Full opinion text
ORDER PRO, District Judge. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings With Respect to Plaintiffs’ Claims for Conversion, Unjust Enrichment, Statutory Wages, and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof (Doc. # 57), filed on June 30, 2006, with supplements (Doc. # 63, # 64). On August 17, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings With Respect to Plaintiffs’ Claims for Conversion, Unjust Enrichment and Statutory Wages (Doe. #66). Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. # 74) on September 11, 2006. This Court held a hearing on the motion on April 30, 2007. I. BACKGROUND This multi-district litigation arises out of allegations that Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., Sam’s West, Inc., and Sam’s East, Inc. systematically failed to pay their hourly employees for all time worked, including overtime hours. Plaintiffs brought suit in various districts and the actions have been transferred to this Court for coordinated and consolidated pre-trial proceedings. Generally, Plaintiffs allege Defendants altered employees’ time records by “shaving” time off employees’ hours worked through several techniques, including altering the employees’ time records to make it appear the employees’ workdays ended one minute after their meal period concluded, deleting overtime hours the employees worked in excess of forty hours per work week, deleting employee time clock punches so employees would not be paid for hours worked, altering employee records to make it appear they took breaks or meal periods when they did not, and failing to pay employees for all reported time. Plaintiffs bring a variety of claims, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, unjust enrichment, and violation of state statutory wage, hour, and record keeping provisions. Defendants now move to dismiss claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and statutory wage, hour, and record keeping violations in eleven of the transferred cases. Defendants argue that ten of the eleven relevant jurisdictions do not recognize a cause of action for conversion of money and Plaintiffs have no possessory interest in Defendants’ payroll records to support a conversion claim. Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for unjust enrichment because that is an equitable remedy available only when no adequate remedy at law exists, and Plaintiffs have adequate remedies at law to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims based on certain state statutory wage, hour, and record keeping provisions. Plaintiffs respond that Defendants converted Plaintiffs’ property interest in compensation for hours worked as reflected in electronic payroll records when Defendants intentionally altered those records by deleting employees’ hours worked. Plaintiffs argue this states a conversion claim in the relevant jurisdictions. Plaintiffs also argue their unjust enrichment claims may lie because they do not have an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs argue only disgorgement will prevent Defendants from retaining profits they generated through pilfering their employees’ time and lowering their payroll expenses. Finally, Plaintiffs assert they adequately state claims under the various state wage, hour, and record keeping statutes. II. LEGAL STANDARD In considering a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). However, the Court does not necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations in the plaintiffs complaint. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.1994). There is a strong presumption against dismissing an action for failure to state a claim. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but whether he may offer evidence in support of his claims. See id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). Consequently, the Court may not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d 967, 969 (9th Cir.1995). The parties agree that in each of these cases, the substantive law of the state where the transferor court sits applies. See In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir.1985) (where the central question is a substantive question of state law, the transferee court in multi-district litigation applies the law of the state in which the transferor court sits). Where a state has not addressed a particular issue, a federal court must use its best judgment to predict how the highest state court would resolve it “using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.” Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.2002). In making that prediction, federal courts look to existing state law without predicting potential changes in that law. Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir.1986). Although federal courts should not predict changes in a state’s law, they “are not precluded from affording relief simply because neither the state Supreme Court nor the state legislature has enunciated a clear rule governing a particular type of controversy.” Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., Ltd., 880 F.2d 176, 186 (9th Cir.1989) (quotation omitted). III. CONVERSION Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for conversion, arguing ten of the eleven jurisdictions currently at issue do not recognize a cause of action for conversion based on unpaid wages. Plaintiffs argue the jurisdictions at issue would recognize conversion of intangible property, including Defendants’ wrongful alteration of Plaintiffs’ hours as reflected in Defendants’ electronic payroll records. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ have no property interest in the payroll records themselves, and thus Defendants’ alleged alteration of the records cannot constitute conversion. Defendants argue Plaintiffs ultimately seek unpaid wages, which cannot be the subject of a conversion claim. A. Jackson (Dora) v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00229 (Count Three) — Delaware “Under Delaware law, conversion is the ‘wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another, in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it.’ ” Res. Ventures, Inc. v. Res. Mgmt. Int’l, Inc., 42 F.Supp.2d 423, 439 (D.Del.1999) (footnote omitted) (quoting Carlton Inv. v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc. et al., 1995 WL 694397, at *16 (Del.Ch. Nov.21, 1995) (unpublished)). To establish a conversion claim, the plaintiff must show he had a property interest in the converted goods, he had a right to possess the goods, and he sustained damages. Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 542 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Del.Ch.1988). Although Delaware traditionally applied conversion law only to tangible goods, Delaware follows the modern trend of expanding conversion to encompass intangible goods “where the intangible property relations are merged into a document.” Resource Ventures, Inc., 42 F.Supp.2d at 439 (quotation omitted) (holding plaintiff stated a conversion claim for its proprietary information, including plans, technology, designs, and specifications); see also Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 168 A. 87, 93 (Del.1933) (specific stock certificates could be converted). Delaware does not recognize a cause of action for conversion of money unless “it can be described or identified as a specific chattel, but not where an indebtedness may be discharged by the payment of money generally.” Goodrich, 542 A.2d at 1203. “The rule therefore is that an action for conversion of money will lie only where there is an ‘obligation to return the identical money’ delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant.” Goodrich, 542 A.2d at 1203 (quoting Lyxell v. Vautrin, 604 F.2d 18, 21 (5th Cir.1979)). Delaware has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiff Jackson’s Complaint. The Court concludes Delaware would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances because the unpaid wages constitute an indebtedness that Defendants may discharge by the payment of money generally. Delaware does not recognize a cause of action for conversion based on money that is not specifically identifiable, such as a particular coin or fund, or monies Plaintiff deposited with Defendant which Defendant has failed to return. Plaintiffs unpaid wages are not specifically identifiable funds but represent a general indebtedness. Alternatively Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiff Jackson’s hours worked. Delaware has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Delaware would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargea-ble through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged. As explained by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, where a document embodies a personal obligation or represents the title to a chattel and “the right to the immediate possession of a chattel and the power to acquire such possession is represented by a document, such document is regarded as equivalent to the chattel itself.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 242 cmt. a (1965). The Restatement gives as examples promissory notes, bonds, bills of exchange, share certificates, warehouse receipts, insurance policies, and savings bank books. Id. cmt. b. Examples of documents which would not fall into this category include executory contracts for land or chattel or contracts for the performance of personal services. Id. Defendants’ payroll records do not embody the right to immediately possess the unpaid wages or the power to acquire the wages, and payroll records are not considered the equivalent of the chattel itself, as a promissory note would be. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of a general debt owed for services performed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. The Restatement notes that some courts have recognized a claim for conversion where “the converted document is not in itself a symbol of the rights in question, but is merely essential to their protection and enforcement, as in the case of account books and receipts.” Id. Delaware has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Even if Delaware would expand its conversion law to cover the conversion of evidence essential to protect and enforce intangible property rights, Delaware law requires the plaintiff to have a possessory interest in the converted chattel to assert a conversion claim. Nothing in Delaware law suggests Delaware would eliminate this required element of a conversion claim where the plaintiff asserts the defendant altered a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. Extending Delaware’s conversion law to cover this type of claim is particularly unwarranted where, as here, the plaintiff may pursue alternative causes of action to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. In sum, the Court concludes Delaware would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Delaware would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count three of Plaintiff Jackson’s Complaint. B. Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00439 (Count Five)-Utah In Utah, conversion “ ‘is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession.’ ” State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (quoting Allred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958)). Utah follows the general rule that to maintain a cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff must be entitled to possess the converted property at the time of the alleged conversion. Benton v. State, Div. of State Lands & Forestry, Dep’t of Natural Res., 709 P.2d 362, 365 (1985). “An interest in the property which does not carry with it a right to possession is not sufficient; the right to maintain the action may not be based upon a right to possession at a future time.” Id. at 365-66 (quotation and emphasis omitted). Additionally, money may not be the subject of conversion unless the defendant “wrongfully received it” or where rights to money are merged in a document, such as converting a check representing proceeds from a note and mortgage. Twitchell, 832 P.2d at 870 (holding defendant liable for conversion where he retained victims’ insurance premium payments in a personal or corporate account rather than the trust account and expended the funds for his personal purposes); Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991). Utah has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiff Williams’ Complaint. The Court concludes Utah would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances because unpaid wages constitute money not subject to conversion under Utah law unless Defendants wrongfully received the money. There is no allegation in the Complaint that Plaintiff Williams gave money to Defendants which Defendants then converted to their own use or that Defendants somehow wrongfully received money reflecting Plaintiffs unpaid wages. Rather, the Complaint alleges Defendants wrongfully failed to pay Plaintiffs wages. Twitchell does not compel a different result. In Twitchell, the defendant owned an insurance brokerage business. 832 P.2d at 867. The defendant promised some clients that their premium payments made to him would secure insurance from licensed insurance companies. Id. Rather than obtain the insurance, the defendant kept the premiums and paid any damages claims himself. Id. Facing criminal charges, the defendant pled guilty to theft by deception and was ordered to pay restitution. Id. The defendant objected to having to pay the ordered restitution. Id. at 868. -Under the Utah scheme, restitution for pecuniary damages was determined with reference to damages recoverable in a civil action. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals used the conversion cause of action to determine whether the defendant owed restitution and found the defendant admitted to converting the premium payments by depositing them into his own account rather than into a trust account for purchasing insurance. Id. at 869-70. Twitchell falls within a traditionally recognized fact pattern for conversion because it involves the defendant using for his own, unauthorized purposes specific funds the plaintiff entrusted to him for a specific purpose. See id. at 870; Bennett v. Huish, 155 P.3d 917 (Utah Ct.App.2007) (holding defendant converted loan proceeds by refusing to return unused funds which plaintiff entrusted to him to apply towards future loan extension fees). Twitchell does not involve unpaid wages or a general debt as alleged in Plaintiff Williams’ Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiff Williams’ hours worked. Utah has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Utah would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargeable through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged for the same reasons Delaware would not. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of money owed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. Utah has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Even if Utah would expand its conversion law to cover the conversion of evidence essential to protect and enforce intangible property rights, Utah law requires the plaintiff to have a possessory interest in the converted chattel at the time of the conversion. Nothing in Utah law suggests Utah would eliminate this required element of a conversion claim where the plaintiff asserts the defendant altered a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. Extending conversion to cover this type of claim is particularly unwarranted where, as here, the plaintiff may pursue alternative causes of action to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. In sum, the Court concludes Utah would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Utah would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count five of Plaintiff Williams’ Complaint. C. Cole v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00437 (Count Four)Montana To establish a conversion claim under Montana law, the plaintiff must establish it owned an interest in the property, it had a right to possess the property at the time of the alleged conversion, the defendant exercised unauthorized dominion over that property, and resulting damages. Trifad Entm’t, Inc. v. Anderson, 306 Mont. 499, 36 P.3d 363, 369 (2001); King v. Zimmerman, 266 Mont. 54, 878 P.2d 895, 899 (1994). “[A]n action in conversion does not lie against a general account as there can be no conversion of a debt” within the debtor-creditor relationship. Free v. Elberson, 157 Mont. 424, 486 P.2d 857, 862 (1971). However, intangible obligations merged into a document, such as a check or settlement draft, may be the subject of conversion. See Eatinger v. Johnson, 269 Mont. 99, 887 P.2d 231, 235 (1994) (defendant cashed check against plaintiffs instruction not to do so); Lane v. Dunkle, 231 Mont. 365, 753 P.2d 321, 322-23 (1988) (defendant forged plaintiffs endorsement and cashed check). Montana has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiff Cole’s Complaint. The Court concludes Montana would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances because Montana does not permit a conversion action on a general account within the debtor-creditor relationship. Here, Plaintiff Cole pursues unpaid wages, a general debt Defendants allegedly owe her. Because Plaintiff Cole and Defendants are in a debtor-creditor relationship if Plaintiffs allegations are true, no conversion action will lie under Montana law. Dunkle does not compel a different result. In Dunkle, the defendant-manager forged the plaintiff-employee’s endorsement on three commission checks. 753 P.2d at 367. Dunkle thus falls into the traditionally recognized fact pattern for conversion in which intangible rights are merged into a document, i.e., a check. Although the check represented the employee’s commissions, the defendant converted the checks not a general debt owing on the commissions. Id. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiff Cole’s hours worked. Montana has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Montana would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargeable through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged for the same reasons Delaware would not. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of money owed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. Additionally, Montana has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Even if Montana would expand its conversion law to cover the conversion of evidence essential to protect and enforce intangible property rights, Montana law requires the plaintiff to have a possessory interest in the converted chattel at the time of the conversion. Nothing in Montana law suggests Montana would eliminate this required element of a conversion claim where the plaintiff asserts the defendant altered a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. Extending conversion to cover this type of claim is particularly unwarranted where, as here, the plaintiff may pursue alternative causes of action to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. In sum, the Court concludes Montana would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Montana would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count four of Plaintiff Cole’s Complaint. D. McFarlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00228 (Count Two)-Alaska In Alaska, conversion is the “ ‘intentional exercise of dominion and control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.’ ” Carver v. Quality Inspection & Testing, Inc. (I), 946 P.2d 450, 456 (Alaska 1997) (quoting Dressel v. Weeks, 779 P.2d 324, 328 (Alaska 1989)). “To establish a claim for conversion, the plaintiff must prove (1) that she had a possessory interest in the property; (2) that the defendant interfered with the plaintiffs right to possess the property; (3) that the defendant intended to interfere with plaintiffs possession; and (4) that the defendant’s act was the legal cause of the plaintiffs loss of the property.” Silvers v. Silvers, 999 P.2d 786, 793 (Alaska 2000). Alaska has permitted a claim for conversion of money where that money was specifically identifiable as a certain envelope of cash left in a decedent’s safe for which the decedent left specific instructions as to who should receive it upon her death. Dressel, 779 P.2d at 327-28. Additionally, Alaska recognizes conversion claims where intangible rights are merged into a document, such as a paycheck. Domke v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., Inc., 137 P.3d 295, 298 (Alaska 2006) (employee deposited paychecks representing overpayments). Prior to transmittal to this Court, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska dismissed from Plaintiff McFarlin’s original Complaint a claim for conversion, ruling that Alaska does not recognize a claim for conversion for unpaid wages owed. (McFarlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2:06-CV-00228, Doc. # 28, Order dated Sept. 12, 2005.) The dismissal was without prejudice and Plaintiff McFarlin has re-pled a claim for conversion in his Amended Complaint. Alaska has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiff McFarlin’s Amended Complaint. The Court concludes Alaska would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances because, as the District of Alaska already has ruled, McFarlin cannot assert a conversion claim for unpaid wages under Alaska law. Domke does not alter this conclusion. In Domke, an accounting error resulted in the employer issuing five additional paychecks to its employee. 137 P.3d at 297. The employee deposited four of the paychecks and returned one of them to the employer. Id. The employer subsequently terminated the employee due to disputes with another employee. Id. at 297-98. When the employee sued regarding his termination, the employer counterclaimed for conversion of the over-payments. Id. at 298. The Alaska Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court to determine a statute of limitations issue, but expressed no reservations about whether a conversion had occurred. Id. at 301-02. Domke falls within a traditionally recognized fact pattern for conversion where an individual converts intangible rights merged into a document, in this case, paychecks. That the checks represented employee compensation does not make it comparable to the allegations in McFar-lin’s Amended Complaint. McFarlin does not allege Defendants converted his paychecks. Rather, he alleges Defendants never paid him for wages he earned. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiff McFarlin’s hours worked. Alaska has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Alaska would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargeable through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged for the same reasons Delaware would not. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of money owed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. Additionally, Alaska has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Even if Alaska would expand its conversion law to cover the conversion of evidence essential to protect and enforce intangible property rights, Alaska law requires the plaintiff to have a possessory interest in the converted chattel at the time of the conversion. Nothing in Alaska law suggests Alaska would eliminate this required element of a conversion claim where the plaintiff asserts the defendant altered a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. Extending conversion to cover this type of claim is particularly unwarranted where, as here, the plaintiff may pursue alternative causes of action to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. See K & K Recycling, Inc. v. Alaska Gold Co., 80 P.3d 702, 717 (Alaska 2003) (expressing doubt about permitting a conversion claim where the claim sounded in contract because “every contract breach cannot be turned into a tort”). In sum, the Court concludes Alaska would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Alaska would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count two of Plaintiff McFarlin’s Amended Complaint. E. Poha v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00230 (Count Seven)Hawaii In Hawaii, “[a]ny distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over one’s property in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it, is a conversion.” Tsuru v. Bayer, 25 Haw. 693, 1920 WL 830, *2 (Hawaii Terr.1920). Traditionally, conversion occurs when a defendant “detain[s] goods so as to deprive the person entitled to the possession of his dominion over them.” Id. However, Hawaii has followed the modern trend and recognizes a claim for conversion where property rights are merged into a document, such as a bill of lading. Matsuda v. Wada, 101 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1322 (D.Haw.1999) (holding plaintiff stated conversion claim where he owned boat and consequently had a right to possess bill of lading, but defendant refused to turn over bill of lading until plaintiff paid for other services rendered). Hawaii has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The Court concludes Hawaii would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances. Hawaii generally adopts the common law for civil actions. See Haw.Rev.Stat. § 1-1. Hawaii’s definition of conversion to date has specified that it applies to “goods,” reflecting the common law roots of the conversion cause of action. Although Hawaii has extended conversion to include intangible rights merged into a document, Hawaii has not indicated an intent to permit a conversion claim based on unpaid wages or any similar general debt. Absent direction from Hawaii that it would extend conversion to cover a general debt, the Court concludes Hawaii would continue to adhere to the theory that conversion applies to tangible goods or intangible rights merged into a document, such as the bill of lading in Matsuda. Permitting a conversion claim on a general debt runs the risk of turning ordinary breach of contract claims into torts. The Court concludes Hawaii would decline to extend its existing law in these circumstances, particularly where Plaintiffs have other theories through which they may pursue the allegedly unpaid wages. Hough v. Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd. does not compel a different result. 