Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED PATENT CLAIM TERMS BENNETT, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................1136 A. Procedural History...................................................1136 B. Factual Background..................................................1137 1. The parties.......................................................1137 2. The patents .................................... 1137 3. Common portions of the patents....................................1138 4. Pertinent claims of the '668 patent.................................1143 5. Pertinent claims of the '196 patent.................................1144 C. Agreed Constructions.................................................1146 D. Constructions In Dispute..............................................1146 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS.......................................................1150 A. Principles Of Patent Claim Construction...............................1150 1. The Phillips methodology..........................................1150 a. The starting point.............................................1150 b. Hierarchy of evidence .........................................1150 2. Other canons of claim construction.................................1154 3. The court’s independent obligation to construe terms.................1155 B. Terms Of The '668 Patent.............................................1155 1. “Stainless steel”..................................................1155 a. Arguments of the parties.......................................1156 b. Analysis......................................................1157 2. “Stainless steel” comprising certain elements.......................1158 a. Arguments of the parties.......................................1158 b. Analysis......................................................1159 i. Characterization of the material...........................1159 ii. Identification of elements.................................1160 Hi. Chromium content and other alleged ambiguities ...........1160 iv. Weight percentage ranges.................................1162 v. The court’s construction...................................1163 3. “Rendered magnetic” or “is magnetized”...........................1164 a. Arguments of the parties.......................................1165 b. Analysis......................................................1167 i. Difference in words or difference in meaning?...............1167 ii. Permanent and residual magnetism .......................1168 Hi. Capacity to be magnetized ................................1168 iv. Time at which the needle is rendered magnetic .............1171 v. Magnetized to a level that enables detection................1174 vi. The court’s construction...................................1175 4. “The wall has a thickness of greater than 0.018 inch”................1175 a. Arguments of the parties.......................................1176 b. Analysis......................................................1176 i. Relationship to independent claims........................1176 ii. Other intrinsic evidence ..................................1177 iii. The court’s construction...................................1179 5. “The needle has an inside diameter of about 0.046 inch and an outside diameter of 0.018 inch”...................................1179 a. Arguments of the parties.......................................1179 b. Analysis......................................................1180 i. Source of the error in the impossible claim..................1180 ii. Construction of the approximation.........................1181 iii. Inside diameter..........................................1183 iv. The court’s construction...................................1183 C. Terms Of The '196 Patent.............................................1183 1. Agreed constructions..............................................1183 2. Disputed constructions............................................1184 a. “Gauge”......................................................1184 i. Arguments of the parties..................................1184 ii. Analysis.................................................1185 iii. The court’s construction...................................1187 b. “Stainless steel”..............................................1187 i. Analysis.................................................1188 ii. The court’s construction...................................1195 c. “Magnetic or magnetizable”...................................1195 i. Arguments of the parties..................................1195 ii. Analysis.................................................1195 iii. The court’s construction...................................1198 d. Comparison to dimensions of “the standard needle cannula”.... 1198 i. Arguments of the parties..................................1199 ii. Analysis.................................................1200 iii. The court’s construction...................................1206 e. Terms in “whereby,” “so that,” or “such that” clauses ...........1206 i. Arguments of the parties..................................1207 ii. Analysis.................................................1208 iii. The court’s conclusion....................................1213 f “The sidewalls flanking the lumen has [sic] a combined thickness of about 0.025 inch”................................1213 i. Arguments of the parties..................................1213 ii. Analysis.................................................1214 iii. The court’s construction...................................1215 g. “Stainless steel comprising” certain elements ...................1215 h. “The needle cannula or piece thereof is magnetized....”.........1215 III. CONCLUSION...........................................................1216 Although this patent infringement action has been before the court for the disposition of several weighty matters, this ruling is the first in which the focus is the patents-in-suit themselves, which are for “detectable” hypodermic needles for livestock. Specifically, this matter comes before the court for construction of disputed patent claim terms, ie., for a ruling after a so-called “Markman hearing.” See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). The parties’ positions on claim construction appear to be as irreconcilable as their positions have been on nearly every substantive issue so far in this case: The parties have agreed on the construction of only two claim terms, but dispute whether another sixteen claim terms in the two patents require any construction at all, and if so, what construction to give them. I. INTRODUCTION A. Procedural History Pursuant to a scheduling order, as amended, the parties filed a Joint Claim Construction Statement (docket no. 160) on March 21, 2007, setting forth the construction of claim terms, phrases, and clauses on which the parties agree, the parties’ proposed constructions of disputed claim terms, and the parts of the patents or prosecution histories of the patents supporting a party’s disputed construction. The parties then filed their Markman claim construction briefs on April 24, 2007. See Plaintiffs Markman Claim Interpretation Brief (docket no. 171); Defendants’ Markman Claim