Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge. Myra A. Hendricks was a Special Agent of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) until she left that job on August 6, 2004. She instituted this lawsuit in 2003 and has amended it thereafter, bringing forth allegations that she suffered discrimination, harassment, and a hostile work environment, that she was retaliated against, and that she was constructively discharged, due to her race, African American, and gender, female, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e el seq. Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paul-son, Jr., sued in his official capacity, denies all allegations. After full discovery, Treasury moved for summary judgment in its favor. The Court has reviewed the extensive record and briefs with great care and concludes that there are no genuine and material fact issues in dispute and that summary judgment should be entered in Treasury’s favor as a matter of law. I. BACKGROUND FACTS A. The Agency and Its Selection Policies Pursuant to the IRS Restructuring Act, in 1998 the Office of Investigations of IRS Internal Security became the Washington Office of Investigations under the new Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”). See Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. and Demand for Jury Trial [Dkt. #49] (“SAC”) ¶ 14. The name of the office changed two more times, eventually becoming the Special Inquiries and Inspection Division in 1999. Id. In 2002, the Special Inquiries and Inspection Division’s name changed to the Special Inquiries and Intelligence Division (“SIID”). Id. SIID is the elite investigative division within TIGTA. Id. ¶ 16. Its special agents handle sensitive investigations, including allegations of misconduct by IRS Chief Counsel employees, the IRS Commissioner’s Advisory Board, IRS Senior Executives, IRS GS-15 management officials, TIGTA Special Agents, and Internal Revenue Service Special Agents assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division. Id. ¶ 16. Special Agents in SIID conduct investigations, write reports of investigation, interview witnesses and complainants, work with the Office of the U.S. Attorney to prosecute subjects of investigations, and testify before grand juries. See id. ¶ 17. The TIGTA Operations Manual contains the agency’s policies, standards and procedures for Merit Staffing. See Chapter (600) 70.5 of the Operations Manual (“Operations Manual”) (Def.’s Ex. 21). When selecting candidates for promotion to vacant positions, the TIGTA must “formally evaluat[e] [all qualified/eligible candidates] against the knowledge, abilities, skills, and other characteristics (‘KSAs’) stated in the vacancy announcement ... determined to be important to the position being filled.” Id. at 531-32. To ensure the integrity and reliability of the candidate evaluation procedures, a merit staffing panel or ranking official will evaluate candidates against KSAs. Use of a panel or a ranking official is at the discretion of the selecting official. Panel members or ranking officials must be at least the grade level of the position to be filled. The panel members for all supervisory positions must be supervisors themselves. If a panel is used, it shall be generally composed of three members. Whenever possible, at least one (and preferably two or more) voting members will have a substantive/technical knowledge of the position to be filled ... The primary function of the panel/ranking official will be to rank all basically qualified candidates against established evaluation criteria. The outcome of this process is a determination of the best qualified candidates. Id. at 532. TIGTA policy indicates that “[t]he selecting official has the discretion to interview or not interview any noncompetitive applicant certified for selection.” Id. With respect to competitive applicants, TIGTA policy indicates that if one competitive applicant is interviewed, then all competitive applicants must be interviewed. Id. B. The Claims Ms. Hendricks is an African-American woman who was a GS-13 Special Agent in TIGTA until August 6, 2004. She began working for the IRS in 1984 as a GS-4 secretary in the Collection Division and worked her way up until she was promoted to the position of Special Investigator, GS-13, in 1997. SAC ¶¶ 1-2. Ms. Hendricks complains that she was passed over for promotion on four occasions, subjected to unwarranted discipline, denied career-enhancing “acting” assignments to fill in for absent superiors, subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment, and constructively discharged. 1. 2000 Application for GS-14 Criminal Investigator (TG2011) Ms. Hendricks applied for the position of GS-14 non-supervisory criminal investigator in March 2000, pursuant to Vacancy Announcement TG2011. SAC ¶ 39. Robert Johnson, a white male, was selected for the position. Id. Then-Assistant Special Agent in Charge (“ASAC”) Tim Camus served as the ranking official for TG2011. Deposition of Timothy Camus (“Camus Dep.”) at 68. He used four ranking criteria and gave points to each applicant on the Best Qualified List accordingly. Id. at 73-75. Robert Johnson (Caucasian male), Jean Keller (Caucasian female), and Michael Radetic (Caucasian male) all received a score of 10 on each of the four criteria. Ms. Hendricks received a rating of 7 for the first criterion, 10 for the second, 7 for the third, and 10 for the fourth. Mr. Camus states that he did not give Ms. Hendricks a higher score on the first criterion because her submission did not indicate that she had used confidential informants or confidential sources or that she had “generated proactive investigative accomplishments.” Camus Decl. 6/7/02 at 5. Mr. Camus states that he did not give Ms. Hendricks a higher score on the third criterion because her submission did not indicate “that she prepared reports concerning highly sensitive, complex, multi-agency-multi allegation investigations.” Id. As discussed below, Ms. Hendricks challenges these statements. Mr. Camus recommended that Mr. Johnson be promoted. Id. The selecting official, then-Speeial Agent in Charge (“SAC”) Brian Dwyer, selected Mr. Johnson for the position on March 23, 2000. Def.’s Facts ¶ 8. Ms. Hendricks asserts that she was more qualified for the job than Mr. Johnson. SAC ¶ 40. She also alleges that Mr. Johnson had a history of misconduct which compared badly to her unblemished record. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. In 1991, Mr. Johnson had engaged in a fistfight when he had been drinking while off duty. Although off duty, he was wearing his official firearm, which he lost in the melee. Deposition of Robert Johnson (“Johnson Dep.”) at 48-50; Pb’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 13. The firearm was returned to TIGTA by the Laurel, Maryland, police. Id. In addition, in 1995, Mr. Johnson was suspended for two days for using his government-owned vehicle (“GOV”) to, inter alia, transport two unauthorized passengers. Johnson Dep. at 55-59. Mr. Dwyer discussed Mr. Johnson’s disciplinary record with his supervisor prior to the selection and determined that it was “ ‘not a problem’ to bring Mr. Johnson into SIID because he had fulfilled his punishment.” Deposition of Bryan Dwyer (“Dwyer Dep.”) at 67; Pl.’s Opp. at 14. At least one other manager in SIID disagreed and thought that Mr. Johnson could never investigate other persons “ ‘based on his own integrity issues.’ ” Pl.’s Opp. at 14 (citing Deposition of ASAC Karen Parker-McGill (“Parker-McGill Dep.”) at 20). The Application Package for Mr. Johnson, Def.’s Mem., Ex. 6, shows that Mr. Johnson had worked as a criminal investigator for the IRS and TIGTA for fourteen years in the Baltimore Field Division. His experience included undercover operations, joint investigations with other federal law enforcement agencies, an internal investigation of a TIGTA Special Agent, an investigation into the kidnapping of an IRS criminal investigator, and international bivestigations. Id. at 5-7. He received performance awards in 1987, 1990, 1991, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, as well as various manager’s awards and special act awards. Id. at 7-8. In his most recent performance appraisal before his promotion, covering June 1, 1998 to May 31, 1999, Mr. Johnson received five out of five, the highest score possible, for the following job elements: Conducting Investigations, Preparation of Reports, Inventory Management, Interpersonal Skills, and Other Assignments and Duties. Id. at 9. He received a grade of four for Case Development. Id. According to his evaluation, Mr. Johnson’s written products were “meticulously prepared,” “clear, complete and concise,” “timely and with no need for correction,” “identified all aspects of the issues being presented,” “prepared in a manner that allows the reader to quickly and easily understand the entire scope of the investigation,” and had “few equals.” Id. at 13. The Application Package for Ms. Hendricks, Def.’s Mem., Ex. 7, shows that she became a criminal investigator in May 1992 and had eight years’ experience. From 1993 until 2000, Ms. Hendricks served as a Technical Service Officer and then a Regional Technical Service Officer (“RTSO”) in addition to her duties as a criminal investigator. Deposition of Myra Hendricks (“Hendricks Dep.”) 7/6/05 at 17-22. Ms. Hendricks’s application indicates that she received performance awards in 1992 and 1997. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 7 at 42. She received a manager’s award in 1994, an IRS Commissioner Protection Detail award in 1998, and a special act award in 1998. Id. In her performance appraisal covering the same time frame as Mr. Johnson’s, Ms. Hendricks received a rating of five out of five for the following job elements: Coordinate Technical Equipment and Operations Program, Interpersonal Relations, and Other Assignments and Duties. Id. at 32. She received a four for Conducting Investigations and Case Development. Id. She received a rating of three for Preparation of Reports and Inventory Management. Id. Her evaluation noted that she was assigned as the RTSO for the National Office. Id. at 35. She was “called upon to perform an unusual number of supplementary tasks” due to this assignment because of “ongoing changes in the organization.” Id. at 35. As such, she devoted the vast majority [of] her time to supporting National Office operations in the technical equipment area. Despite this extraordinary effort as the National Office RTSO, she had an inventory of criminal and administrative cases to manage. Incredibly, all of the above-cited tasks did not deter her from uncovering and developing possible investigations, and assisting other agents with their investigations. She was an invaluable resource for the office, providing both investigative and technical support for other investigators and managers. Id. Ms. Hendricks carried a smaller caseload of investigations than other agents and her reports were “not always submitted within the required time frames.” Id. at 40. 2. 2001 Application for GS-14 Criminal Investigator (TG2114) In October 2001, TIGTA posted Vacancy Announcement TG-2114, for a non-supervisory criminal investigator, GS-1811-14, in SIID. Ms. Hendricks submitted her application, but Steven Geary, a white male, was selected. SAC ¶ 27. Ms. Hendricks alleges that she was more qualified than Mr. Geary, id. ¶ 28, that Mr. Geary had been placed in an acting position earlier in the spring of 2001 to enhance his credentials, id. ¶ 29, and that Ms. Hendricks was not given the opportunity to participate in career-enhancing acting opportunities within SIID. Id. ¶ 30. On this occasion, a panel of three ASACs within SIID acted as the rating panel. Def.’s Facts ¶ 14. The panel included Jim Rice (Caucasian male), Tim Camus (Caucasian male), and Dedra Dray-ton (African-American female). Id. Using the same four criteria as on the selection for Vacancy Announcement TG2011, the panel members prepared worksheets for each application reviewed and scored each applicant accordingly. Def.’s Facts ¶ 16. Ms. Drayton gave Ms. Hendricks a rating of 7 for criterion one, 7 for criterion two, 10 for criterion three; and 7 for criterion four. Declaration of Dedra Drayton (“Drayton Deck”) ¶ 11; Def.’s Mem., Ex. 9. Ms. Drayton gave Mr. Geary a rating of 7 for criterion one, 7 for criterion two, 10 for criterion three, and 10 for criterion four. Drayton Deck ¶ 14; Def.’s Mem., Ex. 9. Mr. Rice gave Ms. Hendricks 7 for the first criterion, 10 for the second, 7 for the third, and 7 for the fourth. Def.’s Mem., Ex. 9. Mr. Camus gave her 7 for the first criterion, 7 for the second, 7 for the third, and 10 for the fourth. Id. Thus, Ms. Hendricks received a total score of 93. Id. Mr. Geary’s total score was 102. Id. The panel of Messrs. Rice and Camus and Ms. Drayton also interviewed each of the candidates on the Best Qualified list, including Ms. Hendricks. Drayton Decl. ¶ 16 Ms. Drayton developed a list of questions that was asked of each candidate. Def.’s Mem., Declaration of James Rice (“Rice Deck”) ¶ 4. Although her interview went well, Ms. Hendricks was not selected. Mr. Rice stated that he recommended Mr. Geary to Mr. Dwyer, the selecting official, because Mr. Geary demonstrated the skill to focus on the specific allegations [he was] to investigate, to address these issues, and to close investigations in a timely manner. [Mr.] Geary ... also demonstrated leadership characteristics by conducting [his] assignments with little or no supervision, conducting [his] investigation timely, and producing on each occasion quality reports of investigations. In contrast, [Ms. Hendricks] takes forever to close assignments and lacks the skill to take on more than one assignment at one time. Rice Deck ¶ 5. Ms. Drayton also concluded that Mr. Geary “had more relevant and more overall experience to do the job” because his application package and interview “demonstrated more of an ability to work complex investigations and the