Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER TERENCE KERN, District Judge. Before the Court are Defendants’ Objections to Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss Temporary Restraining Order (Docs. 91 and 92); Plaintiff ConocoPhillips Company’s Motion and Brief in Support of Request for Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Doc. 93); and Intervenors Norris, DP Manufacturing, Inc., Tulsa Winch, Inc., Auto Crane Company, and Ramsey Winch, Ine.’s Motion and Brief in Support of Request for Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Doc. 94). Also before the Court are briefs of amici curiae. Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Plaintiffs by Securitas Security Services, USA (“Security Services”); Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (“Halliburton”); and the Oklahoma State Chamber of Commerce (the “State Chamber”). Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Defendants by the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) and various Oklahoma citizens. I. Introduction At issue in this litigation are two Oklahoma laws that make it a crime for any “person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity to maintain, establish, or enforce any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person, except a convicted felon, from transporting and storing firearms in a locked motor vehicle, or from transporting and storing firearms locked in or locked to a motor vehicle on any property set aside for any motor vehicle.” See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 1289.7a; 1290.22(B). Generally, the challenged laws grant Oklahoma citizens the right to transport and store firearms in their locked vehicles on private property, even when a private property owner would like to prevent them from doing so. These laws are referred to by their opponents as “forced entry” laws because they force a private property owner to allow entry of firearms onto their property. In contrast, they are referred to by their proponents as laws that protect an individual’s right to transport firearms. In this lawsuit, corporations with policies prohibiting firearms on company property have brought a preenforcement challenge to the laws pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Supremacy Clause, arguing that the laws violate the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief preventing their enforcement. This Court is the first to address the constitutionality of these types of laws. A. Parties Plaintiff ConocoPhillips Company (“ConocoPhillips”) is a Delaware corporation “that operates buildings and facilities [in the Northern District of Oklahoma] that are held open to ConocoPhillips’ employees, customers, vendors, and other visitors for the purpose of conducting company business.” (Compl. in Intervention ¶ 6.) In addition to the buildings themselves, ConocoPhillips “owns and controls numerous parking lots in this district.” (Id.) ConocoPhillips has a policy that prohibits possession of firearms on property owned or controlled by the company, including all parking facilities. (Id. ¶ 10.) The policy provides: The use or possession of contraband is prohibited on Company property. The use or possession of contraband is also prohibited with respect to employees, who, although not on Company property, are on Company business. For purposes of this policy, contraband includes, but is not limited to: Firearms, including shotguns, rifles, handguns (including those legally possessed) ... or any other object, which in the judgment of the Company, may be considered a weapon or firearm, and for which no exceptions apply.... (Id. at Ex. B.) ConocoPhillips alleges that, in response to the challenged laws, it has been forced to begin the process of changing its policies to avoid liability for noncompliance. (Id. ¶ 10.) Intervening Plaintiffs Norris, a Dover Resources Company (“Norris”), DP Manufacturing, Inc. (“DP”), and Tulsa Winch, Inc. (“Tulsa Winch”) are corporations with substantial business operations in Oklahoma. (Compl. of Norris, DP, and Tulsa Winch ¶¶ 11-16, Ex. B to Mot. to Intervene as Additional Pis.) These businesses, like ConocoPhillips, have established and enforced policies prohibiting employees from possessing weapons on company property, including parking lots. (See id. ¶¶ 17-18; see also Norris Policy, Ex. A to Mot. to Intervene as Additional Pis.) Intervening Plaintiffs Ramsey Winch, Inc. (“Ramsey Winch”) and Auto Crane Company (“Auto Crane”) are also employers that do business and own property in Oklahoma and that have policies prohibiting firearms on their business premises. (Compl. of Ramsey Winch and Auto Crane ¶ 8, attached as Ex. B to Mot. to Intervene as Add’l Pis.; see also Auto Crane Weapons Policy, attached as Ex. A. to Mot. to Intervene as Add! Pis.) Norris, DP, Tulsa Winch, Ramsey Winch, and Auto Crane are collectively referred to as Intervening Plaintiffs. Defendants are C. Brad Henry, Governor of the State of Oklahoma (“Governor Henry”), and W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma (“Attorney General Edmondson”) (collectively “Defendants”). Governor Henry is sued in his official capacity based on his duty to faithfully execute the laws of Oklahoma. See Okla. Const, art. 6, § 8. Attorney General Edmondson is sued in his official capacity based on his duty to prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in which the State is an interested party. See Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 18b. (See ConocoPhillips Compl. in Intervention ¶¶ 3, 4.) B. The OFA and OSDA One of the challenged laws is contained in the Oklahoma Firearms Act of 1971, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.1 et seq. (“OFA”). The legislative findings supporting the OFA state that “[the OFA] is necessary for the safe and lawful use of firearms to curb and prevent crime wherein weapons are used by enacting legislation having the purpose of controlling the use of firearms, and of prevention of their use, without unnecessarily denying their lawful use in defense of life, home and property ... including their use and transportation for lawful purposes.” Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § I289.2. The other challenged law is contained in the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act of 1995, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1290.1 et seq. (“OSDA”). The general purpose of the OSDA is to set forth exceptions to the Oklahoma law prohibiting the carrying of “concealed handguns.” See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1290.4. The OFA and OSDA are both contained in Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which is the criminal code. 1. 2004 Amendments to OFA and OSDA On March 31, 2004, Governor Henry signed into law House Bill 2122, see KB. 2122, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.2004), which added the following section to the OFA: PROHIBITING PERSONS FROM TRANSPORTING, STORING FIREARMS IN LOCKED VEHICLE UNLAWFUL No person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity shall be permitted to establish any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person, except a convicted felon, from transporting and storing firearms in a locked vehicle on any property set aside for any vehicle. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.7a (Supp.2004) (amended 2005). Section 1289.7a immediately follows Section 1289.7, which is entitled “Firearms in Motor Vehicles-Exceptions.” See Oicla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.7. Section 1289.7 provides that any person except a convicted felon may transport in a motor vehicle an “open and unloaded” rifle, shotgun, or pistol. Id. In addition to amending the OFA, House Bill 2122 also amended a provision of the OSDA entitled “Business Owner’s Rights” by adding a new subsection (B). See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1290.22(B). Subsection (B) sets forth an “exception” to a property owner’s general right to control the possession of weapons on his property. Section 1290.22 provides: BUSINESS OWNER’S RIGHTS A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, nothing contained in any provision of the Oklahoma Self-Defense Act, Section 1290.1 et seq. of this title, shall be construed to limit, restrict or prohibit in any manner the existing rights of any person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity to control the possession of weapons on any property owned or controlled by the person or business entity. B. No person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity shall be permitted to establish any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person, except a convicted felon, from transporting and storing firearms in a locked vehicle on any property set aside for any vehicle. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1290.22 (Supp.2004) (footnote added). The relief originally sought in this lawsuit was to enjoin enforcement of the 2004 Amendments to the OFA and OSDA. 2. 2005 Amendments to OFA On June 9, 2005, while this lawsuit was pending. Governor Henry signed into law House Bill 1243, see H.B. 1243, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.2005), which revised § 3289.7a. These revisions provide: PROHIBITING PERSONS FROM TRANSPORTING, STORING FIREARMS IN LOCKED VEHICLE UNLAWFUL A. No person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity shall mam tain, establish, or enforce any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person, except a convicted felon, from transporting and storing firearms in a locked motor vehicle, or from transporting and storing firearms locked in or locked to a motor vehicle on any property set aside for any motor vehicle. B. No person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity shall be liable in any civil action for occurrences which result from the storing of firearms in a locked motor vehicle on any property set aside for any motor vehicle, unless the person, property owner, tenant, employer, or owner of the business commits a criminal act involving the use of the firearms. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to claims pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act. C. An individual may bring a civil action to enforce this section. If a plaintiff prevails in a civil action related to the personnel manual against a person, property owner, tenant, employer or business for a violation of this section, the court shall award actual damages, enjoin further violations of this section, and award court costs and attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff. D. As used in this section, “motor vehicle” means any automobile, truck, minivan, sports utility vehicle, motorcycle, motor scooter, and any other vehicle required to be registered under the Oklahoma Vehicle License and Registration Act. Id. § 1289.7a (Supp.2005). According to Defendants, the 2005 revisions were passed, at least in part, to clarify portions of § 1289.7a that had been challenged during this litigation as unconstitutionally vague. (See Defs.’ Obj. to Jurisdiction and Mot. to Dismiss TRO 4-5.) In addition, according to a report of the Oklahoma House of Representatives Media Division, the addition of subsection (B) to § 1289.7a was an attempt to “remove the liability concerns cited by businesses.” See Oklahoma House of Representatives Media Division, Legislature Approves Gun Owner Protections (May 27, 2005), available at htttp://www.lsb.state.ok.us/HOUSE/news 7632.html. The bill passed in 2005, amending § 1289.7a of the OFA, did not make any revisions to § 1290.22 of the OSDA. The Court will refer to all above-described amendments to the OFA and OSDA as the “Amendments.” Where necessary for clarification, the Court will refer to the amendments passed to both the OFA and OSDA in 2004 as the “2004 Amendments” and will refer to the revisions made to § 1289.7a of the OFA as the “2005 Amendments.” Collectively, the Amendments force Plaintiffs to allow employees and other guests to store and transport various types of unloaded and loaded firearms in their vehicles on Plaintiffs’ private property, The types of firearms that may be present in the vehicles, and whether they may be loaded are unloaded, depends on whether the individual has a concealed weapons license under the OSDA or is governed by the more general OFA. 3. Events Leading to Original Drafting of the Amendments An Oklahoma attorney named Lawrence A.G. Johnson (“Johnson”) drafted § 1290.22(B) of the OSDA in recognition of the “continuous problem [that] arises relative to the conflict [that] lawabiding gun owners have regarding the exercise of their right to transport firearms to and from work and park in the employer’s parking lot.” (Aff. of Author of Subject Statute ¶ 1.) Johnson drafted this law and submitted it to the Oklahoma Legislature after several Oklahoma employees were discharged for keeping firearms in their vehicles on their employers’ parking lots, in violation of those employers’ policies. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) According to Johnson, it was his intent to draft a “‘public polie/ statement [so] that discharges [based on transporting firearms in vehicles on company property] would be a termination in violation of public policy and not to draft a criminal statute.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Therefore, Johnson was the original drafter of the language that now appears in § 1290.22(B) and that first appeared in § 1289.7a, although § 1289.7a was revised in 2005 by the Oklahoma Legislature. C. Procedural History of the Litigation On October 27, 2004, before the 2004 Amendments were to take effect, Whirlpool filed a Complaint and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the 2004 Amendments. In its motion, Whirlpool argued the Amendments must be enjoined because they (1) deprived Whirlpool of its fundamental right to exclude individuals who possess firearms from its property; (2) were unconstitutionally vague, and (3) were in conflict with and preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. On October 29, 2Q04, Defendants filed a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction. Defendants asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity and argued that the Ex Parte Young doctrine, which allows suit against government officials in certain circumstances, did not apply because Governor Henry and Attorney General Edmondson lacked a sufficient “enforcement connection” to the Amendments. On October 29, 2004, the Honorable Sven Erik Holmes held a hearing on Whirlpool’s motion. As an initial matter, Judge Holmes denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, citing the case of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), in which the Governor of the State of Oklahoma was the defendant