.1. Before the Court examines the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, two preliminary issues must first be addressed. b. The Effect of the Federal Circuit’s Decision in Ortho-McNeil v. Caraco On January 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a decision construing the “about 1:5” limitation in Claim 6 of the '691 patent in a nearly identical Hatch-Waxman Act infringement case brought by Ortho-McNeil against another generic drug manufacturer. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir.2007). There, the Federal Circuit held that the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan properly interpreted “about 1:5” to mean “approximately 1:5, encompassing a range of ratios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1.” Id. at 1324-25. Ortho-McNeil argues that this holding settles the claim construction dispute in this case, and definitively sets “about 1:5” as equal to 1:3.6 to 1:7.1. The Court disagrees. The facts and analysis of Caraco make clear that the Federal Circuit was not deciding the exact parameters of “about 1:5,” but instead was only placing a ceiling on what range of ratios “about” could possibly represent. In Caraco, the defendant generic manufacturer’s ANDA would have permitted it to sell a generic Ultracet with a weight ratio of 1:8.67; however, the ANDA also included a manufacturing variance that would have allowed the defendant to legally sell its generic with a weight ratio ranging as low as 1:6.41. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., No. 04-CV-73698, 2005 WL 2679788, *1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24998, at *2 (E.D.Mich. Oct.19, 2005). Ortho-McNeil argued there, as it does here, that “about 1:5” encompasses at least 1:3.6 to 1:7.1, the range of ratios representing the statistical variation in efficacy of 1:5. Id., 2005 WL 2679788, *3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24998, at *7-8. However, during the litigation, the defendant amended its ANDA to “cut its authorized manufacturing variability in half to a minimum of 1:7.5.” Id., 2005 WL 2679788, *1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24998, at **2-3. Thus, under the facts presented in Caraco, the Federal Circuit only needed to decide whether “about 1:5” could extend higher than 1:7.1, as urged in that case by Ortho-McNeil, in order to determine whether there was literal infringement. Absent language in Caraco to the contrary, this Court will not assume that the Federal Circuit decided more. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2005) (stating that a court need only construe a claim term “to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803); see also Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1219 (Fed. Cir.1995) (construing “about 5:1” to “not include the [allegedly infringing] ratio of 4:1,” without determining exactly how far “about” expands 5:1). The Federal Circuit’s analysis also indicates that it only decided whether the scope of “about 1:5” was broader, not equal to or narrower, than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1. First, Caraco simply held that “about 1:5” was “no greater” than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1, rather than using language indicating an equivalence to this range, such as “extends to” or “no greater and no lesser than.” Second, Caraco’s claim construction stressed that “the qualifier ‘about’ is narrow,” and that it “was meant to encompass compositions very close to” 1:5, Caraco, 476 F.3d at 1327-28 (emphases added), thus indicating that the Court was only concerned with whether the scope of “about 1:5” was broader than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1. Third, the Federal Circuit in Caraco never considered the defendant’s argument there (and Defendants’ argument in this case) that “about 1:5” should be construed more narrowly than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1 using measurement error. See Caraco, 476 F.3d at 1323-24. Finally, although the Caraco Court did rely in part on the opinion of Ortho-McNeil’s expert, Donald R. Stanski, M.D., that “ ‘about 1:5’ ... includes a ratio up to and including 1:7.1,” Caraco, 476 F.3d at 1328 (emphasis added), it did so only to undercut Ortho-McNeil’s argument that “about 1:5” extends beyond 1:7.1, not to definitively state that “about 1:5” is equivalent to the full scope of 1:3.6 to 1:7.1. This is clearly how the District Court used Dr. Stanski’s testimony in its analysis, when it explained that the “ ‘[u]p to’ 1:7.1,” language Dr. Stanski used “would put an upper limit on the range, while [Ortho-McNeil’s argument for] ‘at least’ 1:3.6 to 1:7.1 has no upper limit,” and would “result! ] in a meaningless and boundless construction.” Caraco, 2005 WL 2679788, *3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24998, at **8-9. The Federal Circuit said that it “s[aw] no error in the district court’s construction,” and cited it approvingly. Caraco, 476 F.3d at 1328. The Court concludes that Caraco’s holding that “about 1:5” extends “no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1” did not answer whether the scope of “about 1:5” extends to a range narrower than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1. As a result Caraco does not settle the infringement issue here since Defendants’ ANDAs would also permit them to legally sell their generic drug with a weight ratio as low as 1:6.41, and Defendants’ have not voluntarily amended their ANDAs to limit this range. Thus, the Court must decide whether the meaning of “about 1:5” encompasses 1:6.41. This is the question the Court will address below. c. Construing the Term “About” The second preliminary issue the Court must address is Kali and Teva/Barr’s suggestion that courts unvaryingly “interpret ‘about’ based on the imprecision inherent in measurement of the claimed element in question,” (see, e.g., Kali Reply Br. at 7), and that therefore, this Court should do the same. Not surprisingly, the proper interpretation of the word “about,” when used in front of a numerical measurement in a patent claim, has been the subject of relatively frequent litigation before the Courts. See, e.g., Caraco, 476 F.3d at 1328 (construing “about 1:5”); Merck, 395 F.3d at 1370 (interpreting “about 70 mg”); Pall, 66 F.3d at 1217-18 (interpreting “about 5:1 to about 7:1”); Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1455-56 (Fed.Cir. 1988) (construing “about 10 liters/mole”); W.L. Gore & Assoc. Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1280 (Fed.Cir.1988) (construing “about 100% per second”). In support of their position, Kali and Teva/Barr cite Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, where the Federal Circuit, with little elaboration, affirmed a district court’s construction of a claim requiring antibodies with an affinity of “at least about 10<8> liters/mole,” as encompassing “two — to three-fold measurement errors inherent in affinity measurements.” 849 F.2d at 1455. The Federal Circuit has explained that “ ‘the word “about” does not have a universal meaning in patent claims, [and instead,] the meaning depends on the technological facts of the particular case.’ ” Caraco, 476 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Pall, 66 F.3d at 1217). Therefore, the limitation “about” is not exempt from the Federal Circuit’s instruction that the meaning of a claim limitation must be that which would be usual and customary to the person of ordinary skill in the particular art at the time of the particular invention. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13. Presumably, the Federal Circuit used this same context-specific approach in Hybritech, and, on the basis of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence relevant to that particular invention, concluded that measurement error was the appropriate benchmark for defining “about.” See Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1455. In other cases, involving different technologies, claims, and specifications, “about” may mean something different. For instance, in Pall, the Federal Circuit construed “about 5:1” not to encompass a ratio of 4:1 because test data in the patent specification and testimony of the inventor showed that a nylon resin membrane with a methylene to amide ratio of 4:1 lacked the desirable properties present in the claimed 5:1 ratio. Id. at 1217-18. In other words, the extent of “about” was limited by what worked as well as 5:1. Thus, the Court rejects Defendants’ suggestion that Hybritech created a per se rule that “about” is always consistent with “measurement error.” The meaning of “about 1:5” is dictated primarily by the intrinsic evidence in this case, to which the Court now turns. d. The Intrinsic Evidence i. The '691 Patent Claims The claims of the '691 patent provide the starting point for an examination of the intrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Those claims make clear that “about 1:5” was intended to be relatively narrow in scope because it is “distinctly claimed and distinguished from other broader weight ratio ranges in the patent,” such as Claim 1 which contains the limitation: “a weight ratio from about 1:1 to about 1:1600.” Caraco, 476 F.3d at 1326-27. Besides Claim 6, only Claim 4, which claims “about 1:1,” distinctly claims a single ratio as opposed to a range. Noting this, the Federal Circuit observed in Caraco that this is further evidence that “about” must be “narrow” because otherwise the scope of “about 1:5” would “encompass a range of ratios that could potentially render meaningless” the “about 1:1” limitation. Id. at 1327-28. Kali and Teva/Barr argue that the words of the claims support their measurement-error theory of claim construction. Defendants’ position is that because the word “about” in the claim describes a weight ratio, “about” must be referring to imprecision in the measurement of the weights of tramadol and acetaminophen. Defendants argue further that, in contrast, Ortho-McNeil’s claim construction theory (explained in detail below) is not supported by the words of the claims because it is based on animal testing data that does not appear in the claims. Defendants are correct that the words of the claims do not refer to the test data, found in the specification, upon which Or-tho-McNeil relies. But the claims also do not refer to errors in the measurement of the weights of tramadol and/or acetaminophen. There are two gaps in Defendants’ position. First, the fact that “about” modifies weight ratios only informs the reader that some degree of variation in those ratios is permitted. The language says nothing about what standard shall determine the correct degree of that variation, and therefore makes it no more likely that the inventors intended that variation to reflect errors in measuring the weight of tramadol or acetaminophen as opposed to the statistical imprecision inherent in the method of using the specification’s test data to find efficacy at that ratio, as urged by Ortho-McNeil. Both could cause variation in the weight ratios, and the words of the claims are silent as to both. Second, imprecision in a weight ratio is not the same thing as imprecision in a measurement of the weight of the drugs that constitute that ratio. A measuring error will not always cause imprecision or variation in the corresponding weight ratio. If a scientist intended to create a drug with a 1:5 weight ratio containing 25 mg of tramadol and 125 mg of acetaminophen, but