Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (JONES PLAINTIFFS) NANCY F. ATLAS, District Judge. This commercial and tort case is presently in a unique procedural posture. There currently are thirty-five Plaintiffs who include nine original plaintiffs and numerous intervenors. Plaintiffs have divided themselves into two camps, each seeking representation by different attorneys. There are several motions pending before the Court that are relevant to one of these groups. First is a Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Petition (“Motion to Amend”) [Doc. # 119], supplemented by a “Memorandum in Support” [Doc. # 127], filed by attorney Grover Hankins on behalf of Plaintiffs Adrienne Bradley, Wayland Jackson, Scottie Jones, Lawrence Neloms, Shirley D. Oliver, Edward O’Brien, Donald Phlegm, Emma Phlegm, Marie Rodriguez, and Mario Rodriguez (collectively, the “Jones Plaintiffs”). Defendants Paper Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International (“PACE International”), Local 4227 Paper Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International (“PACE Local”), Roby G. Plemons, David Taylor, Joseph Campbell, Melvin Byer, James Lefton, B.G. Martinez, and Maxwell Hickerson (collectively, the “Union Defendants”) have responded [Doc. # 149]. Upon review of the Motion to Amend, the supporting attachments and Memorandum, and Defendants’ Response, as well as all pertinent matters of record, and applicable law, the Court concludes that Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is denied. In addition, all named Defendants collectively have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Jones Plaintiffs’ Claims for Failure to Comply with Court Orders and Rules of Civil Procedure (“Motion to Dismiss”) [Doc. # 124], The Jones Plaintiffs have responded [Doc. # 152], Although this motion to dismiss does not directly address the pending motion to amend, it does seek dismissal of all claims asserted by the Jones Plaintiffs, including those in their proposed “Second Amended Complaint” [Doc. # 112] and, should the pending motion to amend be granted, those in their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. # 119-3]. The Motion to Dismiss is granted, consistent with the rulings herein and those in the Court’s Memorandum and Order of Nov. 18, 2007 [Doc. # 168] (the “Curry Memorandum”), addressing the Curry Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. # 116], discussed infra. I. BACKGROUND The factual record is set out in more detail in the Court’s Memorandum and Order of March 22, 2007, 484 F.Supp.2d 604 (“March 2007 Order”) [Doc. #89]. Briefly, this controversy centers around Defendants’ response to an industrial accident that occurred at Phillips Chemical Company’s (“Phillips”) Pasadena Plastics Complex “K-Resin” Unit on March 27, 2000. The accident left one Phillips employee dead and many more injured. Within days of the event, the injured employees were called to a meeting and informed by representatives from Defendant Williams & Bailey Law Firm, LLP (“Williams & Bailey”), that Phillips’ workers’ compensation insurance covered the incident and Plaintiffs’ injuries. The Jones Plaintiffs allege that Williams & Bailey representatives further stated that under Texas law, because Phillips had workers’ compensation insurance, the employees could not bring personal injury lawsuits against the company. In November 2005, nine Phillips employees and spouses of employees brought suit against the Phillips Defendants, Pacific Employers Insurance Company (“Pacific”) (Phillips’ workers’ compensation carrier), Williams & Bailey, and the employees’ Union (PACE International and PACE Local) and Union officials, alleging that these defendants conspired to intentionally misrepresent the state of Phillips’ workers’ compensation insurance. Specifically, these plaintiffs alleged that Phillips used an internal employee benefit plan to pay some employees’ claims in order to create the appearance of workers’ compensation so that employees would not file individual personal injury lawsuits. Plaintiffs asserted numerous state and federal law claims arising from these events. Especially relevant to the Motion to Amend are complicated procedural events that have occurred throughout this litigation: Attorneys Grover G. Hankins and Melvin Houston, as joint counsel, commenced this suit in November 2005. On April 3, 2006, the two attorneys filed an amended complaint on behalf of the nine original plaintiffs, and eleven new plaintiffs. Soon thereafter, evidence of a dispute between the two attorneys and allegedly among the plaintiffs emerged. On April 6, 2006, Mr. Hankins filed a Designation of Lead Counsel, asserting that the nine original plaintiffs had designated him their “Attorney-in-Charge” and expected him to “have full control and management in this cause and to receive all communications from the Court or other counsel relating to the case.” Over the next few months, the parties conducted discovery. Three of the four groups of defendants — the Phillips Defendants, Pacific, and Williams & Bailey— timely filed individual motions for partial summary judgment on the question of Phillips’ workers’ compensation subscriber status [Docs. # 36, # 37, and # 41]. Mr. Hankins and Mr. Houston jointly filed various responses on behalf of all twenty plaintiffs [Docs. # 49, # 51, # 52, # 58, and #59]. On September 19, 2006, while the summary judgment motions were sub judice, Mr. Hankins filed a “Motion to Remove Melvin Houston [and a co-counsel] as Attorneys of Record for the Original Plaintiffs” (“Motion to Remove”) [Doc. # 65]. According to Mr. Hankins, he and Mr. Houston “had inherent directional and supervisory conflicts that have gone unresolved and because of Attorney Houston’s steely resolve, said conflicts have the potential of threatening the successful litigation of this cause.” Specifically, Mr. Hankins complained that Mr. Houston added clients to the case without his or the original plaintiffs’ consent, and that Mr. Houston expressed his intent to represent a group of intervenors “over whom Lead Counsel Hankins would have no direction and/or control.” Mr. Houston responded that Mr. Hankins lacked proper consent from each of the named plaintiffs to dismiss Mr. Houston or his firm. The Court declined to rule on matters of an attorney-client nature and accordingly denied the Motion to Remove. While the Motion to Remove was pending, the rift between Mr. Hankins and Mr. Houston — and perhaps among their respective clients — became more pronounced. On October 4, 2006, Mr. Han-kins filed a Motion [for Leave] to Amend [Doc. # 73] seeking to file a Second Amended Complaint [Doc. # 73-2] on behalf of fourteen plaintiffs. Mr. Hankins asserted that he had “filed several motions seeking to change counsel, and for additional time to allow Plaintiffs to provided [sic] the Court with information not previously presented by former co-counsel for the Plaintiffs.” A review of Mr. Han-kins’ proposed Second Amended Complaint [Doc. # 73-2] revealed that this expanded group of plaintiffs was seeking to add two entirely new claims, both against new