Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES ISHII, District Judge. This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication. Plaintiff Lashawn Barefield (“Barefield”), an African American female, has sued her employer and various individuals alleging racial discrimination under federal and state law, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to the university’s failure to promote her to a position as director of student activities. Defendants are The Board of Trustees of the California State University, Bakersfield (“CSUB”); James H. George (sued as “Jim George”) (“George”), Diane Hendrickson (“Hendrickson”), and Mark Murie (“Murie”). This Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. FACTUAL HISTORY The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. Plaintiff has been employed with CSUB since January 2001 as a tenure-track counselor in the university’s counseling center. On August 19, 2003, CSUB posted an opening for the position of director of student activities, Position 891. Barefield, who holds a master’s degree and chaired a university committee related to students and substance abuse, applied for the position. Plaintiff received the support of her supervisor Diane Hendrickson, who told her she was a “shoe in” for the position and that she was certain to get an interview because Barefield was “more than qualified.” After Plaintiff submitted her application, Hendrickson approached Plaintiff after a managers’ committee meeting where the director of student activities position was discussed, and told Plaintiff that she would be one of the candidates for an interview and that she should get ready for her interview. Plaintiff, however, was not given an interview. Mark Murie, an employee in CSUB’s human resources department, initially reviewed the applications for Position 891 and recommended an applicant pool of the applicants he determined were the five most qualified candidates to be interviewed. These candidates were invited to interview. Joseph Lowder (“Lowder”), CSUB’s first choice candidate and a non-African American, received a second interview. On December 4, 2003, CSUB sent a letter to Lowder informing him that due to the current budget situation the university was postponing filling the position, but that he would be placed on an eligibility list as the top candidate. On December 9, 2003, Barefield received a letter informing her she was not being considered for Position 891. When Plaintiff was not considered for an interview, she spoke with Brian McNamara, the representative of the California Faculty Association regarding filing a discrimination grievance. Plaintiff claims to have filed a grievance in January 2004, and then a second grievance in February 2004. In June 2004, CSUB hired an existing CSUB employee, Marina Avalos-Kegley (“Kegley”), a non-African American female who was in the process of obtaining her master’s degree, as interim director of student activities. Although the university claimed that Position 891 was cancelled due to lack of funding, it hired Kegley as interim director of student activities before it cancelled recruitment for Position 891. According to Plaintiff, CSUB improperly reclassified and awarded Kegley the interim director of student activities position, even though the requirements for Position 891 and the interim position were the same, in order not to give the position to Plaintiff. Barefield alleges that CSUB racially discriminated against her by failing to promote her to the director of student activities position because she was passed over in favor of a less-qualified, non-African-American candidate. Plaintiff alleges she is more qualified than Kegley for the position. Kegley completed her master’s degree in 2004 and did not have the same work experience as Plaintiff. Kegley had not applied for Position 891 at the time it was posted or previously expressed interest. When a permanent director of student activities position was reposted as Position 1010 in April 2005, Kegley was ultimately hired as the permanent director. Plaintiff did not apply for Position 1010. Plaintiff also claims that CSUB and the individual defendants retaliated against her after she filed her discrimination grievances, a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in November 2004 and her Complaint filed in May 2005 instituting this action. Plaintiff claims Kegley’s reclassification was retaliatory. A holiday credit was withheld from Plaintiffs paycheck. When the permanent director of student activities position was posted as Position 1010, Plaintiff claims that Murie changed the qualification requirements to exclude Plaintiff, even though there were no substantive changes in duties between Position 891 and Position 1010. Plaintiff also maintains that James H. George, CSUB provost and vice president for academic affairs, gave her a negative performance evaluation during her annual review. According to Plaintiff, she had received positive evaluations before her discrimination complaints. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Hendrickson excluded her from a department meeting where Hendrickson informed the counseling department that they were required to attend a ball to celebrate CSUB’s 35th Anniversary and to inaugurate CSUB’s new president. By the time Plaintiff found out that her colleagues in the counseling department were attending as a department, Plaintiff was unable to purchase a ticket. As a result of the denial of the promotion and the retaliatory acts, Barefield alleges she has suffered emotional and physical harm for which she is receiving medical care. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed her complaint against CSUB on May 10, 2005. The complaint was addressed to the Superior Court of California, County of Kern but was filed in the United States District Court in Fresno. The complaint alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code § 12940, et seq. (“FEHA”), breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on July 21, 2005 that was identical to her initial complaint, only addressed to the United States District Court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Bare-field’s § 1981 claims and contract claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Defendant also sought dismissal of the entire suit for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) on the assumption that the § 1981 claims would be dismissed. Alternatively, the motion sought to strike Barefield’s request for punitive damages under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f). Barefield opposed the motion in its entirety. While the matter was under submission, Bare-field filed a motion to amend the FAC under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15, which was granted by the magistrate judge. Barefield filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) on November 17, 2005, which added a claim for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). The SAC