Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION BATES, District Judge. Amendment 13C to the South Atlantic Snapper-Grouper Fishery Management Plan imposed tighter restrictions on the harvest of snowy grouper, vermilion snapper, and black sea bass, and loosened existing restrictions on the fishing of red porgy. See 71 Fed.Reg. 55,096 (Sept. 21, 2006). In this suit, the North Carolina Fisheries Association, Inc., two North Carolina fishermen, and a seafood company (collectively “plaintiffs”), joined by the State of North Carolina as amicus curiae, challenge the validity of Amendment 13C under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“MSA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883; the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612; and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Plaintiffs and defendant Carlos Gutierrez, sued in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce, have both moved for summary judgment on the basis of the administrative record. A hearing on the motions was held on June 14, 2007, and resolution of the case was expedited at the request of the parties and in accordance with the MSA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(4). After careful review of the administrative record and the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both of the cross-motions for summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 1. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act The MSA established a national program for the conservation and management of fishery resources. Congress believed that such a program was “necessary to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overf-ished stocks, to insure conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of essential fish habitats, and to realize the full potential of the Nation’s fishery resources.” 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(6). To accomplish these broadly framed goals, the statute promotes cooperation between federal and state officials, and among those officials and representatives of fishing-industry, environmental, and consumer organizations. See id. § 1801(b)(5). These representatives interact in eight regional fishery management councils, each of which has authority over the coastal waters adjacent to its member states. Id. § 1852(a)(1). Regional councils, whose membership is statutorily defined, are charged with enacting and regularly updating fishery management plans (“FMP”) that meet the objectives of, and are consistent with the standards set forth in, the MSA. Id. § 1852(h). The councils consist of voting and nonvoting members, and are also required to “establish and maintain” a scientific and statistical committee (“SSC”) and advisory panels that represent the interests of the fishing industry and other sectors. Id. § 1852(g). “Decisions and recommendations made by [these] committees and panels,” however, are merely “advisory in nature” and do not bind either the councils or federal agency officials. Id. § 1852(g)(5). The federal official responsible for fishery management is nominally the Secretary of Commerce (“the Secretary” or “defendant”), see id. § 1802(34), but in practice he delegates much of his authority and many of his preliminary duties to the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”). See C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1558 & n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1991); Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, 384 F.Supp.2d 203, 209 n. 2 (D.D.C.2005). Particularly relevant to this suit is the process by which the Secretary and the regional councils — here, the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (“the Council”) — promulgate FMPs and amendments to those plans. The primary responsibility for researching and developing the FMPs and their amendments normally falls on the regional councils, which are required by statute to “prepare and submit” any amendments to the Secretary and, in formulating amendments, to “conduct public hearings” at locations throughout their member states. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h)(1), (3). Councils then work with NMFS to transmit to the Secretary both the proposed FMP or amendment and any accompanying regulations that the particular council “deems necessary and appropriate” to implement that plan or amendment. Id. § 1853(c). Once the FMP or amendment is submitted, the Secretary must “immediately” — that is, within five days of receipt, id. § 1854(a)(5) — commence his review and make the plan or amendment available for notice and public comment. Id. §§ 1854(a)(1), (b)(1). Lacking the authority to modify the council’s submission, the Secretary may approve the plan or amendment as consistent with applicable law, or he may either disapprove or partially approve it as inconsistent with such law. Id. § 1854(a)(3). If the proposal is approved, then NMFS assumes the task of implementing the measures adopted by the council. Id. § 1855(d). The Secretary’s determination that the proposal is partially or completely deficient returns the matter to the council, which may then “submit a revised plan or amendment to the Secretary for review.” Id. § 1854(a)(4). Under certain circumstances, the Secretary or his designees, rather than the regional councils, will be the initial movers. For example, where “the Secretary finds that an emergency exists or that interim measures are needed to reduce overfishing for any fishery, he may promulgate emergency regulations or interim measures necessary to address the emergency or overfishing, without regard to whether a fishery management plan exists for such fishery.” 16 U.S.C. § 1855(c); 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(e)(5). Such interim measures last only 180 days, 16 U.S.C. § 1855(c)(3)(B), or 186 days under the Reauthorization Act, see Pub.L. No. 109-479, § 108(a), 120 Stat. at 3594. Agency initiative is also required when the Secretary learns through the statutorily mandated annual-review process that a fishery is overfished. The MSA requires in such situations that the Secretary “immediately notify the appropriate council and request that action be taken to end overfishing in the fishery and to implement conservation and management measures to rebuild the affected stocks of fish.” 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(2). Under the version of the statute in effect until 2007, the councils had up to a year to prepare a FMP, plan amendment, or proposed regulations designed “to end overfishing in the fishery and to rebuild affected stocks of fish.” Id. § 1854(e)(3)(A). The FMP, plan amendment, or regulations proposed by the council must “specify a time period for ending overfishing and rebuilding the fishery” that is “as short as possible” and that “allocate[s] both overfishing restrictions and recovery benefits fairly and equitably among sectors of the fishery.” Id. § 1854(e)(4). Secretarial review of a FMP or plan amendment submitted by a regional council focuses on the proposed action’s consistency with the substantive criteria set forth in, and the overall objectives of, the MSA. As to the latter, the Secretary examines whether the council’s proposal conforms to the explicit statutory requirements and whether it contains measures that are “necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery, to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to protect, restore, and promote the long-term health and stability of the fishery.” 