Full opinion text
ORDER GRITZNER, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Clerk’s No. 21) filed by Defendants Kerkhoff Chiropractic, The Masters Circle, Inc., Larry Markson, Bob Hoffman, Dennis Perman, and Paul Kerkhoff; a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Clerk’s No. 22) filed by Defendants The Masters Circle, Inc., Larry Markson, Bob Hoffman, and Dennis Perman; and a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint and Dissolve or Modify the State Court’s June 15, 2006, Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1450 filed by Plaintiffs (Clerk’s No. 33). Plaintiffs are represented by Kimberley Baer, Steven Wandro, and Kasey Kincaid. Defendants are represented by Mary Brockington, Jonathan Poole, James Gilliam, and Sean Moore. Following an April 27, 2007, hearing, these matters are fully submitted and are ready for disposition. TABLE OF CONTENTS FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................474 I. Factual Allegations.........................................................474 A. The Defendants........................................................474 B. Defendants’Alleged Wrongful Practices ..................................476 C. The Proposed Class Representatives .....................................477 1. Heidi Brown and Trevor Rhiner......................................477 2. Cynthia Christian ..................................................478 D. Nonresident Defendants’ Contacts with Iowa..............................478 1. The Masters Circle.................................................478 a. Physical Presence ..............................................478 b. Virtual Presence................................................481 2. Individual Nonresident Defendants...................................481 a. Markson.......................................................481 b. Hoffman.......................................................482 c. Perman .......................................................482 II. Procedural History.........................................................483 DISCUSSION..................................................................483 I. Issues Related to Standing..................................................483 A. Relevance of the State Court’s June 2006 Order............................483 B. Standing of Brown and Rhiner to Sue The Masters Circle, Hoffman, Markson, and Perman................................................484 1. Applicable Legal Standards..........................................484 2. Discussion.........................................................485 3. The Third Amended Complaint.......................................486 C. Conclusion............................................................487 II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction ............................487 A. Applicable Legal Standards.............................................487 1. Burden of Proof....................................................487 2. Constitutional and Statutory Considerations ...........................488 a. Service of Process..............................................488 b. Constitutional Parameters.......................................489 B. Personal Jurisdiction Under RICO.......................................489 1. Statutory Authorization.............................................489 a. Statutory Provisions............................................489 b. Analysis.......................................................490 i. The Argument for Subsection (d).............................491 ii. The Argument for Subsection (b).............................491 iii. Application of Subsection (b).................................493 (a) The Ninth Circuit Approach..............................494 (b) The Tenth Circuit Approach..............................494 (c) Application of the Tests..................................495 2. Constitutional Considerations........................................497 3. Conclusion.........................................................497 C. Personal Jurisdiction Under the Calder “Effects” Test......................497 1. Applicable Legal Standards..........................................497 2. Discussion.........................................................498 D. Personal Jurisdiction Under the Iowa Long-Arm Statute ...................499 1. Applicable Legal Principles..........................................499 2. Summary of Defendants’ Contacts....................................501 a. The Masters Circle .............................................501 b. Individual Defendants...........................................503 3. Nature, Quality, and Quantity of the Nonresident Defendants’ Contacts, and the Relation of Such Contacts to Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action ..........................................................503 a. The Masters Circle .............................................503 i. Internet Contacts ..........................................503 (a) Legal Standards........................................504 (b) Analysis...............................................506 ii. Non-Internet Contacts......................................508 iii. Individual Defendants.......................................512 iv. Conclusion.................................................512 4. Interest of the Forum State and Convenience of the Parties..............512 5. Conclusion.........................................................513 E. Personal Jurisdiction Under A “Conspiracy Jurisdiction” Theory.............513 F. Conclusion............................................................518 III. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.................................518 A. Applicable Legal Standards.............................................518 1. Rule 8(a) Claims (Non-Fraud Based Claims)...........................518 2. Rule 9(b) Claims (Fraud Based Claims) ...............................523 B. Civil Conspiracy.......................................................525 1. Elements of the Claim..............................................525 2. Allegations of an Agreement or Understanding to Effect a Wrong........526 a. Allegations of the Second Amended Petition........................526 b. Analysis.......................................................527 3. Allegations of Injury or Damage......................................528 4. Conclusion.........................................................528 C. Ongoing Criminal Conduct..............................................529 1. Overview of the Statute.............................................529 2. Purported Pleading Deficiencies......................................530 3. “Specified Unlawful Activity” Allegations..............................530 a. Theft by Deception Under Iowa Law..............................530 i. Legal Standards............................................530 ii. Arguments of the Parties....................................531 iii. Allegations of the Second Amended Petition ...................531 