Full opinion text
Opinion CARMAN, Chief Judge. This case is before this Court on cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 56. Plaintiff, Mitsubishi International Corporation (“Mitsubishi”), challenges the United States Customs Service’s (“Customs”) classification of the merchandise at issue under several different subheadings of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) . Plaintiff argues the merchandise at issue is properly classified in subheading 8454.90.00, HTSUS, as “Converters, ladles, ingot molds and casting machines, of a kind used in metallurgy or in metal foundries and parts thereof: Parts ... Of casting machines”, free of duty. Plaintiff requests this Court order Customs to reclassify plaintiffs entries under subheading 8454.90.00, HTSUS, as parts of casting machines and refund all excess duties with interest as provided by law. Defendant cross moves for summary judgement, requesting this Court deny plaintiffs motion and dismiss this action. Defendant argues as all of the merchandise at issue, except for the segment stand test, are goods properly classified within chapters 84 and 85, HTSUS, Customs correctly classified the merchandise. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994) and this action is before the Court for de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (1994). For the reasons which follow, this Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grants in part and denies in part defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Background A. Subject Merchandise Plaintiff is the importer of the merchandise at issue in this case, consisting of twenty-five articles which comprise components of a continuous steel casting machine. The merchandise at issue originated in Japan, and was entered at the Port of New Orleans in five shipments on or about January 4, March 21, March 22, and July 31, 1990 and April 16, 1991. Continuous steel casting is a process whereby liquid steel is converted to a solid slab with or possessing a defined shape through a continuous, non-interrupted process. In the continuous easting process, molten steel is placed in ladles and is subjected to various conditioning treatments. Following treatment, the molten steel flows from the bottom of the ladle into a vessel known as the tundish. A turret device controls the flow of the molten steel from the ladles into the tundish. An opening at the bottom of the tundish feeds the liquid steel into a mold, in which the steel begins to solidify by forming a thin shell. After the shell forms, the steel slab is pulled from the mold into a containment section consisting of roller assemblies or roller segments. From there the steel slab is conveyed over a series of roller conveyors called “tables” where it is first cut into discrete pre-determined lengths by a torch cutting machine, deburred and weighed on the torch runout table, and then taken off the line for storage and eventual distribution. (See generally PL’s Stmt of Mat. Facts Not in Dispute (“PL’s Facts”); Def.’s Resp to Pl’s Stmt of Mat. Facts (“Def.’s Resp.”)); see also Mitsubishi International Corp. v. United States, 17 CIT 871, 872, 829 F.Supp. 1387, 1388 (1993), appeal dismissed, 22 F.3d 1102, 1993 WL 533148 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Mitsubishi”): Plaintiff entered the imported merchandise under subheading 8454.90.00, HTSUS, as “Converters, ladles, ingot molds and casting machines, of a kind used in metallurgy or in metal foundries, and parts thereof: Parts ... Of casting machines”, free of duty. Customs classified the merchandise at issue under several different subheadings of the HTSUS, based upon the identity and function of each article. The following chart lists the components and the subheadings under which they were classified. Component Plaintiffs Claimed Classification Customs’ Classification Year(s) of Entry 1) Torch Approach Table 8454.90.00 8428.39.00 1990 2) Torch Roller Table 8454.90.00 8428.39.00 1990 3) Torch Runout Table 8454.90.00 8428.39.00 1990 4) Slab Transfer Table 8454.90.00 8428.39.00 1990 5) Segment Changer System 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 6) Ladle Turret 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 7) Tundish Transfer Car 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 8) Ladle-to-Tundish Shroud Changing Mechanism 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 9) Segment Transfer Car 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 10) Tundish Lifting Beam 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 11) Mold and First Zone Lifting Beam 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 12) Segment Lifting Beam 8454.90.00 8428.90.00 1990 13) No. 3 — No. 7 Segment Drive Units 8454.90.00 8483.40.50 1990 14) No. 8 — No. 13 Segment Drive Units 8454.90.00 8483.40.50 1990 15) Torch Roller Table Reducer with Coupling 8454.90.00 8483.40.50 1990 Component Plaintiffs Claimed Classification Customs’ Classification Year(s) of Entry . 16) Torch Runout Table Reducer with Gear Coupling 8454.90.00 8483.40.50 1990,1991 17) Torch Roller Table Roller (with bearing housing) 8454.90.00 8431.39.00 1990 18) Torch Runout Table Roller (with bearing housing) 8454.90.00 8431.39.00 1990 19) Roll Assemblies for Torch Approach Table 8454.90.00 8431.39.00 1991 20) Roll Assemblies for Torch Roller Table 8454.90.00 8431.39.00 1991 21) Debumng Table 8454.90.00 8460.90.00 1990 22) Tundish Nozzle Preheat Station 8454.90.00 8419.89.50 1990 23) Tundish Car Limit Switch 8454.90.00 8536.50.00 1990 24) Tundish Skull Punching 8454.90.00 6903.90.00 1990 25) Segment Test Stand 8454.90.00 9031.80.00 1990 Plaintiff protested Customs’ classification of the merchandise within the time provided for by law. After having paid all liquidated duties due, plaintiff timely commenced this action. B. Relevant Tariff Provisions (1) Note 2 to Section XVI of the HTSUS provides in relevant part as follows: Subject to note 1 to this section, note 1 to chapter 84 and to note 1 to chapter 85, parts of machines ... are to be classified according to the following rules: (a) Parts which are goods included in any of the headings of chapters 84 and 85 ... are in all cases to be classified in their respective headings; (b) Other parts, if suitable for use solely or principally with a particular kind of machine, or with a number of machines of the same heading ... are to be classified with the machines of that kind.... (2) Rule 1(c) of the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation of the HTSUS provides that In the absence of special language or context which otherwise requires— (c)a provision for parts of an article covers products solely or principally used as a part of such articles but a provision for “parts” or “parts and accessories” shall not prevail over a specific provision for such part or accessory; C. The Mitsubishi Case: Classification of Continuous Steel Casting Machine Parts Under the Tariff Schedule of the United States (“TSUS”.) The same parties before the Court in this case came before the Court in 1993 to settle the issue of whether fifteen components of a continuous steel casting machine should be classified as parts of casting machines under 674.10, TSUS, or under separate TSUS provisions corresponding to the identity of each component. See Mitsubishi, 17 CIT 871, 829 F.Supp. 1387. In Mitsubishi, Customs classified fifteen components of a continuous steel casting machine under several different TSUS items. At trial, plaintiff argued General