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(A). FMPs, plan amendments, and regulations must “be consistent with” the ten “national standards for fishery conservation and management.” Id. § 1851(a). Three of those — National Standards 2, 4, and 8 — are of particular importance here. National Standard 2 requires that “[Conservation and management measures ... be based upon the best scientific information available.” Id. § 1851(a)(2). Standard 4 governs the allocation of fishing privileges, barring discrimination between residents of different states and requiring that any allocations made be “fair and equitable” to all fishermen. Id. § 1852(a)(4). National Standard 8 mandates that the measures selected “take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.” Id. § 1851(a)(8). This focus on the welfare of fishing communities, however, must be “consistent with the conservation requirements” of the MSA, “including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overf-ished stocks.” Id. FMPs, plan amendments, and regulations promulgated by the Secretary are subject to judicial review under the MSA. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f). The statute requires that courts review conservation and management measures under the familiar standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Thus, a court considering challenges to the Secretary’s actions shall “set aside” such actions “only ... on a ground specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of [Title 5].” Id. § 1855(f)(1)(B). Section 706(2), in turn, obliges courts reviewing agency action to “hold unlawful and set aside” that action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or if the agency has exceeded its authority, violated a party’s constitutional rights, or failed to comply with procedural requirements. If the party challenging the Secretary’s action so requests, the court is obliged to hold a hearing and to “expedite the matter in every possible way.” 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(4). 2. Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”) FMPs and plan amendments must also conform to “other applicable law,” 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1), a category that includes the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The RFA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612, is a “[pjurely procedural” statute that “obliges federal agencies to assess the impact of their regulations on small businesses.” U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C.Cir.2001). As the First Circuit has explained, the RFA “does not alter the substantive mission of the agencies under their own statutes; rather, the Act creates procedural obligations to assure that the special concerns of small entities are given attention in the comment and analysis process when the agency undertakes rule-makings that affect small entities.” Little Bay Lobster Co., Inc. v. Evans, 352 F.3d 462, 470 (1st Cir.2003); see also 5 U.S.C. § 606 (“The requirements of [5 U.S.C. §§ 603-04] do not alter in any manner standards otherwise applicable by law to agency actions.”). Agencies must first determine whether the regulation under consideration would “have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” Id. § 605(b). The term “small entities” includes small businesses and small organizations. Id. § 601(6). Only if the proposed regulation would have such an impact do the statute’s two primary procedural obligations attach. Those obligations are the preparation first of an initial and then of a final regulatory flexibility analysis, commonly referred to as an IRFA and a FRFA. Id. §§ 603-604. Sections 603 and 604 of the statute establish the explanations and considerations that IRFAs and FRFAs, respectively, “shall contain.” Id. §§ 603(b), 604(a). Both forms of analysis generally “describe[ ] the effect of the proposed rule on small businesses and discuss[ ] alternatives that might minimize adverse economic consequences.” Nat’l Women, Infants, and Children Grocers Ass’n v. Food and Nutrition Serv., 416 F.Supp.2d 92, 108 (D.D.C.2006). But once the decision has been made to promulgate the regulation, the FRFA must provide, among other components, “a description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities,” including “a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency ... was rejected.” 5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(5). The RFA authorizes judicial review of an agency’s compliance with many but not all of the statutory requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a). Courts can, for instance, determine an agency’s compliance with the FRFA requirements set forth in § 604 of the RFA, but cannot adjudicate whether an agency violated the statute by failing to prepare an IRFA. See Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 215 F.3d 61, 79 (D.C.Cir.2000). Even when an agency’s action is subject to judicial review, all that is required of the agency is “a ‘reasonable, good-faith effort to carry out [RFA’s] mandate.’ ” U.S. Cellular Corp., 254 F.3d at 88 (quoting Alenco Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 625 (5th Cir.2000)). Failure to comply with one or more of the statutory requirements, moreover, does not necessarily mean that the regulation must be invalidated. To the contrary, the D.C. Circuit has held that such an omission “may be, but does not have to be, grounds for overturning a rule.” Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 255 F.3d 855, 868 (D.C.Cir.2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 611(a)(4) (authorizing courts to take “corrective action consistent with” the RFA, “including, but not limited to (A) remanding the rule to the agency, and (B) deferring the enforcement of the rule against small entities”). B. Snapper-Grouper Fishery FMP and Amendment 13C The FMP relevant to this case is the South Atlantic Snapper-Grouper Fishery Management Plan. Established in 1983, the original FMP addressed 13 species of fish, a number that has steadily risen to the current total of 73. See 50 C.F.R. Part 622, App. A, Table 4. Access to the fishery had been open and virtually unlimited pri- or to 1983. But conservation measures have vastly increased over the last 24 years, transforming the fishing industry in member states like North Carolina. Acting through plan amendments, more streamlined regulatory amendments, and emergency interim rules, the Secretary and his designees have enacted, among other measures, minimum-size requirements, prohibitions on certain types of traps and nets, quotas, trip limits (limits on the gutted weight of fish caught per trip, not a cap on the number of trips), seasonal and area closures, and recreational bag limits (a cap on the number of fish that recreational anglers may catch per trip). Administrative Record (“AR”) 4769. More recently, access to the fishery has been restricted by requiring those seeking entry to purchase a permit. AR 4827; Pis.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pis.’ Mem.”) at 11. Amendment 13C, the subject of this lawsuit, imposes restrictions on the harvest of four species in the fishery: snowy grouper, golden tilefish, vermilion snapper, and black sea bass. Snowy grouper are large, deep-sea fish — growing to 4 feet long and 66 pounds — that live up to 40 years. AR 4803. Golden tilefish are similarly large (measuring up to 50 inches and 66 pounds) and long-lived, and are also harvested (that is, caught) in deeper waters. AR 4805. The other two species, vermilion snapper and black sea bass, are harvested closer to the ocean surface. Vermilion snapper are relatively small — about 2 feet long and 7 pounds — and can live up to 14 years. AR 4805-06. Black sea bass are a similar size, live approximately 10 years, and are harvested using “pots” that resemble lobster traps. Amendment 13C has a tortuous history, the twists and turns of which must be recounted because they lie at the heart of plaintiffs’ claims. The regulatory action began as Amendment 13, a comprehensive set of measures that the Council started developing in 2001. AR 31. Amendment 13 was intended to address 12 species already designated as overfished, others not yet subjected to overfishing, and regulations governing the Oculina Experimental Closed Area. Those regulations were scheduled to sunset soon, and the complexity of the full amendment made its enactment prior to the sunset date impossible. NMFS therefore decided to carve out the Oculina-related regulations as Amendment 13A and to repackage the remaining measures as the broader Amendment 13B. AR 5350. Amendment 13A was enacted in 2004. AR 36, 43. Meanwhile, data on the four species discussed above, as well as red porgy, was being collected as part of the Southeastern Data Assessment and Review (“SEDAR”) process. The process, which defendant characterizes as “rigorous” and plaintiffs view as controversial, see Def.’s Combined Mem. & Opp’n (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 11; Pis.’ Mem. at 12, took place between 2002 and 2004. SEDAR concluded that snowy grouper (AR 1585), golden tilefish (AR 5015), vermilion snapper (AR 736, 5050), and black sea bass (AR 823, 886, 5098) were undergoing overfishing, which means that the fish were being removed at a rate that jeopardized the species’ ability to produce maximum sustainable yield (“MSY”) on a continuing basis. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(29) (2000); 50 C.F.R. 600.310(d)(l)(i). MSY, in turn, is defined as “the largest long-term average catch or yield that can be taken from a [stock of fish] under prevailing ecological and environmental conditions.” Id. § 600.310(c)(l)(i). SEDAR also determined that snowy grouper (AR 4976), black sea bass (AR 5098), and red porgy (AR 5156) were “overfished,” a state in which the size (or “biomass”) of the fish stocks had declined to a level where management practices would have to be changed in order to achieve MSY and rebuild the stocks. Id § 600.310(d)(l)(iii). Species that are overfished and subject to overfishing, NMFS says, present the “worst case scenario” from a conservation and management standpoint. Def.’s Mem. at 6. By early 2005, the Council had become concerned that Amendment 13B was taking too long and that the four fish stocks deemed overfished by SEDAR needed to be addressed more expeditiously. AR 2396; id. at 5351, 70 Fed.Reg. at 43,127. Much as it had done with Amendment 13A, the Council began to explore other ways to address the results of the SEDAR process. The Council first prepared a “Strawman Options Paper” in advance of a meeting scheduled for June 2005. AR 2396-2410. In that paper, the Council proposed- implementing interim measures pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854(e)(6) and 1855(c). AR 2396-99. Interim measures last only 180 days, meaning that they would have expired before the time at which the rest of Amendment 13B was likely to be ready for implementation. Moreover, the statutory mechanism did not permit the Secretary to take the desired step of reducing the restrictions then in place on fishing red porgy and thereby increasing the amount of red porgy that could be harvested. AR 2097. The Council therefore opted for another mechanism short of a formal plan amendment — a so-called “regulatory amendment.” Through regulatory amendments, the Secretary can establish or modify, among other restrictions, quotas, trip limits, recreational bag limits, minimum sizes, gear restrictions, and area or seasonal closures. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.48(f). The next key event was the June 2005 Council meeting. Discussion - at the meeting focused on what was by then known as Regulatory Amendment 9, the limited measure targeting the overfishing of snowy grouper, golden tilefish, vermilion snapper, and black sea bass. NMFS Council representative Dr. Roy Crabtree urged that many of the concerns voiced and proposals advanced be deferred until the formal consideration of the broader Amendment 13B, which he assured Council members would permit changes to, for example, bans on the sale of certain fish during spawning season. AR 2331, 2467. Among the concerns raised was one of particular importance to plaintiffs here. Specifically, members of the Council’s Snapper-Grouper Advisory Panel objected to the prospect of fish caught and sold by recreational fisherman being counted against the quota established for commercial fishermen. AR 2150. Of the many other issues raised at the June meeting, two are especially pertinent to plaintiffs’ suit. First, some Council members questioned the soundness of the data gathered on the four species and SE-DAR’s evaluation of that data. Foremost among them was Dr. Louis Daniel, then Council Chair and representative of the North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries, who noted that some of the data upon which the Council was basing its actions was itself “incomplete.” AR 2052, 2276. Dr. Daniel’s assessment was consistent with that of a peer-review panel that had emphasized some substantial weaknesses in the data. AR 1740; see also AR 1694. Second, a number of proposals for alternative restrictions were made and rejected as either impractical or beyond the scope of Regulatory Amendment 9. A proposal to allocate quota percentages geographically based on historical records of fish landed was among those rebuffed as impractical, see AR 2242-45, whereas the aforementioned issue of great concern to the Advisory Panel members — recreationally caught fish counting against the commercial quota — -was deemed beyond the scope of the amendment. AR 2467. The Council next met in September 2005. Members learned at that time that an important measure to change the fishing year of black sea bass could not be carried out through a regulatory amendment. AR 2615. They also learned that converting the regulatory amendment to a more formal plan amendment would allow them to implement the measure and would not significantly delay the amendment’s effective date because an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) had already been prepared. AR 2616. The Council then voted to transform Regulatory Amendment 9 into plan Amendment 13C. AR 2620. Progress on Amendment 13C sped forward in the final months of 2005. Ten separate public hearings were held in the member states between November 7, 2005 and December 5, 2005. AR 3226-27; 