83 Hawai'i 457, 927 P.2d 858 (1996). In Hough, the plaintiff suffered a work-related injury for which he sought worker’s compensation benefits. Id. at 861. When the insurer terminated his benefits, the employee brought suit alleging the insurer committed several torts, including conversion, and acted in bad faith in processing his claim. Id. at 863. The lower court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the conversion claim, concluding withholding the compensation funds did not amount to conversion. Id. Although the lower court concluded the worker’s compensation laws did not bar the employee from seeking tort remedies, the lower court later granted another motion for summary judgment in the insurer’s favor, finding the worker’s compensation laws provided the plaintiff with his exclusive remedy. Id. On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated the lower court granted summary judgment based on the merits of the conversion claim, however, the Hawaii Supreme Court never addressed the merits of the conversion claim in its decision. Instead, it treated the conversion claim as if the lower court had granted summary judgment on the basis that the worker’s compensation laws barred the conversion tort. The Hawaii Supreme Court thus reversed and remanded the conversion claim for trial on the basis the claim was not barred, but the Hawaii Supreme Court never addressed substantively the lower court’s ruling that the employee failed to state a conversion claim for the insurer’s withholding of compensation benefits. Because the Hawaii Supreme Court did not substantively address the conversion claim on the merits, this Court does not conclude the Hawaii Supreme Court implicitly overruled the lower court’s ruling. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiffs’ hours worked. Hawaii has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Hawaii would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargeable through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged for the same reasons Delaware would not. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of money owed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. Additionally, Hawaii has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Even if Hawaii would expand its conversion law to cover the conversion of evidence essential to protect and enforce intangible property rights, Hawaii law requires the plaintiff to have a possessory interest in the converted chattel at the time of the conversion. Nothing in Hawaii law suggests Hawaii would eliminate this required element of a conversion claim where the plaintiff asserts the defendant altered a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. In sum, the Court concludes Hawaii would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Hawaii would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count seven of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. F. Woods v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00436 (Count Five)Maine To establish a conversion claim under Maine law, the plaintiff must have a property interest which the defendant converted, the plaintiff had a right to possession at the time of the alleged conversion, and the plaintiff made a demand for the property’s return, which the defendant refused. Leighton v. Fleet Bank of Me., 634 A.2d 453, 457 (Me.1993). Maine will permit a conversion claim for money where it is “capable of being identified, as when delivered at one time, by one act and in one mass ... or when the deposit is special and the identical money is to be kept for the party making the deposit, or when wrongful possession of such property is obtained.” Hazelton v. Locke, 104 Me. 164, 71 A. 661, 662-63 (1908) (citations omitted). Maine has noted that money has a “distinctive quality” different from other kinds of property because title to money passes by delivery and because it is fungible, its identity is lost by being changed into other money or its equivalent. Hazelton, 71 A. at 663. Under Maine law, conversion “may extend to certain types of intangibles, for example a right to payment, or a right to withdraw funds, that are ‘customarily merged in or identified with some document,’... such as a promissory note or bank book.” N.E. Coating Tech., Inc. v. Vacuum Metallurgical Co., Ltd., 684 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Me.1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 242). However, “the unfair use and appropriation of information that is not customarily merged in a particular document is more appropriately addressed by other remedies, including those created for unfair competition or misappropriation of trade secrets.” Id.; see also Innovative Network Solutions, Inc. v. Onestar Commc’ns, LLC, 283 F.Supp.2d 295, 301 (D.Me.2003) (suggesting Maine would not permit a duplicative tort remedy for conversion where the plaintiff had a contractual remedy). Maine has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiff Woods’ Complaint. The Court concludes Maine would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances because Maine law does not recognize conversion for money unless it is identifiable, a deposit is special and the identical money is to be kept for the party making the deposit, or the defendant wrongfully obtained possession of the money. None of these situations apply here. Plaintiffs unpaid wages are not specifically identifiable, rather they reflect an alleged general debt Defendants owe Plaintiff. Plaintiff makes no allegation he specially deposited funds with Defendants. Further, although Plaintiff alleges Defendants wrongfully failed to pay his wages, there is no allegation Defendants wrongfully obtained the funds to pay Plaintiffs wages. Although Bisbing v. Maine Med. Ctr. is somewhat analogous to Plaintiff Woods’ allegations, the Court concludes Bisbing is distinguishable and does not suggest Maine would recognize a claim for conversion as pled in Plaintiffs Complaint. In Bisbing, the plaintiff was an employee who alleged his employer deposited “unpaid vacation wages” into his account and the employer subsequently withdrew the funds. 2002 WL 1978903, *3 (Me.Super.2002) (unpublished). The federal district court in Maine concluded those allegations stated a claim for conversion. Id. In Bisbing, the employer paid the employee an identifiable payment for unpaid vacation time and then wrongfully withdrew it. Because Maine recognizes a conversion claim for money wrongfully obtained, Bisbing is a conventional application of Maine conversion law. Here, Plaintiff Woods does not allege Defendants paid his wages and then withdrew them from his accounts. Rather, Plaintiff alleges Defendants never paid his wages. Although Plaintiff alleges Defendants wrongfully failed to pay his wages, he does not allege Defendants wrongfully obtained the funds to pay his wages. Plaintiff Woods’ allegations would extend Maine’s conversion law beyond its present boundaries. The Court concludes Maine would not recognize a conversion claim as pled in Plaintiffs Complaint, particularly where Maine has cautioned against creating tort remedies where the plaintiff has contractual remedies. Plaintiffs also rely on Warner v. Atkinson Freight Lines Corp., 350 F.Supp.2d 108 (D.Me.2004). In Warner, the employer began