Rule of Interpretation (“GIR”) 10(ij) required the imported components be classified under Item 674.10, TSUS, as “Converters, ingot molds, and casting machines, all the foregoing of types used in metallurgy and in metal foundries, and parts thereof’. The Court held for the plaintiff based on its determination that under Rule 10(ij), the imported components were solely or chiefly used as parts of continuous casting machines and found as a matter of law that the TSUS did not contain any specific provisions for those components. See id at 889, 829 F.Supp. at 1400. In the first step of its two-part inquiry, the Court considered whether the components at issue were used solely or chiefly as parts of a continuous easting machine, in accordance with GIR 10(ij)’s first clause which indicated “a provision for ‘parts’ of an article covers a product solely or chiefly used as a part of such article”. The Court reasoned that in order to determine if a component was used solely or chiefly as a part, it must consider the “ ‘nature, function and purpose [of the component] in relation to the article to which it is attached or designed to serve’” and consider whether the component was an integral component necessary for the completion of the article. See id. at 881, 829 F.Supp. at 1395 (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. United States, 58 C.C.P.A. 9, 13, 433 F.2d 801, C.A.D. 996 (1970)). The Court found each of the individual components contributed to the operation of the assembled casting machine and each played an essential and unique role in the casting machine’s operation and in the overall easting process.” Id. at 882, 829 F.Supp. at 1395. The Court also concluded the components were “dedicated for use” in the casting machine. Id. at 883, 829 F.Supp. at 1396. The Court then turned to the second clause of GIR 10(ij) in order to determine whether the individual components were specifically provided for in the various TSUS items selected by Customs so as to preclude application of Item 674.10, TSUS, the provision advocated by plaintiffs. After reviewing the competing provisions, the Court concluded none of the items chosen by Customs more specifically provided for the components than Item 674.10, TSUS, the provision for parts of a casting machine. The Court’s decision in Mitsubishi relied on two earlier decisions addressing the proper classification of parts. First, in Robert Bosch Corp. v. United States, 63 Cust. Ct. 187, C.D. 3895, 305 F.Supp. 921 (1969), the Customs Court considered whether an automobile radio and radio antenna were properly classifiable as automobile parts or as radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic transmission and reception apparatus and held the items at issue were classifiable by operation of GIRlO(ij) as ra-diotelegraphic a!nd radiotelephonic transmission and reception apparatus. The Court found another provision, the provision for radiotelegraphie and radiotelephonic transmission and reception apparatus, more specifically described the car radio and antenna than the provision for automobile parts and applied the second prong of GIR 10(ij). In reaching this holding, the Bosch Court emphasized its decision was consistent with GIR 10(ij)’s direction that a provision for “parts” of an article does not prevail over a specific provision for the part. In applying Bosch to the case before it, the Mitsubishi court stated it interpreted Bosch to have concluded that the tariff provision for “radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic transmission and reception apparatus” applied to the automobile radio and antenna at issue because the provision’s terminology embraced all radio apparatus even though the tariff provision did not specifically identify car radio apparatus. The court continued to explain the term “generic” used in Bosch described how Item 685.22, TSUS, identified a class of specifically defined equipment, whereas the definition of “generic” advanced by the government in Mitsubishi was so allencompassing that it would render meaningless many tariff provisions, including the ones for parts of continuous casting machines. The Mitsubishi court also based its holding on United States v. DeLaval Separator Co., 65 C.C.P.A. 48, 569 F.2d 1134, C.A.D. 1204 (1978), a case which reviewed whether refrigerator tanks were classified properly under either the TSUS provision for refrigerator parts or the provision for “on-farm equipment for the handling or drying of agricultural or horticultural products.” The De-Laval court held the handling equipment provision did not more specifically provide for the refrigerator parts for purposes of GIR 10(ij), because the handling provision was “sweeping in scope” and “encompass[ed] countless other products which find utility on a farm.” Id. at 50, 569 F.2d at 1136. In Mitsubishi, the court found the provision for lifting and handling equipment at issue in DeLaval was just as sweeping in scope as the provision before it, and held that Item 664.10, TSUS, did not specifically provide for any of the caster components originally classified under that Item. See Mitsubishi, 17 CIT at 885, 829 F.Supp. at 1397. The court instead ordered the components at issue classified as parts of castors under Item 674.10, TSUS, the provision for “Converters, ingot molds, and casting machines, all the foregoing types used in metallurgy and in metal foundries, and parts thereof.” Id. at 888,829 F.Supp. at 1400. Contentions of the parties Plaintiff argues Customs erred in classifying the merchandise at issue under several different subheadings of the HTSUS and not as parts of a continuous steel casting machine under subheading 8454.90.00, HTSUS, free of duty. Plaintiff argues this Court previously held in Mitsubishi that under the TSUS, parts of continuous steel casting machines were classifiable under the provision for parts of a casting machine rather than under the provisions put forward by Customs. Plaintiff argues the Mitsubishi decision is applicable to the entries at issue in this case because the relevant tariff language did not change when the HTSUS replaced the TSUS. Plaintiff contends the components at issue are all parts necessary for continuous steel casting and are parts specifically designed for and solely used in a continuous steel casting machine. In addition, plaintiff argues the tariff provisions under which Customs classified the imported merchandise do not provide for the imported merchandise. As a result, plaintiff requests this Court order Customs to classify the merchandise at issue under subheading 8454.90.00, HTSUS, free of duty, as parts of casting machines. Defendant argues plaintiffs contentions that the merchandise at issue should be classified as parts of easting machines under subheading 8454.90.00, HTSUS, free of duty, are unmeritorious. Defendant contends neither this Court’s decision in Mitsubishi nor .the TSUS are applicable in this action. Defendant maintains Congress recognized classification results under the new tariff schedule could be different from those under the TSUS and argues “prior TSUS eases may be instructive, but only when the language of the provision has not changed and the HTSUS does not require a different result.