Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge. Currently pending before the Court are the motions to extend the Final Judgments in this action filed by the California Mov-ants and the New York Movants (collectively, the “Moving States”). The Final Judgments arise out of a single civil complaint filed by a group of state plaintiffs on May 18, 1998, alleging antitrust violations by Defendant Microsoft Corporation and asserting claims pursuant to federal and state law. The two Final Judgments are premised upon the same liability finding affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and are virtually identical in their substantive provisions. Nevertheless, the two Final Judgments were reached via different paths: the New York Movants’ Final Judgment was the result of a negotiated consent decree settling the remedy portion of this case as to certain state plaintiffs, while the California Movants’ Final Judgment was entered by the Court following a thirty-two day remedy-specific evidentiary hearing. The Moving States’ motions seek the same objective: the extension of the relevant Final Judgment until November 12, 2012. The Court has conducted a searching and dedicated review of the Moving States’ motions, Microsoft’s Opposition, the Moving States’ Reply, and the exhibits attached to those memoranda. In addition, the Court has requested further targeted briefing from the Moving States and Microsoft, and has reviewed each party’s filings carefully. The Court has also given due consideration to the amicus curiae brief filed by the United States of America, Plaintiff in the related action, United States v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1232. Upon a thorough review of all of the foregoing, the relevant statutes and case law, and the entire record herein, the Court shall GRANT-IN-PART and DE NY-IN-PART the Moving States’ motions to extend the Final Judgments. Overview of Court Findings The Court’s decision in this matter is based upon the extreme and unforeseen delay in the availability of complete, accurate, and useable technical documentation relating to the Communications Protocols that Microsoft is required to make available to licensees under Section III.E of the Final Judgments. The Court concludes that the Moving States have met their burden of establishing that this delay constitutes changed circumstances, which have prevented the Final Judgments from achieving their principal objectives. As such, the Court shall extend until November 12, 2009 those provisions of the Final Judgments that have not yet been extended until that date (collectively the “Expiring Provisions”), thus making all provisions of the Final Judgments coterminous. The Court declines the Moving States’ invitation to extend the entirety of the Final Judgments through 2012 at this point in time, concluding that it is premature to do so. The Court’s extension should not be viewed as a sanction against Microsoft; to the contrary, the Court commends Microsoft for its willingness to cooperate with the Plaintiffs in this action and in United States v. Microsoft in negotiating solutions to issues as they have arisen throughout the past five years. Indeed, because the parties have negotiated solutions to each of the myriad issues that have arisen regarding the technical documentation, the Court has never been asked to find Microsoft out of compliance with the Final Judgments, and has not deemed a sua sponte finding of non-compliance necessary or fruitful in achieving compliance. Nevertheless, the fact remains that more than five years after the Final Judgments were entered, the technical documentation required by Section III.E is still not available to licensees in a certifiably complete, accurate, and useable form. Further, as a result of the delay, the various provisions of the Final Judgments have not yet been given the opportunity to operate together as the comprehensive remedy the Court and the parties envisioned when the Final Judgments were entered. The Court’s extension should thus be viewed as a means to allow the comprehensive remedial scheme embodied in the Final Judgments the chance to maximize Section III.E’s pro-competitive potential. The Court cannot know what impact the technical documentation required by Section III.E will have on the market once it is finally available in a complete, accurate, and useable form. The Moving States, however, proffer realistic examples of ways in which the Expiring Provisions of the Final Judgments can yet play a significant role in helping Section III.E achieve its full potential. In the face of these examples, the Court concludes that allowing the Expiring Provisions of the Final Judgments to lapse before Section III.E has even been given a chance to succeed might threaten the ability of the Final Judgments to achieve their full procompetitive impact. The Court therefore concludes that the limited extension it is approving is consonant with the policies of encouraging consent decrees, as well as the Court’s authority to modify court-ordered judgments. I: BACKGROUND A. Proceedings Leading to the Remedial Final Judgments On May 18, 1998, simultaneous with the filing of the complaint in United States v. Microsoft, a group of state plaintiffs filed a civil complaint alleging antitrust violations by Microsoft and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the company’s allegedly unlawful conduct. New York v. Microsoft Corporation, 224 F.Supp.2d 76, 86 (D.D.C.2002) (hereinafter “Remedy Opinion ”). The instant action asserted claims pursuant to federal and state law, and was consolidated with the United States’ action, which asserted only federal law claims. Id. Following a bench trial in the consolidated cases, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson found Microsoft liable for violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and ordered the division of Microsoft into two separate corporations to remedy those findings of liability. Id. (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30, 35 (D.D.C.2000) and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.2000)). On Microsoft’s appeal of those rulings, the D.C. Circuit deferred to Judge Jackson’s factual findings, affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part his findings of liability, and vacated the remedy decree. Id. (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001) (hereinafter “Microsoft”)). Specifically, the D.C. Circuit affirmed only limited violations based on § 2 of the Sherman Act for illegal monopoly maintenance, and reversed all other grounds for liability. Soon thereafter, the consolidated cases were randomly reassigned to this Court, with instructions to hold a “ ‘remedies-specific evidentiary hearing,’ and to ‘fashion an appropriate remedy’ in light of the revised liability findings.” Id. at 87 (citing Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 103, 105). As the remedies crafted on remand were thus cabined by the D.C. Circuit’s findings and instructions in its liability opinion, the Court briefly discusses the key portions of that opinion. 1. Appellate Findings and Instructions The D.C. Circuit’s opinion began by affirming the district court’s definition of the relevant market as “the licensing of all Intel-compatible PC operating systems worldwide.