mistakenly measured 30 mg of tramadol and 150 mg of acetaminophen, the scientist still would have created a drug with precisely a 1:5 weight ratio. While such an error may be unlikely, its possibility illustrates that using “about” to describe a weight ratio does not necessarily refer to errors in measuring the weights of the drugs constituting that ratio. In sum, the fact that “about” modifies weight ratios does not support Defendants’ measurement error argument. It simply begs the question: what standard shall give meaning to the word “about”? Because the words of the claims do not answer this question, the Court will move on and examine the patent specification. ii. The Specification The Federal Circuit has described the patent specification as “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. It “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Id. (citing Mark-man, 52 F.3d at 979). The '691 patent specification does not explicitly define “about.” Implicitly, however, the specification (1) supports a definition of “about” that encompasses the full extent of the variation inherent in the statistical method of determining whether tramadol/acetami-nophen doses in certain weight ratios demonstrate efficacy, and (2) is wholly lacking in support for a definition linked to measurement error. (a) Statistical Variation in Efficacy According to the specification, the inventors only claimed weight ratios of tramadol and acetaminophen that demonstrated synergistic effects when administered to test mice. '691 patent, col. 2, 11. 55-67; col. 3, 1. 63-col. 4, 1. 6; col 8 11. 38-68. The specification also explains how the testing was performed and charts the resulting data. The mice were administered precise doses of tramadol and acetaminophen in each weight ratio tested, for example, 1000:1, 1:1, 1:5, and 1:5.7. Each weight ratio was tested using different dosages of the drugs. For example, the mice received the drugs at a 1:5 weight ratio in three ways: (1) 2.5 mg of tramadol and 12.5 mg of acetaminophen; (2) 5 mg of tramadol and 20 mg of acetaminophen; and (3) 10 mg of tramadol and 50 mg of acetaminophen. At each dosage, the inventors recorded what number out of 30 test mice experienced pain relief. See '691 patent, cols. 9-10. Using the resulting data, the inventors then statistically estimated how many milligrams of tramadol and acetaminophen must be administered in order for 50 percent of the 30 test mice to experience pain relief at each particular weight ratio. The resulting value is called the “median effective dose” of the weight ratio, or “ED50” for short. See '691 patent, col. 8 11. 29-30 (explaining that the “ED50 [value] was estimated from the dose-response curve for a specific fixed-ratio” (emphasis added)); (Smith Inf. Rep., at pp. 8-9, ¶¶ 1-5.). To illustrate, at 1:5, the test data found that 2.5 mg of tramadol and 12.5 mg of acetaminophen caused seven of 30 mice to experience pain relief; at 5 mg/25 mg, 18 of 30 mice experienced pain relief; and at 10 mg/50 mg, all 30 mice experienced pain relief. '691 patent, cols. 9-10, Table 1. Using that data, the inventors “estimated” that in order for 50 percent of 30 test mice to experience pain relief, it would be necessary to administer 4 mg of tramadol and 19.8 mg of acetaminophen. See '691 patent, col. 8 11. 29-30; cols. 9-10. Therefore, 4 mgfi.9.8 mg is the ED50 for tramadol/acetaminophen at a 1:5 weight ratio. The ED50 data points for each weight ratio tested by the inventors are plotted in a graph found at Figure 1 of the specification. Importantly, each ED50 value is only a statistical estimate, based upon the experimental data, of what the true ED50 value would be if it were possible to test an infinite number of animals at a particular dose. {See Smith Inf. Rep., at pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 2-4.) Obviously, only a finite number of mice can be tested, here 30. If further experiments were conducted, the result would be “a slightly different proportion of animals testing ‘positive’ or ‘negative,’ ” for pain relief, and thus, the ED50 value estimated from those results would also vary. {See id., at p. 5, ¶ 4.) To represent this uncertainty, Table 1 lists, and Figure 1 plots, the “95 percent confidence interval” of each weight ratio’s ED50 values. '691 patent, Figure 1; col. 8,11. 61-64; Table 1, cols. 9-10. “A confidence interval describes the variation in the estimate by using upper and lower values that represent a possible range of values that could be obtained from repeated experiments.” (Smith Inf. Rep., at p. 5, ¶ 4.) Therefore, a 95 percent confidence interval means that if the inventors’ mice experiment was repeated 100 times, roughly 95 percent of results would fall within the 95 percent confidence interval ranges. {Id. at p. 5, ¶ 4.) The 95 percent confidence intervals for the 1:5 weight ratio’s ED50 value (4.0 mg tramadol/19.8 mg acetaminophen) are 3.3 mg to 4.7 mg of tramadol, and 16.7 mg to 23.4 mg of acetaminophen. According to Ortho-McNeil’s experts, Dr. Stanski, and Eric Smith, Ph.D., a range of weight ratios that are “statistically indistinguishable” from 1:5 can be discerned from these 95 percent confidence interval figures. (Smith Inf. Rep., at pp. 24-25, ¶¶ 1-3; Stanski Inf. Rep., at pp. 5-7, ¶¶ 7, 10, 12.) The low end of the ratio range is determined by combining the lowest acetaminophen weight, 16.7 mg, with the highest tramadol weight, 4.7 mg. This combination results in a weight ratio of 1:3.6. The high end is then determined by combining the highest acetaminophen weight, 23.4 mg, with the lowest tramadol weight, 3.3 mg. This results in a weight ratio of 1:7.1. Thus, in Dr. Stanski’s and Dr. Smith’s opinions, the data in the specification demonstrates that a 