Full opinion text
ORDER ARCARA, Chief Judge. Defendant Ronnie Funderburk filed an omnibus motion on July 15, 2005, requesting, inter alia, the suppression of evidence obtained via certain electronic eavesdropping warrants and the suppression of statements defendant allegedly made to law enforcement officers. On October 19, 2005, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie G. Foschio, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). On February 24, 2006, Magistrate Judge Foschio filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained via certain electronic eavesdropping warrants be denied. On September 18, 2006, Magistrate Judge Foschio filed an Amended Report and Recommendation, recommending that defendant’s motion to suppress his statements be denied. Defendant filed objections to both Reports and Recommendations on October 23, 2006, and the government filed a response thereto. Oral argument on the objections was held on January 25, 2007. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Reports and Recommendations to which objections have been made. Upon a de novo review of the Reports and Recommendations, and after reviewing the submissions and hearing argument from the parties, the Court adopts the proposed findings of both Reports and Recommendations. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Foschio’s February 24, 2006 Report and Recommendation and September 18, 2006 Amended Report and Recommendation, the Court denies: (1) defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained via certain electronic eavesdropping warrants; and (2) defendant’s motion to suppress statements defendant allegedly made to law enforcement officers. Counsel for all the parties in this case shall appear on February 27, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. for a meeting to set a trial date. SO ORDERED. REPORT and RECOMMENDATION FOSCHIO, United States Magistrate Judge. JURISDICTION This case was referred to the undersigned by the Hon. Richard J. Arcara on October 19, 2005 for all pretrial matters. The matter is presently before the court for a report and recommendation on Defendants’ motions seeking suppression of evidence and as to Defendants Pressley, Edmond and Hargrave, seeking dismissal of the Second Superseding Indictment (Doc. Nos. 130, 132, 137-141, 142-146, 150-152, 154, 172, 182 and 189). BACKGROUND Defendant Richard Mullen and six others, including co-defendants Frederick Nolley, Richardson, Edmond, Stranc, Pressley and Hall, were initially indicted in a five count indictment on July 29, 2004, charging violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 843(b), 846, 848(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Docket Item No. 1). Specifically, Defendant Richard Mullen is alone charged in Count 1 of the Indictment with knowingly, willfully, intentionally and unlawfully engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise of which he allegedly organized, supervised, and managed, and from which he allegedly obtained substantial income and resources, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (“Count 1” or “the CCE Count”). Defendants Richard Mullen, Frederick Nolley, Richardson, Stranc, Hall, Pressley and Edmond were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (“Count 2” or “the Conspiracy Count”); Defendants Richard Mullen, Frederick Nolley and Edmond were charged with knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (“Count 3”); and Defendants Richard Mullen, Frederick Nolley, Stranc and Edmond were charged with knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (“Count 4”). Additionally, Defendant Hall was charged in Count 5 of the Indictment with knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully possessing with intent to distribute and distribute five grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (“Count 5”). In a Superseding Indictment, filed January 20, 2005, Defendants Windley, Har-grave, Hearst, Weeks, Sanger, Graham, Morrison, Adams, Wilkie, Palmer, Drake, Askew, McKnight, Douglas McPeek, K. Davis, West, Cooper, J. Davis, Ayanna Nolley, Terry Mullen, Turner, Gilmore, Jackson, Watson, Degree, Lee, and Ami-don were added as defendants under the Conspiracy Count. (Docket Item No. 52). A Second Superseding Indictment (“the Indictment”), filed on April 28, 2005, added Defendant Funderburk to the Conspiracy Count. (Docket Item No. 116). By order dated February 4, 2005, June 1, 2005 was established as the deadline for filing all pretrial motions, both dispositive and non-dispositive. (Docket Item No. 81) (“the Scheduling Order”). In accordance with the Scheduling Order, the following motions were filed: Richard Mullen on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 150) (“Eoannou Affirmation”), Frederick Nolley on July 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 172) (“Terranova Affirmation”), Efrim Richardson on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 145) (“Lobban Affidavit”), Durrian Pressley on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 140) (“Pressley’s Motion”), LaWanda Edmond on June 2, 2005 (Docket Item No. 154) (“Humann Affirmation”), Joseph Hargrave on June 2, 2005 (Docket Item No. 152) (“Schmukler Affirmation”), Larry Sanger on May 27, 2005 (Docket Item No. 130) (“Torre Affidavit”), Robert Adams on June 1. 2005 (Docket Item No. 142) (“LaTona Affidavit”), Justin Palmer on May 30, 2005 (Docket Item No. 132) (“Palmer Motion”), Debbie Drake on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 151) (“Drake Motion”), Ross Cooper on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 143) (“Desiderio Affirmation”), Ayanna Nolley on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 138) (“Meyers-Buth Affidavit”), Ameer McKnight on May 31, 2005 (Docket Item No. 137) (“Hoffman Affidavit”) and on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 141) (“Hoffman Supplemental Affidavit”), Terry Mullen on June 30, 2005 (Docket Item No. 182) (“LaMendola Affidavit”), Kenya Lee on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 139) (“Stachowski Affirmation”), Michael Stranc on June 1, 2005 (Docket Item No. 144) (“Stranc Motion”), and Ronnie Funder-burk on July 15, 2005 (Docket Item No. 189) (“Funderburk’s Motion”) (“Moving Defendants”).,,,’ The Government was directed to file its response to such motions by August 31, 2005. On August 30, 2005, the court granted the Government’s request for an extension to file its response to Defendants’ motions not later than September 2, 2005. (Docket Item No. 216). On September 2, 2005, the Government filed the Government’s Response to Omnibus Motion in response to Defendants’ motions. (Docket Item No. 223) (“Government’s Response”). As noted, oral argument was conducted on October 11, 2005. On February 13, 2006, in response to the court’s request for clarification of the Government’s Response, the Government filed a Supplemental Response to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Omnibus Motions. (Doc. No. 328) (“Government’s Supplemental Response”). Defendants’ motions include requests for suppression of Title III evidence, suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to various search warrants issued on August 2 and 3, 2004, suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a vehicle stop in Kansas and subsequent warrantless search of several Defendants in March 2003, suppression of post-arrest statements made by Defendants Funderburk