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 52. The D.C. Circuit also adopted the district court’s determination that “circumstantial evidence proves that Microsoft possesses monopoly power,” and noted that Microsoft’s behavior “may well be sufficient to show the existence of monopoly power,” if direct proof were required. Id. at 56-57. The D.C. Circuit’s adoption of the market definition was premised on its simultaneous acceptance of Plaintiffs’ theory of Microsoft’s market dominance. The district court and appellate court both noted that Microsoft’s lawfully-acquired monopoly was naturally protected by a “structural barrier” known as the “applications barrier to entry.” Id. at 55. The applications barrier to entry arises because: “(1) most consumers prefer operating systems for which a large number of applications have already been written; and (2) most developers prefer to write for operating systems that already have a substantial consumer base.” Id. The applications barrier to entry creates a network effects situation, which perpetuates Microsoft’s operating system dominance. Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 89-90. This is because “[e]very operating system has different APIs,” such that “applications written for one operating system will not function on another unless the developer undertakes the ‘time consuming and expensive’ process” of “porting” the application to an alternative operating system. Id. (quoting Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 53, 55). During the liability phase of this case, Plaintiffs proceeded on the theory that certain kinds of software products, known as “middleware,” could weaken the applications barrier to entry “by serving as platforms for applications, taking over some of the platform functions provided by Windows.” Id. at 90. Middleware has the ability to expose its own APIs, and Plaintiffs posited that “[ultimately, by writing to the middleware API set, applications developers could write applications which would run on any operating system on which the middleware was preset.” Id. In accepting the district court’s definition of the relevant market and Plaintiffs’ theory of Microsoft’s market dominance, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court had properly excluded middleware products from the relevant market. Id. The majority of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion focused on Microsoft’s challenges to the district court’s findings of liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act. The D.C. Circuit addressed each in turn, and ultimately sustained the district court’s findings of liability with respect to the following specific conduct: (1) the license restrictions Microsoft imposed upon manufacturers of PCs, known as OEMs, Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59-64; (2) Microsoft’s agreements with IAPs, by which Microsoft agreed “to provide easy access to IAPs’ services from the Windows desktop in return for the IAPs’ agreement to promote [Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (“IE”) web browser] exclusively and to keep shipments of internet access software using [the competing Navigator] browser under a specific percentage,” id. at 67-71; (3) Microsoft’s agreements with ISVs, which required ISVs “to distribute, promote, and rely on IE rather than Navigator,” id. at 71-72; (4) Microsoft’s exclusive agreement with Apple Computer, “both an OEM and a software developer,” which required Apple to privilege IE over Navigator, id. at 71-74; (5) Microsoft’s conduct with respect to the “Java” technologies, including its agreements requiring major ISVs to promote Microsoft’s Java Virtual Machine exclusively, and its deception of Java developers about the Windows-specific nature of the tools it distributed to them, id. at 74-77; and (6) Microsoft’s “threat” to Intel regarding its efforts to develop a “high performance, Windows-compatible” and “Sun compliant” Java Virtual Machine, id. at 77-78. The D.C. Circuit also imposed liability upon Microsoft for the “state law counterparts of’ Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 46. Beyond these findings, however, the D.C. Circuit did not find Microsoft liable for any additional antitrust violations. In particular, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that Microsoft’s “course of conduct” as a whole constituted a separate violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 78. The D.C. Circuit also rejected the district court’s finding of attempted monopolization and remanded Plaintiffs’ § 1 tying claim for further proceedings at the district court level. Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 95. Plaintiffs opted not to pursue their tying claim on remand. Id. After reviewing the district court’s conclusions with respect to liability, the D.C. Circuit turned to considering the district court’s choice of remedy, which mandated the divestiture of Microsoft Corporation into two separate entities and included a number of “interim restrictions on Microsoft’s conduct.” Id. at 95-96 (quoting Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 100). The D.C. Circuit “found three fundamental flaws in the district court’s order of remedy, each of which alone justified vacating the remedial decree.” Id. at 96. First, the D.C. Circuit focused on the district court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing in the face of disputed facts concerning the remedy. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 101-03. Next, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court “failed to provide an adequate explanation for the relief it ordered,” by not “explaining] how its remedies decree would accomplish [the] objectives” of a remedial decree in an antitrust case. Id. at 103. The D.C. Circuit reiterated that “a remedies decree in an antitrust case must seek to ‘unfetter a market from anticom-petitive conduct,’ to ‘terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future.’ ” Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577, 92 S.Ct. 1142, 31 L.Ed.2d 492 (1972) and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250, 88 S.Ct. 1496, 20 L.Ed.2d 562 (1968) (hereinafter “United Shoe”)). Finally, the D.C. Circuit concluded that its substantial modifications to the liability imposed by the district court merited a new determination of the remedy for the surviving antitrust violations. Id. at 103-05. The D.C. Circuit therefore remanded the case to this Court, with instructions to resolve any factual disputes surrounding a remedy and exercise the Court’s “broad discretion” in imposing the “relief it calculates will best remedy the conduct ... found to be unlawful.” Id. at 105. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit “offered specific guidance to this Court regarding the inquiry to be undertaken following remand.” Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 97. Of particular significance, the D.C. Circuit instructed this Court to consider the quantum of proof presented by Plaintiffs as to the “causal connection between Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct and its dominant position in the OS market” in determining what remedy to impose. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 106. The D.C. Circuit specifically noted that it had “found a causal connection between Microsoft’s exclusionary conduct and its continuing position in the operating systems market only through inference,” and that the district court “expressly did not adopt the position that Microsoft would have lost its position in the OS market but for its anticompeti-tive behavior.” Id. at 106-07. The D.C. Circuit also stressed that it had “drastically altered the scope of Microsoft’s liability,” and advised this Court to “consider which of the [original] decree’s conduct restrictions remain viable in light of [the] modification of the original liability decision,” id. at 105. While the D.C. Circuit did not “undertake to dictate to [this] Court the precise form that relief should take on remand,” it noted that the relief “should be tailored to fit the wrong creating the occasion for the remedy.” Id. at 107. 