Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER GARAUFIS, District Judge. The Republic of Colombia, Colombia’s Capital District of Bogota, and a number of Departments of the Republic of Colombia (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring a civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim and common law claims against Diageo North America Inc., United Distillers Manufacturing Inc., Diageo PLC, Seagram Export Sales Company Inc., Pernod Ricard USA LLC, and Pernod-Ricard S.A. (collectively, “Defendants”). Essentially, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are members of a RICO enterprise composed of illegal narcotics traffickers and Defendants’ distributors for the purpose of laundering the proceeds of illegal narcotics sales and illegally smuggling liquor into Colombia. At this time, Defendants Diageo North America Inc., United Distillers Manufacturing Inc., Seagram Export Sales Company Inc., and Pernod Ricard USA LLC move for dismissal on a number of grounds. First, Defendants assert that the action is barred by the revenue and penal rules. Second, Defendants move for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Third, Defendants request that this court abstain from hearing the action under the doctrine of international comity. Fourth, Defendants assert that this case is barred because it presents non-justiciable political questions. Fifth, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ RICO claim should be dismissed because RICO should not be applied extraterritorially to the alleged conduct, which largely occurred outside of the United States. Sixth, Defendants argue that the RICO claim should be dismissed because the Second Amended Complaint fails to plead adequately a RICO claim. Finally, the Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons described below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that the revenue rule bars the instant action is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants’ other motions are denied. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). With respect to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ pleadings and must draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. United States v. The Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir.2006). With respect to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must accept all undisputed factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Robinson v. Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2001). To the extent the parties dispute facts relevant to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion using evidentiary submissions, the court will consider the submitted evidence and, if necessary, decide the disputed factual questions. See id. at 140 n. 6 (in context of motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, district court “must” consult factual submissions “if resolution of a proffered factual issue may result in the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction”). With very few exceptions, the material facts are undisputed. Where the court makes a factual finding, it will do so explicitly. That being said, this statement of facts is not intended to be a comprehensive description of all of the factual issues relevant to this motion. Rather, this section is limited to a description of Plaintiffs’ claims. Other factual issues are discussed in detail in subsequent sections. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs are various Columbian national and regional governmental agencies. The Plaintiff Departments of the Republic of Colombia possess a “constitutional monopoly on the domestic manufacture and sale of liquor products.” (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 1.) Some Plaintiffs manufacture and/or distill liquor and some of the Plaintiffs sell and distribute liquor in Colombia. (Id.) Plaintiffs “are by far the largest sellers and producers of liquor products within the Republic of Colombia.” (Id.) Defendants Defendant Diageo North America is a Connecticut corporation authorized to do business in the State of New York. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant United Distillers Manufacturing is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in the State of New York with a principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut. (Id. ¶ 12.) Diageo PLC is a British corporation that purchased United Distillers in 1997. (Id. ¶ 13.) Defendant Seagram Export Sales Co., Inc. is a New York corporation. (Id. ¶ 14.) Defendant Pernod Ricard USA, LLC is an Indiana corporation with a principal place of business in White Plains, New York. (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendant Pernod-Ricard S.A. is a French corporation with a principal place of business in France. (Id ¶ 16.) Defendants manufacture, distill and/or distribute liquor and other alcoholic beverages on an international scale, including such well-known brands as Tanqueray gin, Smirnoff vodka, Seagram’s 7, Guinness stout, and Baileys Original Irish Cream. (Id ¶ 16; Declaration of Carlos Acevedo (“Acevedo Decl.”) Exh. 2 at 9.) The Enterprise Plaintiffs allege that all of the Defendants were part of a single RICO enterprise. (SAC ¶ 108.) Although Defendants competed with each other, “they were well aware of each other’s activities, copied each other’s strategies when they were successful, and in most cases utilized the same distributors to conduct their illegal sales.” (Id ¶ 26.) Defendants’ “co-conspirators, in the money laundering schemes, including associated distributors, shippers, currency dealers, wholesalers, money brokers, and other participants” were also members of the enterprise. (Id ¶ 108.) The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants knowingly entered into a money-laundering enterprise with narcotics traffickers and, at all times, controlled the enterprise. Defendants “controlled every aspect of the financial transactions involving the purchase of their liquor products.” (SAC ¶ 28.) “Defendants also controlled the exact methods and means by which they were paid for the liquor products.” (Id) Defendants controlled the distribution channels through which their liquor traveled. (Id ¶ 30.) Defendants worked with their co-conspirators to create a “complex web of companies located in Aruba and Panama to disguise the true nature and origin of the criminal proceeds” that were being laundered. (Id ¶¶ 31, 35.) “Defendants and their co-conspirators knew that the purpose and design of this system of seemingly unrelated parties to the financial transaction was to conceal, hide and/or disguise the true nature of the criminal proceeds they were accepting.” (Id ¶ 27(d).) Although the Second Amended Complaint consists of 180 pages and 227 paragraphs, the Plaintiffs essentially allege that Defendants are part of illegal RICO enterprise engaged in money laundering, smuggling, tax evasion, as well as wire and mail fraud. The Scheme The alleged scheme begins with the United States Dollars or other currency that a Colombian narcotics trafficking organization obtains from illegal drug sales. (Id ¶ 27(c); Acevedo Decl. Exh. 6 at 13.) At least some of these moneys are deposited into bank accounts in the United States in small amounts. (SAC ¶ 27(c).) “A large percentage of the narcotics laundering process that occurs in regard to these narcotics sales occur