and Palmer, a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, and dismissal of Count 2 of the Indictment. Based on the following, Defendants’ motions should be DENIED in part, and DISMISSED as moot in part. FACTS The charges in the Indictment arise from an investigation conducted by the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) of an alleged cocaine possession and distribution conspiracy. Defendants Richard Mullen, Frederick Nolley, Richardson, Edmond, Stranc, Pressley, Hall, Hargrave, Hearst, Weeks, Sanger, Graham, Adams, Wilkie, Palmer, Drake, Askew, McKnight, McPeek, K. Davis, Cooper, J. Davis, Ayan-na Nolley, Terry Mullen, Turner, Jackson, Watson, Degree, Lee, and Funderburk are alleged coconspirators in a drug trafficking conspiracy operating in and around Buffalo, New York. According to the Government, Defendant Richard Mullen is the alleged leader of the drug conspiracy. Defendant Frederick Nolley allegedly distributed the cocaine and collected the drug purchase money. Defendant Richardson was an alleged customer of Richard Mullen’s who would convert the cocaine to cocaine base and sell it to his own customers, including Defendants Amidon, McPeek and Wilkie, and others. The Indictment also alleges that Defendant Fun-derburk, a Buffalo police officer, advised Defendant Frederick Nolley, his brother-in-law, on how to operate a vehicle without attracting police attention, and that Fun-derburk staged a bogus car stop of Nol-ley’s vehicle to make it appear the police confiscated money from Nolley’s vehicle, which the Government asserts was given to Nolley by a drug customer. In March 2004, DEA agents learned from Defendant Frederick Nolley, then acting as a cooperating witness, that, according to Richard Mullen, in January 2008 one of Mullen’s drug couriers, Wesley Alleyene, who was then transporting kilogram quantities of cocaine for Mullen from Los Angeles to Buffalo, was stopped in Nebraska in a vehicle from which 10 kilograms of cocaine was seized. Subsequently, in March 2003, following a traffic stop, police in Kansas seized, from a vehicle rented by Defendant Edmond and driven by Defendant Stranc who was arrested, three kilograms of cocaine, which Mullen had obtained in Los Angeles. Defendants Richard Mullen, Nolley and Edmond were also stopped while driving through Kansas at the same time in a separate vehicle when Stranc’s vehicle was stopped, but although Edmond admitted renting the vehicle Stranc was driving, they denied any knowledge of the cocaine. Following these stops, the DEA began conducting surveillance, including electronic surveillance, of Defendants Richard Mullen, Frederick Nolley and Richardson. Prior to applying for eavesdropping warrants, pen registers were installed on Richardson’s cellular telephones. The DEA monitored some calls to Richardson with an informant’s consent. Thereafter, the DEA applied for eavesdropping warrants for Richard Mullen, Frederick Nolley and Richardson. In connection with the investigation, District Judges William M. Skretny and John T. Elfvin issued seven intercept orders pursuant to Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., from which the Government obtained relevant evidence leading to the Indictment and for use at trial. These intercept orders relate to conversations between Richardson, Frederick Nolley, Richard Mullen and others, transmitted by telephone, cellular phone, or pager, and bear the targeted telephone numbers 716-570-2102, 716-578-2781 (target name: Efrim Richardson); 716-369-0057 (target name: Frederick Nolley — Order I); 716-602-0413 (target name: Frederick Nol-ley — Order II); 716-578-2614 (target name: Richard Mullen — Order I); 716-818-2697 (target name: Frederick Nolley-Order III); 716-400-7307 (target name: Richard Mullen-Order II); 716-308-0672 (target name: Richard Mullen — Order III) (“the Intercept Orders”). Government’s Response at 6., The Intercept Orders were executed between February 11, 2004 and August 3, 2004. Id. at 5. Pursuant to this surveillance, the Government intercepted numerous conversations regarding the alleged possession and distribution conspiracy between Richardson, Frederick Nolley, Richard Mullen and other Defendants. The Grand Jury subsequently charged Richard Mullen, Richardson, Frederick Nolley, Stranc, Edmond, Pressley, and Hall in the initial indictment filed on July 29, 2004. Several arrests and search warrants were authorized in the instant case, including the search warrants for Richard Mullen’s residence at 90 Sussex Street, for his business located at 1202 East Delevan Avenue, and for his 1998 Ford Expedition; for Defendant Palmer’s residence at 475 Shirley Avenue; for Defendant Adams’s residence at 928 Humboldt Parkway, Upper; for Defendant Cooper’s residence at 135 Zenner Street, Upper; and for Defendant Terry Mullen’s residence at 90 Sussex, Lower, all located in Buffalo, New York. Agents searched Richard Mullen’s Ford Expedition on August 2, 2004, and arrested Mullen pursuant to a bench warrant. Government’s Response at 8. Federal, state and local law enforcement agents executed search warrants on August 3, 2004, in Buffalo and Niagara Falls, New York, and against Mullen’s vehicle in Henrietta, New York, resulting in the seizure of numerous items, including (1) currency, (2) cell phones, (3) weapons and ammunition, (4) holsters, (5) cartridges, (6) cartridge magazines, (7) a semi-automatic magazine, (8) drug paraphenalia, (9) unidentified pills, (10) cocaine, (11) cocaine base, (12) crack cocaine, (13) crack stems, (14) marijuana, (15) white powder “and chunks,” (16) “white powder substance,” (17) “green vegetable matter,” (18) a “green, leafy substance,” (19) “white, chunky substance,” (20) packaging material, (21) scales, (22) two-way radios, (23) paperwork, (24) documents, (25) bank records, (26) automobiles, (27) keys, (28) safes, (29) computers, (30) paystubs, (31) two silver swords, (32) razor blades, at least one of which contained white, powdery residue, (33) a notebook, (34) a computer tower, (35) a heat sealer (36) and a glass plate. Government’s Response at 8-11; Government’s Supplemental Response at 1. DISCUSSION I. Suppression of Intercepted Electronic Communications The intercepted communications the Government represents it will use as evidence at trial were authorized by Intercept Order Nos. 04-MISC.CR-15 as to 716-570-2102 (“target telephone I”) and 716-578-2781 (“target telephone II”) (“Richardson Order I”, “Richardson Order I, 1st Extension” and “Richardson Order I, 2nd Extension”); 04-MISC.CR-22 as to Frederick Nolley’s pager number 716-369-0057 (“Nolley Order I”); 04-MISC.CR-27 as to 716-602-0413 (“Nolley Order II”); 04-MISC.CR-44 as to 716-578-2614 (“Mullen Order I”); 04-MISC.CR-55 as to 716-818-2697 (“Nolley Order III”); 04-MISC.CR-75 as to 716-400-7307 (“Mullen Order II”); 04-MISC.CR 81 as to 716-308-0672 (“Mullen Order III”). Government’s Response at 6. Defendants Richard Mullen, Terry Mullen, Sanger, Drake, Ayanna Nolley, McKnight, Lee, Funderburk, and Adams move to suppress any and all evidence derived from electronic eavesdropping in this case, arguing that the Intercept Orders authorizing the eavesdropping activity were not supported by probable cause or necessity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518. E.g., Eaonnou Affirmation ¶80. The Government controverts the factual allegations recited by Moving Defendants in support of suppression and Defendants’ legal