in a challenge to the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute. (See TRO Hr’g Tr. 4, Oct. 29, 2004.) Judge Holmes concluded that “the appropriate vehicle by which to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute is to name the chief law enforcement officer of the state, who is the governor, as well as to identify the attorney general.” (Id. at 37.) As to the constitutional challenge to the 2004 Amendments, Judge Holmes focused on Whirlpool’s third argument related to conflict preemption. However, Judge Holmes did not limit his discussion to whether the Amendments were preempted by the OSH Act. Judge Holmes discussed conflict preemption in broader terms and raised the potentially preemptive effect of numerous federal laws. (See id. 28-34; see also ConocoPhillips’ Add’l Br. on Preemption Issues 3 (“At the hearing, the Court also raised the issue of conflict preemption, far more broadly than had Whirlpool, which had limited its arguments in that regard to the OSH Act’s general duty clause.”)). For example, Judge Holmes raised the issue of whether the Amendments prevented an Oklahoma principal from prohibiting guns in a high school parking lot, in direct violation of the Federal Gun Free School Zones Act (“FGFSZA”), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A), and Defendants conceded that the Amendments had such an effect. (See TRO Hr’g Tr. 33, Oct. 29, 2004.) At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Holmes granted the TRO: [T]he Court finds that there is a clear basis, even in a cursory review of federal law, that would form the basis for conflict preemption. The United States Congress and agencies of the United States have duly enacted federal laws that clearly address the subject matter of this statute and do so with express prohibitions on how that statute — on whether and to what extent this statute could stand in the face of those prohibitions. (Id. at 34-35.) Thus, Judge Holmes granted the TRO based on the Amendments’ conflict with numerous federal laws and what he referred to as the doctrine of “complete preemption.” (See id. at 32 & 34.) Judge Holmes then set a hearing regarding the issuance of a preliminary injunction and directed the parties “to prepare and submit what the parties believe to be an exhaustive and comprehensive statement of all of the federal, state, and local ordinances which may be impacted by a facial reading of this statute.” (Id. at 34-35.) Judge Holmes ordered the parties to prepare a form of order memorializing the ruling, which was entered on November 3, 2004. In this Order, Judge Holmes found that Whirlpool had a “substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits regarding its arguments on conflict preemption and constitutional vagueness and overbreadth” and enjoined enforcement of the 2004 Amendments. (See Order, Nov. 3, 2004.) On November 4, 2004, Judge Holmes held a hearing to address preliminary injunctive relief. Judge Holmes first allowed Defendants to present arguments on their Supplemental Brief to Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction, wherein Defendants again asserted sovereign immunity and raised, for the first time, improper venue in the Northern District of Oklahoma. (See Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. 5-19, Nov. 4, 2004.) At the conclusion of arguments, Judge Holmes denied the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied the motion to dismiss as to improper venue. (Id. at 23.) As to the substantive constitutionality of the 2004 Amendments, Judge Holmes again focused on the preemption challenge. Judge Holmes concluded, based on the appendices of federal statutes provided by the parties, that there existed “some 25 different federal laws that deal with firearms that potentially are implicated by this.” (Id. at 32.) Specifically, Judge Holmes observed that the 2004 Amendments would prohibit policies disallowing guns in the parking lots of federal facilities or courthouses; in veterans affairs facilities; in Department of Interior (“DOI”) facilities, including DOI-funded Indian schools; and in explosives facilities, all in violation of federal law. (See id. at 30-32.) Counsel for Defendants did not deny the 2004 Amendments would have these effects and did not wish to defend the constitutionality of the laws. Instead, even after Judge Holmes’ second denial of their motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, Defendants wished to “stand on [their] Eleventh Amendment argument.” (Id. at 34; see also id. at 38.) In order to allow Defendants time to formulate their position on the constitutionality of the statutes, Judge Holmes did not issue a ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction but instead extended the TRO. (Id. at 53-54.) On November 5, 2004, Judge Holmes issued an Order directing Defendants to file a brief that addressed the constitutionality of the 2004 Amendments. In their brief filed November 9, 2004, Defendants still refused to argue in support of the constitutionality of the 2004 Amendments. Instead, they argued the 2004 Amendments were not criminal statutes and that there was no existing immediacy to their enforcement. Defendants then devoted twenty pages of its twenty-nine page brief to re-arguing the sovereign immunity issue that Judge Holmes had rejected on two occasions. By written Order on November 12, 2004, Judge Holmes ordered that the TRO entered on November 3, 2004 would be extended until the Court ruled on the motion for preliminary injunction. (See Order, Nov. 12, 2004.) On November 19, 2004, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the intervenors’ complaint, again arguing improper venue and Eleventh Amendment immunity. (See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. in Intervention of Williams and ConocoPhillips.) On November 23, 2004, Judge Holmes held a second hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction. Faced with statements by the Attorney General in the November 9, 2004 brief that the laws were not criminal in nature, Judge Holmes had concerns regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity. Judge Holmes stated that, while there was Tenth Circuit authority holding that suit against the Attorney General was proper in challenges to criminal statutes, the authority was less clear in relation to civil statutes. (See Prelim. Inj. Second Hr’g Tr. 12, Nov. 23, 2004.) Judge Holmes also had concerns about proceeding in a manner that assumed the 2004 Amendments were criminal statutes in the face of a representation by the Attorney General that they were not. (Id. at 15-16.) Judge Holmes concluded, and the parties agreed, that the classification of the 2004 Amendments as criminal or civil could potentially impact rulings on subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and vagueness. The Court and the parties agreed to certify to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) the question of whether the 2004 Amendments were criminal statutes and to stay all proceedings pending a ruling by the OCCA. (See id. at 16-21.) The parties agreed that the TRO would remain in place. (Id. at 33-34.) On March 16, 2005, the case was reassigned to the undersigned following Judge Holmes’ departure from the bench. On March 28, 2005, the OCCA answered the certified question, finding that the 2004 Amendments were criminal statutes. Specifically, the OCCA held: The plain statutory