in the Eastern District of New York. By virtue of demographics, population, and other factors, a large percentage of individuals involved in laundering these narcotics proceeds reside in and conduct their money-laundering activities in the Eastern District of New York.” (Acevedo Decl. Exh. 6, Affidavit of Alvin C. James (“James Aff.”) ¶ 12.) These cash deposits are in sufficiently small amounts so as to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities. (SAC ¶ 27(c).) A large number of individuals called “smurfs” are used to make these small bank deposits. “The key to the ‘smurf system is the use of a lot of accounts — and a lot of smurfs.” (Id) At this point, the Colombian narcotics organization must find a way to convert its United States Dollars into Colombian pesos without disclosing its illegal operation to law enforcement authorities. (James Aff. ¶¶ 5-6.) Because currency and banking laws preclude drug dealers from laundering their money through banks or other financial institutions, the drug traffickers and money launderers launder their unlawfully obtained funds primarily through the purchase and sale of commercial goods. (Id. ¶ 6.) Ultimately, the proceeds from the illegal narcotics sales are transferred to Defendants. (SAC ¶ 27.) Precisely how this occurs is far less clear. Often, multiple intermediaries are used. (Id. ¶¶ 27(a), 29.) Defendants’ Aruban distributors often serve as intermediaries. (Id. ¶¶ 27(f), 30.) Checks drawn from U.S. accounts in which cash proceeds from narcotics sales were deposited in small amounts appear to be paid directly to Defendants. (See id. ¶ 27(c) (“Checks are then drawn on these accounts — which represent narcotics proceeds — and these checks are then exchanged by Colombian criminal organizations for liquor products manufactured by the Defendants.”).) This transfer of the narcotics proceeds is one aspect of an informal currency exchange known as the Black Market Peso Exchange (“BMPE”). (JamesAff.lffl 2-7.) Plaintiffs have retained Alvin C. James, the former Senior Policy Advisor for Money Laundering of the United States Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and founding chairman of the Treasury Department’s BMPE working group. (James Aff. ¶ 2.) James states that, prior to his retirement in 2000, he “was the Treasury Department’s leading authority on money laundering via international trade financing.” (Id.) In his testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, James explained the BMPE: The Colombian narcotics trafficker has a constant need to repatriate a large part of his drug sale proceeds to Colombia in the form of Colombian pesos. He needs these pesos to operate his illicit business, attempt to avoid government intervention in his activities, and maintain his wealthy lifestyle. It is important to note that the narcotics trafficker’s situation is the opposite of the Colombian dollar/peso broker, since the trafficker has dollars in the U.S. and needs pesos in Colombia; the peso broker has pesos in Colombia and needs dollars in the U.S. The trafficker sells the dollars to the broker. The broker pays for the dollars with pesos in Colombia.... The dollar/peso broker uses two parallel bank accounts to facilitate the sale of dollars to the Colombian importer. The first was a peso account in Colombia. The second was [a] U.S. dollar account in the United States. The dollar/peso broker takes an order for U.S. dollars and receives payment in pesos in Colombia. The dollars are not delivered to the Colombian purchaser, but instead at the time of order, the purchaser instructs the dollar/peso broker to deliver the U.S. dollars to the trade goods supplier to whom he owes payment. These suppliers are often in the U.S., although they may also be in Panama or other ports of trade in Asia or Europe. The trade goods are shipped to Colombia and smuggled into the country to avoid tariffs and taxes[.] (Acevedo Deck Exh. 2 at 20-21.) In their brief, Plaintiffs assert that tax evasion is not a purpose of the alleged RICO enterprise. (See PI. FNC Opp. at 18 (“Defendants’ buyers cannot use the legitimate importation system, not because they don’t want to pay taxes, but because they cannot risk having their use of narcotics-derived funds discovered by the Colombian authorities.... In other words, Defendants’ coconspirators are not selling illegally in order to avoid taxes, they are selling illegally in order to avoid detection of their use of laundered funds derived from narcotics trafficking.”)) Plaintiffs cite only Alvin James’s Affidavit in support of this proposition. The court has carefully reviewed the James Affidavit, however, and finds that at no point does James dispute that tax evasion is a purpose or effect of the alleged enterprise. Further, James’s testimony before United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services and the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, which is attached to James’s affidavit, confirms that both tax evasion and money laundering are purposes and functions of the smuggling scheme alleged by Plaintiffs. James testified that Colombian importers need U.S. dollars to purchase foreign goods, and Colombian laws prevent importers from obtaining U.S. dollars legally without paying the “high Colombian tariffs and taxes.” (Acevedo Decl. Exh. 6 at 20.) James also testified that the Colombian importer “needs to obtain these [U.S.] dollars discreetly so that he can evade the duties and taxes applicable to his imports.” (Id. at 12.) Similarly, James testified that the BMPE provides a means through which Colombian narcotics traffickers can launder the proceeds of illegal drug sales: “[0]nee the trafficker has sold the dollars located in the United States and has received his pesos in accounts in Colombia, he has effectively laundered those dollars.” (Id. at 21; see also James Aff. ¶ 6.) One significant aspect of the BMPE is that the narcotics trafficker is willing to sell each dollar for less than a dollar because he values the service of having his dollars laundered: “[T]he narcotics trafficker sells the currency to the dollar/peso broker at a substantial discount, often amounting to as much as 30 percent.... As a result, the dollar/peso broker is now able to offer his clients, notably Colombian importers, not only a [discreet] source of U.S. dollars, but at a rate significantly less than the rate offered by the Colombian central bank.” (Acevedo Decl. Exh. 6 at 21.