Full opinion text
ORDER SARIS, District Judge. “After review of the objections, I adopt the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and order entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.” REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEIN, United States Magistrate Judge. February 5, 2007 I. INTRODUCTION The plaintiff, Joseph T. Carmack (“Mr. Carmack”), has brought this action pro se against his former employer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”), challenging his treatment leading up to and surrounding his termination from employment as a locomotive engineer. In his Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), Mr. Carmack has asserted claims against Amtrak for slander, libel and defamation (Count One), invasion of privacy (Count Two), disability discrimination and retaliation (Count Three), violation of his civil rights (Count Four), violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (Count Five), discrimination on the basis of religion (Count Six), personal injury under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (“FELA”) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Seven), and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (Count Eight). Presently before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs claims. For the reasons detailed herein, this court finds that based on the undisputed facts set forth in the record, Amtrak is entitled to summary judgment on all of the Counts of the Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, this court recommends to the District Judge to whom this case is assigned that Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 99) be ALLOWED and that Mr. Carmack’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 110) be DENIED. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS The following material facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. Mr. Carmack’s Employment at Amtrak Defendant Amtrak is a passenger railroad that was established pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1970). (DF ¶ 1). Mr. Car-mack became an employee of Amtrak in 1979, and from 1998 until his termination on May 13, 2002, Mr. Carmack worked as a locomotive engineer for Amtrak’s commuter rail operations. (DF ¶¶ 2, 31; PF ¶¶ 14, 16, 111). At all relevant times, Amtrak’s locomotive engineers were members of a union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (“BLE”). (DF ¶ 16). The BLE and Amtrak were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), which governed “the rates of pay, rules and working conditions of employees of Amtrak employed in its engine service operations.” (Def.’s Ex. 11 at 1). The “Letters From Hell” The events giving rise to this litigation occurred after Mr. Carmack’s supervisor, Gerard DeModena, discovered a group of documents on his office desk on April 10, 2001 that were entitled “Letters from Hell.” (DF ¶ 43). The record indicates that Mr. Carmack prepared these documents in connection with a conflict that he was having with his union representative, Michael O’Bryan, regarding Mr. O’Bryan’s handling of a dispute between the plaintiff and Amtrak management. (See Def.’s Exs. 14, 22). Thus, the documents contained a letter from Mr. Carmack to Mr. O’Bryan dated April 4, 2001, in which Mr. Carmack criticized Mr. O’Bryan’s actions in his capacity as Mr. Carmack’s union representative, as well as copies of correspondence between Mr. Carmack and Amtrak management reflecting the plaintiffs underlying dispute with the railroad. (Def.’s Ex. 22). Additionally, the second page of the materials, which Mr. Carmack describes as satire, provided, “[a]ll is not as it appears theres (sic) more to what you see and hear. Dear God: I hear a fat lady singing. Very, very truthfully yours, Lucifer Prince of Darkness.” (DF ¶ 46; PF ¶ 52 (emphasis in original)). Also included among these materials was a two-page document, based on Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which Mr. Carmack refers to as his “Lucifer satire.” (PF ¶ 51; Def.’s Ex. 22 at 33-34). The first page of the document provided, “Dear God, We’re putting on a play down here. Wanna help us fill out all the parts?” followed by the title, “The Tragedie of HAMLET Prince of Commuter Rail.” (DF ¶ 47; Def.’s Ex. 22 at 33). Beneath the title was a list of characters having the same names as the principal characters in the play Hamlet, as well as a corresponding list of players, which included the names of various Amtrak managers as well as the plaintiff and Mr. O’Bryan. (DF ¶ 47; Def.’s Ex. 22 at 33). In particular, Mr. Carmack cast himself as Hamlet and cast Mr. DeModena and Mr. O’Bryan as the characters Rosen-crantz and Guildenstern. (DF ¶ 49; Def.’s Ex. 22 at 33). In Shakespeare’s work, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern had been friends of Hamlet, and King Claudius had sent them, along with Hamlet, to meet the King of England. (DF ¶ 50). Claudius also had provided Rosencrantz and Guil-denstern with a note asking the King of England to execute Hamlet, but Hamlet found the note and replaced it with his own note asking that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern be executed. (Id.). Later, in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, it is announced that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead. (Id.). At the bottom of the page listing the characters and players, Mr. Carmack wrote: If you were in control, perhaps we’d have the history plays. Most likely you would have ended up with Henry IV parts I and II leading into Henry the V. But since the fall of Adam, I’m in charge and this play has a messy ending more to my liking[.] Sinisterly, Lucifer, prince of darkness (DF ¶ 54; Def.’s Ex. 22 at 33(emphasis in original)). Moreover, on the following page, Mr. Carmack included three quotes from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, including one in which Hamlet expresses anger or frustration at how he has been perceived and manipulated and one in which the King declares “[h]ow dangerous is it that [Hamlet] goes loose!” (Def.’s Ex. 22; see also DF ¶ 55). At the bottom of this page, Mr. Carmack wrote, “ROSENCRANTZ AND GILDENSTERN ARE DEAD!” (DF ¶ 55; Def.’s Ex. 22 at 33). Although Mr. Car-mack had sent the Shakespeare parody to Mr. O’Bryan previously, Amtrak denies that Mr. DeModena or other Amtrak officials saw these documents prior to April 10, 2001. (See PF ¶¶ 40, 48; DOF ¶ 40). Mr. DeModena’s Complaint to Amtrak’s Threat Assessment Response Team Mr. DeModena’s response to the “Letters from Hell” triggered a series of events that ultimately culminated in Mr. Carmack’s termination from employment at Amtrak. According to Mr. DeModena, he was disturbed by the “Letters from Hell,” and believed that they contained a potential threat of harm against him. (DF ¶ 57; DOF ¶ 64). Consequently, he spoke with his supervisor, Mr. O’Malley, who advised Mr. DeModena to notify Amtrak's Threat Assessment Response Team (“TART”), the group that was charged with evaluating workplace violence complaints and determining what if any action should be taken. (PF ¶ 58; DF ¶¶ 23, 64; Def.’s Ex. 45 ¶ 6). Mr. DeModena also spoke with Lou DePhillips, Amtrak’s Director of Labor Relations and a member of TART, and was provided with a complaint form, which Mr. DeModena completed and submitted