1:5 weight ratio is statistically indistinguishable from a range of 1:3.6 to 1:7.1. (Smith Inf. Rep., at p. 24, ¶ 1; Stanski Inf. Rep., at p. 6, ¶ 7; p. 7, ¶ 10, 12.) A person of skill in the art of analgesic drugs reading this data would find, Dr. Stanski concludes, that “about” encompasses this “statistical variation in efficacy” of the 1:5 weight ratio, and therefore, “ ‘about 1:5’ would not be statistically different from a ratio up to and including 1:7.1 and a ratio down to and including 1:3.6.” (Stanski Inf. Rep., at p. 6, ¶ 7; p. 7, ¶ 12 (emphases added).) Defendants seek to discredit Ortho-McNeil’s theory of claim construction as mere manufactured “statistical machinations” (Kali Supp. Br. at p. 10.), and “statistical gymnastics,” (Teva/Barr Reply Br. at p. 2.). However, Ortho-McNeil’s expert states that the methodology used by the inventors is not novel in the pharmaceutical industry. (Smith Inf. Rep., at p. 8, ¶ 3.) Defendants do not offer extrinsic evidence to the contrary, and as explained further below, do not offer a more persuasive reading of the intrinsic evidence. Despite the use of data and statistics, Plaintiffs claim construction theory is not as complicated as Defendants would have it seem: the patent teaches that the inventors claimed 1:5 because it demonstrated efficacy, and, according to Plaintiffs experts, the patent data proving l:5’s efficacy also shows that the ratios 1:3.6 through 1:7.1 would, statistically speaking, demonstrate the same efficacy as 1:5. Thus, the Court concludes that this range of ratios offers a sound basis, grounded in the patent specification, for measuring the full breadth of “about 1:5.” In contrast, Defendants have failed to show any reason, supported by the patent specification or otherwise, why “about” was intended to represent variation caused by measurement error. (b) Measurement Error Measurement error is not mentioned in any manner in the specification. This omission is significant, in light of the fact that the specification carefully details how the inventors prepared the trama-dol/acetaminophen combinations administered to mice for testing. See '691 patent, col. 5, 11. 39-61; col. 6, 11. 32-52. If the occurrence of measurement errors were important enough, or common enough, that the inventors felt the need to represent the variation created by such errors with the word “about” in the patent claims, one would think such errors would be accounted for in the specification’s description of how the drug is prepared and measured for administration. Instead, the specification’s description uses precise measurements. For example, in describing how the drugs at a 1:50 ratio were prepared, the specification states that 400 mg of [acetaminophen] as the free base is suspended with 10 mL of the 8 mg tramadol solution and 2 drops of TWEEN 80, a pharmacological dispersant, manufactured by Fisher Scientific Company, to yield the 1:50 ratio, i.e., (8 mg: 400 mg) combination per 10 mL of water. '691 patent, col. 5, 11. 54-59. There is no mention of any variation in the amounts of tramadol or acetaminophen administered to the mice, with the word “about” or otherwise. Indeed, as Kali and Teva/Barr point out, the specification demonstrates that the inventors were capable of measuring the weight of the drugs with accuracy up to at least a hundred-thousandth of a milligram. See '691 patent, cols. 9-10 (stating that, at a weight ratio of 1:800, the inventors administered 0.03125 mg of tra-madol to the test mice). Defendants argue that this precision proves that “about” should at most represent a one-tenth of decimal point variation from 1:5, i.e., 1:4.9 to 1:5.1. However, this argument prematurely assumes that measurement error has already been established as the guidepost for measuring the variation represented by “about.” It has not. Moreover, it also assumes that measurement errors are made. Simply because the data shows that the inventors could accurately measure tramadol to the fifth decimal place, in no way suggests that the inventors could not also do so to the sixth, seventh, or twentieth decimal places. Instead of proving that minute measurement errors should guide the meaning of “about,” the precision measurements shown in the specification suggest that there were no imprecisions at all in weights of the drugs administered to the test rats. Even if measurement errors are made, the absence of any reference to them in the specification suggests that such errors were not contemplated by the inventors. As a result, a person of ordinary skill reading the patent would not contemplate that “about 1:5” refers to imprecision resulting from measurement errors. Kali and Teva/Barr point out that the specification states that, in addition to testing tramadol and acetaminophen at a 1:5 weight ratio, the inventors also tested a 1:5.7 weight ratio. From this, Defendants argue that “about 1:5” cannot extend to 1:5.7 because the inventors recognized 1:5.7 and 1:5 as distinct ratios. This argument overlooks that, unlike the '691 patent’s claims, the specification’s test data does not use the word “about” before its tested ratios. Therefore, the specification does not show that “about 1:5” in Claim 6 does not encompass 1:5.7; it only shows that the inventors considered exactly 1:5 to be distinct from exactly 1:5.7 for testing purposes. Furthermore, the fact that 1:5.7 was tested and ultimately not claimed, if anything, could suggest that the inventors thought that “about 1:5” already encompassed 1:5.7, and that therefore it was unnecessary to separately claim this data point. This is especially so in light of the test data, which shows that the 95 percent confidence intervals for the ED50 values of 1:5 (3.3-4.7 mg tramadol / 16.7-23.4 mg acetaminophen) encompass the ED50 values for 1:5.7 (4.1 mg tramadol / 23.3 mg acetaminophen). '691 patent, cols. 9-10, Table 1. Thus, Defendants’ argument based on testing at a ratio of 1:5.7 further supports Ortho-McNeil’s construction of “about 1:5.” In conclusion, the Court finds no basis in the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence for using measurement error as a guide for construing the scope of “about 1:5.” In contrast, the Court finds that the statistical variation in efficacy provides an appropriate benchmark. As explained above, the Federal Circuit in Caraco used this standard to set a ceiling for “about 1:5.” This Court finds that it provides a floor as well, and holds that “about 1:5” encompasses ratios up to and including 1:7.1 and ratios down to and including 1:3.6. 