Full opinion text
AMENDED OPINION SLEET, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION. The plaintiffs in this action, the Joint Stock Society and the Russian American Spirits Company (“RASCO”), have sued the defendants, UDV North America, Inc. and the Pierre Smirnoff Company, for false advertising, false association, and trademark cancellation. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants have violated several provisions of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1994), as well as two state laws prohibiting unfair competition, see Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2531-36 (1993), by knowingly engaging in over fifty years worth of false advertising and trademark misuse concerning their SMIRNOFF vodka products. This court has jurisdiction over the Lanham Act and state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338, and 1367, respectively. Between April 28, 1998 and August 20, 1998, the defendants filed a series of motions for summary judgment. Because the court is convinced by some of the arguments raised in the defendants’ case dis-positive motions as well as by the responses to some of the questions the court posed to the parties at the hearing on these motions, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the defendants on all counts of the complaint. The reasons for the court’s decision are three-fold. First, the plaintiffs have not taken sufficient preparatory steps to enter the U.S. market and, as a result, have failed to satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement imposed by the United States Constitution. Second, even if the plaintiffs could establish facts or articulate a theory demonstrating that this matter constitutes a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiffs do not have standing to bring these particular claims. Third, and finally, even if the plaintiffs were able to satisfy the constitutional and prudential standing requirements under the relevant statutes, their legal action would be barred as a result of their years of inaction under the doctrine of laches. For these reasons, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD. The court can grant summary judgment only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (1998); see also Berner Intn’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 978 (3d Cir.1993) (citing the rule); Lucent Info. Mgmt. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 986 F.Supp. 253, 257 (1997) (same). An issue is “genuine” if, given the evidence, a “reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case. See ACCU Personnel, Inc. v. AccuStaff, Inc., 846 F.Supp. 1191, 1203 (D.Del.1994) (citing Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. 2124). On summary judgment, the court must refrain from “weighting] the evidence and determining] the truth of the matter” asserted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Instead, the court should only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Berner, 987 F.2d at 978 (citing Anderson, 447 U.S. at 250, 100 S.Ct. 2124). In making this determination, the court must refrain from determining the credibility of witnesses or their testimony. See Country Floors, Inc. v. A Partnership Composed of Charley Gepner and Gary Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir.1991). In addition, the court must draw all inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party — here, the plaintiffs. See Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir.1998); see also ACCU Personnel, 846 F.Supp. at 1204. In other words, on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Berner, 987 F.2d at 978; Lucent, 986 F.Supp. at 257. With these legal principles in mind, the court turns to a recitation of the facts giving rise to this lawsuit. III. BACKGROUND. As stated in an earlier opinion, “[a]n understanding of the plaintiffs’ claims requires a brief lesson on Russian history.” See Joint Stock Soc’y v. Heublein, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 177, 182 (D.Del.1996). Consequently, the court now embarks upon a journey which covers over 130 years worth of world events. A. The Rise And Fall Of The Original Smirnov Trade House. Sometime around 1860, a man named Piotr Arsenyevitch Smirnov founded a Russian trade house called “P.A. Smirnov in Moscow.” This trade house distilled and sold vodka in addition to a number of other spirits. Beginning in 1873, Smir-nov’s vodka started to win a number of prestigious national and international awards, culminating in his being named the “Official Purveyor to the Russian Imperial Court” in 1886. In 1898, Smirnov died, leaving the trade house to his widow and five sons. Four years later, in 1902, the three oldest sons bought out the interests of their two younger brothers — Sergei and Alexey — to form the company “Piotr, Nikolai, and Vladimir Smirnov Trading under the name P.A. Smirnov, Moscow.” This new partnership, however, did not last long. Between 1904 and 1905, both Vladimir and Nikolai sold their interest in the company to Piotr. Pursuant to the most relevant agreement, Vladimir relinquished his “right to the company name, privileges, and honors” in exchange for 500,000 Rubles or, roughly, $250,000 in 1904 dollars. As sole owner of the trade house, Piotr soon enlisted the aid of his wife, Eugenia, to help him run the enterprise. With Piotr’s passing in 1910, Eugenia became the trade house’s sole owner, running its operations until 1917, the year of the Bolshevik revolution, when she married an Italian diplomat and fled the country. In the wake of the Russian revolution, the new government passed laws abolishing private property. As a consequence, the government nationalized the trade house, taking over its operations in 1918. While the facilities were still used to make vodka, it was no longer produced under the SMIRNOV name. Instead, it bore the name of a company created, owned, and run by the Soviet State. B. Evidence Of U.S. Sales. Although there is no direct evidence that any SMIRNOV products were actually purchased in the United States prior to 1918, it appears as if a small quantity of SMIRNOV products were shipped to the U.S. between 1907 and 1914. Specifically, according to a limited series of advertisements or articles concerning SMIRNOV products that appeared in Bonfort’s Wine and Spirits Circular around this time, the J.B. Martin Importation Company of New York, New York was the “sole agent in the United States” for distributing SMIRNOV products. In 1907, roughly 50 cases of SMIRNOV cordials were shipped to J.B. Martin in New York. Finally, prior to 1914, at least two retailers in New York City, one of them apparently being MACY’s, had carried SMIRNOV products for sale. Thus, despite the lack of direct evidence showing that American consumers actually bought these SMIRNOV products, it is probably reasonable to infer that some of the bottles that were imported into the country were indeed purchased by the Anerican buying public — especially when the limited evidence available is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. However, as the parties agree, it is probably fair to say that no SMIRNOV products were being shipped to the U.S. after 1918 since the trade house was taken over by the Soviet State that year. Moreover, with the advent of Prohibition in 1920, it is also fair to say that if there were any SMIRNOV products remaining in the United States, they