Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER HAIGHT, Senior District Judge. In this diversity action, plaintiffs seek to hold defendant Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC (“Lloyds” or “the Bank”) responsible for its alleged role in connection with a massive “pump and dump” scheme perpetrated by two corporate insiders of a software company, who fraudulently inflated the company’s value and then sold their shares and funneled these funds through banks in Switzerland and elsewhere. In this motion defendant seeks to dismiss the complaint on three separate grounds: (1) forum non conveniens; (2) preemption of the claims by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (“SLUSA”); and (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, I dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens. I. BACKGROUND A. The Scheme Perpetrated by Kypria-nou and Poyiadjis Much of the following account is drawn from the complaint, whose well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true on this motion. AremisSoft Corporation (“AremisSoft” or “the Company”) was a software company, incorporated in Delaware in 1997, that purported to develop, market, implement, and support software applications for mid-sized corporations in the manufacturing, healthcare, hospitality and construction industries. Decl. Joseph P. LaSala in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., dated Sept. 21, 2006 (“LaSala Deck”), at ¶ 9. From about 1998 through July of 2001, Lycourgos Kyprianou and Roys Poyiadjis, two Cypriots who were officers of the Company, caused the Company to issue false public statements and regulatory filings representing to the public that it was experiencing rapid growth when in fact its growth nowhere neared the stated revenues. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19. The two men caused AremisSoft to announce publicly that it had acquired other software companies of significant value, when, in reality, the companies were small and had been acquired for much less than the announced price. They fabricated records in support of these falsehoods. Id. The effect of these fraudulent misrepresentations was that the value and profitability of the Company were perceived to be much greater than they actually were, and consequently the price at which the Company’s shares were traded on the open market was artificially high. Kyprianou and Poyiadjis sold their shares at these inflated prices to investors who were not privy to their knowledge concerning the true value of the Company. LaSala Decl. ¶ 11. In order to give the impression that the stock sales were arm’s length sales by other investors, Kyprianou and Poyiadjis devised a money laundering scheme, employing various entities to hold and sell their AremisSoft stock. Id. Kyprianou allegedly breached his fiduciary duties in other ways, by converting assets purportedly used to acquire software companies for his own personal benefit, and failing to account to Aremis-Soft for his insider trading profits. Id. When the truth about the Company was revealed, the value of the stock plummeted, and investors suffered great losses. By the time the fraud was uncovered in 2001, AremisSoft shareholders had sustained losses of approximately $500 million. Compl. ¶ 30. By May 2001 attention began to be focused on AremisSoft for reporting inflated income. On May 17, the New York Times reported that the true value of an Aremis-Soft contract with the Bulgarian government was not the $37.5 million claimed by the Company but rather less than $4 million. Id. ¶ 20. By May 24, 2001, at least one class action lawsuit against AremisSoft and its directors had been filed. Id. ¶ 21. On July 31, 2001, the day after AremisSoft was due to release its second quarter 2001 earnings, the Company announced that Kyprianou had resigned and that it was delaying the earnings release. On July 31, 2001, the Company was delisted from NASDAQ. Id. ¶¶ 23, 24. On or about October 4, 2001, the SEC sued Kyprianou and Poyiadijs in a civil injunction action, alleging that they had sold millions of shares of their AremisSoft stock in violation of U.S. securities laws. Id. ¶ 25. In an action before this Court, the SEC succeeded in freezing $175 million of Poyiad-jis’s proceeds lodged in bank accounts in the Isle of Man. In December 2001, an indictment was obtained against Poyiadjis in the Southern District of New York, and in June 2002, a superseding indictment was returned against Kyprianou, Poyiadjis, and M.C. Mathews, the top AremisSoft executive in India, on counts of securities fraud and money laundering, and conspiracy to commit both crimes. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 29. On March 15, 2002, AremisSoft filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. ¶ 27. B. The Parties Neither of the swindlers, whose acts of fraud and theft are undisputed, is a party to this case. Kyprianou is in Cyprus, and Poyiadjis is awaiting sentencing in this Court, having pleaded guilty to fraud. See United States v. Poyiadjis, et al., 01 Cr. 1177, 2002 WL 1941481 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002). Defendant Lloyds is a wholly owned subsidiary bank of Lloyds TSB Group, PLC, both of which have principal places of business in London, United Kingdom. Lloyds maintains extensive branches throughout the world, including in Geneva, Switzerland, and New York, NY. Compl. ¶¶ 10,11. Plaintiffs are co-trustees of the Aremis-Soft Corporation Liquidating Trust (the “Trust”), a Delaware trust formed pursuant to three orders by District Judge Pi-sano of the District of New Jersey in connection with AremisSoft’s voluntary bankruptcy: (1) a July 2002 order confirming the First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of AremisSoft (“Plan of Reorganization”); (2) an August 2002 order approving a Class Action Settlement, which had settled a consolidated class action brought by former shareholders against AremisSoft; and (3) an August 2002 order correcting the Order and Final Judgment previously entered in respect of AremisSoft’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Id. ¶ 2. The governing documents for the Trust are the Plan of Reorganization and the Liquidating Trust Agreement (“Trust Agreement”). This action seeks to pursue some of the claims assigned to the Trust. Under the Plan of Reorganization, the Trust was assigned claims arising out of the purchase of AremisSoft securities on the open market between April 22, 1999 and July 27, 2001 as well as corporate claims of Aremis-Soft. Id. ¶ 5. The Trust beneficiaries include SoftBrands, Inc. as the reorganized debtor and the former AremisSoft shareholders, who number over 6000 persons. Id. ¶¶ 6, 30. The Trust has litigated Trust Claims abroad. It commenced a chancery action in the Isle of Man against Kyprianou, Poy-iadjis, and others. Id. ¶ 31. Kyprianou defaulted in appearance in this proceeding, and consequently the Trust initiated separate proceedings against him and alleged co-conspirators in Cyprus in July of 2005. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiffs also initiated proceedings in the United Kingdom to freeze assets belonging to Kyprianou and his wife and to obtain relevant documents and information from third parties. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs maintain that it was through these last proceedings that they obtained documents giving rise to their claims in the instant action. Id. ¶¶ 37, 38. C. The Allegations Against the Bank This case, along with the related cases filed by the plaintiff Trustees against UBS, AG (“UBS”) and the Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited (“Bank of Cyprus”), turns on the role of a bank in facilitating the fraud and/or the money laundering of one or both of the swindlers and their co-conspirators. In the captioned case against Lloyds, Kypriannou is the central villain. The gravamen of the complaint is that “Lloyds not only made it possible, and in many instances easy, for Kyprianou to launder the proceeds of his criminal and fraudulent conduct through Lloyds’ accounts, but Lloyds misrepresented material information that it knew would be relied on by AremisSoft and its auditors in reporting the Company’s financial condition and thereby perpetuated Kyprianou’s fraud and crimes upon the Company.” Id. ¶ 60. Kyprianou would use nominee companies, primarily AremisSoft’s subsidiaries AresmisSoft EE.ME.A. and LK Global, to hold and sell his AremisSoft stock. The complaint alleges that Lloyds played an integral role in this scheme. Kyprianou opened an account at Lloyds through Evangelos Embedoklis, his wife’s cousin, who was at the time the Deputy General Manager and Chief of Private Banking of Lloyds. Id. ¶¶ 18, 49. Lloyds assigned Jane Moore-Piacentini, Manager at the Geneva branch of Lloyds, to be Kypria-nou’s account manager. Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiffs allege that at least one account was unquestionably opened for the benefit of Kyprianou and that several others were likely to have been opened for his benefit as well. Id. Kyprianou and Lloyds allegedly agreed that money transferred into the Lloyds-Kyprianou account would be transferred without reference to the remit-ter’s name and directed to Moore-Piacen-tini. Id. It is alleged that Lloyds not only sanctioned but “itself suggested” the use of pseudonyms to conceal Kyprianou’s ownership and control over the accounts. See LaSala Decl. ¶ 43. Furthermore, money was allegedly transferred into that account with reference to “house account” numbers, numbers that are created by a bank for its internal use. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 50, 82. At the time the Lloyds-Kyprianou account was opened, Lloyds is alleged to have known that Kyprianou was Chairman of AremisSoft, a publicly traded United States Company, and that the purpose of the account was depositing the proceeds of the sale of his shares. Id. ¶ 51. Lloyds is also charged in the complaint with knowledge, actual or constructive, that Kyprianou held AremisSoft stock and received stock options, and that Kyprianou had in November 2000 gifted 1.6 million shares to two unnamed donees. Id. ¶ 53. In December 2000, shortly after those “gifts” were made, more than $36 million was transferred into the Lloyds-Kypria-nou account in four tranches from two accounts at Bordier et Cie (“Bordier”) and Dominick Company AG (“Dominick”), two private Swiss banks. Id. ¶ 54. On January 3, 2001 and February 9, 2001, Lloyds received transfers of $7,500,00 and $781,536 from an account at Bordier in a different name. Id. ¶ 55. These were proceeds of the sale of stock after exercise of AremisSoft options that Kyprianou had gifted through another alter ego entity. Id. All together, Kyprianou is alleged to have laundered more than $44 million in furtherance of this scheme. Id. ¶¶ 19, 58. It is alleged that Lloyds’ failure to take measures to clarify the identity of the beneficial owner on the account and its permissive practices with respect to the Lloyds-Kyprianou account, such as receiving payments that did not reference the remitter’s name or account number, made it possible for Kyprianou to launder his ill-gotten funds through Lloyds’ accounts. Id. ¶¶ 50, 82. Additionally, the complaint alleges that Lloyds created a false document that aided Kyprianou in his fraud. In response to an audit inquiry concerning the cash in Arem-isSoft’s bank accounts from Pavlos Mele-tiou, a co-conspirator of Kyprianou who purported to act as AremisSoft EE. ME.A’s auditor, Lloyds issued a letter (the “Confirmation Letter”) in March 2001 stating that since December 29, 2000, Lloyds was holding $9.98 million “blocked in fav-our of AremisSoft (EE.ME.A) Ltd.” Id. ¶ 61. The Confirmation Letter was signed by Moore-Piacentini and Sylvie Orsatti, the Assistant Manager at Lloyds. Id. Lloyds, however, allegedly did not hold $9.98 million blocked in favor of Aremis-Soft; neither AremisSoft EE.ME.A nor any other AremisSoft entity had an account at Lloyds, as the “supposedly blocked funds, if ever blocked at all, were in an account in the name of, or for the benefit of, Kyprianou.” Id. ¶ 63. This letter, which was relied on by the Company’s auditors in preparing their opinion on the finances of the Company and by the Company itself, caused AremisSoft to include false and misleading information in its publicly filed financial statements, delaying the discovery of the fraud. Id. ¶ 66. Despite the media reports appearing in May of 2001 raising red flags about Arem-isSoft, Lloyds continued to do business with Kyprianou, permitting him to open an account in the name of AremisSoft EE. ME.A in June of 2001, even though that entity had no offices, personnel, or business operations in Switzerland. Id. ¶ 69. On June 8, 2001, Lloyds transferred over $10 million (the $9.9 million supposedly “blocked in favour of AremisSoft Ltd” plus interest) from the Kyprianou account to the newly opened Lloyds-EE.ME.A account. Id. ¶ 70. On June 29, 2001, after disclosure of fraud in the reporting of revenues generated by a healthcare contract in Bulgaria, Lloyds permitted transfer of $200,000 from this account to another account in Sofia, Bulgaria. Id. The complaint maintains that even after Kyprianou had been indicted for money laundering, Lloyds permitted at least three transfers to Kyprianou accounts at the bank. Id. ¶ 80. Nearly all transfers referenced Moore-Piacentini. Id. ¶¶ 78, 80. Lloyds’s conduct with regard to these accounts, it is maintained, frustrated the tracing of the proceeds of Kyprianou’s fraud. LaSala Decl. ¶ 4. The complaint states five counts. Counts I-IV allege aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting fraud, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Count V is a tort claim arising under Swiss law for alleged violations of the Swiss Penal Code (“SPC”) and the Federal Act on Prevention of Money Laundering in the Financial Sector (“Money Laundering Act”). The Money Laundering Act requires banks to verify the identity of the customer opening an account by examining proper documentation, requires banks to identify the beneficial owner of the assets in the account if the customer is not the owner, and requires additional investigation and reporting measures where a customer engages in unusual transactions or there is reason to suspect that assets in the account are proceeds of criminal conduct. Compl. ¶ 107. Article 305ter of the SPC prohibits financial intermediaries from accepting, holding on deposit, investing, or transferring assets or failing to determine the identity of the beneficial owner of the assets without the necessary diligence required by circumstances, see id. ¶ 105; and Article 305bis of the SPC prohibits anyone from taking action to frustrate the discovery, tracing, or recovery of funds he or she knows or must assume are the proceeds of criminal conduct, see id. ¶ 106. Plaintiffs contend that civil damages are available under Article 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) for violations of Articles 305ter and 305bis of the SPC as well as for violations of the Money Laundering Act, and they contend that Article 55 of the CO, which sets forth circumstances under which a principal is liable for damages caused by its employees, is also applicable. Id. ¶ 109. D. Judge Pisano’s Decision After defendant’s motion had been filed but before it was fully briefed, District Judge Pisano dismissed a similar case brought by the same plaintiffs in the District of New Jersey against two private Swiss banks. See LaSala v. Bordier et CIE & Dominick, 452 F.Supp.2d 575 (D.N.J.2006). The complaint in that case had, like the complaint at bar, asserted tort and Swiss law claims. Judge Pisano dismissed all the claims on the ground that the entire action was preempted by SLU-SA. Id. at 579-91. In that case, defendants had filed a separate motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction, but “contended] that dismissal under SLUSA ... is a subject matter jurisdiction inquiry pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).” 