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants benefit from their RICO enterprise in three distinct ways. First, Defendants are able to charge the Colombian importers higher prices than they would be able to charge in a legal market because the importers obtain the U.S. dollars that they use to purchase the goods at a discount, i.e., the importers purchase each U.S. dollar for less than one dollar. (James Aff. ¶7.) Second, because the enterprise allows importers to obtain a very large amount of U.S. dollars at a price that is lower than the importers would pay in the absence of the enterprise, the enterprise permits importers to sell large quantities of liquor to consumers at below-market prices. (Id.) In doing so, Defendants increase their market share and their profits by selling a far larger quantity of liquor to Colombian consumers at reduced prices. (Id.) Third, Defendants assert that “because liquor demand is relatively elastic, the manufacturers are able to change demographic buying patterns, so that, for example, consumers will purchase more Johnny Walker or Lucky Strike and less rum or a domestic cigarette brand, because the Johnny Walker and the Lucky Strike are relatively cheaper than they would be if legitimately imported and sold.” (Id.) Although it is not entirely clear how this the third alleged benefit is materially different from the second alleged benefit, for purposes of this motion, the court accepts all three allegations as true. Damages Plaintiffs seek numerous categories of damages. Only a few key categories will be discussed here. First, Plaintiffs seek “the total amount of criminal proceeds laundered by the Defendants.” (SAC ¶ 104.) Second, Plaintiffs seek to recover “large amounts of money [expended] in their efforts to stop money laundering and to recoup funds that they have lost as a result of the activities of the Defendants[.]” (Id. ¶ 105.) Third, Plaintiffs, as liquor manufacturers and distributors, seek compensation for the revenues and profits lost as a result of the Defendants’ enterprise. (Id. ¶ 103(a).) Alleged Relationship between Plaintiffs’ Lost Sales and Profits and Defendants’ Money Laundering and Tax Evasion Defendants dedicate a lot of time, energy, and words to their argument that the Second Amended Complaint asserts claims for damages resulting from tax evasion and smuggling as opposed to money laundering. (E.g., Def. FNC Rep. at 18-19.) I find that the Second Amended Complaint states a claim for damages resulting from both money laundering and tax evasion. The alleged enterprise permits the Colombian importers to purchase liquor from Defendants and/or their agents with U.S. dollars that are acquired at a discounted price, i.e., because each dollar is acquired for less than one dollar. (James Aff. ¶ 6.) Some portion of this discount clearly results from the amount of the Colombian taxes that the importers are unlawfully evading through the enterprise. (Acevedo Decl. Exh. 6 at 12.) Another portion of the discount (if not the remainder of the discount) results from the fact that narcotics traffickers are willing to “sell” their U.S. dollars for less than their face value, i.e., drug dealers sell each dollar for less than one dollar. (Acevedo Decl. Exh. 6 at 20-21.) In effect, the narcotics dealers are paying, as a money laundering fee to the enterprise, the difference between the face value of the money and the price which they are paid for the money. This means that some portion of the discounted price at which the Colombian importers are purchasing the Defendants’ liquor results from tax evasion (the “tax evasion discount”) and some portion of the discounted price at which the Colombian importers are purchasing the Defendants’ liquor results exclusively from laundering the proceeds from narcotics sales (the “money-laundering discount” or the “narco-laun-dering discount”). The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the price discount that Colombian importers pay for their goods is passed along to consumers. (SAC ¶ 103(c).) The discounted retail prices cause Colombian consumers to purchase more of Defendants’ liquor than they would otherwise purchase. This increase in consumption of Defendants’ products leads (1) to a decrease in consumption of Plaintiffs’ competing liquor and/or (2) Plaintiffs to decrease their prices so as to be able to compete with Defendants. Either way, the enterprise causes Plaintiffs to lose revenues and profits. (Id. ¶¶ 103(a), (c), (d).) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motions On a number of different grounds, Defendants move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “It is well ingrained in the law that subject-matter jurisdiction can be called into question either by challenging the sufficiency of the allegation or by challenging the accuracy of the jurisdictional facts alleged.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 68, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). “If the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations, the court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff.” Robinson, 269 F.3d at 140 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If the parties present factual evidence that is “relevant to the jurisdictional question,” the court may consider such evidence. Id.; accord Goonewardena v. New York, 475 F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y.2007). The district court must consider facts outside the pleadings “if resolution of a proffered factual issue may result in the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction,” Robinson, 269 F.3d at 141 n. 6. The party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000); accord Goonewardena, 475 F.Supp.2d at 310. The parties dispute whether Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the basis of the revenue rule and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ RICO claims on the ground of extraterritoriality are properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs cite Arbaugh v. Y & H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), in support of the proposition that both of these motions may be brought only under Rule 12(b)(6). In Arbaugh, the Supreme Court held that whether the employer had a sufficient number of employees to satisfy the definition of “employer” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was merely an element of a Title VII claim as opposed to a jurisdictional prerequisite. The Ar-baugh court held that “[t]he basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332,” and other statutory requirements for recovery should not be treated as jurisdictional unless “the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall be jurisdictional.]” Id. at 514-15, 126 S.Ct. at 1244-45. With respect to Defendants’ revenue rule motion, irrespective of whether the revenue and penal rules are characterized as limitations on subject-matter jurisdiction or abstention doctrines, Rule 12(b) (1) is an appropriate basis on which to make such a motion. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, 99 Civ. 9940(MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002) (motion to dismiss on the basis of the act of state, international comity, and political question doctrines heard on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion even though “[t]hose doctrines go to justiciability rather than to jurisdiction”); 5B Wright & Miller § 1350 (“Courts have recognized a variety of other defenses that one normally would not think of as raising subject matter jurisdiction questions when considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, including claims that ... the subject matter is one over which the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction”). With respect to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the RICO claim on the ground of extraterritoriality, I find that the standard of review will be the same whether it is brought under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). Although the Second Circuit treated civil RICO’s territoriality requirement as jurisdictional prior to Arbaugh, see North South Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (2d Cir.1996), at least one court has questioned whether Arbaugh requires courts to treat civil RICO’s territorial requirement as merely an element of the