2. Remedy Proceedings Before This Court “Following remand, pursuant to Court Order, the parties in the two consolidated cases entered into intensive settlement negotiations.” Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 87. These negotiations resulted in the United States and Microsoft reaching a resolution in United States v. Microsoft, in the form of a proposed consent decree. Id. In the instant case, the settlement negotiations were partially successful; the New York Group joined the settlement between the United States and Microsoft, electing not to proceed to a remedies-specific hearing. Id. The States that opted not to join the settlement — those in the California Group — proposed a remedy distinct from that presented in the proposed consent decree. Id. Following expedited discovery, an eviden-tiary hearing on the issue of the remedy commenced on March 18, 2002. Id. The parties submitted direct testimony in written format, and cross-examination and redirect testimony were offered in open court. Id. “Over thirty-two trial days, the Court reviewed the written direct testimony and heard the live testimony of fifteen witnesses proffered by Plaintiffs and nineteen witnesses proffered by Microsoft.” Id. On November 1, 2002, the Court issued three Memorandum Opinions and related Orders. The first Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order, issued in United States v. Microsoft, involved the Court’s determination, pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (“Tunney Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h), that, with the exception of the provisions relating to the Court’s retention of jurisdiction — which the Court revised to be both more specific and more broadly drawn — the consent decree proposed by the United States and Microsoft was in the public interest. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F.Supp.2d 144 (D.D.C.2002) (hereinafter “Tunney Act Opinion ”). The second Memorandum Opinion and Order, issued in the instant case, similarly concluded that, with the exception of the retention of jurisdiction provision, the consent decree proposed by the Settling States and Microsoft resolved the controversy in a manner consistent with the public interest. See generally New York v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F.Supp.2d 203 (D.D.C.2002) (hereinafter “Settling States Opinion”). The Settling States Opinion incorporated by reference the Court’s Tunney Act Opinion. The final Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Final Judgment addressed the dueling remedy proposals presented to this Court by Microsoft and the California Group, which formed the basis for the remedy-specific evidentiary hearing. See generally Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d 76. The Final Judgments approved as to the Settling States and the Litigating States are substantively quite similar. This similarity is not surprising because both the Settling States’ consent decree and the Court-ordered remedy followed upon, and were constrained by, the D.C. Circuit’s specific liability findings, as well as its guidance as to the nature of an appropriate remedy in light of those findings. Each Final Judgment, in keeping with the goals of antitrust remedies described by the D.C. Circuit in its liability opinion and relevant Supreme Court precedent, addresses not only those specific acts for which the D.C. Circuit imposed liability, but also includes forward-looking remedies designed to “effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints.” Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 100, 108 (quoting International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947)). Significantly, in the Settling States Opinion, the Court noted that the Settling States’ proposed consent decree “takes account of the theory of liability advanced by Plaintiffs, the actual liability imposed by the appellate court, the concerns of the Plaintiffs with regard to future technologies, and the relevant policy considerations.” Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 259 (incorporating Tunney Act Opinion). These are the same factors that the Court weighed in the remedy proceeding. See generally Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d 76. B. The Final Judgments The following description highlights the key provisions that are common to both Final Judgments, and notes the few instances in which the Final Judgments differ. At the outset, the Court notes the following definitions, which are important to understanding the parameters of the Final Judgments: • The term “Non-Microsoft Middle-ware” incorporates the middleware threats that were the focus of the liability phase, and includes “a non-Microsoft software product running on a Windows Operating System Product that exposes a range of functionality to ISVs through published APIs, and that could, if ported to or made interoperable with, a non-Microsoft Operating System, thereby make it easier for applications that rely in whole or in part on the functionality supplied by that software product to be ported to or run on that non-Microsoft Operating System.” Final Judgments, § VI.M. • A “Non-Microsoft Middleware Product” is similar to “Non-Microsoft Mid-dleware,” but adds the requirement that “at least one million copies” of the product “were distributed in the United States within the previous year.” Id., § VLN. • The term “Microsoft Middleware Product” is defined according to a specific set of Microsoft functionalities existing at the time of the Final Judgments, as well as future Microsoft functionality. The existing set of func-tionalities are those provided by “Internet Explorer, Microsoft’s Java Virtual Machine, Windows Media Player, Windows Messenger, Outlook Express and their successors in a Windows Operating System Product.” The future technologies include software included in Windows that provides the functionality of internet browsers, email client software, networked audio/video client software, or instant messaging software. Also included in the definition of “Microsoft Middleware Product” are future functionalities that are both distributed as part of Windows and separately from Windows by Microsoft, trademarked by Microsoft, and which compete with Non-Microsoft Middle-ware Products. Id., § VI.K. • The term “Microsoft Middleware” is similar to “Microsoft Middleware Product,” but is limited to the software code that is separately distributed and trademarked or marketed as a major version of a Microsoft Middleware Product. Id., § VI.J. 1. Substantive Provisions Contained in Section III The substantive proscriptions of each Final Judgment are included within Section III, which is entitled “Prohibited Conduct.” Subsections A through C of § III focus on Microsoft’s dealing with OEMs. Section III.A bars Microsoft from retaliating against OEMs for (i) “developing, distributing, promoting, using, selling, or licensing” software or Non-Microsoft Middleware, (ii) shipping a Personal Computer that includes a non-Microsoft Operating System, or (iii) exercising options or alternatives provided by the Final Judgment. Id. at § III.A. Section III.A also requires Microsoft to provide Covered OEMs with written notice before terminating their licenses for Windows Operating Systems Products. Id. In the Remedy Opinion, the Court described § III.A as “providing] substantial freedom to OEMs in their configuration of Microsoft’s Windows operating system by lifting Microsoft’s illegal license restrictions.” 