defendants. Specifically, Mr. Han-kins’ clients sought to raise a claim that Defendants violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and a claim that Phillips and some previously unidentified foreign subsidiaries provided an unsafe workplace at the K-Resin facility in violation of unspecified OSHA standards. The proposed Second Amended Complaint also included expanded theories regarding the alleged invalidity of Phillips’ putative workers’ compensation insurance policy. In denying Mr. Hankins’ motion for leave to amend, the Court noted that his clients were seeking to amend their claims and assert entirely new theories six months after a pleading amendment deadline set months earlier. The Court questioned why the putative new claims and theories had not previously been asserted, given that the events precipitating this lawsuit occurred in March 2000. In addition, the Court held that Mr. Hankins’ clients had failed to demonstrate that an extension of time to amend their pleadings was warranted. Finally, the Court determined that, “Defendants should not be required to repeat their efforts in order to respond to adjustments to Plaintiffs’ theories that were available but not asserted prior to the deadline for amended pleading or during discovery.” On March 22, 2007, the Court granted Defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment and ordered Plaintiffs to file, by April 22, 2007, a “Third Amended Complaint” in accordance with the Court’s legal ruling that Phillips was a valid workers’ compensation insurance subscriber and that Plaintiffs were covered by Phillips’ policy. The Court emphasized that “Plaintiffs are not permitted to add new claims,” and admonished that Plaintiffs must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) and assert only claims that were warranted in light of the Court’s decision. On April 2, 2007, Mr. Houston filed a Motion to Certify the Order (that granted partial summary judgment) [Doc. # 90] and a Motion for Reconsideration (of that Order) [Doc. # 91] on behalf of ten plaintiffs and fourteen intervenors. Mr. Han-kins subsequently adopted and joined both motions on behalf of the twelve plaintiffs he claimed to represent. The Court denied both motions and gave all plaintiffs until May 30, 2007, to file their amended complaint. On May 30, 2007, Mr. Houston filed a “Third Amended Complaint” [Doc. # 111] on behalf of ten plaintiffs and the (now) fifteen intervenors (hereinafter, the “Curry Plaintiffs”). On May 31, 2007, Mr. Hankins filed a pleading denominated “Second Amended Complaint” [Doc. # 112] on behalf of the remaining ten plaintiffs (the “Jones Plaintiffs”). Notably, and contrary to the Court’s admonition in the March 2007 Order, Mr. Hankins’ proposed “Second Amended Complaint” ambiguously named two, or possibly as many as five, new defendants. He also realleged the additional claims he had sought to raise for the first time in his unsuccessful Motion to Amend [Doc. # 73]. This proposed Second Amended Complaint, in further contravention of the March 2007 Order, repeated verbatim many allegations from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [Doe. #25] that Phillips lacked valid workers’ compensation insurance — claims the Court had rejected in the March 2007 Order. At a June 11, 2007 conference, precipitated by the competing plaintiffs’ counsels’ submission of separate and inconsistent amended complaints, the Court rejected the Jones Plaintiffs’ “Second” [Doc. # 112] and Curry Plaintiffs’ “Third” [Doc. # 111] Amended Complaints and admonished both attorneys to comply with prior orders of the Court. The Court stated that Mr. Hankins’ proposed claims under ERISA and the False Claims Act would not be entertained in this suit, but could, if legally viable, be brought in a separate lawsuit. Furthermore, the Court made clear its expectation that Mr. Hankins and Mr. Houston “continue to collaborate” to craft a complaint that conformed with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and to get the claims into some “manageable” posture. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the Curry Plaintiffs (represented by Mr. Houston) would be permitted to file a “Fourth Amended Complaint” and the Jones Plaintiffs (represented by Mr. Hankins) would be permitted to file a supplement to that complaint in which the Jones Plaintiffs could adopt the claims in Mr. Houston’s new pleading to the extent they wanted to do so. The Court further ruled that if the Jones Plaintiffs wanted to raise additional claims, they could “file a complaint so long as [Mr. Hankins] commit[ted] to [the Court] that [he would] research each element [to] be sure [he had a] factual basis for each element of every claim ... include[d].” The Court also reminded the attorneys of their Rule 11 obligations and stressed that “[t]he amended complaints need to be short and to the point.” On June 18, 2007, pursuant to the Court’s June 11 Order, Mr. Houston filed on behalf of the Curry Plaintiffs a Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. # 116] that variously asserts six claims against the Phillips Defendants, Pacific, and Williams & Bailey. On June 25, 2007 — the deadline for Mr. Hankins to submit his supplement to Mr. Houston’s Complaint — Mr. Hankins filed the Motion to Amend [Doc. # 119] that is the subject of this Memorandum and Order. Contrary to the Court’s directions, Mr. Hankins also filed a proposed sixty-one page complaint [Doc. # 119-3] that, while containing a multitude of factual assertions, contains putative legal claims that are, at best, difficult to understand. This proposed complaint also largely reiterates claims Mr. Hankins’ clients alleged in earlier pleadings. On June 26, Mr. Hankins filed a “Designation of Defendants and Claims” (“Designation”) [Doc. # 120], It is unclear if Mr. Hankins intends this “Designation” to be the supplement that the Court permitted him at the June 11 conference to file. Nonetheless, the Court construes this document as Mr. Hankins’ clients’ authorized (albeit untimely) supplement to the Curry Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. II. STANDARDS OF LAW A. Leave to Amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir.1998). Rule 15(a) “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 254 (5th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). However, leave to amend is by no means automatic, and the decision to grant or deny leave to amend “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir.2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Goldstein, 340 F.3d at 254; Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 763 (5th Cir.1999); Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir.1993). If the district court lacks a “substantial reason” to deny leave, its discretion is not broad enough to permit denial. Lyn-Lea, 283 F.3d at 286; see also Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir.2001) (denying leave to amend absent articulable reason is an abuse of discretion); Wimm, 3 F.3d at 139. In deciding whether to grant leave to file an amended pleading, the district court “may consider such factors as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)) (denying leave to amend because of bad faith and dilatory motive); see also Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading, 195 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir.1999) (“A district court acts within its discretion when dismissing a motion to amend that is frivolous or futile.”). “Futility” in the context of a Rule 15 motion to amend means that the proposed “amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir.2000); see also Duzich v. Advantage Finance Corp., 395 F.3d 527, 531 (5th Cir.2004) (approving district court’s denial of a Rule 15(a) motion to amend using the same reasoning as it used in granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). However, “[e]ven if substantial reason to deny leave exists, the court should consider prejudice to the movant, as well as judicial economy, in determining whether justice requires granting leave.” Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Union Planters Nat’l Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir.1982)). B. Motion to Dismiss A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir.2002). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true. Id. A claim is legally insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6) “only if there is no set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations in the complaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Power Entm’t, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Prop., Inc., 151 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir.1998). However, “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a right of action” is insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 2d § 1216 at 156-59); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (A plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). A cause of action can fail to state a “claim upon which relief can be granted” if, inter alia, it fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Buerger v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 982 F.Supp. 1247, 1249-50 (E.D.Tex.1997); Bank of Abbeville & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 201 Fed.Appx. 988, 990 (5th Cir.2006) (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be a proper vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading under Rule 8.”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a plaintiff is obligated to provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)) (On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only fair notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.” Id. at 1965 n. 3 (internal quotations omitted). When the complaint contains inadequate factual allegations, “this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. at 1966. “[A] district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.” Id. at 1967 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983)). In addition, Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 n. 6 (5th Cir.2000). In particular, the pleadings should “specify the statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain why the statements were fraudulent.” South-land Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Williams v. WMX Tech., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177-78 (5th Cir.1997)). Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to allege the existence of facts sufficient to warrant the pleaded conclusion that fraud has occurred. See In re Haber Oil Co., 12 F.3d 426, 439 (5th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). Because the requirements of Rule 9 are more stringent than those for Rule 8, the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly applies with at least equal force to the Rule 9 pleading requirements. III. ANALYSIS A. Claims Based on Alleged Absence of Workers’ Compensation Coverage The Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed Fourth Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants improperly handled workers’ compensation claims for Phillips’ injured employees by engaging in an “elaborate and complex scheme” aimed at “defrauding Plaintiffs out of filing personal injury claims against Phillips,” and accomplished via subterfuge of the requirements of Texas workers’ compensation law, bribery, and “corporate shell games.” These theories are largely premised on the position that Phillips lacked workers’ compensation coverage — a theory the Court has definitively rejected. To the extent the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed claims are based on this failed theory, the claims are dismissed and/or leave to amend to add these claims is denied, as described in more detail below. Many claims in the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed Fourth Amended Complaint also are premised on a distinct theory: The Jones Plaintiffs claim they were not actually employed by Phillips at the time of the accident, but instead worked for one of two foreign subsidiaries, Phillips Daelim and Phillips Sumika, which allegedly operated the K-Resin plant as joint venturers with Phillips and which were not subscribers to workers’ compensation insurance. Thus, the Jones Plaintiffs deduce that there is no bar to the personal injury claims they seek to assert. The Jones Plaintiffs alternatively allege that because Phillips failed to abide by certain unspecified regulations of the Texas Department of Insurance, Phillips was “not a [workers’ compensation insurance] subscriber under the laws of the State of Texas.” These theories are unavailing. The Court has held not only that Phillips was a subscriber to workers’ compensation insurance, but also that those injured in the explosion — all Plaintiffs working at the K-Resin plant at the time of the explosion— were covered by that insurance. Sixteen months after commencement of this suit— which was not filed until more than four years after the accident in question — the Court decided the question of Phillips workers’ compensation insurance subscriber status. By that time, the allegation that Phillips was the owner and operator of the K-Resin plant had been included in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and the Phillips Defendants had admitted that the allegation was true. Moreover, before the Court ruled in March 2007, Plaintiffs had amended their original complaint once, had been granted lengthy continuances to permit investigation and discovery on the question of subscriber status, and had extensively briefed the issue. The Jones Plaintiffs’ cursory suggestion that they did not know of Phillips Daelim and Phillips Sumika until recently and their conclusory assertion about the Texas insurance regulations do not entitle Plaintiffs to further amendment of their complaint. The Court exercises its discretion under Rule 15 to deny this relief for several reasons. First, the new allegations contradict allegations elsewhere in the Fourth Amended Complaint that “[a]t the time of the explosion and fire ... the [Phillips plant] was owned and operated by Phillips Petroleum Company, d/b/a/ Phillips Chemical Company.” Plaintiffs submit no evi-dentiary material 'and make no argument to establish factually that the information on which this theory is premised is “new.” In any event, these corporate and regulatory matters could and should have been discovered much earlier in this dispute. Defendants would suffer prejudice if entirely new theories are asserted so late in this ease. This suit has been pending for years, was not initiated until more than four years after the explosion, and has been a complex and expensive pro'ceeding. The Jones Plaintiffs unduly delayed in attempting to assert the “new employer” and regulatory defect theories, and will not now be permitted to do so. Alternatively, leave to amend to assert this new theory is denied because the parties relied on the theory that Phillips was Plaintiffs’ employer and the operator of the plant, and the Court granted summary judgment on that basis. “A busy district court need not allow itself to be imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim.” Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 469 (5th Cir.1967). “There is even more reason for refusing to allow amendment long after summary judgment has been granted.” Id. (citing County of Marin v. United States, 150 F.Supp. 619, 623 (N.D.Cal.1957), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 412, 78 S.Ct. 880, 2 L.Ed.2d 879 (1958)). Indeed, “[m]uch of the value of summary judgment procedure ... would be dissipated if a party were free to rely on one theory in an attempt to defeat a motion for summary judgment and then, should that theory prove unsound, come back long thereafter and fight on the basis of some other theory.” Id. at 470. The Court has noted that “[t]he existence of applicable workers’ compensation coverage has always been a crucial threshold issue in this case.” The Court is not willing to revisit this issue once again by allowing the Jones Plaintiffs to assert new theories where no valid reason has been offered for their failure to present these theories at an earlier time. Finally, the doctrine of judicial estoppel operates to bar the Jones Plaintiffs’ assertion of new theories that the plant was owned and operated by, or that Plaintiffs were employed by, entities other than Phillips. Judicial estoppel is a common law doctrine by which a party who has assumed one position in his pleadings may be estopped from thereafter assuming an inconsistent position. See Matter of Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205-06 (5th Cir.1999); Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir.1988). The purpose of judicial estoppel is “to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing parties from playing fast and loose with courts and prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.” Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 206 (citation omitted); see also Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3rd Cir.1996) (“The basic principle ... is that absent any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory.”). Courts generally identify two limitations on the application of judicial estoppel: (1) The position of the party to be estopped must be clearly inconsistent with a prior position, and (2) the court must have accepted the prior position. See Ahrens v. Perot Sys. Corp., 205 F.3d 831, 833 (5th Cir.2000); Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 206. Judicial acceptance means only that the court has adopted the position urged by a party, either as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition. Id. at 206. As explained above, the judicial estoppel criteria are met in this case. Plaintiffs asserted from inception of this suit in 2005 that Phillips owned and operated the K-Resin plant, and that Phillips was Plaintiffs’ employer. Phillips admitted these assertions were true. The Court relied on these allegations in its March 2007 Order [Doc. # 89]. Plaintiffs may not delay this litigation by belatedly asserting a putative new theory inconsistent with their earlier positions. Thus, to the extent the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed claims rely upon theories that the Jones Plaintiffs were not covered under a workers’ compensation insurance policy held by their employer, Phillips, their Motion to Amend is denied. B. RICO Claim In response to a request by the Court for additional briefing on the viability of the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed RICO claim — the “Second Claim for Relief’ in their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. # 119-3] — the Union Defendants, Pacific, the Phillips Defendants, and Williams & Bailey have separately filed motions to dismiss that claim [Docs. # 158, # 159, # 160, and # 161, respectively]. The Jones Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed this claim [Doc. # 164]. Thus, Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Jones Plaintiffs’ RICO claim are denied as moot. However, the Court notes that in their motion to voluntarily dismiss their proposed RICO claim, the Jones Plaintiffs state that according to a “nationally recognized RICO expert with whom they consulted” about the viability of the claim, it was determined that the “claim had a flaw and should not be sought because the [the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed] fraud claims ... substantially covered the issues before the Court.” The Court, in its own research on this claim, agrees that the claim is fundamentally flawed, but not for the reason the Jones Plaintiffs assert. First, the claim as drafted is unclear and confusing, thus precipitating the Court’s request for additional briefing. Indeed, the confusion generated by the Jones Plaintiffs’ claim is not limited to cryptic prose. The claim is also internally contradictory. Further, the Jones Plaintiffs’ RICO claim relies on repeated assertions that Phillips was not a valid workers’ compensation insurance subscriber. As noted in Section III.A., supra, the question of Phillips’ subscriber status has been decided and claims premised on Plaintiffs’ assertions that Phillips’ was not insured are rejected as legally and factually unsupportable. Moreover, the Court agrees with many of Defendants’ arguments that the claim, though spanning forty-three pages (including eighteen pages incorporated by reference), suffers from several pleading deficiencies. The Jones Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which provides that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 ... may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover ... [treble] damages.” A RICO claim must allege legally cognizable injury. See Cullom v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.1988). Further, RICO claims under § 1962 require: “(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise.” In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 741-42 (5th Cir.1993) (emphasis in original) (citing Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir.1988)). The Court is not convinced that the Jones Plaintiffs have adequately pled a “pattern of racketeering activity,” which requires a plaintiff to allege — in the manner required by Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — “(1) predicate acts — the requisite racketeering activity, and (2) a pattern of such acts.” Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 742. Finally, and most importantly, the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed RICO claim fails to allege a “RICO injury.” In essence, the Jones Plaintiffs appear to allege that Defendants fraudulently concealed the true source of payments made to the Jones Plaintiffs to compensate them for injuries suffered in a workplace accident. In so doing, the Jones Plaintiffs claim they were deceived into believing that these payments constituted workers’ compensation benefits. Believing they were receiving workers’ compensation, the Jones Plaintiffs allege that they were fraudulently denied their right to pursue personal injury lawsuits against their employer due to the exclusive remedies regime of Texas’ workers’ compensation law. “‘[A RICO] plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the [RICO] violation.’ ” Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). This requirement excludes from recovery personal injuries and the economic consequences of personal injuries. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979); Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir.1992). As the Court discusses in more depth in the Curry Memorandum, the Jones Plaintiffs’ fundamentally seek recovery for personal injuries and thus, they lack standing to assert a RICO claim. C. ERISA and False Claims Act Claims The Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend focuses entirely on their request to add an ERISA claim to this suit. On July 25, 2007 — a full month after the filing deadline established by the Court — Mr. Hankins filed his supplemental Memorandum in Support. The Memorandum in Support merely highlights Mr. Hankins’ patent disregard for the Court’s various prior orders prohibiting addition of new claims and new defendants. In the Memorandum, Mr. Hankins sets out factual bases for an ERISA claim (which he apparently seeks to bring against five new defendants— MetLife, Aetna, Cigna, Phillips Daelim, and Phillips Sumika). The request to add an ERISA claim is in flagrant disregard of the Court’s prior orders and again is denied. The Jones Plaintiffs also “request that the Court allow [them] to add a claim under the False Claims Act ... once they have sent their letter precedent to the United States Attorney General.” The Jones Plaintiffs, through their counsel Mr. Hankins, concede that adding a False Claims Act claim would cause additional delay in litigating this case, which the Court noted during the June 11 hearing it was unwilling to allow. Plaintiffs provide no basis for the Court to alter its previously ruling that any False Claims Act causes of action must be pursued in a separate action, as it was — and still is — too late to add new claims in this case. The Jones Plaintiffs’ request to add a False Claims Act claim is denied. With the foregoing in mind, to avoid any misunderstanding, the Court will address specifically the viability of each of the Jones Plaintiffs’ claims in their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. D. Evaluation of the Jones Plaintiffs’ Proposed Claims 1. “First Claim for Relief: 1, 3 Buta-diene Exposure: Failure to Provide a Safe Workplace for Plaintiffs against Phillips, Phillips Daelim, and Phillips Sumika” The Jones Plaintiffs’ first proposed claim for relief is that Phillips and its joint venturers negligently “failed and omitted to provide the Plaintiffs with the required monitoring [for exposure to hazardous materials following the March 2000 accident] pursuant to [unidentified] standards promulgated and implemented by OSHA... ,” The Jones Plaintiffs assert that they were “independent contractors that worked for the uninsured joint venture Defendants and were invitees on the Defendant Phillips’ premises” and, therefore, they are “not subject to the exclusive remedies provision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act.” In seeking to bring this claim, which was not asserted in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, but which relies on no facts unavailable to Plaintiffs when that complaint was filed, the Jones Plaintiffs attempt to add Phillips Daelim and Phillips Sumika as additional defendants. As discussed above, this proposed claim is new and thus in clear contravention of the Court’s admonition that no new claims or defendants may be added in this suit. The proposed claim also fails because it relies on the Jones Plaintiffs’ assertion that they were not covered by Phillips’ workers’ compensation insurance. Accordingly, the Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend to add the butadiene exposure claim is denied. 2. Unnumbered Claim: “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ” The Jones Plaintiffs assert in an unnumbered claim that “Defendants conspired to defraud Plaintiffs into believing they had no cause of action against Defendant Phillips for the injuries they suffered from the [March 2000] explosion.” They also allege conclusorily: “As a result of Defendants’ fraudulent scheme, Plaintiffs ... have been injured in their, person, property and business. The Defendants’ fraudulent scheme also prevented Plaintiffs from pursuing tort actions against Defendant Phillips, thus, [sic] depriving Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law, privileges and guarantees under the Constitution and Texas law.” Plaintiffs provide no factual basis for these allegations except to incorporate by reference the preceding forty-two pages of the proposed complaint, much of which sets forth one or more new or rejected theories of relief, as discussed above. No allegations identify the Jones Plaintiffs’ racial or ethnic backgrounds, let alone any other meaningful factual basis for a § 1985 conspiracy claim. A claim under § 1985(3) requires proof of five elements: (1) The defendants must conspire ...; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) one of more of the conspirators must commit some act in furtherance of the conspiracy; whereby (4) another is either (a) injured in his person or property or (b) deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States; and (5)the conspirators’ conduct must be unlawful independent of the Section 1985(3) violation. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 987 (5th Cir.1982). “That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, however, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). “The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. at 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790; accord Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993). The Jones Plaintiffs offer no factual allegations regarding any of the five necessary elements of proof, let alone any suggestion that Defendants were motivated by “discriminatory animus.” Indeed, the Jones Plaintiffs fail to allege any “class-based” classifications. They merely allege con-clusorily that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive them of equal protection of the laws. This assertion is insufficient to demonstrate that the Jones Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. See Twom- bly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir.1987) (“Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights statutes must plead the operative facts upon which their claim is based. Bald allegations that a conspiracy existed are insufficient.”) (citations omitted). These Plaintiffs have submitted four versions of their claims. None sets forth facts that satisfy the pleading standards for a § 1985, indicating that the proposed amendment would be futile. See Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546 (5th Cir.1980) (citing De-Loach v. Woodley, 405 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.1969)); Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.1965) (“Clearly, if a complaint as amended is subject to dismissal, leave to amend need not be granted.”). Additionally, the conspiracy to violate civil rights claim is grounded fundamentally on the rejected assumption that Phillips was not a valid workers’ compensation insurance subscriber. Accordingly, the Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is denied as to this claim, and their conspiracy to interfere with civil rights claim is dismissed. 3. “THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fraud ” In their proposed fraud claim, the Jones Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in fraud by making material misrepresentations of fact to the Jones Plaintiffs and to state and federal agencies. This claim largely replicates the fraud claim in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. In both pleadings, this claim relies expressly and implicitly upon the Jones Plaintiffs’ assertion that Phillips was not a valid workers’ compensation insurance subscriber. Because the Court specifically rejected the fraud theory in the March 2007 Order as factually unsupported, and held that “Plaintiffs may not maintain any cause of action predicated on a contention that Phillips was not a valid subscriber to the Texas workers’ compensation system,” the Jones Plaintiffs may not now re-assert that claim. Accordingly, the Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend to assert the fraud claim is denied and this claim is dismissed. 4. “FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Conspiracy ” The Jones Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to mislead them regarding their right to bring tort claims against Defendants. This claim is an almost verbatim repetition of the conspiracy claim in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The Jones Plaintiffs allege in their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint that Defendants “conspired ... to create the impression that ... Plaintiffs were covered by workers’ compensation insurance.” This claim is barred by the Court’s previous ruling dismissing claims based on Phillips’ alleged lack of workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion' to Amend is denied as to this conspiracy claim and the claim is dismissed. 5. “FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Negligence ” In their proposed “Fifth Claim for Relief,” the Jones Plaintiffs literally incorporate by reference the “Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty” claim contained in the Curry Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendants have filed motions to dismiss directed at this claim and the Jones Plaintiffs filed responses in opposition. Having joined the Curry Plaintiffs’ claim, it is unnecessary for the Jones Plaintiffs to file an additional pleading to raise this same cause of action. Hence, their Motion to Amend is denied as to this claim. The Court addresses the viability of the proposed claim in a separate ruling on motions addressing the Curry Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. 6. “SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Aggravated Assault ” In their “Sixth Claim for Relief,” the Jones Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed aggravated assault by “intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly causing] serious ... bodily injury to each of the Plaintiffs in this action.” This cause of action is essentially a copy of the “aggravated assault” claim in the Curry Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. For the same reasons set out in Section III.D.5, supra, the Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is denied as to this claim. The Court also addresses the aggravated assault claim in a ruling on pending motions directed to the Curry Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint. 7.“SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Violation of ERISA against Defendants Aetna, Cigna, and MetLife” The Jones Plaintiffs next allege that proposed defendants — Aetna, Cigna, and MetLife Insurance Companies — engaged in practices aimed at impeding recovery of the Jones Plaintiffs’ disability benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (“ERISA”). As described above, the Court has ruled that Plaintiffs may not add new claims — specifically an ERISA claim — or new defendants, at this late stage of the case. The Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend to include an ERISA claim is denied. 8. “EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Fraud against Defendant PACE Officers ” In their proposed “Eighth Claim for Relief,” the Jones Plaintiffs allege that PACE union officers fraudulently failed in their “duty to report accurate information [to Union members] about the ability of injured workers to file suit absent a workers’ compensation bar because of Defendant Phillips’ non-subscriber status.” This claim was asserted in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Because this claim is founded on the rejected theory that Phillips was not a valid subscriber to workers’ compensation insurance, the Jones Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is denied as to this claim and this claim is dismissed. 9. “NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Violation of 42 U.S.C. [§ ] 1981 — Intentional Discrimination against Phillips, ConocoPhillips, Chevron Phillips, LP and LLC, PACE Local 4227 and PACE International Union ” In their proposed “Ninth Claim for Relief,” the Jones Plaintiffs substantively repeat the § 1981 “Intentional Discrimination” claim in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The Jones Plaintiffs allege simply that Defendants “maintained a system for making benefit and compensation decisions that is excessively subjective and through which Defendants discriminated against African-American Plaintiffs treating Plaintiffs disparately and by denying them the opportunity to be treated fairly as afforded to other similarly situated White employees outside their protected class.” The Jones Plaintiffs also allege that the “Corporate Defendants’ discriminatory practices have denied Plaintiffs benefits and compensation to which they were entitled, which has resulted in [damages] [and] Union Defendants ensured that White union members