contentions. Government’s Response at 6, 34-51. Specifically, the Government maintains (1) probable cause supports all of the Intercept Orders; (2) Judge Skret-ny was informed in each affidavit in support of each order he issued that the DEA corroborated information provided by Defendant Frederick Nolley, who the Government determined was a reliable informant; (3) Agent Laskowski’s original and subsequent affidavits describing the basis for the investigator’s determination that CS-4 was reliable was the result of, in part, the informant’s participation in “consensually recorded telephone calls for the DEA”; and (4) even if one or more of the orders were not supported by probable cause, Moving Defendants have not shown, under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), that as to any of the Intercept Orders “(1) the issuing judge abandoned his detached, neutral role; (2) the agent was dishonest or reckless in preparing his affidavit; or (3) the agents’ reliance on any order was not reasonable,” thus defeating Defendants’ motions even assuming any lack of probable cause. Government Response at 36-39. A. Standing Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a), only an “aggrieved person” may move to suppress information obtained pursuant to an electronic intercept order. An aggrieved person is defined as “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2978, 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977) (“a person who was not named in the wiretap order and was not a party to a conversation intercepted during that tap is not an ‘aggrieved person’ and may not move to suppress information derived from it.”). Accordingly, the court considers Moving Defendants’ challenges to the Intercept Orders only insofar as each Moving Defendant is named in or had conversations intercepted pursuant to any particular order. In this case, Defendants Richard Mullen and Drake are the only Defendants named in each Intercept Order upon which the Government will rely at trial. As such, they have standing to challenge any or all of those orders. Defendant Funderburk challenges the Richardson I and Nolley III Orders (first and second extensions) requesting suppression of the conversations to which Funderburk was a party in Nol-ley III on the ground that the Richardson I Order, upon which the Nolley III Order was based, was issued without probable cause. Funderburk’s Motion ¶¶ 102, 107. Because Funderburk was not mentioned in any Intercept Order upon which the Government intends to rely but allegedly participated in conversations obtained pursuant to the Nolley III Order, Funderburk only has standing to chai-lenge the Nolley III Order. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11); Fury, supra, at 525-26 (a person who is a party to an intercepted communication or one “against whom the order was directed” has standing to challenge the order’s probable cause foundation or its necessity). However, the basis for Funderburk’s challenge to the Nolley III Order is that the affidavits submitted by Task Force Agent Jennifer A. Catania in support of the first and second extensions of the Nolley III Order rely upon and “incorporate by reference each of the previous interception applications and orders, as outlined above, to supply the necessary probable cause for their issuance.” Funderburk’s Motion ¶¶ 103. As such, Funderburk asserts that he may challenge the probable cause underlying any of the previous orders and, in particular, the probable cause of the Richardson I Order. However, as the court determined, Discussion, infra, at 237-40, the Richardson I Order is amply supported by probable cause. Thus, Funderburk’s argument that Nolley III is unsupported by probable cause in that Richardson I is unsupported by probable cause is without merit, and his asserted standing need not be addressed as to such incorporated Intercept Orders. Defendants Lee, Sanger, Terry Mullen, McKnight and Ayanna Nolley have standing to challenge particular Intercept Orders upon which the Government relies insofar as Defendants allege they were parties to an intercepted communication or the target of such communication based on such Intercept Orders. With the exception of Defendant Kenya Lee, who claims to have standing to challenge the intercepted communications by asserting “the Government was able to intercept some phone calls from ... Lee to Frederick Nolley,” Stachowski Affirmation ¶ 100, Defendants Sanger, Terry Mullen, McKnight and Ayanna Nolley do not specify under which Intercept Orders their respective conversations were intercepted. For example, Defendants Sanger, Terry Mullen and Ayanna Nolley submit a general contention that each is “an aggrieved person and has standing to contest the electronic surveillance in that [he/she], or a telephone account in [his/her] name, is a named target of such eavesdropping warrants and, further, interception and recording of telephonic communications allegedly involving the Defendant ... have been obtained thereby,” but fail to identify the specific intercepted conversations to which these Defendants claim to have standing to move to suppress, nor do they allege a basis for standing. Torre Affidavit ¶ 34; LaMen-dola Affidavit ¶ 36; Meyers-Buth Affidavit ¶ 36. Defendant McKnight moved to join in his eo-Defendants’ motions to suppress, but fails to identify on what ground McKnight had standing to challenge the intercepted communications, nor did McKnight specify the communications he challenges. Hoffman Supplemental Affidavit ¶¶ 5-6; Hoffman Affidavit ¶ 9(h). In proceedings held before the undersigned on February 2, 2005, however, the Government acknowledged that Defendant McKnight was intercepted through wiretaps on Defendant Richardson’s telephone. Additionally, the court observes that Defendants Sanger and McKnight were named in the portion of the Richardson I Order that was effective from March 12, 2004 through April 11, 2004 and from April 21, 2004 through May 20, 2004, and all other Intercept Orders except for that portion of the Richardson I Order that was effective from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 and the portion of the Nolley II Order that was effective from February 20, 2004 through March 22, 2004 and from March 2, 2004 through March 31, 2004. As such, Sanger and McKnight have standing to challenge all Intercept Orders the Government will rely on at trial except the Richardson I Order effective from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 and the Nolley II Order effective from February 20, 2004 through March 22, 2004 and from March 2,. 