224 F.Supp.2d at 152. Under § HUB, Microsoft is required to provide Windows Operating System Products to Covered OEMs “pursuant to uniform license agreements with uniform terms and conditions.” Final Judgments, § III.B. To this end, § III.B requires the royalties Microsoft charges to be set forth in a uniform schedule published on a website accessible to the Plaintiffs and the Covered OEMs. Id. Section III.C “seeure[s] for OEMs the general ability to install and display icons, shortcuts and menu entries for middleware ... on the Windows desktop or in the Start menu,” while reflecting “the care with which the appellate court separated anticompetitive restrictions from legitimate license restrictions.” Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 153. As such, § III.C generally prohibits Microsoft from restricting by agreement any OEM licensee from: (1) installing and displaying icons, shortcuts, or menu entries for any Non-Microsoft Middleware or any product or service that distributes, uses, promotes or supports any Non-Microsoft Middle-ware, where such applications are generally displayed; (2) distributing or promoting Non-Microsoft Middleware by installing and displaying on the desktop shortcuts of any size or shape so long as they do not interfere with the functionality of the user interface; (3) launching automatically any Non-Microsoft Middleware; (4) offering users the option of launching other Operating Systems; (5) presenting in the initial boot sequence its own IAP offer; or (6) exercising any of the options provided in § III.H of the Final Judgments. Final Judgments, § III.C. The Court’s Remedy Opinion described Sections III.D and III.E of the Final Judgments as “explicitly forward-looking remedies,” which “reflect an agreement that effective interoperation between software running on two or more devices will play an integral role in the successful emergence of new software products and platforms.” Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 171. Elsewhere in the Remedy Opinion, the Court acknowledged that the “interoperability disclosures” contained in §§ III.D and III.E were not “directly related to the imposition of liability,” but rather “aimed at the broader goals of unfettering the market and restoring competition.” Id. at 226; see also Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 244-45 (incorporating the Tunney Act Opinion, and stating that “while the rationale for this type of disclosure rests, in part, upon the finding of liability for conditioning the provision of technical information on illegal, exclusive agreements, it can be viewed more broadly to relate to the United States’ theory of the case as a whole.”). Section III.D requires Microsoft to disclose to ISVs, IHVs, IAPs, ICPs, and OEMs the APIs and related documentation that are used by Microsoft Middle-ware to interoperate with a Windows Operating System Product. Final Judgments, § III.D. Section III.E requires Microsoft — starting nine months after the submission of the Settling States’ Final Judgment to the Court and three months after the entry of the Litigating States’ Final Judgment — to make available for use by third parties “on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (consistent with Section III.I) any Communications Protocol that is, on or after the date [the] Final Judgment is submitted to the Court, (i) implemented in a Windows Operating System Product installed on a client computer, and (ii) used to interoperate, or communicate, natively ... with a Microsoft server operating system product.” Final Judgments, § III.E. Section III.E describes “native” communications as “without the addition of software code to the client operating system product.” Id. The Court’s Remedy Opinion described § III.E as “[i]n all likelihood” “the most forward-looking provision in the Court’s remedy.” Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 173. Section III.E was included in the Settling States’ consent decree based on the United States’ belief that the Final Judgment’s “effectiveness would be undercut unless it addressed the rapidly growing server segment of the market.” Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 249 (incorporating the Tunney Act Opinion). Section III.E represented an effort to “obtain protection which is prospective in its focus” despite “the rapid pace of change in the software industry,” so that the “core of the decree would [not] prove prematurely obsolete.” Id. Similarly, § III.E was included in the Court-imposed Litigating States’ remedy based on the Court’s conclusions that: server operating systems can perform a function akin to that performed by traditional middleware because they provide a platform for applications running ‘for’ use on a PC. The mandatory disclosure of the communications protocols relied upon by Microsoft’s PC operating system to interoperate with its server operating systems will advance the ability of non-Microsoft operating systems to in-teroperate, or communicate, with the ubiquitous Windows PC client. Advancement of the communication between non-Microsoft server operating systems and Windows clients will further the ability of these non-Microsoft server operating systems to provide a platform which competes with Windows itself. Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 172-73. Sections III.F, III.G, and III.H of the Final Judgments relate to “other participants in the ecosystem,” namely ISVs, IHVs, IAPs, ICPs, and end users. See Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 166. Section III.F bars Microsoft from retaliating against ISVs or IHVs for “developing, using, promoting or supporting any [competing software] or any software that runs on any [competing software].” Final Judgments, § III.F. In addition, § III.F prohibits Microsoft from entering into any agreement relating to a Windows Operating System Product that conditions the grant of any consideration on an ISV’s refraining from developing, using, distributing or promoting any competing software, unless the condition is related to a bona fide contractual obligation of the ISV regarding Microsoft software. Id. Section III.G, in turn, generally precludes Microsoft from entering into any agreement with any IAP, ICP, ISV, IHV or OEM that requires any such entity to distribute, promote, use or support, “exclusively or in a fixed percentage, any Microsoft Platform Software.” Final Judgments, § III.G. Section III.G also prohibits Microsoft from entering agreements with IAPs or ICPs that grant placement in any Windows Operating System Product “on condition that the IAP or ICP refrain from distributing, promoting or using any software that competes with Microsoft Middleware.” Id. Section III.H requires Microsoft to allow end users and OEMs to enable or remove access to each Microsoft Middle-ware Product or Non-Microsoft Middle-ware Product, by designating a Non-Microsoft Middleware Product to be invoked in place of a Microsoft Middleware Product, i.e., as a default, in certain situations. Final Judgments, § III.H. Section III.H also prohibits Microsoft from designing its Windows Operating System Products so as to induce reconfiguration of an OEM’s or