were probably bought and sold, if at all, only surreptitiously and, thus, in even more limited quantities than before 1918, when it was apparently offered for sale at select New York City locations. Finally, there is no evidence that the original trade house ever formally filed any trademark registrations with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office prior to the company’s closing in 1918. C. The Rise Of A New Smirnoff Company. Around 1920, after fleeing Russia, Eugenia settled in a Russian émigré community located in Nice, France. Around this time, the Soviet State began to refine its laws concerning the ownership of private property. Most relevant to this lawsuit, the communist regime adopted a harsh criminal code that prohibited, among other things, private capital enterprise under severe penalty since it was deemed counterrevolutionary or insurrectionist. In the face of these laws, Vladimir — who had signed away his rights to the family business in 1904 — also fled the country. By 1923, he had settled in Lvov, Poland where he established “Ste. Pierre Smirnoff FIs.,” which loosely translated means the “Company of the Sons of Piotr Smirnov.” Like its predecessor and namesake, Vladimir’s company was formed for the purposes of making and distilling alcoholic beverages, including vodka products. In fact, during this time, Vladimir held out his company as the “Successor to P.A. Smirnoff in Moscow and PN & V Smirnoff.” In an attempt to further profit from this asserted association, the new Smirnoff company sold its vodka in bottles with labels that bore an uncanny similarity to the one employed by the original trade house. Most relevant, the labels on these bottles depicted various emblems, medals, coats of arms, and awards earned by and associated with the original trade house. As an apparent result, the new Smirnoff company became so successful that, by 1925, it had established a facility in Paris, France. Shortly thereafter, Eugenia learned of her brother-in-law’s operation. She became “furious” since she believed that Vladimir had no right to use the SMIRNOFF name. In fact, in 1926, she wrote to her husband, the diplomat, to inquire about her options. Apparently, he informed her that in order to commence legal action, she would need to have documentary proof that the original trade house belonged to her. However, all of the papers which established that she was the sole owner of the original trade house were still located in the Soviet Union — -which, as mentioned earlier, had just begun to pass laws prohibiting free enterprise. Fearing prosecution under the Soviet criminal code, Eugenia elected to stay in France, suspecting that a return to the former Russia might land her in prison. Nevertheless, over the next thirty years, Eugenia did write letters to various friends and relatives still living in the Soviet Union, asking them for help. Specifically, she asked for their assistance in securing documentation that might support her claim of ownership of the original trade house and, thus, its name. Eugenia even enlisted the help of her daughter, Tatyana, to also write letters to various individuals and organizations, including the Red Cross, to ask for similar help. In fact, Tatyana even traveled to Paris once to complain to the Chamber of Commerce about Vladimir’s company. However, there is no evidence that any formal letter of complaint was ever filed with this entity. At this point, it is important to note that although Eugenia and Tatyana were writing letters to a number of individuals as well as both private and public organizations, neither one of them ever once contacted Vladimir to either voice their concerns about or express their displeasure with his activity. As the plaintiffs themselves admit, both of these women “had no desire to talk” with Vladimir because they considered him to be “a pariah, a cheat, and a crook.” According to the plaintiffs, given Vladimir’s unscrupulous nature, both Eugenia and Tatyana believed that, without a set of records demonstrating who was the true owner of the original trade house, they were powerless to do anything about his actions. In 1933, one year before Vladimir’s death, his company, Ste. Pierre Smirnoff FIs., entered into a written agreement with Rudolph Kunnett, an American businessman who was also a Russian émigré. The 1933 agreement purportedly gave Kunnett the exclusive right to produce and sell alcoholic beverages under the SMIRNOFF name in North America. Speeifi-cally, the agreement stated that Kunnett would receive the exclusive right and license to manufacture and sell ... all the alcoholic beverages and other products of the firm [Ste. Pierre Smirnoff FIs.], together with the trademarks and labels as used and owned by the firm, and the exclusive right to reproduce and use the various models of bottles ... in use by the firm or its licensee in France. The 1933 agreement also afforded Kun-nett the “exclusive right to use the subtitles ‘Firm of Pierre Smirnoff, formerly by appointment to the Imperial Court of Russia’ and ‘Firm of Pierre Smirnoff, founded in Moscow in 1818.’” In addition, the agreement granted Kunnett the “exclusive right to reproduce and use ... various emblems, medals, coats of arms, insignia, and awards,” which appeared in a color catalog published by the original trade house in 1912. In particular, these emblems, medals, coats of arms, insignia, and awards included (1) the family crest in a crown, shield, and shroud design as well as (2) three double-headed eagles and the emblem of the Russian empire, which represented the four times that the original trade house won Russia’s highest honor. Finally, the agreement gave Kunnett the “exclusive right and power to apply to the patent office in Washington, D.C. [either] in his own name or in the name of the firm [Ste. Pierre Smirnoff FIs.] ... for the registration of the firm’s name, trademark, labels, emblems, medals, coats of arms, or other insignia or awards as well as for the registrations of the [previously mentioned] subtitles.” That same year, Kunnett conveyed his rights under the agreement to a New York corporation that he had recently formed, called “Ste. Pierre Smirnoff FIs., Inc.” One year later, in 1934, the year that Prohibition was repealed, Kunnett’s company began its exclusive use of the SMIRNOFF name and the various trademarks associated with it in the United States. Like Vladimir, Kunnett sold his SMIRNOFF vodka in bottles which (1) were essentially the same shape as those used by the original trade house and (2) bore labels that contained essentially all of the same marks and other forms of trade dress which adorned the bottles made by the original trade house. Most relevant to this lawsuit, Kunnett’s label displayed the four coats of arms that symbolized the four times that the original trade house had won Russia’s highest honor beneath a crown and bunting design and above a banner that read “Purveyors to the Imperial Russian Court, 1886 — 1917.” The following year, Kunnett’s company obtained three SMIRNOFF trademark registrations from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for various vodka products. In general, these trademark registrations were based on the SMIRNOFF name, emblems, medals, coats of arms, insignia, and awards which were referred to in the 1933 agreement and adorned the bottles of SMIRNOFF vodka sold by his company. At some point in time during the 1930s, Eugenia and her