2004 through March 31, 2004, in which Sanger or McKnight are not named and pursuant to which they do not specifically allege their communications were intercepted,. Defendant Adams is not named in the portion of the Richardson I Order effective from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 and the Nolley II Order effective from February 20, 2004 through March 22, 2004 and from March 2, 2004 through March 31, 2004, nor were his conversations intercepted thereunder. As such, Defendant Adams lacks standing to challenge these orders. Adams is named in the Mullen I Order effective from March 26, 2004 through April 16, 2004; the Mullen II Order effective from May 7, 2004 through June 7, 2004; the Mullen II Order effective from May 7, 2004 through June 7, 2004; the Mullen III Orders effective from May 28, 2004 through June 26, 2004 and from July 12, 2004 through August 2, 2004; the Richardson I Orders effective from March 12, 2004 through April 11, 2004 and from April 21, 2004 through May 20, 2004; the Nolley III Orders effective from April 12, 2004 through May 12, 2004, from May 21, 2004 through June 19, 2004 and from July 2, 2004 through July 31, 2004; and the Nolley II Order effective from April 2, 2004 through April 30, 2004. Accordingly, Adams has standing to challenge the Intercept Orders in which he is named to the extent described above. Defendant Terry Mullen is named in the Mullen II Order effective from May 7, 2004 through June 7, 2004; the Nolley II Order effective from April 2, 2004 through April 30, 2004; the Nolley III Order effective from May 21, 2004 through June 19, 2004 and from July 2, 2004 through July 31, 2004; the Mullen III Order effective from May 28, 2004 through June 26, 2004 and from July 12, 2004 through August 2, 2004; and the Richardson I Order effective from April 21, 2004 through May 20, 2004. As such, Defendant Terry Mullen has standing to challenge the Intercept Orders in which he is named as indicated above. Finally, Defendant Ayanna Nolley is named in the Mullen II Order effective from May 7, 2004 through June 7, 2004; the Mullen III Order effective from May 28, 2004 through June 26, 2004 and from July 12, 2004 through August 2, 2004; the Nolley II Order effective from April 2, 2004 through April 30, 2004; the Nolley III Order; and the portion of the Richardson I Order effective from April 21, 2004 through May 20, 2004. Therefore, Defendant Nolley has standing to challenge the Intercept Orders in which she is named, as stated above. As discussed, Discussion, supra, at 234, although Defendant Lee alleges he was intercepted over some phone calls he made to Frederick Nolley, Lee does not identify under which of the three Nolley Intercept Orders these calls were intercepted. Further, the court notes that Kenya Lee is not named in any of the Nolley Intercept Orders, their related underlying applications, or any applications supporting any Intercept Orders upon which the Government intends to rely at trial. Without specifically identifying under which Nolley Order the conversation(s) were intercepted sufficient to confer standing upon Lee, the court is unable to consider Lee’s motion to suppress the Intercept Orders as asserted. United States v. Magaddino, 496 F.2d 455, 460 (2d Cir.1974) (burden on defendant to establish standing to challenge legality of electronic intercept warrants) (citing United States v. Sacco, 436 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir.1971) (“Defendant has the burden of showing that he has standing to challenge admission of the seized evidence.”)). See also United States v. Osorio, 949 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir.1991) (“Party moving to suppress bears the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.”) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)); United States v. Gallo, 863 F.2d 185, 192 (2d Cir.1988) (motion to suppress wiretap evidence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(iii) “to be construed in accordance with standing requirements usually applied to suppression claims under Fourth Amendment.”) (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175-76 & n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083, 109 S.Ct. 1539, 103 L.Ed.2d 843 (1989). Accordingly, Lee’s motion to suppress should be DENIED. B. Probable Cause As noted, Defendant Richard Mullen challenges each of the Intercept Orders as issued without probable cause. Eaonnou Affirmation ¶¶ 80-97. Defendant Funder-burk challenges the Richardson I and Nolley III Orders on the same basis. Funderburk Motion ¶¶ 107-115. The remaining Moving Defendants who have moved to suppress the intercepted communications argue that the relevant Intercept Orders are deficient based, in part, on a lack of probable cause. Specifically, Defendants Sanger, Ayanna Nolley, and Terry Mullen challenge the probable cause basis for the orders, but do not specify which orders were issued without probable cause, nor do these Defendants provide reasons to support this contention. Defendant McKnight requests that he be allowed to join in his eo-Defendants’ motions and to assert his standing as an “aggrieved party,” but McKnight does not specifically identify any defect upon which a particular order was based, such as the absence of probable cause or a lack of necessity. Hoffman Affidavit ¶ 9(h). Finally, Defendant Lee challenges the probable cause for all of the Intercept Orders, although Lee is not named in any of the orders. Lee also claims to be a party to “some of the intercepted conversations,” but does not specify to which conversations he was a party. Stachowski Affirmation ¶ 88. Accordingly, as Lee fails to establish his standing to challenge the Intercept Orders, Discussion, supra, at 235-36, Lee’s motion should be DENIED. The same standard for assessing probable cause governs an application to intercept electronic communications over a digital display pager as for a wiretap or eavesdropping warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518. United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 847, 113 S.Ct. 139, 121 L.Ed.2d 92 (1992). Additionally, it is well settled that the standard for assessing probable cause for an eavesdropping warrant is no different from that required for a search warrant. United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 530 (2d. Cir.1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2978, 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977). In determining whether probable cause for an eavesdropping warrant exists, the issuing officer need only make a practical, common sense decision whether, given the “totality of the circumstances” set forth in the affidavit requesting such warrant, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be obtained through the use of electronic surveillance. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). An affidavit in support of an application for an eavesdropping warrant, demonstrates probable cause when it sets forth facts which are sufficient, under the circumstances, to indicate a fair probability of criminal activity. United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Gates, supra, at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317). Further, a judge’s determination of probable cause should be given great deference by a reviewing court. Gates, supra, at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317; United States v. Nichols, 912 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir.1990). The resolution of close cases should be determined by the preference accorded to warrants. United States v. Smith, 9 F.3d 1007, 1012 (2d Cir.1993). The court will address only Defendants Mullen’s, Funderburk’s, Sanger’s, Ayanna Nolley’s and Terry Mullen’s general challenges to probable cause for the relevant Intercept Orders as urged by Moving Defendants. Moving Defendants challenge the Intercept Orders on the basis that the reliability of the confidential informants, referred to in the respective applications, particularly Frederick Nolley, who provided information upon which the orders, including the Richardson I Order, were issued, was not sufficiently established in the application. Specifically, Defendant Richard Mullen maintains the information provided by Frederick Nolley is inherently unreliable. Eaonnou Affirmation ¶¶ 87-93. Mullen asserts that Nolley cooperated with the Government to avoid future charges in exchange for providing the Government with information while minimizing his own role in the alleged conspiracy. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. With regard to the three confidential informants who provided information in the application about Richard Mullen and upon which the investigators relied in securing the Intercept Orders, Mullen argues that in addition to an insufficient showing of reliability, the information provided by these informants failed to establish the requisite probable cause for the orders. Id. ¶ 89. Mullen further contends that the first confidential source, CS-1, relied on in the application for the Richardson I order, may only establish probable cause regarding Frederick Nolley’s alleged involvement, and. not Mullen’s, in this case because CS-1 was another drug trafficker who worked for Frederick Nol-ley and “who gave information in exchange for consideration from the government.” Id. ¶ 90. Defendant Mullen further argues that the information proffered by the second confidential informant, CS-2, cannot establish probable cause sufficient to authorize a wiretap order against Mullen because CS-2, who identified Frederick Nolley “in a scheme to facilitate the flight of Michael Stranc from the jurisdiction,” does not name Richard Mullen. Eaonnou Affirmation ¶ 91. Mullen also concludes that the third confidential informant, CS-3, does not establish probable cause for Mullen’s involvement in the narcotics conspiracy because, although CS-3 describes Defendant Richardson’s involvement in the conspiracy, CS-3 does not mention Richard Mullen. Eaonnou Affirmation ¶ 92. Finally, Mullen argues that the fourth confidential informant, CS-4, whom the agents relied upon is unreliable because CS-4 also faces drug charges and only provided information in exchange for leniency. Eaonnou Affirmation ¶ 93. The factors that courts find sufficient to establish the reliability of informants in issuing warrants include that (1) the informant’s statements qualified as admissions against penal interest by admitting to personal involvement in the alleged criminal activity, (2) the informants were witnesses to the alleged criminal activity, (3) the statements were corroborated by other investigative techniques such a pen register records, and (4) the informant was not a professional informant. United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir.1990). However, contrary to Moving Defendants’ contentions, the reliability of the confidential informants as to each of the Intercept Orders challenged on this basis can be established under one or more of these factors. As stated, Defendant Richard Mullen asserts that the information provided by Frederick Nolley is “inherently unreliable” because of Nolley’s interest in diminishing charges filed against Nolley in exchange for his cooperation. Eaonnou Affirmation ¶ 87. At oral argument, counsel for Richard Mullen argued that only eonclusory statements as to Richard Mullen were made to secure the Richardson I Order, and nothing from the Mullen I Order was sufficiently incriminating as to support the Mullen II Order. (Docket Item No. 252). The Government counters by maintaining that the DEA was able to corroborate information Frederick Nolley provided to the DEA to support both orders which included information regarding the Stranc and Mullen traffic stops in Kansas, and the related drug seizure from Stranc’s car, and that these facts were presented to Judge Skretny, who issued the Mullen II Order, in affidavits submitted in support of each order. Government’s Response at 37. Additionally, the Government represented at oral argument that the core probable cause relied upon for the Richardson I Order was the cocaine seizure, in Kansas, from the vehicle in which Stranc was traveling to Buffalo as a drug courier for Mullen’s cocaine distribution operation. The Government also contended that Judge Skretny properly considered Frederick Nolley to be a reliable informant, based on factors found in Rowell, swpra, sufficient to establish the reliability of the wiretap application informants in that Nolley made admissions against his penal interest and that Nol-ley’s statements were corroborated by the DEA. Government Response at 37. This information, coupled with the fact that Nolley admitted to personally participating in Mullen’s drug trafficking organization, was also included in DEA Agent Laskowski’s affidavit in support of the Richardson I Order and accepted by Judge Skretny. Affidavit of Agent Robert J. Laskowski in Support of Intercept Order No. 04-MISC.-CR-15 (“Laskowski Affidavit”) ¶¶ 12-14. Therefore, based on the relevant factors, Rowell, supra, at 903, the court finds that Nolley was a sufficiently reliable informant whose statements supported a finding of probable cause for the Richardson I Order. Defendant Mullen also contends that the information provided by CS-1, CS-2, and CS-3 cannot be relied on to establish probable cause as to Mullen’s alleged involvement in the conspiracy. Eaonnon Affirmation ¶¶ 90-92. However, a plain reading of Agent Laskowski’s affidavit, submitted in support of the Richardson I Order, reveals that CS-1 was personally involved in drug transactions with members of the Mullen narcotics conspiracy and that CS-1 provided a description of specific conduct by Mullen in furtherance of the conspiracy. Laskowski Affidavit ¶¶ 26-27 (“Upon returning to Buffalo, CS-1 met with Mullen to give him [Mullen] the cocaine,” Id. ¶ 26; and “Mullen again approached CS-1 and asked if he/she was interested in working as a drug courier.”) Id. ¶ 27. The Laskowski affidavit further indicates that Frederick Nolley, CS-1, and CS-3 made admissions against their penal interests in statements to law enforcement. Laskowski Affidavit ¶¶ 12, 23, 42. However, the information proffered by CS-2 concerns only Defendants Stranc and Frederick Nolley, and the information provided by CS-3 implicates only Defendant Richardson. Laskowski Affidavit ¶¶ 41-45. Nevertheless, the court finds that, with regard to the information provided by CS-3, and as presented to Judge Skretny in Agent Laskowski’s Affidavit, probable cause was established as to Defendant Richardson in that CS-3 provided such statements against penal interest and the information provided by CS-3 had been corroborated, where possible. Laskowski Affidavit ¶42. Therefore, Judge Skretny properly credited CS-3’s information as to the existence of the conspiracy. Thus, even assuming CS-3 did not directly attempt to incriminate Mullen, several factors supported CS-3 as a credible source. Defendant Mullen also attacks the information provided by CS-4, arguing that CS-4 made the purported admissions in exchange for leniency, that CS-4 made eonclusory statements regarding Mullen’s alleged role in the conspiracy, and that nothing contained in the affidavits establishes CS-4’s source of knowledge. Eaon-nou Affirmation ¶ 93. However, Defendant Mullen’s assessment finds no support in Agent Laskowski’s affidavit. For purposes of establishing probable cause, the Second Circuit considers an informant to be reliable if such information “is based on reliable means, such as first-hand observations or second-hand information from reliable sources, rather than unreliable means such as rumor or innuendo,” and will find information “sufficiently reliable” where it has been “corroborated in material respects by independent evidence.” United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir.1993). Here, the information supplied by CS-4 was personally obtained by CS-4 when CS-4 consensually recorded incriminating telephone calls for the DEA, including Richardson’s statement that Mullen was one of Richardson’s suppliers and that Mullen was assisted by Frederick Nolley who was then cooperating with the DEA. Laskowski Affidavit ¶ 54. Additionally, CS-4 made numerous admissions against penal interest and CS — 4’s statements were corroborated, where possible, by the DEA investigators. Id. The court therefore finds that the agents supplied Judge Skretny with facts supporting CS-4’s reliability sufficient to establish probable cause for the Richardson I Order. Mullen also claims CS-2’s information was unreliable on its face as such information was hearsay and not based on firsthand knowledge. However, as discussed, Discussion, supra, at 238-39, in this case the wiretap applications at issue are based on information provided by several other confidential informants and Frederick Nol-ley, in addition to the information as received from CS-2. Accordingly, even if the information provided by CS-2 and CS-3 were considered to be insufficient to establish probable cause as to Defendant Mullen as a basis for the Richardson I Order, as Mullen contends, the statements provided by Frederick Nolley, CS-1 and CS^4 establish, notwithstanding, the required probable cause against Mullen as each informant either offered statements to the DEA qualifying as admissions against their penal interests, including admitting to personal involvement in the alleged criminal narcotics activity, the information was based on their personal observation of the alleged criminal activity, and CS-1 and CS-4 provided statements corroborated by other investigative techniques such pen register records and Nolley’s incriminating information. Laskowski Affidavit ¶¶ 5, 12, 23, 42. See Wagner, 989 F.2d at 72-73. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 214, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”). See United States v. Rowell, supra, at 903. Thus, taken as a whole, the information contained in the affidavits challenged by Moving Defendants set forth facts sufficient to indicate a fair probability of criminal activity in the nature of a wide-spread narcotics trafficking conspiracy involving Richardson and Mullen. Rowell, 903 F.2d at 902 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Gates, supra, at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317). As such, Moving Defendants’ motions to suppress intercepted electronic communications, resulting from the Intercept Orders, based on this ground should be DENIED. As stated, Funderburk contends the conversations he was a party to in the Nolley III Order, including the first and second extensions, approved by Judge Skretny, should be suppressed because the Richardson I Order, upon which the Nol-ley III Order was predicated, was issued without probable cause. Funderburk Motion ¶ 108. Based on its rejection of Moving Defendants’ contention that the Intercept Orders were issued without probable cause, Discussion, supra, at 236-40, the court has determined that the Richardson I Order, upon which the application for the Nolley III order was based, is supported by probable cause. Thus, Funderburk’s challenge to the Nolley III Order for lack of probable cause fails, and his motion to suppress on this ground should be DENIED. Even if it were assumed that any of the Intercept Orders were issued without probable cause, Moving Defendants have not provided any grounds to conclude the challenged wiretaps would not qualify for the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Although the Second Circuit has yet to determine whether Leon’s good faith exception applies to electronic surveillance such as the intercept orders in this case, other circuits, as well as district courts within the Second Circuit, have so held. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir.1994) (court considered the discretionary language of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) combined with the statute’s legislative history, which “expresses a clear intent to adopt suppression principles developed in Fourth Amendment cases,” to indicate the exclusionary rule applies to § 2518(10)(a) suppression issues), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 1985, 131 L.Ed.2d 872 (1995); United States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir.1988) (court analyzed information contained in the wiretap application under the deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1024, 109 S.Ct. 1149, 103 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989); United States v. Gotti, 42 F.Supp.2d 252, 267 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (court extended the good faith doctrine in Leon to wiretaps where warrants were not facially deficient and where the agents reasonably relied upon the information contained therein); United States v. Bellomo, 954 F.Supp. 630, 638 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (court found “no principled basis” to distinguish wiretap orders from other searches and seizures as to applicability of Leon) (citing cases). But see United States v. Spadaccino, 800 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir.1986) (suggesting, but not holding, that Leon may not apply to challenges to intercept orders pursuant to the federal wiretap statute as suppression is a legislative remedy intended to compel compliance with statutory, not only Fourth Amendment, notice requirements). C. Staleness The Government asserts that Defendant Lee contended certain information supporting the wiretap orders was stale. Government’s Response at 38. However, the court’s review of Lee’s motion indicates no such argument was made. Accordingly, Defendant Lee’s motion on this ground should be DISMISSED. At oral argument, Defendant Palmer’s attorney alleged that the search warrant issued for Palmer’s home was not supported by probable cause because it was stale. Docket Item No. 252. In particular, Palmer’s attorney contended there were three alleged conversations that took place between Defendants Richardson and Palmer in March 2004. Id. As such, Palmer’s attorney argues that there was no probable cause for the search warrant issued in August 2004 because agents could not reasonably have expected to find evidence of criminal activity approximately five months after the conversation took place. The court does not agree. “ ‘[T]he principal factors in assessing whether or not the supporting facts have become stale are the age of those facts and the nature of the conduct alleged to have violated the law.’ ” United States v. Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 867 (2d Cir.1981)), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110, 102 S.Ct. 3493, 73 L.Ed.2d 1373 (1982). “Moreover, ‘[njarcotics conspiracies are the very paradigm of the continuing enterprises for which courts have relaxed the temporal requirements of non-staleness.’ ” Rowell, supra (citing United States v. Feola, 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1090 (S.