received all of their negotiated benefits while failing to accomplish the same for its African-American [e]mployees including Plaintiffs.” The factual basis for this claim is unclear. The Jones Plaintiffs fail to identify their racial or ethnic backgrounds and fail to disclose the “benefit and compensation decisions” to which they refer. This latter information is impossible to ascertain, given numerous disparate allegations in the fifty-two preceding pages of the proposed complaint referencing a variety of benefits plans, including workers’ compensation and at least two internal employee benefits plans. In addition, many of the factual assertions incorporated by reference into this claim run afoul of the Court’s ruling that Plaintiffs may not rely on the theory that Phillips lacked valid workers’ compensation insurance. These defects alone justify denial of leave to amend and dismissal of this claim. See, e.g., Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3 (citing 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)) (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only fair notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.”) Aside from these deficiencies in pleading and theory, this claim suffers from another basic problem: the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. “A statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiffs pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like.” Jones, 339 F.3d at 366. “Federal civil rights actions brought under [§ ] 1981, which lack an express statute of limitations, are governed by the most closely analogous limitations period provided under state law.” Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 278 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-66, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Jones, 339 F.3d at 364). “Under Texas law, one must file a discrimination claim under [§ ] 1981 within two years of the adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Byers v. Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir.2000)). All the claims in this case stem from the March 2000 explosion at Phillip’ K-Resin plant. A thorough reading of the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed Fourth Amended Complaint reveals that all benefits and compensation for injuries from the explosion were alleged to have been distributed within several months of the accident. No conduct by Defendants, nor other wrongdoing, is alleged to have occurred after the close of 2001. The Jones Plaintiffs did not file this case until 2005, well outside the two-year limitations period applicable to § 1981 claims. The Jones Plaintiffs assert that “due to the pervasive fraudulent conduct of the Defendants,” it was not until August 2004 that they “uncovered” the “scheme ... to defraud Plaintiffs out of filing individual personal injury claims against Phillips.” Although the Supreme Court has “declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a discovery rule,” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2162 n. 10, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007), the Fifth Circuit has made clear that a plaintiffs discrimination claim accrues on the date of the alleged discriminatory act, not on some future date at which the plaintiff discovers that the act may have been motivated by discriminatory animus. See Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906 (5th Cir.1992); see also Merrill v. S. Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 605 (5th Cir.1986). The Jones Plaintiffs offer no explanation or factual basis to support the argument that they could not have discovered these allegedly disparate benefits payments within the limitations period. Indeed, the Jones Plaintiffs did not respond to arguments on this issue asserted by the Union Defendants, who have pointed out that at least one of the Jones Plaintiffs sought, and received, a decision from the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) in 2001, which dismissed allegations of preferential treatment by Defendants in the payment of benefits for injuries suffered in the March 2000 explosion. Although not pled by the Jones Plaintiffs, the Court has considered whether the “continuing violations” doctrine justifies their delay in asserting this claim. The doctrine, which operates to “extend[ ] the limitations period on otherwise time-barred claims,” applies where “the unlawful employment practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a series of discrete acts.” Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279. “The core idea [of the continuing violation theory] is that equitable considerations may very well require that the filing periods not begin to run until facts supportive of a ... civil rights action are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated.” Webb v. Cardiothora-cic Surgery Assocs., P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir.199 8) (quoting Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 757 F.2d 1554, 1560 (5th Cir.1985)). However, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279 (citing Nat.’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)). “[E]ach discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Id. Much like “[discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” Pegram, 361 F.3d at 280 n. 5, individual decisions concerning benefits and compensation are discrete acts, each of which triggers the statutory limitations period. This is so because “ ‘in fairness and logic, [such acts] should have alerted the average lay person to act to protect his rights.’ ” Webb, 139 F.3d at 537 (quoting Glass, 757 F.2d at 1561); see also Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. 2162; Price v. Jefferson, 470 F.Supp.2d 665, 685 (2006) (“[W]hile discriminatory paychecks involve repeated conduct, decisions affecting salary are considered discrete acts to which the continuing violations theory does not apply.”). This ease was filed in November 2005. The facts alleged in the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed Fourth Amended Complaint do not establish that Defendants engaged in conduct in violation of the Jones Plaintiffs’ civil rights under § 1981 after November 2003, and thus during the two years prior to commencement of this suit. The facts alleged demonstrate no grounds upon which to apply the continuing violations doctrine. The Jones Plaintiffs have been given ample opportunity to amend their pleadings to include viable claims demonstrating entitlement to relief. They have failed to plead a timely § 1981 civil rights claim. Thus, their Motion to Amend is denied as to this claim and it is dismissed. 