mooted Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion since federal subject matter jurisdiction would remain regardless of dismissal of Barefield’s § 1981 claim. Defendant moved again to dismiss various claims in the SAC and to strike Barefield’s punitive damages claims. This Court granted Defendant’s motion and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs § 1981 claims and contract claims, as well as Plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages. The remaining causes of action were discrimination under FEHA and Title VII, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (“TAC”) on June 5, 2006, adding a claim for retaliation under FEHA, California Government Code § 12900, et seq. The TAC also added individual defendants James H. George, Diane Hendrickson, and Mark Murie. The TAC is the operative complaint. On April 20, 2007, Defendants moved for summary judgement or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication on all claims. Plaintiff did not file a timely opposition, but the Court granted Plaintiffs ex parte motion to amend the briefing schedule on May 22, 2007. Plaintiff filed her opposition on May 25, 2007. Defendants filed a reply on June 4, 2007. The Court took the matter under submission on June 11, 2007. UNDISPUTED FACTS The parties do not dispute the following facts: 1. Plaintiff applied for Position No. 891. 2. Murie initially reviewed the applications for Position 891 and recommended an applicant pool of the applicants he determined were the five most qualified candidates to be interviewed. 3. Hendrickson was not on the selection committee for Position 891. 4. George was the provost at the time Plaintiff applied for Position 891. 5. Plaintiff did not apply for Position 1010. 6. George recommended Plaintiff for another probationary year, which was awarded by the president. 7. Plaintiff went on a leave of absence ■on December 7, 2004 and returned to work on January 3, 2005. 8. In November 2005, Plaintiff brought the issue of her holiday credit to the attention of the human resources department, the issue was researched, and she was immediately given a credit. Plaintiff used her personal holiday on November 14, 2005. 9. On May 20, 2005, CSUB had a ball to celebrate it 35th Anniversary and to inaugurate its new president. Plaintiff missed the counseling department’s meeting at which her peers were instructed to attend the ball. Plaintiff did not purchase a ticket before they were sold out. LEGAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment is proper if “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(e). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party need not support is motion with evidence negating the nonmoving party’s claim, but it “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party “by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). An issue of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On summary judgment any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court does not weigh the evidence or determine whether Plaintiffs allegations are true but determines whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir.2006). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Services, Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (9th Cir.1988). The Ninth Circuit has set a “high standard for the granting of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases ... [W]e require very little evidence to survive summary judgment’ in a discrimination case, ‘because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a ‘searching inquiry’ — one that is most appropriately conducted by the fact-finder, upon a full record.’ ” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1996), quoting Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir.1994). In the alternative, Defendants move for summary adjudication of fourteen issues if summary judgment is not granted. Summary adjudication is proper when a court does not enter judgment upon the whole case or for all the relief requested by the moving party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). Rule 56 requires the court to ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and issue an order accordingly. See id. At trial, such facts shall be deemed established. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). DISCUSSION I. Evidentiary Objections Defendants object to much of the evidence filed by Plaintiff in her opposition brief. Given the resolution of certain issues, it is not necessary for the Court to rule on each objection individually. The Court, however, addresses Defendants’ blanket objection to all non-deposition exhibits attached to the Declaration of Waukeen McCoy In Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“McCoy Declaration”). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs attorney lacks personal knowledge to authenticate these documents. Authentication is a “condition precedent to admissibility,” and this condition is satisfied by “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir.2002); Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). The only exhibits offered by Plaintiff are attached to her attorney’s declaration. Plaintiff was given two opportunities to respond to Defendants’ objections to her evidence, including Defendants’ authentication objections. The first response filed by Plaintiff only addressed Defendant’s supplemental objections and failed to respond to the authentication objections. Plaintiff was ordered to file a response to all of Defendant’s objections, including those based on authentication. Plaintiffs second response to the authentication objections merely stated the general proposition that an attorney can authenticate documents produced in discovery and cited a handful of cases discussed below. Plaintiff cited to Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 n. 12 (9th Cir.1996) for the proposition that documents attached to an attorney’s declaration are authenticated when they are offered against the party who produced the documents during discovery. Plaintiff correctly states the principle of law, but fails to apply that principle to this case by offering evidence that the exhibits attached to the McCoy Declaration were in fact produced by Defendants during discovery. Orr, a more recent Ninth Circuit case, outlined the requirements for authentication-by-production by a party opponent. The Ninth Circuit ruled that when a party attempts to introduce a document by attaching it to the declaration of that party’s attorney, Rule 56(e) requires that the attorney have personal knowledge of the document. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. An attorney’s declaration may lay a foundation for authentication if the attorney drafted the document, witnessed the author draft the document, or is familiar with the author’s signature. Id. Authentication-by-production is permitted when the party identifies who produced the document, or if the party opponent admits to having produced it. Id. Where these threshold requirements are not met, the evidence is inadmissible. See id. at 777-778. Although in Maljack, the Ninth Circuit stated without discussion that the district court did not err in considering documents attached to an attorney declaration when the opposing party produced the documents, many of the documents were on the opposing party’s letterhead, and the opposing party did not contest their authenticity, see Maljack, 81 F.3d at 889 n. 12, Orr emphasizes that there must be some evidence on the record indicating that the documents in question were actually produced by an opposing party in order to allow authentication-by-production. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 777-778. Even the eases cited by Plaintiff require more than mere attachment to an attorney declaration for authentication. In re Homestore. com, Inc. Securities Litigation, 347 F.Supp.2d 769, 781-782 (C.D.Cal.2004) is instructive. There the court found that only those documents that plaintiff, the party offering the documents, identified as having being produced by the parties in discovery were authenticated. See In re Homestore.com, 347 F.Supp.2d at 781 (emails between defendant and third parties deemed authentic because plaintiff identified the documents as being produced by defendant in discovery). The court excluded those documents where the record did not contain a declaration or other testimony authenticating the document. See id. at 782 (memorandum of interview by law firm hired by defendant to conduct forensic audit not properly authenticated and inadmissible where “[t]he record does not contain a declaration or other testimony authenticating this document.”). See also Anand v. BP West Coast Products LLC, 484 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1092 n. 11 (C.D.Cal.2007) (relying on attorney declaration stating the exhibit was produced by the opposing party during discovery in making its determination that the exhibit in question was authenticated). Here, Plaintiff offers no argument or evidence that the documents attached to the McCoy Declaration were produced by the opposing party during discovery. Plaintiff fails to identify who produced the exhibits attached to the McCoy Declaration, and CSUB has not admitted to producing the documents, except perhaps those it attached to its declarations. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. The Court notes that there are some indicia on the documents that under Maljack might be sufficient for authentication. For example, some of the documents are on CSUB letterhead and bear bates stamps indicating the documents were produced in discovery. There are, however, at least two different sets of bates stamps on the exhibits and when examining a document the Court can only speculate as to the source of the bates stamps because Plaintiff failed to identify which bates stamps were used by which party. The Court notes that Defendants’ blanket objection to Plaintiffs exhibits unwittingly, and improperly, includes within its scope many of the same exhibits that Defendants themselves attach to their own declarations. Once evidence has been authenticated by one party, it has been authenticated with regard to all parties. 5 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 901.02[3] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed.2007), citing Orr, 285 F.3d at 775-776 (‘We now hold that when a document has been authenticated by a party, the requirement of authenticity is satisfied as to that document with regards to all parties, subject to the right of any party to present evidence to the ultimate fact-finder disputing its authenticity.”). Defendants’ objections to these documents are overruled. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Exhibits G, H, I, J, O, P, Q, R, T, Z, and CC are deemed authenticated because Defendants attached these same underlying documents to the Mark Murie Declaration. Plaintiffs Exhibits F, K, L, M, N, S, U, V, W, X, Y, AA, BB, DD, and EE are not authenticated and therefore inadmissible. McCoy’s declaration does not lay a foundation for the exhibits. McCoy neither created the documents nor witnessed their creation, and there is nothing indicating he is familiar with any signatures contained therein. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. The exhibits are not authenticated by having been produced in discovery because McCoy has not identified who produced them, nor has CSUB admitted to producing them. Id. Of course, although these exhibits themselves are not admissible, evidence proffered by Plaintiff reflecting the substance of these documents may be admissible. See, e.g., Maljack, 81 F.3d at 889 n. 12. The Court is not required to examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references. See Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir.1988) (“The district judge is not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.”); Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.2003) (“A party opposing summary judgment must direct our attention to specific, triable facts.”). II. Race Discrimination Claim Against CSUB under Title YII and FEHA The parties agree that this case is governed by the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing: (1) that plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (2) that plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applications; (3) that, despite plaintiffs qualifications, plaintiff was rejected; and (4) that, after plaintiffs rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The Supreme Court noted that prima facie proof varies greatly from case to case, and the four specific elements are “not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” Id. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1817. “The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir.2002) (same). Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the prima facie case creates a rebuttable “presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The burden of production then shifts to the employer “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs rejection.” Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir.1995). “To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255,101 S.Ct. 1089. If the employer sustains this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Plaintiff can prove pretext either “(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Chuang v. University of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir.2000). Plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting the prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of the employer’s proffered reasons. Id. A. Prima Facie Case The parties dispute whether Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of failure to promote on the basis of race. Defendants concede that Plaintiff can establish that she is a member of a minority, that she applied and was qualified for Position 891, and that she was rejected, but argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the last element of the prima facie case, that the position remained open after she was rejected. According to Defendants, Plaintiff cannot make this showing because a more qualified applicant was selected and, more importantly, because the position was actually never filled because CSUB lost funding. Plaintiffs opposition brief does not directly respond to these arguments but argues that the position remained open and that it was eventually given to a non-African-American who was less qualified than Barefield. Defendants’ argument that Barefield has failed to meet the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas is without merit. The Ninth Circuit has specifically rejected the argument that a discrimination plaintiff fails to establish the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas if the position is given to another candidate. In Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.1981) a gender discrimination case, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas test strictly and ruled that plaintiff failed to meet the fourth prong, reasoning that because the position was filled by a male candidate it did not remain open. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and observed that the Supreme Court has reiterated the flexibility of the McDonnell Douglas test. Id. at 625. The Ninth Circuit noted that several qualified people applied for one job that would necessarily be filled by one of them. Id. The plaintiffs rejection necessarily occurred simultaneously with the hiring of another candidate, and the position could not possibly remain open. See id. As the court noted, to “apply rigidly the McDonnell Douglas test to this situation would deny any plaintiff the opportunity to establish a prima facie case, no matter how blatant the discrimination.” Id. Thus, the fact that another candidate was selected for Position 891 does not preclude Bare-field from satisfying the requirement that the position remain “open.” That Position 891 was eliminated months later due to budgetary reasons also does not prevent Plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case. The “open” position requirement merely requires that some vacancy exist at the time the application is made. See Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. SO, 694 F.2d 531, 547-48 (9th Cir.1982). This is true even if the position is later eliminated for budgetary reasons. See Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 (10th Cir.1995) (elimination of a position for ostensively budgetary reasons, if done for racially motivated reasons, can potentially form the basis of a discrimination claim). Furthermore, this Court is mindful that “[t]he function of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to eliminate the two most common reasons why an applicant may be rejected: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications, or lack of an open position.” Gay, 694 F.2d at 547, citing International Broth. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). For our purposes, what matters is that the position was open at the time Plaintiff submitted her application and at the time the alleged discriminatory employment action took place, even if that position was later closed. Thus, Barefield has established a prima facie case of discrimination and a rebutta-ble presumption of unlawful discrimination. B. CSUB has Articulated Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reasons for Rejecting Barefield CSUB must now set forth legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not selecting Barefield. CSUB’s burden is one of production, not persuasion, thereby involving no credibility assessment. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). CSUB articulates the following non-discriminatory reasons for rejecting Barefield: (1) Plaintiff was minimally qualified and therefore not among the five most qualified selected to interview; (2) a more qualified candidate was eventually offered the position; and (3) the director of student activities position was closed because funding was lost. Defendants also state that Murie did not discriminate against Barefield because when he conducted the initial review of the applications he was not aware of Barefield’s race. C. Plaintiff has Presented Genuine Issue of Fact that Some of Defendants’ Non-Discriminatory Reasons are Pretextual. Once Defendants present legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, the presumption of discrimination “drops out of the picture,” and Plaintiff has the new burden of proving that the proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1148 (2006), quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). A plaintiff can prove pretext either “(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is ‘unworthy of credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127. Circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive summary judgement. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.1998). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, “any indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder,” and for that reason “summary judgment for the defendant will ordinarily not be appropriate on any ground relating to the merits because the crux of a Title VII dispute is the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir.1995). Nevertheless, “[wjhen evidence to refute the defendant’s legitimate explanation is totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate, even though plaintiff may have established a minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas type presumption.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890-91 (9th Cir.1994). Relying on Hicks Defendants argue that Plaintiff must not merely discredit Defendants’ proffered reasons, but she must also persuade the court that the actual motive was intentional discrimination. Defendants misconstrue the applicability of Hicks to a motion for summary judgment. “At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiffs burden is not high.” Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir.2003), citing Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889. Plaintiff must only show that a rational trier of fact could, on all the evidence, find that the employer’s explanation was pre-textual and that therefore its action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons. Id. If plaintiff does so, then summary judgment for an employer is inappropriate. Id. Furthermore, Defendants’ argument was recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey, a case applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim. The Lindsey court noted that Hicks evaluated a decision based on a complete record, which requires a different analysis from that of a summary judgment motion where all factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party. Lindsey, 447 F.3d at 1148-49. The Ninth Circuit also noted that Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), clarified Hicks and unequivocally stated that “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Id., quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Thus, evidence of the falsity of an employer’s proffered reasons along with attacks on credibility are “valuable forms of circumstantial evidence ... [that] could lead a factfinder to infer discrimination, especially when no other legitimate reason could exist for the challenged behavior.” Id. See also Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.2007) (finding district court misapplied Hicks to case on summary judgment). Barefield’s “burden at the summary judgment stage is not great.” Warren, 58 F.3d at 444. The amount of evidence required at summary judgment is “very little.” Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1113. Barefield cannot, however, rely on generalizations. Wan'en, 58 F.3d at 444. She must produce evidence of facts that either directly show a discriminatory motive or show that CSUB’s explanation for her rejection is not credible. Id. 1. Plaintiffs Qualifications for Director of Student Activities Plaintiff offers what she argues is ample evidence that she was highly qualified for Position 891 in the form of her deposition testimony, and the statements and testimony of Hendrickson and Murie. a. Barefield’s Deposition Testimony According to Barefield, she was qualified for Position 891 because she had considerable experience working with the student activities office initiating, developing, planning, and organizing campus events; advanced human relation skills as a marriage and family therapist; and a master’s degree. These qualifications and skills were listed on the job posting for Position 891. See Exh. J to McCoy Decl. The thrust of Barefield’s testimony is that her experience on CSUB’s alcohol and drug prevention committee, especially her close work with the student activities office, and her work with student groups on campus, qualified her for the director of student activities position because she had practical experience in student affairs. See Deposition of LaShawn Barefield (“Barefield Depo.”) p. 70-72, Exh. A to Declaration of Waukeen McCoy (“McCoy Decl.”). She also states that as a licensed marriage and family therapist she possessed advanced human relations skills, another of the desirable traits listed in the job posting. Id. Finally, she notes that although it is not a requirement, the job posting expresses a preference for a masters’ degree, which she has held since 1995. Id. Barefield testified that she felt these qualifications would be sufficient to at least receive an interview. Id. Plaintiff argues that despite her credentials, she was denied the opportunity to interview for the position based on her race. Plaintiff testified that she felt that she was discriminated against based upon race because there was no other reason to explain why she was not interviewed for the position when she exceeded the qualifications for the position. See Bare-field Depo., p. 100-102. According to Barefield, a non-black colleague who served on the alcohol and drug committee she chairs received an interview for Position 891 although this colleague did not have Barefield’s educational background or the experience. Id. at 105-106. Plaintiff also testified that she met and exceeded the qualifications for the job and that she documented that in her application. Id. at 106. She also stated that at CSUB there were only two African-Americans holding a director position on campus. Id. She also testified that she had her masters’ degree almost ten years before the individual who was given the position, Kegley, who is a non-black colleague. Id. at 106-107. Plaintiff does not support her deposition testimony that she was discriminated on the basis of race with corroborating evidence, whether direct or circumstantial. “Mere conclusory assertions of discriminatory intent, embodied in affidavits or deposition testimony, cannot be sufficient to avert summary judgment. The court must satisfy itself that there is sufficient ‘direct or circumstantial evidence’ of intent to create a genuine issue of fact for the jury, before it can deny summary judgment....” Lindsey v. Shalmy, 29 F.3d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir.1994), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (an issue is not genuine unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for that party). Plaintiff does not present evidence of the qualifications or background of her non-black colleague on the alcohol and drug committee who received an interview, but merely implies that her colleague was less qualified than she without identifying the basis for her conclusion. As to Bare-field’s testimony that she met and exceeded the qualifications, the only evidence Barefield offers is her application for Position 891 and resume, but these are not properly authenticated and inadmissible. (Even if they were authenticated, this evidence would not create a material issue of fact because they do not document the same broad student activities experience that Plaintiff testified to having.) Plaintiff also offers no evidence, other than her bare assertion, regarding the number of African-Americans at CSUB holding a director position. Statistical evidence may create an inference that an employer acted in a discriminatory fashion. See Warren, 58 F.3d at 443, citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (suggesting that statistics as to an employer’s employment policy and practice “may be helpful” in establishing that a particular employment decision was in conformance with a general pattern of discrimination). Plaintiff offers Exhibit N, which Plaintiff represents to be a document reflecting the ethnic make up of the applicants for Position 891. See McCoy Decl. ¶ 15. Exhibit N is unauthenticated and inadmissible, however even if the Court were to consider this document, it would not be sufficient to create a material fact as to CSUB’s alleged racial discrimination because evidence of the applicant pool’s racial breakdown is not probative of the numbers of African-Americans holding any position at CSUB, let alone a director position. This evidence would be insufficient to create an inference of a general pattern of discrimination at CSUB. Plaintiffs deposition testimony alone, unsupported by corroborating evidence, does not create a material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. More fundamentally, Plaintiffs evidence does not address Defendants’ contention that while Plaintiff was qualified for Position 891 she was not among the most qualified. Plaintiff presents no evidence of her qualifications vis-a-vis those of the other applicants in the form of, for example, the applications or resumes of the other applicants for Position 891, including those selected to be interviewed. Plaintiffs testimony raises no factual issue that she was among the most qualified of the applicant pool. At most, Plaintiffs evidence may