family became aware that Vladimir had sold his “rights” to the SMIRNOFF name to Kunnett. Eugenia also became aware that Kunnett was making and selling alcoholic beverages under the SMIRNOFF name in the United States, using several of the emblems, medals, coats of arms, insignia, and awards once associated with the original trade house. However, just as they never contacted Vladimir to voice their displeasure with his activities, neither Eugenia nor Tatyana ever notified Kunnett to assert or, for that matter, explain their claim to the SMIRNOFF name. In 1939, a company called G.F. Heublein & Brothers, now UDV North America, bought Ste. Pierre Smirnoff FIs. from Kunnett. The sale expressly included the trademarks, trademark registrations, and rights under the 1933 agreement that Kun-nett had entered into with Vladimir’s company. Heublein then established a Connecticut subsidiary, also named Ste. Pierre Smirnoff FIs., Inc., to take over the manufacture and sale of SMIRNOFF vodka in the United States. Over the next twenty years, Heublein invested heavily in advertising, marketing, and promoting products under the SMIRNOFF name. In addition, Heublein continued to apply for new trademark registrations for its SMIRNOFF products, while renewing the original three SMIRNOFF trademarks that Kunnett had obtained. Like Vladimir and Kunnett, Heu-blein sold its SMIRNOFF vodka in bottles that essentially bore the same crown and bunting design above the same four coats of arms and the same banner which read “Purveyor’s to the Imperial Russian Court, 1886 — 1917.” All the while, neither Eugenia nor Tat-yana ever once informed the company of either their displeasure with its use of the SMIRNOFF name or the associated marks. Furthermore, even though they both knew that Heublein was selling alcoholic beverages in the United States under the SMIRNOFF name, they never once informed the company that they intended to file suit or assert, in any other matter, any rights that they claimed. Then, in 1958, just before Eugenia died, she signed a document which gave her daughter Tatyana “power of attorney” over, among other things, the “defense of [her] interest in asserting [her] rights to the ownership and title of ‘SMIRNOFF VODKA’ ... which [she believed had] been unjustly used by third parties in violation of her rights.” However, in her lifetime, Tatyana neither brought suit against Heublein nor contacted the company to dispute its right to use the SMIRNOFF name or associated marks in connection to the sale of vodka in the United States. In fact, at the time of her death in 1977, Tatyana had yet to send one letter of complaint to Heublein or, for that matter, correspond with the company in any other way. And, for the eighteen years that followed, Tatyana’s son, Boris Alexandro-vitch, also failed to take any action of any kind against Heublein. In fact, it was not until 1994 when Boris finally took affirmative steps toward vindicating any right that he might have to the SMIRNOFF name. According to the plaintiffs, Boris read a newspaper article in Le Figaro that year which recounted how several other Smirnov descendants had formed their own trade house over in Russia and were involved in a legal battle with Heublein over who had the right to sell vodka under the SMIRNOFF or SMIRNOV name in Russia. Armed with the knowledge that some of his relatives over in Russia were attempting to assert legal claims against Heublein, Boris joined in the fray by traveling to Moscow, finding his relatives at the modern trade house, discussing his business interests with them, obtaining shares in the new company, and authorizing it to sue Heublein to vindicate whatever rights he might have to the family name. As might be expected, in the forty years that followed Eugenia’s death, Heublein dramatically increased its expenditures on advertising, marketing, and promoting its SMIRNOFF products in the United States, spending millions if not tens of millions of dollars on the line annually. As a result, somewhere between five to six million cases of SMIRNOFF vodka are presently sold in the U.S. each year, making it the most popular brand of vodka and the second most popular distilled spirit in the United States. It is still sold in bottles with labels that continue to bear an striking similarity to the ones used by the original trade house. Specifically, these labels, like the ones designed by Vladimir and Kunnett, display essentially the same crown and bunting design above the four Russian coats of arms and a banner reading “Purveyors to the Imperial Russian Court, 1886 — -1917.” Finally, the bottles, their labels, and thus the SMIRNOFF name and associated marks have all, over the years, figured prominently in Heu-blein’s advertising of its SMIRNOFF line. D. The Parties To The Present Action. Despite the rich history previously recounted by the court, the plaintiffs in the case at bar have no direct connection to Eugenia, Tatyana, or Boris — ie., the French Smirnoffs. Instead, as the court will soon discuss, the plaintiffs are two recently-formed corporations that express a desire to enter the U.S. market to sell their vodka under the SMIRNOV name. 1. The plaintiffs. Formed in the wake of Peristroika, the Joint Stock Society was chartered in 1993 under the laws of the Russian Federation. Its principal owners are Andrei and Boris Alexeseeviteh Smirnoff, who claim to be descendants of Smirnov’s two youngest sons — Sergei and Alexey. Beginning in 1994, the Society began contracting with Russian vodka manufacturers to produce and sell vodka under the Cyrillic letters CMHPHOBb, which roughly translates into SMIRNOV. This vodka is presently being offered for sale only in Russia. It has never been exported to or sold in the United States. In fact, at present, no commercial vodka product associated with the Society has ever been sold or, for that matter, offered for sale in the United States. Formed in 1995, RASCO is a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters in the State of Connecticut. The company is the Society’s exclusive licensee for any rights it might have in the SMIRNOFF or SMIRNOV trademark and trade name. RASCO’s rights and obligations under this agreement, however, are expressly contingent on a favorable resolution of this lawsuit. Like its licensor, RASCO has never sold or attempted to sell any vodka product, or any other product, in the United States. Neither the Society nor RASCO has ever attempted to commercially import, sell, distribute, market, advertise, or produce any product, vodka or otherwise, in the United States. Presently, they have no business plan or marketing campaign to govern the sale of their Russian vodka in the United States. They also have never undertaken any advertising of their products in the United States. Furthermore, neither one of these companies has ever entered into any agreement with any company in the United States concerning the distribution of their Russian vodka here. Finally, neither the Society nor RASCO has ever attempted to obtain any federal, state, or local government licenses or permits relating to the production, distribution, or sale of their vodka or any other alcoholic beverage. In short, both the Society and RASCO are completely absent from the U.S. market, waiting (as they themselves admit) to see whether they will prevail in this lawsuit. Essentially, these plaintiffs have filed suit in an attempt to win the exclusive right to use the SMIRNOV