iv. Analysis...................................................532 v. Conclusion.................................................534 b. Insurance Fraud Under Iowa and New York Law...................534 i. Legal Standards............................................534 ii. Arguments of the Parties....................................535 c. Allegations of the Second Amended Petition........................535 d. Analysis.......................................................536 e. Conclusion.....................................................537 4. Scheme to Defraud.................................................537 a. Legal Standards................................................537 b. Allegations of the Second Amended Petition........................538 e. Arguments of the Parties........................................538 d. Analysis.......................................................538 e. Conclusion.....................................................539 5. Money Laundering.................................................539 a. Legal Standards................................................539 b. Allegations of the Second Amended Petition........................540 c. Arguments of the Parties........................................540 d. Analysis.......................................................541 e. Conclusion.....................................................542 6. Conspiracy........................................................542 a. Legal Standards................................................542 b. Allegations of the Second Amended Petition........................542 c. Arguments of the Parties........................................542 d. Discussion.....................................................543 e. Conclusion.....................................................543 7. Conclusion.........................................................543 D. Unjust Enrichment.....................................................543 1. Elements..........................................................543 2. Allegations of the Second Amended Petition ...........................544 3. Discussion.........................................................544 4. Conclusion.........................................................545 E. Conclusion............................................................545 IV. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Second Amended Petition.......................545 A. Legal Standards.......................................................545 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).................................545 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1450 ...................................................546 B. Discussion............................................................546 1. Failure to Cure Previous Amendments................................546 2. Futility ...........................................................546 a. Legal Standards................................................546 b. Discussion......................................................547 i. Federal RICO Claims.......................................547 (a) Applicable Legal Standards..............................548 (b) Analysis...............................................548 (e) Conclusion.............................................551 ii. Tortious Interference Claims.................................551 (a) Elements of the Claims..................................551 (b) Allegations of the Third Amended Complaint...............552 (c) Arguments of the Parties................................552 (d) Analysis...............................................553 (e) Conclusion.............................................553 iii. Conclusion...................................... 553 c. Conclusion.....................................................553 V. Motion Seeking Leave to Amend to Cure Deficiencies...........................553 CONCLUSION.................................................................554 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1. Factual Allegations. This is an uncertified national class action brought on behalf of all patients residing in the United States who have received at least twelve chiropractic treatments from a chiropractor who is currently or who was at the time of treatment a member of organizations known as The Masters Circle, Inc., or The Masters LLC. Second Am. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 20. But see id. ¶ 3 (seeking “redress on behalf of all past, current and future patients who have been treated by chiropractors who are members of [T]he Masters Circle” (emphases added)). According to Plaintiffs, “The Masters Circle is a worldwide organization which trains chiropractors on methods of ‘targeting, leveraging and closing’ the sale of chiropractic services to new patients,” and “teaches ‘scripts,’ various leveraging and high pressure sales tactics to its chiropractors to be used to convince patients to agree for chiropractic care.” Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs contend chiropractors pay The Masters Circle a monthly fee in exchange for education on scripts and tactics they could use to rapidly expand their patient base, resulting in “the practice of them dreams.” Id. ¶2. Plaintiffs contend patients visited chiropractors who were members of The Masters Circle expecting they would administer care with the patient’s best interests in mind but were instead unwittingly drawn into “a nationwide conspiracy by which chiropractors used unethical and misleading practices to induce patients into agreeing, to pay for chiropractic care,” thereby depriving them patients “of their right to make informed medical decisions based upon unbiased medical advice.” Id. ¶ 3. A. The Defendants. Defendant Dr. Paul Kerkhoff is an Iowa resident who either operates or is employed by Kerkhoff Chiropractic, an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Waukee, Iowa. Kerkhoff is a doctor of chiropractic and is licensed to practice in the State of Iowa. The Masters Circle is a New York corporation with its primary place of business in New York. It was incorporated on August 29, 2000, and began conducting business on January 1, 2001. The stated purpose of the organization “is to be an example of and help others achieve happiness, success, and fulfillment through personal growth and professional excellence.” Markson Aff. ¶ 20. To become a member of The Masters Circle, chiropractors submit an application, sign a contract, and pay a monthly fee. In June 2005, the monthly fee was $650 per month, but members could receive a discount by signing up for a longer term of affiliation. Contracts establish a term of affiliation of either fifteen or twenty-seven months for new members and twelve or twenty-four months for renewing members, with termination fees applicable if a member terminates early. Choice of law and forum selection clauses indicate disputes with respect to contracts between the company and its members are to be brought in New York and be governed by New York law. In exchange for their membership