Full opinion text
ORDER LAWSON, District Judge. Before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34) filed by Defendant The Corporation of Mercer University (“Mercer”), a Motion to Strike (Doc. 44) filed by Plaintiff Melanie Ross (“Ross”), a Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures (Doc. 45) filed by Ross, and a Motion to Strike (Doc. 46) filed by Mercer. For the reasons set forth below, Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34) is granted, Ross’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 44) is denied, Ross’s Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures (Doc. 45) is denied, and Mercer’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 46) is denied. 1. FACTS A. Background Mercer is an institution of higher learning, and its primary undergraduate campus is located in Macon, Georgia. In the Fall of 2002, Ross enrolled at Mercer and moved from Columbus, Georgia, to Macon to begin her studies. (Ross Dep. 8.) In October of 2002, Ross began a relationship with Daniel Day (“Day”), another Mercer student and a member of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity (“2AE”). (Ross Dep. 62; Day Dep. 35.) Ross and Day dated for approximately two months — between October and December of 2002 — but ended their relationship before Christmas break. (Ross Dep. 114; Day Dep. 40.) During their two-month relationship, Ross and Day had consensual sexual intercourse between fifteen and twenty times. (Ross Dep. 63.) B. Alleged Assault On the evening of January 8, 2003, Ross and some friends met Day at the house he shared with several roommates. (Ross Dep. 67-69; Day Dep. 4.) A group of students, including Ross and Day, then drove to a local bar. (Ross Dep. 70; Day Dep. 4.) After arriving at the bar, Ross alleges Day slipped her a date rape drug, took her back to his house, and raped her there later that evening or early the next morning. (Compl. ¶ 9; Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) Ross has no memory of any events from shortly after she arrived at the bar until when she awoke the next morning. (Ross Dep. 93-94.) Ross asserts that although she has no memory of having sex with Day, when she awoke she felt pain in her anal area and believed they had engaged in intercourse. (Id. 98, 105.) Later that day, after speaking with a friend, Kim Rockmore (“Rock-more”), about the previous evening, Ross concluded she had been raped. (Id. 106.) Rockmore and her mother took Ross to a local hospital that evening around 11:00 p.m., where Ross was tested for drugs and a rape kit was administered. (Id. 110, 112.) Ross admits no toxicology reports exist showing she was ever given any date rape drugs. (Id. 54). C. Mercer’s Investigation Priscilla Danheiser (“Danheiser”), Mercer’s Interim Dean of Student Affairs, Jim Flader (“Flader”), Mercer’s Director of Residential and Judicial Affairs, and Horace Fleming (“Fleming”), Mercer’s Executive Vice-President and Provost, were all notified about the alleged attack within a day or two of its occurrence. (Danheiser Aff. ¶¶ 3-5.) At this point, Mercer began its investigation into the allegations. Immediately upon hearing about the alleged assault, Danheiser contacted the Chief of Mercer Police, Gary Collins (“Collins”), to begin an investigation. (Id.% 6.) Danheiser also investigated the matter, meeting with Ross’s father, Dan Ross, and Ross. (Mlfil 9, 15.) It is unclear whether Dan-heiser ever met with Day or other members of XAE. Although Danheiser said that she “went to the house to talk with Daniel Day and other members regarding [Ross’s] allegations of sexual assault” (id-¶ 13), she does not say she actually spoke with anyone there or, if she did, what they said. Day claims he never heard from Mercer about the incident. (Day Dep. 29.) D. Mercer’s Meetings with Dan Ross One week after the alleged assault, Dan Ross visited Mercer and met with a number of Mercer officials individually to discuss Ross’s allegations and Mercer’s response. (Ross Dep. 128.) The officials Dan Ross met with included Danheiser, Fleming and Emory Dunn (“Dunn”), the SAE advisor. (Danheiser Aff. ¶ 9; Dan Ross Aff. ¶ 7.) The contents of these conversations are largely uncontroverted. Dan Ross contends he provided Danheiser with the names of two other women who allegedly had been sexually assaulted by SAE members, asked that she speak with them, and told her he believed Mercer needed to address the serious problem posed by XAE. (Dan Ross Aff. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Dan Ross also says he told Dunn that he believed there was a real problem with XAE. (/¿.¶ 7.) Dan Ross additionally asked to meet with the President of Mercer, but this request was denied. (/¿¶ 8.) However, one component of Dan Ross’s conversation with Danheiser is disputed. The parties disagree about whether Dan Ross asked Mercer officials not to interview Day or other XAE members. According to Mercer, Dan Ross requested that Mercer not conduct these interviews because he wanted to wait for the Macon police investigation to conclude before deciding whether to proceed with Mercer’s student disciplinary process. (Danheiser Aff. ¶ 9.) Dan Ross contends, however, that the Macon Police had told him to ask the school to wait until the police had an opportunity to investigate. Dan Ross states he merely relayed this information to Mercer without expressing any personal opinion or making any similar requests himself. (Dan Ross Aff. ¶¶ 5-6.) E. Mercer’s Internal Judicial Proceedings Ross also met with Danheiser and informed her that she had no memory of the evening, but that she had awakened in Day’s bed the next morning feeling violated. (Danheiser Aff. ¶ 15.) When Danheiser and Ross met, Danheiser requested that Ross write out a statement detailing the alleged incident “so that the school would have an official complaint to proceed with the judicial process.” (/¿¶ 19.) On February 19, 2003, Ross e-mailed Flader an approximately one-page e-mail that detailed what she remembered from the evening of January 8th and concluded, “I have decided to press charges hoping to prevent any more such incidents.” (Ross Dep. Ex. 1.) The parties vehemently disagree about what happened next. Mercer alleges it conducted as complete an investigation as it could, but that it was unable to pursue a formal judicial inquiry in large part because Ross failed to submit a sufficiently detailed complaint. Mercer further contends that, despite its best efforts to secure the additional information from Ross necessary to pursue her allegations, she never submitted the requested documentation. (Danheiser Aff. ¶ 23.) Ross’s failure to cooperate with Mercer’s attempts to investigate her case allegedly contributed to Mercer’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with formal internal judicial proceedings. (Id.) Ross tells a far different story. Ross alleges she went through all of the steps to have a judicial hearing, including meeting with Flader twice, submitting a written statement in which she expressed her interest in pressing charges, and revising and resubmitting that statement. (Ross Dep. 128-130.) Ross alleges she understood she was to hear from Mercer regarding the proceeding, but she never heard from Flader or anyone