consumer’s formatting of icons, shortcuts, and menu items less than 14 days after the initial boot up of a new PC, or without first seeking confirmation from the user. Id. Section III.I is closely related to the disclosures mandated by §§ III.D and III.E, see Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 249, and obligates Microsoft to “license to ISVs, IHVs, IAPs, ICPs, and OEMs any intellectual property rights owned or licensable by Microsoft that are required to exercise any of the options or alternatives expressly provided to them under [the Final Judgments]” on “reasonable and non-discriminatory terms” that are limited in scope so as to be “no broader than is necessary.” Final Judgments, § III.I. Finally, § III.J limits Microsoft’s disclosures under the Final Judgments to ensure that the mandated disclosures do not result in the release of information that “would compromise the security of a particular installation ... of anti-piracy, anti-virus, software licensing, digital rights management, encryption or authentication systems,” and limits Microsoft’s disclosure obligations with respect to a specific subset of security-related APIs and communications protocols. Final Judgments, § III.J. Section III.J also provides that Microsoft is not required to disclose any API, interface, or other information if Microsoft is “lawfully directed not to do so by a governmental agency of competent jurisdiction.” Id. 2. Compliance, Enforcement, and Termination While each Final Judgment provides that the relevant “Plaintiffs shall have exclusive responsibility for enforcing this Final Judgment,” Final Judgments, § JV.A, the Final Judgments differ significantly in their compliance and enforcement provisions. The Settling States’ Final Judgment provides for the creation of “a three-person Technical Committee (“TC”) to assist in enforcement of and compliance with” that Final Judgment. Settling States Final Judgment, § TV.B.1. The members of the TC are “experts in software design and programming,” who meet requirements demonstrating their independence from Microsoft, and who are selected by a detailed procedure. Id, § IY.B.2. The TC is broadly empowered to “monitor Microsoft’s compliance with its obligations under [the] Final Judgment,” and is answerable to the United States and the Settling States, rather than to the public or to the Court. Id, § IV.B.8.a., § TV.B.8.e. Although the TC serves the United States and the Settling States, “Microsoft is responsible for the cost and expense of the service of the committee.” Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 253-54 (incorporating Tunney Act Opinion). The Settling States’ Final Judgment also provides for a Microsoft Internal Compliance Officer, who “is far more closely aligned with Microsoft.” Id. at 254. The Compliance Officer is a Microsoft employee responsible for administering Microsoft’s antitrust compliance program and “helping to ensure compliance” with the Final Judgment. Settling States Final Judgment, § IV.C. The TC and the Compliance Officer both may receive complaints from the United States, the Settling States, and third parties, as well as each other, regarding Microsoft’s compliance with the terms of the Final Judgment. Id, § IV.D. The Final Judgment includes specific provisions as to actions the TC and the Compliance Officer are obliged to take in conjunction with complaints received. Id. As the Court explained in the Settling States Opinion, “ultimately the power to enforce the terms of the decree rests with the government,” i.e., the United States and the Settling States, and the TC was “not intended as a substitute for the enforcement authority of the United States” and the Settling States. Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 255-56 (incorporating Tunney Act Opinion). Rather, the TC was intended as a “mechanism for the provision of impartial and expert compliance assessment to the parties charged with enforcement.” Id at 256. Unlike the Settling States, during the remedy hearing before this Court, the Litigating States were “unwaveringly critical of Microsoft’s proposal for a technical committee,” and the Court therefore declined to impose a technical committee upon the Litigating States in their remedy. Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 182. Instead, the Litigating States’ Final Judgment provides for the creation of a Compliance Committee made up of at least three non-employee members of the Microsoft Board of Directors. Litigating States Final Judgment, § IV.B.l. The Compliance Committee, in turn, hires a Compliance Officer, who is “responsible for development and supervision of Microsoft’s internal programs to ensure compliance with the antitrust law and [the] Final Judgment.” Id, § IV.B.2. In addition to vesting the respective plaintiff states with enforcement authority and creating mechanisms to support those efforts, the Final Judgments include two paragraphs regarding the Court’s retention of jurisdiction. First, the Final Judgments provide: Jurisdiction is retained by this Court over this action such that the Court may act sua sponte to issue further orders or directions, including but not limited to orders or directions relating to the construction or carrying out of this Final Judgment, the enforcement of compliance therewith, the modification thereof, and the punishment of any violation thereof. Final Judgments, § VII. The Court’s Tunney Act Opinion and Settling States Opinion each specifically conditioned approval of the relevant consent decree on the parties amending their respective consent decrees to include this reservation of jurisdiction. Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 258-59; see also Tunney Act Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 201-02. The Court did so out of concern that, without such a provision, the language of the Final Judgments might not “clearly vest the Court with the authority to act sua sponte to order certifications of compliance and other actions by the parties.” See Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 258; Tunney Act Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 200-01. The Court deemed it “imperative, in this unusually complex case, for the Court’s retention of jurisdiction to be clearly articulated and broadly drawn.” Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 258; Tunney Act Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 200-01. The Court therefore included the same retention of jurisdiction in the Litigating States’ Final Judgment. In addition to providing for the retention of sua sponte jurisdiction, the Final Judgments provide that: Jurisdiction is retained by this Court over this action and the parties thereto for the purpose of enabling either of the parties thereto to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe this Final Judgment, to modify or terminate any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions. Final Judgments, § VII. It is this provision of the Final Judgments that the Moving States invoke in their motions. As to the term of the Final Judgments, each provides “[ujnless [the] Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment will expire on the fifth anniversary of the date it is entered by the Court.” Final Judgments, § VI.A. In discussing the appropriate term for the Final Judgment in the remedy proceeding, the Court noted that there was “little dispute that many of the acts which gave rise to the imposition of liability in [the] case ha[d] long since ceased.” 