Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS CHALLENGING THE USE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH COURT AUTHORIZED WIRETAPS DANIEL, District Judge. THIS MATTER is before the Court on motions filed by the defendants to suppress information obtained as a result of wiretaps authorized by orders of this Court. A two day hearing was held on November 19 and November 20, 1998. This case involves a drug conspiracy that was allegedly created and implemented by the defendants. Through a Second Superseding Indictment filed on May 20, 1998, Defendant Michael Crumpton was charged with one count of knowingly and intentionally conspiring to distribute and possess cocaine and crack cocaine, three counts of knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing cocaine and crack cocaine, one count of knowingly and intentionally attempting to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, and one count of knowing and wilful use and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Defendant Lateshia Harden was charged with one count of knowingly and intentionally conspiring to distribute and possess cocaine and crack cocaine, and one count of knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing crack cocaine. Defendant Darían Hunter was charged with one count of knowingly and intentionally conspiring to distribute and possess cocaine and crack cocaine, one count of knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing cocaine and crack cocaine, and one count of knowing and wilful use and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Finally, on June 25, 1998 Defendant Devon Camack was charged with two counts of knowing and intentional use of a communications facility to commit and facilitate the commission of crack cocaine possession and distribution, and three counts of knowing and intentional possession with the intent to distribute of crack cocaine. This Order decides the suppression issues. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Pre-Wiretap Investigation This prosecution of these defendants emanates from the actions of the Metro Gang Task Force (“MGTF”). Case agents who worked on the investigation included FBI Special Agent Clyde Langley (“Agent Langley”), who had approximately 4 years and hundreds of hours training as a narcotics officer; Aurora Police Officer Mark Finnin (“Agent Finnin”), who had approximately 13 years training in gang and narcotics related investigations; and Arapahoe County Deputy Sheriff Shauna Volz (“Deputy Volz”). (Government’s Wiretap Exhibit 1 at the hearing, ¶¶ 1-2, Transcript T. 10-12). By the summer of 1995, officials of the Sierra Vista Apartments in Aurora, Colorado informed law enforcement about large scale drug dealing and increased acts of violence on the premises. (T. 13). To aid in the investigation, the case agents decided to enlist the assistance of Pamela Long (“Informant Long”), who was a paid confidential informant. Informant Long moved into the complex in order to make contact with those persons involved in the drug distribution activities. The case agents were aware that Informant Long had been a crack cocaine user and that some of the potential targets of the case might know her and deal with her because of her prior drug usage. (Exhibit 1, ¶ 11, T. 13-14). Informant Long lived at Sierra Vista from approximately July, 1995, to approximately December, 1995. Informant Long’s rent was paid by MGTF and she received a small monthly allowance. (T. 264). Shortly after Informant Long moved into the complex, she began providing the case agents with information about others who were distributing and supplying cocaine and crack cocaine in the complex. By November 1995, based on information supplied by Ms. Long, the “targets” of the investigation became Larry Moore, a/k/a “Captain,” and his suppliers and distributors including Ronald Johnson, a/k/a “Hollywood,” Victor Handy, and Ernest L.C. Robison. According to Informant Long, this group had been engaged in drug dealing since the late 1980’s and was responsible for supplying large quantities of crack cocaine in Denver and Aurora, Colorado. Moore was the leader of the group, Robison was his right hand man, and Handy and Johnson arranged and brokered deals for Moore and others. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 12-13, T. 13-14). Informant Long learned at this time that Robison’s girlfriend, Lisa Hatcher, was also involved in crack cocaine distribution with Robison. This information was reported to the case agents. Over time, Informant Long gained the trust of some of the members of the organization and was able to infiltrate to the point where she could make controlled buys of small amounts of crack cocaine. For example, in November 1995, Informant Long made a controlled purchase of 6.5 grams of crack cocaine from Robison and a purchase of 2.1 grams of crack from Handy. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 17, 45, T. 21). The agents conducted surveillance in connection with these controlled purchases in an effort to learn who was supplying Handy and Robison with crack cocaine. This surveillance, however, did not uncover the identity of the source(s). (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 115-117, T. 22). On November 29, 1995, Informant Long provided a lead on a potential source when she advised the case agents that she had driven Robison to meet with someone named “Tarzan.” After the meeting, Ro-bison showed her \ ounce of crack that he had purchased from Tarzan. (Exhibit 1, ¶ 118). The case agents later identified Tarzan as Thaddeus Martin, who was arrested in March 1996, for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Martin refused to cooperate following his arrest. (T. 22-23). In mid-December 1995, the case agents solicited the help of a second confidential informant identified as Patricia or Patty Heck (“Informant Heck”). Like Informant Long, Informant Heck was also a former crack cocaine user who knew some of the members of the organization. Informant Heck was able to supply information about Handy, Johnson and Robison and was able to infiltrate the organization to the point where she too could buy small quantities of crack cocaine from them. For example, on December 16, 1995, Informant Heck purchased gram of crack from Johnson. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 22-29, T. 26-27). Although Informant Heck had provided information about an apartment that Handy, Johnson and Robison were using, the case agents concluded that they lacked probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the apartment because it was unclear who was using the apartment and whether drugs were actually being stored there. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 125-126). On December 27, 1996, Informant Heck set up a controlled buy from Robison and, on that day, attempted to introduce an undercover agent, Deputy Volz, to Robison. Although the controlled purchase of 2.05 grams of crack was successful, Robison became leery of dealing directly with or speaking with Deputy Volz and tried to conduct the transaction solely through Informant Heck. Robison never offered to deal with Deputy Volz independently of Informant Heck. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶31, 121, T. 27-28). The case agents continued to conduct surveillances in connection with Informant Heck’s activities in order to learn the identity of the drug source, but they were not successful. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 115-117). Although the case agents believed that they had enough information to arrest Robison based on the two controlled purchases, they decided against this course of action because they had not identified the source of drugs to Robison and others in the organization, did not know the identity of those persons in the upper echelons of the organization, and did not want to compromise the ongoing investigation. (T. 23-25). On January 3, 1996, the case agents interviewed a third confidential informant who was identified as Derrick Everidge (“Informant Everidge”), an admitted drug dealer in the Denver area. Informant Ev-eridge was able to provide some historical information on Johnson, Moore and Robi-son and was able to supply the case agents with Moore’s telephone number. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 31-41). Informant Everidge told the case agents, however, that he should not buy from Moore because Informant Ever-idge was in a higher position in the distribution hierarchy and to do so would look out of place and create suspicion. (T. 29-30). In an effort to set up a controlled purchase of crack cocaine, on January 9, 1996 Informant Heck made a monitored phone call to Handy. Handy advised that Robi-son was due in at 3:00 a.m. on his return from California, and that another “party” was planned for the following evening. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 46-48, T. 30). In an effort to corroborate Informant Heck’s information, the MGTF case agents arranged for Informant Long to contact Handy. During the taped conversation, Handy reiterated that Robison would be returning “with a load” around 3:00 that morning. Informant Long asked how much Robison would be picking up and Handy responded that he was unsure. Handy further stated that Robison was taking a risk flying back and forth as this was Robison’s sixth crack importation trip from California. (Exhibit 1, ¶ 49, T. 30-31). On January 9, 1996, the case agents contacted the Denver Police Narcotics team located at Denver International Airport. Officer Chavez of the Narcotics team advised that he had verified that Robison was aboard a flight to arrive from Ontario, California at 2:00 a.m. on January 10th. Surveillance was established at the airport and Agent Langley observed Robison exit the plane carrying a beige canvas Pierre Cardin shoulder bag, with the name “Lani Robison” printed on it. Robison walked into the main terminal where he was stopped by officials and asked to identify himself. He replied that he was Ernest Robison. Officers advised Robison that they believed he was carrying narcotics and asked if they could search his shoulder bag. Robison refused to consent to a search of his bag but did agree to a search of his person. The officers advised Robison that they were going to detain the shoulder bag pending the issuance of a search warrant but that he was free to leave. Thereafter, a search warrant was obtained for the bag and a search uncovered 889.8 grams of cocaine base. However, there was nothing in the bag that revealed the source of the controlled substance. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 50-51, T. 81-82). Believing that the stop and seizure of drugs from Robison would create an opening in the Moore organization, the case agents directed Informant Long to attempt closer contact with Moore. On January 12, 1996, Informant Long made a monitored phone call to Moore and discussed with him the police stop of Robison at the airport and the fact that Robison seemed to be out of the picture. Informant Long further complained that she did not feel safe dealing with Robison anymore, and Moore responded by indicating that he would take care of her directly. (T. 34). On January 30, 1996, Informant Long made a controlled buy of crack cocaine from Moore, and in the winter months of 1996, she began directly purchasing crack cocaine from Moore, becoming closer to him and others in his organization. Specifically, Informant Long began to assist Moore by driving him to meetings with his customers and suppliers and by helping him place telephone calls to people in the organization. During this period, Informant Long supplied the case agents with whatever information she could gather without violating the secrecy of the investigation. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 56-58, T. 34-35). For example, Informant Long provided information about a woman identified as Donna Norris, a/k/a “Dee,” who was distributing crack cocaine out of the Traveler’s Inn and other motels for Moore. Informant Long also provided information as to Norris’ apartment at 112532 East Kansas Drive. However, none of the information provided by Ms. Long established sufficient probable cause to justify search warrants for any location used by Moore or Norris. (Exhibit 1, ¶ 55, T. 34-35). On February 13, 1996, Informant Long advised the case agents that Moore had been stopped by the police and that approximately $500 worth of crack cocaine had been seized from him. At this time, Moore threatened Informant Long and said that if he found out she was working for law enforcement, he would kill her. Taking this threat seriously, the case agents became reluctant to introduce new confidential informants into the organization. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 59, 119, T. 35-37). In March 1996, the case agents applied for and received authorization to install pen registers and trap and trace devices on telephones being used by Moore and Handy. The pen registers were successful in that they identified other telephone numbers being called by Moore and Handy. However, they did not reveal the content of or the parties to these conversations. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 95-97, 99-113, T. 38-39). On March 4, 1996, Informant Long reported that she had been driving with Moore when he went to meet his source of supply at a location just south of the Riv-erfalls Apartment Complex. When they reached that location Moore got out of the car and went to talk to the source. At Moore’s direction, Informant Long remained in the car. (T. 325). The informant was unable to see the source clearly and could only describe him as a black male, and it was from this meeting that the case agents concluded that Moore was secretive with respect to his source. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 61,115, T. 39-40, 268-270). On March 8 and 9, 1996, Informant Long was able to provide the case agents with information relating to Moore’s apartment. However, the agents believed that this information did not establish probable case to obtain a warrant for this location because drugs could not be tied to that location. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 64, 125, T. 40-41). As a result, on March 15, 1996, the agents attempted to supply Moore with a “chipped” cellular telephone, but this plan also proved unsuccessful. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 66-67, 72-7B, T. 41-42). The Littleton Police stopped Moore and a woman named Lisa Hatcher on March 29, 1996, and found ten grams of crack cocaine and a crack pipe on Hatcher’s person. Hatcher was a crack cocaine addict who assisted Moore in his drug distribution by driving him around town and helping him package the drugs. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 70-71, T. 43-44). The case agents were concerned about interviewing Hatcher because they were aware of her close relationship with Robison and Moore. Nevertheless, the agents decided to interview her in jail during which time Hatcher stated that she had driven Moore to locations where he would meet with his source. Although Hatcher had not been allowed to meet directly with Moore’s source of supply, she described him as a tall, lean, black male with a deformed eye. (T. 44). Due to Hatcher’s incarceration, severe crack addiction, and the belief that Hatcher would have no more success infiltrating the Moore organization than Informants Long or Heck, the case agents decided not to use Hatcher as a street informant. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 116,118, T. 44-45). On April 8, 1996, Informant Long advised that she was again driving Moore around when he went to meet with his source. Like the last transaction, this deal took place at night and the Informant was unable to clearly see and identify the source. (Exhibit 1, ¶ 74, T. 46). The case agents interviewed another confidential source identified as Cynthia Sandoval on May 3, 1996, who, like Hatcher, was in jail and a crack cocaine user. Sandoval was a background informant who was able to provide historical information on Moore, Johnson and Robison. Again like Hatcher, the agents decided not to use Sandoval as a street informant due to her incarceration, severe crack problem, and the substantial unlikelihood that she would be able to infiltrate the organization any further than the other informants. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 75-77, T. 44-45). On May 13, 1996, Informant Long advised the agents that she had been driving with Moore when he asked her to page his source “Lucky,” but she was not allowed to participate directly in the later transaction. (Exhibit 1, ¶ 78, T. 48-49). A month later, on June 13, 1996, Long advised that Moore was currently on his way to meet with “Lucky” to purchase a supply of crack cocaine. The informant described the vehicle Moore was in and noted two possible locations where the drug deal could occur. Surveillance was established at each of these locations and Moore was seen meeting with “Lucky” at a parking lot. Approximately two minutes after the meeting took place, “Lucky” and Moore both left the area. Surveillance agents noted that their behavior at the meeting location was consistent with a drug deal taking place. Surveillance units followed “Lucky” and arranged for a marked patrol car to stop and identify him. “Lucky” identified himself as Michael Andre Crumpton. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 79-80, T. 49-50). Crumpton was not arrested at this time because the agents did not believe there was sufficient evidence to sustain an indictment. (T. 50). On June 20, 1996, Informant Long advised that Crumpton’s new pager number was (303) 599-5480. The agents obtained subscriber information for this pager, but the information turned out to be fictitious. (T. 50). Informant Long further advised that Moore stated that Crumpton was going out of town and a female named “La-trisha” would handle the crack cocaine operation in Crumpton’s absence. Five days later, Informant Long told case agents that Moore was on his way to purchase a supply of crack cocaine. She described the car that Moore was traveling in and the location where Moore would meet his contact. Surveillance was established and at 11:80 p.m. Moore arrived at the location. At 11:29 and 11:36 p.m., two pages were received by Crumpton’s pager from Moore’s cellular phone, and at approximately 11:45 p.m., surveillance observed Moore meeting with a black female in a gas station at the identified location. Moore later returned to his car and left the scene. The license on the black female’s car was traced to co-defendant Lateshia Harden. Surveillance units noted that Moore’s and Harden’s behavior at the meeting location was consistent with a drug deal taking place. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 82-83, T. 87-88). Based upon what had transpired, the case agents decided that there was not sufficient information to arrest Harden and that it was too dangerous to try and approach her as an informant given her close association with Crumpton. (T. 88-89). On May 23, 1996, the case agents interviewed another informant identified as Joy Shapiro. Like the other informants, Shapiro was a crack user who knew some of the members of this organization from her past. Shapiro’s role in the organization was similar to that of Hatcher, and Informants Long and Heck. Thus, the agents did not believe that she would be able to infiltrate the conspiracy and deal directly with Moore’s source of supply. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 84-87, 75-77, T. 88-89). At this juncture, there were no new available informants. Prior informants had been unsuccessful due to their identity as crack users and their relatively low level positions in the organization. The prior informants had been unable to fully identify or deal directly with Moore’s sources, or even identify stash houses or places where the drugs might be stored. Informant Heck had also failed in her efforts to introduce an undercover agent to the organization. Further, the informants were afraid of reprisals specifically because of Moore’s earlier death threat to Informant Long if he found out that she was cooperating with law enforcement officials, and his later statement to Shapiro that, “it would only take $1,” to have her erased. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 115, 118-121, T. 89-90). Finally, on May 30, 1996, Informant Long successfully supplied Moore with a “chipped” cellphone, and on June 14, 1996, the case agents applied for and received a pen register on this cellphone. However, like the last pen register, this register was of limited use because it only identified telephone numbers being called by the cellphone, and did not provide the substance of those communications. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 89-93, T. 90-91). The Moore Wiretap Investigation By the end of June 1996, the case agents believed that they had attempted all of the “traditional methods of investigation” and that these methods had either failed completely, were of limited success or were to dangerous to try. The methods used included: (1) use of informants; (2) interviews with witnesses; (3) introduction of undercover agents; (4) search warrants; and (5) pen registers. The case agents, therefore, applied for a wiretap on Moore’s chipped cellphone and his home telephone. On July 17, 1996, Agent Langley sought authorization to intercept wire communications to and from Moore’s landline telephone number (303) 743-0479 (changed to (303) 671-5289), subscribed to by Jamel L. White, 18494 E. Kepner Place, Apartment 105, Aurora, Colorado (hereinafter the “Moore home telephone”), and Moore’s cellular telephone number (803) 809^4970, ESN D4905B7E, subscribed to by CAR Communications, 8547 E. Arapahoe Road, # J, Box 194, Greenwood Village, Colorado (hereinafter “Moore’s cellular telephone”). The target of this investigation was the Moore crack cocaine organization, including his suppliers and distributors. The