Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION [01-8541: 1215]; ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE STREAMCAST’S MOTION FOR A STAY OF THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION’S ENFORCEMENT PENDING APPEAL [01-8541: 1259] STEPHEN V. WILSON, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On September 27, 2006, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the question of liability as against StreamCast Networks, Inc. (“StreamCast”). In that Order, the Court recounted this case’s procedural history, and engaged in a detailed analysis of the factual record pertaining to StreamCast’s inducement of copyright infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F.Supp.2d 966, 971, 975-92 (C.D.Cal.2006). StreamCast is the only defendant remaining in this case. As the parties are well aware, StreamCast operates and distributes the Morpheus System and Software. Presently before this Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction against StreamCast. StreamCast has vigorously opposed the imposition of a permanent injunction. StreamCast also asks for an evidentiary hearing, additional discovery, or at least a stay of the permanent injunction’s enforcement pending appeal. An initial hearing was held before this Court on February 12, 2007. During the hearing, the Court espoused its concern regarding the specificity and scope of Plaintiffs’ proposed permanent injunction. Subsequently, this Court issued an order requiring further briefing, in which it detailed specific questions for the parties to answer. [Docket No. 1284.] On the technology front, the parties were asked to expand on their discussion of filtering technology and StreamCast’s ability to coax end-users away from legacy (non-filtered) versions of Morpheus Software. On the legal front, the parties were ordered to analyze exhaustively the history of permanent injunctive relief in the context of patent inducement. This briefing has since been received, and the Court has evaluated the pertinent issues. The Court’s analysis and conclusions are specified as follows. II. BACKGROUND A. The Proposed Permanent Injunction Plaintiffs’ proposed permanent injunction is composed of several parts. Under § 1(a)(1) and § l(a)(ii), StreamCast would be enjoined from directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works in any manner, which also includes Stream-Cast’s “enabling, facilitating, permitting, assisting, soliciting, encouraging, authorizing, inducing, or knowingly materially contributing to” such infringement. Pursuant to § 1(b), StreamCast would be barred from operating the Morpheus System and Software, or any other similar peer-to-peer or file-trading system, until there is a “robust and secure means exhaustively to” stop infringement. According to § 1(c), StreamCast would be required to “use all technologically feasible means to prevent or inhibit” the infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights by end-users through any version of the Morpheus Software in existence. Until StreamCast is able to “exhaustively” stop all infringement, it would also be barred from displaying advertising on all Morpheus Software versions. Stream-Cast must give notice to all of Stream-Cast’s agents and employees, as well as to any entity interested in a transfer of StreamCast’s ownership interest in the Morpheus System and Software, and all successors or those acting in concert with them. Any successor in interest to any part of StreamCast’s business must also submit to this Court’s jurisdiction and venue, and agree to be bound by the injunction. StreamCast could be held in contempt for any violation of the permanent injunction. B. StreamCast’s Claimed Initial Filtering Efforts In the September 27, 2006 Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, this Court held that StreamCast distributed the Morpheus Software with the intent to induce copyright infringement. Grokster, 454 F.Supp.2d at 992 (“[N]o reasonable factfinder can conclude that StreamCast provided OpenNap services and distributed Morpheus without the intent to induce infringement.”). In support of this conclusion, the record revealed numerous undisputed facts: (1) StreamCast’s software was used overwhelmingly for infringing purposes; (2) StreamCast targeted a known community of infringers — former Napster users; (3) StreamCast provided technical assistance to aid users in their enjoyment of illegally downloaded content; (4) StreamCast thwarted enforcement efforts by copyright holders; (5) StreamCast’s business model depended on massive infringing use; and (6) StreamCast took no meaningful steps to prevent infringement. Id. at 985-92. The Court concluded that “evidence of StreamCast’s objective of promoting infringement is overwhelming.” Id. at 992. After receiving this Court’s Order, StreamCast claims that it decided “to the best of its abilities, it should develop and integrate a robust filtering mechanism ... so that copyrighted works that are not authorized by copyright holders for free downloading or distribution utilizing Morpheus would not be able to be downloaded by Morpheus users.” (Weiss Deck ¶ 4.) Yet, despite taking steps to implement a filter, “StreamCast ... maintains that any requirement to filter is improper and not required under the law. Accordingly, StreamCast reserves the right to cease distribution of a filtered version.” (StreamCast Supp. Opp. at 18 n. 2.) Plaintiffs have reportedly refused to turn over a list of artists that they wish to have filtered. (Weiss Decl. ¶ 6.) Thus, in order to meet its self-imposed deadline of implementing its filtering mechanism by November 17, 2006, StreamCast’s CEO (Weiss) instructed its Director of Technology (Kassis) to copy the names of all artists on the RIAA website. (Id.) Stream-Cast asserts that its homemade filter would be even more effective if it were given the “hash values” of files on Morpheus’ network that contain Plaintiffs’ copyrighted material. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Beginning on November 17 and 20, 2006, StreamCast began distributing its new filtering software to Morpheus users. (Id. ¶ 7.) On December 15, 2006, StreamCast started sending screenshots to users of “legacy versions” of the Morpheus software stating that it was “strongly recommended” that they click “ok” to accept a software upgrade — this upgrade allegedly contained a filter. (Kassis Decl. ¶ 7.) StreamCast asserts that 92.5% of copyrighted audio and video files were blocked by the filtering versions of the Morpheus Software as of January 14, 2007. (Id. ¶ 11.) However, the new filtering software has not replaced all “legacy versions.” In fact, StreamCast admits that only about one-third of the downloading sessions in December 2006 and January 2007 were from software that contained this new filter. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) In order to develop a list of hash values known to contain infringing content, StreamCast initially ran a “batch process” four times per day. (Id. ¶ 16.) These values are derived from the search results generated by end-users. (Id.) “Using each artist name as a search term keyword, the batch process scan the P2P networks accessed by Morpheus users and saves all audio and video file hash values obtained from the search results. The hash values are then stored on a hash database server that StreamCast created and maintains.” (Id. ¶ 19.) When an end-user attempts to download an audio or music video file containing a hash value found in StreamCast’s database, the download is “blocked.” (Id. ¶ 21.) This filtering mechanism is also performed during the uploading process for audio and music video files. (Id. ¶ 23.) For TV shows and motion pictures, StreamCast allows the download of any file with DRM protection. (Id. ¶ 26.) All other such files are blocked if they either exceed fifteen (15) minutes in running-time (if known) or the file exceeds 100 MB in size. (Id. ¶ 27.) All filtering versions of the Morpheus Software are capable of being automatically updated at the end of an individual user’s session. (Id. ¶ 31.) During this timeframe, StreamCast also contacted various companies regarding acoustical fingerprinting technology. SNOCAP informed StreamCast that it would be “difficult to determine” the total number of “artist-title pairs” in its collection. Audible Magic allegedly claimed that it could not identify the total number of artist-title pairs in its database. (Weiss Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Weiss believes that these two options would, regardless, be “cost-prohibitive.” (Id. ¶ 12.) StreamCast has also contacted other companies, such as allmusic.com, NARM, MUZE, and Gra-cenote. (Id. ¶ 13.) It is not clear from these contacts whether such companies would either be willing to license their information to StreamCast, or if it would be comprehensive enough to cover all copyrighted works owned by Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 14.) StreamCast also posts warnings on its websites and within the Morpheus System and Software that end-users should download the new filtering software; they are also warned about their potential legal liability for engaging in illegal file sharing. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.) “StreamCast urges users of non-filtering versions to upgrade to a filtering version each time a user uses a non-filtering version of Morpheus or Morpheus Ultra.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs submitted a declaration indicating that in December 2006, after the institution of StreamCast’s new filtering software, it was still possible to illegally download each of the Top 40 songs on the Billboard chart. (Zaman Deck ¶ 4.) After learning of Plaintiffs’ declaration, Stream-Cast claims to have researched the issue. It determined that the artists’ names from the RIAA website only included gold and platinum artists. (Weiss Deck ¶ 15.) “[I]t was possible that current Top 40 artists who did not reach gold and platinum standings would not be on the RIAA website.” (Id.) StreamCast has since taken steps to add all “Top 40” artist names to its filtering database. (Id. ¶ 16.) Additionally, “StreamCast stands ready to include in its filter any artist names, hash values, or file names that the Plaintiffs provide us. Any information provided to StreamCast by Plaintiffs increases the effectiveness of StreamCast’s filter.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Furthermore, StreamCast claims in its supplemental briefing that it has instituted various other improvements to its filter (e.g., eliminating “low host count files” from the Gnutella network, Morpheus’ “select all” downloading feature, and access to the “G2 Network”). (Kassis Supp. Deck ¶¶4-6.) StreamCast also started collecting information about the files passing through its filtering system, and is now running its batch process twelve (12) times per day as opposed to four (4). (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) StreamCast further asserts that it has added “popular song titles, movies [sic] titles and television titles” to its keyword filter, as well as common misspellings made known to the company. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 23.) Finally, StreamCast claims that it has disabled access to video files in excess of 10 minutes in length as of January 18, 2007. (M! 25.) C. The Purported Effectiveness of StreamCast’s Filter A great deal of effort has been expended by the parties in evaluating whether StreamCast’s homemade filter is effective, and whether it has been improved since this Court’s Order requiring further briefing. Plaintiffs have submitted several declarations in which it is claimed that Morpheus end-users were able to download numerous popular audio and/or video files during December 2006, January 2007, February 2007, March 2007, and April 2007-— all after StreamCast first instituted its filtering software. (See Zaman Deck; Za-man Reply Deck; Patel Deck; Boyle Deck; Patel Second Deck; Bennett Deck) Plaintiffs have also submitted the declaration of Ellis Horowitz, a computer science professor at the University of Southern California. (Horowitz Deck Ex. 1.) Although some of his criticisms regarding StreamCast’s filter may have since been partly remedied by StreamCast’s efforts, he asserts the following implementation flaws: (1) StreamCast filters only by artist, not by title name; (2) StreamCast does not filter common misspellings or variations; (3) StreamCast only collects hashes for its database four times a day; (4) the size filter of 100 MB does not capture 30-minute television shows, especially when StreamCast cannot identify a file’s “run-time”; (5) StreamCast does not filter all file types, including “rar” files that “can break up large files into numerous pieces, send them in pieces, and then reassemble them on the other end.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 32-41.) Horowitz further argues that StreamCast’s filter is technologically outdated, substantially because of its failure to incorporate “digital fingerprinting” technology such as acoustical fingerprinting. (Id. ¶¶42, 47.) In response, StreamCast claims to have conducted its own in-house testing of the Morpheus filter compared to those utilized by other peer-to-peer networks (in particular, I-Mesh and Kazaa). (Deutscher Deck; Frawley Deck; Thompson Deck) Stream-Cast has also submitted a statistical analysis of the results. (Mercurio Deck; Mer-curio Supp. Deck) D. Plaintiffs’ Proposals Regarding Filtering Technology and Legacy Software 1. Filtering Options Plaintiffs maintain that StreamCast’s “homemade filter” is hopelessly ineffective. They believe that StreamCast should be required to employ commercially available state-of-the-art filtering solutions to prevent infringement by end-users. Plaintiffs offer two related but distinct proposals for the filtering of: (1) audio/music video files, and (2) other video files. a. Audio/Music Video Files i File Hashes and Acoustical Fingerprinting First and foremost, Plaintiffs state that StreamCast should be required to incorporate both “acoustical fingerprint” and “file hash” technology into a filter. According to evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, other companies claim to have employed this filtering duo successfully. (See generally Sorenson Deck; Marco Deck) Acoustical fingerprinting is licensed by various companies, including Audible Magic. This technology analyzes the actual content of an audio file, as opposed to a written description of what is contained within it (e.g., “metadata”). (Ikezoye Deck ¶ 3 (“Audible Magic’s technology analyzes the shape of the spectrum represented by a digital audio file.”).) This means that the filtering tool “listens” to the sound recording, and creates a twenty-second “fingerprint” that can then be compared against any other file that an end-user is