fees, members received a variety of services. Members received an Enrollment Package that included a 340-page document entitled “Masters Guide for the 21st Century Chiropractor” (the “Manual”). Topics included in the Manual include patient education, patient compliance, developing leverage over patients, and acquiring new patients. The Manual contains written “scripts” each chiropractor was to memorize and use to persuade patients to start or continue care. Members were also provided access to the “Members Only” portion of the eompa-ny’s website, written and audiovisual materials, educational products, monthly practical open discussions, telephone and email access to coaches, and access to a digital bulletin board. The company’s coaching services have been described as “life-changing” and are available “at any time” a chiropractor needs a consult. Kerkhoff Aff. ¶ 13. As a result of the nature of the coaching services, coaches often become “very close Mends and mentors” of the company’s chiropractor members. Id. The Masters Circle also provides members and their staffs admittance at four seminars each year, including an annual “Super Conference”. Seminars are held in New Jersey, Illinois, Nevada, and California, and none have ever been held in Iowa. Upon becoming a member of The Masters Circle, chiropractors were required to agree to study and follow the Manual, comply with The Masters Circle’s practices and policies, and follow the advice and instructions of their coaches. These practices had the alleged goal of encouraging patients to pay for long-term chiropractic services that may or may not have been needed. Plaintiffs contend chiropractors’ use of these services and practices were not disclosed to the patients they treated. Defendant Dr. Larry Markson is The Masters Circle’s CEO Emertius. He acts as the Chairman of the Board, oversees partners’ meetings, designs seminars, and authors publications. Defendant Dr. Robert Hoffman is the company’s president. Hoffman is responsible for day-today operations and hiring, firing, budgetary, and policy decisions. Defendant Dr. Dennis Perman is the company’s vice-president. Hoffman, Markson, and Perman are each New York residents and are all alleged to be owners or employees of The Masters Circle who disseminated techniques of the organization to dues-paying members. B. Defendants’ Alleged Wrongful Practices. According to Plaintiffs, The Masters Circle trumpets itself as a “highly specialized and unique leadership training and practice building organization” that uses an “Identity Based” approached to transform chiropi’actors into the types of people who will “do whatever it takes” to “build the practice of their dreams and the lifestyle they can imagine.” Plaintiffs allege some of the practices the organization taught and its members used are unethical and unlawful. As a result of the joint agreement to use services taught by The Masters Circle, Plaintiffs assert Defendants engaged.in a nationwide conspiracy designed to induce patients to pay for unneeded or excessive chiropractic care to make The Masters Circle and its members more prosperous. The Masters Circle’s techniques allegedly increased the chiropractors’ businesses and spurned additional purchases of The Masters Circle’s products and services. The Masters Circle used its increased revenue to attract new chiropractors to its fold. C. The Proposed Class Representatives. There are three named plaintiffs in this action. 1. Heidi Brown and Trevor Rhiner. Heidi Brown and her son, Trevor Rhiner, are Iowa residents. Rhiner, accompanied by Brown, sought treatment from Kerkhoff in late 2001 when Rhiner was fourteen years of age. Kerkhoff recalled Rhiner was suffering from leg pain, low back pain, and headaches. According to Kerkhoff, Rhiner had difficulty walking because of the pain. Kerkhoff administered x-rays and diagnosed a reverse curvature of the cervical spine and scoliosis. Kerkhoff recommended a course of treatment that included adjustments and traction. Plaintiffs allege Kerkhoff indicated that without intense and immediate chiropractic treatment, Rhiner could not continue playing sports, would develop arthritis, and was at risk of serious injury. According to Plaintiffs, Kerkhoff attempted to “pre-sell” a year of chiropractic treatment but mentioned discounts were available if they paid in cash immediately. After Kerkhoff treated Rhiner for several weeks, he became symptom-free. Although Rhiner’s initial symptoms disappeared, Kerkhoff recommended further treatment to resolve “underlying conditions which had caused his symptoms.” According to Kerkhoff, he advised Rhiner to refrain from playing sports until his underlying condition improved, which would reduce the risk of a serious and permanent injury. During the course of treatment, Kerk-hoff allegedly submitted claims to Rhiner’s insurance carrier seeking payment for the diagnosis and treatment. According to Plaintiffs, Kerkhoff received payment for some treatments from Rhiner’s insurance carrier. Brown and Rhiner became concerned with the continued treatment regimen, so they visited an orthopedic surgeon for a second opinion. The orthopedic surgeon allegedly disagreed with Kerkhoff s assessment of the severity of Rhiner’s scoliosis, as well as Kerkhoff s recommendation that Rhiner continue treatment. Plaintiffs relay the orthopedic surgeon indicated the traction treatments recommended by Kerkhoff were unnecessary and could be harmful. Kerkhoff recalls the orthopedic surgeon phoned him after examining Rhiner, reporting he found a slight reverse curvature of Rhiner’s cervical spine but did not think chiropractic treatment could alleviate the symptoms. Instead, the surgeon recommended physical therapy and anti-inflammatory drugs. Brown discontinued Rhiner’s chiropractic treatment and sued Kerkhoff for malpractice in the Iowa District Court for Dallas County (the “state court”). During discovery in the malpractice case, Brown learned Kerkhoff was a member of The Masters Circle. According to Plaintiffs, they learned Kerkhoff used purportedly unethical and fraudulent practices endorsed and taught by this organization as part of Rhiner’s treatment program. Defendants argue that because The Masters Circle was not in existence when Rhiner received treatment from Kerkhoff, Kerkhoff could not have been a member at the time he treated Rhiner. At their depositions in the malpractice action, Rhiner and Brown admitted that Rhiner’s headaches, leg pain, and back pain dissipated as a result of Kerkhoffs treatment and that he had not been injured by Kerk-hoffs techniques. 