224 F.Supp.2d at 184. The Court further observed that there was “no dispute that the industry at issue in [the] case is remarkable for its constant and rapid change,” and noted the D.C. Circuit’s concern in its liability opinion as to the difficulties inherent in crafting conduct remedies in quickly shifting markets. Id. (quoting Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49). In that vein, the Court acknowledged that “it is beyond the capacity of this Court, counsel, or any witness, to craft a remedy in 2002, for antitrust violations which commenced in the mid-1990s, which will be appropriately tailored to the needs of a rapidly changing industry in 2012.” Id. Cognizant of the fact that an “antitrust decree should endure only so long as is necessary to ensure competition,” the Court concluded that a five-year term was appropriate. Id. For similar reasons, the Court’s Tunney Act Opinion, and thus the Settling States Opinion, concluded that the consent decree’s five-year term was in the public interest, notwithstanding the fact that prior cases (not involving this technology) brought by the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice had resulted in ten-year decrees. Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 252 (incorporating Tunney Act Opinion). Finally, each Final Judgment describes one specific scenario in which the Final Judgments might be extended by the Court, allowing the Plaintiffs to “apply to the Court for a one-time extension of this Final Judgment of up to two years ... [i]n any enforcement proceeding in which the Court has found that Microsoft has engaged in a pattern of willful and systematic violations.” Id., § VLB. The Final Judgments do not, however, indicate that § VI.B represents the sole scenario in which the Final Judgments might be extended, and the Moving States do not purport to invoke that provision in their motions. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts alone appealed the Litigating States’ Final Judgment, challenging many of the substantive provisions described above. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion on appeal addressed each challenged provision and “affirm[ed] [this Court’s] remedial decree in its entirety,” finding that the Court’s “reasoning was based upon evidence in the record, was sound, and involved no abuse of discretion.” Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1204, 1234 (D.C.Cir.2004) (hereinafter “Massachusetts v. Microsoft”). In the same opinion, the D.C. Circuit addressed arguments raised by third-parties who sought to intervene in the Court’s public-interest determination under the Tunney Act, and upheld this Court’s “approval of the consent decree as being in the public interest.” Id. at 1204. In affirming this Court’s opinions, the D.C. Circuit reiterated that, “key to the proper remedy in this case is to end Microsoft’s restrictions on potentially threatening mid-dleware, prevent it from hampering similar nascent threats in the future, and restore the competitive conditions created by similar middleware threats.” Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d at 1243. C. Implementation of the Final Judgments The Court entered the Litigating States’ Final Judgment on November 1, 2002, and entered the Settling States’ Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) on November 12, 2002. On May 14, 2003, the Court issued an Order requiring the parties to file joint status reports with the Court every six months regarding Microsoft’s compliance with the Final Judgments and Plaintiffs’ enforcement efforts. That Order provided that status conferences would be scheduled within one month of the Court’s receipt of each status report. Over time, however, in response to various issues, the Court’s practice evolved to include a Joint Status Report (hereinafter “JSR”) — filed jointly by the United States, the New York Group, the California Group, and Microsoft, in both this action and United States v. Microsoft — and a corresponding status conference approximately every three months. In addition, for reasons described below, in January 2006 Microsoft began filing monthly Supplemental Status Reports regarding its compliance efforts in connection with § III.E of the Final Judgments. The Court has kept abreast of the Plaintiffs’ enforcement efforts and Microsoft’s compliance efforts through the myriad Status Reports filed and status conferences held over the past five years. In order to place the Moving States’ motions in context, the Court briefly summarizes the major developments over the past five years. The Court first addresses those related to provisions of the Final Judgments other than § III.E, before turning to those connected with § III.E. As detailed below, Section III.E has, over time, become the focus of the parties’ and the Court’s attention, as well as the source of the most ongoing compliance issues. At the outset, the Court commends the members of the TC as well as the California Group’s technical expert, Mr. Craig Hunt, who has worked alongside the TC in many of its compliance efforts related to Section III.E. In the Court’s view, the TC has truly become one of the most successful aspects of the Final Judgments, because it has been invaluable in facilitating the Plaintiffs’ enforcement efforts. As the Court noted when the Final Judgments were entered, the instant case is an “unusually complex” one, Settling States Opinion, 231 F.Supp.2d at 258 (incorporating Tunney Act Opinion), and the TC has provided the Plaintiffs with crucial technical expertise by providing advice and evaluating Microsoft’s compliance with the Final Judgments. The' TC has gone far beyond the simple “monitoring” with which it was tasked in the Settling States’ Final Judgment, see Settling States’ Final Judgment, § TV.B.8.a, to providing testing, feedback, and critiques that have proved critical to the Plaintiffs’ efforts to maximize the full potential of the Final Judgments’ remedies. The TC’s expertise has allowed Plaintiffs to reap another, undoubtedly significant benefit from the Final Judgments: beginning in the Summer of 2004, “Plaintiffs, with the assistance of the TC, [began] discussions with Microsoft concerning the successor operating system to Windows XP,” which was eventually released as Windows Vista. 7/9/04 JSR at 7. Plaintiffs focused on changes in Vista that might implicate Sections III.C and III.H of the Final Judgments, reviewed materials supplied by Microsoft, discussed their concerns with Microsoft, and were actually able to effect changes to Vista in advance of its release, particularly with respect to the methods for setting default middle-ware. See generally id.; 10/8/04 JSR; 10/19/05 JSR at 8-9. Throughout that process, the TC developed a number of testing tools that middleware ISVs used to ensure “Vista-readiness” prior to the shipment of Windows Vista. 10/19/05 JSR at 9-10; 11/21/06 JSR at 5-6; 3/6/07 JSR at 6-7. In addition to their oversight efforts related to Vista, Plaintiffs were also able to “stud[y] the new search feature in Internet Explorer 7 and discussf ] its implications with Microsoft months before it was included in the beta versions released to consumers.” 