3259-3401. The Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee (“SSC”) convened in mid-October and declared that Amendment 13C was based on the best scientific information available at that time. AR 3629. Days later, a draft EIS was released for a period of public comment that would run through December 5. AR 5358-59. The Council met again in December of 2005, just after the end of the public-comment period. AR 3726-4087. After reviewing the comments received from the public and from the Advisory Panel, the Council selected some “preferred alternatives” — i.e., options for ending overfishing — that diverged in key ways from the choices agreed to at the September meeting. The Council decided, among other things, to phase out overfishing of snowy grouper and black sea bass over three years (rather than immediately) in order to minimize the unavoidable adverse economic impact on fishermen and fishing communities. AR 5580. Pointing to uncertainty regarding the condition of vermilion snapper and to the predicted economic effects of a lower cap, the Council also voted to increase the selected quota for that species. AR 5592. With these changes, the Council voted 12-to-l to approve Amendment 13C and to send it to the Secretary for approval. AR 4077. The changes approved during the December 2005 meeting meant that Amendment 13C was materially different from the one that had been planned at the September Council meeting. In light of those changes, the Council requested that its staff work together with NMFS personnel on an interdisciplinary plan team (“IPT”) to finalize the updated amendment for Secretarial review. AR 32; AR 5614, 71 Fed. Reg. at 55,096. (A more detailed account of the IPT’s alterations is provided in Part III.B.2, infra.) The IPT also added text to comply with a regulatory requirement imposed by the Council for Environmental Quality (see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27) and to address the potential long-term benefits of the reconstituted amendment and the effects of continued overfishing' — something that had been requested during the Council’s September meeting. See AR 2577; AR 5614-15, 71 Fed.Reg. at 55,096-97. Thosfe edits were designed largely to reflect the changes adopted by the Council between its September and December meetings and to correct some conclusions that NMFS no longer believed to be supported by the analyses conducted. In February 2006, the Council submitted the revised Amendment 13C to the Secretary for review and approval. The amendment was also sent to NMFS’s Southeast Regional Science Center, which approved the revised product as based on the best scientific information available. AR 5472-74. Not everyone agreed with the Science Center’s conclusion. Preston Pate, head of the North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries, sent a letter to Dr. Crabtree in May 2006 voicing concern over changes in the tone and content of the analyses being submitted to the Secretary. AR 5496-97. The Council’s SSC, speaking through its chairman, likewise complained that the committee had not had an opportunity to review the revised social and economic analyses before their presentation to the Secretary. AR 7228-31. Hence, the SSC could aver that the amendment draft reviewed in October 2005 had been based on the best available science, but could neither confirm nor deny the same regarding the updated version. Id. at 7231. Despite these concerns, the Secretary pressed forward, publishing the proposed rule in the Federal Register on June 9, 2006. AR 5392. Notice of the final rule was then published on September 21, 2006. AR 5614-26. That notice included responses to 19 separate public comments, the first of which addressed the changes made by the IPT following the Council’s December 2005 meeting. AR 5614-15. The remaining comments reflected the Secretary’s difficult task of balancing conservation efforts against the needs of fishermen and fishing communities. Whereas some comments challenged the scientific basis for concluding that the four fish species were overfished and emphasized the negative socio-economic impacts that the amendment would have on recreational and commercial interests, other comments emphasized Amendment 13C’s failure to end overfishing of the four species immediately and highlighted the lack of a formal rebuilding plan. AR 5615-19. The final rule noted the availability of a final regulatory flexibility analysis (“FRFA”) and, borrowing from the FRFA, provided a comprehensive review of the measures implemented, the alternatives considered and rejected, and the projected consequences of Amendment 13C. What, then, did Amendment 13C do? For one thing, it imposed a “hard quota” on commercial fishing of the four species, meaning that once the quota is reached, the harvest and sale of the species is prohibited. In addition, Amendment 13C established strict trip limits for snowy grouper and golden tilefish, quotas that become increasingly strict over a three-year period for snowy grouper and black sea bass, lower recreational limits for all but vermilion snapper, and new gear requirements for the fishing of black sea bass. The specific nature of the measures, as well as their projected effects on the fisheries, are recounted in detail in the administrative record. See AR 5586-88 (snowy grouper); AR 5589-91 (golden tilefish); AR 5591-96 (vermilion snapper); AR 5596-5603 (black sea bass). C. Procedural History This suit challenging the validity of Amendment 13C was filed on October 20, 2006 by plaintiffs the North Carolina Fisheries Association, Inc. (“NCFA”), Jeff Oden, Joseph Andrew High, and Avon Seafood. NCFA is a non-profit organization formed in 1952 whose members rely on the Snapper-Grouper Fishery for their livelihoods and whose primary purpose is to advance the interests of its members before the Council and other regulatory bodies. Compl. ¶ 8. Jeff Oden is a commercial fisherman based in Hatteras, North Carolina; he obtains approximately 40 percent of his income from the Snapper-Grouper Fishery, and alleges that he will be particularly affected by the trip limits that Amendment 13C establishes for the harvest of snowy grouper. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff Joseph Andrew High is also a commercial fisherman. He is based in Wilmington, North Carolina, and earns most of his revenue from black sea bass. Id. ¶ 10. Avon Seafood is a fish-packing plant in a town of the same name that earns up to 20 percent of its annual revenue from the buying and selling of snapper and grouper species. Amendment 13C, plaintiffs claim, may well put Avon Seafood out of business. Id. ¶ 11. Along with Oden and High, Avon Seafood joined with other snapper-grouper fishermen to form a group, the South Atlantic Fisheries Association (“SAFSA”), in order to protect their interests. SAFSA opposed the implementation of interim measures via the regulatory action that became Amendment 13C and submitted extensive comment letters to that effect in advance of the Council’s June 2005 and December 2005 meetings. AR 2504-28; id. at 4101-4112 In their four-count complaint naming Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez as defendant, plaintiffs allege that Amendment 13C violates the MSA, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as incorporated by the MSA, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”). Plaintiffs’ claims mirror what agency officials have expressly articulated as the three most controversial aspects of Amendment 13C: (1) the scientific basis for the measures implemented; (2) the short-term economic impact on fishermen and fishing communities, particularly in North Carolina; and (3) the alterations made by the IPT after the Council approved a revised Amendment 13C in December 2005. See AR 5581. According to plaintiffs, these aspects of the amendment render it not just “controversial,” but legally infirm. The first two counts of the Complaint allege that the Secretary failed to comply with National Standards 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8, though plaintiffs have since abandoned their reliance on Standards 5 and 6. See Pis.’ Mem. at 42 n. 33. Count III asserts that Amendment 13C’s unitary focus on ending overfishing violated the requirement in the MSA that plan amendments be designed both “to end overfishing in the fishery and to rebuild affected stocks of fish.” 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(3) (emphasis added). Finally, Count IV alleges a violation of the RFA. Plaintiffs seek an order that, among other remedies, declares Amendment 13C and its accompanying regulations unlawful, enjoins the amendment’s enforcement, and awards plaintiffs their attorney fees and costs. See Compl., Prayer for Relief. The State of North Carolina has filed a friend-of-the-court brief supporting plaintiffs’ claims. In its amicus brief, the State makes essentially two points. The State first emphasizes what it describes as the devastating effect of Amendment 13C on its fishing communities, arguing that the amendment affects North Carolina fishermen far more than it does fishermen in the other states governed by the FMP. Amicus Br. at 4. Second, the State asserts that it has a continuing interest in the proper functioning of the regional council system. When that system breaks down, as North Carolina believes it did during the preparation of Amendment 13C, the member states allegedly lose their ability “to participate with confidence” in the Council and to work cooperatively with the Secretary and his designees. Id. at 5. The Secretary, as one would expect, frames the case quite differently. In his view, plaintiffs are rehashing in their lawsuit a series of “policy arguments” that were made and rejected at the administrative level. Def.’s Mem. at 25. And because first the Council and then the Secretary “carefully considered” those policy arguments in enacting Amendment 13C, defendant insists that the amendment is entitled to deference and must be sustained. Id. (quoting Nat'l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F.Supp. 210, 227 (D.D.C.1990)). The Secretary thus seeks summary judgment on the basis of the administrative record. At a hearing held on June 14, 2007, the Court heard argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Following the hearing, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing a question of statutory construction central to resolution of the challenge raised in Count III of the Complaint. Dkt. #30 (Order of June 14, 2007). These briefs having been received, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are now ripe for resolution. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In a case involving review of a final agency action under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, however, the standard set forth in Rule 56(c) does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record. See Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 89-90 (D.D.C. 2006). Under the APA, it is the role of the agency to resolve factual issues to arrive at a decision that is supported by the administrative record, whereas “the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” See Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir.1985); see also Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 18 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[Tjhis case involves review of a final agency determination under the [APA]; therefore, resolution of th[e] matter does not require fact finding on behalf of this court. Rather, the court’s review is limited to the administrative record.”). Summary judgment thus serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review. See Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n. 28 (D.C.Cir.1977), cited in Bloch v. Powell, 227 F.Supp.2d 25, 31 (D.D.C.2002), aff'd, 348 F.3d 1060 (D.C.Cir.2003). Plaintiffs challenge Amendment 13C under the APA as violating the requirements of the MSA and the RFA. Under the APA, the Court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). A reviewing court must be satisfied that the agency has “ ‘examine[d] the relevant data and artieulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2006). The agency’s decisions are entitled to a “presumption of regularity,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), and although “inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.” Id. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814. That inquiry is confined to the administrative record, subject to limited exceptions not applicable here. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”). Judicial review of agency action under the MSA is especially deferential. See, e.g., Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 345 (9th Cir.1996). When a party challenges a FMP, plan amendment, or regulation as inconsistent with one or more of the ten National Standards set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a), a court’s “task is not to review de novo whether the amendment complies with these standards but to determine whether the Secretary’s conclusion that the standards have been satisfied is rational and supported by the record.” C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1562 (D.C.Cir.1991). Fisheries regulation requires highly technical and scientific determinations that are within the agency’s expertise, but are beyond the ken of most judges. See The Ocean Conservancy v. Gutierrez, 394 F.Supp.2d 147, 157 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Courts defer to NMFS decisions that are supported in the record and reflect reasoned decision making, especially where, as here, the dispute involves technical legal issues that implicate substantial agency expertise.”), aff'd, 488 F.3d 1020 (D.C.Cir.2007). Accordingly, while judicial review is by no means a rubber stamp, see Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755 (D.C.Cir.2000), courts should generally “defer to the expertise and experience of those individuals and entities — the Secretary, the Councils, and their advisors — whom the [MSA] charges with making difficult policy judgments and choosing the appropriate conservation and management measures based on their evaluations of the relevant quantitative and qualitative factors.” Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F.Supp. 210, 223 (D.D.C.1990). This Court’s role, simply put, is not to “second guess an agency decision or question whether the decision made was the best one.” See C & W Fish Co., 931 F.2d at 1565. III. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs point to a number of alleged substantive and procedural infirmities in Amendment 13C. Their primary argument, advanced in Count III of the Complaint, is that the Secretary violated the MSA by approving a plan amendment that was designed exclusively to end overfishing and that did not also establish a mechanism for rebuilding the fish stocks. Plaintiffs further contend that Amendment 13C is inconsistent with National Standards 2, 4, and 8, and for many of the same reasons that it allegedly violates Standard 8, also violates the RFA. These latter challenges will be addressed first for ease of organization and because they apply to all of the affected fish stocks. But before reaching any of plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court must address a threshold issue raised by defendant — whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have standing to sue. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). A. Standing The Supreme Court’s modern framework for addressing standing is a familiar one. “A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations set forth in a complaint, but must instead submit cognizable evidence demonstrating that he has been harmed by the governmental action and that a favorable decision would likely redress that harm. See Lu-jan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Sierra Club v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C.Cir.2002). To demonstrate the requisite “personal injury,” or “injury in fact,” a plaintiff must show “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations and quotation marks omitted); Nat’l Family Planning and Reproductive Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 828-29 (D.C.Cir.2006). In making this determination, courts ask simply whether the plaintiff has “asserted a present or expected injury that is legally cognizable and non-negligible.” Huddy v. FCC, 236 F.3d 720, 722 (D.C.Cir.2001). The requirement that the injury be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct is one of causation. In other words, is the challenged action of the defendant what caused the injury alleged? See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 414 F.3d 76, 83 (D.C.Cir.2005). The third and final showing, that of redressability, requires a plaintiff to establish that a favorable decision on the merits of his claim will likely ameliorate the harm alleged. Id. While these two concepts often overlap to some degree, see Dynalantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 115 F.3d 1012, 1017 (D.C.Cir.1997) (observing that “redressability and traceability overlap as two sides of a causation coin”), “it is important to keep the inquiries separate [so that] the ‘redressability’ component [can]' focus on the requested relief.” Allen v.. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Like the injury requirement, these two elements of the standing inquiry “assure that proper parties have brought their dispute to the proper branch of the federal government.” Florida Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc). “Causation,” the D.C. Circuit has explained, “focusfes] on whether a particular party is appropriate; redressability, on whether the forum is.” Id. at 664. These established principles guide the Court’s analysis here. There is little doubt that plaintiffs have satisfied each of these requirements with respect to their claims in Counts I, II, and IV of the Complaint. Indeed, defendant offers no explanation as to how the claims in those counts differ from the ones advanced in the “many” cases in which a party’s “standing to seek review of administrative action is self-evident.” Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899-900. Amendment 13C regulates the primary conduct of commercial fishermen, a class that, as the administrative record establishes, includes plaintiffs. See, e.g., AR 2519-21 (SEDAR comment letter from plaintiff High); id. at 3737 (plaintiff Oden’s membership on Council Advisory Panel). There is thus no need for plaintiffs to “supplement the record ... to explain and substantiate [their] entitlement to judicial review.” Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900. But even assuming that information in the administrative record does not make their standing “self-evident,” plaintiffs have satisfied each of the three required elements. Plaintiffs allege, and bolster with an affidavit filed in response to defendant’s motion, that the restrictions imposed in Amendment 13C harm them economically by limiting the number of fish that they can catch and sell. Economic harm of this sort is a canonical example of injury in fact sufficient to establish standing. E.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (recognizing that injury to “traditional economic interests [] will support a claim of standing”). If there is such harm here, then it emanates from the measures enacted by the Secretary via Amendment 13C. Plaintiffs’ injury, in other words, is fairly — and indeed directly — traceable to defendant’s actions. See DaimlerChrysler, 126 S.Ct. at 1861. Finally, plaintiffs seek an order vacating Amendment 13C in whole or part, “with instructions to develop a lawful regulatory scheme.” Pis.’ Reply at 3^4. This request approximates the relief available under the MSA and RFA, which authorize not only a judicial declaration that Amendment 13C is unlawful, but also an order setting aside the amendment, or declining to enforce it against “small entities” like these plaintiffs. See 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f); 5 U.S.C. § 611(a)(4): To be sure, the conclusion that the amendment violates the MSA and/or RFA would not obligate the Court to enjoin its enforcement. But plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate with absolute certainty that the relief requested in their complaint will eliminate the harms they will allegedly suffer. They must instead show only “a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the[ir] claimed injury.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). Moreover, the law in this circuit is that courts “assume for the purposes of standing that [the plaintiff] will ultimately receive the relief sought.” Florida Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 665. Making that assumption, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that a decision in their favor would likely redress their claimed injury. Standing, however, is determined on a claim-by-claim basis, DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. at 1867; Allen, 468 U.S. at 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, and defendant’s argument is best read as challenging plaintiffs’ standing to bring Count III of their Complaint. Plaintiffs assert in Count III that Amendment 13C violates the MSA because it does not include measures designed both to end overfishing and to rebuild fish stocks. Compl. ¶ 93 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(3)). Defendant is willing to assume for the purposes of argument that plaintiffs can demonstrate economic injury, but contends that they cannot establish that such injury is “fairly traceable” to the lack of a rebuilding plan, as opposed to the restrictions imposed in order to end overfishing. Def.’s Reply at 3. Nor, defendant maintains, are any of the remedies requested by plaintiffs likely to redress their alleged injuries. This is because (1) an