else at Mercer again. (Id. 130, 209.) Ross claims she did not contact Mercer concerning the lack of progress because she was afraid of having to sit in the same room as Day during the proceedings. (Id. at 130.) Eventually, Ross concluded Mercer had “just brushed it under the rug.” (Id. at 209.) F. Aftermath Both Dan Ross and Ross asked that Mercer move Ross to different housing, and Mercer did so within two weeks of the alleged attack. (Danheiser Aff. ¶¶ 9, 16, 17; Ross Dep. 212-13.) Ross was also referred to a Mercer counselor (Danheiser Aff. ¶ 18), and she saw the counselor a number of times for posttraumatic stress disorder, depression and suicidal ideation (Ross Dep. 18, 169-70, 180). Ross alleges these emotional struggles and paranoia occurred as a result of the alleged incident with Day, and that she remained terrified of him and sought to avoid running into him. (Id. 152-54.) Ross only saw Day once after the alleged attack, when they passed each other on the road while driving separate vehicles. (Id. 151-52.) Ross was unsure whether Day saw her, and neither acknowledged the other’s presence. (Id.) Ross did, however, allegedly have one particularly unpleasant encounter with a member of XAE, Matt Kathy (“Kathy”). Allegedly, Ross and Rockmore gave a girlfriend a ride home from a bar one night, and Kathy got in the car for a ride as well. (Id. at 156.) Ross testifies that after Rockmore dropped her off at her dorm, Kathy later came back to her house, and then stayed outside, throwing things at her window, yelling at her, and leaving messages on her answering machine. (Id. at 156, 158-59.) Other than the one sighting of Day and the abuse from Kathy, however, Ross admits she had no contact with any other XAE members after the alleged attack-not only did they not harass her, but they refused to speak to her at all. (Id. at 174-75.) Ross contends that, as the Spring semester continued, she skipped a number of classes, stopped eating because she did not want to go to the cafeteria and eventually dropped one class altogether. (Id. 165, 168, 187.) After completing her spring semester, Ross left Mercer and transferred to another school. (Id. 9, 17, 215.) Ross alleges her decision to transfer was because she no longer felt safe at Mercer, she felt like she was constantly being judged, and Mercer made her feel like she was a criminal. (Id. 17,171, 214.) II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Ross filed a ten-count lawsuit on January 11, 2005, seeking damages from two defendants-Mercer and “Psi Georgia, LLC, D/B/A The Georgia Psi Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon” (“£AE”). Upon joint motion by all parties, XAE was dismissed without prejudice, and the Court dismissed Counts Eight and Nine of Ross’s Complaint, which alleged liability solely against SAE. As a result, eight claims against Mercer remain. Count One alleges a general violation of Title IX of the Education Act and Hostile Environment Based on Sex (“Title IX”) for Mercer’s failure to adequately respond to Ross’s sexual assault complaint. (Am. Compl.lffl 17-30.) Count Two is styled as “Title IX Against Mercer University for Deliberate Indifference.” (17£¶¶ 31-45.) Count Three alleges Mercer’s inaction and intimidation constituted retaliation. (Id1H( 46-50.) Count Four alleges Mercer’s inadequate and discriminatory sexual assault investigation and complaint procedures have a disparate impact on women. (Id. ¶¶ 51-65.) Count Five is a demand for damages based on the aforementioned four violations of Title IX. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67.) Count Six alleges Mercer breached its duty to keep premises safe, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. (Id. ¶¶ 68-75.) Count Seven alleges Mercer failed to provide adequate security in violation of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. (Id. ¶¶ 76-82.) Count Ten alleges Mercer violated its assumed duty to protect its students from sexual assault and prevent on-campus sexual assaults. (Id. ¶¶ 93-98.) On February 2, 2006, Mercer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34). Ross filed a Response (Doc. 40), and Mercer filed a Reply (Doc. 47). Two motions to strike related to the evidence the Court may consider when ruling on the motion for summary judgment have also been filed — one by Ross (Doc. 44) and one by Mercer (Doc. 46) — and both motions have been completely briefed. Finally, Ross filed a Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures (Doc. 45), and Mercer filed a Response (Doc. 51). III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS A. Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment must be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact arises only when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a Court must evaluate all evidence and make any logical inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir.1995). “[T]he plain language of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant carries the initial burden and must meet this burden “by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmov-ing party’s case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 th Cir.1991). The nonmoving party is then required “to go beyond the pleadings” and to present competent evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions, admissions and the like, designating “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must put forth more than a “mere scintilla of evidence.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990). “[T]here must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Id. This evidence must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1991). Thus, under Rule 56, summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. B. Motion to Strike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) sets forth the standard for motions to strike. “Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading ... the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure identify “pleadings” as complaints, answers and replies to counterclaims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a). Nonetheless, it is common for parties to file motions to strike directed at matters that are not contained in the pleadings. It is equally common for courts that receive such improperly targeted motions to strike to promptly deny them, irrespective of their underlying merit. See, e.g., Putnal v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 5:04-cv-130, 2006 WL 2850424, at *3 (M.D.Ga. Sept. 29, 2006) (“the preferred method for challenging a defective affidavit is to file a notice of objection to the challenged portion of the affidavit”); Newsome v. Webster, 843 F.Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D.Ga.1994) (noting the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia does not entertain motions to strike affidavits supporting or opposing motions for summary judgment); Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 700 F.Supp. 1574, 1576 (N.D.Ga.1988) (noting the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia does not entertain motions to strike affidavits supporting or opposing motions for summary judgment). Although these courts deny the motions to strike, the same courts generally treat the motions to strike as objections to the challenged portions of the affidavits. Putnal, 2006 WL 2850424, at *3. C. Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures Respecting initial disclosures, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides, in pertinent part: [ejxcept in categories of proceedings specified in Rule 26(a)(1)(E), or to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: (A) the name ... of each individual likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A). Parties are also under a duty to supplement or correct their Rule 26 disclosures at appropriate intervals. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) prohibits parties who fail to satisfy these disclosure and supplementation requirements without “substantial justification” from using the undisclosed evidence “at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion,” unless the failure is “harmless.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). IV. ANALYSIS: PROPER EVIDENCE FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER As the parties’ Motions to Strike and Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures all address what evidence the Court may properly consider on summary judgment, they will be analyzed first. As mentioned previously, a motion to strike is only appropriately directed towards matters contained in the pleadings. Neither of the Motions to Strike addresses matters contained in the pleadings. In view of the forgoing, both of these Motions are denied. Nonetheless, both parties correctly assert that the Court may only consider admissible evidence when deciding a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the Court will construe the parties’ Motions to Strike as evidentiary objections and explicitly rule upon the objections contained within them, as well as upon the Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures, before it turns its attention to the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. A. Ross’s Motion to Strike Ross filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 44) contending that portions of three exhibits attached to Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment cannot be considered by the Court in support of the summary judgment motion. First, Ross argues that paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of Exhibit A, Danheiser’s Affidavit, are based on hearsay. {Id. at 1, 2-4.) Second, Ross posits that Exhibit B, in its entirety, should not be considered by the Court because it contains purported records from the Georgia Bureau of Investigations (“GBI”) that have not been authenticated. {Id. at 2, 5.) Third, Ross contends that Exhibit C, which consists of Ross’s purported academic records from Mercer, also cannot be considered due to a lack of authentication. {Id.) Mercer filed a Response (Doc. 50). Ross failed to file a Reply. 1. Danheiser’s Affidavit Ross argues that seven paragraphs of Danheiser’s Affidavit contain inadmissible hearsay and are not based on personal knowledge. (Doc. 44 at 1, 2^1) a. Paragraph 11 Paragraph 11 contains two sentences: “Chief Collins interviewed Daniel Day and males who [sic] he listed as a[sic] potential witnesses to the events. Daniel denied all allegations, and stated that he and the plaintiff had had consensual sex as usual on the night in question.” (Danheiser Aff. ¶ 11.) Mercer responds to Ross’s allegation that the two sentences are hearsay by arguing the first sentence contains no statements, only Danheiser’s personal knowledge of the investigation, and that while the second sentence is admittedly hearsay, the information it conveys is contained elsewhere in the record. The first sentence is hearsay. Even though Danheiser did not say “Chief Collins told me that he interviewed Daniel Day and males whom he listed as potential witnesses to the events,” that is essentially what Danheiser has sworn. The only two ways Danheiser could know Collins conducted these interviews, as she admittedly was not present for them, would be if someone orally told her about the interviews or if she read a written report that said the same. Either way, the statement that informed her about the interview would be hearsay. Mercer could have submitted an affidavit from Collins stating that he had conducted these interviews, but it did not. While Mercer might have been able to produce Collins to testify to these facts at trial, the Court cannot consider inadmissible hearsay at the summary judgment stage. This hearsay is inadmissible because it does not fall into any exception-—it is not a party admission, and it is being submitted to prove the truth of the matter. Nonetheless, at least the information that Collins and Day spoke is a fact the Court may consider, since Day mentioned this talk in his deposition. (Day Dep. 28-29.) The second sentence contains two statements of Day’s: (1) that he denied Ross’s allegations and (2) that the sex on the night in question was consensual. These statements are hearsay, but given that both pieces of information are contained elsewhere throughout the record, including in Day’s sworn deposition (Id. 4, 15-16, 21), the Court will consider this information when ruling on Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. b. Paragraphs 12 and 14 Paragraphs 12 and 14, like the first sentence in paragraph 11, are inadmissible. Although these statements contain no explicit statements by third parties, they contain information regarding Collins’s purported investigation into Ross’s allegations: that Collins followed up with the Macon Police Department, received copies of various reports and interviews, and investigated the incident independently. Mercer’s argument that these paragraphs reflect Danheiser’s personal knowledge of Mercer’s investigation as it relates to Collins’ actions is, again, unavailing. Mercer could have submitted an affidavit from Collins with this same information, but it may not rely on hearsay from Danheiser to introduce evidence on the matter. All of the information in these paragraphs, with the exception of the fact that the Macon Police never arrested Day, is inadmissible. c. Paragraph 20 Paragraph 20 states “Jim M. Flader, Mercer’s Director of Residential and Judicial Affairs, followed-up with Melanie regarding her written statement and requested that she speak with Mr. Robert Knott, Coordinator of Judicial Education, Residential and Judicial Affairs, regarding the school’s judicial process.” Danheiser’s comments on the actions and statements of Flader are no less hearsay than those regarding Collins. The paragraph consists of pure hearsay and will not be considered by the Court when ruling on Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, the Court rejects Mercer’s argument in favor of admitting the information contained in this paragraph — that “the underlying fact that plaintiff was informed to speak with school officials regarding the school’s judicial process is admissible, as a party admission.” (Doc. 50 at 5.) Mercer cites to Ross’s deposition after making this assertion, but the portion of her deposition to which Mercer directs the Court’s attention, pages 128-130, never mentions Knott. In summary, the Court accepts