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Cross Mot. for Summ. J. and. in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J: (“Def.’s Br.”) at 7.) Standard of Review In a ease involving factual disputes between the parties, the government’s classification decision is presumed to be correct, see 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V), and the party challenging the decision has the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. See St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 769 (Fed.Cir. 1993). Where, as here, there are no material facts in dispute and only questions of law remain, the statutory presumption of correctness under § 2639 is not applicable, and the Court has a statutory duty to decide independently the meaning of a classification term. No deference attaches to Customs’ classification decisions where there are no disputed, issues of material fact. In Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 484 (Fed.Cir.1997) the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) held the Court of International Trade’s (“CIT”) duty “to reach the correct decision” in classification cases would be subverted if Customs’ interpretation of a classification term was given deference. See also Universal Electronics v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491-93 (Fed.Cir.1997). As a result, if the Court finds, because of evidence or other authority presented by plaintiff, that Customs’ classification decision is incorrect, this Court must reach-the correct classification on its own or after remand to the agency. See Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 70, 74-75, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (“[T]he court’s duty is to find the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.”), petition for reh’g denied, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 97, 739 F.2d 628 (1984). Discussion A. Summary Judgment This case is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” U.S. CIT R. 56(d). “The Court will deny summary judgment if the parties present ‘a dispute about a fact such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict against the movant.’ ” Ugg International, Inc. v. United States, 17 CIT 79, 83, 813 F.Supp. 848, 852 (1993) (citation omitted). Both parties in this case agree that trial is inappropriate and that there are no genuine issues of material fact which would prevent this Court from deciding this action on the basis of the pending motions for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 8; (Def.’s Br. at 4); (Def.’s Mem. in Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J.) (“Def.’s Reply”) at 20.) Therefore, the sole issue remaining in this case is the proper interpretation of the pertinent sections of the HTSUS. See Rollerblade, Inc., 112.F.3d at 483 (“[N]one of the pertinent characteristics of the merchandise is in dispute, and thus the sole issue is a matter of properly interpreting the classification term at issue ... to determine whether the scope of that term is broad enough to encompass the items with the particular characteristics.”). B. Application of Mitsubishi and the Change from the TSUS to the HTSUS Plaintiff argues “the imported components, because they are parts suitable for use solely or principally with a continuous steel casting machine, and because no other provision provides for the parts as discrete articles or goods, must be classified under heading 8454, HTSUS.’-’ (Pl.’s Br. at 27-28.) Plaintiff argues this Court already has held under the TSUS that parts of continuous steel casting machines are classifiable under the parts provision for easting machines rather than the alternative provisions put forward by Customs. Plaintiff compares the language of TSUS Item 674.10 (“Converters, ingot molds, and easting machines, all the foregoing types used in metallurgy and in metal foundries, and parts thereof ... ”), the basis for the Court’s decision in Mitsubishi, to the language of HTSUS subheading 8454.90.00 (“Converters, ladles, ingot molds and casting machines, of a kind used in matellurgy or in metal foundries, and parts thereof: Parts ... Of casting machines”) and concludes the comparison'“clearly shows that no substantial change to the provision covering continuous casting machines and parts thereof was made when the HTSUS was adopted.” (Pl.’s Br. at 16.) Plaintiff concludes the similarity between the language used in the HTSUS and that found in the TSUS supports the same conclusion in this case as the court held in the first. The legislature is presumed to have approved the judicial construction of a tariff provision when the provision is reenacted in the same or substantially the same language. (Id. at 19 (citation omitted).) Defendant contends neither Mitsubishi nor the TSUS are applicable in this action. Defendant argues Congress recognized classification results under the new tariff schedule could be different from those under the TSUS and argues “prior TSUS eases may be instructive, but only when the language of the provision has not changed and the HTSUS does not require a different result.” (Def.’s Br. at 7.) Defendant explains Mitsubishi was decided according to the Court’s interpretation of 6IR 10(ij) of the TSUS which required a relative specificity analysis to determine whether the subheadings proffered by Commerce specifically provided for the merchandise at issue. Defendant maintains under the HTSUS, however, this relative specificity analysis is not required. Defendant additionally contends Additional Rule of Interpretation 1(c), HTSUS, while similar to GIR 10(ij), is prefaced with a clause the TSUS did not contain, stating it applies only “[i ]ra the absence of special language or context which otherwise requires.” (Id. at 8.(quoting Additional Rule of Interpretation 1(c)) (emphasis added in Def.’s Br).) Defendant explains Additional Rule of Interpretation 1(c) also states in the absence of additional language, a provision for parts covers articles solely or principally used as parts, but will not prevail over a specific provision for such part. Defendant concludes “[t]he language clearly demonstrates Congress intended that Additional Rule 1(c) be narrowly applied only where other context does not require. Here, ‘special language or context ... otherwise requires.’ ” (Id. at 9.) Defendant argues plaintiff “forgets that in certain circumstances, the HTSUS was expressly intended to modify the treatment of certain merchandise” and “classification results under the new tariff could be different from those under the TSUS.” (Def.’s Reply at 8.) Defendant maintains “it is long settled that a change in the language of a statute is generally construed to import a change in meaning unless the contrary is made plainly to appear in other ways.” (Id. (citation omitted).) In this case, defendant explains, the addition of Note 2(a) to Section XVI of the HTSUS, which requires “[pjarts which are goods included in any of the headings of chapters 84 and 85 ... are in all eases to be classified in their respective headings”, “shows that Congress intended a change in the tariff treatment of merchandise such as Mitsubishi’s, so that the merchandise is classified within its own heading, and not as part of a casting machine.” (Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).) Defendant further argues the rate increase on plaintiffs merchandise may have been critical and notes the legislative history included a statement that any changes in the rates of duty are consequential to the process of converting to the new nomenclature, and are necessary to reflect an overall balance of tariff concession commitments between the United States and its trading partners in the GATT. Some of the rate increases in the United States’ conversion respond to our trading partners’ failure to make appropriate commitments in the GATT negotiations on the Harmonized System. (Id. at 8 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, at 88 (1988)), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547.) In further discussing the importance of Note 2(a) to Section XVI of the HTSUS, defendant contends “Mitsubishi again attempts to sidestep the transparency of the statute in its opposition by ignoring Note 2(a) to Section XVI of the HTSUS which modifies the application of [Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation] 1(c) here” which applies only “ ‘in the absence of special language or context which otherwise requires.’ ” {Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).) Defendant explains Note 2(a) provides “[p]arts which are goods included in any of the headings of chapters 84 and 85 ... are in all cases to be classified in their respective headings” and concludes as all of the merchandise at issue, except the segment stand test, are goods properly classified within chapters 84 and 85, HTSUS, the merchandise at issue is classified correctly within the appropriate subheadings, as found by Customs. Defendant states “[t]hq plain language of the HTSUS provides, therefore, that Note 2(a) is to be broadly applied and goods covered by any Heading in chapter 84 or 85 are always classified in those Headings,” (Def.’s Br. at 9), and argues “[b]y its very language, Note 2(a) is ‘special language or context which otherwise requires’; and therefore modifies the effect of Rule 1(c) in this case.” (Def.’s Reply at 3.) Defendant argues “[t]he fact that Rule 1(c) is an ‘additional’ note and applies ‘in the absence of special language or context which otherwise requires’ plainly indicates that Congress intended the Additional U.S. Rule to be subordinate to the rest of the legal language of the HTSUS.” {Id. at 5.) Defendant additionally contends plaintiffs position that Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1(e) was designed to clarify Note 2(a) to Section XVI of the HTSUS is not supported by case law or by the HTSUS. Defendant argues plaintiff incorrectly contends the Court should interpret Note 2(a) to Section XVI to require that only goods “more specifically” covered by chapters 84 and 85 should be classified within those headings and concludes “Note 2(a) does not limit classification to cases whether goods are ‘specifically,’ or even ‘more specifically’ provided for in heading 84 or 85” but “explicitly provides that articles included within ‘any ’ chapter 84 or 85 headings are ‘always ’ classified within those headings.” {Id. at 5.) Defendant argues the merchandise at issue is clearly classifiable within headings in chapter 84 or 85, HTSUS. In further support of its position, defendant quotes the Explanatory Notes for Note 2 of Section XVI. The Explanatory Notes provide: The above rules [that parts which are suitable for use solely or principally with particular machines are classified in the same Headings as the machines] do not apply to parts which in themselves constitute an article covered by a Heading of this Section {other than Headings 84.85 and 85.84); these are in all cases classified in their own appropriate Heading even if specially designed to work as part of a specific machine. This applies in particular to: (3) Lifting and Handling machinery (Heading 84.25, 84.26 or 84.28) (Def.’s Br. at 10 (quoting Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, Explanatory Notes, at 1131 (second, and third emphasis added by defendant)).) Defendant additionally quotes the Explanatory Notes to Heading 84.28 which provide: It should, however, be noted that the Heading excludes lifting or handling machines designed to be incorporated in furnaces, coverters, etc., or to form a complete unit therewith, provided they are presented with the furnaces, etc. (see Headings 84.17, 84.54, 84-44, etc.). When presented separately they remain in this Heading [Heading 8428]. (Id. at 10-11 (quoting Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, Explanatory Notes, at 1200 (fourth emphasis added by defendant)).) Defendant argues plaintiff’s claim Mitsubishi provides relevant and applicable precedent in this matter must fail because “the HTSUS contains Note 2(a), a provision whose very language absolutely contradicts Mitsubishi’s contentions and which did not appear in the TSUS in any form whatsoever.” (Def.’s Reply at 4.) Finally, the government responds to plaintiffs argument that defendant’s interpretation of Note 2(a) to Section XVI of the HTSUS would render numerous tariff provisions addressing “parts” meaningless because nothing would be classified as “parts” by stating merchandise with the primary purpose of casting has been classified consistently as parts under Heading 8454, HTSUS. Defendant argues plaintiff inaccurately asserts the primary purpose of all of the components at issue is easting and, therefore, all of its merchandise must be classified as parts of casting machines. Defendant contends Mitsubishi’s own evidence demonstrates the primary purpose of many of the articles at issue is not the creation of steel slabs, but consists of other operations, and therefore, the merchandise at issue cannot be classified as parts of casting machines under Heading 8454, HTSUS. Plaintiff disagrees with defendant’s construction of Note 2(a) to Section XVI and argues it does not function independently of HTSUS General Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 1, but must be read in pari materia with Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1(c). Plaintiff argues Additional Rule of Interpretation 1(c) was modeled after GIR 10(ij), TSUS, and contends “in order for a part to be found a ‘good’ in chapter 84 or 85 and classified there pursuant to Section Note 2(a), the provision for the ‘good’ must describe the part in a manner supported by GRI 1 and the other rules of tariff construction, including the common law.” (Pl.’s Br. at 21.) Plaintiff contends the imported components at issue here are not “goods included in any of the headings of chapter 84 or 85” (Id. at 23 (internal quotes omitted).) Plaintiff also maintains “[t]he addition of Rule 1(c) shows that the concept of specificity and the spirit of GIR 10(ij) were to be included in the HTSUS, and to be read in conjunction with its provisions,” (id. at 24), and additionally argues Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1(c) “was added into the United States tariff [schedule] to clarify and make consistent the treatment of parts, and explicitly to require a ‘specific provision’ in light of the International Nomenclature Committee to the Convention on the Harmonized Commodity and Coding System’s vague language regarding the scope of Note 2(a).” (Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”.) at 13.) Plaintiff argues to accept defendant’s interpretation would mean “virtually any mechanized device that can lift, handle or load, regardless of the other functions it performs or the other features in [sic] incorporates” would be improperly excluded from classification under Heading 8454, HTSUS. (Pl.’s Br. at 25.) Plaintiff instead maintains “[Additional U.S.] Rule 1(c) clarifies and defines what is meant by ‘goods included in the headings’ by requiring, under United States law, that classification of a part be under a specific provision for that part, and if not, then under the parts provision.” (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff further notes it acknowledges that unlike GIR 10(ij), Note 2(a) to Section XVT does not employ the clause “specific provision for such part”, but argues “this is not a point of distinction because courts always construed Rule 10(ij)’s specificity requirement liberally to include tariff provisions that described an article by name, specific function or generic term. Those courts drew the line at general, catch-all basket provisions, and refused to classify parts in those provisions pursuant to Rule 10(ij).” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 11-12 (citation omitted).) Plaintiff contends although Section Note 2(a) does not include a specificity clause, common sense and traditional Customs jurisprudence regarding the classification of parts support Plaintiffs position that Note 2(a)’s reference to “parts which are goods included in any of the headings of chapters 84 and 85 ...” means a heading that provides for the part in an express manner that is not a broad,“catch-all basket provision.” (Id. at 12.) Defendant contests plaintiffs argument that Section Note 2(a) must be read in pari materia with GRI 1 and argues it is unmeri-torious. Defendant argues plaintiff “misunderstands both GRI 1 and its relation to Note 2(a), as well as the reasons its merchandise is properly classified in Heading 84.” (Def.’s Br. at 12.) Defendant explains even if plaintiff is correct that Note 2(a) must be read in pari materia with GRI 1, “nothing within the HTSUS (much less explicitly GRI 1 or Note 2(a)) supports Mitsubishi’s jump in logic that Note 2(a) therefore applies only to Headings which narrowly name specific products.” (Id.) Defendant observes GRI 1 expressly dictates classification is governed by the section and chapter notes, and concludes pursuant to the plain language of the HTSUS, all components which are classifiable under chapters 84 and 85, HTSUS, must be classified within the relevant and applicable headings and not as parts of easting machines under Heading 8454, HTSUS. This Court finds plaintiffs argument the Mitsubishi decision is determinative of this case is based on a misreading of Mitsubishi and of the differences between the relevant provisions of the HTSUS and the TSUS. The Mitsubishi Court did not find, as plaintiff claims, that similar merchandise was excluded from classification within the lifting and handling provisions of the TSUS. Rather, the Court held for the plaintiff based on its determination that under Rule 10(ij), the imported components were solely or chiefly used as parts of continuous casting machines and found as a matter of law that the TSUS did not contain any specific provisions for those components. See Mitsubishi, 17 CIT at 889, 829 F.Supp. at 1400. This Court finds persuasive defendant’s argument the addition of Section Note 2(a) and its effect on the outcome of this ease cannot be ignored nor explained simply as a clarification of Additional U.S. Rule 1(c), as plaintiff argues. As a result of the changes in language between the TSUS and the HTSUS, this Court holds it cannot apply the holding of Mitsubishi to the facts of this case. While several of the components at issue here may be similar to those at issue in Mitsubishi, and while Additional U.S. Rule 1(e) is similar to GIR 10(ij), Rule 1(c) contains the proviso that it applies “[i]n the absence of special language or context which otherwise requires.” The inclusion of Note 2(a) to Section XVI provides a “context” which requires this Court to examine whether the components at issue are “[pjarts which are goods included in any of the headings of chapters 84 and 85” and thus whether they should “be classified in their respective headings.” The Court now turns to the issue of whether the merchandise at issue falls was classified properly by Customs, in effect, whether the components at issue are “goods included in any of the headings of chapters 84 and 85.” C. Whether Customs Properly Classified the Merchandise at Issue Classification of merchandise under the HTSUS is performed in accordance with the General Rules of Interpretation, taken in order. GRI 1 states “classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” HTSUS, GRI 1. In the absence of a precise definition appearing in the HTSUS, the correct meaning of a tariff term is usually resolved by ascertaining its common and popular meaning. In construing such terms, “the court may rely upon its own understanding, dictionaries and other reliable sources.” Medline Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407, 1409 (Fed.Cir.1995) (citing Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed.Cir.1994)). Once the correct meaning of the terms within the provision are ascertained, a determination must be made as to whether the merchandise at issue falls within the description of such terms as properly construed. See National Advanced Systems v. United States, 26 F.3d 1107, 1109 (Fed.Cir. 1994). Defendant argues, the merchandise at issue, with the exception of the segment test stand, was clearly and properly classifiable as liquidated by Customs because all of the articles imported by plaintiff are described by specific headings within chapters 84 and 85, and therefore, in accordance with Note 2(a) to Section XVI, are classified properly under these headings rather than under Heading 8454. Plaintiff responds by arguing that assuming arguendo the Court does not follow the reasoning set out in Mitsubishi, the provisions under which Customs classified the imported components do not provide for the components. Plaintiff maintains the imported components are “not described by the tariff provisions under which Customs’ [sic] classified them” and “[bjecause the imported components are not provided for in heading 84 or 85[sic] (other than as parts of a casting machine), classification according to Section XVI, Note 2(a) fails.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 15.) Plaintiff argues, therefore, “Note 2(b) [of Section XVI] controls, and the imported components must be classified as parts of the machine for which they are solely and principally used: a continuous steel casting machine.” (Id.) Plaintiff also contends application of the “more than” doctrine, where an article that is “more than” a certain other article is not described by the provision for the article, establishes that “the imported merchandise cannot be classified under the provisions chosen by Customs.” (Pl.’s Br at 31.) Plaintiff argues [i]n some cases, the provisions are so general that they cover a myriad of products under a literal construction of the statute. In others, the provisions chosen by Customs are simply wrong as a matter of law. In addition, because of the special and unique design features that dedicate the components for use as components of a continuous steel casting machine, they are “more than” or “other than” the general types of articles classified in the provisions in which Customs classified the merchandise. Therefore, because these components are “suitable for use solely or principally” as a continuous steel casting machine, and are not “goods included in any of the headings of chapter 84 or 85 ..Note 2 to Section XVI requires classification under heading 8454. (Id. at 48-9.) Defendant responds to plaintiffs argument regarding the application of the “more than” doctrine by asserting “the judicially developed ‘more than’ or, more correctly, ‘other than’ doctrine has been subsumed into the General Rules of Interpretation (‘GRI’s’) under the