create a material fact that she was more qualified than Kegley, who was offered the interim director of student activities position. Plaintiffs qualifications vis-a-vis those of Kegley are discussed in Part II. C.2, infra. Barefield also testified that Hendrickson informed her that she was highly qualified for the position and that she was one of the candidates selected to interview for Position 891. Hendrickson’s statements are examined in the following section. This Court does not find that Plaintiff was not qualified for the director of student activities position, but merely that her testimony creates no triable issue of material fact that CSUB’s reason for not interviewing her is pretextual. b. Hendrickson’s Statements to Plaintiff Barefield testified at her deposition that when she informed Hendrickson that she was applying for the position, Hendrickson told her that she was a “shoe in” for the position, and either that she was “extremely qualified” or “more than qualified” for the position. Barefield Depo., p. 56-57. More importantly, Hen-drickson told Barefield that she was one of the five candidates selected to interview for Position 891 after Hendrickson returned from a management committee meeting where the position was discussed. According to Barefield, Hendrickson approached her while Barefield was making copies and told her “that she had returned from the management team meeting and told me that they had five candidates for the position of the Student Activities Director and informed me to get prepared for my interview.” Id. at 75. Barefield testified that Hendrickson told her “that I would be one of the five candidates to be interviewed for the position.” Id. at p. 78. Barefield asked Hendrickson if she was sure and Hendrickson responded that she was sure. Id. At her deposition Hendrickson testified that she could not recall telling Barefield that she believed Barefield was qualified or that she was “more than qualified.” Hendrickson Deposition (“Hendrickson Depo.”), p. 31-32, Exh. D to McCoy Decl. Hendrickson characterized herself as being “supportive” of Barefield’s application and as a “cheerleader,” and agreed that she would not generally be supportive of an employee applying for a position for which she knew the employee was not qualified. Id. at p. 29-34. Hendrickson also testified that she discussed aspects of the management committee meetings relating to the position with Barefield. Id. at p. 38-39, 46-48, 50. That management committee included members of the selection committee for the director of student activities position. Id. Hendrickson admits that after one of these meetings she told Barefield that she would be interviewed, but in her deposition testified that this was based on her belief that all on-campus applicants would be interviewed. Id. at p. 47-50. Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, Hendrickson did tell Plaintiff that she was highly qualified for the position and that she would be one of the candidates receiving an interview. Hendrick-son’s assessment of Barefield’s qualifications may not be highly probative because it is undisputed that Hendrickson was not on the selection committee for Position 891 and Plaintiff offered no evidence that Hen-drickson was involved in the selection of the candidate for Position 891, or that Hendrickson reviewed or had knowledge of the qualifications of other applicants. However, Hendrickson’s statement to Barefield that she would be interviewed is sufficient for a rational factfinder to find that Barefield was qualified and indeed actually selected to interview. Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Hen-drickson sat on a management committee with members of the selection committee and admitted that at management committee meetings the status of the director of student activities position was discussed. Hendrickson admits she communicated information from the meetings to Barefield. Hendrickson admits telling Barefield that she would be interviewed. When coupled with Hendrickson’s repeated encouragement and “eheerlead[ing],” Barefield has presented an issue of fact that she may have been selected for an interview and indeed among the most qualified candidates. At summary judgment “[o]ur place is not to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir.2001). c. Murie’s Statements Barefield also offers Mark Mu-rie’s deposition testimony as evidence that she was qualified, and Murie’s declaration as well as other statements as evidence of pretext. Murie was the member of CSUB’s human resources department who initially reviewed the 39 applications for Position 891 and recommended an applicant pool of the five most qualified candidates. Murie Declaration (“Murie Deck”), ¶ 4. At his deposition, Murie testified that Barefield met the basic qualifications for the position, but that his review of Bare-field’s application indicated that “there [was] not enough information provided for a determination to be made at this pass whether this individual is either accepted or rejected as an applicant.” Murie Deposition (“Murie Depo.”), Exh. B to McCoy Deck, p. 70-73. Murie testified that his selection criteria was based on the qualifications listed in the job announcement, including the expressed preferences. Id. at p. 65-66. The criteria applied by Murie to screen the initial pool of applicants were “two years student life related experience with master’s degree.” Id. at p. 65. Mu-rie testified that no policy required him to use the job announcement preferences rather than the minimum requirements to evaluate applicants. Id. at p. 68-69. Although Barefield did not meet the selection criteria used by Murie, she was not rejected outright. Instead, Murie testified that he did not make a determination whether she would be accepted or rejected. Id. at p. 70-73. However, Murie testified that ultimately Barefield “was not selected for an interview as a result of comparing [her to] the other applicants in the applicant pool.” Id. at p. 72. The only evidence of pretext that Plaintiff provides is that Murie stated in his declaration that he was not aware of Plaintiffs race when he reviewed her application. See Murie Decl. ¶ 4 (“When I receive the applications, the Applicant Flow form, which is the only part of the application upon which ethnic information appears, has already been removed. At the time I reviewed the applications, I was unaware of Plaintiffs ethnicity.”). See also Murie Depo. at p. 94 (“I did not know the ethnicity of the applicants.”) and at p. 97 (Q: “ ‘So is it your testimony ... that when you were accepting and/or rejecting candidates in 2003 for the Director of Student Activities position, you did not know that LaShawn Barefield was an African-American?’ A: ‘That’s correct.’ ”). Plaintiff argues that this “strains credulity” because Murie reviewed Barefield’s resume which lists classes that she has taught, including “The African American Experience.” This is sufficient evidence that could allow a rational factfinder to find that Murie was aware of Plaintiffs race, notwithstanding his declaration and testimony to the contrary. Murie’s knowledge of Barefield’s race is not necessarily evidence of discrimination, but the fact that he insists that he did not know Barefield’s race notwithstanding evidence of race in the resume and application he reviewed seems internally inconsistent and, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could give rise to an inference that the reason he denied knowing her race was to disguise his use of an impermissible motive. Plaintiff also provides evidence that Mu-rie misrepresented to her that Dr. Bill Perry, CSUB’s assistant vice president for student life, was involved in the initial review of the applications. Murie responded to an email Barefield wrote to Kelly Garcia, the head of human resources, after she received her rejection letter. See Murie Decl. ¶ 7 and Exhibit H to Murie Decl. Murie in his response wrote that “In accordance with our campus recruitment process, the hiring department chairperson, Dr. Bill Perry, and I reviewed the approximately 40 applications for the position and determined an appropriate candidate pool based upon the qualifications as reflected in the position announcement.” See Exhibit H to Murie Decl. It is undisputed that Murie alone initially reviewed the applications for Position 891 and recommended an applicant pool of the applicants he determined were the five most qualified candidates to be interviewed. See also Murie Decl. ¶ 4; Murie Depo., p. 39. Dr. Perry does not appear to have had any role in the initial selection process. A rational factfinder could also find that Murie’s statement to the contrary that Dr. Perry participated in the initial selection process was to cover an impermissible motive. Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence that Defendants’ proffered reason that she was not among the most qualified may have been pretextual. 2. Whether a More Qualified Candidate Was Offered the Position A threshold question for this Court is whether to treat Position 891 and the interim position as two different positions or whether, as Plaintiff alleges, they are really the same position. This is a central question in part because it determines the candidate against whom Plaintiff is gauged: Joseph Lowder, who was offered the director of student activities position, or Marina Avalos-Kegley, who received the interim position and subsequently the full time position as director of student activities. Defendant has offered evidence in the form of interview evaluations and an offer letter that Lowder was deemed the most qualified candidate for Position 891 and placed at the top of an eligibility list for the position in December 2003, pending resolution of budget issues. See Exhs. C, D, E, F to Murie Decl. Plaintiff argues that the budgetary rationale for not hiring Lowder was pretext to avoid giving her the position, that Kegley was reclassified into the position, and thus that Barefield must be gauged against Kegley. Plaintiff, however, offers no admissible evidence to support her argument. Thus, only Lowder’s qualifications are considered. Defendants argue that Plaintiff was minimally qualified and that Lowder, a more qualified candidate, was offered the position. Plaintiff does not offer evidence of her qualifications vis-a-vis those of the interviewees or Lowder. However, Plaintiff has already raised an issue of material fact that she may have been one of the applicants selected for an interview, based on Hendrickson’s testimony. That evidence is also sufficient to raise a factual issue that she was at least as qualified as Low-der. Lowder may well have been more qualified than Barefield, but it is not the role of this Court to determine who was the most qualified, but only to determine if there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1117 (“[W]hether appellants were as qualified as any of the promotion recipients is a factually intensive question best resolved by the jury.”). Plaintiff has raised an issue of fact that she may have been as qualified as Lowder because she has raised a factual issue that she was among the five candidates to be interviewed. Thus, Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence that Defendants’ proffered reason may be pretext. 3. Whether the Position was Closed Due to Budgetary Reasons Barefield argues that Position 891 was not closed for budgetary reasons, but rather that CSUB’s proffered decision is pretext because the interim director of student activities position was created in its stead. Plaintiff argues that the interim position was created for and awarded to Kegley through an improper reclassification of her position. Defendants present substantial evidence that Position 891 was not awarded due to budgetary reasons. Lowder was notified that budgetary reasons precluded CSUB from awarding him the position several days before Barefield received her rejection letter. See Murie Deck, Exhs. F (Letter from Kellie Garcia to Joseph Lowder, dated December 4, 2003) (informing Low-der that he was first choice candidate but that due to budgetary reasons Position 891 was not being filled at that time) and G (Letter from Kellie Garcia to LaShawn Barefield, dated December 9, 2003) (informing Barefield she is not being considered for Position 891). Furthermore, there are several other references to budgetary issues in Defendants’ internal mem-oranda. See, e.g., Murie Decl., Exh. E (Memorandum from Bill Perry to Kellie Garcia, dated November 21, 2003) (“Dr. Hibbard and I would like to offer position # 891 Director of Student Activities to Joseph Lowder, in the Spring quarter, after the budget situation has been resolved.”). See also Murie Decl. ¶ 6. According to Plaintiff, the interim position was reclassified in violation of university policy to cover up the fact that the position was still open. Evidence that the university did not follow its established procedures may be circumstantial evidence of pretext. However, Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence that university procedures were violated. Plaintiff also offers evidence that in her view demonstrates that Kegley was not qualified for and lacked the relevant experience to be awarded the director of student activities position. Even when taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the fact that Kegley may be less qualified than Plaintiff is irrelevant because Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence of an improper reclassification or violation of university policy in creating the interim position or hiring Kegley to fill that position. Plaintiff does not offer any probative evidence that CSUB’s budgetary rationale is pretextual. In summary, Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to allow a rational factfinder to determine that some of CSUB’s proffered reasons for not hiring her may be pretextual, thereby precluding summary judgment on the race discrimination claim. Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact that she was qualified, was selected for an interview, and that Murie may have used impermissible motives due to his insistence that he did not know Plaintiffs race and his representation that Bill Perry was involved in the selection process. Plaintiff raised no issue of fact that the budgetary rationale was pretextual. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication is denied as to Issue No. 1 because Plaintiff has raised a material issue of fact regarding whether CSUB discriminated against her; and denied as moot as to Issue Nos. 2-4 regarding whether the individual defendants discriminated against Plaintiff, because the TAC does not indicate the individual defendants are sued for discrimination. III. Retaliation under FEHA At the summary judgment stage, an employee’s allegations of retaliation under FEHA are evaluated under the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas to determine whether there are triable issues of fact. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123, citing Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 652. An employee must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The burden then shifts to the employer to provide legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for its actions. Id. Plaintiff must then provide direct or indirect evidence that the proffered reasons are pretextual. To make a prima facie case, an employee must show that: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer subjected the employee to adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. Id. Protected activity includes filing a complaint or grievance. Yanowitz, 36 Cal.4th at 1042, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123. An adverse employment action is any action that “materially affeet[s] the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. at 1036, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123. When considering whether an employee has been subjected to adverse employment action, the Court may consider the “totality of the circumstances” rather than each discreet act in isolation. Id. The causal connection requirement may be satisfied by “an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that the employee engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842, citing Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir.1988). As a threshold matter, Plaintiff relies on the Ninth Circuit’s “deterrence test,” articulated in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.2000), to argue that an adverse employment action is any action “‘reasonablely likely to deter employees from engaging in a protected activity.’ ” This test was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Yanowitz for retaliation claims arising under FEHA. See Yanowitz, 36 Cal.4th at 1051, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123. The proper standard for defining an “adverse employment action” under California law is the “materiality test,” which requires that an employer’s adverse action “materially affect the terms and conditions of employment.” See id. at 1036, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123. When discussing this standard, the Yanowitz court explained that FEHA protects an employee against unlawful discrimination with respect not only to ultimate employment actions such as termination or demotion, but also to the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in his or her career. See id. at 1053-1054, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123. The materiality standard “must be interpreted broadly to further the fundamental antidiscrimi-nation purposes of the FEHA.” Id. at 1054, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123. Accordingly, this Court will apply Yanow-itz ’s materiality test to Barefield’s alleged adverse employment actions. A. Prima Facie Case [38] According to Barefield, she engaged in protected activities on four separate occasions: January 5, 2004, when she filed a discrimination grievance with the California Faculty Association (“CFA”), Exh. S to McCoy Decl.; February 20, 2004, when she filed her second discrimination grievance, Exh. U to McCoy Deck; November 22, 2004, when she filed her complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) (not attached); May 2005, when she filed this action. Plaintiff, however, does not provide sufficient factual support that she engaged in the protected activities. Exhibit S and U are not inadmissible on authentication grounds; although Plaintiff appears to have written these documents, her attorney may not authenticate them on her behalf because he lacks personal knowledge. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. Even if these documents were authenticated, this Court’s review of the record indicates that Barefield testified at her deposition that she spoke with the CFA representative regarding filing a discrimination grievance, but that she did not actually file a grievance with CFA. See Barefield Depo., p. 87-93. Additionally, she provides no evidence that the CFA representative communicated her complaints to CSUB. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence of her complaint of discrimination with the EEOC. As to her legal Complaint in this action, the Court may take judicial notice that the Complaint was filed on May 10, 2005. Thus, the only protected activity for which any evidentiary support exits is the filing of the Complaint in this action in May 2005, and that is only through this Court’s judicial notice. Barefield argues that Defendants retaliated against her by: (1) reclassifying Keg-ley’s position at CSUB in June 2004 to appoint Kegley as director of student activities; (2) withholding holiday credit from her paycheck in January 2005; (3) changing the criteria for the director of student activities position so Barefield would not qualify in April 2005; (4) issuing Plaintiff a poor performance evaluation in May 2005; and (5) isolating her from CSUB’s May 20, 2005 inaugural ball that her non-African-American colleagues were asked to attend. The first three of these alleged retaliatory actions, however, took place before the filing of Plaintiffs Complaint. The latter two, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, may have occurred after the Complaint was filed. Plaintiffs performance review is dated May 9, 2005, one day before Plaintiff filed her Complaint. At her deposition, however, Barefield testified that she received her performance review after she filed her Complaint. See id. at p. 116-119. Sufficient facts exist for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the review was delivered after the Complaint was filed. Additionally, the inaugural ball took place after the filing of the Complaint. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts that support that the acts Barefield alleges are adverse employment actions and that there is no causal connection. Under Yanowitz, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must pr