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd, 875 F.2d 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834, 110 S.Ct. 110, 107 L.Ed.2d 72 (1989)). In Rowell, supra, the court held that information as old as 18 months need not be suppressed on the basis of staleness, particularly with regard to the investigation of a narcotics conspiracy. Rowell, supra, at 903. Here, the information which Palmer maintains was stale was also obtained during the investigation of a narcotics conspiracy and, as less than six months old at the time of the relevant application, was significantly fresher than the information at issue in Rowell. Further, Palmer’s attorney offers no authority for his contention that the particular time period applicable to the search warrant for Palmer’s residence necessarily invalidates the probable cause foundation for the warrant on staleness grounds. Accordingly, Palmer’s staleness claim is without merit and Palmer’s motion should be DENIED on that ground. D. Necessity Defendants Richard Mullen, Funder-burk, Sanger, Ayanna Nolley, Terry Mullen, Lee and Adams challenge the necessity of the initial eavesdrop application and the necessity of every extension application obtained thereafter. These Defendants contend the Government did not adequately establish that it had employed other, conventional means of investigation without success or the reason why such means, if employed, would not uncover criminal activity as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (“ § 2518(3)(c)”). Eoannou Affirmation ¶ 96; Funderburk Motion ¶¶ 107-128; Torre Affidavit ¶ 39; Meyers-Buth Affidavit ¶ 41; LaMendola Affidavit ¶ 41; Stachowski Affirmation ¶¶ 106-109; LaTona Affidavit ¶ ¶ 41, 54. Additionally, Defendants contend that statements proffered by the DEA investigators to show the necessity of such electronic surveillance are conclusory and “boilerplate” in nature, and that the applications for electronic surveillance reference numerous confidential informants that witnessed the narcotics activity, thus demonstrating that wiretapping was not essential to the investigation. Torre Affidavit ¶ 37; Meyers-Buth Affidavit ¶ 39; LaMendola Affidavit ¶ 39; LaTona Affidavit ¶ 54. The Government contends the Defendants’ challenges misunderstand the governing law and ignore the justification for the electronic surveillance in the affidavits submitted in support of the challenged Intercept Orders. Government’s Response at 40. Specifically, the Government contends that each supporting affidavit contained facts that were “more than minimally adequate to support ... [Judge Skretny’s] determination” that electronic interception was warranted and identified the investigative techniques that were attempted or used and included reasons why others were not used. Government’s Response at 42-43. The Government therefore submits that this information, as provided to Judge Skretny, was sufficient to determine the necessity of the requested electronic surveillance. Id. (citing United States v. Ruggiero, 12 & F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831, 105 S.Ct. 118, 83 L.Ed.2d 60 (1984)). Specifically, in this case, according to the Government, the investigative techniques that either were used, were attempted and failed, or were not used as described in the affidavits submitted include “the use of informants; the use of grand jury subpoenas; the use of physical surveillance; the interview of targets; the review of pen register information; the use of search warrants or trash runs; and the use of undercover agents.” Government’s Response at 42-43. The Government further contends that electronic surveillance was necessary to obtain a conviction of the members of Mullen’s narcotics conspiracy. Id. at 42. Finally, the Government argues that Defendants have not made a “substantial” showing that any supporting affidavit was made with “deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. at 44. As required by § 2518(3)(c), an application for an electronic intercept order must contain “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” The purpose of this requirement is not to render electronic surveillance an investigative tool of last resort, but to apprise the judicial officer of the progress of the investigation and the difficulties inherent in the use of normal investigative techniques. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990). Thus, courts have held that the requirement of § 2518(3)(c) must be construed in a practical, common sense and realistic fashion. United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976). The statute does not require that all possible techniques be exhausted in fact before a wiretap may be authorized, but, rather, “[a]n affidavit describing the standard techniques that have been tried and facts demonstrating why they are no longer effective is sufficient to support an eavesdropping order even if every possible means of the investigation has not been exhausted.” United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931, 103 S.Ct. 2095, 77 L.Ed.2d 304 (1983). In this case, each of the challenged affidavits demonstrates compliance with the necessity requirements for the issuance of Intercept Orders. Specifically, each of the intercept applications include an affidavit from a DEA agent directly involved in the investigation of the alleged narcotics trafficking conspiracy detailing why other investigative techniques are not likely to be effective. Laskowski Affidavit in Support of Intercept Order No. 04-MISC. CR-15 effective from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 (¶¶ 76-95), from March 12, 2004 through April 11, 2004 (¶¶ 89-92), and from April 21, 2004 through May 20, 2004 (¶¶ 41-48); Affidavit of DEA Agent William Donovan (“Donovan Affidavit”) in Support of Order No. 04-MISC.CR-22 ¶ 15; Affidavit of DEA Agent Daniel F. Rinaldo (“Rinaldo Affidavit”) in Support of Intercept Order No. 04-MISC.CR-27 effective from March 2, 2004 through March 31, 2004 (¶¶ 16-28), and from April 2, 2004 through April 30, 2004 (¶¶ 20-31); Affidavit of DEA Special Agent Dale M. Kasprzyk (“Kasprzyk Affidavit”) in Support of Intercept Order No. 04-MISC.CR44 ¶¶ 19-32; Affidavit of DEA Agent Jennifer A. Catania (“Catania Affidavit”) in Support of Intercept Order No. 04-MISC.CR-55 effective from April 12, 2004 through May 12, 2004 (¶¶ 18-30), from May 21, 2004 through June 19, 2004 (¶¶ 16-29), and from July 2, 2004 through July 81, 2004 (¶ 65-82); Kasprzyk Affidavit in Support of Order No. 04-MISC.CR-75 ¶¶ 43-58; Kasprzyk Affidavit in Support of Order No. 04-MISC.CR-81 effective from May 28, 2004 through June 26, 2004 (¶¶ 127-141), and from July 12, 2004 through August 2, 2004 (¶¶ 42-59) (“Agents’ Affidavits”). Each of these affidavits describes other techniques that have been used in the investigation, including telephone call toll records, pen register analysis, physical surveillance, obtaining the criminal history of the subjects of the investigation, a grand jury subpoena of Moshe Friedlan-der’s bank records and the persons and businesses associated with him relative to a money laundering investigation associated with this case, and why such methods such as grand jury subpoenas, infiltration of the suspected conspiracy by undercover agents and securing search warrants, for example, were impractical at that time. E.g., Laskowski Affidavit in Support of Richardson I Order from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 ¶¶ 76-96. For example, although DEA agents in this investigation had conversations with reliable informants, the agents nevertheless represented they received limited cooperation from such