order invalidating Amendment 13C would perpetuate rather than end overfishing, further depleting fish stocks and undermining the purposes of the MSA; (2) an order requiring the Secretary to prepare the missing rebuilding plan would not eliminate the immediate economic impact of Amendment 13C’s quotas on fishermen and fishing communities; and (3) the “mediation” plaintiffs propose in their Reply is not a remedy available under the MSA. See id. at 3-4. Defendant portrays plaintiffs’ inability to establish causation and redressability as symptomatic of a “fundamental disconnect” between plaintiffs’ interests and the alleged statutory violation. In sum, while some party (for example, an environmental group) could surely challenge the absence of a rebuilding plan, it is less obvious that these particular plaintiffs are the appropriate party to do so. Although defendant’s argument has some appeal, the Court concludes that it ultimately demands too direct of a relationship between the alleged government misconduct and the proffered injury. The causation requirement, as the Supreme Court has most recently phrased it, examines whether the party’s injury is “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” See DaimlerChrysler, 126 S.Ct. at 1861 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Neither this phrasing nor the analogous terms “causal connection” and “causal relationship” suggests that the challenged action must be the “sole” or “proximate” cause of the harm suffered, or even that the action must constitute a “but-for cause” of the injury. Another court in this district has found to the contrary, relying on out-of-circuit authority. See Ward v. Caldera, 138 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2001) (“[O]ne need [not] show that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the alleged injury.”). At its core, the causation inquiry asks whether “the agency’s actions materially increase^] the probability of injury.” Hud-dy, 236 F.3d at 722. By reducing the amount of fish that plaintiffs could catch and sell, the agency action here — the preparation and promulgation of Amendment 13C — certainly “increase[d] the probability” that plaintiffs would earn less money and thus suffer economic harm. See id. Simply put, defendant’s argument to the contrary parses the agency action at issue too finely, and fails to recognize that a challenge based on the absence of a rebuilding plan, just like a challenge grounded in another statutory standard, still speaks to the overall validity of the plan amendment. It is agency action in the form of this amendment that allegedly caused the harm of which plaintiffs complain, The knottier question, and the one that most clearly captures the “fundamental disconnect” described by defendant, is whether a favorable decision is likely to redress plaintiffs’ injury. Resolution of that question turns largely on the nature of judicial inquiry at this stage of the litigation. As explained above, the D.C. Circuit has instructed courts to “assume for the purposes of standing that [a party] will ultimately receive the relief sought.” Florida Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 665. The broadest form of “relief sought” here is an order setting aside Amendment 13C as contrary to law. Defendant may be right that this Court, even if agreeing with plaintiffs on the merits of their claim, could ultimately decline to “set aside” the amendment and could instead order , the Secretary to enact a rebuilding plan while keeping Amendment 13C in place. Other courts have prescribed similar forms of relief when faced with a partially defective plan amendment. See, e.g., Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, Civ. A. No. 04-0811, 2005 WL 555416, at *43 n. 36, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3959, at *145 n. 36 (D.D.C. March 9, 2005); Southern Offshore Fishing Ass’n v. Daley, 995 F.Supp. 1411, 1437 (M.D.Fla. 1998). But this line of reasoning runs directly counter to the D.C. Circuit’s instruction that, in assessing standing, courts must assume that the plaintiff will in the end receive the relief requested. Florida Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 665. The MSA permits the broadest remedy that plaintiffs seek, see 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f), and such a remedy would provide redress by removing the source of the claimed injury. What relief (if any) plaintiffs deserve is a question that is bound up with the merits and that lies beyond the scope of the standing inquiry. Accordingly, even if the relief that plaintiffs ultimately obtain constitutes a “Pyrrhic” victory, Pis.’ Reply at 29, the Court could award them relief that would remove the source of their injury. Nothing more is required to satisfy the redressability prong. That leaves only the prudential-standing requirement that applies to challenges to agency action. Litigants have prudential standing to sue if they fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutes at issue, here the MSA, RFA, and APA. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). The zone-of-interests test is not, however, meant to be especially onerous. Rather, it “is intended to ‘exclude only those whose interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’ ” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 1272, 1287 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987)). Plaintiffs fall well within the zone of interests protected by the MSA and RFA. As small businessmen, a small business, and an organization that represents small-business interests, plaintiffs are precisely the type of entities Congress had in mind when it passed the RFA. See Pub.L. No. 96-354, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 164, 165 (Sept. 19, 1980) (“It is the purpose of this Act to establish as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.”). Likewise, the MSA, although directed first and foremost at conservation, includes among its stated goals creating sustainable fisheries for the benefit of fishermen and fishing communities. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(3). Plaintiffs’ interests are in no sense “so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes” of these statutes as to deny their right to sue. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 417 F.3d at 1287. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have prudential standing to bring their four claims. B. Count I (National Standard 2) In Count I, plaintiffs contend that Amendment 13C is inconsistent with National Standard 2, which requires that all FMPs and plan amendments “be based upon the best scientific information available.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2). An NMFS regulation clarifies that “[sjcientific information includes, but is not limited to, information of a biological, ecological, economic, or social nature.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b)(1). Although by no means pellucid, plaintiffs’ claim appears to have two components. First, plaintiffs directly challenge the soundness of the scientific information upon which Amendment 13C was based. Compl. ¶ 85. The second and more developed contention focuses on the changes made to Amendment 13C by the IPT between the Council’s December 2005 meeting and the submission of the amendment for Secretarial review. Id. ¶ 84. Ultimately, neither of these arguments holds water. 