to TART. (Def.’s Ex. 45 ¶¶ 5, 6; DF ¶ 61). In his Workplace Violence Report Form, Mr. DeModena described the “Letters from Hell” as a “threat” and further stated that they consisted of a “compilation of letters and writings authored by Joe Car-mack. In one addressed to ‘God,’ he maintains that he is in ‘control’ now then proceeds to recast ‘Hamlet’ [with managers], proclaiming to change the ending to his ‘liking,’ and kills off my character.” (Def.’s Ex. 21). Mr. DeModena also noted that “[t]his episode followed a few incidents where I had to speak [with] Car-mack [regarding] his conduct.” (Id.). Mr. DeModena’s actions in complaining about the documents were consistent with Amtrak’s workplace violence policy, which allowed zero tolerance of threats and violence. (DF ¶¶ 19, 21, 58). The policy provided, in relevant part: Amtrak employees should notify a supervisor of any threats which they have witnessed, received, or have been told that another person has witnessed or received. Even without an actual threat, employees’ should report any behavior they have witnessed which they regard as threatening or violent, when that behavior may impact an Amtrak worksite, occurs on a Company-controlled site, or may result in violent behavior on a Company-controlled site. (DF ¶ 22 (quoting Def.’s Ex. 12 at 3)). The policy also provided that when a threat is reported, representatives from certain departments within Amtrak form a TART team and evaluate the company’s response. (DF ¶ 23). The members of the TART team that considered Mr. DeModena’s complaint consisted of Mr. DePhillips, one of Amtrak’s Directors of Human Resources, Suzanne Allan, and Inspector Robert Smith of Amtrak’s Police Department. (DF ¶¶ 8, 9, 66). Amtrak’s Decision to Medically Disqualify Mr. Carmack Mr. DePhillips found the “Letters from Hell” disturbing and he decided to seek input from Amtrak’s medical staff. (DF ¶ 63). Accordingly, Mr. DePhillips sent selected portions of the documents to Amtrak’s health services department. (DF ¶ 63; PF ¶ 80). Pursuant to Amtrak’s workplace violence policy, Amtrak’s medical director may assist in a TART investigation by consulting with senior management regarding safety sensitive employees, assaults, threats, homicides, and suicides. (DF ¶ 25). The medical director also may provide guidance on fitness for duty evaluations, analyze documentation for medical related issues, and review and coordinate medical information from outside sources. (Id.). Employee medical records that are provided to Amtrak’s health services department are considered private and confidential. (DF ¶ 27). Furthermore, the policies and procedures that were in place during the relevant time period prohibited the disclosure of employee medical records to the employee’s department or supervisors without the employee’s express authorization. (DF ¶ 28; see also PF ¶ 77). In addition to notifying the health services department, on April 13, 2001, Mr. DePhillips sent an e-mail to Mr. O’Malley and Mr. DeModena in which he stated in relevant part: In my view, I would not recommend either a rule 25 or disciplinary scenario. What I believe you do have is a foundation to have the employee undergo an in-service (psychiatric) evaluation. After determining that he did in fact author the correspondence, you would the[n] advise that his letters are troubling and that you have concern for his own well-being and by extension, the traveling public. Because of your concerns, you will be directing him to undergo an in-service examination. (The physician we have used in the past is Dr. Martin Kelly. He is an associate professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and is affiliated with Brigham and Women’s Hospital — Boylston Consultation Center ... ) The consequence of the employee’s refusal to cooperate could be your issuance of a direct order to undergo the exam and a continued refusal would be grounds for gross insubordination and a removal from service. (Def.’s Ex. 25; see also DF ¶ 67). Mr. Carmack suggests that Mr. DePhillips’ recommendation constituted a scheme to have him charged with insubordination and improperly terminated. (PF ¶¶ 88-90). Amtrak vigorously denies this accusation. (See DOF ¶¶ 88-90). Subsequently, on May 3, 2001, Mr. De-Phillips forwarded his e-mail to Ms. Allan, who then forwarded it to the health services department for comment. (DF ¶ 70; Def.’s Ex. 25). On that same date, Amtrak’s Medical Director, Dr. Timmie Pin-sky, reviewed selected portions of the “Letters from Hell” and made a determination to medically disqualify Mr. Car-mack pending a psychiatric fitness for duty examination to be performed by an experienced psychiatrist. (DF ¶¶ 10, 71). Accordingly, the Manager of Amtrak’s health services, Marianne Letterio, notified Mssrs. O’Malley, DeModena and DePhil-lips, as well as Ms. Allan, that “Amtrak’s Medical Director/NEC, Dr. Tim Pinsky, has reviewed samples of materials reportedly written by Mr. Carmack. Following his review, Dr. Pinsky stated that the samples justify Mr. Carmack being deemed medically disqualified immediately pending a ... FFD exam.” (Def.’s Ex. 26 (internal quotations omitted)). On May 4, 2001, Mr. O’Malley notified Mr. Carmack of Dr. Pin-sky’s decision, and informed the plaintiff that he would be held “out of service, with pay,” beginning that day. (DF ¶ 75). Shortly thereafter, on about May 7, 2001, Mr. O’Bryan contacted Dr. Pinsky and expressed his disagreement with the decision to medically disqualify Mr. Car-mack pending a psychiatric fitness for duty examination. (Def.’s Ex. 57). In particular, Mr. O’Bryan informed Dr. Pinsky that the documents comprising the “Letters from Hell” consisted of 40 pages, that they were authored in response to what Mr. Carmack had considered inadequate representation by Mr. O’Bryan, that he felt Mr. Carmack was being treated unfairly, and that he did not believe that Mr. Carmack posed a threat to himself or others. (Id.). He also told Dr. Pinsky that Mr. Carmack and other employees referred to him as “God,” and that Mr. Carmack’s letter to “God” was actually a letter to Mr. O’Bryan. (Id.). Nevertheless, Dr. Pinsky told Mr. O’Bryan “that there was ample written documentation to warrant that Mr. Carmack be medically disqualified pending a fitness for duty exam” and that “[t]he content of his writings raised the index of suspicion of an underlying psychiatric disorder to the level where a psychiatric evaluation is appropriate.” (Id.). Following his conversation with Mr. O’Bryan, Dr. Pinsky reviewed the remaining pages of the “Letters from Hell,” but did not alter his opinion. (DF ¶ 77). Mr. O’Bryan informed Mr. Carmack that Dr. Pinsky’s decision to medically disqualify him was based on the “Letters from Hell.” (DF ¶ 80). Mr. Carmack’s Refusal to Submit to an Examination Amtrak’s ultimate decision to terminate Mr. Carmack’s employment occurred following the plaintiffs decision not to submit to a psychiatric fitness for duty examination. Ms. Letterio selected Dr. Russell Vasile, a psychiatrist, to conduct an examination of the plaintiff, and on May 16, 2001, she notified Mr. O’Malley that she had scheduled an appointment for the examination on June 4, 2001. (DF ¶¶ 81, 82). On May 17, 2001, Mr. O’Malley sent a letter to Mr. Carmack notifying him that a fitness for duty examination had been scheduled for him with Dr. Vasile