10. “TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing [against Defendants] Phillips, Williams & Baliley [sic], Defendant Insurance Companies, Defendant Unions ” In their tenth proposed claim, the Jones Plaintiffs copy the “breach of fiduciary duty” claim from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The Jones Plaintiffs assert simply that Defendants, “[b]y virtue of contracts between and [sic] Plaintiffs and the fact that Defendants deducted and/or otherwise handled money payable and belonging to Plaintiffs, Defendants owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs to properly investigate, evaluate, and otherwise handle Plaintiffs’ claims as they related to the 2000 explosion.” There are no other facts alleged to support this claim. Although Texas courts have “declined to impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract, [they] have recognized that a duty of good faith and fair dealing may arise as a result of a special relationship between the parties governed or created by a contract.” Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex.1987). However, such a duty “does not exist in Texas unless intentionally created by express language in a contract or unless a special relationship of trust and confidence exists between the parties to the contract.” Lovell v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1988) (citing Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167). “The special relationship necessary to create [a duty of good faith and fair dealing] either arises from the element of trust necessary to accomplish the goals of the contract, or has been imposed by the courts because of an imbalance of bargaining power.” Lovell, 754 S.W.2d at 302 (citing English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1983)). Other relationships giving rise to such a duty involve “long standing personal or social relationships,” Lovell, 754 S.W.2d at 302 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex.1962)), or proof of “dealings of long standing to justify reliance by the complaining party.” Lovell, 754 S.W.2d at 302 (citing Consolidated Bearing & Supply Co., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank at Lubbock, 720 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ.)). i. Phillips As to Defendant Phillips, the Jones Plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of any express contractual language giving rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of their employer. They have also failed to demonstrate the existence of a special relationship necessary to recover for a breach of this duty. Indeed, Texas courts have expressly declined to extend the duty of good faith and fair dealing to employment relationships, see Rios v. Tex. Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 816 (TexApp.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied); Cole v. Hall, 864 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.), and this Court has already rejected Plaintiffs’ belated and unsupported assertion that the employees at the K-Resin plant worked for a company other than Phillips. Thus, the Jones Plaintiffs’ attempt to assert a claim against Phillips for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is rejected. ii. Williams & Bailey As to Defendant Williams & Bailey, the Jones Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they had any contractual relationship with the law firm. According to the Jones Plaintiffs’ proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, at the meeting during which representatives of Williams & Bailey allegedly explained Phillips employees’ rights under Texas workers’ compensation law, ‘Williams & Bailey ... entered into attorney/client representation contracts with certain contractors and Union employees ....” Subsequent allegations indicate that these “certain contractors and Union employees” did not include the Jones Plaintiffs. Similarly, there are no allegations that the Jones Plaintiffs had any other “special relationship” with the law firm which would give rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing. However, assuming arguendo that there was some implicit attorney/client relationship sufficient to give rise to a duty requiring Williams & Bailey to “properly investigate, evaluate, and otherwise handle Plaintiffs’ claims as they related to the 2000 explosion,” this relationship nevertheless fails to provide the Jones Plaintiffs with a legally viable good faith and fair dealing claim against the law firm because any such claim would be time-barred, as explained below with respect to Pacific. iii. Pacific Next, with regard to the proposed breach of good faith and fair dealing claim against Pacific, the Court assumes for the purposes of the pending motions that the Jones Plaintiffs and Pacific had a special relationship that gave rise to the necessary duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167 (“In the insurance context a special relationship arises out of the parties’ unequal bargaining power and the nature of insurance contracts which would allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insured’s misfortunes in bargaining for settlement or resolution of claims.”). The claim for breach of this duty, however, is untimely. The statute of limitations governing this cause of action is two years. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex.1990). “[A] cause of action can generally be said to accrue when the wrongful act effects an injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learned of such injury.” Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.1990). “The fact that damage may continue to occur for an extended period after denial [of an insurance claim] does not prevent limitations from starting to run. Limitations commences when the wrongful act occurs resulting in some damage to the plaintiff.” Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 828 (citing Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex.1967)). Thus, a decision by an insurance company to deny a claim, or any other discrete benefit or compensation decision, would trigger the limitations period. See Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 828-29. However, the “discovery rule” provides an exception to this general proposition, “defer[ring] a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.1996). “The discovery rule, in application, proves to be a very limited exception to the statute of limitations ... [that] has been permitted in those cases where the nature of the injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable.” Id. at 455-56. “ ‘[Inherently undiscoverable’ [does not] mean merely that a particular plaintiff did not discover his injury within the prescribed period of limitations .... ” Ellert v. Lutz, 930 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, no writ). Instead, the question before a court is “whether [a plaintiffs injury] is ‘the type of injury that generally is discoverable in the exercise of due diligence.’ ” Wagner & Brown v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tex.2001) (quoting HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex.1998)) (emphasis added); see Computer Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456 (collecting cases); see also San Antonio Credit Union v. O’Connor, 115 S.W.3d 82, 96 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Whether the discovery rule applies to a given context is a question of law.”). A corollary to the discovery rule is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. See S.V. v. R.V., 933