name in connection with the anticipated sale of their vodka products here. Specifically, the plaintiffs seek to cancel of the existing SMIRNOFF trademarks obtained by the defendants over the last sixty years as well as to enjoin the defendants from any use of the SMIRNOFF name in the future. The plaintiffs, however, also seek to recover damages from the defendants for their allegedly wrongful use of the SMIRNOFF name. On this point, the plaintiffs essentially advance three theories. First, in addition to punitive and treble damages, they request the disgorgement of all of the defendants’ profits from 1982 to the present. While an exact calculation of these profits would require an accounting, they can be estimated at roughly $1 billion. Second, they seek a reasonable royalty from the defendants to recover for their use of the SMIRNOFF name from 1939 to the present, an amount which the plaintiffs calculate at approximately two percent of the defendants’ gross sales to date or approximately $300 million — ie., roughly ten percent of the defendants’ historical profits. Third and finally, the plaintiffs desire somewhere between $20 to $125 million to fund an advertising campaign to correct any consumer misperception about the origin of SMIRNOFF vodka or its true maker. 2. The defendants. Although it has gone through a series of name changes, UDV North America has manufactured, sold, distributed, and marketed vodka under the SMIRNOFF name, both in the United States and throughout the world, since 1939. As previously discussed, its vodka is sold in bottles with labels that bear a marked resemblance to the ones used by the original trade house. Within the last few years, UDV has commenced a number of legal or administrative proceedings against the Society in other foreign jurisdictions, seeking to protect its use of the SMIRNOFF name. The Pierre Smirnoff Company is a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters in London, England. The company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of UDV North America and is responsible for coordinating the worldwide marketing strategy for the SMIRNOFF brand. As stated earlier, as a result of the investment that these two companies have made in their product, SMIRNOFF vodka is now the most popular brand of vodka and the second most popular distilled spirit in the United States, selling somewhere between five to six million cases annually and generating roughly $800 million in gross sales each year. With these facts in mind, the court turns to a discussion of the governing law. IV. DISCUSSION. After reviewing the voluminous record before it, the court has decided that granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants is appropriate for three reasons. First, by failing to take adequate precatory steps to enter the U.S. market, the plaintiffs have not presented this court with a justiciable case or controversy. Second, because of their absence from the marketplace, the plaintiffs also lack standing to bring the particular Lanham Act and state law claims they seek to assert. Third, and finally, even if the plaintiffs were able to satisfy the constitutional and prudential standing requirements under the relevant statutes, their action is barred by doctrine of laches as a result of the extraordinary amount of time it has taken them to bring this suit and the extreme prejudice this delay has caused the defendants. The court will now address these issues seriatim. A. The Plaintiffs Have Failed To Establish The Existence Of An Article III Case Or Controversy That Is Ripe For Decision. Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, this court can only exercise jurisdiction over cases or controversies arising under the laws of the United States. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The Constitution imposes this requirement in order to prevent the federal judiciary from impermissibly expanding the scope of its mandate through the issuance of advisory opinions on hypothetical or abstract issues. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). To qualify as a legitimate case or controversy, a lawsuit “must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). In other words, there must be an actual dispute between adverse litigants concerning an issue where there is a substantial likelihood that a decision by a federal court on the matter will bring about some sort of desired change or effect. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 48-50 (2d ed.1994); see also United States Nat’l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (noting that the suit must pursue “an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights by one [party] against another” and that these “valuable legal rights ... [would] be directly affected to a specific and substantial degree” by a decision on the matter by a federal court) (quoting See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 359, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911); Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 262, 53 S.Ct. 345, 77 L.Ed. 730 (1933)). In this case, the plaintiffs contend that they commenced this legal action against the defendants because they feared that they might be sued if they first attempted to sell their SMIRNOV vodka products in the United States. In other words, the plaintiffs claim that, at the time they filed this lawsuit, they believed that if they had offered their goods for sale in the U.S., they would have been immediately sued for trademark infringement by the defendants, who make and sell SMIRNOFF vodka here. To support their contentions, the plaintiffs point to the various other legal actions the defendants have filed against them in at least fifteen other countries in addition to the Russian republic. Thus, in order to determine whether this lawsuit presents an actual or live case or controversy, the court must first examine whether the plaintiffs’ fears or beliefs are merely “imaginary, illusory, speculative, or fabricated entirely in the plaintiffs’ mind” or whether the “threat [of suit] is immediate or real in any perceptible way.” See United Sweetener USA, Inc. v. Nutrasweet Co., 760 F.Supp. 400, 407 (D.Del.1991); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Advanced Environmental Recycling Technologies, Inc., 826 F.Supp. 112, 114 (D.Del.1993) (requiring an “objectively reasonable apprehension” of suit); Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 662 F.Supp. 603, 610 (D.Del.1987) (noting that the plaintiff must show not only a “reasonable apprehension” of suit but also a “concrete” claim rather than one which is “academic”) (quoting Enka B.V. of Arnhem, Holland v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 519 F.Supp. 356, 361 (D.Del.1981)). However, an examination of the plaintiffs’ fears or beliefs only begins the inquiry. In addition, the court must also explore whether the plaintiffs have evinced an immediate intent and ability to commence the allegedly infringing activity by taking sufficient precatory steps to enter the U.S. market. See Starter, 84 F.3d at 596. Because the court finds that the plaintiffs have not meaningfully or adequately prepared to begin selling their SMIRNOV vodka products in the United States, it concludes that they have failed to present a justiciable case or controversy which is ripe for decision. 