on June 4, 2001. (PF ¶ 98; Def.’s Ex. 28). In addition, Ms. Letterio sent Dr. Vasile a letter describing the information that Dr. Pinsky was seeking as a result of the examination, including, among other things, any special accommodations needed for Mr. Carmack, any reasons why Mr. Carmack could not perform the duties of a passenger engineer, whether Mr. Carmack presented a danger to himself or others, and a determination of Mr. Carmack’s long-term fitness for the position of a passenger engineer. (DF ¶ 84; Def.’s Ex. 29). Dr. Vasile was to report the results of his examination to Amtrak’s health services department, but to no one else. (DF ¶ 85). On May 24, 2001, Mr. Carmack sent a letter to Dr. Pinsky in which he requested all documents and correspondence referring to the plaintiff, the medical basis for disqualifying him, including a specific diagnosis, Dr. Pinsky’s qualifications for making such a judgment, a complete explanation of an “FFD exam,” including what it is and what it entails, and the legal basis for Dr. Pinsky’s decision. (Def.’s Ex. 30). Thereafter, Ms. Letterio sent Mr. Car-mack his medical file, but Dr. Pinsky did not reply to the plaintiffs letter. (DF ¶¶ 87-88). On June 4, 2001, Mr. Carmack notified Dr. Vasile that he was cancelling the appointment scheduled for that day, and that the appointment would not be rescheduled. (DF ¶ 89). Consequently, on June 8, 2001, Mr. O’Malley wrote to the plaintiff and informed him that effective June 4, 2001, his status had been changed to “ ‘medically disqualified’ without pay.” (Def.’s Ex. 34). Additionally, Mr. O’Malley ordered Mr. Carmack to arrange for another appointment, and informed Mr. Carmack that if he failed to comply, he would be subject “to charges of insubordination, which, if proved, could result in your permanent dismissal from service.” (Id.). Mr. Carmack contends that his own physician advised him against submitting to the examination. (PF ¶ 101). However, the record shows only that his physician advised him that “a forced, non-confidential psychiatric consultation, because of its coercive and intrusive nature, would be medically harmful to him and ethically suspect.” (Def.’s Ex. 56, Letter dated 4/4/02). In any event, Mr. Carmack contacted Dr. Vasile and scheduled an appointment for June 27, 2001. 0^¶91). On June 27, 2001, Mr. Carmack and Mr. O’Bryan met with Dr. Vasile at his office. (DF ¶ 94). Mr. Carmack questioned Dr. Vasile about the basis for the proposed fitness for duty examination and the medical support for the decision to disqualify him. (DF ¶¶ 95, 96). Additionally, the plaintiff and Mr. O’Bryan showed Dr. Va-sile the entire contents of the “Letters from Hell.” (DF ¶ 97). Dr. Vasile informed Mr. Carmack that he could not make a determination regarding the basis for medical disqualification or assess whether the plaintiff posed a threat to others without conducting a full psychiatric evaluation. (Def.’s Ex. 44 at ¶ II). He also informed Mr. Carmack that any findings from his evaluation would be provided to Amtrak’s health services department. (DF ¶ 98). Mr. Carmack expressed concerns regarding confidentiality, and after Dr. Vasile explained that the evaluation would include a comprehensive psychiatric history, mental status exam and psychological testing, the plaintiff declined to undergo an examination. (Def.’s Ex. 44 ¶ IV; DF ¶¶ 101, 103). Mr. O’Malley again wrote to Mr. Car-mack on July 24, 2001 and directed him to schedule another appointment for an examination or be charged with gross insubordination. (DF ¶ 105). The plaintiff did schedule an appointment with Dr. Vasile for August 27, 2001, but after much deliberation, he decided not to appear for the examination. (DF ¶¶ 106-108). Mr. Carmack’s Termination from Employment Mr. O’Malley initiated formal proceedings against Mr. Carmack as a result of his failure to submit to the examination. On September 5, 2001, the health services department notified Mr. O’Malley that Mr. Carmack had cancelled his appointment. (DF ¶ 110). On September 10, 2001, Mr. O’Malley sent the plaintiff a Notice of Formal Investigation directing him to appear for an investigation and informing him that his failure to comply with the order to appear for a fitness for duty examination constituted a direct violation of Amtrak’s “Standard of Excellence,” which required that employees “comply with all company and departmental policies, procedures and rules as well as all instructions, directions and orders from supervisors and managers.” (Def.’s Ex. 43 (internal quotations omitted)). An investigative hearing took place over the course of four separate days in the Spring of 2002. (DF ¶ 113). It was presided over by an independent hearing officer retained by Amtrak for the purpose of presiding over hearings into disciplinary charges against employees, and Mr. Car-mack was represented by the BLE throughout the investigation. (DF ¶¶ 114, 115). On May 13, 2002, the hearing officer issued a Decision Letter in which she found that Amtrak had proved the charges against Mr. Carmack for insubordination in violation of Amtrak’s Standard of Excellence, and described the basis for her determination. (Def.’s Ex. 45). Later that same day, Amtrak’s Assistant General Manager for Commuter Rail Operations terminated Mr. Carmack’s employment at Amtrak based on the findings of the hearing officer and the nature of the offense. (Def.’s Ex. 46). Amtrak denied the BLE’s appeal of Mr. Carmack’s termination, and the union further appealed to the Public Law Board. (DF ¶¶ 121, 122). On January 31, 2003, the Public Law Board denied the appeal. (DF ¶ 122). Mr. Carmack’s Visit to South Station Several months after he had been discharged from Amtrak, in August 2002, Mr. Carmack visited the South Station train station in Boston and spoke with Mr. De-Modena’s personal assistant, Cheri Thompson. (PL’s Ex. 18; PF ¶ 114). Mr.' Carmack’s defamation claim against Amtrak in the instant case is based in part on statements that Mr. DeModena made after learning of Mr. Carmack’s discussion with Ms. Thompson. During his conversation with Ms. Thompson, Mr. Carmack requested information on the location of Mr. DeModena’s office and the road foremen’s office, as well as the identity of employees who would have keys to those offices. (Id.). According to Mr. Carmack, the purpose of his questions was to obtain evidence to show that someone from Amtrak, and not Mr. Carmack, had left the “Letters from Hell” on Mr. DeModena’s desk. (See PF ¶¶ 112-114, 116). However, after Mr. De-Modena learned of the discussion, he notified other Amtrak officials and asked Mr. O’Malley “to consider imposing a restraining order which would prohibit Mr. Car-mack from contacting Amtrak managers and their staff, also from trespassing in areas other than those accessed by the public .... ” (PL’s Ex. 18). Mr. DeModena also discussed the possibility of a restraining order with Inspector Smith, and told him that “[w]e have concerns about Mr. Carmack’s intentions on a broader scope [regarding] Amtrak management and staff.” (PL’s Ex. 20). Additionally, Mr. O’Malley issued a letter to Mr. Carmack advising him that he had been barred from Amtrak property, and that Amtrak was seeking legal guidance regarding the plaintiffs contact with Amtrak employees on Amtrak property. (PL’s Ex. A). The plaintiff asserts that Mr. DeModena’s communications defamed him by “charaeter-iz[ing] Plaintiffs investigation of the facts regarding DeModena’s Workplace Violence complaint as an attempt to break and enter into secured areas.” (PL’s Mem. at 18). Additional factual details relevant to the court’s analysis are described below. III. ANALYSIS A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue is “one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant ... would permit a rational fact finder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.” Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted). A material fact is one which has the “potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir.1996) (internal citations and quotation omitted). In order to defeat the entry of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must submit “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a choice between the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). In evaluating motions for summary judgment, however, the court will not consider “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). “Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic Rule 56 standard, but rather simply require [the court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.” Adria Int’l Group, Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir.2001). “When facing cross-motions for summary judgment, a court must rule on each motion independently, deciding in each instance whether the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56.” Dan Barclay, Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 761 F.Supp. 194, 197-98 (D.Mass.1991). B. Counts One, Two, Seven and Eight: Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, FELA/Intentional Inñiction of Emotional Distress and Wrongful Discharge Amtrak has moved for summary judgment on Mr. Carmack’s claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, which are set forth in Counts One, Two, Seven and Eight of the Complaint, on the grounds that the claims are preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (“RLA”). Furthermore, Amtrak contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Mr. Carmack has failed to present sufficient evidence to support any of these claims on the merits. Mr. Carmack disputes Amtrak’s preemption arguments and contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each cause of action. As set forth below, this court finds that Amtrak is entitled to summary judgment on each cause of action either because it is preempted by the RLA or because the plaintiff has not presented adequate evidence to warrant a jury trial on any of the claims asserted therein. 1. RLA Preemption Generally “Whether federal law pre-empts a state law establishing a cause of action is a question of congressional intent.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2243, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). With respect to the RLA, “Congress’ purpose in passing the [statute] was to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes. To realize this goal, the RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for ‘the prompt and orderly settlement’ of two classes of disputes.” Id. at 252, 114 S.Ct. at 2243-44 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a). One class, known as “major” disputes, concerns “rates of pay, rules or working conditions,” and “relate[s] to the formation of collective [bargaining] agreements or efforts to secure them.” Id. at 252, 114 S.Ct. at 2244 (second alteration in original; quotations and citations omitted). The other class, “known as ‘minor’ disputes, ‘gro[ws] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.’ ” Id. at 252-53, 114 S.Ct. at 2244 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a). Accordingly, “[m]inor disputes involve ‘controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation.’ ” Id. at 253, 114 S.Ct. at 2244 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33, 77 S.Ct. 635, 637, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957)). Because minor disputes must be resolved only through the mechanisms established by the RLA, “a determination that [the plaintiffs] complaints constitute a minor dispute would pre-empt his state-law actions.” Id. “Given that a state law claim requiring interpretation of the CBA is [a minor dispute that is] preempted, the key question becomes whether resolution of a dispute ‘hinges upon’ such interpretation.” Adames v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 258 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Flibotte v. Penn. Truck Lines, Inc., 131 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.1997)). Accordingly, “[i]f ‘the asserted state-law claim plausibly can be said to depend upon the meaning of one or more provisions within the collective bargaining agreement,’ federal law preempts the claim.” Id. (quoting Flibotte, 131 F.3d at 26). On the other hand, “a state-law cause of action is not pre-empted by the RLA if it involves rights and obligations that exist independent of the CBA[.]” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 260, 114 S.Ct. at 2247. Accordingly, where the resolution of a state law claim turns on purely factual questions that “do not ‘requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement,’ ” that claim will not be preempted. Id. at 261, 114 S.Ct. at 2248 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988)). As the Supreme Court stated in Lingle, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is “independent” of the agreement for ... pre-emption purposes. 486 U.S. at 409-410, 108 S.Ct. at 1883. There is no dispute that Mr. Carmack was subject to the CBA between Amtrak and the BLE. (DF ¶ 16; Def.’s Ex. 11). At issue, therefore, is whether his claims are independent of the CBA or are “ ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the meaning of terms in the CBA and are thus preempted by federal labor law.” Adames, 258 F.3d at 12 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)). Each of Mr. Carmack’s claims will be addressed separately. 2. Count One: Defamation Mr. Carmack’s defamation claim, which is alleged in Count One, is based on (1) the statements made by Mr. DeModena in his Workplace Violence Report; (2) statements by Mr. DeModena to Mr. DePhillips regarding the plaintiffs mental condition; (3) Dr. Pinsky’s comments that the content of Mr. Carmack’s writings “raised the index of suspicion of an underlying psychiatric disorder” and that Mr. Carmack “sign[ed] off as ‘Lucifer;’ ” (4) Mr. O’Mal-ley’s statement in a letter to Mr. O’Bryan that Dr. Pinsky’s decision to medically disqualify the plaintiff “is no different than an engineer being categorized as medically disqualified for failing to provide sufficient documentation to explain an existing medical condition;” (5) testimony by witnesses during the disciplinary hearing that Mr. Carmack refers to or imagines himself to be the devil; (6) statements made by Mr. DeModena allegedly characterizing Mr. Carmack’s visit to South Station “as an attempt to break and enter into secured areas;” and (7) a statement by Amtrak employee Christa Cuppernull that Mr. Carmack “has been removed from service for reasons of insanity.” (PL’s Mem. (Docket No. 112) at 17-18 and exhibits cited). This court finds, for the reasons detailed below, that the claim is preempted