5/12/06 JSR at 13. The Court also notes that the enforcement and voluntary dispute resolution mechanisms of the Final Judgments have been a resounding success. Over the past five years, a variety of complaints have been brought to the parties’ attention by third parties, and the parties themselves ■have also identified areas of concern. Through discussions with Microsoft and the TC, the Plaintiffs have determined which issues fall within the scope of the Final Judgments and whether those issues raise concerns as to Microsoft’s compliance. Where Plaintiffs have identified a compliance-related concern, they have engaged in constructive negotiations with Microsoft and have — based largely upon the TC’s ability to evaluate the technical significance of issues and advise the Plaintiffs and Microsoft as to potential solutions— been able to resolve them through cooperation rather than litigation. The Court has always encouraged the parties to negotiate solutions and avoid litigation, and continues to do so. Indeed, the Court commends Microsoft for being open to concerns raised by the TC and third parties, being willing to negotiate workable solutions rather than becoming intransigent, and thus seeking to avoid costly and complex litigation. Nevertheless, the Court would be remiss in suggesting that the compliance and enforcement road has been altogether smooth, even outside the context of Section IILE’s implementation. It is certainly true that, as Microsoft stresses, it has never been found to be out of compliance with the Expiring Provisions of the Final Judgments. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Microsoft Corporation in Opposition to Certain Plaintiff States’ Motions to Extend the Final Judgments (hereinafter “MS Opp’n”) at 11. However, it is also true that, over the years, compliance-related issues have arisen regarding virtually every aspect of Section III that the Plaintiffs have determined merited further investigation and warranted concern with Microsoft’s compliance efforts. See 7/3/03 JSR at 4-6 (describing ongoing questions related to § III.B compliance); 2/8/06 JSR at 10 (describing complaint under § III.C regarding OEM ability to customize first-boot experience); 6/19/07 JSR at 7-8 (describing reports alleging failure to disclose APIs as required by § III.D); 10/8/04 JSR at 7-8, 11 (describing concern .pursuant to § III.F regarding Microsoft contracts for .NET Framework); 10/19/05 JSR (describing issue under § III.G regarding draft specification for promotional CD that included exclusivity requirement); 10/17/03 JSR at 5-6 (describing § III.H issue relating to automatic invocation of IE). In each instance, the parties have— with the assistance of the TC — been able to negotiate a solution that has been acceptable to the parties and the Court. These negotiated solutions have obviated the need for compliance-related litigation and have precluded any possible Court findings of noncomplianee. D. The Section III.E Saga By far, the most significant focus of attention and criticism by the parties and the Court over the past five years has been Section III.E of the Final Judgments, which the Court once described as “the most forward-looking provision in [its] remedy.” Remedy Opinion, 224 F.Supp.2d at 173. Despite its originally forward-looking nature, no one involved— including the United States — disputes that more than five years after the entry of the Final Judgments, Section III.E still has yet to be fully implemented. The Court briefly recounts the tortured history that has led to this point. Section III.E of the Final Judgments requires Microsoft to license “on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (consistent with Section III.I) any Communications Protocol” that is “(i) implemented in a Windows Operating System Product installed on a client computer, and (ii) used to interoperate, or communicate, natively ... with a Microsoft server operating system product.” Final Judgments, § III.E. As the California Movants stress, Microsoft was aware that it would be required to produce Communications Protocols and corresponding technical documentation at least as early as November 2001, when it entered into the consent decree with the United States and the Settling States. CA Mem. at 6. That consent decree obligated Microsoft to make Communications Protocols available starting nine months after the consent decree was submitted to the Court, or in August 2002, while the Litigating States’ Final Judgment required Microsoft to make Communications Protocols available three months after entry of that Final Judgment, or in February 2003. Final Judgments, § III.E. When the Court held its first compliance-related Status Conference in this case on July 24, 2003, Microsoft represented that it had “identified more than 100 Communications Protocols encompassed by Section III.E” and developed a program, known as the Microsoft Communications Protocol Program (“MCPP”), under which third parties could license all of the Communications Protocols or a subset thereof. 7/3/03 JSR at 21. Microsoft also advised the Court that it had developed more than 5,000 pages of technical documentation, “produced by approximately ten technical writers working full-time for nine months.” Id. Microsoft began offering licenses under the MCPP in August 2002 and, as of July 2003, four ISVs had signed license agreements with Microsoft. Id. at 22. ' Plaintiffs’ initial § III.E enforcement efforts focused on ensuring that MCPP licenses were offered on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, as required by §§ III.E and III.I of the Final Judgments. See id. at 6-10. Plaintiffs continued to investigate issues relating to the terms, royalty rates, and structure of the licenses offered under the MCPP into early 2004. See generally 10/17/03 JSR. Throughout that period, Plaintiffs — including the United States, the New York Group, and the California Group — stressed that the delay in Section III.E’s implementation might undermine its “forward-looking” nature. See 7/3/03 JSR at 9. In response, in October 2003 Microsoft reported that it had decided to allow licensees to extend the term of their licenses for an additional five years at any point during the license period. 10/17/03 JSR at 8-9. Still, in January 2004, Plaintiffs jointly advised the Court that, after conducting interviews with most of the then-current MCPP licensees as well as a number of prospective licensees, they were “concerned that the current licensing program has thus far fallen short of satisfying fully the goals of Section III. E.” 1/16/04 JSR at 2-3. Also in January 2004, Plaintiffs reported to the Court that they had received a complaint regarding the sufficiency and completeness of the technical documentation provided by Microsoft to MCPP licensees, which the TC was investigating. Id. at 9. Plaintiffs reported a second complaint in this vein in April 2004, and informed the Court that the TC had “begun an investigation into this issue.” 4/14/04 JSR at 4-5. “As a result of this investigation and other work performed by the Plaintiffs, [Plaintiffs] concluded that the technical documentation nee[ded] substantial revision in order to ensure that it [would be] usable by licensees across a broad range of implementations as envisioned by Section III. E.” Id. at 5. Thus began the saga of the technical documentation, which continues unresolved to this day. During the rest of 2004, the parties worked towards collectively developing a standard for completeness to which the technical documentation would be held, with the expectation that the project would be completed by the fall of 2004. 7/9/04 JSR at 5-6. All Plaintiffs — the state plaintiffs as well as the United States— continued to voice their concern that the delayed implementation of Section III.E should not be allowed to “reduce the useful life of the licensed technology to current and potential licensees.” 