2. “Pharmaceutical Composition” Ortho-McNeil and Kali also disagree over the proper construction of the Claim 6 limitation: “pharmaceutical composition [comprising a tramadol material and acetaminophen].” (emphasis added). Kali argues that the co-administration of tramadol and acetaminophen in separate but concurrent or sequential doses qualifies as a “pharmaceutical composition.” Ortho-McNeil counter argues that the term is limited to “a medicinal preparation comprising an ‘intimate admixture’ of’ tra-madol and acetaminophen, “prepared outside the body, generally in the form of a ‘dosage unit’ such as a ‘tablet’ or ‘capsule.’ ” (Pl.’s Opp. Br., p. 27.) The Court concludes that the intrinsic evidence favors Ortho-McNeil’s construction. The specification describes “[pharmaceutical compositions comprising the tra-madol material and acetaminophen,” as “an intimate admixture with a pharmaceutical carrier .... ” '691 patent, col. 4, 11. 42-45. The pharmaceutical carrier can take various forms, such as water, alcohols, starches, or sugars, depending on whether the composition is to be administered orally, intravenously, or parenterally. Id. at 11. 47-49, 53-59. The specification further explains that the “pharmaceutical compositions will generally be in the form of a dosage unit, e.g., tablet, capsule, powder, injection, teaspoonful and the like,” and that this dosage unit will “contain[ ] ... preferably from about 0.3 to 200 mg/kg of the active ingredients,” id. at col. 5,11. 3-7 (emphasis added). Therefore, a “pharmaceutical composition” necessarily contains both tramadol and acetaminophen. Additionally, examples one, two, and three of the specification, which give instructions on the “Preparation of the Combined Doses of Tramadol and [acetaminophen],” all state that the tramadol/acetaminophen “combinations are ... made by adding 10 mL of each [tramadol] dilution to the appropriate mg of [acetaminophen].” '691 patent, col. 5, 11. 38-53; col. 6, 11. 32-44; col. 7, 11. 23-36. Thus, the specification makes clear that a pharmaceutical composition was intended to be a single dosage unit containing a mixture of both active ingredients. The prosecution history also supports this construction. In an April 2, 1993 letter, the PTO informed the inventors that their claims had been rejected as obvious over the Flick patent, because “it would have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to combine two compounds (i.e. tramadol and acetaminophen) in varying amounts in the same composition since both compounds are known to useful (sic) for treating the same condition (i.e.pain).” (Kushan Deck, Ex. 10, at KAL016264 (emphases added).) Thus, it is apparent that the patent examiner understood “pharmaceutical composition” to require the combination of the two compounds in the same unit. In its response, Ortho-McNeil did not attempt to change the examiner’s understanding of the invention. (Kushan Deck, Ex. 10, at KAL016271-73.) Ortho-McNeil also presents extrinsic evidence supporting its construction. First, in the expert opinion of Dr. Stanski, based on how the phrase is “commonly used in medical terminology, a pharmaceutical composition of Tramadol and [acetaminophen] would not extend to tablets in which the Tramadol and the [acetaminophen] were not in an ‘intimate admixture’ (e.g., two tablets, one solely containing tramadol and one solely containing [acetaminophen] ).” (Stanski Inf. Rep., at p. 5.) Second, Ortho-McNeil notes that the word “pharmaceutical” is defined as “relating to the preparation, use, or sale of medicinal drugs,” The Oxford English Dictionary, at p. 662 (2d ed., VokXI, 1989), and that “composition” is defined as “[t]he forming (of anything) by combination of various elements, parts, or ingredients,” id., vol. III, p. 624. Accordingly, it argues, a “pharmaceutical composition” should be understood as a medicinal drug formed by combining two or more active ingredients. In response, Kali points out that Dr. Raffa, a co-inventor of the '691 patent, stated in his deposition testimony that he “would not expect it to make a difference” whether tramadol and acetaminophen were administered mixed together or separately to test mice, “as long as they were given within a reasonable proximity in terms of time.” (Brown Deck, Ex. 16, p. 301, 11. 6-12.) While this testimony may indicate that the two methods of administration are equally effective, Dr. Raffa was not purporting to construe “pharmaceutical composition” in his testimony. He was only asked whether the method used to administer the two drugs would affect the test results in the specification. Furthermore, although Dr. Raffa could not recall which method of administration was used during the mice testing (Brown Deck, Ex. 16, p. 300, 11. 16-21), the specification indicates that the mice were indeed given “combined doses of tramadol hydrochloride and acetaminophen.” '691 patent, col. 8,11. 