withdrawing from employees’ salaries a four percent contribution towards an employee stock ownership program. Id. at 112-13. The employer placed the funds into an escrow account pending creation of the program. Id. at 113. The employer never finalized the program and the employer returned payments to all its current employees. Id. However, the employer did not return the money to former employees who had contributed to the program but who no longer were employed by the time the employer refunded the money. Id. The plaintiffs were former employees who brought suit against the employer alleging, among other things, conversion of the funds. Id. at 112-13. The Warner court did not decide the merits of the conversion claim, instead it found the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act did not preempt the claim. Id. at 124-25. Nevertheless, the Warner case falls within a traditionally recognized fact pattern for a conversion claim where the plaintiff entrusts segregated funds with the defendant for a specified purpose. Consequently, Warner does not stand for the general proposition that an employer is liable for conversion where the employer fails to pay an employee’s wages. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiff Woods’ hours worked. Maine has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Maine would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargeable through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged for the same reasons Delaware would not. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of money owed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. Additionally, Maine has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Even if Maine would expand its conversion law to cover the conversion of evidence essential to protect and enforce intangible property rights, Maine law requires the plaintiff to have a possessory interest in the converted chattel at the time of the conversion. Nothing in Maine law suggests Maine would eliminate this required element of a conversion claim where the plaintiff asserts the defendant altered a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. Extending conversion to cover this type of claim is particularly unwarranted where, as here, the plaintiff may pursue alternative causes of action to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. Maine has expressed skepticism towards extending the tort of conversion to cover claims for which the plaintiff has contractual remedies. In sum, the Court concludes Maine would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Maine would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count five of Plaintiff Woods’ Amended Complaint. G. Curless v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00440 (Count Three)-Wyoming To establish a conversion claim under Wyoming law, a plaintiff must show: (1) he had legal title to the converted property; (2) he either had possession of the property or the right to possess it at the time of the conversion; (3) the defendant exercised dominion over the property in a manner which denied the plaintiff his rights to use and enjoy the property; (4) in those cases where the defendant lawfully, or at least without fault, obtained possession of the property, the plaintiff made some demand for the property’s return which the defendant refused; and (5) the plaintiff has suffered damage by the loss of the property. Ferguson v. Coronado Oil Co., 884 P.2d 971, 975 (Wyo.1994) (quotation omitted). “Only personal property (chattel) can be converted.” Id. Wyoming recognizes a conversion claim for money so long as it is identifiable and the defendant has an obligation to deliver the money in a specific manner. Id. at 978 (holding oil and gas royalty capable of being converted when it accrues and then defendant wrongfully retains it); O’Donnell v. W. Nat’l Bank of Casper, 705 P.2d 1242, 1243, 1245 (Wyo.1985) (holding statute of limitations barred conversion claim against bank for diverting funds from a loan into two other accounts to pay pre-existing debts of the bank customer’s company). Wyoming has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiff Curless’ Complaint. The Court concludes Wyoming would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances. The parties agree the closest analogy in Wyoming law is Ferguson, in which the plaintiff had a net profits interest in oil produced through certain waterflood operations in the Osage oil field. Ferguson, 884 P.2d at 974. Through certain accounting schemes, the defendant made it appear as if the oil field operations produced no net profits when in fact it had. Id. The plaintiff discovered the defendant’s scheme and sued for, among other things, conversion of the plaintiffs net profits interest. Id. at 974-75. The defendant argued a net profits interest was a contractual obligation, not personal property subject to conversion. Id. at 975. The Wyoming Supreme Court explained that to be subject to conversion, the interest at issue must be a personal property interest. Id. The Court then examined whether a net profits interest was contractual in nature or whether it was akin to personal property. Id. at 975-76. The Court found a net profits interest in oil is similar to a non-participating royalty interest, which is a right to oil and gas only after it is removed from the ground. Id. at 977. Under Wyoming law, when oil and gas are removed from the ground, they become personal property. Id. Therefore, the Court ruled that similar to a royalty interest, a net profits interest once accrued is personal property subject to conversion. Id. The Court then found that although the property interest at issue was money, it was subject to conversion because it was specifically identifiable and the manner of payment was specified in the relevant agreement between the parties. Id. at 978. Under Ferguson, the Court first must determine whether Plaintiff claims a personal property interest because only personal property is subject to conversion in Wyoming. The Court concludes Plaintiff has not identified personal property subject to conversion. Unlike a net profits or royalty interest, which in effect are monetarily representative of the individual’s personal property right in oil or gas extracted from the ground, Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages, which is a monetary obligation due for services rendered. The unpaid wages are not chattel but a debt allegedly owed or contractual obligation allegedly unfulfilled. Accordingly, the unpaid wages are not personal property under Wyoming law, and therefore are not subject to conversion. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiff Curless’ hours worked. Wyoming has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Wyoming would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargeable through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged for the same reasons Delaware would not. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of money owed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. Additionally, Wyoming has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Even if Wyoming would expand its conversion law to cover the conversion of evidence essential to protect and enforce intangible property rights, Wyoming law requires the plaintiff to have a possessory interest in the converted chattel at the time' of the conversion. Nothing in Wyoming law suggests Wyoming would eliminate this required element of a conversion claim where the plaintiff asserts the defendant altered a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. Extending conversion to cover this type of claim is particularly unwarranted where, as here, the plaintiff may pursue alternative causes of action to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. In sum, the Court concludes Wyoming would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Wyoming would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count three of Plaintiff Curless’ Complaint. H. Stafford v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00438 (Count Three)-Nebraska Conversion under Nebraska law is “any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.” Allen v. Dealer Assistance, Inc., 207 Neb. 455, 299 N.W.2d 744, 747 (1980). At the time of the alleged conversion, the plaintiff must be entitled to immediately possess identified property. Id.; Elander v. Kellogg Grain Co., 174 Neb. 782, 119 N.W.2d 522, 526 (1963). Identifying property with reasonable accuracy becomes more difficult when dealing with commingled fungible property, such as identifying the plaintiffs share of grain in a commingled quantity which includes grain belonging to another individual. Otto Farms, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of York, 228 Neb. 287, 422 N.W.2d 331, 334 (1988). In Nebraska, money, bank bills, notes, and bonds may be the subject of conversion. State v. Omaha Nat’l Bank, 59 Neb. 483, 81 N.W. 319, 321-22 (1899). Although Nebraska recognizes money is different than other chattel, as it is intended to pass quickly from hand to hand and possession represents right and title thereto, where money is earmarked or specially designated it is subject to conversion. Id. For example, where a decedent and her niece were named on joint accounts with a right of survivorship, the defendant banks converted the funds therein when they refused to give the funds to the surviving niece and instead transferred the funds to the administrator of the decedent’s estate. Zimmerman v. FirsTier Bank, N.A., 255 Neb. 410, 585 N.W.2d 445, 452 (1998). Additionally, where a defendant allegedly obtains funds wrongfully, a conversion action will lie. Ochs v. Makousky, 249 Neb. 960, 547 N.W.2d 136, 139 (1996) (holding it was a question of fact for jury whether defendant removed without permission $50,000 from joint account of elderly woman for whom he provided care-taking services). Nebraska has not addressed whether it would recognize a conversion claim for unpaid wages as pled in Plaintiff Stafford’s Amended Complaint. The Court concludes Nebraska would not recognize a conversion claim in these circumstances because Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages which consist of commingled fungible monetary funds in Defendants’ possession. Plaintiff cannot identify any specific personal property with reasonable accuracy. Plaintiff does not allege the unpaid wages are held by Defendants in some earmarked or specially designated fashion, or that Defendant wrongfully received the funds from Plaintiff. Instead, Plaintiff alleges Defendants owe her money on an obligation. These allegations do not fall within any factual pattern Nebraska recognizes as a conversion. None of the cases upon which Plaintiffs rely alters the Court’s conclusion. In Roth v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Nebraska, the plaintiff owned an insurance policy which covered theft of his swine but which did not cover wrongful conversion. 220 Neb. 612, 371 N.W.2d 289, 290 (1985). The plaintiff entered into a business deal with another individual who sold the swine but failed to pay the plaintiff his share. Id. The plaintiff filed a claim with his insurance company for the theft of his swine. Id. The insurer refused to pay, contending the swine were converted, not stolen. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court held the person who sold the hogs lawfully possessed them under the parties’ agreement, but converted the proceeds from the sale. Id. at 291. The Court thus held the policy exclusion for conversion applied. Id. at 292. Roth involved the conversion of proceeds from the sale of chattel, not the failure to pay a general debt for services performed. In Terra Western Corp. v. Berry and Co., the plaintiff held a security interest in a corn crop which was destroyed by hail. 207 Neb. 28, 295 N.W.2d 693, 695-96 (1980). The insurer paid the insured on the claim for the destroyed crop instead of paying the plaintiff on its security interest in the crop. Id. at 696. The plaintiff brought a claim against the insurer for conversion of the insurance proceeds. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that under the relevant law, the proceeds did not become subject to the security interest until the insured received the proceeds. Id. at 697-98. Consequently, the Court held the plaintiff did not state a cause of action for conversion because the plaintiff did not allege facts which gave it a property interest in the funds before the insured received the proceeds. Id. at 698. Terra involved the alleged conversion of a specific, identifiable insurance payment in which the plaintiff alleged a security interest. Terra is not analogous to the allegations in Plaintiff Stafford’s Complaint regarding the failure to pay wages. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue Defendants converted the electronic payroll records evidencing Plaintiff Stafford’s hours worked. Nebraska has not addressed whether payroll records, or other records evidencing a debt, may be the subject of conversion, and if so, whether it would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff has not alleged a possessory interest in the document evidencing the debt. The Court concludes Nebraska would not expand its conversion law to cover any record which evidences a debt dischargea-ble through the payment of money generally as opposed to a document in which property rights are merged for the same reasons Delaware would not. Defendants’ payroll records constitute evidence of money owed, not intangible property rights merged in a document. Additionally, Nebraska has not signaled an intent to extend its conversion law beyond those situations where intangible property rights are merged into a document. Plaintiffs contend Mundy v. Decker establishes a person can convert electronic records. 