informants. E.g., Laskow-ski Affidavit in Support of Richardson I Order from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 ¶¶22, 34, 37-39, 45. Further, according to Agent Laskowski, targets of the investigation had proven themselves to be conscious of surveillance so that prolonged physical surveillance, required to identify all members of the conspiracy and their modus operand^ was ineffective. Id. ¶ 90. Despite such attempted investigative techniques, the full extent of the conspiracy including, inter alia, the identity of all of its members and their respective distribution networks, the conspiracy’s methods of drug supply, particularly the identity of Richardson’s and Richard Mullen’s narcotics sources of supply in New York City and Los Angeles, the means of financing the purchase of the drugs, the scope of Richard Mullen’s and Richardson’s narcotics-related activities, the location where drugs and proceeds were stored and the members of the conspiracy and their methods for disposing of the narcotics, could not be readily determined. E.g., Laskow-ski Affidavit in Support of Richardson Order I from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 ¶¶ 76-78. Similar affidavits, stating that despite use of visual surveillance and pen registers employed against suspected members of the conspiracy for several months during the interceptions and the receipt of informant information, agents were unable to determine the extent of a drug trafficking conspiracy, have been held sufficient to establish the need for an intercept order. See United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231-32 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990); United States v. Young, 822 F.2d 1234, 1237 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Puglisi, 790 F.2d 240, 241-42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827, 107 S.Ct. 106, 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986). Defendants Adams and Funderburk argue the intercepted communications obtained pursuant to the Richardson I and Nolley III wiretap orders should be suppressed because the orders contravene the Second Circuit’s holding that “generalized and conclusory statements that other investigative procedures would prove unsuccessful” are insufficient to establish the requisite necessity for authorizing such an order. LaTona Affidavit ¶¶ 49-54; Fun-derburk’s Motion ¶¶ 117-128 (citing United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir.1983)). Defendants contend that, as in Lilia, evidence derived from the orders in the instant case must be suppressed because the statements made in the supporting affidavits do not establish this case is more than a “small time narcotics case.” Id. The court finds the facts of the instant case distinguishable from those in Lilia. In the instant case, the initial investigation began in March 2003, approximately one year before the Richardson I order was authorized and approximately Yk years before the initial indictment in this case. During this time, the investigation consisted of obtaining information from at least four informants who provided information to Agent Kasprzyk and Detective Rinaldo regarding the drug trafficking activities of members of the alleged conspiracy, some of which described drug trafficking between New York City and Buffalo, and between New York and Los Angeles; the arrest of Defendant Stranc while transporting narcotics from Los Angeles to Buffalo and the related questioning in March 2003 of Defendants Richard Mullen, Frederick Nolley and Edmond while traveling to Buffalo through Kansas in proximity with Stranc; information regarding the earlier arrest in January 2003 of Wesley Alleyne and Billy Gene Lee in Omaha, Nebraska and a corresponding cocaine seizure; eonsensually monitored, incriminating calls made by certain informants to Defendant Richardson; toll and pen register analysis over target telephones of in-terceptees and violators; and surveillance of Richardson, Richard Mullen and Frederick Nolley. Government’s Response at 4-7; Laskowski Affidavit in support of Richardson Order from February 11, 2004 through March 12, 2004 ¶ 79. As the Second Circuit in Puglisi, supra, stated This [information] stands in stark contrast to United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.1983), where, less than a month after being informed that Lilia was selling narcotics, and after buying marijuana directly from Lilla, a state trooper obtained an eavesdropping warrant solely on the strength of his representations that no other method would reveal Lilia’s co-conspirators. United States v. Puglisi, 790 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827, 107 S.Ct. 106, 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986). Here, the extensive investigation that preceded application for the wiretap orders, without identifying the true scope of the conspiracy, the identity of members or related questions such as the exact source of supply and finance of the conspiracy, demonstrated the necessity of such orders. As noted, § 2518(3)(c) does not require all other investigative procedures be exhausted before a wiretap order may be issued. Discussion, supra, at 242-43. In Torres, supra, the court upheld a wiretap order which followed an extensive, 14-month investigation against a necessity challenge because, unlike the “bare conclusions” contained in the supporting affidavits in Lilia, “the affidavits ... convincingly established that the Torres Organization was a large scale operation which could not be adequately surveiled by traditional investigative methods.” Torres, 901 F.2d at 232. Here, the Mullen conspiracy was geographically wide-ranging and, as alleged by the Grand Jury, involved over 30 co-conspirators. Under these circumstances, the court finds that, based on the affidavits submitted in support of the Intercept Order applications challenged by Defendants, the interception of electronic communications among the Defendant conspirators was necessary to obtain relevant evidence as other standard investigative techniques were not productive as of the date on which each such application was made. Defendants fail to explain how, as in Lilla, supra, standard investigative techniques could have been productively utilized prior to any of the applications or their respective extensions. Thus, the challenged applications amply satisfy the necessity requirement of § 2518(3)(c). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the intercept orders on this basis should be DENIED. E. Minimization and Failure to Record Defendants Adams, Sanger, Drake, Ayanna Nolley and Terry Mullen contend that the agents “failed to properly minimize their interceptions,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (“ § 2518(5)”). LaTona Affidavit ¶¶ 77-82; Torre Affidavit ¶ 36; Drake Motion Part VIII, ¶ 4; Meyers-Buth Affidavit ¶ 38; LaMendola Affidavit ¶ 38; Government’s Response at 44. The court’s consideration of this ground for suppression is hampered by Defendants’ failure to state which call or series of calls they contend violate the minimization requirement of § 2518(5). Id. Upon a defendant’s claim § 2518(5)’s that minimization requirements were not met, the court must determine whether the actions of the agents conducting the telephonic surveillance were reasonable under the circumstances. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). It is the government’s burden to make a prima facie showing of