2. Cynthia Christian. Plaintiff Cynthia Christian is also a resident of Iowa. Christian visited Kerkhoff in 2004 after experiencing neck pain. Kerk-hoff allegedly told Christian she had “non-curvature” in her neck and that immediate and intense chiropractic treatments were needed to correct her condition. He also told Christian that without long-term chiropractic care, she would not be able to hold her head up when she reached her sixties. According to Plaintiffs, Kerkhoff encouraged Christian to purchase nine months of chiropractic care up front. When Christian told Kerkhoff she could not afford it, Kerkhoff purportedly told her to obtain a bank loan to obtain money to pay for the necessary treatments. After a few treatments, Christian’s neck improved. However, Plaintiffs argue Kerkhoff continued to use unethical practices to pressure Christian to continue to pay for treatment. After Christian had received nine months of treatment, Kerk-hoff allegedly attempted to sell Christian another long-term package. D. Nonresident Defendants’ Contacts with Iowa. Because one of Defendants’ motions seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against The Masters Circle, Hoffman, Markson, and Perman because of a purported lack of personal jurisdiction, a relevant issue is the type of contacts these Defendants have had with Iowa. 1. The Masters Circle. a. Physical Presence. The Masters Circle is a New York corporation and maintains its primary place of business there. All of the company’s materials and products — including its website — are prepared, produced, and maintained in New York. The company maintains no offices in Iowa and does not have a registered agent in Iowa. The company owns and leases no real or personal property in this state, and it maintains no mailing address, bank accounts, records, or telephone numbers in Iowa. The company does not send mail from or receive mail in Iowa. The company is neither licensed to do business in nor has it ever been registered to do business in Iowa. The company pays no taxes to the State of Iowa. None of its shareholders are Iowa residents. The record also shows The Masters Circle does not make telephone calls into Iowa to solicit members, recruit members, or sell products. The company contends it has never recruited employees in Iowa, does not advertise in Iowa, and claims to direct no print, television, or radio advertising toward the state, and does not tailor its business products to Iowa residents. Only one employee of The Masters Circle, Dr. Janice Hughes, has ever lived in Iowa during the time of her employment with the company. The record shows The Masters Circle recruited Hughes while she lived in Canada. For approximately a year and a half, she visited Davenport every three or four months to teach a weeklong course at the Palmer College of Chiropractic. She became a full-time Palmer employee and a Davenport resident from July 2003 through August 2004. Concurrent with a portion of her time at Palmer, she performed part-time contract work as a coach for The Masters Circle. None of the individuals she coached resided in Iowa. Plaintiffs point to an Annual Report prepared by The Masters Circle for the 2003 fiscal year detailing Hughes’s involvement with a “vital” speakers program at Palmer that featured The Masters Circle’s executives. Hughes was also responsible for coordinating a fair that drew “outstanding members of The Masters Circle to speak at the college on an average of every 6-8 weeks” and structuring “workshops [that] present specific concepts and topics unique to The Masters Circle systems and philosophy.” In addition, Hughes oversaw the establishment of a Masters Circle Club at the college. The Masters Circle Club is designed “to help ease the transition from student to Doctor of Chiropractic” by “empowering] students with the tools and resources to create success in practice and in life.” The Masters Circle publishes bylaws and guidelines for these clubs, but the organizations are formed by and operated by students. After leaving Palmer, Hughes moved to Colorado and has lived there since. The record contains evidence suggesting Hughes was to return to Iowa in May 2005 to deliver a speech about The Masters Circle’s practices and techniques at a meeting at Palmer, but the record does not indicate whether Hughes actually attended. As of June 2005, seventeen Iowa residents were dues-paying members of the organization. The organization’s Iowa members were required to sign contracts and pay monthly membership fees. Four Iowa residents joined at a seminar in Illinois, four joined at a seminar in Nevada, six joined by telephoning The Masters Circle and asking to join, and three joined at a seminal' in Colorado sponsored by a company other than The Masters Circle. The •remaining member — Kerkhoff—claims he joined in July 2004 after attending a seminar in Illinois. Plaintiffs argue Kerkhoff admitted he decided to join after receiving a flyer in the mail. After joining The Masters Circle, Kerkhoff was a regular consumer of The Masters Circle’s products, some of which he received through the mail. Twenty-one other Iowa residents are former members of The Masters Circle. The record shows The Masters Circle derived $270,665 from dues paid by Iowá residents from 2001 to mid-2005. Many Iowa members also purchased products from the company, resulting in $36,582.11 in sales. As noted above, a key service The Masters Circle provides is coaching services to its members. The record indicates approximately 1300 phone calls have occurred between coaches or employees of The Masters Circle and Iowa residents, but members typically initiate these communications. Markson relayed that member chiropractors regularly contact coaches for individual advice and consultation. Calls are directed from members to coaches located in states other than Iowa: eleven are residents of New York, three are residents of New Jersey, three are residents of Florida, and one is a Colorado resident. Most coaches have coached or are coaching at least one Iowa resident. Some have not. Most who have coached Iowa residents contend the member initiated the call. In addition, most coaches have visited Iowa or had conversations with Iowa residents unrelated to coaching duties. Only one coach as had no contact with Iowa or its residents. To support their allegations that Defendants have had continuous and systematic contacts with Iowa, Plaintiffs point to an affidavit prepared by Dr. Braxton Pulley, a Des Moines chiropractor. Pulley is not and never has been a member of The Masters Circle but claims to have received “numerous” invitations to join the company over the last several years. Markson contends Pulley cannot have received information in , this manner because The Masters Circle does not solicit members of the public to join the company through the mail and does not advertise -in publications targeted at Iowa. Markson conjectures Pulley must have either received a copy of a national publication equipped with an advertisement or received promotional materials he specifically requested. Plaintiffs also point to an editorial published in a Pálmer student newspaper, wherein the author boasts that Palmer lacks negative pressures from advertising experienced by students at institutions educating different medical professionals. The author notes some companies — such as The Masters Circle — do have a presence on campus but claims their presence is symbiotic with the education Palmer offers. Plaintiffs claim this editorial establishes it is commonplace for The Masters Circle to be at Palmer selling its products and services. b. Virtual Presence. The company’s website is additional evidence of the company’s success in transacting business with Iowa residents. The company’s website provides the general public a portal to learn about the company and purchase its products. It contains a password-protected “members only” area for members to access materials and interact directly with each other and their coaches. The company’s internet presence serves as a primary way to communicate with members. There is no way to apply for membership through the website; interested chiropractors are directed to call a toll-free number for more information. The website provides contact information for The Masters Circle’s offices, contains online registration forms for seminars, and presents a feedback form for comments and questions. 