HTSUS.” (Def.’s Reply at 11-12.) Defendant continues to explain the GRI’s specify that when classifying an article that consists of more than one material or substance, rather than using a “more than” or “other than” analysis, the GRI’s require a step by step consideration of each succeeding principle of classification: relative specificity (GRI 3(a)), essential character (GRI 3(b)), and finally, last in numerical order (GRI 3(c)). (Id. at 12-13.) Defendant concludes even if the “more than” or “other than” doctrine exists independent of the HTSUS, “Mitsubishi cannot point to any feature or element of the merchandise as imported which would make them ‘more than’ the Government’s provisions.” (Id.) The Court now turns to an examination of each heading under which the components were classified to determine if Customs correctly classified the merchandise at issue. A. Heading 8128, HTSUS “Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery (for example, elevators, escalators, conveyors, teleferics). ” Customs classified the ladle turret, tundish transfer car, ladle-to-tundish shroud changing mechanism, tundish lifting beam, segment changer system (stationary guide), segment lifting beam, mold and first zone lifting beam, segment transfer ear, slab transfer table, torch approach table, torch roller table and torch runout table under Heading 8428, HTSUS. Plaintiff argues Heading 8428, HTSUS, does not provide for the imported merchandise “even in a broad or literal reading,” (Pl.’s Br. at 32-33), and asserts the terms listed in the heading “do not describe any of the items presently at issue,” (id. at 33), because “[t]he provisions under which Customs classified Plaintiffs merchandise are catch-all ‘other’ provisions, with 8428.39 covering merchandise that meets the description of ‘Other ... conveyors, for goods or materials: Other’, and 8428.90 covering merchandise describable as ‘Other lifting, handling ... Other machinery.’ ” (Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff also contends the subheadings chosen by Customs are not eo nomine provisions describing merchandise by a specific name, nor are they use provisions. In support of its argument, plaintiff maintains the common and commercial meaning of the terms within Heading 8428; HTSUS, and its coverage of “[o]ther lifting [and] handling”. components cannot be construed to describe the imported merchandise at issue because the definition of lifting and handling machinery found in the Explanatory Notes refers to machines “ ‘usually based on pulley, winch or jacking systems, and [which] often includ[e] large proportions of static structural steelwork, etc.’ ” (Pl.’s Br. at 33 (quoting Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System: Explanatory Notes 1197 (1986)).) Plaintiff also argues “[m]aterial handling machines, including conveyors, are used to move discrete finished products or precursor raw materials, whereas the imported components are parts of the machine that converts the raw material (molten steel) into the finished product (steel slabs of a particular size).” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 16.) Plaintiff cites the Academic Press Dictionary of Science and Technology, as well as McGraw-Hill Concise Encyclopedia of Science and Technology to support its argument that lifting or handling equipment is not synonymous with machinery used to manufacture steel. Plaintiff concludes the imported components at issue “do not lift or handle a finished product, but instead are operating in conjunction with other components to manufacture the finished product.” (Pl.’s Br. at 34.) Defendant argues “the subheadings of Heading 8428 and the Explanatory Notes explicitly cover [the] merchandise at issue.” (Def.’s Br. at 15.) Defendant contends articles classified within heading 8428, HTSUS, “need not always be based upon a pulley, winch or jack system” and “[t]he Notes also specify that ‘this Heading covers a wide range of machinery for the mechanical handling of materials, goods, etc. (lifting, covey-ing, loading, unloading, etc.).’” (Id. at 16 (quoting Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, Explanatory Notes)) (emphasis added by defendant). Defendant argues “Mitsubishi misunderstands that while the [sic] much of the merchandise at issue here may be eventually utilized in the process of casting steel, its immediate primary function design, construction, or function is not making steel slabs. Rather, it is lifting and handling materials.” (Def.’s Reply at 14 (citation omitted)). Defendant adds “because the Explanatory Notes also state that Heading 8428 covers machinery for the ‘mechanical handling of materials, good, etc,’ Mitsubishi’s assertions that Heading 8428 only describes machines that handle materials, and Mitsubishi’s reliance upon only definitions of the term ‘material’ are misplaced.” (Def.’s Br. at 17.) Defendant concludes “Mitsubishi’s narrow definition of lifting and handling machinery is not supported by the HTSUS” because the definition “includes a wide range of machinery for mechanical handling of materials, goods, people, and other items.” (Id. at 18.) 1. Subheading 8428.39, HTSUS: Torch Approach Table, Torch Roller Table, Torch Runout Table, Slab Transfer Table Customs classified the torch table, torch roller table, torch runout table, and slab transfer table under subheading 8428.39, HTSUS, as “Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery: ... Other continuous-action elevators and conveyors, for goods or materials: Other”, dutiable at 2% ad valorem. The tables are used to convey the solidifying steel slab during the final forming operations. Each roller table consists of a frame onto which rollers with bearings and drives are mounted and they advance and discharge the slab at a easting speed synchronized with the speed of the torch cutter or in accordance with a certain time cycle of a subsequent process, such as deburring or weighing. The frames are connected and mounted on a common foundation. (See Pl.’s Facts at 10-11; Def.’s Resp. at 10.) Plaintiff argues the common and commercial meaning of Heading 8428.39, HTSUS, cannot be construed to describe the imported merchandise. Plaintiff contends the roller tables are not used to convey a finished slab, but are part of the machinery used to form and contain the steel slabs. Plaintiff maintains the components are not conveyors “as that term is commonly and commercial [sic] known or described in the [Explanatory Notes]” because they do not move or handle materials or finished products but are instead individual frames and roll assemblies with bearings and drives onto which the roll assemblies are mounted after importation. (Pl.’s Br. at 39.) After entry, plaintiff explains, “[the components] are not discrete ‘conveyors’ capable of being used as a roller conveyor system to move materials or products”, but the frames are connected and mounted on a common foundation with the other components of the easting machine, and the roll assemblies are affixed onto the frames, becoming part of the casting machine’s flow line. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 18.) Plaintiff maintains the roller tables “are used to support the cooling slabs between the containment area and that part of the continuous easting process where the slab is cut to size, deburred and weighed” and are not part of a conveyor. (Pl.’s Br. at 39.) Plaintiff concludes the definitions of conveyors found in the McGraw Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms and the Explanatory Notes “show that devices known as conveyors are a distinct type of machine used to move and distribute discrete finished products or precursor raw materials. They are not machines used in the actual process of manufacturing the product.” (Id.) Defendant notes “Section (II)(B)(2) of the Explanatory Notes for Heading 8428 provides that as used in Heading 8428, ‘Conveyors are used for moving goods, usually in a horizontal direction’” and concludes “[t]he tables at issue here clearly are used for moving goods in a horizontal direction, and are consequently conveyors, classifiable under 8428.39.00, HTSUS.” (Def.’s Br. at 22.) Defendant further contends the Explanatory Notes do not limit the term conveyors to material handling machines which only move these narrow products and cites Subsection II of the Explanatory Notes to Heading 8428, HTSUS, as expressly including steel as a material handled by conveyors. Defendant additionally maintains contrary to any suggestion by plaintiff, the articles are not excluded from classification as conveyors based on speed. Defendant finally argues Mitsubishi’s claim is incorrect that the merchandise is not properly classified as conveyors because the torch roller table holds a torch which cuts the steel slab into shorter lengths and the deburring table holds deburring machines which remove the burrs from each end of the steel slab after it has been cut. These additional machines are not imported with the tables, but are added after importation. Therefore, in the condition as imported the roller tables are merely conveyors, properly classifiable under 8428.39.00, HTSUS. (Id. at 23-24.) This Court finds although the roller tables are used in the continuous steel casting process, plaintiff itself describes the tables’ function as advancing and discharging the slab and further states they “are used to hold and convey the solidifying slab during the final forming operations.” (Pl.’s Facts at 10.) The Court also notes defendant’s argument the Explanatory Notes indicate heading 8428, HTSUS, covers a “wide range of machinery for the mechanical handling of materials, [and] goods” (Def.’s Br. at 16 (emphasis omitted)), and agrees the primary function of the components at issue is not making steel slabs but lifting and handling materials. The Court holds because the roller tables are within Section Note 2(a)’s provision covering “parts which are goods included in any of the headings of chapters 84 and 85”, Customs properly classified the torch table, torch roller table, torch runout table, and slab transfer table, according to Section Note 2(a)’s mandate, under subheading 8428.39.00, 'HTSUS, as “Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery: ... Other continuous-action elevators and conveyors, for goods or materials: Other”, dutiable at 2% ad valorem. 2. Subheading 8428.39.00, HTSUS: Deburring Table Customs classified the "deburring table under subheading 8460.90.00, HTSUS, as “Machine tools for deburring, sharpening, grinding, housing, lapping, polishing or otherwise finishing metal, sintered metal carbides or cermets by means of grinding stones, abrasives or polishing products, other than gear cutting, gear grinding or gear finishing machines of heading 8461: Other:”, dutiable at 4.4% ad valorem. Defendant indicates Customs’ original classification of the deburring table under 8460.90.00, HTSUS, was based upon a misunderstanding that the article was in fact a deburring machine. Defendant continues to explain “[i]n its condition as imported, the article is only a roller table” and “[t]he de-burring machine is not installed until after importation.” (Def.’s Br. at 22 n. 11.) Defendant concludes “the imported article is a conveyor, classifiable under subheading 8428.39, HTSUS, at a duty rate of 2% ad valorem.” (Id.) Plaintiff disagrees and’ argues the debur-ring table “is nothing more than a roller table, upon which a deburring device is added after importation.” (Pl.’s Br. at 44.) Plaintiff additionally argues the table “is the same class of component that Customs classified under heading 8428, but which Plaintiff argues is classifiable under heading 8454.” (Id.) This Court finds the deburring table is properly classified as a conveyor, as defendant argues, under subheading 8428.39.00, HTSUS, at a duty rate of 2% ad valorem. Plaintiff concedes “the deburring runout table is similar to the [other roller tables],” and in further support of the Court’s decision the deburring table should be classified as a conveyor, plaintiff explains after the deburring table, “[n]ext the slab is conveyed onto the weighing tables.” (Pl.’s Facts at 12.) This Court finds this entry was properly classified as a conveyor under subheading 8428.39.00, HTSUS, instead of as part of a casting machine under Heading 8454, HTSUS. 3. Subheading 8^28.90, HTSUS: Segment Changer System, Ladle Turret, Tundish Transfer Car, Ladle-to-Tundish Shroud Changing Mechanism, Tundish Lifting Beam, Segment Lifting Beam, Mold and First Zone Lifting Beam and the Segment Transfer Car Customs classified the segment changer system, ladle turret, tundish transfer car, ladle-to-tundish shroud changing mechanism, segment transfer ear, tundish lifting beam, mold and first zone lifting beam and segment lifting beam under subheading 8428.90, HTSUS, as “Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery: ... Other machinery:”, dutiable at 2% ad valorem. (a) Ladle Turret The ladle turret is the component of the easting machine that rotates the ladle in and out of the casting position. It is a large electromechanical device that is motor driven and contains bearings, rolls, and frame and drive elements, such as gear boxes, gears and electric motors. (See Pl.’s Facts at 3; Def.’s Resp. at 2-3.) Plaintiff argues the ladle turret does not lift or handle a finished product but “is the component of the casting machine that orients the ladle of molten steel into the casting commencement position” and then monitors and regulates the flow of the liquid steel into the tundish. (Pl.’s Br. at 34 (footnote and citation omitted).) Plaintiff argues the “special functions imparted by the ladle turret are central to the process of actually casting steel slabs in a continuous manner, and cannot be considered simple moving or handling features used to move a finished product from one place to another.” (Id. at 35.) Defendant argues, pursuant to Mitsubishi, the function of the ladle turret is to hold and rotate the ladle in and out of the casting position. Defendant quotes plaintiffs description of the ladle turret as consisting of [a] very large diameter antifriction bearing ... used to rotate the turret. The turret is rotated by means of a pinion and a large diameter pin-rack system. Emergency drive system for ladle rotation is provided using an air motor. The ladle is stopped precisely at a predetermined position using a brake and a specially designed position fixer. (Def.’s Br. at 18 (quoting App. to Pl.’s Br., Ex. A at 3).) Defendant concludes “it is clear that the ladle turret’s central, primary purpose is to handle and manipulate the ladle” and that “the ladle turret does not orient the ladle nor regulate the control of the flow of steel.” (Id. at 18, 19.) Defendant thus concludes the ladle turret “is therefore plainly classifiable under 8428.90, HTSUS.” (Id. at 18.) Finally, defendant adds plaintiffs proof of the ladle turret’s additional functions comes only from testimony proved in the trial in Mitsubishi, and since