requisite leadership abilities through' interviews.” Drayton Deck ¶20. With Mr. Camus’s full agreement, the Interview Panel made a unanimous recommendation to Mr. Dwyer that Mr. Geary and Ms. Joanne Jensen were Best Qualified for the two vacancies. Id., ¶¶ 21-22. For the two open positions, Mr. Dwyer selected Ms. Jensen and Mr. Geary. Def.’s Mem., Declaration of Brian Dwyer (“Dwyer Deck”) ¶ 4. The application package for Mr. Geary showed that he had spent four years as a police officer with responsibilities for interviewing witnesses, completing incident reports, serving and executing search warrants, and testifying in court, before joining the IRS as a criminal investigator in 1989. Def.’s Mem., Ex. 12. He had conducted over 150 criminal and administrative investigations and served as a Technical Support Officer. Id. He had also been assigned to serve as Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge. Id. Mr. Geary submitted two performance appraisals, one covering October 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001, and one covering February 12, 2000 to October 31, 2000. Id. The latter of these appraisals showed that Mr. Geary had received a mid-year evaluation in February 2000 of “Pass” on TIGTA’s pass/fail appraisal system for special agents. Id. By year’s end, ie., October 31, 2000, he had raised his performance to a Pass Plus. Id. He maintained that level of performance throughout the next year. Id. Naturally, the work history submitted by Ms. Hendricks in connection with Vacancy Announcement TG2114 was substantially similar to that contained in her application for TG2011. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 13. Ms. Hendricks had received two additional awards in 2000 — a special act award and a manager’s award — which she included in this application. See id. She also addressed more recent investigations and submitted her most recent performance appraisal for the period of November 1, 2000 to October 31, 2001. This appraisal reflected ratings of “Pass” for her midyear and final appraisal on all elements. 3. 2002 Application for Criminal Investigatory Senior Special Agent (02-FESB-210) Ms. Hendricks applied for the position of GS-14 Senior Special Agent in SIID under vacancy announcement 02-FESB-210 in September 2002. SAC ¶ 23; Def.’s Mem., Ex. 14. Ron McKeever, a white male, was selected. Id. Tim Herlihy served as the subject matter expert and ranked the application packages. Deposition of Tim Herlihy (“Herlihy Dep.”) at 28-29. Based on Mr. Herlihy’s rankings, the Bureau of Public Debt, which was providing personnel services to TIGTA, prepared two Best Qualified lists, one for “Competitive Eligibles” and one for “Non-competitive Eligibles.” Def.’s Mem., Ex. 15. Ms. Hendricks was listed on the list of Competitive Eligibles along with Mr. McKeever. Id. All candidates who made either Best Qualified list were interviewed by a panel consisting of ASAC Drayton (African-American female), ASAC Tim Upham (Caucasian male) and Special Agent Dwaine Brinson (African-American male). Def.’s Facts ¶ 35. The interview was crucial to the interview panel’s recommendation. Mr. Brinson, a work friend of Ms. Hendricks, stated that “at the time of the interview, Ron McKeever answered the questions that I had very clearly, very concisely ... I don’t recall Myra Hendricks doing that ... She did not answer the questions as clearly as Ron McKeever had answered the questions.” Deposition of Dwaine Brinson (“Brinson Dep.”) at 34-35. Mr. Brinson favorably compared Mr. McKeever’s field experience — which he viewed as giving Mr. McKeever experience on multi-agency cases dealing with a wide spectrum of issues — to Ms. Hendricks’s experience in SIID, which he viewed as presenting a more narrow scope of cases. Brinson Dep. at 35-36. Mr. Brinson said the panel agreed that Mr. McKeever “was by far the best candidate.” Declaration of Dwaine Brinson (“Brinson Deck”) at 2. Ms. Drayton also concluded that Mr. McKeever had “worked more complex and/or more involved cases and was more qualified for the position than [Ms. Hendricks].” Dray-ton Deck ¶ 29. Mr. Upham states that all candidates were asked the same questions, and that he ranked Ms. Hendricks the lowest among them. Declaration of Timothy Upham (“Upham Deck”) ¶ 7. The panel unanimously decided to recommend Mr. McKeever for the position. Drayton Deck ¶ 29. They told Richard Sherwood, then Special Agent in Charge, that Mr. McKeever’s interview was “far and above all the other applicants.” Deposition of Richard Sherwood (“Sherwood Dep.”) at 60-61. The panel advised that Mr. McKeever provided “the most complete answers and that those answers reflected the broadest experience and growth potential of all candidates.” Declaration of Richard Sherwood (“Sherwood Decl.”) at 1. As SAC, Mr. Sherwood did not have the authority to make a GS-14 selection, which TIGTA policy required be made by an agency executive. Def.’s Facts ¶ 40. Based on the recommendation of the interview panel, Mr. Sherwood recommended that Steve Jones, then-Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, select Mr. McKeever for the position. ¶¶ 39-40. Mr. Jones selected Mr. McKeever on January 7, 2003. Def.’s Eh. 15. He based his selection on the recommendations of the interview panel and Mr. Sherwood, which he thought constituted a “diverse panel of individuals who ... represented a good base of experience to render an opinion.” Deposition of Steven Jones (“Jones Dep.”) at 29-30. The work histories of Mr. McKeever and Ms. Hendricks are not disputed. Mr. McKeever had been a criminal investigator with TIGTA and its predecessor, the IRS Inspection Service, since 1987. Def.’s Facts ¶42. He had previously been a police officer with the Washington Metro Transit Authority for approximately four years. Id. While a criminal investigator with the Department of Treasury, Mr. McKeever was responsible for initiating, planning and conducting investigations of alleged misconduct and criminal violations, executing search and arrest warrants, preparing reports, and testifying at trials and administrative hearings. Id. He was involved in multi-agency and international investigations involving bribery and conflict of interest allegations as well as a wide variety of offenses including impersonation, unauthorized disclosure, false statements, corrupt interference, threats and assaults, theft, computer fraud, and drug offenses. Id. He received performance awards in 1996, 1997 and 2002, a Manager’s Award in 1996, and a Special Act award in 1998. Id. Mr. McKeever submitted a performance appraisal dated October 4, 2001, with his application. Id. ¶ 43. In TIGTA’s pass/fail performance system, Mr. McKeever received a pass evaluation in each of the three critical elements for both mid-year and year-end reviews. Id. Ms. Hendricks’s application included her most recent performance appraisal as well. It showed that she had received a pass rating for all critical elements for both the mid-year and year-end reviews. Id. ¶ 45. Ms. Hendricks’s application package demonstrated that she had conducted a variety of investigations and also held the RTSO and TSO collateral responsibilities until 2000. 