Construction Brief (docket no. 166). The parties filed rebuttal briefs on claim construction on June 15, 2007. See Plaintiff Markman Claim Interpretation Rebuttal Brief (docket no. 188); Defendants’ Markman Claim Construction Rebuttal Brief (docket no. 191). In a prior patent case, the court provided the parties with a tentative draft of a ruling on claim construction prior to the Markman hearing. See Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 411 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1015-16 (N.D.Iowa 2006). The court found that such a procedure was very effective in focusing the parties’ arguments on the areas in which there were truly disputes about the construction of claim terms and where the parties believed that the court had gone wrong in its constructions, and the parties in that case agreed. The court followed such a procedure in this case by providing the parties with a 144-page tentative draft ruling on claim construction issues on July 27, 2007. Once again, the court and the parties found that use of a tentative draft dramatically narrowed the number of issues that the parties felt compelled to argue during the Markman hearing. Specifically, the plaintiff requested that the court “revisit” its construction of only one claim term, while the defendant took issue with the court’s construction of only four claim terms. Moreover, both parties recommended that the court continue to use such a procedure for Markman decisions in patent cases in the future and expressed their hope that other federal district court judges would become aware of and use such a procedure in patent cases. The court held the Markman hearing in this case on August 3, 2007. The Mark-man hearing in this case was the first instance in which this court has conducted a hearing using teleconferencing and “web-casts” of the parties’ presentations over the internet. The court and the parties found that this procedure was also extremely effective in both presenting the parties’ arguments and saving the parties substantial sums in attorney fees and travel costs. At the hearing, plaintiff Ideal Instruments, Inc., was represented by Toni L. Harris, who presented Ideal’s argument, and Mark R. Fox of Fraser, Trebilcock, Davis & Dunlap, P.C., in Lansing, Michigan. Defendants Rivard Instruments, Inc., and Meril Rivard, were represented by Terence J. Linn, who presented the defendants’ argument, and Karl T. Onders-ma of Van Dyke, Gardner, Linn & Burk-hart, L.L.P., and local counsel Dennis W. Johnson of Dorsey & Whitney, L.L.P., in Des Moines, Iowa. The question of the proper construction of disputed claim terms of the patents-in-suit is now fully submitted. Although this ruling is the fifth substantial ruling in this case, the new issues of claim construction nevertheless require a statement of some of the pertinent background to the patents-in-suit and to this litigation to put in perspective the court’s ruling on claim construction. B. Factual Background 1. The parties Plaintiff Ideal Instruments, Inc., (Ideal) is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Lansing, Michigan. Corporate defendant Rivard Instruments, Inc., is a closely held for-profit Canadian corporation, and individual defendant Meril Rivard is a citizen of Canada, a resident of Winnipeg, Manitoba, and the president and majority, if not sole, shareholder of Rivard Instruments. Unless the context requires otherwise, the court will identify the defendants collectively as “Rivard.” Both Ideal and Rivard manufacture “detectable” hypodermic needles for use, for example, in hypodermic syringes for livestock. The needles are “detectable” in the sense that they are made to be easily detected in the carcasses of slaughtered animals by using metal detectors installed in meat processing plants, if they break off or are otherwise inadvertently left behind in the course of injecting the animals. 2. The patents Two of Ideal’s patents are at issue in this lawsuit. Ideal is the assignee of United States Patent No. 6,488,668 (the '668 patent) for a “detectable heavy duty needle.” The inventor of the '668 patent is identified as Gordon Prindle, and the patent stems from application number 08/714,-041, filed November 16, 2000. The '668 patent originally issued on December 3, 2002, and was upheld on ex parte reexamination on December 23, 2004. Ideal is also the assignee of another patent for a “detectable heavy duty needle,” United States Patent No. 6,960,196 (the '196 patent), which also identifies the inventor as Gordon Prindle, and stems from application number 10/215,122, filed on August 8, 2002, as a continuation of the application that ripened into the '668 patent. The '196 patent issued on November 1, 2005. Ideal manufactures, sells, and distributes a product exploiting the inventions disclosed in the '668 and '196 patents under the commercial name “D3 Detectable Needles.” 3. Common portions of the patents Because the '668 patent and the '196 patent stem from the same original application, most portions of the Abstract, Figures, Background Of The Invention, Summary Of The Invention, and Detailed Description Of The Invention in the two patents are identical. Thus, the Abstract describes the patented invention in each patent as follows: The present invention provides a detectable heavy duty needle cannula for use in hypodermic syringes and the like. Needle cannula comprises a magnetizable or magnetized stainless steel alloy, which enables needle cannula to be detectable in metal detectors that are commonly used in the meat processing industry to detect broken needle cannulas in the flesh of slaughtered animals. Needle cannula further comprises a sidewall that is thicker than the sidewalls of prior art needle cannulas. The thicker sidewall imparts to needle cannula greater resistance to breakage during the process of injecting animal health products into an animal and greater detectability in a metal detector. Joint Exhibit 1001 (hereinafter the '668 patent) (component numbers omitted); Joint Exhibit 1003 (hereinafter the '196 patent). The Summary Of The Invention makes clear that the patented inventions have as an object “to provide a needle cannula that is more resistant to breakage during the process of injecting animal health products into an animal” and as another object “to provide a needle cannula comprising a stainless steel alloy that is magnetized to facilitate detection of the broken needle cannula in the flesh of the animal using the metal detectors that are commonly used in the meat processing industry.” The '668 patent, Col. 3, ll. 19-27; the '196 patent, Col. 3, ll. 21-29. To understand the patented inventions, the court finds it helpful to pair figures from the patents with the pertinent parts of the Detailed Description Of The Invention. Figure 1, as shown in the '196 patent, and described as “a longitudinal cross-sectional view of the needle assembly comprising the detectable heavy duty needle of the present invention,” is the following: The Detailed Description Of The Invention in both patents explains Figure 1 as follows: FIG. 1 schematically illustrates a needle assembly 10 adapted for detach-ably mounting on a luer collar of a hypodermic syringe or the like comprising the detectable heavy duty needle cannula 12 having proximal end 14, distal end 16, and a sidewall 17 with an outer sidewall 17A and inner sidewall 17B therebetween having a lumen 18 extending therethrough defining a longitudinal axis. Distal end 16 of the needle cannula 12 preferably includes sharpened tip 20. A mounting hub 22 is securely affixed to the proximal end 14 of needle cannula 12 and includes projections 24 extending therefrom for threaded engagement with a luer collar or like attachment means. Thus, nee-die assembly 10 is mountable on a hand-held hypodermic syringe barrel. However, needle assembly 10 can also be mounted on a catheter device or mounted on automatic injection devices. The '668 patent, Col. 4,11. 