452 F.Supp.2d at 577 n. 1. While Judge Pisano noted that the case had been brought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, he said, “The Court need not resolve whether this motion is properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and/or Rule 12(h)(3),” because the parties agreed that SLUSA would be addressed before other pending motions and the outcome of his SLUSA analysis rendered the other pending motions moot. Id. SLUSA preemption is certainly a question of subject matter jurisdiction when the case comes to federal court via removal from a state court. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch et al., 332 F.3d 116, 122-25 (2d Cir.2003); Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 206 F.Supp.2d 377, 380 (E.D.N.Y.2002). For claims that fall within SLUSA, the statute preempts actions removed from state courts “by essentially converting a state law claim into a federal claim,” Spielman, 332 F.3d at 123, and then mandating its dismissal. As Judge Lynch of this Court has pointed out, however, the statute contains separate provisions concerning “preemption as a jurisdictional mechanism requiring removal” and “preemption as a defense to state-law claims.” Winne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S, 315 F.Supp.2d 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y.2003). Preemption therefore appears in SLUSA in the form of both a jurisdictional provision and a failure to state a claim provision. Normally, as Judge Newman pointed out in a concurring opinion in Spielman, the two are “the opposite sides of the same coin.” Spielman, 332 F.3d at 132. See also Winne, 315 F.Supp.2d at 409. The case at bar was not removed from a state court to this Court. Plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. In consequence, SLUSA is a preemption defense and, as such, one of a number of preliminary grounds for dismissal, among which a judge has discretion to choose when deciding whether to dismiss a case. See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., — U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 1186, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (a federal court “has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the exercise of that discretion, I consider first the forum non conveniens ground for dismissal. II. DISCUSSION A. Forum Non Conveniens The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to dismiss an action “even if the court is a permissible venue with proper jurisdiction over the claim.” Carey v. Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, 370 F.3d 234, 237 (2d Cir.2004) (citation omitted). A district court should dismiss a complaint where, on balance, the resolution of the matter in an adequate alternative forum would be more convenient for the parties and courts and more just. See R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir.1991) (“The central purpose of a forum non conveniens inquiry is to determine where trial will be most convenient and will serve the ends of justice.”). “The first step in a forum non conveniens analysis is for the court to establish the existence of an adequate alternative forum. Second, the court must determine the level of deference to accord the plaintiffs choice of forum. Third, the court must weigh the public and private interests in order to determine which forum will be most convenient and will best serve the ends of justice.” USHA (India), Ltd. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2005) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). A decision to dismiss “lies wholly within the broad discretion of the district court and may be overturned only when we believe that discretion has been clearly abused.” Honeywell International, 421 F.3d at 134 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the last analysis, it always must be borne in mind that there is no algorithm that assigns precise weights to the factors that inform forum non conveniens determinations. The doctrine instead is intensely practical and fact-bound. The most that may be said is that courts reach informed judgments after considering all of the pertinent circumstances.” First Union Nat’l Bank v. Paribas, 135 F.Supp.2d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y.2001), aff'd sub nom., First Union Nat’l Bank v. Arab African Int’l Bank, 48 Fed.Appx. 801 (2d Cir.2002) (unpublished opinion). 1. Adequacy of the Alternative Forum An alternative forum is adequate “if the defendants are amenable to service of process there, and if it permits litigation, of the subject matter of the dispute.” Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir.2003). The test does not mean that the same degree of relief must be available in the alternative forum. See Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.1975) (district court “has discretion to dismiss an action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, ... even though the law applicable in the alternative forum may be less favorable to the plaintiffs chance of recovery”). “Absent ... a fundamental obstacle to a plaintiffs recovery ... American courts are not prone to characterizing a sovereign nation’s courts as ‘clearly unsatisfactory.’ International comity plays a part in this context as well.” Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 801 F.Supp. 1068, 1076 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 990 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.1993). Defendant may properly be sued in Switzerland, see Decl. Ursula Cassani in Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, dated Jul. 21, 2006 (“Cassani Deck”), ¶¶ 42-45, and thus only the second part of the test is at issue. The parties agree that if this case were tried in Switzerland, and Swiss law were applied, Swiss law affords plaintiffs “no causes of action analogous to Counts I through IV of the complaint.