2. Individual Nonresident Defendants. Turning to the individual nonresident Defendants, each has submitted an affidavit attesting to the fact that none now owns or leases or has ever owned or leased real or personal property in Iowa. None has a mailing address, telephone number, bank account, or business or chiropractic license in Iowa. None maintain an office or staff here, pay taxes here, or receive mail in or send mail from this state. Hoffman and Perman do not currently and have never lived in Iowa. a. Markson. Markson was an Iowa resident from October 1958 to December 1961 while he was a student at Palmer. After earning his degree from Palmer, he moved from Iowa and has not lived in this state since that time. Since then, he has returned to Iowa “several times,” frequently on business trips for The Masters Circle. In August of each of 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, he was invited to be a guest speaker at the Palmer Lyceum, an annual celebration hosted by the college, and was present at a booth where members of the public could ask questions about The Masters Circle and buy the company’s goods-. The Masters Circle received an honorarium for each speech Markson provided. Markson claims no Iowa residents joined The Masters Circle as a result of his efforts at the Palmer Lyceum. Dr. Guy Riekeman, Palmer’s president at the time, explained that The Masters Circle was invited to set up a booth to speak with members and other friends in attendance. Other speakers were afforded the same courtesy. Markson returned to Palmer in June 2002, where he attended lectures by Palmer’s president, two Palmer faculty members, and a chiropractic historian given to members of the Winners Circle Club. Markson described the typical agenda at Winners Circle Club meetings as follows: “We just came in, sat in a classroom and we had-three or four faculty members, a chiropractic - historian, a chiropractic philosopher, the president of the college himself, address our people and that was the event, in and out.” Markson Aff. 7:22-8:1. In addition to the June visit, Markson recalls returning to Iowa two other times 2002, upon being invited to speak to Palmer students. According to Markson, he did not discuss membership with The Masters Circle with anyone and did not sell any of the company’s products. Markson returned to Iowa in April 2004, where he attended an open house hosted by a colleague who had been a member of The Masters Circle since November 2002. Markson had previously provided advice to this member while she was redesigning and refurbishing her office. It was at this party he saw Kerkhoff. • Kerkhoff mentioned he was interested in joining The Masters Circle and asked Markson for application materials and inquired of the date of the next seminar.- Aside from physical visits to Iowa, Markson contends his only other contacts with Iowa have been limited to receiving periodic telephone calls or emails from Iowa members of The Masters Circle, all of which Markson did not initiate. While he does not specifically recall conversing with Iowa residents while he was coaching members, he is “sure” he has done so at least once. And, as noted above, the record shows some- materials Markson authored were sent to the company’s Iowa members. b. Hoffman. Hoffman has visited Iowa ten to twelve times. His first trip was for a celebration at Palmer in 1995. His second trip was in 1999 and was for the inauguration and investiture for a new president at Palmer. Neither of these expeditions was carried out for The Masters Circle. His later visits were carried out as a representative of The Masters Circle. Like Markson, Perman attended lectures given by Palmer’s president, two Palmer faculty members, and a chiropractic historian for members of the Winners Circle Club in 2002. The remaining seven to nine visits arose from invitations to appear, speak, or attend as a guest various events at Palmer. ' The Masters Circle received honoraria for Hoffman’s speeches. The record also indicates that while he was at Palmer’s Lyceums, Hoffman, like Mark-son, was present and interacted with the public at booths sponsored by The Masters Circle. Hoffman contends his only other contacts with Iowa have been sparse, pointing to infrequent telephone or e-mail consultations initiated by Iowa residents or telephone conversations with faculty members and the president of Palmer. The record indicates he spoke over the telephone with Palmer students who were Masters Circle Club members and participated in a POD involving all Masters Circle Clubs’ officers, presumably including Palmer’s. Like Markson, Hoffman does not specifically recall coaching any Iowa residents, but he is “sure” he has. As with Markson, some materials he authored have been received electronically or through the mail by Iowa members of The Masters Circle. c. Perman. Perman’s contacts with Iowa are even more sporadic, having visited Iowa just five times. In 1999, before becoming an employee of The Masters Circle, he attended a seminar in Davenport sponsored by The Masters LLC. He returned in August 2001 to attend classes and speak at Palmer. He ventured to Iowa in June 2002 to attend the same lectures attended by Hoffman and Markson and visited Palmer again in August 2002 and August 2003 to attend classes and give speeches. Perman’s only other contacts with Iowa have been telephone calls and e-mails from Iowa members. II. Procedural History. This action was most recently removed to this Court on July 21, 2006. Before removal, on June 15, 2006, the state court dismissed claims against The Masters Circle, Markson, Hoffman, and Perman, concluding Brown lacked standing. Brown v. Kerkhoff, No. LACV 032346, slip op., at 9 (Iowa Dist. Ct. June 15, 2006). The state court allowed Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings to add Christian as a plaintiff but directed that the breach of fiduciary duty claims against The Masters Circle, Markson, Perman, and Hoffman be omitted. Id. The Second Amended Petition resulted. The Second Amended Petition reasserts claims by Brown, Rhiner, and Christian against The Masters Circle, Markson, Per-man, and Hoffman for civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violations of Iowa’s ongoing criminal conduct statute. In the present Order, the Court