language here prohibits enumerated entities from establishing particular policies affecting firearms. That is, the plain language forbids an act. This fits squarely within the statutory definition of crime and public offense. The statutory provisions are found within the Penal Code — the section of the public laws specifying classes ' of persons capable of committing crimes and liable for punishment, defining the nature of crimes, and prescribing the kind and nature of punishments for each. The statutory language does not itself impose a punishment for performance of the forbidden acts, so the general misdemeanor statute controls, and the offense is punishable as a - misdemean- or. Whirlpool Corp. v. Henry, 110 P.3d 83, 85 (Okla.Crim.App.2005) (footnotes omitted). In light of this ruling by the OCCA, the Court denied Defendants’ pending Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Intervention of Williams and ConocoPhillips, which had been held in abeyance pending the OCCA’s ruling. (See Order, April 8, 2005.) After the OCCA’s ruling, the Court established a briefing schedule to govern dispositive motions. Before these dis-positive motions were due, the 2005 Amendments were passed. The motions currently before the Court address the constitutionality of both the 2004 and 2005 Amendments, and Plaintiffs request permanent injunctive relief preventing their enforcement. On August 18, 2005, the Court deemed moot the prior motions for preliminary injunctive relief, which were limited to the 2004 Amendments, and ordered that the injunction agreed to by the parties would remain in place until the Court ruled on the motions for permanent injunction. Thereafter, the Court ordered additional briefing on the issue of preemption. Specifically, the Court ordered additional briefing on (1) Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs’ constitutional standing to make Supremacy Clause challenges that, if successful, would not redress their alleged injuries in fact, and (2) whether the Amendments impermissibly conflict with the OSH Act. The latter issue was initially raised by Whirlpool and Intervening Plaintiffs, but was not raised by remaining Plaintiff ConocoPhillips and was not briefed in the motions for permanent injunction. In the additional briefing submitted to the Court, ConocoPhillips argued in favor of OSH Act preemption and adopted the arguments and evidence originally submitted by Whirlpool. (See ConocoPhillips’ Add’l Br. on Preemption Issue 2-3.) D. Plaintiffs’ Claims and Court’s Conclusions Plaintiffs offer three constitutional bases for their request for permanent declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the Amendments. (See Br. in Support of Request for Perm. Inj. and Declaratory Relief 7-18.) First, Plaintiffs argue the Amendments result in an unconstitutional deprivation of private property interests. Plaintiffs’ argument related to their property rights takes two forms: (a) Plaintiffs allege an unconstitutional “taking” of private property in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 2, Section 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution (“Takings Clause challenge”); and (b) Plaintiffs allege an unconstitutional deprivation of their “fundamental right” to exclude others from private property, in violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 2, Section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution (“Substantive Due Process Clause challenge”). Second, Plaintiffs argue the Amendments are unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (“vagueness challenge”). Third, Plaintiffs argue the Amendments are preempted by various federal statutes in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (“Supremacy Clause challenge”). The Court grants in part and denies in part the motions for permanent injunction. In summary, the Court concludes: (1) the Amendments do not result in an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiffs’ private property rights or an unconstitutional deprivation of a “fundamental right”; (2) Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a facial vagueness challenge; and (3) the Amendments are preempted as in conflict with the OSH Act. The Court enjoins enforcement of the challenged laws against Plaintiffs and all employers subject to the OSH Act. II. Standing The Court has not addressed the issue of standing in prior written Orders or at prior hearings. The Court has an obligation to determine whether Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims before addressing the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. See Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, LLC, 434 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir.2006) (explaining that district courts must address standing and other matters pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to merits of claim); O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir.2005) (“Because it involves the court’s power to entertain the suit, constitutional standing is a threshold issue in every case before a federal court.”). “Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution extends the judicial power only to ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’ A dispute is an Article III ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ only if the plaintiff can establish what is known as ‘constitutional standing.’ ” Robey, 434 F.3d at 1210 (quotation omitted). “The constitutional requirements for standing to challenge a state statute in federal court are threefold: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged act, and (3) á likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1109 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). In addition to constitutional standing, Plaintiffs must satisfy three “prudential” standing principles: “(1) [Plaintiffs] generally must assert [their] own legal rights; (2) the court must refrain from adjudicating generalized grievances most appropriately addressed by one of the other branches of government; and (3) [Plaintiffs’] complaint must fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.” Utah Shared Access Alliance v. Carpenter, 463 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir.2006) (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing constitutional and prudential standing. Foulston, 441 F.3d at 1109. Plaintiffs have not been prosecuted for violation of the Amendments and are therefore making a pre-enforcement challenge. When faced with an allegedly unconstitutional criminal statute, “a plaintiff need not suffer an actual arrest or prosecution to establish a case or controversy.” Foulston, 441 F.3d at 1110. However, “[t]he mere presence on the statute books of an unconstitutional statute, in the absence of enforcement or credible threat of enforcement, does not entitle anyone to sue, even if they allege an inhibiting effect on constitutionally protected conduct prohibited by the statute.” Winsness v. Yo-com, 433 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.2006). Instead, when prospective relief against enforcement is sought, a plaintiff must show “an objectively justified fear of real consequences, which can be satisfied by showing a credible threat of prosecution or other consequences flowing from the statute’s enforcement.” Id. (quotation omitted). As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs face a credible threat of