4. 2003 Application for Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Technical and Forensic Support Division (03-FESB-181) TIGTA posted Vacancy Announcement 03-FESB-181 for the position of ASAC, GS-14, in the agency’s Technical and Forensic Support Division. Def.’s Mem., Ex. 18. Ms. Hendricks applied for the position, located in Landover, Maryland, in April of 2003. SAC ¶ 35. Michael Radetic, a white male, was selected for the position. Id. According to its position description, the duties of this ASAC were to supervise five to eleven special agents and one support person; to manage the group’s investigative program and assigned resources; and to review and forward the results of investigations to the Department of Justice, IRS management, or other authorities for action concerning the criminal and administrative findings. Id. At the time that Mr. Radetic applied for the job, he was already a GS-14 special agent in SIID. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 19 at 1. Ms. Hendricks was a GS-13 special agent. Def.’s Mem., Ex. 20. No interviews were conducted for this vacancy, and TIGTA was not required to conduct interviews for the position. Def.’s Facts ¶ 48 see also Hendricks Dep. 7/7/05 at 84-86. On April 10, 2003, the Bureau of Public Debt prepared two certificates for this vacancy announcement, one for competitive eligibles (those who were not at the GS-14 level) and one for non-competitive eligibles (those who already held GS-14 jobs). See Def.’s Mem., Exs. 22 (Merit Staffing Certificate — Non Competitive Eligibles) & 23 (Merit Staffing Certificate — Competitive Eligibles). Mr. Radetic and two other candidates were on the non-competitive eligibles certificate; Ms. Hendricks and one other candidate were on the competitive eligibles certificate. Def.’s Facts ¶ 5 1. Ms. Hendricks acknowledges that the difference between the two lists is that a noncompetitive candidate could be selected for an in-grade transfer without consideration of the other applicants. Id.; Hendricks Dep. 7/7/05 at 85-86. The application packages were provided to Michael Doak, SAC of the Technical and Forensic Division, for rating and ranking. Jones Decl. at 2. Mr. Doak recommended Mr. Radetic. Id. Mr. Jones selected Mr. Radetic based on Mr. Doak’s recommendation, his own review of the applications, and discussion with Mr. Doak concerning the non-competitive eligibles. Mr. Jones did not consider either of the candidates on the competitive eligibles list, including Ms. Hendricks. There is no dispute about Mr. Radetic’s background. He is a graduate of Illinois State University with a B.S. in Criminal Justice. Def.’s Facts ¶ 54; Def.’s Mem., Ex. 19. From 1987 to 1998, he worked as a Special Agent for the Office of the Inspector General for the Small Business Administration, where he conducted criminal investigations into loan fraud, contract fraud, bank fraud, theft, embezzlement and various other violations of Titles 15 and 18. Id. He became an Internal Security Inspector, GS-13, with the IRS Inspection Service (TIGTA’s predecessor agency) in August 1998. Id. There, he was responsible for investigations involving contract/procurement fraud, identity theft, child pornography, narcotics violations, and complex financial crimes. Id. He has been involved in undercover operations and with multi-agency investigations involving federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Id. Ms. Hendricks’s application notes her experiences as a GS-13 special agent, as a TSO, as an RTSO and an additional special recognition note for her work on a criminal investigation involving child pornography. Def.s Mem., Ex. 20. Both Mr. Radetic and Ms. Hendricks had received “pass” evaluations on all critical elements of their positions in their most recent performance appraisals. Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 55, 56. 5. Hostile Work Environment Ms. Hendricks complains that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and a series of adverse personnel actions that ultimately led to her constructive discharge. a. Background Investigation In 1999, the IRS conducted a background investigation to update Ms. Hendricks’s security clearance. Hendricks Dep. 7/11/05 at 54. By memo dated January 5, 2000, Bob Velón, TIGTA’s Security Officer, notified Ms. Hendricks that his review of her background investigation disclosed credit issues. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 31. According to Mr. Velón, the report indicated that Ms. Hendricks had a poor credit history dating back to 1987; it also included current outstanding balances more than 120 days past due and a late mortgage payment. Id. Mr. Velón advised Ms. Hendricks that “[t]he frequency and recency of the above information raises a security concern that your payment practices demonstrate a history of not meeting your financial obligations or an unwillingness to satisfy your debts.” Id. Mr. Velón identified two TIGTA policies that were implicated by Ms. Hendricks’s financial history and proposed to monitor her credit for one year. Id. Further, Mr. Velón advised, “Failure to properly meet your financial obligations jeopardizes your position as a Special Agent with TIGTA, and may be grounds for further disciplinary actions, up to and including removal.” Id. Ms. Hendricks signed the memo on January 7, 2000, acknowledging its receipt but noted that “there are some inaccuracies in the memo” and indicated that she would provide a letter regarding them. Id. Ms. Hendricks does not dispute that she “had some issues paying bills timely.” See Hendricks’s Dep. 7/11/05 at 56-57 (“Q. You don’t dispute that you had some issues paying bills timely, do you? A. I was a divorced mother. I was going through a divorce and — no, I’m not disputing that.”). Following the one year of credit monitoring, Donna Copson, Associate Inspector General for Management Services (at this point in history, TIGTA’s personnel function), informed Robert Cortesi, then-Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, that there had been “little improvement in Ms. Hendricksfs] credit” and that “[i]f this pattern continues, Ms. Hendricks is in jeopardy of losing her TOP SECRET eligibility as well as disciplinary action.” See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 32. Ms. Hendricks then met to discuss her credit issues with David Buckley, then-Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Brian Dwyer, then-SAC for SIID, and Tim Camus, then-ASAC and her first line supervisor. Def.’s Facts ¶ 79; Hendricks Dep. 7/11/05 at 66. Mr. Buckley instructed her to take immediate action to prevent her from losing her security clearance. Hendricks Dep. 7/11/05 at 68. Mr. Buckley gave Ms. Hendricks two hours a day of administrative time to prepare a response to the January 7, 2000, memo from Mr. Velón. Id. Ms. Hendricks submitted the