claim. See Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina, No. 04 Civ. 9201(GEL), 2006 WL 587842, at *4 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh may require that the Court of Appeals review its treatment of the question of RICO’s extraterritorial effect.”). This court agrees that there is, in the least, a serious question as to whether, in the civil RICO context, the territoriality requirement can be considered jurisdictional under Arbaugh. In this case, there is no reason to resolve the question of whether RICO’s territoriality requirement goes to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants have made clear that they “do not rely upon material outside of the Complaint for” their motion to dismiss on the basis of extraterritoriality. (Def. RICO Rep. at 2.) Nor do Plaintiffs seek to introduce facts outside of the Second Amended Complaint for purposes of this motion. As a result, whether the motion on this ground is brought under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), the court is required to treat the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true and to draw reasonable inferences on the basis of such allegations. See Robinson, 269 F.3d at 140 (“If the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations, the court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions With the exception of the mail and wire fraud predicate RICO acts, which are subject to a heightened pleading requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the Second Amended Complaint is subject to the liberal pleading requirement set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. After briefing and oral argument on this motion were complete, the Supreme Court clarified the pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and the standard under which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are reviewed. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S.-, -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Court explained that plaintiffs must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” If they “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Goldstein v. Pataki 488 F.Supp.2d 254, 286 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (Garaufis, J.) (discussing Twombly). Since Twombly, the Second Circuit has explained that Twombly imposes a plausibility requirement on pleadings under Rule 8, but does not, as a general matter, change the Rule 8 pleading standard: After careful consideration of the Court’s [Twombly ] opinion and the conflicting signals from it that we have identified, we believe the Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible “plausibility standard,” which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir.2007). In another post-Twombly decision, the Second Circuit confirmed that “the district court must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in plaintiffs complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and construe the complaint liberally.” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509-10 (2d Cir.2007). Of course, courts in this Circuit have noted that RICO claims “ ‘must be reviewed with appreciation of the extreme sanctions it provides so that actions traditionally brought in state courts do not gain access to treble damages and attorneys fees in federal court simply because they are cast in terms of RICO violations.”’ Leung v. Law, 387 F.Supp.2d 105, 112-13 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (Garaufis, J.) (quoting Mathon v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 875 F.Supp. 986, 1001 (E.D.N.Y.1995)). In this vein, it has also been said that “courts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at any early stage of the litigation.” Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), 349 F.Supp.2d 765, 827 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quotation marks omitted). III. REVENUE RULE A. Background The Second Circuit recently explained that “[t]he revenue rule is a longstanding common law doctrine providing that courts of one sovereign will not enforce final tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims of other sovereigns.” Attorney General of Canada v. B.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter, “Canada”), 268 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2001). The revenue rule was originally created by eighteenth-century English courts as what amounted to a subsidy for British trade: English courts refused to enforce foreign customs laws that would have had the effect of interfering with or diminishing British trade. Id. at 110. More recently, federal courts have found that the revenue rule should continue to be applied to serve separation of powers and sovereignty concerns. Id. at 109-115. Courts continue to refer to Judge Learned Hand’s explanation of the rationale for the revenue rule: [A] court will not recognize those [liabilities] arising in a foreign state, if they run counter to the ‘settled public policy’ of its own. Thus a scrutiny of the liability is necessarily always in reserve, and the possibility that it will be found not to accord with the policy of the domestic state.... To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other authorities. It may commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its neighbor. Revenue laws fall within the same reasoning; they affect a state in matters as vital to its existence as its criminal laws. No court ought to undertake an inquiry which it cannot prosecute without determining whether those laws are consonant with its own notions of what is proper. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir.1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring). Both this court and the Second Circuit recently addressed the revenue rule in the European Community cases. See European Community v. Japan Tobacco, Inc. (hereinafter, “Amazonas”), 186 F.Supp.2d 231, 243 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (Garaufis, J.), aff'd in part and rev’d in part sub nom., European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. (hereinafter, “European Community I”), 355 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 544 U.S. 1012, 125 S.Ct. 1968, 161 L.Ed.2d 845 (2005), on reconsideration following remand, 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir.2005) (hereinafter, “European Community II”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S.Ct. 1045, 163 L.Ed.2d 858 (2006). “The revenue rule is implicated whenever the substance of the claim is, either directly or indirectly, one for tax revenues, such that the whole object of the suit is to collect tax for a foreign revenue, and that this will be the sole result of a decision in favour of the plaintiff.” European Community I, 355 F.3d at 131 (emphasis added; internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “What matters is not the form of the action, but the substance of the claim.” Canada, 268 F.3d at 130. 