that Ross and Flader met, recognizes the discussions during and outcome of these meetings are points of serious contention, but holds Mercer cannot use Danheiser’s affidavit to present what Flader said or did. d. Paragraph 21 The section of paragraph 21 at issue states “Mr. Flader continually followed-up with Melanie regarding a written complaint. Finally, on February 19, 2003, Melanie sent an e-mail to Mr. Flader, which provided a vague description of her allegations.” This section contains hearsay but the facts contained within it are largely admissible through Ross’s deposition. The fact that Flader and Ross spoke is reflected in Ross’s deposition, and the e-mail sent by Ross to Flader on February 19, 2003 (Ross Dep. Ex. 1) has been sworn to and verified under oath. In addition, Ross confirmed in her sworn deposition that she and Flader spoke and that she sent him an e-mail detailing her allegations. (Ross Dep. 129-30, 199-200.) However, to the extent the paragraph can be said to establish that Flader “continually followed-up with Melanie,” the Court will not construe it as reflecting any greater effort on Flader’s behalf than what is reflected in Ross’s deposition — that Flader and Ross spoke at least twice and their conversations involved Ross sending Flader an e-mail regarding the alleged attack. Mercer chose to omit an affidavit from Flader and must abide by the consequences of that decision. Hearsay from Danheiser to establish what Flader did, when Flader’s own testimony was available, is inadmissible. e.Paragraph 22 Paragraph 22 states: “Although Mr. Knott repeatedly contacted Melanie regarding her February 19th e-mail, Melanie did not speak with Mr. Knott until March 7, 2003. At this meeting, Mr. Knott explained the judicial process to Melanie and requested that she write a more detailed report. Melanie never did so.” The entirety of paragraph 22 is hearsay and inadmissible. Instead of trying to get Danheiser to testify on behalf of Collins and Flader, Mercer is now attempting to have her testify on Knott’s behalf. If Mercer wanted the Court to consider what Knott did and said, it should have submitted an affidavit from him. Again, Mercer’s attempt to direct the Court to Ross’s deposition to prove the facts underlying Danheiser’s account is self-defeating. Mercer argues Ross “admitted the underlying facts contained therein-that the judicial process was explained to her and that she was requested to write a more detailed statement.” (Doc. 50 at 6.) However, while Ross’s deposition does reflect that she provided a written statement, the pages Mercer cited show that the statement was provided to Flader, not Knott, and that while Ross apparently revised the statement, it offers no explanation as to why or how the statement was revised. (Ross Dep. 199-201.) f. Paragraph 23 Paragraph 23 concludes that “Given the lack of evidence substantiating plaintiffs allegations, plaintiffs and her father’s persistence that Mercer not conduct a full judicial procedure until they advise otherwise, plaintiffs lack of cooperation in codifying her allegations, lack of physical evidence substantiating plaintiffs allegations, and Daniel Day’s and several witnesses!’] statements refuting plaintiffs allegations, Mercer determined that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with formal school judicial proceedings.” Paragraph 23 does not contain any hearsay as it contains no statements and it reflects Dan-heiser’s personal knowledge of the rationale underlying Mercer’s decision to not pursue a formal school judicial proceeding. It is proper for Danheiser to testify about why Mercer ended its investigation, because she was integral in making that decision, and her stated reasons for the decision are not being admitted for the truth of the underlying matters asserted, but rather for the fact that Mercer based its decision on such beliefs. The paragraph is admissible. 2. GBI Report Ross argues Exhibit B, in its entirety, should not be considered by the Court because it contains purported GBI records that have not been authenticated. (Doc. 44 at 2, 5.) Mercer, in response, offers two arguments for the documents’ authenticity: (1) the documents are self-authenticating, per Rule 902(1) (Doc. 50 at 7-8); or (2) the documents are admissible under the residual hearsay exception, Rule 807 (Id. at 8-9). Mercer also contends Ross admitted the underlying facts in the report are true, and therefore the Court should consider the findings regardless of the documents’ admissibility. (Id. at 9.) Federal Rule of Evidence 901 provides that authentication of an exhibit is a condition precedent to its admissibility. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). Under Rule 902(1), a document bearing the seal of a state and a signature purporting to attest or execute the document is self-authenticating. Fed. R.Evid. 902(1). However no seals were attached to the documents here. Instead, the documents bore copies of seals. Therefore, the documents are inadmissible under 902(1). See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 464 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir.2006) (“The rationale of Rule 902(1), according to the Committee Notes, is that a seal is difficult to forge. But that is not true of a copy of a seal ....”) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the “residual” exception, allows statements not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, to be admitted. Fed.R.Evid. 807. However, by its express terms, Rule 807 only applies to statements the likes of those discussed in Rule 803 and 804. It does not apply to self-authenticating documents. “Rule 902 contains no catch-all or residual provision, such as that set forth in Fed.R.Evid. 807 for hearsay exceptions; in order for [a] publication to qualify as a self-authenticating document, it must fit within the express provisions of the rule.” Goguen ex. rel Goguen v. Textron Inc., 234 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.Mass.2006) (“There is little chance the document is a forgery.... However, the rule does not permit self-authentication in all cases where the risk of forgery is slight; rather, it exempts a small number of specific kinds of documents from the general authentication requirement.”) Here, Mercer has made no showing that the documents fit within any of the express provisions of Rule 902. Mercer’s third argument is that, because Ross has admitted the facts contained in the documents, they should be considered by the Court. This contention is true, in part. Mercer submitted three alleged GBI Reports in its Exhibit B: the first dealt with a toxicology report for recreational drugs, the second contained the results of Ross’s sexual assault evidence kit, and the third was the poison determination dealing with whether Ross had been given a date rape drug. In her deposition, Ross admitted that she had no test results demonstrating she was ever given a date-rape drug, and she was aware of the existence of no such test results. (Ross Dep. 54.) Therefore, the Court accepts that Ross has produced no evidence to prove she was given any date-rape drugs. However, the Court will not consider the actual GBI reports attached here, nor will it consider the results of the other two reports dealing with the presence, or lack thereof, of recreational drugs or seminal fluid. 