1. Since the plaintiffs have not taken adequate steps to enter the U.S. market, they fail to satisfy the “actual controversy” requirement under the Declaratory Judgment Act. As a result, they cannot satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement to maintain their claims under the Lanham Act. In order to maintain a claim for trademark infringement under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant’s conduct has created a “real and reasonable apprehension of liability” on the part of the plaintiff and (2) the plaintiff has engaged in a “course of conduct which has brought it into adversarial conflict with the defendant.” See Starter, 84 F.3d at 595 (citing Windsurfing Intn’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 757-58 (Fed.Cir.1987)); see also G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 990 (7th Cir.1989) (requiring a “reasonable apprehension” of suit and an immediate ability to produce the product and, then, enter the marketplace). Even though the court finds that the plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to support their claim that they reasonably believed that they would be sued by the defendants if they attempted to sell their SMIRNOV vodka products in the United States, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have not taken sufficient steps to support a finding that they were adequately prepared to enter the U.S. market. a. The plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to support their contention that they reasonably feared suit by the defendants. A plaintiff reasonably apprehends that it will find itself facing a lawsuit for trademark infringement when the defendant has engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear that he or she would face either an actual suit or the threat of one. See Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783-84 (7th Cir.1979); see also Enka, 519 F.Supp. at 364 (noting that the defendant must have asserted its rights through “words or conduct” that would cause the plaintiff to “reasonably fear adverse action”). As the Enka court noted, contemporaneous lawsuits filed in foreign jurisdictions, which concern the same subject matter as the domestic litigation, lend credence to a plaintiffs claim that it reasonably anticipates being sued. 519 F.Supp. at 369. Thus, even though the parties dispute, to a degree, the amount of litigation which has occurred between them in other foreign jurisdictions, they both agree that the defendants did bring a legal action against the Society over in Russia when the company began to sell its SMIRNOV vodka there. A pending litigation in a foreign country between essentially the same parties, even one that concerned a slightly different topic, has been found to create a objectively reasonably apprehension of suit. See Ethicon, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 369 F.Supp. 934, 936-37 (D.N.J.1973). Therefore, even though it appears as if the defendants have never directly threatened the plaintiffs with legal action in the United States, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to support their claim that they reasonably feared a lawsuit if they attempted to enter the U.S. market. Cf. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 257 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir.1958) (recognizing that “it is not essential [for] there to be a direct threat of litigation in order to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act.”). Nevertheless, because the court finds that the plaintiffs have not evinced an immediate intent and ability to enter the U.S. market, it finds that they have not presented a justiciable casé or controversy that is ripe for decision, b. The plaintiffs, however, have not introduced sufficient evidence to support their assertion that they had the immediate intent and ability to enter the U.S. market. In addition to experiencing a reasonable fear that it might be subjected to suit if it entered the relevant market, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that it has “more than a vague or general desire to use” the mark or marks in question and, instead, an “actual intent and ability to immediately engage in the allegedly infringing conduct.” See Starter, 84 F.3d at 596; see also Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 758 (quoting Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.1963)). On this point, a plaintiff must show that it has taken adequate, meaningful, and active steps to prepare for its entry into the relevant market. See G. Heileman, 873 F.2d at 990-91 (citing International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210, 1215 (7th Cir.1980)); see also Starter, 84 F.3d at 596 (citing Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed.Cir.1988)). Put differently, the plaintiff must have taken steps up to “the last point of before the point of no return.” See G. Heileman, 873 F.2d at 990 (quoting 6A James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 57.20, at 57-217) (cited with approval in Starter, 84 F.3d at 596). Here, although the plaintiffs do currently manufacture and sell vodka under the SMIRNOV name in Russia, there is no evidence that they have taken any steps toward entering the U.S. market. See Starter, 84 F.3d at 596-97. In particular, they have no business plan or marketing campaign concerning their entry into the United States. They also have not undertaken any advertising in the United States. In fact, they have not even submitted a draft or mock advertising campaign to show that they have, at the very least, invested some time, energy, money or even any thought into selling their vodka products here. Cf. G. Heileman, 873 F.2d at 991 (noting that the plaintiff had consulted with an advertising agency to discuss its new brand name). Moreover, the plaintiffs also have not conducted any consumer surveys, see Starter, 84 F.3d at 596, to determine a target customer base or the most appealing way in which to package or advertise their product. Nor have the plaintiffs made any strategic decisions with respect to who will distribute their vodka products once they are shipped to the United States for sale. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not obtained any approval from any government agency concerning their potential entry into the U.S. market. In fact, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the plaintiffs have even contacted a government agency to discuss the various requirements that they will have to meet before they can begin importing their SMIRNOV vodka here for sale. Thus, even though the plaintiffs have submitted a label to the court which they claim will serve as the one they intend to use in the United States, they have yet to submit this label to the relevant federal agencies to gain their approval. See 28 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). In addition, they have yet not sought any state approval or licenses for the distribution of their vodka products. See, e.g., Del.Code Ann. tit. 4, § 501 (1998). Finally, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that even if they had made all of these plans, signed all of the necessary distribution agreements, and obtained the necessary government approval to bring their product to market, they would be able to “enter the United States market in quantity.” See Muller v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir.1968). Put simply, there is no evidence in the record concerning the amount of vodka the Society would be able