16-80; the '196 patent, Col. 4, 11. 17-81. It should be added, for the sake of completeness, that the Detailed Description later explains, “FIG. 1 shows a particular embodiment of needle assembly 10 comprising needle cannula 12; however, the detectable needle cannula of the present invention is not limited to that particular embodiment.” The '668 patent, Col. 4, l. 67, to Col. 5, l. 4; the '196 patent, Col. 5, ll. 4-7. Figure 2, as shown in the '196 patent, and described as “an isometric view of the detectable heavy duty needle of the present invention,” is the following: The pertinent portion of the Detailed Description Of The Invention in both patents explains this figure as follows: As shown in FIG. 2 in greater detail, needle cannula 12 is tubular with proximal end 16, distal end 14, and a sidewall 17 therebetween. The needle cannula 12 has a lumen 18 defining a cannula longitudinal axis 19. Preferably, needle 12 has a sharpened tip 20 at distal end 16 and is blunt at proximal end 14. The '668 patent, Col. 4, ll. 49-54; the '196 patent, Col. 4, ll. 50-55. Figure 3, as shown in both the '668 patent and the '196 patent, and described as “a perspective view of an apparatus comprising a metal detector for detecting a part of the detectable heavy duty needle of the present invention broken off in the flesh of an animal and a conveyor for transporting the flesh through the metal detector,” is the following: The pertinent portion of the Detailed Description explains this figure as follows: FIG. 3 shows one embodiment for an apparatus for detecting metal in the flesh of an animal after slaughter. Shown is apparatus 100 comprising a conveyor means 102 for transporting animal flesh or meat products after slaughter 200 through metal detector 104 for detecting whether animal flesh contains a broken piece of needle cannula 12 of the present invention. Metal detector 104, comprises a coil arrangement 110 (shown in FIG. 4) inside a metal case 106. The '668 patent, Col. 6, ll. 20-27; the '196 patent, Col. 6, ll. 24-31. Figure 4, as shown in both the '668 patent and the '196 patent, “shows a balanced three-coil system commonly used in the metal detectors that are used in the meat packing industry,” as follows: The Detailed Description describes Figure 4, and also explains the essence of how metal detectors detect needles or other metallic objects left behind in the carcasses of slaughtered animals, as follows: The metal detector preferably uses a balanced three-coil system 110 (FIG. 4), which is a configuration that is commonly used in the meat processing industry to detect metal in the flesh of animals after slaughter. The three coils are wound on a non-metallic frame or former, each exactly parallel with the other. The center transmitter coil 112 is connected to a high frequency radio transmitter. The two receiver coils 114 on each side of the coil 112 act as radio receivers or aerials. Because receiver coils 114 are identical and the same distance to transmitter coil 112, they pick up the same signal and an identical voltage is induced in each. When coils 114 are connected in opposition, they cancel out resulting in zero output. When a piece of metal in animal flesh or meat product after slaughter 210 passes through coil arrangement 110, the high frequency field is disturbed under one coil, changing the voltage generated by a few microvolts. The perfect state of balance is lost and the output is no longer zero. The resulting signal output is sent to a receiver where it is processed and amplified. The processed signal is then sent to a computer processing unit or other device. It is this frequency disturbance phenomenon that is used to detect the presence of unwanted metal in the flesh of an animal after slaughter. A magnetized or magnetic piece of metal will also induce a change in voltage that can be measured by the metal detector. Preferably, coil arrangement 110 is mounted inside a metal case 106 with a hole in the center to allow passage of animal flesh or meat product after slaughter 200 (FIG. 3). Metal case 106 provides rigidity to coil arrangement 110 and acts as a screen, preventing airborne electrical signals, or nearby metal items and machinery from disturbing the detector. Aluminum is frequently used for metal case 106 but where frequent washdown is required such as in meat processing plants, stainless steel is generally used. The '668 patent, Col. 6, l. 49, to Col. 7, l. 16; the '196 patent, Col. 6, l. 53, to Col. 7, l 20. The court believes that the illustrations and portions of the Detailed Description quoted here provide sufficient context, at least for the moment, for the specific claims of each patent. The court will return to the Summary of the Invention, the Detailed Description, and the prosecution history of the '668 and the '196 patents, as appropriate, in its analysis of the parties’ competing constructions of claim terms. For present purposes, however, the court will pass on to the pertinent claims of the two patents. 4.Pertinent claims of the '668 patent The pertinent claims of the '668 patent for purposes of this ruling on claim construction, and apparently for purposes of Ideal’s claims of infringement by Rivard, are claims 1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, and 15. Those claims are quoted below, with italics indicating claim terms for which the parties dispute the construction: I claim: 1. In a method of injecting flesh of a living food animal which comprises: (a) providing an injection means comprising a tubular needle defined by at least one wall forming the tube and supported on a hub and mounted on a device for injecting a dosage of a material in an animal, where in the needles is made of stainless steel which comprises Fe and 0.01-3.0 wt % Si, less than 0.03 wt % P, 4-25 wt % Cr, 0.003-7.0 wt % Al, 0.01-1.0 wt % Mn, 0.001-0.03 wt % S,0.01-5.0 wt % Mo, 0.01-1.0 wt % Ti, 0.003-0.08 wt % C, 0.01-5.0 %vt % Ni, 0.01-0.5 wt % Cu, less than 0.01 wt % Pb, 0.02-0.5 wt % B% 0.5-1.0 wt % Nb, 0.02-1.0 wt % Zr, and 0.05-1.0 wt % V, and which is rendered magnetic to a level that enables detection of the magnetism of the needle if the needle is broken off in the flesh of the living animal during injecting the animal; and (b) injecting the living animal with the dosage using the needle, wherein if the needle breaks in the animal during injection, the needle, which has been rendered magnetic prior to injecting the living animal or while in the flesh of the animal after slaughter, can be detected in the flesh of the animal upon slaughter and processing into the food. ❖ * * 5. The method of claim 1 or 2 wherein the wall has a thickness of greater than 0.018 inch. 6. The method of claim 1 or 2 wherein the needle has an inside diameter of about 0.046 inch and an outside diameter of 0.018 inch [sic]. 