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 9 (citing Cassani Deck ¶¶ 99-110; Deck Mark Pieth in Supp. Pk’s Mem. in Opp’n, dated Sept. 21, 2006 (“Pieth Deck”), ¶¶ 69-73). Plaintiffs contend that since “Switzerland does not recognize the majority of the AremisSoft Trust’s claims,” it is an inadequate alternative forum. Id. The Second Circuit, however, has made it abundantly clear that “[t]he availability of an adequate alternate forum does not depend on the existence of the identical cause of action in the other forum,” PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir.1998). Cf. Zweig v. Nat’l Mortgage Bank of Greece, No. 91 Civ. 5482, 1993 WL 227663, at *9 (S.D.N.Y June 21, 1993) (plaintiffs’ contention that only one legal remedy remains in Greece due to tolling of Greek statute of limitations is incorrect and thus plaintiffs have “a number of options that remain viable” and there is no “fundamental obstacle” to plaintiffs’ recovery). Courts in this district have in some cases found overseas fora inadequate where plaintiffs have sued under particular U.S. statutory regimes, see Greenlight Capital, Inc. v. GreenLight (Switzerland) S.A., No. 04 Civ. 3136, 2005 WL 13682, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) (inadequacy of alternative forum stemmed from the fact that “[tjrademark rights are largely territorial, as they exist in each country solely according to that country’s statutory scheme”) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted). However, the present plaintiffs’ causes of action that will fail in Switzerland are not based on U.S. statutory law but rather on common law tort. The mere fact that Switzerland’s tort law does not provide the same causes of action as ours does not render it inadequate. In addition, where portions of Swiss law are designed to prevent banks from facilitating money laundering, it cannot be said that the forum fails to permit “litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.” Consequently, the courts of Switzerland constitute an adequate alternative forum. 2. Deference Due to Plaintiffs’ Choice of Forum The adequacy of the alternative forum having been determined, the next question is the amount of deference to be given plaintiffs’ choice of forum. In cases with foreign defendants, the home forum for the plaintiff is any federal district in the United States, not the particular district in which the plaintiff lives. Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir.2000); Jacobs v. Felix Bloch Erben Verlag fur Buhne Film und Funk KG, 160 F.Supp.2d 722, 743 (S.D.N.Y.2001). Thus in this case I must consider the deference that should be given plaintiffs’ choice to sue in the United States (not New York specifically) as opposed to Switzerland. In the Second Circuit, the “degree of deference to be given to a plaintiffs choice of forum moves on a sliding scale depending on several relevant considerations.” Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir.2001) (en banc). Considerations include “the plaintiffs or the lawsuit’s bona fide connection to the United States and to the forum of choice,” which encompasses “convenience of the plaintiffs residence in relation to the chosen forum, the availability of witnesses or evidence to the forum district.” Id. at 72. Plaintiffs argue that they fall at a very high point on this sliding scale. They maintain that they have a significant connection to the United States, as this is where AremisSoft was incorporated, where the bankruptcy Trust was established, and where the beneficiaries of the Trust are located. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 6-8. They also argue that their choice of forum was motivated by factors of convenience rather than forum shopping. See id. at 7. I agree that plaintiffs have significant ties to the United States and legitimate reasons for preferring to prosecute this action in the United States, such as convenience and expense and their interest in having an American judge decide issues that they maintain arise under American law. However, in the Second Circuit, deference is diminished when “plaintiff is a corporation doing business abroad and can expect to litigate in foreign courts.” Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir.2000). See Morrison Law Firm v. Clarion Co., Ltd., 158 F.R.D. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (“The private interest of plaintiffs in suing in its [sic] home location is diluted because it chose to do business with Japanese firms and to seek their custom, making it logical that they be required to litigate there, a result which should not expose plaintiff to surprise.”); CCS Int’l, Ltd. v. ECI Telesystems, Ltd., No. 97 Civ. 4646, 1998 WL 512951, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1998) (while “it remains defendants’ burden to overcome the forum choice made by these American-citizen plaintiffs,” for plaintiffs “who are involved in a decidedly international dispute such as this, their American citizenship and residence do not constitute the powerful, near-decisive factors for which they contend”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiffs choice of forum is also “given reduced emphasis where ... the operative facts upon which the litigation is brought bear little material connection to the chosen forum.” Nieves v. Am. Airlines, 700 F.Supp. 769, 772 (S.D.N.Y.1988). See also Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *4 (notwithstanding plaintiffs American citizenship and residency, dismissal in favor of Greece is warranted because operative facts on which the litigation was based bore little connection to New York). Plaintiffs are not a corporation doing business abroad, but they are suing on behalf of a trust whose governing document specifically authorizes litigation abroad. Plaintiffs have already litigated in several foreign countries. See Compl. ¶¶ 31-36. Plaintiffs therefore more closely resemble a corporation with substantial resources than ordinary citizens of comparatively modest means. See Carey, 370 F.3d at 238 (in the case of an “individual of modest means,” this “individual’s choice of the home forum may receive greater deference than the similar choice made by a large organization which can easily handle the difficulties of engaging in litigation abroad”). Moreover, the operative facts of this litigation unquestionably took place in Switzerland. See infra Part II.A.3.b. I therefore conclude that while plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to some deference, it does not operate at full strength. Additionally, I note that “[a] citizen’s forum choice should not be given dispositive weight.... [D]ismissal should not be automatically barred when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As always, if the balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court, dismissal is proper.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (citations omitted). See also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir.2000) (There is no “rigid rule of decision protecting U.S. citizen or resident plaintiffs from dismissal for forum non conveniens rather, a court “must take into account the hardship dismissal would cause to a resident plaintiff’); Paribas, 135 F.Supp.2d at 447 (“[T]he weaker the connection between a plaintiffs U.S. activities, even those of a U.S. plaintiff, and the events at issue in the lawsuit, the more likely it is that defendants attacking the plaintiffs choice of a U.S. forum will be able to marshal a successful challenge to that choice.”). Courts in this Circuit have numerous times dismissed suits by an American citizen or entity in favor of a foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc) (in suit by American corporation, Trinidad held to be more appropriate forum); Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.1978) (dismissing suit by Iranian national on the basis of forum non conveniens despite treaty that mandated court access equivalent to American citizen); Telephone Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Network Telecom PLC, 303 F.Supp.2d 377, 384-85 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (dismissing in favor of United Kingdom despite presumption in favor of American corporation’s choice of United States forum because “[t]hat presumption in favor of a plaintiffs convenience is not absolute and may be outweighed”); Realuyo v. Villa Abrille, No. 01 Civ. 10158, 2003 WL 21537754, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2003) (finding, in concluding that the Philippines would be more appropriate jurisdiction, that “[ajlthough [American plaintiffs] forum choice warrants great deference, it is in this case outweighed by every other consideration”); Paribas, 135 F.Supp.2d at 447; Panama Processes S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 500 F.Supp. 