to produce for export to the United States. If the Society instead intends to manufacture its vodka domestically, then it has failed to demonstrate that it has entered into or even attempted to execute any agreements which would allow the Society to enter the U.S. market in any quantity, large or small. In this respect, the plaintiffs have done nothing to elevate this controversy beyond anything more than a theoretical dispute between two companies that may, one day, find themselves competing with one another. See Polaroid Corp. v. Berkey Photo Inc., 425 F.Supp. 605, 608, 609 (D.Del.1976). Like the party in Polaroid, the defendants here “ha[ve] not ... alleged any facts regarding [their] plans, as nebulous or certain as they may be, which would inform the court of the substance and scope of [their] intentions.” Id. Thus, while the plaintiffs may be “anxious” to enter the U.S. market, see Muller, 404 F.2d at 505, there is no evidence that they are also “ready and able” to do so. Id. In short, the court has no evidence upon which it could base a finding that the plaintiffs have “invested a significant amount of time and money” in their plan to enter the U.S. market and begin selling their vodka. See Starter, 84 F.3d at 596; see also G. Heileman, 873 F.2d at 991 (noting that the plaintiff had “incurred considerable expenses in developing a market” for its product). Instead, all that the plaintiffs have manifested is an interest to use the SMIRNOV name in connection with the anticipated sale of their products in the United States. However, as the Federal Circuit has noted, this type of mere desire fails to constitute a justiciable case or controversy. See Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 758 (citing Wembley, 315 F.2d at 90); see also Golden Gulf Corp. v. Jordache Enters., Inc., 896 F.Supp. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing same). In fact, just like the party in Windsurfing, “[r]ather than use the mark, get sued, and fight it out in court,” the plaintiffs here are saying “We would like to use the mark, but before we do, we want a court to say [that] we may do so safely.” 828 F.2d at 758. In this respect, the plaintiffs are effectively asking the court to issue an advisory opinion about the implications of some possible future course of action undertaken pursuant to a hypothetical business plan; an opinion which this federal court is not allowed to express. See id. (citing Aetna, 300 U.S. at 241, 57 S.Ct. 461). Thus, even though the law does not require the plaintiffs to “perform a useless act,” see Bowen Eng’g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F.Supp. 467, 489 (D.N.J.1992) (citing, inter alia, Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 283 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir.1960)), it does require them to do something, which is basically the one thing that the plaintiffs in this case have not done. In the words of the Starter and G. Heileman courts, in order to avoid finding themselves the subjects of a lawsuit, the plaintiffs here have stopped at some point before the last point before the point of no return. See Starter, 84 F.3d at 596 (quoting G. Heileman, 873 F.2d at 990). As stated earlier, unlike the plaintiffs in those two actions, the plaintiffs here have not made any investment in entering the U.S. market. See G. Heileman, 873 F.2d at 991 (noting that the plaintiff had “already expended many thousands of dollars for product development and the creation of a bottle label and can designs” in addition to “developing a market” for its product); see also Starter, 84 F.3d at 596 (describing how the plaintiff had “designed and prepared [a] prototype” and “made strategic decisions regarding who should manufacture” the product). In this respect, the plaintiffs in this case “are seeking to secure a ... judgment before incurring any costs which might prove to have been wastefully expended should this court find that” their anticipated business activities infringe on the defendants’ trademark rights. See Heerema Marine Con tractors v. Santa Fe International Corp., 582 F.Supp. 445, 451 (C.D.Cal.1984). However, as the Constitution makes clear, this the court cannot do. See id. (noting that the desire to “mitigat[e] economic waste does not allow a business to obtain a purely advisory opinion from the court”). Moreover, as the plaintiffs themselves recognize, even if they had prepared concrete business plans, marketing strategies, and advertising campaigns, they are still several steps away from being able to actually enter the U.S. market and sell their SMIRNOV vodka. Putting aside the fact that they lack any business partners and have not entered into any distribution agreements to ensure that they could actually place their vodka on store shelves in sufficient quantity, the plaintiffs also have not obtained approval from any federal, state, or local government agency, which is a prerequisite for doing business in the heavily regulated alcohol industry. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 356 (10th Cir.1993) (citing 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-11); Fedway Assocs., Inc. v. United States Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 976 F.2d 1416, 1418 (D.C.Cir.1992) (citing same); Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers, Inc. v. Ayers, 504 A.2d 1077, 1078-80 (Del.1986) (citing Del.Code Ann. tit. 4, § 101 et seq. (1984)). In the face of these multiple contingencies, the court cannot conclude that this case is ripe for decision. See Kiser v. Johnson, 404 F.Supp. 879, 886 (M.D.Pa.1975); cf. Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 934 F.Supp. 925, 938 (N.D.Ill.1995) (recognizing that even if approval by the Food and Drug Administration could be obtained within three months, this approval had yet to be granted at the time of the court’s decision, and “there [wa]s no guarantee that the ... approval w[ould] be forthcoming on any particular date in the future”). To paraphrase the Polaroid court, if this court held in this trademark case that the plaintiffs’ actions in a foreign country were sufficient to create a justiciable controversy in the United States, independent of any business activity undertaken here or of any concrete plans to commence commercial activity here, its ruling would completely undermine the basic tenets of the Article III case or controversy requirement. 425 F.Supp. at 609. The door would open to unlimited efforts by other foreign companies who may have rights to a similar trade name or trademark in their countries but wanted to obtain an advisory opinion from a federal court in an effort to limit their potential liability. Such a ruling would “fly in the face of the clear constitutional mandate governing the functioning of the federal judiciary.” Id. It would essentially turn every hope or dream of striking it rich in America into a five or actual “case or controversy” under the U.S. Constitution, regardless of the steps taken toward actually entering the marketplace here. While the court does not doubt that the plaintiffs have refrained from entering the U.S. market out of a genuine fear that they might find themselves the subject of a lawsuit for trademark infringement initiated by the defendants, cf. Enka, 519 F.Supp. at 369, the court cannot help but notice that, out of an apparent over-abundance of caution, the plaintiffs have not taken any steps in preparation for their entry into the United States. As a result, they have failed to demonstrate an immediate intent as well as the present ability to enter the U.S. market. In the words of the Heerema court, while the plaintiffs may be able to avoid engaging in some “economically wasteful activity” before bringing suit, they cannot “avoid all potentially wasteful activity” since the risk that an adverse ruling might render some of their activities fruitless is the “risk [that] must be taken as a prerequisite [for] seeking judicial relief’ in order to ensure that “an actual controversy is presented to the court.” 