1. Direct Enforcement “A suit directly seeks to enforce foreign tax laws when a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would require the defendants to reimburse them for lost tax revenues.” European Community I, 355 F.3d at 131. Defendants argue that “the Revenue Rule bars Plaintiffs’ claims regardless of whether these Colombian sovereign government entities sue for sovereign or commercial losses resulting from sovereign revenue law issues.” (Def. FNC Rep. at 28.) In other words, Defendants are arguing that the instant claims for lost sales and profits are barred by the revenue rule because Plaintiffs are directly seeking compensation for lost revenues. Plaintiffs argue that the revenue rule bars only claims that a sovereign brings in its sovereign capacity and does not preclude claims by a sovereign in its commercial capacity. (PI. FNC Opp. at 28-33.) Plaintiffs cite Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534, 331 N.E.2d 502 (1975) in support of this proposition. In Banco Frances, a private Brazilian bank brought a fraud claim against individuals, alleging that the individuals submitted false currency-exchange applications to the bank in violation of Brazilian currency regulations, thereby causing the bank to improperly exchange Brazilian cruzeiros into travelers checks in United States dollars. The Court of Appeals distinguished Banco Do Brasil v. AC. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d 235 (1963), and found that the revenue rule did not bar the plaintiffs claims for a variety of reasons, including as follows: The [Banco Do Brasil ] case relied upon by the Appellate Division is quite distinguishable. There the Government of Brazil, through Banco do Brasil, a government bank, sought redress for violations of its currency exchange regulations incident to a fraudulent coffee export transaction. Here, the plaintiff is a private bank seeking rescission of the fraudulent currency exchange transactions and damages. [][N]o case has come to our attention where a private tort remedy arising from foreign currency regulations has been denied by the forum as an application of the revenue law rule and we decline so to extend the Banco do Brasil rationale. Thus, in the instant case we find no basis for reliance upon the revenue law rule to deny a forum for suit. Banco Frances, 36 N.Y.2d at 598-99, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534, 331 N.E.2d at 506-07. Without question, at least portions of the Banco Frances decision are no longer good law in federal courts. Above all else, the Banco Frances court’s conclusion that the revenue rule is not “analytically justifiable” is clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 161 L.Ed.2d 619 (2005), and the Second Circuit’s decisions in Canada and the European Community cases. That being said, Banco Frances does support the proposition that a commercial actor may bring a private tort claim even though the claim involves a foreign revenue law. Defendants rely on Banco Do Brasil, 12 N.Y.2d at 377, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d at 237, and Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 94 (N.Y.1806). These cases are inapposite. Banco Do Brasil is inap-posite because, as the Banco Frances court observed, the plaintiff-sovereign was clearly suing in its sovereign capacity as opposed to its capacity as a commercial actor. Banco Do Brasil, 12 N.Y.2d at 377, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d at 237 (holding that the action by Brazil for damages caused by defendant’s evasion of foreign currency exchange laws was barred by revenue rule). Ludlow is a very old and curious decision. In Ludlow, a breach of contract action between two private parties, the court held that the revenue rule barred the court from considering a defense based on a French stamp tax law. Ludlow seems to stand for the proposition that, where a claim constitutes a justiciable cause of action to which there exists a potentially meritorious defense based on a foreign tax law that the revenue rule precludes the courts from considering, the court should hear the action and ignore the defense. In this way, Ludlow appears to be inconsistent with those Second Circuit cases that state that the revenue rule precludes a court from hearing a claim that would require the court to consider the validity of a foreign tax law. In European Community I, the Second Circuit explained that foreign tax laws “embody the political and social judgments of the sovereign and its people” and that: judicial examination and enforcement of foreign tax laws at the behest of foreign nations may conflict with the other branches’ policy choices with respect to cooperation in tax enforcement, and create the risk that the judiciary will be drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to— and better handled by — the political branches of government. European Community I, 355 F.3d at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit’s Canada decision strongly supports the conclusion that a claim constitutes proscribed direct enforcement of a revenue law only when the sovereign is seeking damages it sustained in its capacity as sovereign. In considering which types of damages are barred by the revenue rule, Canada recognized a distinction between damages that a government suffers in its sovereign capacity and damages that a government suffers as a commercial actor. See Canada, 268 F.3d at 132. Thus, Canada could not recover law enforcement costs that the defendants’ unlawful acts caused Canada to incur in part because they were a cost that Canada had incurred in its capacity as a sovereign: Law enforcement costs incurred to secure taxes for the sovereign are qualitatively different from the damages suffered by a private individual; they fall within the class of acts that are “jure imperii, ” that is, that are expressions of a foreign sovereign’s will or are carried out by virtue of that sovereign authority. United States courts have traditionally been reluctant to enforce foreign laws that a re “jure imperii. ” Id. at 132 (internal citation omitted). The Second Circuit continued to explain that costs that are jure imperii are distinct from those that are jure gestionis: “An example of a private, ‘jure gestionis’ act is operating a business.” Id. at 132 n. 41. This distinction between a sovereign suing in its sovereign capacity as opposed to in its capacity as a private actor is consistent with Canada’s reading of the purpose of the revenue rule. In Canada, the Second Circuit explained that suits involving a foreign sovereign’s revenue laws are problematic because they raise public policy concerns that go to the heart of sovereignty: Tax laws embody a sovereign’s political will. They create property rights and affect each individual’s relationship to his or her sovereign. They mirror the moral and social sensibilities of a society. Sales taxes, for example, may enforce political and moral judgments about certain products. Import and export taxes may reflect a country’s ideological leanings and the political goals of its commercial relationships with other nations. Id. at 111. Under this reasoning, tax laws are problematic not because they raise revenue for the government and the government may use such revenues for a controversial purpose, but because the laws, in and of themselves, embody policy choices that are infused with moral and political judgments. As a result, Canada’s reading of the revenue rule strongly supports the proposition that the rule is not triggered by every foreign law that causes a foreign sovereign to generate revenue; rather, the rule is targeted to those revenue-generating statutes that involve moral and political judgments. A sovereign’s commercial activities do not involve the kind of moral and political judgments that the