7. In a slaughtering method of slaughter and processing of animals for food while conveying the flesh of the animal, the improvement which comprises detecting a broken stainless steel tubular needle in the flesh wherein the stainless steel comprises Fe and 0.01-3.0 wt % Si, less than 0.03 wt % P, 4-25 wt % Cr, 0.003-7.0 wt % Al, 0.01-1.0 wt % Mn, 0.001-0.03 wt % S, 0.01-5.0 wt % Mo, 0.01-1.0 wt % T% 0.003-0.08 wt % C, 0.01-5.0 wt % Ni, 0.01-0. 5 wt% Cu, less than 0.01 wt % Pb, 0.02-0. 5 wt % Bi, O. 5-1.0 wt % Nb, 0.02-1.0 wt % Zr, and 0.05-1.0 wt%V, and wherein the needle has at least one wall and is supported on a hub for mounting on a device for injecting a dosage of a material into an animal, wherein the needle is magnetized to a level which enables detection of the magnetism of the needle when the needle is broken off from the hub and is in the flesh of the animal when the animal is slaughtered and processed. * * * 11. The method of claim 7 or 8 wherein the wall has a thickness of greater than 0.018 inch. 12. The method of claim 7 or 8 wherein the needle has an inside diameter of about 0.046 inch and an outside diameter of 0.018 inch [sic]. 13. In a method of detecting and removing a broken injection needle in a slaughtered animal resulting from injecting the flesh of a living food animal, the improvement which comprises: (a) providing an injection means comprising a tubular needle defined by at least one wall forming the tube and supported on a hub and mounted on a device for injecting a dosage of a material in an animal, wherein the needles is made of stainless steel comprising Fe and 0.01-3.0 wt % Si, less than 0.03 wt % P, 4-%5 wt % Cr, 0.003-7.0 wt % Al, 0.01-1.0 wt % Mn, 0.001-0.03 wt % S, 0.01-5.0 wt % Mo, 0.01-1.0 wt % Ti, 0.003-0.08 wt % C, 0.01-5.0 wt % Ni, 0.01-O. 5 wt % Cu, less than 0.01 wt % Pb, 0.02-0.5 wt % B% 0.5-1.0 wt % Nb, 0.02-1.0 wt % Zr, and 0.05-1.0 wt%V, which is rendered magnetic at a level that enables detection of the magnetism of the needle if the injection needle is broken off in the flesh of the living animal during the injection; (b) injecting the living animal with the dosage using the needle, whereby when the needle breaks in the animal during the injection, the needle can be detected in the flesh of the animal upon slaughter and processing into the food; and (c)detecting and removing the broken needle in the slaughtered animal during processing into the food. 15. In a slaughtering method for slaughter and processing of animals for food while conveying the flesh of the animal, the improvement which comprises: (a) detecting a broken stainless steel tubular injection needle in the flesh, wherein the injection needle has at least one wall and is supported on a hub for mounting on a device for injecting a dosage of a material into an animal and which comprises Fe and 0.01-3.0 wt % Si, less than 0.03 wt % P, 4 — 25 wt % Cr, 0.003-7.0 wt % Al, 0.01-1.0 wt % Mn, 0.001-0.03 wt % S, 0.01-5.0 wt % Mo, 0.01-1.0 wt % Ti 0.003-0.08 wt % C, 0.01-5.0 wt % Ni, 0.01-0.5 wt % Cu, less than 0.01 wt % Pb, 0.02-0.5 wt % Bi 0.5-1.0 wt % Nb, 0.02-1.0 wt % Zr, and 0.05-1.0 wt % V, wherein the injection needle is magnetized to a level which enables detection of the magnetism of the needle when broken off in the flesh of the animal when the animal is slaughtered and processed; and (b) removing the broken needle from the flesh. The '668 patent, Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, and 15. 5. Pertinent claims of the '196 patent The pertinent claims of the '196 patent for purposes of this ruling on claim construction, and apparently for purposes of Ideal’s claims of infringement by Rivard, are claims 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 11. Those claims are quoted below, with bold indicating claim terms for which the parties have agreed on a construction, italics indicating claim terms for which the parties dispute the construction, and underlining indicating corrections stated in the November 1, 2005, Certificate of Correction, Joint Appendix at 534: I claim: 1. In a method of injecting an animal health product into flesh of a living food animal which comprises: (a) providing an injection means comprising a needle assembly which includes a gauge of needle cannula having an outer diameter and a lumen with a lumen diameter and which is mounted on a device for injecting a dosage of the product into the living food animal, wherein the needle cannula is made of stainless steel which is magnetic or magnetizable, and the outer diameter is greater than an outer diameter of a standard needle cannula and the lumen diameter is identical to a lumen diameter of the standard needle cannula between H and 27 gauge so that the needle cannula has a sidewall thickness which renders the needle cannula resistant to breakage during the injection and increases detectability in a metal detector over the standard needle cannula such that the magnetism and the sidewall thickness enables [sic] detection of the magnetism of the needle cannula or piece thereof in the flesh of the animal upon slaughter and processing into a food if the needle cannula or piece thereof were to break off in the flesh of the living animal during the injection; and (b) injecting the living food animal with the dosage using the injection means, whereby if the needle cannula or piece thereof breaks off in the living animal during the injection, the needle cannula or piece thereof can be detected by a metal detector when the standard needle cannula of the same gauge cannot be detected in the flesh of the animal upon slaughter and processing into food. * * * 3. The method of claim 1 or 2 where in the sidewalls flanking the lumen has [sic] a combined thickness of greater than 0.018 inch. 4. The method of claim 1 or 2 where in the sidewalls flanking the lumen has [sic] a combined thickness of about 0.025 inch. 5. The method of claim 1 or 2 wherein the stainless steel comprises Fe and 0.01-3.0 wt % S% less than 0.03 wt % P, k-25 wt % Cr, 0.003-7.0 wt % Al, 0.01-1.0 wt % Mn, 0.001-0.03 wt % S, 0.01-5.0 wt % Mo, 0.01-1.0 wt % Ti, 0.003-0.08 wt % C, 0.01-5.0 wt % Ni, 0.01-0.5 wt % Cu, less than 0.01 wt % Pb, 0.02-0.5 wt % Bi, 0.5-1.0 wt % Nb, 0.02-1.0 wt % Zr, and 0.05-1.0 wt % V. * * * 8. In a slaughtering method for slaughter and processing of animals for food while conveying the flesh of the animal through a detector for detecting needle cannulas or pieces thereof in the flesh, the improvement which comprises detecting in the flesh of the animal a broken stainless steel tubular needle cannula or piece thereof which has broken off of a needle assembly of an injection means for injecting a dosage of an animal health product into the animal while it is living, wherein the needle cannula is of a gauge, has an outer diameter, and a lumen with a lumen diameter and wherein the outer diameter is greater than the outer diameter of a standard needle cannula and the lumen diameter is identical to a lumen diameter of the standard needle cannula between and 27 gauge so that the needle cannula has a sidewall thickness which renders the needle cannula resistant