by the RLA with respect to all the statements preceding Mr. Carmack’s termination, i.e., those numbered 1-5, inclusive. Nevertheless, this court also concludes that Amtrak is entitled to summary judgment on the defamation claim because the record supports the defendant’s assertion that the remaining statements were privileged. Preemption of Defamation Claim “[I]n order to determine whether a particular state-based cause of action is preempted ... a court must analyze the specific elements of the state-based claim.” Cullen v. E.H. Friedrich Co., Inc., 910 F.Supp. 815, 820 (D.Mass.1995). Under Massachusetts law, “[d]efamation is the intentional or reckless publication, without privilege to do so, of a false statement of fact which causes damage to the plaintiffs reputation.” LeBeau v. Town of Spencer, 167 F.Supp.2d 449, 456 (D.Mass.2001) (citing Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319, 572 N.E.2d 7 (1991)). “The elements of a defamation claim include (1) a false and defamatory communication (2) of and concerning the plaintiff which is (3) published or shown to a third party.” Cornwell v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 369 F.Supp.2d 87, 110 (D.Mass.2005) (quoting Dorn v. Astra USA, 975 F.Supp. 388, 396 (D.Mass.1997)). “Words may be found to be defamatory if they hold the plaintiff up to contempt, hatred, scorn or ridicule, or tend to impair his or her standing in the community.” Id. (quoting Dorn, 975 F.Supp. at 396). However, statements that constitute “[m]ere expressions of opinion are protected by the First Amendment and are not actionable.” Id. (emphasis in original). Moreover, “an employer has a conditional privilege to disclose defamatory information concerning an employee when the publication is reasonably necessary to serve the employer’s legitimate interest in the fitness of the employee to perform his or her job.” Elicier v. Toys R Us, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (D.Mass.2001) (quotations and citations omitted). Amtrak argues that the defamation claim is preempted by the RLA because all of the alleged defamatory statements were “directly related to matters associated with the termination of Plaintiffs employment.” (Def.’s Mem. (Docket No. 100) at 10; see also Def.’s Reply Mem. (Docket No. 126) at 4-5). Thus, any judicial resolution of whether the statements were defamatory “must address the nature of the CBA in order to find whether or not Plaintiffs employment was wrongfully terminated.” (Def.’s Mem. at 10). This court agrees as to most, but not all, of the statements at issue. Where claims for defamation have involved the circumstances surrounding an employee’s discharge and the disciplinary or termination proceedings conducted pursuant to the terms of a CBA, courts have held that those claims are preempted. See, e.g., Bagby v. Gen. Motors Corp., 976 F.2d 919, 921-22 (5th Cir.1992) (defamation claim based on temporary suspension and removal from workplace that occurred in accordance with CBA required interpretation of the CBA); Willis v. Reynolds Metals Co., 840 F.2d 254, 254-55 (4th Cir.1988) (plaintiffs claim against employer for slander preempted because it arose in connection with employer’s right under CBA to conduct investigations into possible harassment and its associated right to confront suspected employee); Johnson v. Ankeuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir.1989) (libel claim based on accusations that served as the basis for plaintiffs discharge preempted where resolution of claim would require construction of CBA to determine whether plaintiff was wrongfully discharged); Cullen, 910 F.Supp. at 824 (defamation claims based on statements made in termination letters preempted where resolution of such claims would involve construction of the CBA to determine whether discharge was wrongful). Therefore, the defamation claim is preempted to the extent that the alleged defamatory statements were made in connection with Amtrak’s investigation pursuant to its workplace violence policy and by witnesses who testified during the disciplinary hearing, as such claims would involve the construction of the CBA to assess whether the discharge was wrongful. These involve the statements numbered 1-5 above, which all involve the events leading up to the decision to require the psychiatric examination, the events surrounding Mr. Carmack’s refusal to take the exam and Amtrak’s decision consequently to terminate his employment. In fact, these challenged statements and actions were considered or could have been considered by the hearing officer in determining whether Amtrak’s charges against Mr. Carmack for gross insubordination were substantiated, and whether Amtrak had violated the CBA. {See Def.’s Ex. 45). Therefore, the claims of defamation based on these statements are preempted. Mr. Carmack’s claim for defamation based upon Ms. Cuppernull’s statement that Mr. Carmack “has been removed from service for reasons of insanity,” or upon Mr. DeModena’s remarks allegedly mischaracterizing Mr. Carmack’s August 2002 visit to South Station as an attempt to enter Amtrak’s offices unlawfully, however, arose in a different context and are not preempted. The record shows that these statements occurred under circumstances that were unrelated to the disciplinary and termination proceedings against Mr. Carmack. {See Def.’s Ex. 65; Pl.’s Ex. 18 & 20). They were made after Mr. Carmack had been terminated from Amtrak, and Amtrak has not pointed to any provisions in the CBA as having relevance to these incidents. Thus, Mr. Carmack is not prevented, under the doctrine of preemption, from pursuing his claim to the extent that it is based on the statements numbered 6 and 7 above. Substantive Claim of Defamation Even assuming that Mr. Carmack’s defamation claims are not preempted, Amtrak nevertheless has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment on Count One. Amtrak argues that the defamation claim must fail because, among other reasons, the alleged defamatory statements were not all attributable to the defendant, were not published to a third party, were true, or warrant protection pursuant to a conditional or absolute privilege. (Def.’s Mem. at 12). This court agrees. “Massachusetts courts have recognized that a person may possess a conditional privilege to publish defamatory material if the publication is reasonably necessary to the protection or furtherance of a legitimate business interest.” Bratt v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 512-13, 467 N.E.2d 126, 131 (1984). They “also have recognized a qualified or conditional privilege ‘where the publisher and the recipient have a common interest, and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it.’ ” Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 95, 508 N.E.2d 72, 80 (1987) (quoting Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 190-91, 93 N.E.2d 524, 528 (1950)). “Thus, the privilege applies to statements about an employee’s job performance and conduct made to the employee’s supervisor, department head or others who should be informed provided ‘the publication is reasonably necessary to serve the employer’s legitimate interest in the fitness of an employee to perform his or her job.’ ” Cornwell, 369 F.Supp.2d at 111 (internal citation omitted). The record demonstrates that the alleged defamatory statements that occurred prior to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Carmack were made by Amtrak personnel acting pursuant to the company’s workplace violence policy. In particular, the statements were made as a result of Mr. DeModena’s concern about a potential threat and in furtherance of an effort to develop a response to the “Letters from Hell” and obtain an evaluation of Mr. Carmack’s fitness to perform the duties of a locomotive engineer. Therefore, they concerned Mr. Carmack’s conduct while on the job and were made in order to serve the company’s legitimate business interests in ensuring the safety of its employees as well as Mr. Carmack’s ability to operate commuter trains and otherwise perform his job safely. Accordingly, this court concludes that the statements contained in Mr. DeModena’s Workplace Violence Report, as well as all of the statements made in the course of communications by and between TART members, health services employees, management personnel, and Mr. Carmack’s union representative regarding Mr. Carmack’s writings, mental condition and medical disqualification, are protected by the conditional privilege and cannot support a claim of defamation. The undisputed evidence also shows that statements by Mr. DeModena allegedly characterizing Mr. Carmack’s visit to South Station as an attempt to break and enter into secured areas were contained in communications in which Mr. DeModena expressed concern regarding Mr. Carmack’s intentions and requested assistance in preventing the plaintiff from accessing the offices of Amtrak management and their staff. (See Pl.’s Ex. 18-20). Thus, the record demonstrates that the statements were made in order to pursue a legitimate business interest in ensuring safety in the workplace in light of what Mr. DeModena perceived as a potential threat from a former employee. Consequently, those statements are entitled to the conditional privilege as well. Similarly, this court finds that the conditional privilege extends to the statement by Amtrak employee Christa Cuppernell that Mr. Carmack “has been removed from service for reasons of insanity.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 17 (listing allegedly defamatory statements); Def.’s Ex. 65). The record demonstrates that the statement was made in an internal e-mail in which Ms. Cuppernell was seeking information about dates for which she believed Mr. Carmack had been paid, but for which he was seeking payment. The statement was made in passing and it was intended to convey Mr. Carmack’s employment status. (See Def.’s Ex. 65). Because the statement was made as part of Ms. Cuppernull’s attempt to carry out her job responsibilities, this court finds that it was reasonably related to a legitimate business interest in handling the plaintiffs claims, and cannot support Mr. Carmack’s defamation claim. Loss of the Conditional Privilege Mr. Carmack asserts that even if a conditional privilege applies to the challenged statements, any such privilege was forfeited by the defendant’s knowledge that the statements were untrue and by their reckless publication of the statements. (Pl.’s Mem. at 19-24). “The conditional privilege is lost if the defendant (1) knew the information was false, (2) had no reason to believe it to be true, or (3) recklessly published the information unnecessarily, unreasonably, or excessively. The burden is on the employee, [Carmack], to prove that the privilege has been abused.” Cornwell, 369 F.Supp.2d at 111—12 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the instant case, Mr. Carmack has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the privilege. Despite Mr. Carmack’s assertions that Mr. DeModena and Mr. O’Malley knew or should have known that statements they made regarding the plaintiffs mental condition were false, there is no evidence showing that these individuals or any other Amtrak personnel “intentionally made up the allegations or did not actually believe what [they] saw or heard, or what [they were] told.” Id. at 112. In particular, there is no evidence that Mr. DeModena did not reasonably perceive the “Letters from Hell” as a threat or that any of the challenged statements were, as the plaintiff suggests, made as part of a coordinated effort to terminate his employment rather than an effort to evaluate Mr. Car-mack’s ability to perform his job and to ensure the safety of Amtrak employees and the commuting public. Moreover, although Mr. Carmack claims that Mr. De-Modena’s statements regarding the plaintiffs visit to South Station were dishonest and maliciously made, there is no evidence that Mr. DeModena did not perceive Mr. Carmack’s visit to South Station and his inquiries regarding the location of offices and access to keys as a possible effort by a disgruntled former employee to obtain unauthorized access to private office areas. See Foley, 400 Mass. at 95, 508 N.E.2d 72 (no evidence that statements “were made with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity” where there was no evidence that speaker’s “belief was not reasonably grounded”). Nor is there any evidence that any of the challenged statements were published “unnecessarily, unreasonably or excessively.” The record illustrates that Mr. DeModena, consistent with Amtrak’s workplace violence policy, notified the appropriate individuals about a perceived threat. It also shows that Mr. DePhil-lips acted in accordance with Amtrak’s workplace violence policy when he requested input from Amtrak’s medical staff. Moreover, “there is no evidence that any [Amtrak] personnel acted for any reason other than [Amtrak’s] legitimate business interest.” Cornwell, 369 F.Supp.2d at 112. The plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing facts by which a jury could find that Amtrak abused its conditional privilege. Consequently, this court recommends that summary judgment enter for the defendant on Count One of the Complaint. 3. Count Two: Invasion of Privacy In Count Two of his Complaint, Mr. Carmack alleges that Amtrak violated his right to privacy under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § IB. The statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § IB. “In order for a plaintiff to succeed on an invasion of privacy claim, he must prove not only that the defendant unreasonably, substantially and seriously interfered with his privacy by disclosing facts of highly personal or intimate nature, but also that it had no legitimate reason for doing so.” Martinez v. N.E. Med. Ctr. Hosps., Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 257, 267 (D.Mass.2004). Therefore, “[i]n determining whether there is a violation of § IB [in the employment context], it is necessary to balance the employer’s legitimate business interest in obtaining and publishing the information against the substantiality of the intrusion on the employee’s privacy resulting from the disclosure.” Bratt, 392 Mass. at 521, 467 N.E.2d at 135-36. For substantially the same reasons as detailed above, this court concludes that Mr. Carmack’s privacy claim is preempted by the RLA. In addition, this court finds that Amtrak is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the invasion of privacy claim. Preemption of the Privacy Claim Mr. Carmack claims that his privacy was invaded by Amtrak’s effort to obtain “an entire psychiatric