Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON, District Judge. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint came on for hearing before this court on February 7, 2007. Plaintiffs, forty individual states acting through their Attorneys General, and certain named government entities (collectively “plaintiffs” or “plaintiff States”), appeared through their respective counsel. Defendants appeared through their counsel, Julian Brew, Ronald C. Redcay, Joel S. Sanders, Peter Nemer-ovski, Kenneth R. O’Rourke, Harrison J. Frahn, Gary L. Hailing, and Robert B. Pringle. Having read all the papers submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and DENIES the motion to dismiss in part, for the reasons stated at the hearing, and as follows. BACKGROUND The instant case is closely related to a separate antitrust MDL action that is currently pending before the court, In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, M 02-1486 PJH. Both actions generally allege a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy in the U.S. market for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”), carried out by numerous manufacturer defendants. Whereas the MDL case, however, is comprised of numerous private actions brought by individuals and entities seeking relief against defendants, the present action has been brought by forty individual plaintiff States, acting through their respective Attorneys General, as well as certain government entities located within the forty states. A. Background Allegations DRAM is a semiconductor high-speed memory chip that is used to store electronic data in a wide variety of electronic products, including personal computers and servers. See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 9. DRAM is sold worldwide, with the United States DRAM market accounting for a significant share of global DRAM sales — more than $5 billion annually. See id. at ¶ 31. The complaint alleges that over a four year period beginning in 1998, the defendants — various manufacturers of DRAM who collectively control the majority of U.S. DRAM sales — conspired together to unlawfully fix, raise, and maintain the price for DRAM in the U.S. market. See id. at ¶ 34. Defendants’ conspiracy was allegedly effectuated through coordinated participation in meetings, frequent price communications, and coordinated supply reductions. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 35-36, 39, 42, 60, 69, 79. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of defendants’ unlawful activity, DRAM prices were artificially inflated during the conspiracy period, forcing consumers and businesses who purchased DRAM during the period to pay more for DRAM than they would have in a free and competitive market. See id. at ¶¶ 89-91. Plaintiffs define the victims of defendants’ illegal price fixing cartel to include: (1) the plaintiff States themselves, since they were and are “purchasers of electronic products;” and (2) the “end user consumers” in the various plaintiff States, since they, too, are purchasers of electronic products. See FAC at ¶ 4. To that end, plaintiff States, acting through their various Attorneys General, proceed against defendants in various representative capacities — i.e., “on their ovm behalf, and on behalf of state agencies, political subdivisions, natural persons and/or businesses as warranted by federal and state laws.” Id. In addition, certain state agencies and/or political subdivisions located within the plaintiff States also proceed as named plaintiffs, and are pursuing the instant action in a representative capacity on behalf of similarly situated entities. See generally FAC (named plaintiffs include, for example, City and County of San Francisco, County of Santa Clara, and the Los Ange-les Unified School District “on behalf of all other political subdivisions similarly situated”); see also id. at ¶ 12. All plaintiffs seek to recover “as damages, restitution, and/or disgorgement of the illegal overcharges that consumers paid as a result of the DRAM manufacturers’ price fixing.” See id. B. Plaintiffs’ Claims The instant complaint sweeps broadly. Although it is presented as stating only three “claims for relief,” those claims for relief are further divided into several “counts,” which collectively state numerous federal and state law claims alleged by varying combinations of different plaintiff groups. See generally FAC. Regardless whether styled as a claim for relief or a specific count, each of plaintiffs’ grounds for relief is based on the allegations that defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade in the DRAM market: 1. First Claim for Relief (Sherman Act) Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief alleges that defendants violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, and is further broken down into three separate counts. See FAC at ¶¶ 98-113. Count one alleges a claim by all forty plaintiff States against all defendants, and seeks injunctive relief against them to prevent and restrain the antitrust violations alleged by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further allege that included among all plaintiff States are both direct and indirect purchasers of DRAM. See id. at ¶¶ 101(c), 102. Count two alleges a claim for damages under section 1 of the Sherman Act, brought by only seven plaintiff States. See FAC at ¶¶ 105-108. These seven plaintiff States allege that they are entitled to damages against defendants as direct purchasers of DRAM, by virtue of certain assignment clauses contained in contracts that were entered into between the seven plaintiff States and certain Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEM”). Id. Count three alleges a claim for damages under section 1 of the Sherman Act, brought by twenty plaintiff States. See id. at ¶ 111. As do the plaintiff States who proceed pursuant to count two, these twenty plaintiff States allege that they, too, are entitled to damages as direct purchasers of DRAM from defendants. They do not, however, rely on the same grounds for claiming direct purchaser status. Rather, these twenty plaintiff States at issue allege that they can recover as classic direct purchasers, because their state agencies and/or political subdivisions purchased DRAM directly from defendant Micron, through one of Micron’s company divisions, Crucial Technology. Id. at ¶¶ 110-12. 2. Second Claim for Relief (Cartwright Act) Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief alleges defendants’ violation of California’s state antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act. This claim is alleged by seventeen plaintiff States and named plaintiffs the City and County of San Francisco, the County of Santa Clara, and the Los Angeles Unified School District, the latter three proceeding as class representatives for other state agencies and political subdivisions similarly situated. See FAC at ¶ 114. Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ unlawful conspiracy was carried out and effectuated within California, and that defendants’ conduct within California in turn caused injury to “natural persons and state agencies and political subdivisions” throughout the whole of the United States. See id. at ¶ 115. Plaintiffs then divide their Cartwright Act claim in accordance with these three distinct groups of injured parties. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that their Cartwright Act claim is brought: (1) in a parens patriae capacity by the Attorneys General of eight plaintiff States, on behalf of all natural persons in those states; (2) in a parens patriae capacity, or in a proprietary/representative capacity, or in a class capacity, by the Attorneys General and/or class representatives of sixteen plaintiff States, on behalf of all state agencies in those states; and (3) in a parens patriae capacity, or in a proprietary/representative capacity, or in a class capacity, by the Attorneys General and/or class representatives of eleven plaintiff States, on behalf of all political subdivisions in those states. Id. All three plaintiff groups appear to include both direct and indirect purchasers, although this is not entirely clear from the allegations of the complaint. 3. -Third Claim for Relief (State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Laws) Finally, plaintiffs’ third claim for relief alleges numerous violations of state antitrust and unfair competition laws. The claim is separated into forty separate state law counts, one for each of the forty plaintiff States before the court. See FAC at ¶¶ 123 et seq. Depending on the particular plaintiff State at issue in any given count, plaintiffs’ state law claims are (a) alleged oh behalf of the States themselves, natural persons, state agencies, and/or political subdivisions, (b) brought by the States (and their Attorneys General) by means of parens patriae or class action allegations, and/or (c) cover both direct and indirect purchaser claims. See id. C. The Instant Motion to Dismiss Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint in part, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Specifically, defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ second and third claims for relief. They seek dismissal in part of the former — brought under the Cartwright Act — on grounds that standing to sue under the Act is generally lacking for non-California persons and entities. They seek dismissal in part of the latter — brought pursuant to state antitrust and consumer protection claims — based on myriad procedural and substantive arguments. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). In order to survive a dismissal motion, however, a plaintiff must allege facts that are enough to raise his/ her right to relief “above the speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it is nonetheless “a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief [which] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. In short, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” not just conceivable. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. B. Cartwright Act Claims (Second Claim for Relief) Defendants challenge nearly the whole of plaintiffs’ second claim for relief, seeking dismissal of every claim stated therein by all non-California plaintiffs. Those claims, all brought pursuant to California’s Cartwright Act, are alleged in a variety of representative capacities on behalf of natural persons, state agencies, and political subdivisions. See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 114-21. Defendants seek dismissal based on three overriding arguments. First, they argue that the six plaintiff States pursuing par-ens patriae claims on behalf of non-California residents lack standing to do so under the Cartwright Act. Second, defendants contend that the twelve plaintiff States pursuing representative claims on behalf of non-California government agencies — • i.e., state agencies and political subdivisions — also lack standing to bring such claims under the Act. Third, defendants assert that, in addition to lack of standing under the Cartwright Act itself, none of the plaintiff States at issue authorize their Attorneys General to bring suit under the Cartwright Act in the first place. 1. Non-California Claims on Behalf of Natural Persons/Businesses Six plaintiff States — Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, South Carolina, and Utah — assert parens patriae claims under the Cartwright Act on behalf of all natural persons. See FAC at ¶ 115. Defendants, however, contend that the Cartwright Act does not authorize parens patriae actions brought by non-California Attorneys General on behalf of non-California residents. Defendants argue that the plain language of the Cartwright Act itself restricts par-ens patriae claims to those brought exclusively by the California Attorney General, exclusively on behalf of California residents. Defendants are correct. In the section of the Cartwright Act specifically addressing Attorney General enforcement suits brought as parens patriae actions, the Act provides: “[t]he Attorney General may-bring a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, in the superior court of any county which has jurisdiction of a defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by those natural persons to their property by reason of any violation of this chapter ... ”. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 16760(a) (1) (emphasis added). This provision could not be plainer: where the Attorney General is empowered to bring a damages action seeking relief for violation(s) of the Cartwright Act, it is only the California Attorney General who is so empowered, and on behalf of California residents only. The out-of-state Attorneys General therefore have no parens patriae authority under the Act. Plaintiffs, for their part, have submitted no legal authority expressing a contrary view of section 16760, nor do their opposing arguments persuade the court to find otherwise. Plaintiffs argue, for example, that even if the above conclusion is true, out-of-state Attorneys General may still bring suit under the general enforcement provision of the Act, which provides a private right of action to “any person” injured under the Act. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 16750(a) (“Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, may sue therefor”). According to plaintiffs, their parens patriae action should be considered nothing more than a procedural device, similar to a class action, which could be filed on behalf of natural non-residents under the Cartwright Act. For support, plaintiffs rely on California case law purportedly holding that class actions under the Cartwright Act are not precluded. See, e.g., Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal.App.3d 120, 134-35, 179 Cal.Rptr. 342 (Cal.Ct.App.1981). However, while plaintiffs are generally correct that Bruno sanctions the use of private class actions under the Cartwright Act, this in no way establishes that parens patriae actions should also be allowed pursuant to the Cartwright Act’s private right of action provision. This is because a par-ens patriae action is expressly defined as a means for a state to seek redress for wrongs affecting the public at large, while a class action is generally a means by which individual private rights may be collectively enforced. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251, 257-58, 266, 92 S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972). Plaintiffs have furthermore failed to present the court with any legal authority holding that parens patriae actions are the same as class actions, for purposes of maintaining a private right of action under the Cartwright Act. Accordingly, and without express authority adopting plaintiffs’ position, the court will not assume that out-of-state parens patriae actions are specifically contemplated by the Cartwright Act’s private enforcement provisions. Plaintiffs also contend that sections 16750(e) and 16760(f) of the Cartwright Act authorize the non-California parens patriae claims before the court. This is wrong. Section 16750(e) permits the Attorney General to enter into contracts and cooperate with private parties and other government entities bringing antitrust actions. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 16750(e) (“In any action brought by the Attorney General pursuant to either state or federal antitrust laws ... the Attorney General may enter into contracts relating to the investigation and the prosecution of such action with any other party plaintiff who has brought a similar action ... ”). However, there is no legal authority that affirmatively interprets this statute as granting express parens patriae authority to non-California Attorneys General acting on behalf of non-California residents. Nor is such an interpretation warranted. The plain language of section 16750(e) avoids mention of parens patriae authority altogether, and merely grants the California Attorney General the right to cooperate with other plaintiffs in jointly investigating and/or prosecuting cases in which the other plaintiffs have brought “similar actionfs] for the recovery of damages.” See id. In other words, the California Attorney General is empowered to cooperate with other plaintiffs who have already, and independently, filed a similar claim. It does not work the other way around — i.e., other party plaintiffs are not authorized to state a claim under the Cartwright Act, simply because they agree first to cooperate with the California Attorney General as part of the Attorney General’s prosecution of an action under the statute. Even assuming, therefore, that the non-California Attorneys General here do, in fact, proceed jointly with the California Attorney General pursuant to section 16750(e) of the Act, this provision grants them no greater authority than they otherwise would have under the Act. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ reliance on section 16760(f) of the Act is similarly misplaced. This provision states that the par-ens patriae powers enumerated in that section “are in addition to and not in derogation of the powers granted to the Attorney General by common law with respect to bringing actions parens patriae.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 16760(f). Plaintiffs rely on this language for proof that plaintiffs’ authority to bring a parens pat-riae suit under the Act is to be found in the common law parens patriae powers vested in all Attorneys General — which the Act itself recognizes. This argument, however, is inapposite. Section 16760(f) is but one provision contained within the broader section 16760 — the Attorney General enforcement provision. As such, and when viewed in the larger context of the section as a whole, section 16760(f) is more correctly viewed as a modifier to the broader section, which is limited to actions by the California Attorney General, as noted above. See generally Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16760. In other words, the lesser provision relates only to those common law powers granted to the California Attorney General, not to out-of state Attorneys General. Finally, plaintiffs assert that parens pat-riae authority on behalf of out-of-state residents is suggested by the California Supreme Court’s holding in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 16 Cal.4th 1143, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291 (1997). But this argument, too, fails. Pacific Gas & Electric engaged in an exhaustive review of the statutory language of the Cartwright Act, and specifically of the provisions of the Act that discuss the Attorney General’s capacity to sue under the Act. See, e.g., id. at 1153, 69 Cal. Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291. The court found that the statute was to be interpreted expansively, and in such a way that a county should be deemed able to bring a representative action under the Act, even though counties are not explicitly referenced in the Act. See id. at 1154-55, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291. However, the case provides no support for plaintiffs’ sweeping conclusion that out-of-state Attorneys General should likewise be allowed to bring suit under the Act. Indeed, even though construing the Act broadly, the Pacific Gas & Electric court specifically referred to the Act as recognizing “that not only the Attorney General and local district attorneys, but also ‘any county, city, public corporation or public district of this state, ’ may bring a civil action under the Cartwright Act.” Id. at 1157, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291 (emphasis added). At no time did the court refer to out-of-state entities, let alone did it touch upon the ability of such entities to state claims under the Act — in a parens patriae capacity or otherwise. The California Supreme court having declined to so construe the Act there, this court will refrain from such a holding here. Accordingly, the Cartwright Act claims asserted by plaintiff States Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, South Carolina, and Utah on behalf of natural persons and/or residents, are hereby DISMISSED for lack of standing under the Cartwright Act. 2. Nonr-Califomia Claims on Behalf of Government Entities There are 12 non-California plaintiff States’ Attorneys General who assert claims pursuant to the Cartwright Act in a parens patriae, proprietary, and/or class capacity, on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions (collectively “government entities”). See FAC at ¶ 115. Defendants seek dismissal of all these claims, once more arguing that standing is lacking under the Cartwright Act. They contend that the non-California government entities do not constitute “persons” authorized to bring suit under the Cartwright Act. To that end, defendants seek dismissal of all claims brought on behalf of government entities by the Attorneys General of plaintiff States Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. Defendants contend, as they did with respect to their arguments in support of dismissing non-California claims on behalf of natural persons, that the provisions of the Cartwright Act expressly contemplate that only California’s government entities may sue under the Act, and that only the California Attorney General may sue as parens patriae on their behalf. Plaintiffs, for their part, respond with the argument that California state cases have interpreted the Cartwright Act to allow suit by out-of-state government plaintiffs to the same extent as any other “person” under the Act. Defendants once again have the better argument. Beginning, as the court must, with the language of the Cartwright Act, its plain meaning is that only California government entities are granted standing to sue as “persons” under the Act. Section 16750, for example — the civil enforcement provision that plaintiffs rely on for authority — provides that “[a]ny person who is injured in his or her business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, may sue therefor ... ”. See Cal Bus. & Prof.Code § 16750(a). The term “person” is, however, specifically defined elsewhere in the Act to include “corporations, firms, partnerships and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of this State or any other State.... ” See id. at § 16702 (emphasis added). Accordingly, standing to sue under this provision of the Act is granted to all natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships and associations — regardless whether they are California residents or not. While government entities are not included in this group of permissible plaintiffs, this does not mean that they are precluded from bringing suit. Rather, the California legislature saw fit to authorize government entities to bring suit by way of a separate provision, codified at section 16750(b) of the Cartwright Act. That provision expressly states that the term “person,” as set forth within the civil enforcement provision of section 16750, shall be deemed to include “[t]he [S]tate and any of its political subdivisions and public agencies.” Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 16750(b). The meaning of this language is clear: the California Attorney General, and any of its political subdivisions and public agencies, also have standing to bring suit under the Act. Out-of-state government entities, however, do not. Section 16750(b) expressly limits the government entities authorized to bring suit to “[t]he [S]tate” — i.e., California — and its agencies and subdivisions. See id. The California legislature knew how to include out-of-state government entities as “persons” capable of suit, had it wanted to. After all, it had previously defined “person” to include out-of-state “corporations, firms, partnerships and associations.” See id. at § 16702. Thus, its failure to broaden the definition of “person” to include out-of-state government entities under section 16750(b) is logically viewed as proof that the legislature did not intend for these entities to be included in the group of potential plaintiffs capable of bringing suit pursuant to the Cartwright Act’s enforcement provisions. In the face of the Cartwright Act’s express language limiting suit on behalf of government entities to California and its Attorney General, plaintiffs’ citation to alternative case law in support of a contrary conclusion is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs rely, for instance, on FTC v. MTK Mktg. Inc., for the proposition that out-of-state government plaintiffs should be treated as “persons” under a given statute, wherever that statute refers to the phrase “person.” See 149 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.1998). In MTK Mktg., the Ninth Circuit interpreted a California statute relating to bond enforcement, and found that a federal government agency could constitute a “person” within the meaning of the statute. See id. at 1039. Plaintiffs are correct that the Ninth Circuit there reasoned that, in the face of statutory language that seemingly defined “person” to include only the state and its political subdivisions and agencies, the court should nonetheless interpret the statute in a manner that treated the federal government in the same manner as the state government, absent some indication of legislative intent. Id. To that end, the Ninth Circuit construed “person” to include the federal government agency. This reasoning does not apply here, however. For unlike the statute at issue in MTK Mktg., the Cartwright Act here explicitly distinguishes between out-of-state corporations, firms, partnerships and associations who can sue, and those out-of-state government entities who cannot. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code 16702, 16750(b, c). Moreover, defendants’ citation to legislative history further supports the conclusion that the legislature did, in fact, intend to include only California government agencies as “persons” capable of suit under the Cartwright Act. See Nemerovski Decl. ISO Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Nemerovski Deck”), Ex. 7 at 23-24. Accordingly, all indications here are that the California legislature did not intend to grant out-of-state government entities standing to sue under the Cartwright Act. And as the Ninth Circuit in MTK Mktg. indicated, courts should defer to the legislative intent behind statutes, where ascertainable. Plaintiffs also rely on cases construing the Sherman Act, in which courts conclude that state government entities are “persons” capable of suit under the Act. This reliance is misplaced, however, as these cases are not controlling here. It is true enough that the Sherman Act ordinarily provides helpful guidance in construing state antitrust laws that are modeled on the Sherman Act. However, as even the California Supreme Court has explicitly noted, this is not necessarily so where the Cartwright Act is concerned. See California v. Texaco, 46 Cal.3d 1147, 252 Cal.Rptr. 221, 762 P.2d 385 (1988) (noting that, contrary to popular belief, Cartwright Act was modeled on Texas state law rather than federal antitrust law, and holding Sherman Act cases to be not directly probative regarding Cartwright Act interpretation). Even if the court were to rely on case law interpreting the Sherman Act, the cases are not actually supportive of the point urged by plaintiffs. This is because, while the cases plaintiffs rely on do construe state governments as “persons” for purposes of section 4 of the Clayton Act — the Sherman Act’s enforcement provision — the Clayton Act is distinguishable from the Cartwright Act. Specifically, the Clayton Act does not contain any provision expressly defining or limiting the types of government entities who may sue under the Act. The Cartwright Act, as already explained above, does. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code 16750(b) (“The [S]tate and any of its political subdivisions and public agencies shall be deemed a person within the meaning of this section”.). Moreover, the Sherman Act cases relied on by plaintiff consider only whether state governments may sue under the Act in their own names, and do not consider the precise issue here — i.e., whether the state government may sue on behalf of further removed state agencies and political subdivisions. All of the foregoing suffices to distinguish the Sherman Act cases from the case at bar. In sum, then, the court’s consideration of the statutory language of the Cartwright Act and its supporting legislative history persuade the court that the Cartwright Act was not intended to, and by its language does not, support the inclusion of out-of-state government entities as “persons” capable of suit under the Act, and upon whose behalf the plaintiff States in question may sue. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is granted^ and plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act claims brought on behalf of government entities by the Attorneys General of plaintiff States Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia, are hereby DISMISSED. 3. Individual State Law Authorization for Cartwright Act Claims Finally, defendants also argue that, in addition to the language of the Cartwright Act itself, a further reason supports dismissal of all non-California plaintiff States’ claims, on behalf of both natural persons and government entities: namely, that these plaintiff States do not authorize their Attorneys General to bring suit on behalf of persons or government entities pursuant to another state’s laws. Defendants look to the states’ governing antitrust laws in particular, and note that their plain statutory language restricts suits on behalf of natural persons and government entities to violations of state antitrust law and in some instances, federal law, and does not permit suits for violation of foreign states’ antitrust laws. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.50.577(a-b); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6 §§ 2105, 2108; Haw.Rev.Stat. § 480-14(b); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 367.200; La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 51:128, 51:138; N.D. CentCode § 51-08.1-07; 4 N. Mar. I.Code § 5206; Okla. Stat. tit. 79 § 205; 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 732-204; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6 — 36—11(b); S.C.Code Ann. § 39-3-190; Va.Code Ann. § 59.1-9.15(a, c). In response, plaintiffs contend that reliance on antitrust statutes alone is insufficient, as the plaintiff States’ Attorneys General are authorized to bring Cartwright Act claims on behalf of residents and government entities by virtue of the powers and duties vested in them by other sources. See, e.g., Del.Code Ann. tit. 29, § 2504(3); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 15.020; N. Mar. I. Const. Art. Ill, § 11; N.D. Cent.Code § 54-12-02; Okla. Stat. tit 74 § 18b; Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-916(3). Plaintiffs also urge the court to place the burden on defendants to prove that the individual plaintiff States affirmatively prohibit their Attorneys General from bringing Cartwright Act claims, rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove that state laws allow them to file such claims. Defendants are correct, in the first instance, that the statutory language of the various state antitrust statutes at issue limits suits brought by the various State Attorneys General to suits for violation of their own antitrust laws and in some instances, federal law. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.50.577(a-b) (authorizing Attorney General to bring civil action on behalf of government entities to secure monetary relief “by reason of any violation of AS Jp5.50.562-ii.5.50.570”) (emphasis added); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 480-14(b) (authorizing Attorney General action on behalf of government agencies “to recover the damages provided for by this section, or by any comparable provisions of federal law”) (emphasis added). There is no language in any of the antitrust statutes, nor can plaintiffs point to any, that expressly authorizes any State Attorney General to bring suit for antitrust violations pursuant to a foreign state’s statute. Plaintiffs instead rely on alternative sources of authority — such as general enforcement provisions, common law, and/or state constitutional provisions — in order to invoke the authority that is lacking in the antitrust statutes themselves. See, e.g., DeLCode Ann. tit. 29, § 2504(3) (general empowerment statute authorizing Attorney General to “exercise all such power and authority as the public interest may from time to time require”); Commonwealth v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 1993 WL 476633, *3 (W.D.Va.1993) (recognizing common law powers of Virginia Attorney General in bringing federal Sherman Act claim in addition to state antitrust claim); La. Const. Art. IV, § 8 (“As necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or interest of the state, the attorney general shall have authority (1) to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any civil action or proceeding ...”) (emphasis added). According to plaintiffs, these alternative sources establish the right of the Attorneys General of the various states to do everything in their power to represent the interests of the residents and entities within their states, and this must necessarily include the ability to institute civil actions pursuant to another state’s antitrust law. The problem with plaintiffs’ argument, however, is that while the types of authorities they cite do generally establish the ability of the State Attorneys General to do their utmost to institute and prosecute suits in order to protect the well-being of their state’s residents and entities, those authorities also appear to contemplate that such representative suits will be prosecuted under the laws of their own state, or in some instances, federal law. Not a single source relied on by plaintiffs expressly provides or even implies that a representative action by an Attorney General may be brought pursuant to another state’s laws, let alone California’s antitrust law specifically. Nor could the court find any such authority. Indeed, even the most expansive of the general empowerment statutes relied on by plaintiffs, while recognizing the Attorney General’s ability to bring actions in out-of-state courts, stops short of actually authorizing the Attorney General to bring actions in out-of-state jurisdictions pursuant to out-of-state laws. See, e.g., Ky.Rev.Stat. § 15.020 (general rights and duties provisions establishing that Attorney General “shall also commence all actions or enter his appearance in all cases, hearings, and proceedings in and before all other courts, tribunals, or commissions in or out of the state, and attend to all litigation and legal business in or out of the state required of him by law, or in which the Commonwealth has an interest”) (emphasis added). This being the case, the court declines plaintiffs’ invitation to find that the majority of plaintiff States’ Attorneys General are authorized, pursuant to their own state laws, to bring suit pursuant to California’s Cartwright Act, in addition to pursuing their own state law claims. In so holding, the court has also declined plaintiffs’ invitation to place upon defendants the burden of persuading the court that the plaintiff States affirmatively prohibit their Attorneys General from bringing representative Cartwright Act claims, and has instead placed upon plaintiffs the burden of persuading the court that state laws allow them to file the instant claims. This is because, as the court has stated on prior occasions in connection with related litigation, the court desires to avoid making affirmative pronouncements regarding state law that would have the effect of substantially broadening the legal rights available pursuant to that law, without some indication that such a result has been expressly contemplated by the courts of a given state. A conservative approach is also warranted, in the court’s view, given the basic nature of representative and/or par-ens patriae actions instituted by State Attorneys General. Parens patriae actions, for example, are unique vehicles that allow states to vindicate “quasi-sovereign interests” — such as interests in the physical and economic health and well-being of state residents and/or entities. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). And while neither party before the court has expressly raised the issue, it appears to the court that an inherent presumption in state actions brought to vindicate “quasi-sovereign” interests is that a state will necessarily vindicate those interests through enforcement of its own state — or, where warranted, federal — laws, given that the persons and entities from whom the state’s quasi-sovereign interests stem, and the authority for vindicating such interests, are both rooted in the state itself and by extension, within its boundaries. Here, because of the unduly broad nature of plaintiffs’ allegations, it is impossible for the court to tell at this juncture whether plaintiffs are in fact asserting a parens patriae claim, a specifically defined “representative” claim, or a class claim on behalf of both natural persons and government entities. See FAC at If 115 (asserting Cartwright Act claim on behalf of non-California state agencies and political subdivisions “in either a parens patriae, a proprietary/representative, or a class capacity”) (emphasis added). However, in view of plaintiffs’ alternative allegations, the concerns just noted counsel in favor of a conservative approach to the question whether the non-California State Attorneys General have been expressly authorized to bring suit pursuant to the Cartwright Act. In sum, therefore, the court concludes that the state laws of Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia also fail to provide the necessary standing for the plaintiff States’ Attorneys General to bring their Cartwright Act claims on behalf of natural persons and/or government entities. Accordingly, these claims are DISMISSED on this ground, in addition to lack of standing under the Cartwright Act itself. C. State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Claims (Third Claim for Relief) Defendants also challenge the state law claims that are alleged by way of forty separate counts in plaintiffs’ third claim for relief. Plaintiffs’ claims are rooted in either state antitrust statutes, or state unfair competition/consumer protection statutes, or both. Regardless of the source of plaintiffs’ claims, defendants target the majority. They argue that dismissal in whole or in part is required, for one or more of the following four reasons: (1) the Illinois Brick doctrine bars certain state law claims that seek recovery on behalf of indirect purchasers; (2) certain state law claims are barred because plaintiffs have failed to allege any intrastate activity, as required pursuant to state law; (3) that certain state law claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; and (4) certain state law claims alleging parens patriae authority on behalf of natural persons and businesses are deficient, because plaintiffs lack the parens patriae capacity to sue for monetary damages on behalf of those entities. 1. Illinois Brick Defendants urge the court to dismiss several plaintiff States’ claims brought pursuant to their own antitrust and/or unfair competition/consumer protection statutes. They argue that, to the extent plaintiffs seek recovery for indirect purchasers pursuant to these statutes, relevant laws of these states specifically prohibit or limit indirect purchasers from bringing antitrust suits, in accordance with Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977). According to defendants, since these states follow Illinois Brick’s general prohibition on indirect purchaser suits alleging antitrust violations, the indirect purchaser relief plaintiffs seek here is improper. Defendants argue that, on this basis, the indirect purchaser claims brought by Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia must be dismissed. a. Alaska Plaintiffs allege claims pursuant to Alaska’s Monopolies and Restraint of Trade Act, as well as Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“AUTPCPA”). See Alaska Stat. § 45.50.562 et seq.; § 45.50.471 et seq.; see also FAC at ¶¶ 123-28. Specifically, plaintiffs seek relief — through Alaska’s Attorney General — on behalf of the state, and as parens patriae on behalf of state agencies, political subdivisions, and natural persons. See FAC at ¶¶ 125-27. Defendants target all of these claims to the extent they seek relief on behalf of indirect purchasers. They contend that Alaska’s antitrust statute does not cover indirect purchaser claims that are based, as here, on conduct occurring prior to July 1, 2003, and that Alaska’s consumer protection statute cannot be used as an alternative to circumvent the prohibition imposed by the state’s antitrust statute. In response, plaintiffs recognize that Alaska did not enact a law granting indirect purchasers standing to sue until July 1, 2003, but they assert that indirect purchaser standing under both the antitrust and consumer protection statutes was nonetheless recognized prior to passage of the 2003 law. Beginning with Alaska’s antitrust statute, both parties acknowledge that the statute was amended in 2003 to expressly allow for indirect purchaser standing. The amended statute now empowers the Attorney General — and the Attorney General alone — to seek monetary relief on behalf of indirect purchasers. See Alaska Statute § 45.50.577® (“Only the attorney general, in a suit brought under this section, may seek monetary relief for injury indirectly sustained for a violation of [the Act]”). Plaintiffs are therefore generally correct that Alaska’s antitrust statute would normally permit suit by the Attorney General for monetary relief on behalf of indirect purchasers. However, this is not the case here. For as defendants point out, the historical and legislative notes to the statute indicate that the amended provision of the statute governing Attorney General actions applies “to civil actions alleging a violation of [the state antitrust statute] that occurred on or after July 1, 2003." See id. (editor’s notes to the statute) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges violations of the antitrust statute that occurred between 1998 and 2002. See FAC at ¶¶ 96, 99. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ allegations are not covered by the amended provision of the statute that would allow the Alaska Attorney General’s suit to go forward on behalf of indirect purchasers. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this conclusion by arguing that, even prior to passage of the amended provision discussed above, Alaska’s antitrust statute was already construed to allow for suits by the Attorney General on behalf of indirect purchasers. Plaintiffs would invoke this prior authority as alternative grounds for the instant suit on behalf of indirect purchasers. The court, however, is unpersuaded by these arguments. The obvious implication of Alaska’s amendment to its antitrust statute is that, prior to amendment, no indirect purchaser standing existed under the statute. Else, there would have been no need to amend the statute to permit indirect purchaser claims. This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that the editor’s notes to the statute explicitly state that the amended statute applies prospectively to conduct occurring after July 1, 2003. Having concluded, therefore, that the instant claims by the Alaska Attorney General on behalf of indirect purchasers are barred under the state’s antitrust statute, the issue remains whether the Attorney General may nonetheless bring indirect purchaser claims pursuant to the state’s unfair competition statute. The AUTPCPA provides: “A person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of another person’s act or practice declared unlawful [under AUTPCPA] may bring a civil action to recover for each unlawful act or practice three times the actual damages or $500, whichever is greater.” See Alaska St. § 45.50.531. There is nothing in the statute’s language or definitions that specifically designates either direct or indirect purchasers as “persons,” or that distinguishes between the two. Nor has either party submitted any controlling case authority directly on point as to this issue, although plaintiffs have pointed to one case that provides persuasive authority for the argument that the Alaska Attorney General may seek restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers under the unfair competition statute. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.1999). The court does not find Mylan instructive, however, in light of the fact that the My-lan case predated Alaska’s 2003 amendment to its antitrust statute, and did not contain any discussion of indirect purchaser standing under AUTPCPA in light of the state’s Illinois Brick policy. Specifically, the facts of the Mylan case provided no occasion for that court to consider — as is squarely before the court here — the wisdom of allowing plaintiffs’ claims to proceed under Alaska’s consumer protection statute where those exact same claims were explicitly barred under the state antitrust statute. As such, and furthermore recognizing that this court is not in the best position to decide unresolved legal issues for the State of Alaska, the court adopts — as it has done previously — the interpretation that will wreak the least amount of havoc on the existing law in Alaska. To that end, the court declines to read AUTPCPA to permit the Attorney General to assert indirect purchaser claims here, since no court has affirmatively found to the contrary, and since, under the current status of the antitrust laws in Alaska, the Attorney General may only seek relief on behalf of indirect purchasers for conduct that is alleged to have occurred after July 1, 2003. For the above reasons, the court concludes that the indirect purchaser claims brought by the Attorney General pursuant to Alaska’s antitrust and consumer protection statutes must be, and hereby are, DISMISSED. b. Arkansas Plaintiffs also assert claims under Arkansas law pursuant to the state’s antitrust and consumer protection statutes. See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-75-301 et seq. (Arkansas Unfair Practices Act (“AUPA”)); Ark.Code Ann. § 4-88-101 et seq. (Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”)); see also FAC at ¶ 130. Acting through the Arkansas Attorney General, they seek relief for plaintiff State Arkansas, its state agencies, and its natural persons. FAC at ¶ 130. Defendants once again target the indirect purchaser claims. As they did with respect to plaintiffs’ claims under Alaska law, defendants argue that Arkansas’ antitrust statute was only recently amended to allow the Attorney General to sue on behalf of indirect purchasers, and that this amendment did not become effective until April 8, 2003 — thereby failing to cover the pre-2003 conduct alleged by plaintiffs here. See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-75-315(b) (“The Attorney General also may bring a civil action in the name of the state, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in this state, to secure monetary relief as provided under this section for injury, directly or indirectly sustained by those persons ... ”) (effective April 8, 2003). This being the case, defendants contend that the indirect purchaser claims are barred under the Arkansas antitrust statute, and that such claims under the state’s consumer protection statute should also be barred, lest plaintiffs be allowed to circumvent the Illinois Brick policies contemplated by the antitrust statute. Although these arguments were persuasive with respect to claims under Alaska’s state laws, they are not similarly persuasive here. For as plaintiffs point out, the Arkansas antitrust statute here is not as narrow as Alaska’s antitrust statute. This is because the 2003 version of the Arkansas antitrust statute — including its amendments — does not explicitly apply only to violations occurring after its enactment. Rather, the Arkansas statute elsewhere merely indicates that it does not “allow for the commencement of any action by the Attorney General under the provisions of [the Act] for events occurring prior to [April 8, 2003] of which the Attorney General had actual knowledge.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-320(e). Thus, as plaintiffs argue, a fair reading of the amended statute is that it applies to actions commenced by the Attorney General that allege conduct occurring prior to April 8, 2003, but only where the Attorney General had no actual knowledge of the conduct at the time. Pursuant to this plain reading of the statute, plaintiffs’ claims here on behalf of indirect purchasers pass muster. For there are no allegations anywhere in plaintiffs’ complaint indicating that the Arkansas Attorney General had actual knowledge of defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct. To be sure, plaintiffs’ complaint comes close to alleging as much in the section of the complaint that alleges defendants’ fraudulent concealment of their activities. See FAC at ¶¶ 4, 40, 84 (defendants concealed their conduct “[f]rom approximately 1998 to June of 2002”). However, although defendants argue that these fraudulent concealment allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that the Attorney General had actual knowledge of defendants’ purported antitrust violations — and thus, that the amended statute does not apply — the court is not convinced. The fraudulent concealment allegations state only that the defendants stopped concealing their activities from plaintiffs in 2002, not that plaintiffs- — or more specifically, the Arkansas Attorney General — actually knew of defendants’ activities as of 2002. As such, and in the absence of allegations or proof indicating that the State Attorney General affirmatively had knowledge of defendants’ conduct prior to April 8, 2003, the antitrust claims alleged on behalf of indirect purchasers are viable at this time. Having ascertained that plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of indirect purchasers pursuant to the Arkansas antitrust statute may proceed, the court turns to plaintiffs’ indirect purchaser claims pursuant to the Arkansas consumer protection statute — ADTPA. See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-88-101 et seq. While both parties rely on non-controlling authority for support of their contrary positions, plaintiffs rely on the only case cited by the parties that specifically considered whether antitrust indirect purchaser claims may be asserted pursuant to ADTPA. See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 178-79 (D.Me.2004). The In re New Motor Vehicles court stated: there is “no support in the ADTPA or Arkansas case law for a ban on indirect purchaser suits. The ADTPA provides a private cause of action for damages for any person injured by a violation of the ADT-PA, and is not limited to a cause of action for direct purchasers.” The court also noted that Arkansas “does not prohibit indirect purchaser suits under its antitrust laws.” See id. Given that In re New Motor Vehicles is the only case to construe indirect purchaser claims under the ADTPA in light of the amended Arkansas antitrust statute, and in view of defendants’ failure to cite any directly contrary authority insofar as the ADTPA is concerned, the court finds In re New Motor Vehicles persuasive. For these reasons, and in view of the fact that Arkansas’ antitrust statute additionally allows for plaintiffs’ indirect purchaser claims as alleged in the instant complaint, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claim under the ADTPA, on behalf of indirect purchasers, is viable and may proceed. Accordingly, the court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ indirect purchaser claims pursuant to Arkansas’ antitrust and consumer protection statutes. The denial with respect to the antitrust statute is without prejudice, as the issue may be revisited on summary judgment should discovery reveal that the Attorney General had actual knowledge of the claims before the effective date of the statute. c. Florida Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to Florida’s Antitrust Act, brought by plaintiff State Florida, and on behalf of its natural persons, state agencies, and political subdivisions. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 542.18 and 542.22; see also FAC at ¶¶ 134-39. Defendants seek to dismiss it, arguing that to the extent the claim seeks damages on behalf of indirect purchasers, Florida courts have expressly held that indirect purchaser standing is barfed under the Act. Plaintiffs respond by pointing to the portion of their complaint alleging that Florida’s state agencies and political subdivisions were the recipients of valid claim assignments executed by direct purchaser OEMs. Plaintiffs contend that, by virtue of these assignments, any claims on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions are direct purchaser claims, not indirect purchaser claims, thereby justifying recovery pursuant to Florida’s Antitrust Act. Preliminarily, defendants are correct— and plaintiffs do not dispute — that Florida’s Antitrust Act prohibits indirect purchaser standing. See Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So.2d 100, 103 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (neither plaintiff nor •court “challenged] the trial court’s conclusion that under [Illinois Brick, plaintiff] and the others in her class, all of whom are indirect purchasers, cannot bring a Florida antitrust claim”). As such, the only issue before the court is whether plaintiffs have adequately alleged direct purchaser claims under the Act, as opposed to indirect purchaser claims. With respect to claims brought by plaintiff State on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions, the court finds that plaintiffs have satisfactorily done so. Plaintiffs’ direct allegations under the Act leave much to be desired; there is not a single allegation that adequately describes or even alludes to the direct/indirect purchaser status of any of the persons/entities on whose behalf plaintiffs purport to bring suit. See FAC at ¶¶ 134-39. Nonetheless, despite this lack of clarity, the court is persuaded that the allegations contained in paragraphs 106 through 108 of the complaint do adequately state that Florida’s state agencies and political subdivisions are proceeding as direct purchasers, by virtue of certain assignment clauses contained in executed contracts. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiffs seek recovery under the Florida Antitrust Act on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions, it is reasonable to infer that plaintiffs are seeking such recovery as direct purchasers, pursuant to the same assignment clauses that plaintiffs allege earlier in the complaint. If this is indeed the case, those claims may proceed under the Act. To the extent, however, that this is not the case, and plaintiffs in reality seek recovery on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions who do not invoke direct purchaser status, such claims must fail. For as noted above, only direct purchasers may sue under Florida’s Antitrust Act, and any indirect purchaser claims brought on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions are accordingly barred. Indeed, this is the conclusion that the court reaches with respect to plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Florida’s Antitrust Act on behalf of natural persons. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges these claims, in addition to claims brought on behalf of government entities. Despite the fact that defendants’ motion to dismiss is also aimed at them, however, plaintiffs’ opposition mentions nothing about them — perhaps because plaintiffs’ complaint is completely silent on the question whether claims brought on behalf of natural persons are brought as direct/indirect purchaser claims. At any rate, given the lack of either argument or allegation establishing that claims brought on behalf of natural persons under the Act are direct purchaser claims, the court finds it more likely than not that plaintiffs’ complaint alleges indirect purchaser claims on behalf of natural persons. As such, defendants’ arguments in favor of dismissing all such claims is well-taken, in view of Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. Accordingly, the court concludes that, to the extent that plaintiffs’ complaint alleges (1) claims on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions who do not invoke direct purchaser status by virtue of direct claim assignments or otherwise; and (2) indirect purchaser claims on behalf of natural persons, defendants’ motion is granted and all such claims under the Florida Antitrust Act are hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Act may proceed, however, with respect to state agencies, political subdivisions, and natural persons who seek recovery as direct purchasers. d. Hawaii Plaintiffs assert a claim, brought by the Hawaii Attorney General on behalf of all state agencies, pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statute § 480-2 et seq. See FAC at ¶ 140. Defendants challenge this claim, to the extent it includes claims on behalf of indirect purchasers. While they acknowledge that Hawaii’s antitrust statute permits indirect purchasers to sue for damages, and further permits the State Attorney General to sue as parens patriae on behalf of indirect purchasers who are natural persons, they assert that the statute does not similarly recognize indirect purchaser standing for suits on behalf of government entities. Plaintiffs, for their part, object to defendants’ challenge, referring to the broad rights granted to all indirect purchasers under the statute, as indicated by the legislative history and the statutory language. The court’s resolution of this issue begins and ends with the plain language of Hawaii’s antitrust statute. The statute provides: “The [Attorney [Gjeneral may bring an action on behalf of the [sjtate or any of its political subdivisions or government agencies to recover the damages provided for by this section, or by any comparable provisions of federal law.” See Haw. Rev.Stat. § 480-14(b). Accordingly, it is clear from the outset that the State Attorney General is expressly empowered to bring suit under the state antitrust statute on behalf of government entities. This says nothing, however, regarding suits on behalf of government entities who are indirect purchasers. For guidance as to this indirect purchaser issue, the court must look to section 480-14(c) of the statute, which separately grants the Attorney General the express right to bring “a class action for indirect purchasers asserting claims under this chapter.” See Haw.Rev. Stat. § 480-14(c). In granting this express right, however, the statute also limits such actions to those brought on behalf of natural persons only. See id. (“Actions brought under this subsection shall be brought as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the State”). Accordingly, and considering each of the foregoing provisions of the state antitrust statute, the statute appeal’s to limit actions brought by the Attorney General on behalf of indirect purchasers to those on behalf of natural persons. They do not encompass state government entities — on whose behalf the Attorney General is also permitted to sue, by way of a separate provision that contains no authorization for indirect purchasers. In