tax or revenue laws typically involve. A sovereign engages in commercial activity for the same reason a private individual or corporation participates in such activity — to turn a profit. A sovereign’s decision to drill for oil, manufacture airplanes, or provide postal services is not infused with the kinds of moral and political judgments necessarily involved in taxing cigarettes or providing a tax credit for higher education spending. To read the revenue rule to prohibit sovereigns from bringing damages claims irrespective of the nature of the damages claim would have extremely troubling consequences. As Plaintiffs urged at oral argument, if the revenue rule prohibits sovereigns from bringing all claims for damages, then the Venezuelan government could not bring a claim arising out of a contract dispute with an American corporation concerning Venezuela’s oil business. (Feb. 2, 2007 Oral Argument Transcript at 40.) If the United Kingdom had such a revenue rule, the United States Postal Service could not bring a contract claim in the United Kingdom against a British corporation that it had retained to deliver American mail in the U.K. Such an interpretation of the revenue rule would (1) make it very difficult for sovereigns to participate in commercial activities and (2) provide strong disincentives for foreign sovereigns to do business with United States corporations. Such a reading of the revenue rule would cause these problems while achieving absolutely no public policy purpose: prohibiting sovereigns from bringing claims arising out of purely commercial activities would in no way serve the separation of powers or extraterritoriality concerns that currently motivate federal courts to recognize the revenue rule. Further, if the revenue rule barred suits by foreign sovereigns suing in their commercial capacity, foreign sovereigns would find themselves at a unique disadvantage in federal courts. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), a foreign sovereign is subject to jurisdiction in federal courts with respect to actions arising out of a commercial activity carried on by the foreign state, provided that there is some connection between the commercial activity and the United States. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover. Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 2164, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992). Thus, under Defendants’ reading of the revenue rule, a private plaintiff could sue a foreign sovereign in United States courts for claims arising out of commercial activity but the foreign sovereign could not bring a counterclaim arising out of that same course of conduct. Such an outcome would be manifestly unjust. Because (1) claims by a foreign sovereign for damages sustained in its capacity as a commercial actor do not raise the same policy concerns as claims brought by a foreign sovereign in its sovereign capacity and (2) foreign sovereigns are subject to suit in the federal courts for claims arising out of commercial actions, I conclude that claims brought by a foreign sovereign in a commercial capacity do not constitute the kind of direct enforcement of a foreign revenue law that is barred by the revenue rule. Of course, such a claim may require a court to rule upon the validity of a foreign revenue law. In those circumstances, such a claim could still constitute indirect enforcement of a foreign revenue law that is barred by the revenue rule. 2. Indirect Enforcement The reality is that “[ijndirect enforcement is ... easier to describe than to defíne[.]” Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 368, 125 S.Ct. at 1778-79 (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties vigorously contest precisely what constitutes indirect enforcement of a revenue law. Defendants argue that any claim that would require the court to have to consider, apply or otherwise pass on a foreign tax law is barred by the revenue rule. (E.g., Def. FNC Rep. at 7-8.) Plaintiffs argue that the revenue rule bars only claims that seek to collect unpaid foreign taxes. (PI. FNC Opp. at 25.) According to Plaintiffs, whether a claim requires a court to rule on the validity of a foreign tax law is irrelevant. (Id.) What is clear is that the revenue rule bars claims for costs resulting from enforcement of foreign tax laws because such claims seek indirectly to enforce the laws. See European Community II, 424 F.3d at 179; Canada, 268 F.3d at 132. However, much as other aspects of the revenue rule presented in this case, no binding authority has clarified the extent to which the revenue rule prohibits courts from considering the validity of or recognizing foreign tax laws. The Canada and the European Community courts did not have occasion to determine whether a federal cause of action that is substantively unrelated to foreign tax laws but requires the federal court to recognize and apply foreign tax laws is the kind of indirect enforcement that runs afoul of the revenue rule. There is language in Canada that could be read to mean that a federal court may not hear any claim that requires the court to recognize and apply a foreign tax law: Additional considerations reinforce our determination that Canada’s claim for law enforcement costs must be dismissed. To proceed with the law enforcement costs claim, we would have to examine the tax laws at issue in order to assess the causation aspect of this claim. For example, we would have to assess whether the law enforcement costs were in fact spent on achieving the cessation of cigarette smuggling. So doing, we would have to examine whether, when and to what extent the smuggling existed, which would require a determination that tax laws were applicable to defendants. These inquiries could draw the courts into troubled waters. Id. at 133; see also Amazonas, 186 F.Supp.2d at 237 (quoting some of this same language). The Attorney General of Canada specifically argued that “the revenue rule may prohibit the enforcement of Canadian tax laws, but not their recognition in order to calculate damages.” Id. at 133. In support of this proposition, the Attorney General of Canada cited In re State of Norway’s Application (Nos. 1 and 2), [1990] A.C. 723, 724 (H.L.) and Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd., [1956] 2 Q.B. 490, 515-16 (C.A.), aff'd [1957] 3 All. E.R. 287 (H.L.). The Second Circuit explained that: In both of these cases, the court permitted recognition but not enforcement of foreign revenue laws. However, in neither Norway nor EC. Sethia was the British court called upon to allow damages that would serve as a substitute for previously unpaid taxes to be paid in the United Kingdom to a foreign sovereign. Canada, 268 F.3d at 133-34. In concluding that Norway and K.C. Sethia were distinguishable, the Second Circuit did not reject the distinction between recognition and enforcement of a foreign tax law. Further, in Pasquantino, the Supreme Court suggested that a distinction was to be made between recognition of a foreign tax law and enforcement, stating “[indirect enforcement is ... easier to describe than to define, and it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between an issue involving mere[ ] recognition of a foreign law and indirect enforcement of it.” Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 368, 125 S.Ct. at 1778-79 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). In the European Community cases, this court stated that “any action in which the court ‘will have to pass on[ ] the validity of [foreign] revenue laws and their applicability [to the claims at bar]’ constitutes ‘enforcing [foreign] revenue laws,’ and thereby triggers the revenue rule.” Amazonas, 186 F.Supp.2d at 235. That passage quoted a portion of the Second Circuit’s decision in Canada, 268 F.3d at 108, that, in turn, quoted the district court’s decision in Canada, Attorney General of Canada v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F.Supp.2d 134, 143 (N.D.N.Y.2000). As the claims in the European Community cases were essentially identical to the claims in Canada, in Amazonas, I did not confront the issue I confront here: whether a claim that requires a court to recognize, apply, or consider the validity of a foreign tax law is barred by the revenue rule. Further, I did not dismiss the Ama-zonas plaintiffs’ money laundering claims on the basis of the revenue rule. In Ama-zonas, I found only that the smuggling claims were barred by the revenue rule. Amazonas, 186 F.Supp.2d at 236 (“In this [revenue rule] section of the opinion, the court will consider the RICO claims pursuant to smuggling grounds. The court will consider the claims in light of the money laundering grounds at Part IV of this opinion.”). Other than the dicta relied upon by Defendants, nothing in Amazonas supports the proposition that any time an action forces a court to consider a foreign revenue law, the action constitutes an attempt to indirectly enforce a foreign revenue law that is proscribed by the revenue rule. As I am now explicitly confronted with this issue, this is my first opportunity to clarify the extent to which consideration of a foreign revenue law violates the revenue rule. There is a continuum along which a claim will require a court to consider or “pass on” a foreign tax law. At the least problematic end of the continuum is the mere recognition of a foreign tax law. At the next point along the continuum, a court must apply such a foreign law. Next, a claim might require a court to rule on the validity of a foreign tax law. Finally, a claim might require a court to explicitly enforce a foreign revenue law. The Second Circuit cases make clear that the revenue rule clearly bars explicit enforcement. However, I find that whether lesser forms of consideration of a foreign revenue law— recognition, application, and determination of validity — are permissible depends on the extent to which the consideration of the foreign revenue law raises separation of powers and sovereignty concerns. I recognize that the Second Circuit cases and the language in this court’s Amazonas decision make clear that ruling upon the validity of a foreign law will raise significant policy concerns in many, if not all, cases. As Judge Learned Hand explained, “[n]o court ought to undertake an inquiry which it cannot prosecute without determining whether those laws are consonant with its own notions of what is proper.” Moore, 30 F.2d at 604 (L.Hand, J., concurring). In the typical case where a court will have to rule on the validity of a foreign tax law, the court will have to determine whether the law is consistent with its own public policy. The revenue rule bars such a determination in most, if not all, circumstances. See Canada, 268 F.3d at 113 (“Addressing the public policy concerns raised by the imposition of such foreign taxes could embroil United States courts in delicate issues in which they have little expertise or capacity”); see also CI-NAR Corp. Securities Litig., 186 F.Supp.2d 279, 293 n. 9 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (revenue rule “mandates that courts refrain from adjudicating cases where they will have to pass upon the validity of the revenue laws of foreign nations”; holding that the revenue rule did not apply where “[t]he Court would not be commenting on the validity of the Canadian incentive scheme, but rather deciding whether the defendants’ admitted abuse of that scheme defrauded American investors.”) This approach to the revenue rule — allowing a federal court to assess the policy implications of considering, applying, and determining the validity of a foreign revenue law before determining whether a claim that triggers such consideration is barred by the revenue rule — is most consistent with the Second Circuit’s recent revenue law jurisprudence. The Canada court explicitly held that determining whether the revenue rule barred a claim required both an analysis of the facts of the case and the policy concerns behind the revenue rule: We do not suggest that the revenue rule always bars United States courts from furthering the tax policies of foreign sovereigns .... These concerns about sovereignty and [extraterritoriality] are therefore not absolute, and are not implicated in every case involving foreign tax laws. However, as explained below [ ], the particular facts of this case— most notably, the fact that a foreign sovereign plaintiff is directly seeking to enforce its tax laws, and that our government has negotiated and signed a treaty with this sovereign providing for limited extraterritorial tax enforcement assistance but stopping well short of the assistance requested here — lead us to be wary in this instance of becoming the enforcer of foreign tax policy. Canada, 268 F.3d at 113. Similarly, in the European Community cases, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that determining whether a claim involves proscribed indirect enforcement of a revenue law requires an analysis of the facts of the case and policy concerns behind the revenue rule. In European Community I, the court’s very definition of indirect enforcement incorporated the policy concerns motivating the revenue rule: “[IJndirect enforcement occurs when a foreign state seeks a remedy that would give extraterritorial effect to its tax laws; for instance, a suit seeking damages based on law enforcement costs is an attempt to shift the cost of enforcing the tax laws onto the defendants, and would therefore require the court indirectly to enforce the tax laws.” European Community 1, 355 F.3d at 131. The Second Circuit continued to explain that “[t]he revenue rule is therefore not absolute. Even if the substance of the claim invokes foreign tax laws, the revenue rule will not be triggered where the sovereignty and extraterritoriality concerns that inform the rule’s application are not present.” Id. at 131-32. Similarly, the European Community court explained that the argument that the revenue rule is discretionary “is also foreclosed by Canada, which clearly establishes that, once the sovereignty and separation of powers concerns that inform the rule are implicated by the substance of a plaintiffs claims, the court may not hear those claims absent evidence that the rule has been abrogated.” European Community I, 355 F.3d at 138. In re-evaluating the Circuit’s revenue rule jurisprudence in the wake of Pasquantino, the Second Circuit continued to hold that the scope of the revenue rule would be informed by the dual policy concerns motivating the rule: We stressed in our [Canada ] opinion that the revenue rule is designed to address two concerns: first, that policy complications and embarrassment may follow when one nation’s courts analyze the validity of another nation’s tax laws; and second, that the executive branch, not the judicial