long-awaited response to Mr. Velon’s memo on December 27, 2000, almost twelve months later. See Def.’s Mem. Ex. 33; Hendricks Dep. 7/11/05 at 69-70. She detailed the nature of the accounts and reported that she had brought them current. See id. Thereafter, Ms. Copson notified Ms. Hendricks that she had satisfactorily addressed her credit issues. See Def.s Mem., Ex. 34; Hendricks Dep. July 11, 2005 at 71. Ms. Hendricks ties the initial memorandum from Mr. Velón and the monitoring of her credit to the alleged hostile work environment by noting that Mr. Velón and Mr. Dwyer were friends, Pl.’s Issues VI.C, and by asserting that Mr. Velon’s treatment of her was inconsistent with his treatment of white male agents who had serious financial problems in their backgrounds. Id. VI D. She compares herself to Mr. Radetick, who declared personal bankruptcy at an unspecified time in the past but was never questioned about it by the security officers of TIGTA. See Deposition of Michael Radetic (“Radetic Dep.”) at 59-61. b. Other Personnel Actions 1. Counseling Memo and Reprimand On September 15, 2003, Ms. Hendricks received two memos from her first-line supervisor, ASAC Tim Herlihy — one counseling her about performance problems, Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 34, and one charging her with failure to follow supervisory instructions. Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 33. Ms. Hendricks complains that she was thus subjected to “unwarranted discipline” as part of the alleged hostile work environment. See SAC ¶¶ 44-49. The Counseling Memorandum indicated concerns about Ms. Hendricks’s performance of Critical Element #2, Conducting Investigations, and Critical Element #3, Execution of Duties. See Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 34. Specifically, Mr. Herlihy noted “four cases that are significantly overage” and detailed their status. Id. He recommended advanced training and concluded that he “currently considered] your performance to be at the ‘pass’ level as it relates to the performance plan elements and standards of your position” but that, without improvement, it could become a “fail.” Id. Mr. Herlihy directed Ms. Hendricks to complete and submit her reports of investigation on the four identified cases by the end of the fiscal year. Id. The Letter of Reprimand from Mr. Herlihy concerned a direct instruction from him that Ms. Hendricks admits she had failed to obey. PL’s Opp., Ex. 33. Ms. Hendricks had concluded that one of her investigations had proven certain allegations but, in a meeting with Mr. Herlihy and agency counsel, her supervisor and the lawyers disagreed with her assessment. See id. Ms. Hendricks obtained more information that she wanted to provide to agency counsel but was specifically directed by Mr. Herlihy not to do so. Id. Nonetheless, “Ms. Hendricks believed she was obligated to notify TIGTA counsel that she had obtained the information they requested from her, which is what she did. Hendricks Dep. 7/11/05 at 23-25.” PL’s Opp. at 26. Mr. Herlihy reprimanded Ms. Hendricks for not following his directions: I expect you to follow my instructions. Though you thought the information should immediately be sent to Counsel for review, I told you not to send it, and I expected you to comply with my instructions. Your email to Counsel was unprofessional and reflected poorly on SIID. PL’s Opp., Exh. 33. Mr. Herlihy noted that Ms. Hendricks’s email to counsel acknowledged that he had instructed her not to send the information. See id.; see also Def.’s Mem., Ex. 29 (April 4, 2003 email) (admitting that Mr. Herlihy had said “not to provide additional information to counsel, and to wait and see what opinion counsel rendered” but that “[t]his email is not an attempt to be insubordinate by any means. I just feel that counsel needs the additional information.”) Mr. Herlihy’s reprimand noted that counsel “indicated that the additional information did not [a]f-feet the conclusions reached during this meeting.” Pl.’s Opp., Ex. 33. 2. Year-End and Mid-Year Evaluations Mr. Herlihy evaluated Ms. Hendricks’s performance in an appraisal dated October 31, 2003. See PL’s Opp., Ex. 31. She received “pass” on all three critical elements of her position and Mr. Herlihy praised her performance in connection with a variety of investigations. Id. At the end of her appraisal, he added: I am dedicated to working together in FY-04 to dispose of the investigations currently in your inventory; [sic] and assist you in pursuing new investigations. I am also dedicated to working with you in connection with your professional development. Specifically, attending the various training classes involving editing investigative reports, advanced investigative techniques, and continuing legal education, which were previously identified. Id. By the next mid-year evaluation, however, Ms. Hendricks’s situation was more dire. In May 2004, Mr. Herlihy issued a mid-year performance appraisal for Ms. Hendricks that rated her as failing in two out of three critical elements, i.e., Conducting Investigations and Execution of Duties. See PL’s Opp., Ex. 32. Ms. Hendricks was advised that she would soon be put on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”). Hendricks Dep. 7/ 705 at 222; Herlihy Dep. at 84-85. In the interim, Ms. Hendricks had filed an EEO complaint charging Mr. Herlihy with discrimination and retaliation over the September 15 counseling letter and letter of reprimand. PL’s Issues VI.G. 3. Use of VRS and Leave Restrictions In February 2004, Ms. Hendricks approached ASAC Tim Herlihy, her direct supervisor, about a medical ailment that required physical therapy. Herlihy Dep. at 72-73, 77. Ms. Hendricks lives in Baltimore, Maryland, where her therapists were located. Id. at 75. With Mr. Herlihy’s approval, Ms. Hendricks utilized the agency’s virtual resource system (“VRS”) program to telework from Baltimore so that she could schedule her physical therapy appointments without taking as much leave as might otherwise be required. Id. at 71-73; see also id. at 72 (“I agreed to allow her to VRS, adjust her work schedule and submit leave slips after the fact.”). However, Ms. Hendricks’s unavailability resulted in insufficient hours under the Law Enforcement Availability Pay (“LEAP”) program. LEAP increases a federal law enforcement officer’s salary by 25% of their base pay for working, or being available to work, an average of two (2) extra hours each day. Hendricks Dep. 7/11/05, at 101. Mr. Herlihy conducted a normal quarterly review of LEAP hours on April 1, 2004. Def.’s Facts ¶ 94. Ms. Hendricks was only averaging 1.5 hours per day, instead of the statutorily required two hours. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 37. Accordingly, on May 5, 2004, Mr. Herlihy issued a LEAP memo to Ms. Hendricks, commenting that it was particularly disturbing that Ms. Hendricks had not met her LEAP hours because she had failed to meet the time in the prior year as well and had been directed to increase her LEAP average. Id.; see also Herlihy Dep. at 77-78. Mr. Herlihy identified a plan of action to bring Ms. Hendricks current in her LEAP hours, including that she could no longer work at home under the VRS telecommuting program, that she would increase her hours and achieve a 2.0 average by June 20, 2004, and that she would maintain a 2.0 average for the remainder of the year. Def.’s Mem. Ex. 37. This action plan was not successful and Ms. Hendricks averaged only 1.7 hours in the next quarter, instead of 2.0. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. 38. She received another LEAP memo on July 29, 2004. Id.; Hendricks Dep. 7/11/05 at 118. Ms. Hendricks alleges that her removal from VRS was discriminatory “because everyone else in the office was allowed to work from home.” Id. at 121. She recognizes that, under the rules governing the VRS program, employees must meet all of their employment requirements, that TIG-TA unilaterally reserved the right to cancel VRS participation, that a decline in performance is one ground for removal from VRS participation under the VRS rules, and that VRS is not an “employee benefit.” Id. at 122-124. However, she does not admit that she was removed from the VRS program due to her admitted failure to meet the LEAP requirements. “Participating in the agency’s VRS telework program required Ms. Hendricks to use less leave to obtain needed medical treatment, and therefore helped her meet her LEAP requirements.” PL’s Issues at 46. Prior to leaving his employment with TIGTA, Mr. Herlihy contacted the Bureau of Public Debt concerning Ms. Hendricks’s usage of unscheduled annual leave and sick leave. Def.’s Facts ¶ 97. Mr. Herlihy had intended to issue a leave restriction memorandum to Ms. Hendricks but left TIGTA before it was drafted. Id. Therefore, John Phillips, acting ASAC, issued a leave restriction memo to Ms. Hendricks on June 24, 2004. Id.; see Def.’s Mem., Ex. 39. Her record showed that Ms. Hendricks had used 138 hours of illness-related leave in a ten-pay-period span on 26 different days, including a full eight hours of leave on 13 of those days. Def.’s Facts ¶ 98. She had also used 48 hours of unscheduled annual leave without obtaining prior approval in accordance with TIGTA policy. Id. The memorandum placed restrictions on Ms. Hendricks’s use of unscheduled annual leave, requiring her to produce acceptable evidence of the need to take unscheduled leave without prior approval. Def.’s Mem., Ex. 39. In addition, Ms. Hendricks was required to submit an acceptable medical certificate for any sick leave for illness-related reasons. Id. Ms. Hendricks was informed that her failure to comply would result in her being charged absent without leave (“AWOL”). Id. On July 6, 7, 8, and 9, 2004, Ms. Hendricks left voicemail messages with ASAC Phillips advising him that she was taking sick leave for each day. Declaration of John Phillips (“Phillips Deck”) ¶ 14. In accordance with her restricted-leave status, she was initially charged AWOL until she brought in adequate medical certificates to substantiate her need for sick leave. See PL’s Issues at 49 (“She was initially charged AWOL, and had to bring multiple doctors’ letters to her supervisors to have the time changed to [leave without pay] LWOP status.”). 4. Failure to Select for Acting Positions As part of the alleged hostile work environment, Ms. Hendricks also alleges that she was not selected for “career-enhancing acting positions,” awarded to others outside her protected class and/or who had not engaged in protected activities. See SAC ¶¶ 50-55. She does admit that in November-December 2001, when Mr. Camus was her direct supervisor, reporting to Mr. Dwyer, both men arranged for Ms. Hendricks to receive a 30-day Acting ASAC detail to the Baltimore Field Office. Hendricks Dep. July 11, 2005 at 42-43 (“Mr. Camus and Mr. Dwyer suggested that I may be interesting in acting in Baltimore because there was going to be an acting assignment in Baltimore.”). When Ms. Colonna was her direct supervisor, Ms. Colonna asked Ms. Hendricks if Ms. Hendricks wanted to be considered for an acting position as ASAC of Technical Support Services because she had experience as a tech agent. Id. at 50-51. Ms. Hendricks declined the opportunity to be considered for this acting position because she wanted to focus on her SIID investigations. Id. at 51. This was the same acting position that Mr. Radetic held for a while and that supported his application for the job. Id. Mr. Herlihy supervised Ms. Hendricks during the year that she “was taking sick leave to get therapy for an injury to her foot,” Pl.’s Issues at 48, and when he issued a counseling memo and a letter of reprimand. Mr. Herlihy did not select Ms. Hendricks for acting positions because he felt she needed to focus on completing her overdue investigations. Herlihy Decl. ¶ 4. 5. Removal of Collateral TSO Duties In April 2000, James Rice, the Plaintiffs supervisor at the time, created a list of collateral duties that appeared to reassign Ms. Hendricks’s technical support collateral duties to a new agent in the office. Def.’s Facts ¶ 57. However, Ms. Hendricks continued performing her collateral duties until September 2000, when she advised Mr. Camus that she no longer wanted to perform these duties after seven years. Pl.’s Dep. 7/7/05 at 142-145. The alleged reassignment in April had no effect on Ms. Hendricks’s wages, benefits, or job performance evaluation. Id. at 148-149. 6. Constructive Discharge None of the facts immediately surrounding Ms. Hendricks’s resignation is in dispute. In early July 2004, Acting ASAC Phillips assigned a new complaint to Ms. Hendricks that needed an initial investigation. Def.’s Facts ¶ 100. Due to the target of the complaint, it was deemed to be a sensitive and high-profile matter. Id. Under SIID and TIGTA policy, the complaint needed to be investigated within 30 days, or by August 8, 2004. Id. Acting ASAC Phillips had also received special direction from the Acting SAC that the complaint had to be resolved within the appropriate timeframe. Id. Ms. Hendricks was aware of this deadline. Id. On August 3, 2004, Acting ASAC Phillips met with the SAC and then told Ms. Hendricks that she needed to complete her investigation on that day. Id. ¶ 101. Ms. Hendricks advised him that she still needed to interview one additional person, who would not be available until the next day, August 4, 2004. Id. Ms. Hendricks called in sick on August 4 and did not conduct the interview. Id. She completed the interview in the morning on August 5 and then called in sick for the remainder of the day. Id. She told Mr. Phillips that she would work on her memorandum of interview on August 6, 2004, after she concluded some previously-scheduled rifle range training. Id. Mr. Phillips left Ms. Hendricks a voicemail instructing her to report to the office on August 6, 2004, and not to attend rifle training at the range, so that she could complete the investigation. Id. On August 6, rather than report to the office as ordered, Ms. Hendricks went to the rifle range and submitted her resignation. Id. ¶ 102. Ms. Hendricks admits all of these facts and adds, “[b]y way of further response, [she] was suffering from serious health problems in the summer of 2004.” Id. ¶ 101. Ms. Hendricks states that she was suffering from acute bronchitis and learned that she had an enlarged heart chamber in July 2004. Pl.’s Issues VILA. “Her treating mental health professional advised her that she should take extended sick leave....” Id. VII.B. Because Ms. Hendricks had no leave available and was already on leave restrictions, she could not take this advice. Id. “[H]er therapist advised her to resign from the agency [in] order to protect her health.” Id. “For all of these reasons, and those that created the hostile work environment, Ms. Hendricks believed she had no choice but to resign from the agency.” Id. VII.C. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment must be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). Moreover, summary judgment is properly granted against a party who “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor and accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999). Rather, the non-moving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Id. at 675. If the evidence “is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). B. Discrimination Claims Under Title VII Generally, to prevail on a claim of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must follow a three-part burden-shifting analysis generally known as the McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C.Cir.2003). The Supreme Court has explained the framework as follows: First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection” ... Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.... The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (internal citations omitted) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C.Cir.1999); Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 428 (D.C.Cir.2003). “The burden of establishing a prima facie case ... is not onerous.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption then arises that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Id. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. To rebut this presumption, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. The employer “need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” Id. Rather, “[t]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the employer successfully presents a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, “the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — disappears, and the sole remaining issue is discrimination vel non.’’ Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1088 (internal citations omitted). At this point, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff “must show that a reasonable jury could conclude from all of the evidence that the adverse employment decision was made for a discriminatory reason.” Id. (citing Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc)). The court must consider whether the jury could infer discrimination from (1) the plaintiffs prima facie case, (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation, and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff. Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992-93 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289). The plaintiff need not present evidence in each of these categories in order to avoid summary judgment. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. Rather, the court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer’s explanation in light of the total circumstances of the case. Id. at 1291. C. Retaliation Claims Under Title VII Title VII provides, in part, that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2413, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation or reprisal by demonstrating that (1) she engaged in protected behavior; (2) the employer took an action against plaintiff that a reasonable employee would believe was designed to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination; and (3) there is a causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 (D.C.Cir.2006). The Supreme Court recently clarified that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision pertains only to those employer actions that are materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant. Burlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. Therefore, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “materially adverse consequence ... such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible harm” which would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219 (citing Brown, 199 F.3d at 457). If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the analysis then follows that for a discrimination claim, i.e., the defendant must provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions and the plaintiff then has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s actions were taken for reasons other than those offered, and instead, for a retaliatory purpose. See Welzel v. Bernstein, 436 F.Supp.2d 110, 115 (D.D.C.2006) (applying the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting to retaliation claims post Burlington Northern and Rochon). If a plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is pretext for discrimination, however, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment and plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law. Welzel, 436 F.Supp.2d at 116. D. Discrimination Claims Based on Hostile Work Environment Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). Toward that end, an employer may not create or condone a hostile or abusive work environment that is discriminatory. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Such an environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently sever or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Singletary v. Dist. of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 526 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399). On the other hand, “[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title VIPs purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367. Thus, to determine whether a hostile work environment exists, courts look to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interfered with an employee’s work performance. Id. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). In considering the totality of the circumstances, however, the court is mindful that: [ejveryone can be characterized by sex, race, ethnicity or (real or perceived) disability; and many bosses are harsh, unjust and rude. It is therefore important in hostile work environment cases to exclude from consideration personnel decisions that lack a linkage of correlation to the claimed ground of discrimination. Otherwise, the federal courts will become a court of personnel appeals. Bryant v. Brownlee, 265 F.Supp.2d 52, 63 (D.D.C.2003) (quoting Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 377 (2d Cir.2002)). To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment occurred because of the plaintiffs protected status; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known about the harassment, but nonetheless failed to take steps to prevent it. Lester v. Natsios, 290 F.Supp.2d 11, 22 (D.D.C.2003); Crenshaw v. Georgetown Univ., 23 F.Supp.2d 11, 15 (D.D.C.1998); Jones v. Billington, 12 F.Supp.2d 1, 11 (D.D.C.1997). Finally, although there is authority that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to hostile work environment claims, the law of this Circuit provides for the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to hostile work environment claims. Baloch v. Norton, 355 F.Supp.2d 246, 259 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Duren v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 2004 WL 2857273 *1 (D.C.Cir.2004) and Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C.Cir.2002)). III. ANALYSIS Unhappy events certainly affected Ms. Hendricks’s last years with TIGTA — she was not promoted, she was reprimanded, she was critiqued for slow performance— but there is no evidence that ties these events to her race or gender or retaliation. While Treasury concedes that she presents a prima facie case of race and/or gender discrimination, and/or retaliation, in regards to each of the promotions at issue, she fails to demonstrate pretext to overcome TIGTA’s legitimate non-discriminatory explanations for its selections. Her hostile environment claim is based on a series of negative events that happened in her worklife but she presents absolutely no evidence tying any of these events to her race, gender, or protected EEO activity. The Court finds that even if Ms. Hendricks presented a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, she failed to show that Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions are pretextual. Finally, Ms. Hendricks resigned at a time when she was under great stress but there is no evidence that ties this stress to unlawful discrimination in her workplace. The complaint will be dismissed. A. Selection of Robert Johnson Ms. Hendricks argues that the selection of Robert Johnson was discriminatory because he had not presented his application in the proper format, while she did; he had two prior instances of discipline for misconduct, while she had none; and he had worked in the Baltimore field office doing inferior work to the kinds of high-profile and sensitive investigations she had conducted in SIID. See SAC ¶¶ 39-42. These factors represent a difference of opinion as to the importance of these points but do not evidence discrimination. Certainly, Ms. Hendricks is an African American female who applied for the position and was qualified for it. Certainly, a Caucasian male was selected and not her. She has clearly made out a prima facie case of discrimination on account of her race and gender. TIGTA, however, has come forward with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its selection of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson had a superior performance appraisal, a varied and extensive history of investigations for many more years than Ms. Hendricks, and scored higher than Ms. Hendricks on Mr. Camus’s rating and ranking chart. In response, Ms. Hendricks argues pretext. She discounts the performance appraisal and Mr. Johnson’s history of investigations because Mr. Johnson worked in the Baltimore field office and she believes that SIID in headquarters handles more complex, sensitive and high-profile cases than anything that is done in the field offices. Even more, she emphasizes her unblemished record and Mr Johnson’s two instances of discipline, which she asserts disqualify him from a position in SIID that requires the highest integrity. Finally, she questions the motives of Mr. Camus, the recommending official, and Mr. Dwyer, the selecting official. Ms. Hendricks may not establish pretext unless she shows that TIGTA’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for selecting Mr. Johnson are false and that discrimination based on her race or gender motivated the actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-516, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). “Once the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action, the issue is not ‘the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons offered ... [but] whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.’ ” Fischbach v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1996). Even when a job applicant “was victimized by [ ] poor selection procedures,” the court may not “second-guess an employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably discriminative motive.” Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94, 100 (D.C.Cir.1982). Ms. Hendricks relies on Mr. Johnson’s prior misconduct and Mr. Camus’s ranking Mr. Johnson higher based on a standard form OF-612, which she alleges was not tailored to the individual KSAs for the position. Regarding the first issue, Brian Dwyer, the selecting official, testified that he did not view Mr. Johnson’s prior issues as disqualifying him for promotion. The issue was raised with the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations and it was decided that the past misconduct did not pose a problem for the selection. Camus Dep. at 65. Further, as explained by Steven Jones, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations of TIGTA, there is difference between someone violating a rule and being disciplined, and someone having “integrity” problems. Jones Dep. at 13-16. With respect to the second issue, the 0F-612 and other documents included with Mr. Johnson’s application materials, Mr. Johnson’s application materials demonstrated a more than reasonable basis for his selection. Mr. Johnson’s appraisal indicated that his written products are meticulously prepared. They are clear, complete, concise. He submits his work timely and with no need for corrections. His reports of investigation always identify all of the issues being examined and they are prepared in a manner that allows a reader to quickly and easily understand the entire scope of the investigation. Mr. Johnson has few equals when it comes to preparing quality reports. To survive a motion for summary judgment in a non-selection case when the employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the non-selection, a plaintiff must prove that she was “significantly” or “markedly” better qualified than the successful candidate. See Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (D.C.Cir.2003). The record demonstrates that Mr. Johnson had some disciplinary issues in his past, but it also demonstrates that Mr. Johnson was a highly qualified applicant with a long history of investigative experience. Moreover, Plaintiffs argument concerning her superior qualificatio