16-17. Kali also cites for support the Federal Circuit’s decision in PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1245 (Fed.Cir.2002), where the Court construed the claim limitation, “composition,” to mean “a mixture that is formed at any time during use, such as through simultaneous application of the constituent chemicals, as long as a mixture is indeed formed.” PIN/NIP, however, did not involve pharmaceuticals, or the limitation “pharmaceutical composition,” and in any event, there is nothing in the intrinsic evidence that supports Kali’s proposed claim construction, and much that supports Or-tho-McNeil’s. In sum, after examining the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the Court construes “pharmaceutical composition” to mean a medicinal preparation comprising an intimate admixture, prepared outside the body, generally in the form of a dosage unit, such as a tablet or capsule. B. Infringement The Court must engage in two inquiries to determine whether Kali and Teva/Barr have infringed Claim 6 of the '691 patent. First, as the Court has already done, the meaning and scope of the claim being asserted as infringed must be construed as a matter of law. See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1247; Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. Second, the construed claim is then compared to the product accused of infringement. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. Determining whether the accused device infringes the construed claim is a question of fact. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1125 (Fed. Cir.1985). The patentee bears the burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused device infringes one or more claims of the patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys. Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2001). In this case, Ortho-McNeil accuses Defendants of infringing Claim 6 both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. Defendants seek summary judgment of non-infringement; Ortho-McNeil argues that genuine issues of material fact exist, precluding summary judgment. 1. Literal Infringement To prove literal infringement, the patentee must show “that the accused device contains each limitation of the asserted claim(s).” Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1247 (citing Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed.Cir.1998)). “If any claim limitation is absent from the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter of law.” Id. Typically, the “accused device” is one that is already being manufactured, marketed, or sold when an infringement suit is brought, but in the Hatch-Waxman Act context this is not the case. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) the submission of an ANDA, with the purpose of obtaining the FDA’s approval to manufacture, use, or sell a drug claimed in a patent, is defined as “an act of infringement.” It is only an act of infringement, however, in the sense that it “creates case-or-controversy jurisdiction to enable the resolution of an infringement dispute before the ANDA applicant has actually made or marketed the proposed product.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2003). This “artificial” act of infringement is not determinative of whether Defendants are liable for infringement; instead the issue “is determined by traditional patent infringement analysis, just the same as it is in other infringement suits ... the only difference being that the inquiries now are hypothetical because the allegedly infringing product has not yet been marketed.” Id. Therefore, the Court must determine “[w]hat is likely to be sold, or, preferably, what will be sold, [in order to] ultimately determine whether infringement exists.” Glaxo, Inc. v. Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1570 (Fed.Cir. 1997). a. Teva/Barr’s Literal Infringement Summary Judgment Motion Teva/Barr have stipulated that should Barr’s ANDA be approved, Barr is “likely to sell the products defined in that ANDA, including tablets within the full range of the content uniformity standards specified in the ANDA.” (Pritikin Deck, Ex. 2, at 2.) The content uniformity standards in Barr’s ANDA permit Barr to produce a tablet with a tramadol to acetaminophen weight ratio as low as 1:6.41. In light of this stipulation, counsel for Teva/Barr conceded on the record at oral argument that “should the Court construe ‘about 1: 5’ to cover 1:6.4[1] or greater, there would be no triable issue of fact [on infringement] as to Teva.” (Oral Arg. Tr. of July 21, 2006, at p. 89:9-15, 21-25.) Because the Court has indeed construed “about 1:5” to encompass ratios greater than 1:6.41, not only will Teva/Barr’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement be denied, but the Court will grant summary judgment of infringement for Ortho-McNeil against Teva/Barr. Although Ortho-McNeil did not cross-move for summary judgment, the Court “already is engaged in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and the parties have been given an opportunity to present evidence designed either to support or refute the request for the entry of judgment,” and thus, “[t]he grant of judgment for the nonmoving party clearly is proper [since here] both sides agree that there are no material fact issues and join in the request that the case be decided.... ” 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure (Civil) § 2720 at 346 (3d ed.1998); see also id. at 347 (“The weight of authority ... is that summary judgment may be rendered in favor of the opposing party even though the opponent has made no formal cross-motion under Rule 56.”). b. Kali’s Literal Infringement Summary Judgment Motion i. The Role of the ANDA in Determining Literal Infringement Unlike Teva/Barr, Kali has