3. Academic Transcript Ross also argues Exhibit C, her unauthenticated academic transcript, should not be considered by the Court in support of Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 44 at 2, 5.) In response, Mercer argues official college transcripts, such as the one here, are so inherently trustworthy that they qualify as self-authenticating documents under Rule 901 and 902 and are exceptions to hearsay under the residual exception of Rule 807. Mercer also presents a case from the former Fifth Circuit which it says is binding upon this Court, in which a college transcript was found to be properly self-authenticating and thus admissible. See United States v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir.1979). Two of Mercer’s arguments, which mirror those it made regarding the GBI reports, are rejected on similar grounds. This copy of an official transcript is not self-authenticating, as it bears merely a copy of a seal, not an actual seal. Likewise, Mercer cannot rely on Rule 807 to excuse its laziness. Mercer could have easily secured an original version of Ross’s transcript or provided an employee affidavit to establish the transcript’s validity. Finally, the Court rejects Mercer’s contention that Hitsman is controlling. In Hits-man, the former Fifth Circuit found a district court did not err in admitting a defendant’s college transcript under Rule 803(24) based on testimony by a government witness who testified to the defendant’s personal information contained on the transcript and since “the exhibit had the indicia of being an authentic copy since it bore a seal above the registrar’s signature.” Id. Hitsman and the instant case are distinguishable on two fronts. First, the former Fifth Circuit did not announce a sweeping holding that all college transcripts were automatically admissible under the catch-all hearsay exception — it found one district court had not committed an error in allowing such an admission under certain, fact-specific circumstances. Second, there is no way for the Court to determine whether the seal in question in Hitsman was an actual seal affixed to a copy of a transcript, or exactly what “personal information” about the defendant in Hitsman the government witness corroborated. In short, the factual circumstances in this case either are, or very well may be, different from the facts in Hitsman; therefore, the Court is not bound by the appellate court’s holding in Hitsman. Accordingly, the Court will not consider Ross’s transcript, Exhibit C, when ruling on Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. B. Mercer’s Motion to Strike Mercer filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 46) addressing portions of four exhibits attached to Ross’s Response to Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. First, Mercer argues that the last sentence of paragraph 5, the last sentence of paragraph 7, and the second and last sentences of paragraph 9 of Exhibit 1, Dan Ross’s Affidavit, are based on hearsay and cannot be considered by the Court. (Id. at 2, 3-4.) Second, Mercer posits that Exhibit 2, the responses of Mercer to the interrogatories of Zenobia Lacabe (“Lacabe”), should not be considered by the Court in their entirety because they were not submitted under oath and are thus unauthenticated. (Id. at 2, 5-6.) Third, Mercer contends that Exhibit 3, which consists of Rockmore’s Affidavit, cannot be considered at all due to its irrelevance. (Id. at 2, 4-5.) Four, Mercer argues the third sentence of paragraph 5 in Exhibit 4, Ross’s Affidavit, is hearsay and cannot be considered. (Id. at 2, 3-4.) Ross filed a Response (Doc. 62), and Mercer filed a Reply (Doc. 63). 1. Dan Ross’s Affidavit Mercer posits that four sentences contained in Dan Ross’s Affidavit contain classic, inadmissibly hearsay, in that they are statements made by someone other than Dan Ross offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ross offers some specific argument about why each statement is admissible and also offers two additional, general reasons why all of the statements are admissible — that “each statement either is not provided for the truth of the matter or it is a party admission.” (Doc. 62 at 2.) The Court will address each disputed statement in turn. a. Alleged Statements of Macon Police In the last sentence of paragraph 5, Dan Ross states that during his meeting with the Macon Police “[t]hey had told me to have the school not take any action until they had an opportunity to investigate, and that it would be done quickly.” (Dan Ross Aff. ¶ 5.) Mercer argues this statement is classic hearsay, in that it is a comment allegedly made by another person, the Macon Police, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted — that the Macon Police told Dan Ross to relay this information to Mercer — and that Dan Ross could have submitted an affidavit from the Macon Police regarding its alleged communications. (Doc. 63 at 3-4; Doc. 46 at 4.) Ross responds that because Dan Ross was a party to the conversation with the Macon Police, he should be allowed to relay the content of the communication, as it is based on his personal knowledge. Mercer is correct. Quite simply, Dan Ross cannot put words in the mouth of the Macon Police and have the Court accept that they were said. As for Ross’s two catch-all arguments, first, Ross is offering the statement for the truth of the matter— that the Macon Police told him to convey this specific statement to Mercer — so it is not saved on that basis. Second, the Macon Police are not a party, therefore the statement is not a party admission. b. Alleged Statements of Dunn In the last sentence of paragraph 7, Dan Ross states “Dunn, the 2AE advisor, said that they would take no actions against the fraternity.” (Dan Ross Aff. ¶7.) Again, Mercer argues this statement is classic hearsay (Doc. 46 ¶ 2; Doc. 63 at 3-4) while Ross responds that this statement is not hearsay because Dan Ross was present and heard Dunn say it (Doc. 62 at 2). Mercer’s objection is valid. The statement is hearsay. It is clear that Ross is trying to use this statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted — that Mercer had decided it would not take any disciplinary action against YAE — thus the statement is inadmissible under this hearsay exception. Ross has also posited that some of these statements are party admissions. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) states that an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter attested is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.” Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Dunn presumably was an employee of the University at the time he allegedly made the statement. However, it is unclear whether, as faculty advisor to SAE, he exercised any degree of influence over whether Mercer would pursue its judicial investigation against Day. Because the Court cannot tell whether Dunn should be considered a party, and because Ross has offered no argument or evidence on this point, the Court is unable to find this hearsay fits within an exception, and the Court will not consider this statement when ruling on Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. c. Alleged Statements of Danheiser Mercer also argues the second and last sentences of paragraph 9 in Dan Ross’s affidavit are hearsay. Dan Ross alleges that after he told Danheiser two other girls had been identified as having been sexually assaulted by 2AE members and met with her to ask whether she had spoken with them, “Danheiser informed me that she had spoken with them and that their allegations were similar to Melanie’s. Danheiser said that she would not act unless the students chose to bring the claims themselves.” (Dan Ross Aff. ¶ 9.) Again, these statements clearly fit the definition of hearsay and are only admissible if they fit into an exception. Unlike the previous discussion regarding Dunn, it is clear that Danheiser was an agent of Mercer and that these alleged statements concern a matter within the scope of the agency and made during the existence of the relationship. Danheiser admitted that, as Interim Dean of Student Affairs, she was in charge of ensuring compliance with Mercer’s student disciplinary procedures and for the overall administration of student complaints. (Danheiser Aff. ¶ 3.) Therefore, Danheiser clearly exercised influence over Mercer’s decision to investigate Ross’s allegations and then to terminate that investigation. Therefore, her out-of-court statements are not hearsay, but are admissions of a party-opponent, admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Danheiser’s statements shall not be granted carte blanche admissibility, however, as the nature of the comments requires further analysis. The statements “Danheiser informed me that she had spoken with them” and “Danheiser said that she would not act unless the students chose to bring the claims themselves” are both out-of-court statements of Danheiser, a party, and the Court will consider them. The statement “their allegations were similar to Melanie’s” is double hearsay, and it shall be considered to show that Danheiser relayed this information to Dan Ross, but not for the truth of the matter asserted. 2. Responses to Interrogatories Mercer moves to strike the responses to interrogatories of Lacabe as unsworn statements (Doc. 46 at 6), while Ross states she “has found no support for Mercer’s position that interrogatory responses must be verified to be used at summary judgment” (Doc. 62 at 8). The Eleventh Circuit has clearly held that “[ujnsworn statements do not meet the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e) and cannot be considered by a district court in ruling on a summary judgment motion.” Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n. 26 (11th Cir.2003) (citation and quotation omitted); see also Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1362 (N.D.Ga.2003) (finding an unverified response to interrogatories filed in a separate action did not meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) and could not be considered by a district court in ruling on a summary judgment motion). Like the situation in Owners Insurance Co., Lacabe’s responses to interrogatories were filed in a separate action and are not verified. Accordingly, as an unsworn statement, the responses shall not be considered by the Court in its ruling on Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 3. Rockmore’s Affidavit Mercer moves to exclude Rock-more’s entire affidavit from the Court’s consideration because it allegedly contains no facts which are relevant to Ross’s Title IX or state law claims. The parties’ briefing on this issue reveals a fundamental disagreement about the way in which they view Ross’s burden of proof in the case. Ross states that “in order to recover under any of her theories, including Title IX, [she] must prove that she was sexually harassed and/or assaulted .... and accordingly, the affidavit is relevant.” (Doc. 62 at 3.) Mercer, however, states that “[w]hether or not plaintiff was allegedly harassed or assaulted by Mr. Day has no relevancy to the legal issues contained in the motion for summary judgment and it is of no consequence to their determination because Title IX focuses on Mercer’s actions or inaction after plaintiff alleges an assault, and not whether plaintiff was actually assaulted.” (Doc. 63 at 6.) The Supreme Court has emphasized that only “known circumstances” inform what a court can consider when it determines whether a response is “clearly unreasonable” under Title IX. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999). Accordingly, the proper questions before the Court when considering the admissibility of Rockmore’s affidavit is not whether a sexual assault actually occurred, but what circumstances were known by Mercer, and how did those known circumstances color the adequacy of Mercer’s response. Here, Ross has offered no evidence to suggest that Rockmore ever relayed any of the information in her affidavit to anyone at Mercer. Accordingly, the Court shall not consider Rockmore’s Affidavit when ruling on Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 4. Ross’s Affidavit Mercer also seeks to exclude the statement “The nurse said that I had anal abrasions consistent with forced anal penetration” (Doc. 46 ¶ 2; Doc. 63 at 5-6) as impermissible hearsay. The statement is hearsay and Ross’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing — Ross clearly is offering the statement for the truth of the matter asserted and there is no evidence that the nurse could be construed as a party and/or agent of Mercer. The statement will not be considered by the Court. C. Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures 1. Six Witnesses Mentioned in Motion Ross filed a Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures (Doc. 45). Ross argues the Court should allow the deposition transcripts of Anna Christine Coley, Barry Jenkins, Steven Brown, Samuel F. Hart, Raymond Golden, and Christy Henry to be admitted into evidence to support Ross’s claim regarding foreseeability. Ross contends that, while the information contained within the depositions of witnesses identified in the parties’ Initial Disclosures is sufficient to support its claim regarding foreseeability, the testimony of the aforementioned individuals would bolster that claim. Ross concludes that although the witnesses were not disclosed under Rule 26(a)(1), there is no prejudice to Mercer that would prohibit Ross from using their testimony, since the same attorneys that now represent Mercer in the present action represented Mercer in Doe v. Mercer University, and Mercer had the opportunity to cross examine these witnesses in that case. Finally, Ross offers the deposition transcripts for the impeachment of Mercer’s allegations that no evidence exists that it is foreseeable that an acquaintance rape would occur on its campus, and that it is not deliberately indifferent to claims of sexual harassment and assault. By way of opposition, Mercer filed a Response (Doc. 51) that opposes admitting the proffered depositions because (1) they are needlessly cumulative, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, (2) Ross has offered no justification for her failure to provide the disclosures as required, and (3) their admission would be severely prejudicial. It is