branch, should decide when our nation will aid others in enforcing their tax laws. These twin concerns for sovereignty and separation of powers are important to the revenue rule analysis, because they imply certain exceptions to the rule. European Community II, 424 F.3d at 180 (citation omitted). This is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the revenue rule, in that the Eleventh Circuit also considers the policy implications of a claim in determining whether it is barred by the revenue rule. See Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.2003) (“The Republics’ complaints make clear that their tax laws embody anti-smoking policies directed at protecting their citizens from the health hazards of smoking, both by attempting to discourage smoking by raising the price of cigarettes and by providing revenue for anti-smoking programs.... Because the tax laws underlying the Republics’ RICO claims embody specific policy choices, we hold that the revenue rule applies to these claims and prevents us from considering them.”) (emphasis added). As a result, determining whether a claim for damages that requires a court to recognize, apply, or rule on the validity of a foreign sovereign’s tax laws constitutes the kind of indirect enforcement that is proscribed by the revenue rule requires both an analysis of the facts of the case and the policy concerns motivating the revenue rule. B. Analysis Although Defendants do not characterize them as such, Defendants have two central arguments as to why the revenue rule bars the instant claims. First, Defendants argue that the instant claims are an effort to directly enforce the Colombian revenue law providing that the Colombian government shall have a monopoly on certain liquor manufacturing and distribution businesses by awarding Plaintiffs revenues to which they are allegedly entitled under the monopoly law. Second, Defendants argue that the instant claims constitute impermissible indirect enforcement of Colombian revenue laws because they require the court to “pass on” Colombian revenue laws. Each of these arguments will be considered in turn. 1. Direct Enforcement Colombian law provides that the Colombian government shall have a monopoly on certain liquor manufacturing and distribution businesses. Defendants argue that the instant claims are an effort to directly enforce this law by awarding Plaintiffs revenues to which they are allegedly entitled under the monopoly law. As discussed above, determining whether the instant claims constitute proscribed direct enforcement of a revenue law depends on whether Plaintiffs are suing in their sovereign capacity or in a purely commercial capacity. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are suing in their sovereign capacity because they engage in the following sovereign acts: “(1) monopolizing the entire liquor industry; (2) collecting revenues to be placed in the government coffers for the general health and welfare of the Colombian peo-pie; (3) collecting a ‘consumption’ tax on liquor that is given to the Departments [of the Colombian Government]; and (4) enacting and charging discriminatory taxes.” (Def. FNC Rep. at 29.) Defendants point to the fact that Colombia’s Constitution requires that revenues generated by government monopolies must be used for the public welfare and that “[rjevenues obtained through the exercise of liquor monopolies shall be used preferably for health care services and education.” (Declaration of Mauricio A. Plazas Vega (“Plazas Decl.”) ¶¶ 11-12 (quoting the Colombia Constitution).) Defendants are partially correct. Two categories of claims are clearly barred. First, to the extent Plaintiffs are stating claims for damages resulting from lost liquor taxes, such claims are barred by the revenue rule and are dismissed. See European Community I, 355 F.3d at 132 (RICO claims seeking lost taxes are barred by revenue rule); Canada, 268 F.3d at 131 (same). In this case, lost liquor taxes include both the consumption taxes charged on imported liquor and the so-called “monopoly participations.” Second, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking damages that they suffered in their sovereign capacity, such claims are also barred by the revenue rule. A sovereign suffers harms in its sovereign capacity when its injury concerns activity undertaken by the government “by virtue of [its] sovereign authority.” Canada, 268 F.3d at 132 (holding that revenue rule barred plaintiffs’ claim for law enforcement costs because such costs were suffered by plaintiffs in their sovereign capacities). The Second Amended Complaint is extremely lengthy and identifies countless forms of injury. On pages 31 and 32 of their Reply Brief, Defendants have identified eighteen allegations of injury that they believe are objectionable. At this time, the court will address only those eighteen alleged injuries. The court agrees that at least sixteen of the eighteen forms of injury are injuries that Plaintiffs could suffer only in their sovereign capacity and, as a result, are barred by the revenue rule. However, two of the eighteen identified forms of injury are not necessarily barred by the revenue rule: (1) “adverse economic impact” of the Colombian “underground economy;” and (2) harm resulting from Defendants’ failure to properly label goods. Each of these two types of injury will be considered in turn. First, the “adverse economic impact” of the Colombian “underground economy” is simply too general and vague a term to encompass only injury that is barred by the revenue rule. For instance, Plaintiffs’ lost sales and profits resulting from Defendants’ money laundering are presumably included within the “adverse economic impact” of the Colombian “underground economy.” Although the claim for such “adverse economic impact” does not run afoul of the revenue rule, this allegation, read independently, is too vague to withstand Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s liberal pleading requirements and, thus, is dismissed. Specific allegations of injury that fall within the category of “adverse economic impact” survive, however. For instance, Plaintiffs have pled a claim for lost sales and profits, which is an injury Plaintiffs suffer in a commercial as opposed to a sovereign capacity. Second, harm resulting from Defendants’ failure to properly label their goods is arguably a harm that Plaintiffs suffer in a commercial capacity. Although Plaintiffs may bring the improper labeling claim in a purely commercial capacity, such a claim may still be barred by the revenue and/or penal rules if it requires the court to enforce Colombian labeling laws. In any event, at this time, the court will dismiss on revenue rule grounds only the sixteen harms that are clearly suffered by Plaintiffs in their sovereign capacities. However, Plaintiffs’ claims for lost revenues and profits seek redress for a harm that Plaintiffs allegedly suffered in a commercial—as opposed to sovereign—capacity and, as a result, do not constitute the kind of direct enforcement of foreign revenue laws that runs afoul of the revenue rule. Manufacturing and/or selling liquor is not “within the class of acts that are ‘jure imperii, ’ that is, that are expressions of a foreign’s sovereign’s will or are carried out by virtue of that sovereign authority.” Canada, 268 F.3d at 132. Sales of liquor in a national or international market can be made by a governmen