attempting to upload or download. (Id. ¶ 8.) If the suspected file has that precise sequence (or spectrum) of sounds, the uploading or downloading of the song will be blocked. According to Plaintiffs, Audible Magic has a database of approximately 6 million acoustical fingerprints of musical sound recordings. (Id. ¶ 11.) The second part of this filtering system is the “file hash.” This represents a different type of “fingerprint.” “A hash value is a unique multi-character number that is associated with a computer file. Some computer scientists compare a hash value to an electronic fingerprint in that each file has a unique hash value.” United States v. Cartier, 2007 WL 319648, at *1 (D.N.D. Jan.30, 2007). This fingerprint is not based on the actual sound/content of the recording, but constitutes a mixture of characters that allow the file to be easily identified, and remains the same for identical copies of that file (after they are uploaded or downloaded). The file hash is a fairly limited took In order to explain its usefulness, the Court constructs the following hypothetical: assume that there is a two minute sixteen second version of Louis Armstrong singing “What a Wonderful World” available for download through the Morpheus System and Software, which has a hash value of 123456789. If any other individual downloads this precise file, and makes no alterations to it, his/her downloaded copy will contain the same file hash: 123456789. Companies such as Audible Magic claim to have a database of file hashes that are known to contain copyrighted content. Therefore, if file hash 123456789 is already contained in an Audible Magic database, and StreamCast purchases the right to license this information, a Morpheus end-user should be prevented from downloading this precise copy of the song. However, an end-user with this two minute sixteen second copy of “What a Wonderful World” could decide to recopy the song such that it only lasts for two minutes fifteen seconds. This one second alteration would automatically cause the derivative file to be associated with a different file hash — for example, 012345678. If StreamCast relied entirely on file hash filtering, then the derivative version of “What a Wonderful World” with hash value 012345678 would evade the filtering gatekeeper mechanism. The file hash filter serves as a useful starting point according to Plaintiffs. It theoretically gives StreamCast the ability to start with a number of computer files that are known to contain infringing content. This is where the acoustical fingerprinting technology arrives at center stage. In following from the original hypothetical, the Court presumes that Audible Magic has created a twenty-second audio fingerprint of “What a Wonderful World,” which comes from the file containing hash value 123456789. Because this fingerprint is based on the spectrum of sounds contained in the sound recording, it can also be “matched up” with the file associated with hash value 012345678. Thus, the filtering tool would recognize all files, regardless of the hash value, that contain this “acoustical fingerprint” of What a Wonderful World. Audible Magic represents that its acoustical fingerprinting technology “would successfully block well over 99% of the files unauthorized for peer-to-peer distribution.” (Ikezoye Decl. ¶ 18.) ii. Keyword Filtering Keyword filtering is merely a supplement to the acoustical fingerprinting and hash value filtering tools, and would be ineffective by itself. Every file has “meta-data,” which contains certain information about itself (e.g., artist, song title, etc.). By having a filter that matches files against certain keywords of known artist/song titles found in the metadata, StreamCast would be better positioned to identify infringing content. (Marco Decl. ¶¶ 11-12; Sorenson Decl. ¶ 17.) This information can be easily altered. Unknown misspellings of artist names and song titles could escape the filter. But according to Plaintiffs, keyword filtering is sometimes the best method for locating illegally “leaked” pre-release copies of sound recordings that have yet to be added to the acoustical fingerprint database. in. “Quality Improvement Process” Plaintiffs argue that filtering technologies evolve rapidly, and are fine-tuned to incorporate state-of-the-art technology and to overcome the efforts of would-be in-fringers to defeat the filtering tools. Plaintiffs explain that StreamCast should be required to update the lists of blocked files on a routine basis. This information can be obtained from third-party sources such as Audible Magic. It can also result from an agreement with StreamCast that would allow the record companies to modify the block list, and require StreamCast to implement it immediately. This would help ensure that the list is not overinelu-sive or underinelusive. b. Video Files The motion picture Plaintiffs begin by noting that commercial vendors are rapidly developing filtering techniques for video downloads. Audible Magic uses the same kind of acoustical fingerprinting for such files. (Izekoye Decl. ¶ 24.) In a declaration, Audible Magic asserts that it has over 1000 acoustic fingerprints for motion pictures and television shows, and in the near future it will likely expand to a large number of Plaintiffs’ “most popular” titles. (Id. ¶ 26.) Additionally, it appears that technology is developing that may allow for “video fingerprinting.” This presumably means that the filter would have in its database a visual “snapshot” of the film, which could then be compared against other files end-users are attempting to upload and download. (See Winter Decl. ¶ 7.) Companies such as Philips, Vobile, and Gracenote are in the process of trying to use acoustical fingerprinting, video fingerprinting, or both in order to make filtering more successful. (Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief at 10.) The motion picture Plaintiffs suggest an injunction in two parts, which would be subject to reexamination after 180 days. First, StreamCast should be ordered to utilize commercially available acoustical fingerprinting technology for those video titles currently protected. To protect works not currently fingerprinted in this manner, Plaintiffs ask that StreamCast perform the following: (1) use commercially available solutions for creating and supplementing a database of hashes that have been verified as infringing or likely to contain infringing content, (2) block files that are longer than 10 minutes in length or larger than 40 megabytes in size, and (3) use a supplemental keyword search based on terms submitted by the Plaintiffs. Second, Plaintiffs ask that this Court order the parties to submit briefing in 180 days after the injunction is entered in order to determine whether a status conference is necessary in light of technological advances. c. What Happens if the Filter Fails? Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction previously required StreamCast to “exhaustively” stop all infringement. However, this Court questioned whether such language would leave StreamCast liable for infringement even if it accepts a third-party filtering system approved by Plaintiffs, but is not itself “perfect.” Plaintiffs assert that they would not hold StreamCast hable in such circumstances, but only if Stream-Cast: (1) properly installs, implements, and maintains the third-party filter and available updates/upgrades, (2) takes into account reasonably foreseeable deficiencies with a filtering solution, and (3) implements technological improvements as they become available. If Plaintiffs believe that StreamCast has not acted in good faith, then Plaintiffs vaguely suggest that the Court’s injunction include a “mandated notice-and-eure procedure pursuant to which Plaintiffs would give StreamCast written notice of such problems and StreamCast would have a certain amount of time to cure the problems or otherwise respond.” (Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief at 15.) It is not clear to the Court how exactly this procedure would work. Lastly, Plaintiffs do not believe that they should bear the burden of providing artist-title pairs or hash values to StreamCast for a “homemade filter.” 2. Legacy Software a. Encouraging Morpheus Users to Upgrade StreamCast states that it cannot require users to upgrade their software to versions containing a filter. Similarly, declarations submitted by Plaintiffs reveal that some of StreamCast’s apparent competitors, I-Mesh and Kazaa, are unable to do so as well. (Sorenson Deck ¶ 20 (“Sharman did not have a technical means to force users to upgrade.”).; Marco Deck 119 (“As a result of these efforts, our sense is that there are at most hundreds or thousands of customers still using the legacy software and that small number becomes smaller still over time.”).). Plaintiffs do not currently seek such relief. (See Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief at 17 n. 7.) Instead, Plaintiffs ask this Court to include three conditions in its forthcoming injunction Order. First, StreamCast should insert aggressive “pop-ups” that would make it difficult (or at least very annoying) for users to continue with the unfiltered versions of the Morpheus software. Second, Plaintiffs ask that StreamCast copiously remove all postings in the “Morpheus Forum” that help users to download non-filtering versions of Morpheus. Third, StreamCast should be forced to distribute do-not-infringe messages as search results, so that users who continue to search for copyrighted material are given a warning not to infringe. b. Advertising Plaintiffs ask that StreamCast be denied the right to sell advertising on the legacy versions of the Morpheus software. III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard Under 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), this Court is empowered to grant a permanent injunction “as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” “It goes without saying that an injunction is an equitable remedy.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). “An injunction should issue only where the intervention of a court of equity ‘is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.’ ” Id. at 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456, 39 S.Ct. 142, 63 L.Ed. 354 (1919)). As recently confirmed by the Supreme Court, Plaintiffs must meet their burden with respect to the traditional four-part test. Plaintiffs “must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839,164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). “[T]he decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts.” Id. at 1841. Further, the Supreme Court “has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.” Id. at 1840. B. Application of the Four-Part Test Before applying eBay, it must be noted that Plaintiffs also ask this Court first to apply an arguably different (and perhaps more permissive) permanent injunction test. Prior to eBay, in MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]s a general rule, a permanent injunction will be granted when liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing violations.” Consistent with the Ninth Circuit, Nimmer writes, “[i]t is uncontroversial that a 'showing of past infringement and a substantial likelihood of future infringement’ justifies issuance of a permanent injunction.” 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 14.06[B] & n. 76.1 (quoting Superhype Pub., Inc. v. Vasiliou, 838 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (S.D.Ohio 1993)); see also id. § 14.06[B] (“Because a permanent injunction is issued only after liability is established, its issuance probably does not require a showing of irreparable injury.”). In light of this two-part rule (past infringement + likelihood of future infringements), Plaintiffs have asked for a permanent injunction. However, this Court has doubts that MAPs “general rule” regarding permanent injunctions survives eBay. In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” in patent cases that “courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.” 126 S.Ct. at 1839-40 (citation omitted). As stated in Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence, the “historical practice” of granting permanent injunctive relief in most instances after the establishment of infringement “does not entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should issue.” Id. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Supreme Court also stated that permanent injunctions issued under the Patent Act should be treated as they are under the Copyright Act, and that the traditional four-part test must be applied. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has applied eBay to the Lanham Act. See Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137-38 (9th Cir.2006). By implication, the four eBay factors are the only relevant considerations for purposes of Plaintiffs’ instant motion under the Copyright Act. This Court can identify no place for a separate and distinct two-part MAI test or “general rule” that could circumvent eBay. See Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir.2007) (applying eBay and rejecting plaintiffs assertion that “when copyright infringement has been proved and there is a threat of continuing infringement, the copyright holder is ‘entitled to an injunction’ ”) (citations omitted). See also Nat’l League of Junior Cotillions, Inc. v. Porter, 2007 WL 2316823, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug.9, 2007) (“The Fourth Circuit more recently reaffirmed [in Phelps] the traditional showing that a plaintiff must make to obtain a permanent injunction in copyright cases.”). MAI should only be relevant to the extent it informs the eBay analysis. 1. Irreparable Harm, The first question to address is whether Plaintiffs “ha[ve] suffered an irreparable injury.” eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839. “The concept of irreparable harm, unfortunately, ‘does not readily lend itself to definition.’ ” Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250 (10th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). According to the Fifth Circuit, “[b]y definition, ‘irreparable injury’ is that for which compensatory damages are unsuitable.” Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir.1992). Or, as alternatively stated by the Seventh Circuit, “[ojnly harm that the district court cannot remedy following a final determination on the merits may constitute irreparable harm.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1331 (7th Cir.1980). In perhaps combining these two statements, the Tenth Circuit has observed that “irreparable harm is often suffered when the injury canfnot] be adequately atoned for in money, or when the district court cannot remedy [the injury] following a final determination on the merits.” Prairie Band, 253 F.3d at 1250 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). One district court has also recently stated that “the irreparable harm requirement contemplates the inadequacy of alternate remedies available to the plaintiff.” Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F.Supp.2d 978, 982-83 (W.D.Tenn.2006), thereby linking the first eBay factor with the second. Based on these varying definitions, the Court now proceeds to its irreparable harm analysis. a. There is no Presumption of Irreparable Harm The parties dispute whether, in light of eBay, irreparable harm can be presumed. Pre-eBay and Post-eBay Permanent Injunction cases: Other courts have in the past presumed the existence of irreparable injury upon the establishment of liability in copyright cases. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1072 (D.Ariz.2006) (“Accordingly, when seeking a permanent injunction in copyright cases, irreparable harm is presumed on a showing of success on the merits.”); Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Bryant, 2004 WL 783123, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Feb.13, 2004) (“Copyright infringement is presumed to give rise to irreparable injury. Accordingly, when seeking a permanent injunction in copyright cases, irreparable harm is presumed on a showing of success on the merits.”) (internal citation omitted). As pointed out by Plaintiffs, this Court once essentially agreed with this analysis. See Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Caridi, 346 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1073 (C.D.Cal.2004) (Wilson, J.) (entering a permanent injunction after a default judgment in a copyright action). Yet, these cases were all decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay. The eBay Court held that it is Plaintiffs who “must demonstrate” (meaning, have the burden of proof) that the traditional factors favor a permanent injunction. 126 S.Ct. at 1839 The Supreme Court also highlighted that it has “consistently rejected” the rule that “an injunction automatically follows” an infringement holding. Id. at 1840. Given Plaintiffs’ burden of proof and the inability of a district court to “automatically” issue injunctions, it is perhaps unclear in eBay’s wake whether a permanent injunction can be granted based on a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. On remand from the Supreme Court, the eBay district court highlighted this uncertainty by initially expressing the following concerns: [T]he legal standard for issuing an injunction was in flux throughout the appeal of this matter and appears to remain uncertain today in that the Supreme Court did not expressly address whether the presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of validity and infringement survives the Supreme Court’s decision. Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 467 F.Supp.2d 608, 615 n. 7 (E.D.Va.2006). However, the eBay district court has subsequently decided that there can be no presumption of irreparable harm in the permanent injunction context. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F.Supp.2d 556, 568 (E.D.Va.2007) (“[A] review of relevant caselaw, as well as the language of the Supreme Court’s decision, supports defendants’ position that such presumption no longer exists.”). This view appears to have been followed by perhaps every court expressly considering eBay. See IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 469 F.Supp.2d 203, 224 (D.Del.2007) (describing the “now-overturned presumption that a patent holder is irreparably harmed upon a finding of infringement”); Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D.Tex. Aug.16, 2006) (“The eBay decision demonstrates that no presumption of irreparable harm should automatically follow from a finding of infringement.”); z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F.Supp.2d 437, 440 (E.D.Tex.2006) (“This language does not imply a presumption, but places the burden of proving irreparable injury on the plaintiff.”). This Court agrees with StreamCast, and these district courts, that the presumption of irreparable harm no longer inures to the benefit of Plaintiffs. The eBay Court plainly stated that Plaintiffs “must demonstrate” the presence of the traditional factors, and therefore have the burden of proof with regard to irreparable harm. If this Court adopted a presumption of irreparable harm in favor of Plaintiffs, then StreamCast would effectively have the burden of proving the contrary. Such a rule would contravene the Supreme Court’s intent that Plaintiffs establish not merely that infringement causes “harm,” but how it amounts to irreparable harm. Analogy to Preliminary Injunction Cases: In arguing for a presumption, Plaintiffs also cite to various preliminary injunction cases within the Ninth Circuit that predate eBay. In these cases, the Ninth Circuit held that “a showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm.” Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir.1989); see also LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir.2006) (same); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir.1998) (same). Plaintiffs’ citations are unpersuasive. First, prior preliminary injunction cases issued by the Ninth Circuit are of no moment when this Court is faced with a more recent Supreme Court decision that is directly on point, and which requires a different holding. Second, one might reasonably argue that there is a sensible policy rationale for permitting a presumption of irreparable harm in preliminary injunction, but not permanent injunction, motions. As stated by the Fourth Circuit: Unlike a permanent injunction, which resolves the merits of a claim and imposes an equitable remedy because a legal one is inadequate, a preliminary injunction maintains a particular relationship between the parties in anticipation of a decision on the merits, pending completion of the litigation. United States Dep’t of Labor v. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). Preliminary injunctions are typically requested when a lawsuit’s factual development is limited and are designed to preserve the status quo pending trial. Relatedly, preliminary injunctions are also temporary in the sense that they will expire once the case’s merits are decided. Given these considerations, one could legitimately conclude that a plaintiff should be absolved of proving irreparable harm at such an early stage. Third, the longstanding rule that irreparable harm can be presumed after a showing of likelihood of success for purposes of a copyright preliminary injunction motion may itself have to be reevaluated in light of eBay. It is true that post-eBay, the Federal Circuit assumed the continued existence of a presumption of irreparable harm for preliminary injunctions. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2006) (“First, as noted above, we conclude that Abbott has not established a likelihood of success on the merits. As a result, Abbott is no longer entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm.”); see also Docusign, Inc. v. Sertifi, Inc., 468 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1309 n. 6 (W.D.Wash.2006) (“Abbott, which came after eBay, assumed (without deciding) that such a presumption was still appropriate in the preliminary injunction context, where a strong showing of likely infringement was made.”). And some district courts have also rejected eBay’s application to preliminary injunctions. E.g., Christiana Industries v. Empire Electronics, Inc., 443 F.Supp.2d 870, 884 (E.D.Mich.2006) (“Defendant asserts that in [eBay], the Supreme Court eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm for preliminary injunctions upon a showing of validity and infringement. Plaintiff argues, and this Court agrees, that eBay did not invalidate the presumption.”). However, a significant number of lower court cases are reaching precisely the contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Sun Optics, Inc. v. FGX Int’l, Inc., 2007 WL 2228569, at *1 (D.Del. Aug.2, 2007) (“Even if the moving party succeeds in demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, the notion that there follows a presumption of irreparable harm seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in [eBay ].”); Torspo Hockey Int’l, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F.Supp.2d 871, 881 (D.Minn. 2007) (“[T]he Court finds that it may not presume that a patentee who is likely to succeed on the merits at trial will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.”); Allora, LLC v. Brownstone, Inc., 2007 WL 1246448, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Apr.27, 2007) (“Until this issue is clarified by the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court, this Court will not presume irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits following a prima facie showing of copyright infringement, but will instead treat copyright cases in the same manner as any other civil action requesting a preliminary injunction.”); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., 2007 WL 1017751, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Mar.30, 2007) (“While eBay has yet to be completely fleshed out in the lower courts, it has been applied to preliminary, as well as permanent, injunctions, and has been read to limit the presumption of irreparable harm solely upon the finding of infringement.”) (internal citation omitted). The law is muddled, and the Court is not aware of a post-eBay Ninth Circuit ruling on this point. Certainly, the post-eBay legal landscape has created some question as to the viability of these Ninth Circuit preliminary injunction decisions. Amoco and eBay: The argument that eBay bars a presumption of irreparable harm with regard to permanent or preliminary injunction motions is strengthened when considered in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s prior opinion in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987). In Amoco, the Ninth Circuit entered a preliminary injunction after determining that the Secretary of the Interior likely violated Section 810 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”). Id. at 534, 107 S.Ct. 1396. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit applied a presumption of irreparable harm. The Supreme Court reversed and held that “[t]his presumption is contrary to traditional equitable principles and has no basis in ANILCA.” Id. at 545, 107 S.Ct. 1396. Prior to eBay, Amoco appears to have had little impact. In Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.1988), the Ninth Circuit signaled that Amoco might be limited to ANILCA and should not be extended even to National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) cases. Id. at 1195; see also Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Andrus, 825 F.Supp. 1483, 1505 (D.Idaho 1993) (“The Ninth Circuit has questioned the applicability of the Amoco decision in NEPA cases.”). There was perhaps little reason to think that Amoco would be relevant to intellectual property cases. But in eBay, the Supreme Court cited to Amoco twice. Amoco was cited first, as support for the four factors that a plaintiff must demonstrate before district courts can grant a permanent injunction, and second, to help justify the proposition that a departure from traditional equity practice should not be “lightly implied.” eBay. 126 S.Ct. at 1839 (citing Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396). The eBay Court relied on Amoco in this manner even though it was a preliminary injunction case. eBay’s invocation of Amoco suggests that permanent and preliminary injunctions should generally be treated alike. eBay and Amoco also have important parallels. Amoco held that a presumption of irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction is “contrary to traditional equitable principles.” 480 U.S. at 545, 107 S.Ct. 1396. eBay does not speak in the language of presumptions and only expressly states that “traditional equitable considerations” militate against the “automatic” issuance of permanent injunctions. 126 S.Ct. at 1840. But as already discussed, eBay is in implicit agreement with Amoco on the presumption question (in the permanent injunction context) because it clearly places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Id. at 1839. Furthermore, these cases stand together for the principle that a district court should not depart from a traditional analysis of the relevant equitable factors, whether for a preliminary or a permanent injunction, unless directed to do so by statute. See eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839 (“[A] major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied”) (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 320, 102 S.Ct. 1798); Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396 (“[W]e do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles.”) (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313, 102 S.Ct. 1798). Policy considerations aside, there is nothing in the text of Section 502 evidencing a departure from traditional equitable practices for either a preliminary or a permanent injunction. Section 502(a) merely states that a district court “may ... grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). Based on eBay and Amoco, there is no language in the text of the Copyright Act that would permit a departure from traditional equitable principles such that a presumption of irreparable harm would be allowed in any injunctive context. Thus, Amoco provides additional doctrinal support for rejecting a presumption of irreparable harm in permanent injunction cases, and further reduces the import of Plaintiffs’ pre-eBay preliminary injunction citations. b. Irreparable Harm has been Established Irreparable harm cannot be established solely on the fact of past infringement. Additionally, it must also be true that the mere likelihood of future infringement by a defendant does not by itself allow for an inference of irreparable harm. As to the latter, future copyright infringement can always be redressed via damages, whether actual or statutory. See 17 U.S.C. § 504. To the extent that future infringement is relevant to the analysis, the onus is on Plaintiffs to explain why future infringements resulting from StreamCast’s inducement would cause irreparable harm. It cannot be presumed. For example, in a recent patent infringement case in the Eastern District of Texas, the district court held that the defendant’s continued infringement of plaintiffs patent would cause irreparable harm due to the “[l]oss of market share in this nascent market” for digital video recorders. TiVo Inc., 446 F.Supp.2d at 669. Importantly, the TiVo Court did not make a finding of irreparable harm based on the simple fact of continued infringement, which could be compensated for with an award of damages. “[IJrreparable harm may