undisputed that Ross failed to disclose these witnesses, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A), and failed to supplement her initial disclosures at an appropriate time, pursuant to Rule 26(e)(1). Therefore, pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), the Court must examine whether this omission was “substantially justified” and whether it was “harmless.” Ross, however, failed to offer any justification, substantial or otherwise, for her failure to identify these witnesses in a timely fashion. Regarding prejudice, Ross argues that Mercer would not suffer any prejudice, due to the fact that the same attorneys who represent Mercer in the present case acted as counsel in Doe and, during the depositions in question, they were able to cross examine these witnesses. Mercer refuses to concede the harmlessness of the omission, noting that it did not review the undisclosed duplicate materials before drafting its motion for summary judgment, due to their nondisclosure. As a result, Mercer contends it has not had the chance to refute the alleged facts set forth therein. The Court agrees with Mercer; Ross’s omission was hardly harmless. Additionally, Ross’s Response contains one sentence that contends she also offers the deposition transcripts for the purpose of impeaching Mercer. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that Rule 26(a)(3) exempts evidence used solely for impeachment because pretrial disclosure would significantly diminish its impeachment value. Bearint ex rel. Bearint v. Dorell Juvenile Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir.2004). This exception contains its own caveat, however — the Rule distinguishes between impeachment and substantive evidence, and exempts only evidence used solely for impeachment from the Rule 26 disclosure requirement. See, e.g., Cooley v. Great S. Wood Preserving, 138 Fed.Appx. 149, 161 (11th Cir.2005). Here, Ross failed to show the evidence was being offered solely for impeachment purposes. Her passing mention of an impeachment purpose, following two pages of argument regarding the evidence’s substantive value, is insufficient. Ross has offered no substantial justification for her failure to timely identify these witnesses and depositions, nor is her failure to do so harmless. Furthermore, although Ross attempted to argue the evidence was to be used for impeachment purposes, she failed to show the evidence was being offered solely for that reason. Ross shall not be allowed to use these depositions in response to Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and her Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures (Doc. 45) is denied. Accordingly, the Court will not consider these depositions in ruling on Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 2. Five Witnesses Not in Motion In addition to the six individuals Ross mentioned by name in her Motion to Introduce Evidence from Witnesses Not Previously Identified in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures, she submitted depositions for five other people: Gary Collins (Doc. 53), Laurie Lankin (Doc. 55), James Russell Henry (Doc. 60), Stephen L. Gaines (Doc. 61), and William J. Causey (Doc. 64). Ross cited to these depositions throughout her Response to Mercer’s Statement of Undisputed Material Pacts (Doc. 41), specifically beginning in the section therein entitled “Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts for Which Genuine Issues Exist for a Jury.” {Id. at 5.) Given that Ross did not list these names when discussing witnesses whom she failed to include in her initial disclosures, and that Mercer did not object to their depositions on this ground, the Court must conclude Ross did identify these five witnesses in her initial disclosures. Therefore, the Court shall assume that these five depositions are properly before the Court while considering Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. V. ANALYSIS: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A. Count 1: Title IX Violation for Student-On-Student Sexual Harassment 1. Standard Title IX provides that “[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (2000). The Supreme Court has recognized Title IX claims may be based on either teacher-on-student harassment or student-on-student harassment and that different legal standards apply in each circumstance. Compare Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) (holding teacher-on-student harassment actionable), with Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (finding an implied private right of action for a plaintiff to recover monetary damages against a school for student-on-student harassment). Analyzing a student-on-student sexual harassment claim, the Eleventh Circuit recently emphasized that to recover under Title IX, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the defendant is a Title IX funding recipient; (2) an appropriate person had actual knowledge of the discrimination or harassment the plaintiff alleges occurred; (3) the funding recipient acted with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities; and (4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir.2007) (citations and quotations omitted). A brief analysis of the Williams case is illustrative of how the Eleventh Circuit recently addressed a Title IX complaint, albeit at the motion to dismiss stage. In Williams, a former student at the University of Georgia (“UGA”) brought a suit against UGA and the University of Georgia Athletic Association (“UGAA”) for a violation of Title IX after she was allegedly raped and sexually assaulted by three men, all varsity athletes at the University. Id. at 1287. In particular, the plaintiff alleged three forms of Title IX discrimination or harassment: (1) UGA and UGAA recruited and admitted the ringleader of the attack despite their knowledge of his past instances of sexual misconduct at other schools; (2) the attack itself; and (3) the discrimination she faced as a result of UGA’s failure to respond to her allegations. Id. at 1294. This differentiation between the defendants’ actions before the attack on Williams and their response afterwards underscores the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis that courts can find deliberate indifference either when a defendant’s actions make its students vulnerable to harassment or when a defendant’s actions actually cause its students to undergo harassment. Davis, 526 U.S. at 645, 119 S.Ct. 1661. In other words, a court can find a Title IX violation when a university exhibits deliberate indifference before an attack that makes a student more vulnerable to the attack itself, or when a university exhibits deliberate indifference after an attack that causes a student to endure additional harassment. 