prosecution. The Amendments prohibit policies that Plaintiffs currently have in place and that Plaintiffs actively desire to enforce. Therefore, this is not a case in which Plaintiffs may or may not choose to violate the law at some point in the future. See Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736 (finding that a plaintiff lacked constitutional standing because he had “alleged neither an intent nor a desire to violate the flag-abuse statute in the future”). In addition, Plaintiffs have no reason to believe or assume the Amendments will not be enforced against them. See Winsness, 433 F.3d at 732-33 (10th Cir.2006) (finding that a plaintiffs prosecution for violation of Utah’s flag-abuse statute was too speculative where district attorney filed affidavit promising non-prosecution and U.S. Supreme Court had invalidated similar flag-abuse statute in another state). Unlike the flag-abuse statute at issue in Winsness, the constitutionality of the Amendments or similar laws has not been addressed by any court and certainly has not been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Nor is there any sworn promise of non-prosecution in the event this Court’s injunction is lifted. In this Court’s view, it would be illogical to find that Defendants — who are charged with enforcing and prosecuting the laws of Oklahoma — have no intention to enforce a criminal law that has not been declared unconstitutional or otherwise infirm. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs face a “credible threat of prosecution” as one consequence flowing from the Amendments. In addition to the general threat of prosecution, Plaintiffs allege three specific “other consequences” flowing from the Amendments’ prohibitions of their policies: “(I) impermissible interference ... with [their] constitutionally protected property rights; (2) the clear and imminent potential for criminal liability arising from the enforcement of the constitutionally vague and overbroad Amendments, and (3) the consequences of [their] inability to comply with federal statutes which conflict with and have supremacy over the Amendments.” (ConoeoPhillips’ Add’l Br. on Preemption Issues 7.) The Court will address each of these “other consequences” to determine if they constitute injuries in fact. The Court will also address whether Plaintiffs can meet the other two standing requirements for each of their specific claims for declaratory relief. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1867, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (stating that “the [Supreme] Court’s standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press”) (quotation omitted); Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir.2004). A. Injury to Property Rights — Takings Clause Challenge and Substantive Due Process Clause Challenge An injury in fact is an “invasion of a legally protected interest that is both (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Gandy, 416 F.3d at 1154. Plaintiffs have alleged injury to their right to exclude others from private property, which they allege to be legally protected by the Takings Clause and the Substantive Due Process Clause. This alleged injury to Plaintiffs’ property rights is concrete and particularized because, were the Amendments to be enforced, Plaintiffs’ right to exclude would be impaired to the extent Plaintiffs desire to exclude those carrying firearms in vehicles onto their private property. Further, the injury is not purely conjectural. Plaintiffs have policies excluding such individuals from their property, making it clear they actively exercise their right to exclude this segment of the population. To establish causation, a plaintiff must show the “injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and is not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. at 1156 (quotation omitted). Prior to enactment of the Amendments, Plaintiffs maintained their policies with no threat of criminal prosecution or injury to their property rights. Upon passage of the Amendments, Plaintiffs began the process of revising their policies and sought relief in this Court. The Amendments are the direct cause of the alleged injury to Plaintiffs’ property rights. The “redressability” element requires that a “plaintiff demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress its injury in fact.” Id. at 1158. A plaintiff must “show that a favorable judgment will relieve a discrete injury, although it need not relieve his or her every injury.” Id. If the Court were to declare that the Amendments result in an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiffs’ private property without just compensation or that the Amendments violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, their alleged injuries would be redressed. Specifically, Plaintiffs would be allowed to maintain their policies, exclude those carrying firearms in vehicles, and avoid the threat of prosecution. At the very least. Plaintiffs would receive a declaration they were entitled to some form of compensation for the deprivation of their property interests. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have standing to assert the Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Clause challenges. The Court must also consider prudential standing requirements, which require Plaintiffs to assert their “own legal rights” and to show that the controversy is not a “generalized grievance.” See Utah Shared Access Alliance, 463 F.3d at 1137. Under both the Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Clause, Plaintiffs make arguments regarding the rights of property owners that are not before the Court. (See Br. in Support of Request for Perm. Inj. and Declaratory Relief 7-8 (arguing that the Amendments “deprive Plaintiffs and other Oklahoma property owners of their fundamental rights of property ownership without compensation” and that the Amendments are “harmful to the rights of all Oklahoma property owners”).) The Court finds that Plaintiffs lack prudential standing to assert a Takings Clause challenge on behalf of all Oklahoma property owners because the Court’s adjudication of other property owners’ rights would be based on purely hypothetical arguments. The Court is not aware of any Takings Clause case in which a court invalidated a law based on its impact on property owners that were not parties to the litigation. Even the per se takings cases relied upon by Plaintiffs, which are explained infra Part III, are tied to the challenged law’s alleged impact on the challenger’s particular piece of property. The Amendments’ precise effect on an individual’s property rights differ depending on how that individual chooses to exercise his or her right to exclude. Accordingly, the Court limits its Takings Clause analysis to whether the Amendments result in a taking of these Plaintiffs’ property interests. With respect to the Substantive Due Process Clause challenge, the Court’s analysis is the same regardless of whose property is at issue. If the Amendments impair a fundamental right without being narrowly tailored to meet their objectives, the Amendments must be declared unconstitutional as to all Oklahoma property owners, including Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have therefore met the requirements of prudential standing to make the Substantive Due Process Clause challenge as it is framed in their brief. B. Injury to Right to “Fair Notice” — Vagueness Challenge Plaintiffs have also alleged injury to their right to receive fair notice of what conduct is criminalized by the Amendments, which is protected by the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs challenge three aspects of the Amendments as unconstitutionally vague: (1) discerning what policies will “have the effect” of prohibiting the activities the Amendments seek to allow; (2) discerning what is considered “property set aside for any vehicle” or “property set aside for any motor vehicle”; and (3) discerning what qualifies as a “locked vehicle” or a “locked motor vehicle.” (See Br. in Support of Request for Perm. Inj. and Declaratory Relief 14-17.) Because the Amendments have not been enforced. Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge is a facial challenge. In two recent cases, the Tenth Circuit addressed the constitutional standing requirements for a plaintiff bringing a facial vagueness challenge. In both cases, the Tenth Circuit found that an injury in fact existed based on the plaintiffs lack of notice regarding whether his desired conduct was or was not covered by the statute. In Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir.2006), there were conflicting Attorney General opinions interpreting the challenged statute in two different ways. The court found these “conflicting interpretations of the reporting statute and the uncertainty as to what conduct will lead to prosecution did potentially deprive [pjlaintiffs of fair notice.” Id. at 1110 (emphasis added). In Doctor John’s, Incorporated v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir.2006), the plaintiff company believed that it did not fall under the definition of a “sexually oriented business.” The court found an injury because the plaintiff could show he would suffer harm if he did or did not follow his interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1156. In both cases, there was ambiguity as to whether the plaintiffs desired conduct was actually covered by the challenged statute. In contrast, in this case, Plaintiffs’ desired conduct — maintaining their current policies and altogether excluding firearms from their property — is clearly prohibited by the Amendments. Plaintiffs raise three potentially vague aspects of the Amendments but fail to show that these ambiguities impair their right to receive fair notice of whether their desired policies are prohibited. Plaintiffs’ first vagueness challenge relates to discerning what types of policies “have the effect of’ prohibiting the conduct the Amendments seek to allow. (See Br. in Support of Request for Perm. Inj. and Declaratory Relief 16) (arguing that the “[t]he general public cannot discern what policies will ‘have the effect’ of prohibiting, such activities”). These particular Plaintiffs, however, cannot be confused as to whether their own policies “have the effect of’ prohibiting what the Amendments seek to allow — firearms in vehicles on their private property. All Plaintiffs have policies that prohibit unauthorized firearms anywhere on company property. The Amendments were passed in direct response to the enforcement of corporate policies like Plaintiffs’ against employees transporting firearms in their vehicles on company property. See generally Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.2006). While there might be vagueness problems in applying this language to other individuals or other types of policies, e.g., — whether an individual’s informal “household rule” that she will not allow firearms on her property qualifies as a “policy” that “has the effect of’ violating the Amendments — there can be no question that the Amendments prohibit the policies before the Court. Plaintiffs’ second vagueness challenge relates to the phrases “property set aside for any vehicle” and “property set aside for any motor vehicle.” Plaintiffs argue that these phrases potentially prohibit firearms in areas other than parking lots, such as internal roads within a corporate complex or areas inside the corporate facility that are traversed by forklifts, tractors, and other motorized equipment. However, Plaintiffs’ current policies prohibit employees or visitors from having unauthorized firearms anywhere on their property. Thus, whether the phrase “property set aside for any motor vehicle” means only parking lots or extends to other internal corporate roads mentioned by Plaintiffs, the phrase still unambiguously criminalizes Plaintiffs’ current policies. Again, although problems could arise with application of this phrase to others. The third vagueness challenge relates to the problems caused by the phrases “locked vehicle” and “locked motor vehicle.” Plaintiffs’ concern is that a firearm may technically be in a “locked” vehicle but still easily accessible because that vehicle is an open-air Jeep or convertible. Again, Plaintiffs’ policies, as they currently exist, disallow unauthorized firearms everywhere on company property and therefore disallow the firearms whether or not they are in a locked, unlocked, exposed, or unexposed vehicle. Thus, Plaintiffs’ desired conduct would not be impacted by resolution of ambiguities in the phrase “locked vehicle.” Plaintiffs cannot show that the three allegedly vague aspects of the statute have prevented them from knowing whether their desired actions violate the Amendments. Instead, these particular Plaintiffs are on notice that the precise conduct in which they wish to engage — maintaining the policies in the record before the Court — is criminalized by the Amendments. In this situation, Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the laws as unconstitutionally vague. See Z.J. Gifts D-k, LLC v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir.2002) (stating that, outside the context of challenged laws that impact First Amendment expression, “[sjtanding usually requires that the plaintiff assert an injury to himself, rather than injuries to third parties not before the court”), rev’d on other grounds, 541 U.S. 774, 124 S.Ct. 2219, 159 L.Ed.2d 84 (2004); see also United States v. Day, 223 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir.2000) (“[Vjagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand. One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.”); Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 n. 6 (6th Cir.1995) (noting that, in a case that does not involve First Amendment freedoms, a plaintiff “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only insofar as the statute is vague as applied to their conduct”). To be clear, the Court has significant concerns regarding the Amendments’ reach to “policies” enforced by individual property owners regarding firearms near their homes, the Amendments’ lack of clarity in informing Oklahoma citizens of exactly what conduct is criminalized, and the potential for arbitrary enforcement of the Amendments. However, this Court must be satisfied that the record before it presents a justiciable controversy, and the Court concludes that these are not the proper plaintiffs to make a facial vagueness challenge. C. Injury to Compliance with Federal Law — Supremacy Clause Challenge In the additional briefing ordered by the Court, Plaintiff clarified its Supremacy Clause argument. Plaintiffs’ position is that the Amendments must be wholly invalidated based on the sheer number of conflicts the Amendments create with federal law: “ConocoPhillips believes that the numerous conflicting federal statutes create an untenable situation in Oklahoma with regard to the Amendments.... The significant degree of conflict preemption would suggest the total invalidation of the Amendments is appropriate.” (See ConocoPhillips’ Add’l Br. on Preemption Issues 7-8.) The allegedly conflicting federal statutes and regulations include, but are not limited to, the OSH Act; the FGFSZA, a specific provision the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Act”) contained at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); and 39 C.F.R. § 232.1 (prohibiting possession of firearms on postal property). Plaintiffs argue they have standing to make their Supremacy Clause challenge based on the collective number of conflicts with federal law, without regard to whether Plaintiffs are impacted by the allegedly preemptive federal law. Although the Amendments are likely in conflict with several federal laws, the Court is aware of no legal doctrine authorizing total invalidation of a state law based on the number of conflicts it creates with various federal laws. Plaintiffs cited no legal authority for this position, and the Court was unable to locate any such authority. In addition, Plaintiffs cited no standard setting forth how many conflicts must exist in order to wholly invalidate the state law. In the absence of citation to such authority, the Court’s preemption analysis is limited to the three categories articulated by the Supreme Court: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001); Choate v. Champion Home Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 792 (10th Cir.2000). Plaintiffs do not and cannot argue that Congress intended to occupy the entire “field” of firearm regulation to the exclusion of the States. See 18 U.S.C. § 927 (stating that Congress does not intend to “occupy the field” of firearm regulation and that state laws may stand so long as they do not conflict). Thus, Plaintiffs’ challenges are necessarily based on the doctrine of “conflict preemption.” This doctrine requires detailed, individualized consideration of each allegedly preemptive federal law. See, e.g., Choate, 222 F.3d at 795-97 (explaining that, in conducting a “conflict preemption” analysis, a court must evaluate the congressional intent and overall objectives of the allegedly preemptive federal law). Accordingly, the Court must analyze Plaintiffs’ preemption challenge individually as to each allegedly conflicting federal law. In turn, for purposes of standing, the Court must analyze whether Plaintiffs have constitutional standing to make Supremacy Clause challenges as to each allegedly conflicting federal statute. The Court assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiffs can meet the injury and causation elements for all preemption challenges. However, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot meet the “redressability” requirement for any federal statute or regulation raised, with the exceptions of the OSH Act and Brady Act. This is because Plaintiffs cannot “show that a favorable judgment” as to any of the other allegedly preemptive federal statutes will “relieve [their] discrete injury,” Gandy, 416 F.3d at 1154. As an example, Plaintiffs argue that 39 C.F.R. § 232.1, which prohibits possession of firearms on postal property, preempts the Amendments. If Plaintiffs were successful in this challenge, the Amendments would only be preempted to the extent they conflicted with this federal law. See Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Serv., 516 U.S. 474, 476, 116 S.Ct. 1063, 134 L.Ed.2d 115 (1996) (stating that, in cases where conflict preemption by federal law is the means for invalidation of state law, “state law is displaced only ‘to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law ”) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation cfe Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983)). Thus, a successful Supremacy Clause challenge would not permit Plaintiffs, who do not own or operate postal property, to maintain their policies or to avoid criminal prosecution. Instead, Plaintiffs would be in the same position they were before bringing the lawsuit. This same conclusion applies to all but two of the allegedly preemptive federal laws — the OSH Act and the Brady Act. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs lack standing to bring any Supremacy Clause challenges that, if successful, would not redress their alleged injuries and would not allow them to maintain the policies in the record before the Court. See Nat’l Audobon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 849 (9th Cir.2002) (finding that plaintiffs alleged injury to the bird population was “redressable because if [plaintiff] wins on its preemption claims, the federal parties will resume their prior use of leghold traps, thereby redressing the injury by protecting the bird population”); Antilles Cement Corp. v. Calderon, 288 F.Supp.2d 187, 193 (D.P.R.2003) (finding that a plaintiff who solely imported foreign cement did not have standing to bring its Supremacy Clause challenge because the allegedly conflicting federal regulations dealt only with domestic commerce). In contrast, the OSH Act’s requirements clearly apply to Plaintiffs, all of which are “employers” under the OSH Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (defining “employer” as “a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees, but does not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State”). If the Court were to invalidate the Amendments based on the OSH Act, this would prevent enforcement of the Amendments against Plaintiffs, allow them to maintain their policies, and redress their alleged injuries. Further, to a more limited extent, invalidation by the Brady Act would also redress Plaintiffs’ injuries by allowing Plaintiffs to exclude eight more categories of individuals than the Amendments currently permit them to exclude. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (prohibiting nine specific categories of persons from possessing firearms, only one of which (convicted felons) is currently excepted from the Amendments). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to assert Supremacy Clause challenges based on conflict with the OSH Act and the Brady Act. Plaintiffs have standing to assert the Takings Clause challenge, the Substantive Due Process Clause challenge, and a limited form of the Supremacy Clause challenge. There is therefore more than one constitutional question presented. As a general rule, “[w]hen a case presents two constitutional questions, one of which disposes of the entire case and the other of which does not, resolution of the casedispositive question should suffice.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 62, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Although the Court ultimately holds the Amendments are preempted by the OSH Act, the Court will address the other two constitutional questions because they potentially entitle Plaintiffs to greater or different declaratory relief. For example, a successful Takings Clause challenge could result in a finding that the Amendments constitute a taking of Plaintiffs’ property without just compensation, entitling them to greater injunctive relief and/or compensation. A successful Substantive Due Process Clause challenge would result in total invalidation of the Amendments, rather than only partial invalidation to the extent of conflict with federal law. Therefore, the Court’s OSH Act preemption holding does not “dispose! ] of’ Plaintiffs’ entire case, and the Court will address all constitutional questions for which standing exists. See id. III. Takings Clause Challenge A. Ripeness Defendants have not raised the issue of ripeness of the Takings Clause challenge. However, ripeness must be raised sua sponte by the Court because it pertains to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Bateman v. City of W. Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 706 (10th Cir.1996). The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth two specific ripeness requirements for typical claims arising under the Takings Clause: (1) “a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue”; and (2) “[a] taking claim is not yet ripe [until the property owner] ... seek[s] compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.” See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985); see also Bateman, 89 F.3d at 708 (holding that Takings Clause claim was not “ripe for review because [plaintiff] has not sought compensation from the City pursuant to Utah’s inverse condemnation law”). Despite Plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy these typical requirements, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ challenge ripe for review. First, it must be noted that Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court has indicated that parties threatened with a taking may seek redress for their injuries notwithstanding certain ripeness requirements. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (“While the Declaratory Judgment Act does not expand our jurisdiction, it expands the scope of available remedies. Here it allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before potentially uncompensable damages are sustained.”). Thus, the procedural posture of the case may render the Williamson requirements moot. Second, the Williamson requirements have no application because, were they satisfied, they would not render the case any more or less ripe for judicial review. The first requirement relates to a final decision by a state or local agency regarding the property at issue. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 187-88, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (reasoning that a property owner did not meet the first ripeness requirement because he had submitted a plan to the relevant state agency but had not sought certain variances that could have resolved some of the agency’s objections to the property owner’s proposal). In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the Amendments function to deprive them of their right to exclude others engaging in an unwanted activity. The Amendments do so by their express language and by criminalizing Plaintiffs’ policies that seek to exclude others engaged in the unwanted activity. In this case, there is no state agency charged with enforcing the Amendments, and there is no potential agency decision that would render the controversy more meaningfully developed. The second requirement relates to seeking compensation in state court. See id. This requirement has no application because Plaintiffs do not allege any economic impact resulting from the Amendments. Although a factual record is typically necessary to evaluate the economic harm caused by a taking, see, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2003), Plaintiffs do not allege to have suffered economic harm as a result of the Amendments. Instead, Plaintiffs focus exclusively on the Amendments’ impact on their right to exclude. Thus, to the extent the economic harm factor must be weighed as part of various takings analyses, which are discussed at length below, this factor will not weigh in favor of a taking. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987) (noting that challengers faced an “uphill battle” in facially attacking a law as a taking because they had not alleged any economic harm resulting from the regulations). Finally, the Court finds the ultimate touchstones of a ripeness inquiry — “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration” — weigh in favor of issuing a decision on the merits. See Bate-man, 89 F.3d at 706. With respect to the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision,” the Court has before it (1) the text of the Amendments (the alleged taking of private property rights); Plaintiffs’ policies restricting firearms on their business property (the specific exercise of the allegedly injured property right); and (3) statements by Plaintiffs regarding the purposes and application of such policies (evidence of how the challenged law impacts their property rights). This is sufficient for the Court to meaningfully evaluate the Takings Clause claim. As to the second factor, there is “significant hardship” to the parties occasioned by withholding court consideration because the Amendments are criminal laws. Plaintiffs face the choice of eliminating/revising their policies (thereby suffering the alleged injury to their right to exclude) or maintaining their policies (thereby suffering the injury of criminal prosecution). In sum, based on Plaintiffs’ arguments and the record evidence, the “factual components of the dispute are sufficiently fleshed out to permit meaningful judicial review.” Id. at 707. B. Framework for Analysis The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005). The Takings Clause does not prohibit the taking of private property but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power. Id. It “is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” Id. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074. The “paradigmatic” taking is a direct government appropriation of private property. Id. In addition to outright appropriation of property, the government may effect a taking through a regulation if it is “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.” Id. This is known as a “regulatory taking.” Plaintiffs argue the Amendments result in a “regulatory” taking due to the burden the Amendments place on their private property rights — specifically, the burden placed on their right to exclude. In Lingle, the Supreme Court provided a framework for addressing regulatory takings. First, a court must determine if the regulation results in one of two types of “per se ” regulatory takings. Id at 538, 125 S.Ct. 2074. These occur (1) where a regulation requires an owner to suffer a “permanent physical invasion” of the property (known as a Loretto or physical taking); or (2) where a regulation completely deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses” of the property (known as a Lucas taking). Id. If a regulation results in a per se taking, this ends the inquiry. If a regulation does not qualify for per se treatment, it is analyzed under the ad hoc balancing test first set forth in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. 2074. Although they have different theoretical underpinnings, all three takings inquiries, Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central, share a “common touchstone.” Id. at 539, 125 S.Ct. 2074. “Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.” Id. Each of the tests focuses directly on the “severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights.” Id. In the Loretto context, the “