not stipulated that it is likely to sell a generic Ultracet with a weight ratio at or below 1:7.1. Focusing on Kali’s ANDA specification, Ortho-McNeil argues that Kali is likely to sell a drug that infringes Claim 6. A pharmaceutical manufacturer like Kali must submit an ANDA to the FDA to receive expedited approval of a generic version of a drug the FDA has previously approved. See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1244 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 366(j)). An ANDA contains a specification, which describes the applicant’s product. This description limits what the applicant is legally permitted to sell once the ANDA is approved. Id. at 1248-50. Selling a drug outside of the ANDA’s parameters exposes the generic manufacturer to various civil and criminal penalties. Id. at 1249-50. Kali’s ANDA states that it intends to sell a drug identical to Ultracet, containing 37.5 mg of tramadol and 325 mg of acetaminophen, and possessing a weight ratio of 1:8.67. However, like Barr’s ANDA, Kali’s ANDA specification permits the actual weight of each active ingredient to vary either higher or lower by 15 percent. Ortho-McNeil points out that this 15 percent variation would lawfully permit Kali to sell a tablet containing as much as 43.125 mg of tramadol and as little as 276.25 mg of acetaminophen. Such a tablet would have a weight ratio of 1:6.41, and therefore, would literally infringe the 1:3.6 to 1:7.1 scope of the “about 1:5” limitation. Thus, because the ANDA permits Kali to legally sell a product that infringes Claim 6, Ortho-McNeil argues that literal infringement has been conclusively established, and that the Court may not examine additional evidence. Kali concedes that the ANDA would permit it to sell an infringing product, but argues that this is not conclusive of whether it is likely to do so. Kali argues that the Court may look beyond the ANDA and examine any other relevant evidence, including the results of tests conducted on samples of the drug it proposes to sell, called a “biobatch,” submitted to the FDA in order to demonstrate that its generic drug will indeed be the “bioequivalent” of Ultracet. See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1249 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(7)). Kali claims that the content uniformity tests performed on its bio-batch samples demonstrate that the actual pills they are likely to sell do not literally infringe “about 1:5.” The Court agrees with Kali that, in this particular case, the parameters of the ANDA specification are not determinative of whether Kali is likely to sell a literally infringing product, and therefore, the Court may examine additional evidence, including the biobatch test results. The Federal Circuit has explained that the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) does not “mandate an infringement analysis limited to the scope of the approval sought [in the ANDA],” and therefore, the infringement “inquiry must be based on all of the relevant evidence, including the ANDA.” Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1567-68 (emphasis added). In certain situations (although this is not one of them), there is no need for a district court to examine relevant evidence outside of the ANDA. This occurs when either: (A) the entire scope of the compound described in the ANDA falls outside the scope of the plaintiffs asserted patent, and thus, legally, the defendant cannot infringe the patent; or (B) the entire scope of the compound described in the ANDA falls inside the scope of the plaintiffs asserted patent, and thus, legally, the defendant cannot avoid infringing the patent. In either situation A or B, the “ ‘well-defined compound’ ” that the Defendant seeks approval to sell will either certainly infringe or certainly not infringe, regardless of where the actual product eventually sold falls within the boundaries of the ANDA specification’s description. In such a case, “ ‘the ultimate question of infringement is usually straightforward,’ ” see Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1569), and so, there is no reason to go outside the ANDA because “the ANDA directly addresses the question of infringement.” Id. An example of situation A was presented in Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed.Cir.2000). In that case, the plaintiffs patent claimed a compound called nifedipine, with an SSA of 1 to 4 square meters per gram (“m2/g”). The defendant generic manufacturer filed an ANDA that would permit it to sell nifedipine with an SSA of 5 m2/g or greater. Because the SSAs of these two compounds are exclusive of each other, the Federal Circuit stressed that “the only drug [the defendant generic manufacturer] can produce upon approval of the ANDA at issue is a drug that does not literally infringe the [plaintiffs] patent.” Id. at 1250. Thus, the Court found that the defendant’s “ANDA mandates a finding of no literal infringement” and declined to look to the defendant’s biobatch test results. Id. at 1249 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Caraco, because the generic manufacturer’s ANDA, unlike Defendants’ ANDAs here, legally prevented it from making an Ultracet generic with a weight ratio less than 1:7.5, the Federal Circuit held that “there can be no literal infringement,” simply on the basis of the ANDA. 476 F.3d at 1328. Conversely, one could imagine an example of situation B. If in Bayer AG, the defendant’s ANDA indicated that it sought approval to sell nifedipine with an SSA of 2 to S m2/g, this range would fall completely within the 1 to 4 m2/g range of the asserted claim. As a result, the only drug the defendant would have been able to produce upon approval of the ANDA would have been a drug