resolves a motion filed by Plaintiffs seeking leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, which would add allegations that Defendants violated federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and committed two species of tortious interference. DISCUSSION I. Issues Related to Standing. A. Relevance of the State Court’s June 2006 Order. The Court must first consider the impact of the state court’s June 15, 2006, order finding Brown and Rhiner lack standing to bring claims against The Masters Circle. Recalling, the state court found as follows: Although conceding that Kerkhoff did not belong to [T]he Masters Circle at the time he treated Rhiner, the plaintiff contends that [T]he Masters Circle may still be held liable for Rhiner’s alleged injuries because Kerkhoff at the time was following the teachings of The Masters L.L.C., a predecessor-in-interest to [Tjhe Masters Circle. Although these allegations would have been sufficient to establish standing for purposes of a motion to dismiss, these allegations are not contained in the plaintiffs petition. Indeed, even in the plaintiffs’ [proposed pleadings], [T]he Masters L.L.C. is mentioned only once. In this one instance, the plaintiffs seek to expand the plaintiff class to include patients treated by [T]he Masters L.L.C. Critically, however, the petition never alleges that Kerkhoff belonged to this organization. Therefore, this court is presented with a situation in which the plaintiff admits Kerkhoff did not belong to [T]he Masters Circle, but does not allege that he belonged to any other organization which could possibly be a defendant in this case. Therefore, Heidi Brown has not alleged a sufficient interest in this matter and therefore plaintiffs’ claims against defendants [The] Masters Circle, Markson, Perman, and Hoffman must be dismissed for lack of standing. Brown v. Kerkhoff, No. LACV 032346, slip op., at 7-8 (Iowa Dist. Ct. June 15, 2006) (footnotes and citations omitted). However, at the conclusion of its order, the state court ruled that “[t]he plaintiffs are allowed to file their Revised Second Amended Petition as submitted, but absent plaintiffs’ claim against defendants [The] Masters Circle, Markson, Perman, and Hoffman based on breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. at 19 (emphasis added). The Revised Second Amended Petition, “as submitted,” included claims by Brown and Rhiner against The Masters Circle, Hoffman, Markson, and Perman. This Court is guided by 28 U.S.C. § 1450 when assessing what effect to give this conclusion: Whenever any action is removed from a State court to a district court of the United States ... [a]ll injunctions,, orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1450. The state court’s June 2006 order must therefore be given “full force and effect” until modified or dissolved by this Court. While this Court is therefore bound, at least for the time being, by the state court’s decision that Rhiner and Brown lacked standing to sue The Masters Circle, Hoffman, Markson, and Perman, it is also bound, at least for the time being, by the state court’s decision to allow Plaintiffs to revive those claims (excepting one for breach of fiduciary duty) by permitting them to file the Revised Second Amended Petition “as submitted.” Therefore, the state court’s June 2006 order did not extinguish all claims by Brown and Rhiner against The Masters Circle. While the state court’s ultimate conclusion was probably a result of an inadvertent drafting error, this Court is bound by what the state court said, not what it meant. B. Standing of Brown and Rhiner to Sue The Masters Circle, Hoffman, Markson, and Perman. In papers filed in this Court, however, Defendants renew their argument that Brown and Rhiner lack standing to sue The Masters Circle, Hoffman, Markson, and Perman. As a result, this Court must decide whether these Plaintiffs have standing to sue these Defendants. 1. Applicable Legal Standards. It is “long-settled ... that standing cannot be ‘inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings.’” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (quoting Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 284, 3 S.Ct. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932 (1883)). Instead, each plaintiffs standing to bring claims “ ‘must affirmatively appear in the record.’ ” Id. (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)). As the parties seeking the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving each element of standing. Id. (quoting McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936)); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). To meet their burden, Plaintiffs must adduce ‘“facts demonstrating that [they are proper parties] to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.’ ” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 231, 110 S.Ct. 596 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). Because the standing requirement is not a “mere pleading requirement[ ],” Plaintiffs must support each element “in the same way as any other matter on which [they bear] the burden of proof, ie., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Because this case is “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [it is] presumed] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotation marks omitted); accord Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). The three-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife guides the constitutional standing analysis: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations and footnote omitted); accord Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). To be injured in a “particularized” way, a plaintiff must be injured “in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 2. Discussion. The crux of Defendants’ argument hinges on the definition of the class included in the Second Amended Petition, which was filed shortly after issuance of the state court’s June 2Ó06 order: This action is brought on behalf of a Class, consisting of all past, current and future patients (1) who have been treated by chiropractors who have been or are members of The Masters LLC or The Masters Circle, and (2) who underwent at least 12 chiropractic sessions, the minimum number of visits required by [T]he Masters Circle before a recheck of the patient’s condition. Second Am. Pet. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs have apparently conceded Kerkhoff was not a member of The Masters Circle when he treated Rhiner. Defendants also note the Second Amended Petition does not include allegations that Kerkhoff was a member of The Masters LLC when he treated Rhiner. Plaintiffs note that when this action was initially filed, The Masters Circle was included as a defendant because Kerkhoff had testified -at a 2005 deposition that he had joined The Masters Circle in 1996 or 1997 and continued to belong to that organization through 2005. Indeed, the record contains testimony from Kerkhoff indicating he joined the organization in 1996 or 1997. This cannot be so, because The Masters Circle did not then exist. Plaintiffs next point to various documents that they contend prove Kerkhoff actually joined The. Masters LLC, which in reality is a predecessor in interest to The Masters Circle. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, they have not alleged in the Second Amended Petition or otherwise that Kerkhoff was a member of The Masters LLC at any time or that The Masters Circle is The Masters LLC’s successor. This conclusion has two immediate implications. First, because Plaintiffs have not included allegations that Kerkhoff was ever a member of The Masters LLC, and because the basis of each of the named Plaintiffs’ claims grows from treatment received from Kerkhoff alone, no named Plaintiff could have been injured in a way traceable to any action of The Masters LLC. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. It follows that no named Plaintiff has included allegations sufficient to provide them standing to sue The Masters LLC. Second, even if Kerk-hoff was a member of The Masters LLC and was following that organization’s teachings when he allegedly harmed Rhin1 er and Brown, there are no allegations connecting any wrongful conduct of The Masters LLC to The Masters Circle. Therefore, Rhiner and Brown could not have been injured in a way traceable to any action of The Masters Circle or its employees. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. It follows that.Rhiner and Brown have not included allegations sufficient to provide them standing to sue The Masters Circle, Hoffman, Markson, and Perman. 3. The Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs contend allegations found in a proposed Third Amended Complaint remedy the standing ills identified above. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to the following allegations: Defendant Dr. Paul Kerkhoff is a practicing chiropractor in Waukee, Iowa. Defendant Kerkhoff at all times relevant hereto was or is a member of or practitioner following the principals [sic] of Markson Management, The Masters LLC and/or The Masters Circle. 1 Defendant The Masters Circle is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Jericho, New York. Upon information and belief, The Masters Circle is the successor in interest to Masters LLC, which was the successor in interest to Markson Management. Each of these entities has engaged in the ongoing and continuous course of conduct as alleged herein. • Upon information and belief, when The Masters LLC was operational it conducted business or was doing business as “The Masters Circle” at various times and used the name interchangeably at times with “The Masters.” Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11-12. These paragraphs highlight allegations that Kerkhoff was a member of or was following treatment protocols of one or all of Markson Management, The Masters LLC, or The Masters Circle at the time the relevant treatment was provided. Defendants reiterate Kerkhoff was not a member of The Masters Circle, Masters LLC, or Markson Management when he treated Rhiner. As a result, Defendants contend, Rhiner and Brown cannot have been harmed by those organizations. With respect to Christian, Defendants argue she lacks standing to bring claims against The Masters LLC because Kerk-hoff was not a member of that organization when he treated Christian. The Court will permit Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings to add The Masters LLC and Markson Management as parties but cautions Plaintiffs to carefully consider the claims brought against those Defendants in light of the resolution of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion below. If, after amendment, The Masters LLC and Markson Management feel Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims against them, those parties may seek dismissal of whatever causes of action (if any) Plaintiffs bring. C. Conclusion. In light of evidence Plaintiffs have adduced to repair these flaws, Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their pleadings to include allegations that Kerkhoff was a member of The Masters LLC before he began treating Rhiner and was following that organization’s teachings at the time of his treatment. Plaintiffs are also permitted leave to amend their pleadings to include allegations that The Masters LLC is a predecessor company to The Masters Circle, Inc. II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. The Court turns to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The parties do not challenge the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Kerkhoff and Kerkhoff Chiropractic. Plaintiffs allege the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the person of each nonresident Defendant under the traditional “minimum contacts” test and under an assortment of more exotic theories, analyzed seriatim, after identifying the applicable legal standards. A. Applicable Legal Standards. 1. Burden of Proof. When personal jurisdiction is challenged, the nonmoving party must prove jurisdiction is proper in the proposed forum. Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir.2006); Romak USA, Inc. v. Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 983-84 (8th Cir.2004); Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072-73 (8th Cir.2004); Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir.2003). Only a prima facie showing is required until either an eviden-tiary hearing or a trial — neither of which have occurred here — at which point then proof by a preponderance of the evidence is necessary. Epps, 327 F.3d at 647; Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706 n. 3 (8th Cir.2003); Pecoraro v. Sky Ranch for Boys, Inc., 340 F.3d 558, 561 (8th Cir.2003); Stanton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir.2003); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Courtney Enters., Inc., 270 F.3d 621, 623 (8th Cir.2001). “[Ajffidavits, exhibits, [and] other evidence” outside the pleadings either “may,” see Romak USA, 384 F.3d at 983, or “must,” see Dever, 380 F.3d at 1072-73, be submitted by the party attempting to establish jurisdiction. The Court examines the record in a light favorable to resisting parties, who also benefit from a favorable resolution of any factual disputes. See Romak USA, 384 F.3d at 983-84; Lakin, 348 F.3d at 706; Pecoraro, 340 F.3d at 561; Stanton, 340 F.3d at 693; Epps, 327 F.3d at 646-47. 2. Constitutional and Statutory Considerations. “[Bjefore a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be more than notice to the defendant and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the defendant and the forum. There also must be a basis for the defendant’s amenability to service of summons.” Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104, 108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987). In other words, the Court must first decide if the statutes upon which Plaintiffs’ claims rest potentially allow for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by providing for service of process and, if so, decide whether the exercise of that power comports with due process. The analysis differs for Plaintiffs’ state and federal claims. a. Service of Process, Service of process, the Supreme Court has noted, “is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350, 119 S.Ct. 1322, 143 L.Ed.2d 448 (1999). At common law, courts obtained jurisdiction over the person of a defendant by executing a writ of capias ad respondendum, which directed sheriffs to take defendants into custody. Id. The physical act of detention and delivery provided the court with jurisdiction over the person detained. Official service of process is the modern analog to the writ. Id.; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (“ ‘[T]he capi-as ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940))); accord Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (quoting same). The summons is “the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 351, 119 S.Ct. 1322. As a result, in the absence of service of process or waiver; a court typically cannot exercise power over the parties named in a complaint. Id. at 350, 119 S.Ct. 1322 (citing Omni Capital Int’l, 484 U.S. at 104, 108 S.Ct. 404 (“Before a ... court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.”)); Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45, 66 S.Ct. 242, 90 L.Ed. 185 (1946) (“[Sjervice of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.”). Service of process in federal actions is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Rule 4(k)(l) provides, in relevant part, as follows: Service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant (A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located, or (D) when authorized by a statute of the United States. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k). By limiting the territorial reach of their process, Rule 4 necessarily restricts the persons over whom district courts may exercise personal jurisdiction. Rule 4(k)(l)(D) is potentially implicated by Plaintiffs’ RICO claim, and Plaintiffs’ state law causes of action implicate Rule 4(k)(l)(A), which, in turn, draws the Iowa long-arm statute into play. b. Constitutional Parameters. If personal jurisdiction is to rest on Plaintiffs’ state law claims, Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns guide the analysis. For Plaintiffs’ RICO claims, the due process clause found in the Fifth Amendment provides constitutional guidance, provided the Court finds a statutory basis for subjecting the out-of-state Defendants to service of process. B. Personal Jurisdiction Under RICO. 1. Statutory Authorization. RICO, passed as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, contains special venue and service of process provisions. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 901, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006). For ease of analysis, the Court sets forth the implicated sections. a. Statutory Provisions. Plaintiffs contend Defendants violated two liability provisions of RICO: (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. (d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of [section 1962]. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d); see Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105-112 (subsection (c) violations), ¶¶ 112-115 (subsection (d) violations). The remedies available to plaintiffs successfully prosecuting violations of section 1962 are found in section 1964, which provides in relevant part as follows: (a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders .... (c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.... 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (c). The venue and service of process provisions relevant for personal jurisdiction purposes are found in section 1965 and implicate section 1964: (a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. (b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof. (c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the United States under this chapter in the district court of the United States for any judicial district, subpenas [sic] issued by such court to compel the attendance of witnesses may be served in any other judicial district.... (d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. 18 U.S.C. § 1965. b. Analysis. The Court must first decide whether RICO potentially confers jurisdiction by permitting service of process on the nonresident Defendants and, if so, must decide if the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants comports with the federal Constitution. There is considerable debate regarding whether section 1965(b) or (d) is a “statute of the United States” authorizing service of process on a nationwide basis for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(l)(D). The decision matters: If the Court relies on subsection (b), it follows that when raised in the proper venue, RICO allows personal jurisdiction in “any judicial district of the United States” to the extent needed to satisfy “the ends of justice,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b); if subsection (d) is used, RICO supplies a statutory basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over “any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs,” id. § 1965(d). The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold (and the Third Circuit has implied) that subsection (b) is a statute authorizing nationwide service of process for purposes of Rule 4(k)(l)(D). See Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (10th Cir.2006); PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir.1998); Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th Cir.1990); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 675 (4th Cir.1989); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671-72 (7th Cir.1987); Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538-39 (9th Cir.1986); see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liability Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Lisak, 834 F.2d at 671); United States v. Contents of Accounts Numbers 3034504504 & 144-07143 at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. [herein after Contents of Various Accounts ], 971 F.2d 974, 982 (3d Cir.1992) (dicta). The Fourth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits hold that subsection (d) is such a statute. See World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1168 (D.C.Cir.2002); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir.1997); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir.1997). The Eighth Circuit has yet to pass judgment on the issue. For reasons described below, this Court joins the former group. i. The Argument for Subsection (d). As noted, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have identified section 1965(d) as the statutory basis governing nationwide service of process over RICO defendants. See Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 942; ESAB Group, 126 F.3d at 627. In Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., the Eleventh Circuit, without “paus[ing] long” over the question, summarily decided that “[sjection 1965(d) of the RICO s