to breakage during the injecting and increases detectability of the needle cannula in a metal detector over the standard needle cannula while being conveyed through the detector so that it can be detected when the standard needle cannula of the same gauge cannot be detected, and wherein the needle cannula or piece thereof is magnetized to a level which enables detection of the magnetism of the needle cannula or piece thereof when the needle cannula or piece thereof is broken off in the flesh of an animal while the flesh of the animal is being conveyed through the detector during the slaughter and processing. * * * 10. The method of claim 8 or 9 wherein the sidewalls flanking the lumen has [sic] a combined thickness of greater than 0.018 inch. 11. The method of claim 8 or 9 wherein the sidewalls ñanking the lumen has [sic] a combined thickness of about 0.025 inch. The '196 patent, Claims 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 11. C. Agreed Constructions As the court noted at the outset of this decision, the parties have agreed on the construction of only two claim terms, both of which appear in the '196 patent: “needle assembly,” which appears in claims 1 and 8, and “flanking the lumen,” which appears in claims 3, 10, and 11. These terms appear in bold in the quotation of the pertinent claims, above. The claim terms and the parties’ agreed proposed constructions are as follows: The court will consider below whether it is required to or will accept either or both of these agreed constructions. D. Constructions In Dispute As also noted above, Ideal contends that no other claims terms require construction, while Rivard contends that numerous claim terms in each of the patents require construction. The following chart shows the claim terms identified by Rivard as requiring construction, Rivard’s proposed construction for each term, and Ideal’s alternative construction for each term, if any, which Ideal offers if the court deems it necessary to construe the term in question. The disputed terms are quoted here in the way that they are stated in the patents, rather than the way that they are stated in the Joint Claim Construction Statement or the parties’ briefs, where there is a difference. II. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Principles Of Patent Claim, Construction In construing patent claims, courts follow the methodology set forth in the recent en banc decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc). See, e.g., Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs. Corp., 483 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed.Cir.2007) (“This court construes claims according to the principles set forth by this court in [Phillips ].”); CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed.Cir.2005); Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2005). The court will, therefore, summarize that methodology and review key canons of patent claim construction. 1. The Phillips methodology a. The starting point As the court explained in Phillips, “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). Consequently, before and since the decision in Phillips, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has reiterated that courts must “begin [their] claim construction analysis with the words of the claim.” Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc., 424 F.3d 1136, 1142 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)); Biagro Western Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“It is elementary that claim construction begins with, and remains focused on, the language of the claims.”). “The construction of claims,” the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.” Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp., 418 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). b. Hierarchy of evidence The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the process of claim construction begins with “intrinsic” evidence: The words of the claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. [Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d] at 1582. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. The person of ordinary skill in the art views the claim term in the light of the entire intrinsic record. See id. Thus, the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Markman v. West- view Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc). “ ‘The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.’ ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed.Cir.1998)). In addition to the written description, “the prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id. at 1317. Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1142; accord Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C. v. Cabela’s, Inc., 485 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2007) (the goal of claim construction is “to implement the invention described in the specification and prosecution history, within the confines of the prior art”) (citing Phillips); Intamin, Ltd., 483 F.3d at 1334 (under Phillips, “the court consults primarily the claims themselves in context, with much of that context supplied by the specification and the prosecution history”); Biagro Western Sales, 423 F.3d at 1302 (explaining that “prosecution history, ... like the patent itself, has been designated as part of the ‘intrinsic evidence’ ” for claim construction) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317). When examining such “intrinsic” evidence, “dependent claims can supply additional context for construing the scope of the independent claims associated with those dependent claims.” Intamin, Ltd., 483 F.3d at 1335 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). This is so, because “[a]n independent claim impliedly embraces more subject matter than its narrower dependent claim.” Id. For example, a dependent claim may demonstrate what distinctions the patentee perceived and what the independent claim impliedly embraced. Id. More specifically, under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “ ‘[t]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent claim.’ ” Acumed L.L.C. v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed.Cir.2007) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed.Cir.2004)). “ ‘That presumption is especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim.’ ” Id. (quoting Sun-Race Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed.Cir.2003)). More generally, the doctrine of claim differentiation “is based on ‘the common sense notion that different words or phrases used in separate claims are presumed to indicate that the claims have different meanings and scope.’ ” Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, L.L.C., 474 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2007) (quoting Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971-72 (Fed.Cir.1999)). Thus, “ ‘[t]o the extent that the absence of such difference in meaning and scope would make a claim superfluous, the doctrine of claim differentiation states the presumption that the difference between claims is significant.’” Id. at 1369-70 (quoting Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed.Cir.1987)). The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the “central importance” of the specification of the patent, another form of “intrinsic” evidence, in claim construction is “because ‘the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.’ ” AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313); Research Plastics, Inc. v. Federal Packaging Corp., 421 F.3d 1290, 1295 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“It is presumed that the person of ordinary skill in the art read the claim in the context of the entire patent, including the specification, not confining his understanding to the claim at issue.”). Indeed, “[w]here ... the disputed claim term is technical or a term of art, ‘[t]he best source for understanding [it] is the specification from which it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.’ ” AquaTex, 419 F.3d at 1380 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315). The specification is not only “highly relevant” to claim construction, “[u]sually, it is dispositive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (adding that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term”). The court may also consult the prosecution history as “intrinsic” evidence to determine the proper construction of claim terms. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “ ‘The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a claim is to “exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.” ’ ” Research Plastics, 421 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Rhodia Chimie v. PPG Indus., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2005), in turn quoting ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1988)). This is so, because “the prosecution history can reveal instances where the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution and thus narrowed the scope of the claim.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18). In addition to “intrinsic” evidence, consisting of the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history, “extrinsic” evidence can also be useful in claim construction. Terlep, 418 F.3d at 1382 (“Extrinsic evidence ... also ‘may be considered if the court deems it helpful in determining the true meaning of the language used in the patent claims.’ ”) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318). For example, “ ‘technical dictionaries may provide [help] to a court “to better understand the underlying technology” and the way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.’ ” AquaTex, 419 F.3d at 1380 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315, in turn quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1584). Indeed, “[i]n some cases, it is possible to construe a claim term by applying ‘the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.’ ” Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 422 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). Therefore, “a judge who encounters a claim term while reading a patent might consult a general purpose or specialized dictionary to begin to understand the meaning of the term, before reviewing the remainder of the patent to determine how the patentee has used the term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has recently reevaluated the usefulness of dictionaries to determine the meaning of claim terms: Our en banc decision in Phillips clarified the appropriate use of dictionaries in claim construction, rejecting the view that dictionary definitions govern unless contradicted by intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320. Nonetheless Phillips confirms that courts may “ ‘rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms’ ” and that “[dictionaries ... are often useful to assist in understanding the commonly understood meaning of words.” Id. at 1322 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n. 6 (Fed.Cir.1996)). The court must ensure that any reliance on dictionaries accords with the intrinsic evidence: the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. Id. at 1314. Under Phillips, the rule that “a court will give a claim term the full range of its ordinary meaning,” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001), does not mean that the term will [*1349] presumptively receive its broadest dictionary definition or the aggregate of multiple dictionary definitions, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320-1322. Rather, in those circumstances where reference to dictionaries is appropriate, the task is to scrutinize the intrinsic evidence in order to determine the most appropriate [dictionary] definition. Id. at 1322-23, 1324. Free Motion Fitness, Inc., 423 F.3d at 1348-49. Thus, while standard and specialized dictionaries have their place in patent claim construction, the court must choose the proper dictionary definition in light of the “intrinsic” evidence of the meaning of patent terms, consisting of the patent description and the prosecution history, not merely choose a dictionary definition over the definition suggested by such “intrinsic” evidence. See also Terlep, 418 F.3d at 1382 (dictionaries are useful, “provided the court ‘attaeh[es] the appropriate weight ... to those sources in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.’ ”) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324). Thus, “[w]hat Phillips now counsels is that in the absence of something in the written description and/or prosecution history to provide explicit or implicit notice to the public- — i. &, those of ordinary skill in the art — that the inventor intended a disputed term to cover more than the ordinary and customary meaning revealed by the context of the intrinsic record, it is improper to read the term to encompass a broader definition simply because it may be found in a dictionary, treatise, or other extrinsic source.” Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1145; see also Acumed L.L.C., 483 F.3d at 813 (in Phillips, the en banc court expressly rejected construing claim terms in accordance with the broader of two dictionary definitions, where there was no express disavowal of claim scope in the specification). Extrinsic evidence that may be useful in claim construction also includes “expert testimony,” but such testimony should also be considered in the context of intrinsic evidence. Biagro, 423 F.3d at 1302; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19. More specifically, “a court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by ... the written record of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Network Commerce, Inc., 422 F.3d at 1361 (citing Phillips for the proposition that “expert testimony at odds with the intrinsic evidence must be disregarded”). 2. Other canons of claim construction Apart from the evidence upon which claim construction may be based, claim construction involves various “canons.” One canon of claim construction is that “claim terms are presumed to be used consistently throughout the patent, such that the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims.” Research Plastics, Inc., 421 F.3d at 1295 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313-14, and Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001)). On the other hand, “[w]hen different words or phrases are used in separate claims, a difference in meaning is presumed.” Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1143 (citing Tandon Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed.Cir.1987)); see also Andersen Corp., 474 F.3d at 1369 (describing this presumption as the doctrine of claim differentiation). Similarly, the court must interpret claims so that no term becomes “superfluous.” See Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”); Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed.Cir.2004) (stating that interpretations of claims rendering claim terms superfluous is generally disfavored). Another canon of patent claim construction is that the patentee may act as “lexicographer.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In other words, “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess,” and when that happens, the paten-tee’s definition must govern. Id. Nevertheless, the authority of the specification as a source for definitions for claim terms is not limitless. Rather, “[t]he court must take care in its analysis, when locating in the written description the context for a disputed term, not to import a limitation from that written description. It must use the written description for enlightenment and not to read a limitation from the specification [into the construction of the term].” Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 906 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Comark Communications v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed.Cir.1998)). To put it another way, “ ‘[i]t is axiomatic that claims, not the specification embodiments, define the scope of protection.’ ” Id. (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted)). With these principles in mind, the court turns to construction of the disputed claim terms in this case, patent-by-patent and claim-by-claim. However, the court must first resolve the question of the role that the parties’ proffered constructions play in the court’s construction of claim terms. 3. The court’s independent obligation to construe terms In a recent patent case, this court asked the parties to brief the question of whether the court is bound by the parties’ competing definitions in its claim construction process, that is, whether the court must choose only between the parties’ competing definitions or is, instead, free to construe the claim terms for itself. See Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 411 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1042-43 (N.D.Iowa 2006). Based on the agreements of the parties in that case and the authorities that they cited, this court concluded that it is not bound to make a “binary” choice between the parties’ proffered constructions, but must, instead, independently construe disputed claim terms. Id. Indeed, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly held that the court is free to adopt a construction independent of those suggested by the parties. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed.Cir.1995). Thus, the court reiterates its conclusion that it has an obligation to construe the patent terms independently, applying the Phillips methodology, and is not bound to adopt either party’s proffered construction of any claim term. The court now turns to its independent construction of the claim terms, but in construing disputed claim terms, the court will use the parties’ proffered constructions as its starting point. B. Terms Of The '668 Patent Although Ideal contends that none of the terms of the '668 patent require construction, because all are unambiguous and well known and understood by one skilled in the art, Rivard contends that six terms of the '668 patent require construction by the court. Some of the same or similar terms are also in dispute in the '196 patent, where the parties contend that they should be given the same constructions. The court will consider the disputed terms of the '668 patent in turn. Because Rivard is the party asserting that the terms require construction, and most of Ideal’s arguments in its Markman brief are devoted to explanations of why Rivard’s proffered constructions are wrong, the court will begin each summary of the parties’ arguments concerning constructions of disputed terms with Rivard’s arguments. 1. “Stainless steel” The term “stainless steel” is used in claims 1, 7, 13, and 15 of the '668 patent. The parties have offered the following constructions of this term: a. Arguments of the parties Rivard contends that “stainless steel” is ambiguous, in part, because “stainless steel” is sometimes specified in the patent as comprising, inter alia, 4-25 % by-weight of chromium, but Rivard asserts that an alloy containing as little as 4% chromium is not “stainless steel” within the ordinary meaning of the term or within the meaning disclosed by the specification. Rivard points out that the specification states that “[t]he stainless steel alloy can comprise any corrosion-resistant magnetic material with an elemental composition within the range set forth in” certain specified patents. See the '668 patent, Co. 5, ll. 24-28. Rivard asserts that the patents referred to specify that chromium in excess of 8 % is required to obtain the corrosion resistance desired, not as little as 4 % as elsewhere stated in the claims and specification of the '668 patent, and those patents suggest other conflicts with the percentages of other components expressly stated in the '668 patent. Rivard acknowledges that the patent states that, in case of conflict between the specification and patents incorporated therein by reference, “the present description, including definitions, will control,” see the '668 patent, Col. 3, ll. 44-48, but apparently contends that this statement does not dispel the ambiguity. Rivard also notes that one of the patents for “stainless steel” incorporated by reference in the Detailed Description, U.S. Patent No. 4,969,963 to Honkura, is described contrariwise in the prosecution history to the '668 patent as “completely unsuitable for the needle of the method claimed in the ['668 patent].” Joint Exhibit 1002, Joint Appendix at 492. Rivard also points out that the prosecution history reveals that the patentee confirmed that the properties of stainless steel are dependant upon the constituents of the steel. Finally, Rivard cites extrinsic evidence in the form of ordinary and technical dictionary definitions defining “stainless steel” as having at least 10 percent chromium. Consequently, Rivard argues that the ordinary meaning of “stainless steel” is “a large group of corrosion resistant steels that contain 10 % or more of chromium and may contain other elements.” In the alternative, Rivard argues that the patents sufficiently redefine “stainless steel” to mean alloys limited to the compositions disclosed in the patents. Indeed, in its rebuttal brief, Rivard argues that the use of “stainless steel” in the specifications and claims of the patents-in-suit results in defining five particular formulations of stainless steel. Rivard then contends that only one of those formulations is explicitly claimed in independent claims 1, 7, 13, and 15 of the '668 patent and claims 5 and 12 of the '196 patent, while any of the five formulations could apply to references to “stainless steel” without specification of a chemical composition in