not be pre-sumedly but] [i]n run-of-the-mill copyright litigation, such proof should not be difficult to establish.... ” 6 Patry, supra, § 22:74. Thus, Plaintiffs may establish an irreparable harm stemming from the infringement (e.g., loss of market share, rep-utational harm). It is also possible that some qualitative feature about the infringement itself, such as its peculiar nature, could elevate its status into the realm of “irreparable harm.” StreamCast accepts that certain harms caused by infringement, such as loss of brand recognition and market share, can amount to irreparable harm. (StreamCast Opp. at 10.) However, StreamCast rejects the argument that copyright infringement can itself ever represent irreparable harm. StreamCast asserts that “[i]f damages can be calculated, the injury is not irreparable ... — the Copyright Act specifically provides for statutory damages, which are calculable assuming Plaintiffs can prove direct infringement of their works, and a basis for the range requested.” (Id.) This Court has doubts regarding StreamCast’s position. In eBay, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that irreparable harm can result from the infringement itself, depending upon the circumstances of the case: From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases. This “long tradition of equity practice” is not surprising, given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s wishes-a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of the traditional four-factor test. 126 S.Ct. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also MercExchange, 500 F.Supp.2d at 568 (“[T]he court is not blind to the reality that the nature of the right protected by a patent, the right to exclude, will frequently result in a plaintiff successfully establishing irreparable harm in the wake of establishing validity and infringement.”); cf. Muniauction, Inc., 2007 WL 2225847, at *2 (“Even though we may not categorically enter an injunction solely because plaintiffs patent has been infringed, we may still consider this to be a relevant factor in our analysis under the four-factor test.”). And “[l]ike a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses ‘the right to exclude others from using his property.’ ” eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840 (citation omitted); see also Grokster, 454 F.Supp.2d at 997 (“The right to exclude is inherent in the grant of a copyright.”). This Court also recognizes that a competing eBay concurrence took issue with Chief Justice Roberts’s “right to exclude” language. Justice Kennedy explained his view that “the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a violation of that right.” eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This Court agrees, since a contrary conclusion would come close to permitting a presumption of irreparable harm. This Court also observes that Justice Kennedy’s statement was made primarily in the context of certain recent developments in the patent field that are wholly inapplicable to this lawsuit. For example, this is simply not a case in which the copyright infringement represents “but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce,” such that “legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement.” Id. As this Court previously held, StreamCast’s entire business was built around the fundamental premise that Morpheus would be utilized to infringe copyrights, including those owned by Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[t]he equitable discretion over injunctions ... is well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments.... ” Id. Given the technological aspects of the infringement induced by StreamCast, and the flexibility conferred by the Copyright Act, this Court is persuaded that its bases for finding irreparable harm, infra, are supported by both Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kennedy’s concurrences. In light of this authority, the Court concludes that certain qualities pertaining to the nature of StreamCast’s inducement of infringement are relevant to a finding of irreparable harm. As stated before, the Court disagrees with the Eighth Circuit’s categorical pronouncement in Taylor that “irreparable harm inescapably flows from the denial” of “the right to control the use of its copyrighted materials.” See supra note 13 (quoting Taylor, 403 F.3d at 968). After eBay, the word “inescapably” simply goes too far. However, infringement may still occur in such a manner that it has the actual effect of irreparably harming a plaintiffs right to control the use of his/her copyrighted material. The irreparable harm analysis centers on two basic themes: (1) StreamCast has and will continue to induce far more infringement than it could ever possibly redress with damages; and (2) Plaintiffs’ copyrights (especially those of popular works) have and will be rendered particularly vulnerable to continuing infringement on an enormous scale due to StreamCast’s inducement. The Court agrees with both arguments, and each is independently sufficient to support of finding of irreparable harm in this ease. First, the Court must ask whether a particular defendant’s probable inability to pay damage constitutes irreparable harm. In the ordinary case, “merely alleging an opponent’s inability to pay damages does not constitute irreparable harm.” Rosewood Apartments Corp. v. Perpignano, 200 F.Supp.2d 269, 278 (S.D.N.Y.2002). But “[i]n some limited circumstances, parties have demonstrated such a strong likelihood that their opponent will be unable to pay that courts have awarded them equitable relief.” Id. For example, in another copyright infringement case, the district court found that the harm from infringement “will not be remedied by a damage award that may or may not be collectible.” See Lava Records LLC v. Ates, 2006 WL 1914166, at *3 (WJD.La. July 11, 2006). The rationale in such cases must be that an award of monetary damages will be meaningless, and the plaintiff will have no substantive relief, where it will be impossible to collect an award for past and/or future infringements perpetrated by a defendant. Plaintiffs have not yet sought an award of statutory damages. Additionally, Plaintiffs have not provided this Court with specific evidence as part of this motion demonstrating that StreamCast would be unable to pay damages for the infringements it has induced in the past, and could continue to induce in the future. But such evidence is not necessary here. Based on the undisputed evidence at summary judgment of massive end-user infringement, it is highly likely that the award of statutory damages that ultimately befalls Stream-Cast in this case will be enormous (especially considering the potential relationship between inducement and a finding of willfulness), and would far outstrip the amount of revenue the company has garnered in recent years. See Grokster, 454 F.Supp.2d at 982-83. This Court’s conclusion would also be the same even if Plaintiffs chose to forgo a damages award as part of this lawsuit. This is because the amount of infringement that StreamCast could induce in the future is so staggering that the recoverable statutory damages would very probably be well beyond StreamCast’s anticipated resources. Because it is extremely unlikely that StreamCast will be able to compensate Plaintiffs monetarily for the infringements it has induced in the past, or the infringements it could induce in the future through Morpheus, Plaintiffs have and will continue to suffer irreparable harm. Second, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ claim that a substantial number of their copyrighted works have and would continue to become irreparably exposed to infringement on a tremendous scale due to StreamCast’s inducement. This inducement greatly erodes Plaintiffs’ ability to enforce their exclusive rights. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir.2001) (rejecting Napster’s request for compulsory royalties as opposed to injunctive relief because “Plaintiffs would lose the power to control their intellectual property”). It also promises no realistic mechanism through which statutory damages can be collected for all of the inevitable subsequent infringements occurring outside of the Morpheus System and Software. In our constitutional system, Congress has been empowered “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Pursuant to this authority, the Copyright Act confers certain exclusive rights to Plaintiffs in their works, such as the rights of reproduction and distribution. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3). The exclusive right to engage in such actions also provides the copyright owner the concurrent power, through the legal system, to exclude others from engaging in such activities without authorization. See Taylor; 403 F.3d at 968 (copyright owner has right to “control the use of its copyrighted materials”). Importantly, the inducement of infringement via the internet and other digital pathways represents no ordinary infringement: When digital works are distributed via the internet, ... every downloader who receives one of the copyrighted works ... is in turn capable of also transmitting perfect copies of the works. Accordingly, the process is potentially exponential rather than linear, threatening virtually unstoppable infringement of the copyright. Elektra, 2004 WL 783123, at *7 n. 5 (internal citation omitted); see also Streeter, 438 F.Supp.2d at 1073 n. 2 (same). Stream-Cast’s inducement through the Morpheus Software has “left Plaintiffs’ sound recordings vulnerable to massive, repeated, near-instantaneous, and worldwide infringement.” Elektra, 2004 WL 783123, at *7; Streeter, 438 F.Supp.2d at 1073 (same); see also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 901-02 (N.D.Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that “the Napster service gives its users the unprecedented ability” to infringe). When StreamCast induces infringement, Morpheus end-users obtain “perfect copies” of Plaintiffs’ work that can be inexpensively reproduced and distributed ad nauseam. In fact, through StreamCast’s inducement, an entire universe of copyrighted content has been, and can continue to be, made available for unending infringement outside of the Morpheus System and Software. And given the volume of infringement caused by StreamCast’s inducement in this particular case, the assault on Plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights through further digital transfers by members of the public — Plaintiffs’ customer base — is difficult to overstate. Stream-Cast’s inducement has eviscerated Plaintiffs’ ability to protect and enforce their statutorily-created property rights. StreamCast has submitted to this Court an article in which it is claimed that internet file sharing has had a “statistically indistinguishable” effect on music sales. (Baker Decl. Ex. B at 68.) However, this argument misses the mark because it does not matter whether file sharing affects record company sales or not. It would also make no difference if StreamCast’s inducement was demonstrated to increase Plaintiffs’ sales. The Court is not concerned with whether end-users are now less likely, or more likely, to buy Plaintiffs’s music or movies as a result of their infringement. This is a policy rationale for a legislature to consider, if it should choose to do so. As copyright owners, Plaintiffs have the exclusive right to decide when and how their material should be reproduced and/or distributed, regardless of whether their decisions make good business sense. When StreamCast induces infringement, Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works can be unstoppably and near-instantaneously infringed throughout the computer-literate world with the files obtained by Morpheus endusers. Plaintiffs’ power to control their rights has been so compromised by the means through which StreamCast encouraged end-users to infringe (digital files plus the internet) that the inducement amounts to irreparable harm. This is especially true considering the amount of infringement that occurs on the Morpheus System and Software. Morpheus users have the continued ability to pillage a tremendous quantity of Plaintiffs’ intellectual property, and to spread this capacity elsewhere with additional file sharing. The Court is aware that Plaintiffs can seek an award of statutory damages from StreamCast for infringements occurring through the Morpheus System and Software (ignoring for now the likely reality regarding StreamCast’s ability to pay). However, Plaintiffs cannot recover damages from StreamCast for the inevitable derivative infringements that will occur outside of Morpheus, with copyrighted content originally acquired within it, as a consequence StreamCast’s inducement. Even numerous lawsuits against direct in-fringers will necessarily prove to be insufficient under these conditions. Cf. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-30, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (“When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct in-fringers .... ”). Indeed, the very need to file multiple lawsuits as a consequence of StreamCast’s inducement is itself supportive of an irreparable harm finding. In sum, Plaintiffs’ have offered two independently sufficient grounds for a finding of irreparable harm. Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm because of StreamCast’s likely inability to pay for the past and/or future infringements that it has induced. Additionally, StreamCast’s inducement has and will continue to irreparably harm Plaintiffs’ very ability to enforce its exclusive rights. Relatedly, Plaintiffs cannot possibly recover all damages for the infringements that will occur in the future outside of Morpheus, with files obtained within Morpheus, as a consequence of the inducement. 2. Adequate Remedy at Law The Court must now consider whether there is an adequate remedy at law for the harm that has or could be caused by StreamCast’s inducement. “[T]he requisite analysis for the second factor of the four-factor test inevitably overlaps with that of the first....” MercExchange, 500 F.Supp.2d at 582; see also 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd., 505 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1336-37 (M.D.Fla.2007) (quoting Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1124 (5th Cir.1976) (“ ‘[ojften times the concepts of ‘irreparable injury’ and ‘no adequate remedy at law’ are indistinguishable’ in the context of a permanent injunction.”)). As should be expected, this Court’s adequate remedy at law analysis parallels that performed for irreparable harm. First, as discussed above, there is a substantial possibility that StreamCast will be unable to pay a statutory damages award for the infringement it has induced (or will continue to induce). “Damages are no remedy at all if they c