that literally infringed the plaintiffs patent, and accordingly the ANDA itself would mandate a finding of literal infringement. See Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir.2002) (“If an ANDA specification defines a property of a compound such that it must meet a limitation of an asserted claim, then there will almost never be a genuine dispute of material fact that the claim is infringed with respect to that limitation.” (emphasis added)). Not every case is so clear-cut. Often, the ANDA is not conclusive of whether what is likely to be sold will or will not infringe, because the ANDA specification’s description of the product is broad enough to permit the applicant to sell both a product that infringes and a product that does not infringe. In this category of cases, “the ANDA specification ... d[oes] not define the compound in a manner that directly addresse[s] the issue of infringement.” Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1250. For example, in Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1565-66 (Fed.Cir. 1997), the plaintiffs patent claimed products containing a compound called “Form 2” ranitidine hydrochloride (“RHC1”). Id. at 1565-66. The defendant’s ANDA sought permission to sell a product containing at least 90% “Form 1” RHC1. The scope of the ANDA’s description was broad enough to permit the Form 1 RHC1 to contain impurities that could contain Form 2 RHC1. Id. at 1564, 1567. The plaintiff argued, similarly to Ortho-McNeil here, that it was error to focus “on what [the defendant] will sell under the ANDA if and when the ANDA is approved, instead of focusing solely on the fact that the scope of approval sought by [the defendant] would allow it to manufacture compositions containing Form 2 RHC1.” Id. at 1567. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, stating that, “especially in a case such as this, involving a compound capable of existing in various forms” (i.e., an infringing form, and a non-infringing form), the “inquiry must be based on all of the relevant evidence, including the ANDA.” Id. at 1568. Another example of a case falling into this category came before this Court in 2005 in In re Gabapentin, 393 F.Supp.2d 278, 287 (D.N.J.2005). There, the plaintiffs patent claimed a compound containing “less than 20 ppmt]” chloride. Id. at 281-82. The defendant’s ANDA sought to market the same compound with a level of chloride “anywhere from 0 ppm to 100 ppm,” a range that “includes the infringing range of less than 20 ppm chloride.” Id. at 287. The plaintiffs there, as Ortho-McNeil does here, urged the Court to “assume that Defendants will sell [the compound] with the lowest possible chloride permitted by their ANDA and, in doing so, will infringe the [asserted] patent.” Id. However, because the ANDA did “not address the precise infringement issue before the Court,” the Court declined to confíne its analysis to the ANDA, and “look[ed] to all the relevant evidence, including bio-batch data results and additional testing of [the defendant’s ANDA product].” Id. The Court will do the same here, as the case before it is clearly not one in which the scope of the ANDA’s specification legally requires Defendant to sell an infringing product. Claim 6 has been construed to encompass weight ratios ranging from 1:3.6 to 1:7.1. Kali’s ANDA permits it to sell a product with a weight ratio as low as 1:6.41, which would infringe Claim 6, but also a product with a weight ratio above 1:7.1, which would not infringe. Thus, the ANDA does not directly resolve the precise infringement issue, and the Court will examine additional evidence. ii. The Biobatch Test Results During discovery, Kali produced actual samples of its tramadol/acetamino-phen tablets, and the results from tests it performed on five batches of its product it submitted to the FDA as a part of the ANDA approval process. The five batches were made in the same manner as Kali’s commercial product was to be made, as described in its ANDA. Kali tested 170 tablets randomly sampled from the five batches, and recorded how many milligrams of tramadol and acetaminophen each tablet contained, by what percentage that amount deviated from Kali’s target of 37.5 mg of tramadol and 325 mg of acetaminophen, and the resulting tramadol/ace-taminophen weight ratio. The results demonstrate that Kali is able to consistently produce a tablet with a weight ratio very close to 1:8.67. The closest any one tested tablet came to a weight ratio of 1:7.1, the high end of the “about 1:5” infringement range, is a relatively distant 1:8.26. (Subra-manian Deck, Ex. 1; Stanski Inf. Rep., Ex. 12, at KAL019195, KAL019245.) Ortho-McNeil points out that one particular tested tablet contained 11.6 percent less tramadol than the target 37.5 mg (Su-bramanian Decl., Ex. 1 (Batch EB 090, Content Uniformity — Middle, Tablet 6).), and hypothesizes that a tablet having a similar 12 percent variance in each of its two active ingredients could possess a weight ratio as low as 1:6.81, which dips into the infringement range. Given this possibility, Ortho-McNeil argues that a genuine material fact question exists, and summary judgment is inappropriate. The Court disagrees. While the hypothetical tablet above would indeed infringe, Ortho-McNeil has presented no evidence showing that Kali is likely to make such a tablet. The tablet that tested for 11.6 percent less tramadol had an overall weight ratio of l:9.72(id), which is well outside the infringement range. No other tablet tested had even a 10 percent variance, either higher or lower, from its target amounts of each active ingredient. (Id.) Given this high degree of accuracy, no reasonable juror could conclude from the test results that Kali is likely to sell a literally infringi