2. Application a. First Element: Funding Recipient As to the first element, there has been no argument or evidence to suggest Mercer is not a Title IX funding recipient properly subject to Title IX liability. The Court finds the first element of Ross’s Title IX claim based on student-on-student sexual harassment is satisfied. b. Second Element: Actual Knowledge As to the second element, the Court must initially identify what discrimination or harassment Ross alleges occurred before it can determine whether an appropriate person at Mercer had actual knowledge of it. In the present case, Ross’s Amended Complaint alleged three forms of harassment: (1) Mercer had actual knowledge of XAE’s history of sexual assault allegations and failed to remedy the situation, making Ross more vulnerable to the attack she suffered (Am.Compl.1ffl 7-8); (2) Mercer had actual knowledge of Day’s previous sexual harassment of Mercer students and failed to act, making Ross more vulnerable to the attack she suffered (Id. ¶¶ 19-21); and (3) Mercer had actual knowledge of Day’s attack on Ross but failed to effectively respond to Ross’s allegation, causing Ross to undergo harassment (Id. ¶¶ 13, 22-30, 32-45). Furthermore, reading Ross’s Response to Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment reveals two additional allegations of harassment: (1) Mercer admitted Day despite having actual knowledge of his previous misconduct involving drugs and alcohol, making Ross more vulnerable to the attack she suffered (Doc. 40 at 4); and (2) Mercer exhibited laxity regarding student-on-student sexual harassment in general on its campus, making Ross more vulnerable to the attack she suffered. (Id. at 4-5). Therefore, the Court must determine whether an “appropriate person” at Mercer had actual knowledge of these five forms of harassment that Ross allegedly faced: (1) Day’s past struggles with drugs and alcohol; (2) past complaints of sexual assault against Day; (3) past allegations of sexual assault against 2AE; (4) Mercer’s lax treatment of student-on-student harassment and failure to promulgate and disseminate sexual harassment policies; and (5) the alleged attack on January 8, 2003. i. Mercer’s actual knowledge of Day’s previous misconduct involving drugs and alcohol and admission to the university nonetheless Ross contends that an appropriate person at Mercer had actual knowledge of Day’s previous problems with alcohol and drugs and his graduation from an internet correspondence course instead of a traditional high school, but decided to admit him to the university anyway due to his family’s connections to the school. Ross has provided no evidence to support these allegations. However, even if the Court were to assume that Ross had somehow shown an appropriate official was aware of all of these facts, it is unclear how such knowledge could possibly give rise to Title IX liability. While the precise boundaries of what kind of “actual knowledge” a school must have to subject itself to Title IX liability remain undefined, it is generally accepted that the knowledge must encompass either actual notice of the precise instance of abuse that gave rise to the case at hand or actual knowledge of at least a significant risk of sexual abuse. See, e.g., Doe v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F.Supp.2d 57, 63 (D.Me.1999) (actual notice may be found “when the district ... had notice that the teacher had abused other students in the past”); Massey v. Akron City Bd. of Educ., 82 F.Supp.2d 735, 744 (N.D.Ohio 2000) (“For actual knowledge to exist, an agent of the school must be aware of facts that indicate a likelihood of discrimination.”). Here, even assuming Mercer knew Day had struggled with drugs and alcohol and graduated from an Internet correspondence course, such knowledge, at best, might have forewarned Mercer that Day ran the risk of battling substance abuse or encountering academic difficulties. Obviously, neither of these potential risks constitutes a Title IX violation. The Court is at a loss to see how this knowledge would have indicated to Mercer that Day might sexually assault a Mercer student. Accordingly, the Court finds Ross has failed to put forth evidence sufficient for a jury to find she suffered discrimination due to Mercer’s admission of Day. ii. Mercer’s actual knowledge of Day’s previous sexual harassment . of Mercer students and failure to respond appropriately In her Complaint and her Amended Complaint, Ross alleges Mercer “had prior complaints regarding Day” and “had prior complaints that Day had sexually assaulted or raped other students.” (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21.) However, Ross has provided no evidence to support this allegation, and Mercer has provided testimony to support the opposite conclusion. Thus, there is no evidence in the record to support Ross’s conclusory allegation that Day has previously harassed Mercer students, much less a finding that any “appropriate person” at Mercer was aware of such harassment. Accordingly, the Court finds Ross has failed to put forth evidence sufficient for a jury to find she suffered discrimination due to any such claims. iii. Mercer’s actual knowledge of DAE’s history of sexual assault allegations and failure to remedy the situation Ross contends that, prior to her alleged assault, Mercer had actual knowledge of at least two specific allegations that 2AE members had committed sexual assaults, as well as general allegations that SAE members had access to date rape drugs. Ross relies on the depositions of four individuals to support these contentions: Ross, Day, Alexis Antonocci (“Antonocci”) and Garrett Ratcliff (“Ratcliff’). However, Ross never filed any depositions for Anto-nocci or Ratcliff in the present case, therefore she may not rely on them. As for the sections of Ross and Day’s depositions that Ross alleges provide evidence of the aforementioned facts, the Court finds the testimony relied upon does nothing of the sort. Ross’s deposition reflects that (1) she had overheard at a party once that SAE members used date rape drugs (Ross Dep. 23-24); (2) she had spoken with another Mercer student, Kerry Kelly (“Kelly”), who felt she was twice drugged and raped by a member of SAE {id. at 41-46); and (3) another 2AE member was accused of rape after Ross left Mercer {Id. at 47-49). However, even if Ross overheard at a party that SAE used date rape drugs, this certainly does not establish that an appropriate official at Mercer was aware of such allegations. Regarding Kelly, Ross admits in her deposition that she is not sure whether these alleged incidents occurred before or after her encounter with Day (Ross Dep. 43), and states she is confident that Kelly never reported her allegations to the police or anyone within the SAE Chapter {Id. at 44-46). Again, this evidence falls far short of proving Mercer had actual knowledge of this alleged attack. Finally, whether or not an SAE member was accused of rape after Ross left Mercer has no bearing on whether Mercer had actual knowledge of a problem with the fraternity before Ross’s alleged attack. Day’s deposition is even less helpful to Ross’s case. Day provides no evidence regarding any rumors about SAE members using date rape drugs. Regarding the two SAE members whom Ross had discussed, Day admitted he heard rumors that both men had been accused of sexual assault. (Day Dep. 54-55). However, Day never gave any testimony that would support the conclusion that Mercer had any actual knowledge of these alleged incidents. Finally, the Court notes that Ross attached exhibits to her Response to Mercer’s Motion for Summary Judgment that include excerpts from a study conducted by the Association of American Coll