582 F.Supp. at 449. Consequently, the court finds that this case fails to present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. As a result, it dismisses the plaintiffs’ case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(8) (1998). B. The Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Bring Their Asserted Claims. Were the plaintiffs able to establish the existence of an Article III case or controversy that is ripe for decision, the court would still have to conclude that their particular claims are barred because the plaintiffs lack standing to assert them. When addressing the question of standing, the court essentially asks whether the particular litigant before it is entitled to have the court decide the merits of its particular dispute or of the particular issues raised within it. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). In answering this question, the court must focus its analysis on six factors — three constitutional and three prudential. Because the plaintiffs fail to satisfy essential elements of both these requirements, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 1. The plaintiffs fail to meet at least one of the constitutional standing requirements. In order to satisfy the three constitutional standing requirements, a plaintiff must show that it has (1) suffered or will imminently suffer an injury, which is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and which is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable federal ruling on the matter. See Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). On this first point, a plaintiff must show that this injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, a plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief must show that the defendant’s conduct will likely cause injury in the future. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). By their own admission, the plaintiffs will not attempt to enter the U.S. market unless and until this lawsuit is resolved in their favor. Consequently, they have not demonstrated that they have suffered an actual or imminent injury or are likely to suffer an injury in the future. In other words, because they presently lack the immediate intent and present ability to market their vodka products in the United States, the plaintiffs fail to satisfy the minimum requirements necessary to establish standing under the United States Constitution. 2. The plaintiffs also fail to meet several of the prudential standing requirements. In addition, the plaintiffs also fail to satisfy the prudential requirements necessary to maintain standing under the Lanham Act and the Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.; Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2531-36. Specifically, the plaintiffs here fail to demonstrate that the interests that they seek to protect fall “within the ‘zone of interests’ intended to be protected by the[se] statute[s].” See Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir.1998). a. The plaintiffs have no standing to bring their claims under Sections 43 and 34 of the Lanham Act. Although Section 43 of the Lanham Act specifically provides that “any person ... who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged” by false or misleading statements about any good or service used in commerce may bring an action in federal court, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (emphasis added), most courts have declined to interpret this language literally since such an “expansive reading would further flood the already overcrowded federal courts.” See, e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Intn’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1174 (3d Cir.1993) (citing Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir.1971)). Instead, these courts have come to the conclusion that, in order to maintain standing under Section 43, a litigant must, at a minimum, establish the “potential for a commercial or competitive injury.” See, e.g., Berni v. International Gourmet Restaurants of America, Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir.1988). In light of this requirement, the Third Circuit has traditionally asked whether the party has a “reasonable interest” to protect under the statute. See, e.g., Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 933 (3d Cir.1984). Recently, in an effort to provide district courts with an appropriately flexible analysis to address the disparate factual scenarios that typically arise under the Lanham Act, the Third Circuit refined the Thorn test. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538-44, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983)). Recognizing that the Act was intended to “ferret out unfair competitive methods and [to] protect businesses from the unjust erosion of their good will and reputation,” id. at 236, the Third Circuit crafted a multi-part standing inquiry, which essentially explores the connection between the plaintiffs alleged injury and the defendant’s purportedly wrongful conduct. Id. at 233-35. Because the court finds that this connection is too tenuous in this case to confer standing upon the plaintiffs, it will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. i. The plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not the type that Congress sought to redress under the Lanham Act. First, as the Conte Bros, court noted, “while there may be circumstances in which a non-competitor has standing to sue ..., the focus of the Lanham Act is on ‘commercial interests [that] have been harmed by a competitor’s false advertising’ and in ‘secur[ing] to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.’ ” Id. at 234 (citations omitted). Here, however, the court does not believe that the plaintiffs have either asserted a sufficient commercial interest or suffered an actual competitive harm that would satisfy the Conte Bros, standard. Specifically, as the plaintiffs admit, they have no commercial presence in the United States. In fact, they do not plan on obtaining a presence here until and unless they win this lawsuit. As a result, even though the plaintiffs and defendants are “head-to-head” or direct competitors over in Russia, they do not compete at all, whether directly or indirectly, in the United States. Without a commercial presence, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiffs have asserted a legitimate commercial interest to protect or have suffered a tangible competitive harm within the meaning of the Lanham Act. See PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1112 (2d Cir.1997) (recognizing that the litigant “d[id] not currently sell a ... product that compete[d] with [his opponent’s] products,” regardless of whether that party was acting lawfully or unlawfully); see also Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir.1995) (noting that the plaintiff was not then, nor had ever been, in competition with the defendants at any level). And, even though a “future ‘potential for a commercial or competitive injury’ can establish standing” under certain circumstances, see PDK, 103 F.3d at 1112 (citing Berni, 838 F.2d at 648), the court believes, as it has already discussed, that the plaintiffs mere hopes or dreams of entering the U.S. market to sell their SMIRNOV vodka products are presently too tenuous or nebulous to establish standing under the Lanham Act. See PDK, 103 F.3d at 1112; cf. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F.Supp. 72, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1964) (noting that, under anti-trust law, the plaintiff must “show that he has the intention and preparedness to engage in th[e respective] business”) (citing Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 152 F.2d 398, 400 (3d Cir.1945)). An examination of the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries adds further support to this conclusion. According to the plaintiffs, perhaps the “worst injury” that they suffer is the “complete barrier to entry into the United States vodka market” imposed by the defendants’ virtual “trademark monopoly” over the SMIRNOFF name and associated marks. However, in the opinion of the court, this asserted injury does not arise out of a violation of the Lanham Act. Instead, it seems to stem from the defendants’ threat to sue the plaintiffs under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement if they attempt to enter the U.S. market with their SMIRNOV vodka products. However, the court doubts that the threat to sue another party under the Lanham Act can give rise to a violation of that same Act. Instead, in the opinion of the court, this asserted anti-competitive harm is better recognized, if at all, under other statutes. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1257-58 (9th Cir.1982); Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F.Supp. 702, 704-07 (E.D.Mich.1992); cf. Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 438 F.Supp. 82, 87 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (recognizing that the test to determine “whether a trademark is being used to confer a monopoly in a certain product” is properly conducted “under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2,” which requires a showing that the defendant’s “actions have led to or resulted in a dangerous probability that it will gain a monopoly over the product in issue”) (emphasis added). For these reasons, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiffs have asserted injuries which the Lanham Act was intended to protect. ii. The plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are indirect and speculative. Without a commercial presence, the plaintiffs cannot establish that they suffer a direct injury from any of the defendants’ actions. Most notably, as the plaintiffs themselves admit, they cannot show that they have actually lost sales or profits to the defendants’ competing products since, given their absence from the U.S. market, the plaintiffs have never sold any of their products here in the first place. Cf. A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir.1999). Recognizing this deficiency in their case, the plaintiffs have advanced three alternative damage theories. In addition to their request for punitive and treble damages, they seek (1) the disgorgement of all of the defendants’ profits since 1982, which they estimate at roughly $1 billion, (2)'a reasonable royalty for the defendants’ use of the SMIRNOFF name since 1939, which they calculate at approximately $300 million, and (3) the costs of a corrective advertising campaign, which would run anywhere between $20 to $120 million. Thus, from one perspective, the plaintiffs appear to allege specific damages figures. However, a closer inspection reveals that these numbers are supported by nothing other than sheer speculation. For example, in support of their request for a reasonable royalty, the plaintiffs allege only that “Eugenia might well have considered ... licensing her name.” Thus, by definition, the plaintiffs are engaging in speculation. In short, “[a]ny royalties that might have accrued due to other potential licensing agreements [which were never explored at the time] are [purely] speculative.” See Jacobson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. CV 89-2008, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14519, at *16-18 (C.D.Cal. July 23, 1991). Put differently, the claim that Eugenia “lost royalties from unnamed licensees for unnamed amounts” for a time when she was not even licensing her name is based on nothing other than mere conjecture. See id. at *18. The other damage theories advanced by plaintiffs suffer from even more serious flaws. Most notably, as the defendants point out, these theories are based on the faulty premise that the plaintiffs may act as a “vicarious avenger” of the general public’s right to be protected against potentially false advertisements. Cf. Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175 (rejecting this approach) (quoting Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230 (3d Cir.1990)). However, for the very reason that the Lanham Act does not confer standing upon consumers, see id. at 1174 (citing Colligan, 442 F.2d at 693), this court should not interpret the statute as allowing a litigant to seek redress for diffuse injuries purportedly spread across the public at large. Cf. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 963 (7th Cir.1992) (recognizing that an award of $24 million, which amounted to ten percent of the defendant’s profits, conferred a “windfall” upon the plaintiff, which “b[ore] no relationship to that [party’s arguably unjust] enrichment”). Thus, while the court recognizes the evidentiary leniency afforded to litigants who claim that they have been partially or totally excluded from the marketplace as a result of another’s actions, see Danny Kresky Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 212-13 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Corp., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969)), the court cannot help but notice that by seeking the disgorgement of the defendants’ profits from 1982 to the present, the plaintiffs are essentially asking to recover for an eleven to thirteen year period when they did not even exist. As a result, they could not have possibly suffered any commercial or competitive injury during this time period. Moreover, while the plaintiffs attempt to sidestep this issue by pointing out that they are asserting the rights that the French Smirnoffs possessed in the years which led up to this lawsuit, the court feels obligated to point out that Boris, the sole surviving descendent of the French Smir-noffs, was not engaged in any commercial activity concerning the use of the SMIRNOFF name until 1994, the year before this lawsuit was filed. Consequently, any injuries that he may have incurred as a result of the defendants’ conduct, like those suffered by his mother and grandmother, are at best conjectural, in. The plaintiffs are too far removed from the alleged misconduct and, thus, the risk of duplicative damage awards is great. Finally, as the Conte Bros. court noted, “the ‘existence of an identifiable class of persons’ — manufacturers of competing products — ‘whose self-interest would normally m