plaintiff failed to provide proof that the ladle turret in both actions were the same, “Mitsubishi cannot substitute the facts in the earlier Mitsubishi case for the facts in the present action. Mitsubishi therefore failed to prove that the ladle turret is .more than lifting and handling machinery, and Customs’ classification must be sustained.” (Def.’s Reply at 15.) This Court finds Customs properly classified the ladle turret under subheading 8428.90, HTSUS, as “Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery: ... Other machinery:”, dutiable at 2% ad valorem. Plaintiff’s description of the ladle turret as “the component of the casting machine that lifts and orients the ladle of molten steel,” (Pl.’s Facts at 3), supports this Court’s conclusion that the ladle turret’s primary function is lifting or handling materials. (b) Tundish Transfer Car and Ladle-to-Tundish Shroud Changing Mechanism During the continuous casting process, the molten steel is poured from the ladle into the tundish, which is a rectangular, refractory-lined, fabricated steel vessel positioned above the mold, with nozzles along the bottom. The tundish is used to hold the molten steel bath during its distribution into the casting machine’s mold. The depth and capacity of the tundish helps control the flow rate of the molten steel into the mold, minimizes temperature drops, facilitates the continuous easting process by allowing the empty ladle to be exchanged for a full one without interrupting the flow to the mold, and provides a reservoir for the flotation and removal of nonmetallic inclusions. (See Pl.’s Facts at 3; Def.’s Resp. at 3.) The tundish transfer car supports and holds the tundish. It sits on a rail and moves between the casting position and an area away from the casting where the tundish shroud changing mechanism is removed. (See Pl.’s Facts at 4; Def.’s Resp. at 3.) Plaintiff maintains the tundish transfer car regulates the flow of the molten bath by making sure the liquid steel is driven through the bottom of the tundish at a certain speed and volume,” a critical step in the steel casting process. (Pl.’s Br. at 35.) Plaintiff contends this, as well as the car’s other functions of supporting argon gas load cells and being equipped with a limit switch bracket, are not handling features but features that “go to easting steel.” (Id. at 36.) The ladle-to-tundish shroud changing mechanism is a device attached to the tundish transfer car that positions and supports the nozzle from the ladle in the tundish during the pour. (See PL’s Facts at 4.) The ladle-to-tundish shroud also prevents unwanted oxygen or nitrogen from entering the liquid metal stream during the transfer. (See Pl.’s Facts at 5; Def.’s Resp. at 4.) Plaintiff explains the ladle-to-tundish shroud changing mechanism, in addition to positioning and supporting the nozzle, is used to detach, remove and replace the nozzle leading from the ladle into the tundish. Plaintiff concludes the tundish transfer car, along with the shroud changing mechanism “are integral to the manufacturing process,” are “part of the flow line of the steel making process,” and are not “based on a pulley, winch or jacking system.” (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts “to describe [the components] as handling equipment is a gross oversimplification of what the components do in the operation of the caster and the manufacture of steel. As such, these components are ‘more than’ handling machines.” (Id.) Defendant contends in light of the fact that the tundish transfer ear moves the tundish back and forth between the easting position and the “tundish yard” where tundishes are exchanged, “it is clear that the car is properly classified as lifting and handling machinery under Heading 8428.” (Def.’s Br. at 20.) Defendant maintains the additional easting operations plaintiff claims are performed by the tundish transfer car, such as regulating the flow of the molten steel, are performed by other components, such as the ladle-to-tundish shroud changing mechanism and slide gate, that are “added to the tundish car after importation” and “[i]t is, of course, black letter law that an article is classified according to its condition upon importation.” (Id. at 20 n. 8.) Defendant argues [i]f, at the time of importation, these parts were attached to the tundish transfer ear, then the tundish transfer car would be a composite machine and would be classified according to Note 3 of Section XVI, HTSUS.... Here, however, no evidence shows that the additional parts were already attached to the tundish transfer car at the time of importation. Thus, in its condition as imported, the tundish transfer car can simply move the tundish back and forth, and is therefore is [sic] only a handling machine, classifiable under 8428.90, HTSUS. (Id. at 20.) Defendant responds by asserting Mr. Umeda’s affidavit, which states the tundish transfer car as imported contained additional features that regulate the flow of molten steel, “is not credible nor sufficient to support Mitsubishi’s claims on this point” because “[t]he affidavit does not distinguish between the condition of the merchandise after it has been imported and installed from its condition at the time of entry.” (Def.’s Reply at 16.) Defendant also argues the drawings of the ladle-to-tundish shroud changing mechanism make clear that the mechanism is properly classified as only a handling machine under 8428.90, HTSUS, “as the article appears and performs as a simple mechanical arm.” (Def.’s Br. at 21.) This Court finds Customs properly classified the tundish transfer car and shroud changing mechanism under subheading 8428.90, HTSUS, as “Other lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery: ... Other machinery:”, dutiable at 2% ad valorem. This Court finds no evidence that the tundish transfer car or shroud changing mechanism perform the additional casting operations plaintiff claims without parts added after importation. In their condition as imported, this Court find these components were classified properly by Customs because they perform lifting and handling functions. Plaintiffs expert, Mr. Umeda, stated in his affidavit that the ladle-to-shroud changing mechanism “is used to detach, remove and replace the nozzle leading from the ladle into the tundish” and the tundish transfer car “locates and supports the tundish in the casting position” and “is equipped with a lifting mechanism.” (Umeda Aff. ¶¶ 18, 16, 24.) His statements further support Customs’ classification of these items as “lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery” under subheading 8428.90, HTSUS. (c) Tundish Lifting Beam, Segment Changer System, Segment Lifting Beam, Mold and First Zone Lifting Beam and Segment Transfer Car The segment changer system is a stationary guide in the form of an overhead crane used to align the segments for removal or insertion. (See Pl.’s Facts at 9; Def.’s Resp. at 9.) The segment transfer car is used to transport a segment between the storage area and the area where the casting operation occurs. The segment transfer car is mounted permanently on the ground floor and moves between the casting bay and the replacement bay, an area away from the casting operations where the segments are stored. (See Def.’s Resp. at 9; Pl.’s Facts at 10.) The tundish lifting beam is a specially designed component used to remove the tundish from the tundish car, thus allowing for the replacement of the refractory bricks. (See Pl.’s Facts at 5; Def.’s Resp. at