claims 1-4, 7-11, and 14 of the '196 patent. Ideal, on the other hand, contends that the meaning of “stainless steel” is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art. Ideal also asserts that Rivard’s attempt to narrow the definition is improper, because it lacks even an iota of support in the intrinsic evidence, and the extrinsic evidence that Rivard cites is irrelevant. More specifically, Ideal argues that both the patentee and the examiner recognized that “stainless steel needles” were well known in the prior art, but that nowhere in the prosecution history was there any reference to or unmistakable limitation of “stainless steel” to an alloy comprised of 10% or more of chromium. Ideal contends that the extrinsic evidence on which Ri-vard relies is irrelevant, because resort to such evidence cannot overcome the ordinary and customary meaning of the term in the context of the claim term and the embodiments described in the patents-in-suit. In the alternative, Ideal asserts that “corrosion-resistant steel” is an appropriate construction of “stainless steel” that is found in, and well-supported by, the intrinsic evidence, stays true to the claim language, and naturally aligns with the description of the invention. b. Analysis The appropriate place to begin construction of claim terms is with the words of the claims. Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1142 (courts must “begin [their] claim construction analysis with the words of the claim”); see also Playtex Prods., Inc., 400 F.3d at 906 (“It is axiomatic that claims, not the specification embodiments, define the scope of protection.”). The court notes that the term “stainless steel” is never used in the claims of the '668 patent without specification of its chemical composition. See the '668 patent, Claim 1 (“stainless steel which comprises” certain elements in ranges of percentages by weight); Claim 7 (“stainless steel comprises” certain elements in ranges of percentages by weight); Claim 13 (“stainless steel comprising” certain elements in ranges of percentages by weight); Claim 15 (“stainless steel tubular injection needle, wherein the injection needle ... comprises” certain elements in ranges of percentages by weight). Consequently, the court concludes that it is unnecessary to construe the term “stainless steel” in isolation. More specifically, “comprising” is an “open-ended” term, which raises a presumption that the list of elements is nonexclusive. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2007). Nevertheless, it “ ‘is not a weasel word with which to abrogate claim limitations.’ ” Id. (quoting Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1998)). As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “Comprising” appears at the beginning of the claim — “comprising the steps of’ — and indicates here that an infringing process could practice other steps in addition to the ones mentioned. Those six enumerated steps must, however, all be practiced as recited in the claim for a process to infringe. The presumption raised by the term “comprising” does not reach into each of the six steps to render every word and phrase therein open-ended — especially where, as here, the patentee has narrowly defined the claim term it now seeks to have broadened. Dippin’ Dots, Inc., 476 F.3d at 1343. Similarly, here, “comprising” is “open-ended” only to the extent that it indicates that the alloy may be comprised of other elements not specified. Cf. id. Indeed, the Detailed Description demonstrates the correctness of such an interpretation, because it specifies, first, that the alloy comprises several elements in specified weight percentage ranges, then adds that preferred embodiments may include additional elements in specified weight percentage ranges. See the '668 patent, Col. 5, ll. 23-44. On the other hand, “comprising” cannot be used as a “weasel word” to abrogate the express claim limitations requiring that the “stainless steel” be comprised of specific elements. Cf. Dippin’ Dots, Inc., 476 F.3d at 1343 (“[Comprising] ‘is not a weasel word with which to abrogate claim limitations.’ ”) (quoting Spectrum Int’l, Inc., 164 F.3d at 1380). Thus, from the plain language of the claim term, whatever the term “stainless steel” might mean, standing alone, in other contexts, in the context of the '668 patent claims, “stainless steel” necessarily “comprises” specified elements. That being so, the court declines to construe the term “stainless steel” in isolation. Instead, the court will pass on to the question of the proper construction of “stainless steel comprising” specified elements, which is the second term in the '668 patent for which the parties dispute the proper construction. 2. “Stainless steel” comprising certain elements Claims 1, 7, 13, and 15 of the '668 patent use the claim term “stainless steel comprising” a list of elements in certain weight percentage ranges. The parties dispute the proper construction of the specification of that chemical composition, as shown in the following chart: As the chart indicates, Rivard includes both the full name of each element, in addition to its symbol in the periodic table, and construes the weight percentage ranges as “at least ... and no more than ...,” while Ideal includes in its alternative construction, if any construction is required, only the full name of each element in addition to its symbol in the periodic table. a. Arguments of the parties The court construes the arguments that the parties made concerning the meaning of “stainless steel,” in isolation, to be incorporated into their arguments concerning the meaning of “stainless steel comprising” a list of elements. Thus, the court will summarize here only the parties’ additional arguments about the meaning of the latter term. Rivard argues that there is no dispute as to the meaning of the element abbreviations in these claims. On the other hand, Rivard argues that there is a dispute about the import of the stated weight percentage ranges for each element. Rivard asserts that each stated weight percentage range provides the upper and lower range values as strict end points, citing Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2000). Rivard argues that considering the range values as strict end points is consistent with the disclosure of the '668 patent and its prosecution history, where the latter demonstrates that certain compositional ranges were added to distinguish prior art. Rivard also points out that the patent uses the term “about” when numerical values are only approximations, so that it is clear that the paten-tee knew how to indicate an approximation. Moreover, Rivard asserts that the lack of specification for the range of Fe (Iron) demonstrates that the patentee knew how to identify an element for which no fixed numerical value was intended. Finally, Rivard argues that the percentage ranges were added to distinguish prior art and that the examiner allowed the claims, because the prior art failed to suggest the claimed ranges for constituent elements. Rivard reiterates these arguments in its rebuttal brief. Indeed, in its rebuttal brief, Rivard contends that only one of the five formulations identified in the specifications of the patents-in-suit is explicitly claimed in independent claims 1, 7, 13, and