1. Quality of the information National Standard 2 “requires that rules issued by the NMFS be based on a thorough review of all the relevant information available at the time the decision was made, and insures that the NMFS does not ‘disregard superior data’ in reaching its conclusion.” The Ocean Conservancy v. Gutierrez, 394 F.Supp.2d 147, 157 (D.D.C.2005) (citations omitted), aff'd, 488 F.3d 1020 (D.C.Cir.2007). Far from being rigid, the standard is a “practical” one “requiring only that fishery regulations be diligently researched and based on sound science,” such that the NMFS is not obliged “to rely upon perfect or entirely consistent data.” Id. Legal challenges to the Secretary’s compliance with National Standard 2 are frequent and frequently unsuccessful. “Time and time again courts have upheld agency action based on the ‘best available’ science, recognizing that some degree of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in agency decisionmaking.” Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, 384 F.Supp.2d 203, 219 (D.D.C.2005). As the D.C. Circuit explained in interpreting statutory language analogous to that of National Standard 2, the agency “must utilize the ‘best scientific ... data available,’ not the best scientific data possible.” Building Industry Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C.Cir.2001). Absent some indication that superior or contrary data was available and that the agency ignored such information, a challenge to the agency’s collection of and reliance on scientific information will fail. See id. at 1246-47; accord Oregon Troilers Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 1104, 1120 (9th Cir.2006); The Ocean Conservancy, 394 F.Supp.2d at 157; Nat’l Coalition For Marine Conserv. v. Evans, 231 F.Supp.2d 119, 130 (D.D.C. 2002). Plaintiffs have not come close to clearing this high hurdle. They point, among other things, to (1) the acknowledgment by SEDAR officials that there were “substantial weaknesses in the data,” (2) Dr. Daniel’s criticism of certain assessments drawn from the data culled, and (3) methodological concerns about the accuracy of data collected from the recreational fishing sector. See Pis.’ Mem. at 23-25. But even assuming that the data was weak, that Dr. Daniel was correct in his criticism, and that the collection methodology was flawed, the Secretary’s decision to press forward with Amendment 13C was rational. It is well settled — and both applicable regulations and consistent case law confirm — that the Secretary can act when the available science is incomplete or imperfect, even where concerns have been raised about the accuracy of the methods or models employed. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b); Nat’l Coalition For Marine Conserv., 231 F.Supp.2d at 130 (collecting cases). Deference is due, as even one of the primary authorities cited by plaintiffs recognizes, because “[difficulties with the data and the nature of the scientific method are expected in managing a resource as elusive as a fishery.” Southern Offshore Fishing Ass’n, 995 F.Supp. at 1432; see also Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F.Supp. 210, 220 (D.D.C.1990) (“[The MSA] does not force the Secretary and the Councils to sit idly by ... simply because they are somewhat uncertain about the accuracy of the relevant information.”). As in those cases, the Secretary was not obliged to “sit idly by” when faced with overfishing and overfished stocks simply because the data available to him may have been less than perfect. Id. In sum, the Secretary’s decision to act on the basis of the existing information easily meets the standard of rationality required of him. 2. IPT’s alterations The main focus of plaintiffs’ frustration, already voiced during the comment process, is the alterations to Amendment 13C made between the December 2005 Council meeting and the submission of the document for Secretarial review. Plaintiffs present the IPT members who drafted the changes as driven by a nefarious motive, and villanize the NMFS representative on the Council, Dr. Roy Crabtree. In the story that plaintiffs tell, Dr. Crab-tree pushed the IPT to make the conclusions and supporting data in Amendment 13C conform to NMFS’s policy preferences, and then deliberately avoided showing the finished product to the only body that plaintiffs believe is capable of assessing the soundness of the data-the Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee (“SSC”). Rather than taking that extra step, plaintiffs say, the Secretary’s designees essentially placed the information into a “black box,” out of which emerged scientific conclusions that happened to fit the agency’s policy preferences. Preliminary Transcript of Motions Hearing (“Prelim. Tr.”) at 19. They thus analogize Amendment 13C’s genesis to the processes employed in cases where the agency “simply created a rule based on mere political compromise.” See Hadaja v. Evans, 263 F.Supp.2d 346, 353-54 (D.R.I.2003); see also Prelim. Tr. at 54. The administrative record, however, tells a less one-sided story. It reveals that, while the Secretary’s designees openly made substantive changes and chose to bypass the Council’s SSC in pushing the much-delayed project forward, they did so in part at the behest of the Council and for reasons that the Secretary has rationally explained in the Federal Register. Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary suffers from fatal factual and legal flaws. First the facts. Plaintiffs point to three alterations as demonstrating that the IPT made deliberate and “substantive” changes to the version of Amendment 13C approved by the SSC in October 2005. See Pis.’ Reply at 17-19. The principal subject of their ire is a revision made to Section 4.1.6.1 of the amendment. AR 2954-55, 5004-05. The version of that section in the October 2005 draft stated that if “Alternative 2” for regulating snowy grouper was chosen, “there would be a disproportionate effect on North Carolina unless perhaps the fishing year is changed,” and concluded, “[i]t is probable that ... commercial snapper grouper fishing will be severely diminished or even extinguished.” AR 2954-55. In contrast, the final version of the amendment stated that “Alternative 2 and the Council’s Preferred Alternative 3 would not have a disproportionately negative [e]ffect on fishermen from North Carolina and Florida.” AR 5004. Differing again slightly from the earlier version, the final amendment concludes that “[i]t is possible that ... commercial snapper grouper fishing could be severely diminished.” AR 5005. As the Secretary persuasively argues, plaintiffs have taken out of context, and have inflated the importance of, a few minor changes in a complex 650-page document. This issue was directly confronted in the Secretary’s very first response to public comments in the final rule. AR 5614-15. He explained there that all of the substantive changes had either been made pursuant to requests by the Council at its September or December meetings, or to comply with regulatory obligations. The post-December changes had to be made because the Council had chosen a different “preferred alternative” for regulating commercial fishing of snowy grouper. Id. at