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (American citizenship has “no particular effect” where other factors favor dismissal), aff'd, 650 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.1981). In this case, because plaintiffs are not an entity that stands to experience hardship of the kind that would be suffered by an individual plaintiff of modest means, I conclude that the deference due to plaintiffs is not so significant as to outweigh other factors if they weigh in favor of defendant. 3. Private and Public Interests In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), the Supreme Court set forth private and public interest factors to be considered by the district court in determining which forum is most convenient and will best serve the ends of justice. These include “the ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining the attendance of willing, witnesses; ... and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839. Public interest factors include administrative .difficulties stemming from court congestion, the interest in having “localized controversies decided at home,” and the interest in having issues of foreign law decided by a foreign tribunal. Id. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839. a. Private Interest Factors Where alleged misconduct is centered in the foreign forum and the majority of evidence resides there, dismissal is favored. See Strategic Value Master Fund v. Cargill Fin. Servs. Corp., 421 F.Supp.2d 741, 766 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (granting motion to dismiss in favor of England). See also Acosta v. JPMorgan Chase, 06 Civ. 0995, 2007 WL 689529, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 2007) (nothing unreasonable in district court’s conclusion that inconvenience of transporting witnesses and translating documents from Spanish to English favors dismissal) (unpublished opinion); Carey, 370 F.3d at 238-39 (district court’s decision to dismiss in favor of Germany was proper due to difficulty otherwise to be incurred by German defendant in securing presence of its witnesses in the United States and due to reasonableness of requiring plaintiff to litigate business transaction dispute in the country where it occurred); Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *7 (Greece more appropriate forum where “majority of the witnesses and documentary evidence” is located there). In this case, the vast majority of relevant evidence appears to be located in Switzerland, where the Bank accounts were opened and administered. According to defendant, documents pertaining to the accounts are exclusively in the possession of the Geneva branch of Lloyds. Deck Beat Kunz in Supp. Defi’s Mot. Dismiss, dated Jul. 21, 2006 (“Kunz Deck”), ¶12. Defendant argues that a complex statutory banking secrecy regime in Switzerland would make it difficult for documents to be obtained from Switzerland for the purpose of proceedings here. See Def.’s Mem., at 15 (citing Casani Deck ¶¶ 28-33). Plaintiffs maintain, by contrast, that the United States houses important documents because each transfer of dollars from the Lloyds accounts had a corresponding transaction in the United States at a New York correspondent bank. See Ph’s Mem. in Opp’n at 14; LaSala Deck ¶¶ 16, 45. They also maintain that documentary evidence related to the AremisSoft fraud has been accumulated by the Trust and by the United States government in the United States, and that the Trust has further accumulated documents, at present located in New York, through discovery proceedings in the British Virgin Islands and in England. Ph’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 14; La-Sala Deck ¶¶ 39-45. Even if documentation in the United States of corresponding dollar transfers were of use in the case, I do not see how it could be more helpful than documentation of the actual transfers made through the Lloyds accounts in Switzerland. Moreover, plaintiffs have not indicated that the correspondent bank records include documentation concerning the initiation and administration of the accounts, as opposed to merely the transfers occurring in them. Finally, documentation pertaining to the fraud perpetrated by Poyiadjis and Kyprianou does not appear to concern the actions of the Bank that are at issue in this ease. All together, the documentary evidence offered by defendant appears to be more relevant, and thus the location of these documents weighs in favor of Switzerland. However, in an age of electronic communication, where files are usually kept in digital form, this factor does not carry enormous weight. See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London et al., 940 F.Supp. 528, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y.1996), aff'd 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir.1998) (“[I]n light of technological advances in transportation and communication, this Court recognizes that the location of documents is a factor which is to be given less weight now....”). The location of witnesses is a factor in the private interests analysis carrying greater weight. Plaintiffs name a number of witnesses who reside in this country. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 11-12. First, they name Poyiadjis, who is in the custody and control of the United States Department of Justice. Plaintiffs state that he would be able to testify about how Kypria-nou directed him and his operatives to transfer approximately $44 million to an account Kyprianou had opened at Lloyds through a cousin of his wife, that there was an arrangement with Lloyds to conceal the source of the funds in accounts owned and controlled by Kyprianou, and that the Confirmation Letter issued by Lloyds was false and misleading, see LaSala Decl. ¶¶26, 27. Second, plaintiffs list Robert Peak, the principal accountant at the SEC involved in the investigation of AremisSoft. Id. ¶¶ 31-33. They next cite the usefulness of the testimony of Courtney Wilson, the FBI Special Agent in charge of the investigation of AremisSoft. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs contend that testimony from Poyiadjis and the U.S. government employees could be obtained in New York but not in Switzerland, see Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 11-14. Plaintiffs suggest that non-party representatives of the New York correspondent banks would be of use, and they also indicate that former officers and directors of AremisSoft, who all reside in the United States, might be called as witnesses. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. These include George Ellis, former member of the Board of Directors of AremisSoft, and David Latzke, who became CFO of AremisSoft after the resignation of Kyprianou. These persons would testify as to the deception and fraud wrought on the Board by Ky-prianou and the internal investigation of the fraud after it was uncovered. Id. ¶ 36. Finally, plaintiffs assert that Mr. LaSala himself would be called to testify about the Trust and the damages sustained by Ar-emisSoft and its former investor. Id. ¶ 37. Defendant counters plaintiffs’ claim about Poyiadjis’s centrality to the case by pointing out that his name was not mentioned even once in the complaint’s description of Lloyds’ alleged misconduct. See Def.’s Reply Mem., at 6 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 48-82). Defendant also questions the helpfulness of testimony from the government employees. Id. Defendant, instead, identifies a number of witnesses, for the most part current or former employees of the Bank, who defendant asserts are all residing in Switzerland, with the exception of one Swiss national who resides in Cyprus. Def.’s Mem., at 16-17. Key among these are Jane Moore-Piacentini, who is alleged to have been the primary employee at Lloyds responsible for the accounts at issue, and Roger Meyer, one of the trustees of a trust through which tens of mb-lions of dollars were allegedly laundered by Kyprianou. In the related case against UBS, Meyer is alleged to be a private money manager and investor advisor with an address in Switzerland, and he allegedly directed the very transactions as to which Moore-Piacentini and Lloyds are accused of violating Swiss money laundering laws. See Def.’s Mem., at 16, 18. Neither of these witnesses is in the employ of Lloyds, and both reside in Switzerland. See Kunz Decl., ¶¶ 2, 11. In addition, defendant identifies six Lloyds employees and former employees who were co-signers of the Confirmation Letter or were otherwise involved in managing the Lloyds-Kyprianou account. See Def.’s Mem. at 17; Kunz Decl. ¶¶ 4-9. Finally, defendant indicates that officers and employees of the Bordier and Dominick banks, who presumably reside in Switzerland, would be additional non-party witnesses. See Del’s Mem., at 18. While the witnesses mentioned by plaintiffs undoubtedly would have something to say about the overall scheme perpetrated by Poyiadjis and Kyprianou, I fail to see how they would assist a fact-finder in determining what Bank employees knew and did surrounding the particular accounts at issue in this case. As Judge Weinfeld noted in a situation where an alleged fraudulent scheme occurred in Switzerland but the defendant contended that New York witnesses were important, “The New York witnesses can testify only as to how undisputed trades were executed. These matters, if pertinent at all, are not even of secondary significance; they are subordinate to the basic issue central to plaintiffs claims.... [The alleged fraudulent scheme] occurred in Geneva at Banque and Advicorp. Those who performed the fraudulent acts and issued directions in furtherance thereof did so there.” Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F.Supp. 506, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1982). I am persuaded that the witnesses identified by defendant have the more relevant first-hand knowledge of the pertinent facts in this case concerning the Bank’s conduct, and these witnesses reside in Switzerland. Plaintiffs next argue that defendant can cause its employees to appear in the United States to testify and that to the extent that non-party witnesses reside abroad, the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad is an adequate means to compel documents and witness testimony. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 13. However, this private interest factor is about convenience to the parties; thus the presence of the vast majority of witnesses in one forum weighs in favor of that forum, even if the witnesses could be transported. See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, 940 F.Supp. at 538 (where nearly all witnesses reside overseas, “transporting witnesses from England to the United States — even if they were within this Court’s subpoena power or would appear voluntarily — would be extremely inconvenient and would impose a prohibitive cost on defendants”); Scottish Air Int’l Inc. v. British Caledoni-an Group, PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (2d Cir.1996) (affirming district court’s dismissal on forum non conveniens ground and noting that since vast majority of potential witnesses were residents of Great Britain, “the difficulty, cost, and disruption of requiring the attendance of such witnesses in New York — whether they were willing to appear or not — would be considerable” and this weighed in favor of dismissal). In addition, for those who could not be compelled to testify in the United States, obtaining evidence by means of letters rogatory pursuant to the Hague Convention is a poor substitute for live trial testimony. See Scottish Air, 81 F.3d at 1233 (noting that in prior case, the Second Circuit established that “the live testimony of key witnesses was necessary where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to defraud them. We deemed such testimony necessary for the jury to assess the witnesses’ credibility”); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1001 (2d Cir.1993) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of securities fraud action in favor of Australia where plaintiffs alleged fraud and noting that “live testimony of key witnesses is necessary” in such cases); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1165 (2d Cir.1978) (for important non-party Swiss witnesses, obtaining testimony by means of letters rogatory would be “very serious handicap” favoring dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens); Paribas, 135 F.Supp.2d at 450 (there exists a “strong preference for live trial testimony”). As two non-party witnesses residing in Switzerland— Moore-Piacenti and Meyer — are likely to be key witnesses, this additionally weighs in favor of the Swiss forum. Another consideration pertaining to the witnesses and documents is translation. Defendant notes that many witnesses may testify through an interpreter. See Def.’s Mem., at 17. This also weighs in favor of dismissal. See Schertenleib, 589 F.2d at 1165 (“serious problem of translation” of live testimony and documents in Switzerland is factor supporting dismissal); Fus-tok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F.Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (“In addition to the expense and inconvenience of travel for these [foreign] witnesses, if that were contemplated, many of them do not speak English as a primary language which would present an added obstacle to a smooth flowing trial in this District.”). Even putting aside the question of cost, the difficulties presented to a court’s assessment of witness credibility are considerable. See Fustok, 546 F.Supp. at 510 (“In addition to the expense and inconvenience of travel for these [foreign] witnesses, if that were contemplated, many of them do not speak English as a primary language which would present an added obstacle to a smooth flowing trial in this District.”). See also Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *8 (amount of translation of documents and testimony that would be required if litigation remained in New York far outweighs amount if action were litigated in Greece). In sum, I am not persuaded that evidence from the U.S. sources proffered by plaintiffs would be more relevant than evidence originating from the locale of the complained-of conduct. Based on the location of documents and relevant witnesses, I conclude that the private interest factors favor defendant. b. Public Interest Factors Public interest factors include judicial economy, the interest in having “localized controversies decided at home,” and the interest in having issues of foreign law decided by a foreign tribunal. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839. As Judge Kaplan has explained, “[T]here is little sense to allowing a U.S. citizen to haul a group of foreign defendants into a U.S. court on transactions having little or nothing to do with this country where there is an available foreign forum significantly better suited to handling the litigation in a prompt, efficient and effective manner.” Paribas, 135 F.Supp.2d at 448 (dismissing fraud claims against French bank in favor of London, where fraudulent activity was centered). See also Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *4 (dismissing claims of New York plaintiff against Greek bank, even though plaintiff alleged he was defrauded in New York, because actions by Greek bank took place in Greece). I turn first to the public interest in having localized controversies decided at home. This requires an evaluation of which forum possesses a stronger local interest in the controversy. See Pollux Holding, 329 F.3d at 76 (affirming district court’s determination that London has a “stronger local interest” in the controversy because, inter alia, the derivative instrument at issue was purchased there, the alleged fraud and misrepresentations primarily occurred there, and the alleged breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty arose out of contracts entered into there). Plaintiffs point to the interest of the United States in safeguarding transactions involving U.S. currency and in “ensuring that foreign banks are not havens for criminals who steal and launder U.S. currency.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 15. They also point to the interest of the United States in adjudicating matters affecting its residents. See id. Plaintiffs argue that the existence of related civil and criminal actions in this district also causes the public interest to weigh in favor of the United States. See id. at 16. Finally, plaintiffs cite as a United States interest the fact that their claims “are predominantly brought” under U.S. law. Id. Defendant, by contrast, maintains that Switzerland possesses a strong interest in regulating the conduct of banks in its own country. See Def.’s Mem. at 19-20. Defendant also stresses Switzerland’s interest in applying its own law, particularly where that law is disputed. Id. at 20. I am persuaded that Switzerland possesses the strongest interest in this case. The United States may have some interest in ensuring that American currency not be laundered, but the argument that dollar transfers through banks in the United States creates a strong public interest in favor of the Untied States has been rejected by courts in this Circuit. See, e.g., Lan Assocs. XVIII v. Bank of Nova Scotia, No 96 Civ. 1022, 1997 WL 458753, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (alleged wire transfer of funds in New York is insufficient to create public interest link to New York) (‘Were such minimal contact with New York to be deemed significant, this Court, located in one of the world’s largest and busiest financial centers, would be burdened with countless international financial disputes having no real, substantive link to New York.”); see also Calgarth Invs. Ltd v. Bank Saderat Iran, No 95 Civ. 5332, 1996 WL 204470, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1996) (“[D]ebits and credits at New York bank accounts, without more, do not give New York or the United States an interest in transactions that otherwise are entirely foreign.”), aff'd, 108 F.3d 329 (2d Cir.1997) (mem.); Sussman, 801 F.Supp. at 1074 (bank’s “use of its New York Branch ... to route the loan proceeds ... cannot be regarded, in the overall scheme of things, as other than peripheral,” and this is true “even if this routing of the funds was for the purpose of evading Israeli law”). In this case, there is even less connection between the underlying events and the United States than in Zweig. As for plaintiffs’ argument that adjudicating the interests of its residents is a United States interest, I agree that this interest exists, but it stands in equipoise to Switzerland’s interest in adjudicating matters affecting its residents. Whatever interest the United States has, it pales in comparison with that of Switzerland. Switzerland possesses a strong interest in regulating the conduct of banks within its borders. See Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *10 (despite the fact that plaintiff was allegedly defrauded in New York and made visit to branch of Greek bank in New York, quoting Sussman for the proposition that “Greece’s public interest in the issues raised by these charges dwarfs the public interest of New York, which is minimal”). There is no question that this dispute centers around events occurring there. The Bank accounts were opened in Switzerland, and the transfers alleged to have been improperly permitted by the Bank were authorized by personnel there. This is at its heart a dispute involving what Swiss banking representatives did and what they knew when they did these things. The knowledge plaintiffs allege on the part of the Bank, both concerning its legal obligations and concerning the fraudulent nature of Kyprianou’s transfers, exists only in the minds of Bank representatives in Switzerland. If, to quote Gilbert, it is preferable that “localized controversies” be “decided at home,” Switzerland is home for the controversies generated by the plaintiffs’ complaint. I agree with plaintiffs that the law to be applied augments the interest of the forum possessing the applicable law, see PL’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 16, as this implicates both the local interests possessed by the competing jurisdictions and the Gilbert Court’s assessment that it is more appropriate to try a diversity case “in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.” Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509, 67 S.Ct. 839. However, I disagree with plaintiffs’ position that the law of a state of the Untied States applies to Counts I-IV of the complaint. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 27-28. Courts often do not decide choice of law issues when performing a forum non con-veniens analysis, see Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251, 102 S.Ct. 252 (judges considering forum non conveniens motions need not conduct an elaborate choice-of-law analysis because the doctrine “is designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law”), but sometimes they do undertake the analysis. See Zweig, 1993 WL 227663, at *9 (need to engage in choice of law analysis, in which Greek law is found to apply, “plays an important role” in decision to dismiss under forum non conveniens). The mere likelihood of the application of foreign law weighs in favor of dismissal. See Pollux Holding, 329 F.3d at 76 (affirming as proper exercise of discretion district court’s determination that application of English law favored adjudication in England); Calavo Growers v. Generali Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir.1980) (“[T]he likelihood that Belgian law would govern in turn lends weight to the conclusion that the suit should be prosecuted in that jurisdiction.”); Paribas, 135 F.Supp.2d at 453 (likelihood that court would have to apply English law to part or entirety of case “cuts to some degree in defendants’ favor”). Since a federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice of law rules of the forum state, see Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), which in this case is New York, if New York choice of law rules dictate that this case arises entirely under Swiss law, that outcome would weigh in favor of dismissal. In tort cases, New York courts apply the law of the jurisdiction with the “greatest interest” in regulating behavior within its borders or in having its law applied. Brink’s Ltd. v. South African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022, 1031 (2d Cir.1996) (citing cases). This is a “flexible approach intended to give controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.” Fin. One Public Co. Ltd. v. Lehman Bro. Spec. Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 337 (2d Cir.2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The contacts of the parties and occurrences with each jurisdiction are thus factors to be considered in applying interest analysis, together with the policies underlying each jurisdiction’s rules, the strength of the governmental interests embodied in these policies, and the extent to which these interests are implicated by the contacts.” Id. Plaintiffs suggest that the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation is the locus of injury, which here is the United States. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n, at 27 (“When the law is one which regulates conduct, such as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will apply.”). In applying interest analysis, New York courts have said that “the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating behavior within its borders.” Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, 81 N.Y.2d 66, 72, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919, 612 N.E.2d 277 (1993). The locus of the tort is where the “last event necessary to make the actor liable occurred.” Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 124 F.Supp.2d 46, 58 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (citation omitted). However, this “last place” criterion “is not chiseled in stone, but rather gives way when it is at war with state interests so that the more general Babcock principle applies.” Id. (referring to the landmark interest analysis case Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963)). In other words, the “last place” criterion does not displace ordinary interest analysis. See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F.Supp.2d 452, 492 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (refusing to apply the last event necessary test where a single state was overwhelmingly the center of gravity of the events at issue and that state’s interest in regulating the conduct of work performed there was strong); HSA Residential Mortgage Servs. of Texas v. Casuccio, 350 F.Supp.2d 352, 365 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (refusing to apply “last place” criterion in case where plaintiffs alleged that defendant accounting firms prepared and approved fraudulent financial statements and instead applying law of New York which “has a strong interest in defining the scope of liability for accountants who work in its state” and “has the more significant interest in having its conduct-regulating law govern in order to regulate behavior within its borders”). Even the Second Circuit’s recent application of the test did not rely on it exclusively in conducting interest analysis. See White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. v. Cintas Corp., 460 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2006) (“[H]ere, where not only the vast majority of the conduct supporting the claim occurred in New York, but also the damages were suffered at WPL’s New York headquarters, New York has the most significant interest and its laws apply.”) (emphases added). In this case, the “last place” or locus of the “last event necessary” is the United States, where the harm allegedly caused by the Bank was felt. A situation such as this, where the alleged misconduct occurred in one jurisdiction, but because of the international nature of a company’s business dealings the harm caused by that misconduct was felt in another country, presents precisely the sort of circumstance where a blind adherence to the rule that the last place determines the locus of the tort and therefore the jurisdiction with the greatest interest would result in the jurisdiction which does not possess the greatest interest being deemed so for choice of law purposes. In Sussman I held that even where the injury was felt in the United States, “Whether or not defendants’ conduct was tortious will be measured by the law of Israel. It is that law upon which the parties, plaintiffs and defendants alike, relied in respect of defendants’ conduct; and the interest of Israel in applying its law to admonish or prevent similar conduct in the future assumes a critical, and in my opinion, controlling importance in choice of law analysis.” Sussman, 801 F.Supp. at 1075 (citing cases to support proposition that “this Court has regarded the place where the victim of fraud or negligence suffered economic loss as less significant for choice of law purposes than the law of the place by which the defendant’s conduct is evaluated”). See also Pollux Holding, 329 F.3d at 76 (approving district court’s assessment that “[gjiven that most of the relevant conduct occurred in England, English law would apply to the preponderance of plaintiffs’ tort claims”); Brink’s, 93 F.3d at 1032 (where injury of theft was felt in the United States, South Africa has greater interest than New York in the alleged willful misconduct or gross negligence of South African Airways, a government instrumentality, and the South African police). In this case, as discussed supra, the contacts between Switzerland and the underlying events are strong, while the contacts with the United States are minimal. See Finance One, 414 F.3d at 337 (contacts between Thailand and events are strong but between New York and events are weak where negotiations and other activities surrounding transactions at issue took place in Thailand, Hong Kong, or Tokyo). I conclude that the strength of Switzerland’s interest in the litigation outweighs that of the United States. Switzerland’s interest in regulating the conduct of banks within its borders, particularly where the bank is a leading financial services provider in the country, is great. The reputability of the country’s banking system is intimately connected to the effectiveness of the country’s regulation of its banks, and it has a stronger interest in policing its financial systems than does the United States in ensuring that United States dollars are not laundered abroad to the detriment of United States shareholders and a United States company. Because the operative events took place almost exclusively in Switzerland, the contacts with Switzerland directly implicate these significant governmental interests. I therefore conclude that Swiss law applies to plaintiffs’ common law tort claims. Not only does choice of law analysis indicate that Switzerland’s interest in the case is greater than that of the United States, but Switzerland’s interest in this litigation is all the more keen as the parties dispute the application of Swiss law to Count V. Defendant submits a declaration by Ursula Cassani, a lawyer and a professor at the University of Geneva Law School, and points out the conflict between Ms. Cassani and plaintiffs’ expert Mark Pieth, a professor of criminal law and criminal procedure at the University of Basel. See Def.’s Mem. at 7-8 (citing Pi-eth Decl.). The two experts disagree on a number of points that are central to the Swiss law claims, including the following: • Whether Art. 305ter of the SPC provides a basis for civil liability. Compare Cassani Decl. ¶¶ 59-64, and Decl. Ursula Cassani, dated Oct. 18, 2006 (“Cassani Reply Decl.”) ¶¶ 13-16 (Art 305ter does not protect individual financial interests), with Pieth Decl. ¶¶ 45-48 (Art. 305ter could potent