1999 WL 14479, *4 (Neb.Ct.App.1999) (unpublished). In Mundy, a secretary deleted from her employer’s computer system documents she had saved on her work computer, including both her personal documents and the company’s documents. Id. at *1. The evidence established the computer and its contents were the employer’s property. Id. at *4. The Court suggested that had the employee deleted only her private correspondence stored on her employer’s computer, no conversion would have occurred. Id. But because the employee deleted the entire directory of word processing documents, including both personal and business documents, she converted the business documents unless the employer authorized her to destroy them. Id. Mundy is an application of existing conversion law. Mundy involved the deletion of documents, albeit in electronic form. The Nebraska Court of Appeals likened the destruction of electronic documents to throwing out physical letters. Id. at *4. Although the Nebraska Court of Appeals extended conversion to electronic documents, it did not eliminate as a required element of a conversion claim that the plaintiff have a possessory interest in the converted property. The Mundy Court specifically distinguished between documents belonging to the employer versus personal documents, and specifically referred to the computer directory as “owned and controlled by [the employer].” Id. at *4, *6. Nebraska thus has not signaled an intent to extend conversion to a defendant altering a document which the plaintiff had no right to possess where that document evidenced a general debt the defendant owed the plaintiff. The Court concludes Nebraska would not eliminate the element of a possessory interest from a conversion claim, as Mundy illustrates. Further, Nebraska has indicated an unwillingness to extend conversion to factual scenarios that involve “rights” as opposed to personal property. See Fun World, Inc. v. Big Red Keno, Ltd., 1999 WL 79391, *5 (Neb.Ct.App.1999) (rejecting conversion claim based on allegations a competitor began to sell “pickle cards” under a lease agreement in derogation of the plaintiffs exclusive right to sell “pickle cards” in the same location). Extending conversion to cover Plaintiffs claim is particularly unwarranted where, as here, the plaintiff may pursue alternative causes of action to recover the allegedly unpaid wages. In sum, the Court concludes Nebraska would not recognize a claim for conversion based on unpaid wages. Additionally, the Court concludes Nebraska would not recognize a conversion claim where a defendant alters its own electronic payroll records to avoid paying the plaintiffs wages. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and will dismiss count three of Plaintiff Stafford’s Amended Complaint. I. Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-101099 (Count Two)Nevada Although Defendants assert generally that none of the ten relevant jurisdictions, including Nevada, would recognize a conversion claim as pled in Plaintiff Hall’s Complaint, Defendants cite no law from Nevada nor do they make any specific argument regarding whether Nevada would recognize a conversion claim under the facts Plaintiff Hall alleges. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-2(d), “[t]he failure of a moving party to file points and authorities in support of the motion shall constitute a consent to the denial of the motion.” Defendants did not support their motion with points and authorities with respect to Nevada despite the fact that Defendants’ motion requires an examination of each state’s law. Defendants therefore have consented to the denial of their motion with respect to Nevada. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss count two of Plaintiff Hall’s Amended Complaint. J. Jackson (Reginald) v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00231 (Count Five)-Idaho Although Defendants assert generally that none of the ten relevant jurisdictions, including Idaho, would recognize a conversion claim as pled in Plaintiff Jackson’s Complaint, Defendants cite no law from Idaho nor do they make any specific argument regarding whether Idaho would recognize a conversion claim under the facts Plaintiff Jackson alleges. Pursuant to Local Rule 7 — 2(d), “[t]he failure of a moving party to file points and authorities in support of the motion shall constitute a consent to the denial of the motion.” Defendants did not support their motion with points and authorities with respect to Idaho despite the fact that Defendants’ motion requires an examination of each state’s law. Defendants therefore have consented to the denial of their motion with respect to Idaho. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss count five of Plaintiff Jackson’s Complaint. IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for unjust enrichment because Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs respond their unjust enrichment claims seek to remedy the injustice of Defendants reducing their payroll expenses and increasing profits by obtaining unpaid labor from their employees and, in the interest of justice, Defendants should have to disgorge their ill-gotten profits. Plaintiffs argue merely requiring Defendants to pay low-hourly-pay employees their wages plus interest does not address Defendants’ conscious wrongdoing in intentionally manipulating the payroll records to both cheat its employees and to gain unfair competitive advantage in the marketplace by artificially lowering payroll expenses. Plaintiffs argue disgorgement of profits is required to deter such conscious wrongdoing. Plaintiffs therefore argue they do not have an adequate remedy at law. A. Jackson (Dora) v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al., 2:06-CV-00229 (Count Four)-Delaware Under Delaware law, unjust enrichment is “the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience.” Total Care Physicians, P.A. v. O’Hara, 798 A.2d 1043, 1056 (Del.Super.Ct.2001) (quotation omitted). To establish unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show: “(1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a relation between the enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) the absence of justification, and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law.” Id. (quotation omitted). A remedy at law is adequate if it “(1) is as complete, practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the rem