evaluation and psychological testing with a complete medical and personal history....” (Pl.’s Mem. at 43). Amtrak argues that this claim is preempted by the RLA because “[a]ll of the activities which allegedly violated Plaintiffs privacy rights are directly related to matters associated with the termination of Plaintiffs employment.” (Def.’s Mem. at 19). For the reasons detailed above, whether or not Amtrak had the right to demand the psychiatric evaluation and psychological testing “hinges upon” an interpretation of the CBA, and is, in fact, the analysis undertaken by the hearing officer. Thus, the claim of invasion of privacy is preempted by the RLA. See, e.g., Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 112-20 (1st Cir.1988) (invasion of privacy claims preempted where claims challenged drug testing policy that was implemented pursuant to a broad management rights clause in CBA); Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir.2000) (where employee was wrongfully suspended based on coworker’s complaint that he posed a security risk, invasion of privacy claim preempted by RLA since whether employer acted properly requires an interpretation of its duties under the CBA). Substantive Claim of Invasion of Privacy Even if Mr. Carmack’s privacy claim is not preempted by federal law, the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a jury trial on the merits of his claim. As an initial matter, Mr. Carmack has failed to show that any interference with his privacy occurred because no psychiatric examination ever took place and no results were ever disclosed. See Jackson, 863 F.2d at 116 (interference with privacy under Massachusetts law involves both “obtaining information and disclosing it”); French v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2 F.Supp.2d 128, 132 (D.Mass.1998) (attempted invasion of privacy not actionable under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § IB). Furthermore, even if Amtrak had successfully completed the examination, it would have been reasonable under the circumstances presented by the undisputed facts in the record. See Jackson, 863 F.2d at 116 (privacy statute “proscribes only unreasonable interferences with a person’s privacy [and] legitimate countervailing business interests in certain situations may render the disclosure of personal information reasonable and not actionable under the statute”) (quoting Bratt, 392 Mass. at 520, 467 N.E.2d at 135). “In determining whether an employee’s privacy right under § IB is violated by [the] disclosure of personal medical data to his employer, [the court must] consider the degree of intrusion on privacy and the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship balanced against the employer’s need for the medical information.” Bratt, 392 Mass. at 523, 467 N.E.2d at 137. As the courts in Massachusetts have recognized, “an employer may have a substantial and valid interest in aspects of an employee’s health that could affect the employee’s ability effectively to perform job duties.” Id. at 524, 467 N.E.2d at 137. Accordingly, “when medical information is necessary reasonably to serve such a substantial and valid interest of the employer, it is not an invasion of privacy, under § IB, for a physician to disclose such information to the employer.” Id. That is the situation here. The evidence demonstrates that Amtrak ordered Mr. Carmack to undergo a psychiatric examination as a result of a perceived threat by Mr. Carmack, and that it did so in order to determine whether he was fit to safely perform his job responsibilities, which involved the provision of passenger rail services to the public. In particular, the evidence shows that Dr. Yasile was asked by Amtrak’s health services personnel to determine any reasons why Mr. Carmack could not perform the duties of a passenger engineer and whether Mr. Carmack presented a danger to himself or others. (DF ¶ 84; Def.’s Ex. 29). Therefore, the record indicates that the primary purpose of the examination was to assess a potential threat to safety. Moreover, although the results of any examination were to be shared with Amtrak’s health services department, under company policy, any medical records provided to the health department were to be considered private and confidential and were not to be disclosed to the employee’s department or supervisors without express authorization from the employee. (DF ¶¶ 27, 28; PF ¶ 77). Thus, while “information concerning an employee’s medical conditions is ... within the realm of one’s privacy interest,” Amtrak had policies in place to limit the dissemination of that information. Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 418 Mass. 425, 431, 637 N.E.2d 203, 207 (1994). Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, this court finds that Amtrak’s proposed examination was reasonable and did not threaten to infringe upon Mr. Carmack’s privacy rights under Massachusetts law. See id. at 432-33, 637 N.E.2d at 207-08 (defendant’s legitimate business interest in ensuring plaintiffs safe operation of company motor vehicle outweighed plaintiffs privacy interest and justified random urinalysis testing for drugs); O’Connor v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 408 Mass. 324, 328-30, 557 N.E.2d 1146, 1149-50 (1990) (no invasion of privacy caused by warrantless, sus-picionless drug testing of police cadets where police department’s compelling interest in ensuring safety, maintaining integrity and promoting confidence in law enforcement personnel outweighed plaintiffs interest in avoiding intrusive urinalysis procedures). Consequently, this court recommends that Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment be allowed with respect to Count Two of the Complaint. 4. Count Seven: Claim of Personal Injury Under FELA and Intentional Inñiction of Emotional Distress In Count Seven, Mr. Carmack asserts a claim for personal injury under FELA and an alternative common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Compl. ¶¶ 382-97; Pl.’s Mem. at 51-52). In support of these claims, Mr. Carmack alleges, inter alia, that “[o]n or about April 11, 2001 DeModena and DePhillips maliciously and intentionally filed a false workplace violence complaint in order to coerce Plaintiff to undergo a non-confidential psychiatric exam and psychological testing.” (Comply 386). He also alleges that Amtrak, through it agents Pinsky, Vasile and others, has falsely and publicly labeled, stigmatized and otherwise assessed the Plaintiff as a mentally ill person in order to use its administrative control over Plaintiff to induce Plaintiff to forgo fundamental rights and privileges including rights of privacy and confidentiality and thereby to wantonly and maliciously injure Plaintiff and undermine Plaintiffs health, safety and medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 393). Mr. Carmack claims to have suffered “severe emotional distress with physical repercussions” as a result of the willful conduct of the defendant’s agents. (Id. ¶ 397). Amtrak is seeking summary judgment with respect to the FELA claim on the grounds that Mr. Carmack sustained no physical injury and was not within the zone of danger of sustaining a physical injury. It also seeks summary judgment with respect to the common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that (1) the claim is preempted by the RLA; (2) the claim must be brought under FELA, but is not compensable under FELA; and (3) the record does not support such a claim. For the reasons articulated below, this court finds that Mr. Carmack has not shown that he sustained the type of harm for which recovery is available under FELA. This court further finds that to the extent Mr. Carmack has asserted a viable common law claim, it is preempted by the RLA. Moreover, the claim cannot survive summary judgment because Mr. Carmack has not presented evidence that the defendant engaged in the type of extreme and outrageous behavior that is necessary to support such a claim. Claims for Emotional Distress Under FELA “Section I of the FELA renders common carrier railroads ‘liable in damages to any person suffering injury while ... employed by [the] carrier’ if the ‘injury or death resulted] in whole or in part from the [carrier’s] negligence.’ ” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 144, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 1216-17, 155 L.Ed.2d 261 (2003) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51) (alterations in original). The question presented with respect to the plaintiffs FELA claim in the instant action is whether any emotional distress Mr. Carmack claims to have suffered as a result of Amtrak’s conduct may constitute “injury” under the statute. (See Def.’s Mem. at 24-25; Pl.’s Mem. at 51-52). This court finds that Mr. Carmack has failed to show that any emotional harm that he may have suffered constitutes a compensable “injury” under FELA. In Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994), the Supreme Court considered “the proper standard for evaluating claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress that are brought under the [FELA].” 512 U.S. at 535, 114 S.Ct. at 2400. In doing so, the Court addressed the types of emotional injuries that may be compensated under FELA. See id. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. at 2410-11. Significantly, the Court determined that “an emotional injury constitutes ‘injury’ resulting from the employer’s ‘negligence’ for purposes of FELA only if it would be compensable under the terms of the zone of danger test.” Id. at 555, 114 S.Ct. at 2410. That test confines recovery for standalone emotional distress claims to plaintiffs who: (1) “sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct”; or (2) “are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct” — that is, those who escaped instant physical harm, but were “within the zone of danger of physical impact.” Ayers, 538 U.S. at 146, 123 S.Ct. at 1217 (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547-48, 114 S.Ct. at 2406). Thus, railroad employees seeking compensation under FELA are only able to recover for emotional injuries “caused by the negligent conduct of their employers that threatens them imminently with physical impact.” Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 556, 114 S.Ct. at 2411. The plaintiff does not argue, and the record provides no evidence, that Mr. Carmack sustained any type of physical injury or impact as a result of Amtrak’s conduct. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that any of the defendant’s actions placed Mr. Carmack in imminent danger of sustaining physical harm. Mr. Carmack argues that because he “was considered to be under the Defendant’s administrative control, and subject to an order to comply [with] a requirement for a medical intervention, that medical intervention would have [had] physical consequences and the zone of danger is the office wherein the examination would be performed.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 52). However, Mr. Carmack’s assertion is not supported by any facts showing that the examination would have caused him to sustain physical harm. The only evidence regarding the potential for harm from an examination is the opinion of the plaintiffs physician that “a forced, non-confidential psychiatric consultation, because of its coercive and intrusive nature, would be medically harmful to him.... ” (Def.’s Ex. 56, Letter dated 4/4/02). Not only is there no evidence of the nature of any potential medical harm and whether or not it may have included physical harm, but there also is no evidence that Amtrak was proposing a non-confidential examination. Under Amtrak’s policies, any employee medical records provided to Amtrak’s health services department were deemed private and confidential, and were not to be disclosed to the employee’s department or supervisors without the employee’s authorization. (DF ¶¶ 27-28; PF ¶ 77). Accordingly, the record does not support Mr. Carmack’s claim under FELA. Preemption of Common Law Claim of Emotional Distress Alternatively, Mr. Carmack is seeking recovery under state law for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Amtrak argues that any such claim is preempted by the RLA because Amtrak’s conduct is “directly related to matters associated with the termination of Plaintiffs employment.” (Def.’s Mem. at 25). As described above, Amtrak’s reaction to the “Letters from Hell” and its effort to evaluate Mr. Carmack are part and parcel of its decision to demand a psychiatric evaluation which, in turn, led to the initiation of disciplinary and termination proceedings against the plaintiff. Thus, the complained of conduct must be evaluated in light of Amtrak’s duties and responsibilities under the CBA, and Mr. Carmack’s claim is therefore preempted. See Flibotte, 131 F.3d at 27 (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim preempted where defendant’s rights and obligations under CBA were central to inquiry into its intentions and whether its conduct was sufficiently outrageous to give rise to liability under state tort law). Accordingly, Amtrak is entitled to summary judgment on Count Seven on the basis of RLA preemption. State Claim of Intentional Inñiction of Emotional Distress Even if Mr. Carmack’s claim is not preempted by the RLA, Amtrak is still entitled to summary judgment since the evidentiary record does not support an inference that Amtrak engaged in the type of behavior necessary to support the claim. In order to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct, (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community, (3) that the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiffs distress, and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe and of a nature that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145, 355 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (1976) (quotations and citations omitted). The record here does not support a claim that the defendant’s actions were “extreme and outrageous” or “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” The undisputed facts show that Mr. DeModena was acting pursuant to Amtrak’s workplace violence policy when he reported what he perceived as a threat from the “Letters from Hell.” There is no evidence that Mr. DeModena did not actually feel threatened or that his report was part of a plot to force Mr. Carmack to undergo a mental health analysis. Furthermore, the record shows that Amtrak’s actions in response to Mr. De-Modena’s complaint, including its effort to have Mr. Carmack evaluated, were consistent with the company’s workplace violence policy and were dir