4/14/04 JSR at 5. In response, Microsoft revised the MCPP license to provide for a two-year extension for the availability of the MCPP (until November 2009), and committed to allowing licensees to use the licensed protocols to develop products in perpetuity. 7/9/04 JSR at 4-5. Microsoft released its first major revision of the technical documentation in early December 2004. 1/25/05 JSR at 3. While Plaintiffs believed that it represented a “significant improvement” over the previous documentation, they all remained concerned that further work was needed to ensure its completeness, usability, and accuracy. Id. To that end, the parties agreed to a comprehensive plan designed to remedy the deficiencies, which they expected to be completed in one year, i.e., by early 2006. Id. at 3-5. That plan involved two efforts, one to be undertaken by the TC, the other by Microsoft. Id. The TC’s portion of the plan soon began to make extensive progress, 6/1/05 JSR at 2-3, while Microsoft’s portion of the plan— dubbed “Troika” — became mired in difficulties, see generally id. By October 2005, the parties reported that under a “best-case” scenario, the Troika project would be completed in October 2006, ten months later than originally projected, and Microsoft admitted “[qjuite frankly,” that it “did not fully appreciate the scale, complexity, cost, and duration of the project,” and “overestimated the capability of existing technologies to meet the requirements of the effort.” 10/19/05 JSR at 5-6,14. As the Troika-related problems emerged, the Plaintiffs — particularly those within the California Group — began to question whether Microsoft was devoting the resources necessary to ensure that Section III.E resulted in complete, accurate, and useable technical documentation. See 10/26/05 Status Hrg. Tr. at 20:7-26:19 (expressing the California Group’s opinion that “[ejssentially, Microsoft hasn’t done what it promised to do” and stressing the significance of the technical documentation within the Final Judgments’ overall remedial scheme). The Court likewise stressed the significance of accurate and complete technical documentation during various status conferences, admonishing Microsoft that “if there is an issue of resources, then put them in, whatever it takes to make this work.” Id. at 33:11-14. In the Fall of 2005, the parties and the Court focused their attention on the Troika project, and the parties developed another four-part plan to address the project delays. 11/18/05 JSR at 2. The parties’ plan called upon the TC to assume responsibility for an increasingly significant portion of the work that Microsoft had previously committed to completing, while Microsoft agreed to “increase the resources dedicated to responding to the TC and to making resulting changes to the technical documentation” in response to Technical Documentation Issues (“TDIs”) identified by the TC. Id. at 2-8. Under the parties’ plan, Microsoft was to respond to TDIs within certain time frames, depending upon their severity, but by January 2006, Plaintiffs reported that Microsoft had fallen significantly behind in meeting those guidelines and that the number of outstanding TDIs was mounting. Pis’ 1/23/06 Resp. to Microsoft Suppl. Status Report. All Plaintiffs jointly condemned this slippage, advising the Court that “Microsoft need[ed] to dramatically increase the resources devoted to responding to technical documentation issues in order to get its performance under the [guidelines] back on track.” Id. at 2. Based on all Plaintiffs’ sharp criticism of Microsoft, “the frequent delays with the Troika project, [and] Microsoft’s newfound disregard for the [TDI guidelines],” during its opening comments at the February 8, 2006 status conference, the Court voiced its “eoncern[ ] that Microsoft was neglecting a portion of its compliance obligations and promises.” 2/8/06 Status Conf. Tr. at 6:5-10. Throughout that status conference, the Court stressed the need “to make sure that ... Microsoft [was] still carrying their end ... in terms of making sure this actually works,” particularly given the TC’s continued assumption of responsibilities originally undertaken by Microsoft. 2/14/06 Status Hrg. Tr. at 17:11— 18 (noting that “if [the TC’s] been able to do it, I don’t understand why Microsoft hasn’t been able to”). In addition, the Plaintiffs — again led by the California Group — denounced what they viewed as a “lack of commitment and seriousness with which Microsoft takes its obligations here.” Id. at 35:14-41:15. At that point in time, however, the Court’s concerns were assuaged in part by Microsoft’s announcement of a “new significant step to facilitate its communications protocol licensing, namely Microsoft’s plan to license the Windows source code at no extra cost to the licensees and to provide them with training.” Id. at 6:22-7:5. As a result of this development, the Plaintiffs determined that rather than address TDIs to Microsoft, the TC would attempt to resolve them itself using the Windows source code, and would only bring concerns to Microsoft’s attention if it found itself unable to do so. 2/8/06 JSR at 4-7 Unfortunately, what had seemed sq promising in February 2006 again proved ineffective. Rather than declining, the number of outstanding TDIs continued to rise, and Microsoft remained unable to promptly resolve open TDIs identified by the TC. 5/12/06 JSR at 3-5. By May 2006, the parties’ efforts towards implementing Section III.E reached a crisis point, as the delays stretched on and it became increasingly obvious that the available technical documentation was far from the type of quality product envisioned by Section III.E. Id. In response to mounting pressure from the Court and all of the Plaintiffs, Microsoft finally acknowledged that a new approach to the technical documentation was necessary, along with more resources. Id. at 4. As a result, Microsoft brought in a high-level executive, Robert Muglia, Senior Vice President of Microsoft’s Server and Tools Business, to analyze the lack of success in implementing Section III.E and to “determine the most efficient method for producing technical documentation that is of a sufficiently high quality to assure Plaintiffs and the TC that Microsoft is meeting its obligations to licensees.” Id. at 6. Mr. Muglia “and his team ultimately concluded that the current process of trying to fix issues identified by the TC one at a time was unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to result in [satisfactory] documentation.” Id. Microsoft therefore determined that “a broader ‘reset’ would be much more effective and efficient, meaning that Microsoft [would] rewrite substantial portions of the documentation,” id., in order to “describe the protocols in a context in which they [would] be implemented by people [with] limited knowledge of Windows,” 5/17/06 Status Hrg. Tr. at 39:9-18. At the May 17, 2006 status conference, which focused on the RESET plan, Microsoft admitted that prior to the RESET plan, it “didn’t have the exact right resources, [and] didn’t have the right process in place.” Id. at 39:3-8. Microsoft also acknowledged that it added significant resources to the technical documentation project in early 2006. Id. Indeed, while Microsoft originally devoted only ten employees to the technical documentation project, see 7/3/03 JSR at 22, by May 2006, over 210 employees were involved in Microsoft’s technical documentation efforts, including 150 product team engineers and program managers. 5/12/06 JSR at 19-20. The RESET plan undertaken in May-2006 was accompanied b