named interceptees and targets were: “Larry Moore, Ronald Johnson, Ernest L.C. Robison, Victor Handy, Wendy Dya-kovich, Michael Crumpton, Elizabeth Martin, Patrick Miller, Donna Norris, and others as yet unknown.” (Exhibit 1, ¶ 7(a), T. 12). The objectives of the wiretap were to gather admissible evidence leading to: (1) the identification of the individual(s) supplying Moore, Crumpton, and others in the organization with controlled substances (cocaine and cocaine base); (2) the identification of the person(s) distributing and transporting controlled substances (cocaine and cocaine base) on behalf of Moore, Crumpton and others in the organization; (3) the identification of the time(s) and loeation(s) of meetings during which Moore, Crumpton, and others in the organization distributed controlled substances (cocaine and cocaine base) for further distribution; (4) the identification of other communication facilities utilized by Moore, Crumpton, and others in the organization; and (5) the time(s) of importation and delivery of the controlled substances (cocaine and cocaine base) within Colorado and elsewhere. (Exhibit 1, ¶ 7(c)). The clear and express purpose of the wiretap was to gather information as it related to named interceptee and target Michael Crumpton. The case agents considered Crumpton and his suppliers and distributors to be part of the same investigation and organization as Moore. (T. 101). The wiretap affidavit set forth the facts detailed above and included a conclusion section which summarized the necessity for the wiretap. In that section, Agent Langley concluded, based on all of the facts of the investigation to date, that necessity had been satisfied because: informants had failed to accomplish the objectives of the investigation; informants and witnesses who had been interviewed had not been productive; attempting to introduce an undercover agent had failed; search warrants and pen registers had been of limited success; and a grand jury had not been tried because of the case agent’s belief that it would be of limited success. (Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 114-129). On July 17, 1996, United States District Judge John L. Kane, Jr. authorized the wiretap on both the telephones used by Moore. The wiretap lasted for a thirty day period. 1. Information About Crumpton Obtained From the Moore Wiretap During the first thirty days of the Moore wiretap, the case agents corroborated the belief that had been set forth in the Moore wiretap affidavit, to wit, that Crumpton was in fact a crack and cocaine source of supply for Moore. (T. 100). Also during the first thirty days of the Moore Wiretap, the case agents continued to try traditional methods of investigation to determine the identities of Crumpton’s source, his associates and distributors, and where Crumpton was storing controlled substances. For example, the agents combined pen register data and trap and trace data to determine what cellular telephone Crumpton was using. The agents further conducted a subscriber check and determined that the cellphone was subscribed to by Noelle Poindexter, 18 Lansing Street, Aurora Colorado. (Government’s Exhibit 2, ¶ 27). Second, when the intercepted communications revealed that Crumpton and Moore were about to meet to transact a drug deal, the case agents conducted surveillance in connection with 'those meetings. Through this wiretap directed surveillance, the agents were able to establish what apartment Crumpton was using. The apartment was leased to Lateshia Harden. (Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 35-37, T. 110). The agents further attempted to determine whether there was a phone in the apartment and, if so, whether that phone was also subscribed to by someone other than Crump-ton. (T. 107,423). The agents continued using traditional investigatory methods to determine what communications facilities Crumpton was using but this failed because the technology needed to trap and trace one cellular phone call to another was not available. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 27, T. 108). The pen registers had only been partially successful in that they confirmed communication between Crumpton and Harden (Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 44-46, T. Ill, 112), and between Crumpton and Tyrone Gray. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 48, T. 112— 113). The surveillances helped agents identify a potential stash house, but probable cause for a search warrant of that location was still lacking. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 51, T. 114-115). Most importantly, surveillance and the other traditional methods had not revealed who Crumpton’s source of supply was. At this point, what was revealed was Crumpton’s extreme cautiousness and ability to conduct counter surveillance. (T. 106, 107, 109, 110-111). Indeed, the Moore wiretap confirmed that Crumpton had detected the earlier surveillance. Specifically, on July 26, 1996, Moore had a conversation with his daughter wherein Moore stated that Crumpton believed that people were following them and as a result, they were not going to do any deals. This conversation led the case agents to fear that continued surveillance might compromise the entire investigation. (Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 51-53). With respect to confidential informants, the case agents had not developed any new informants with information about the Crumpton organization. The only informant who had been able to get close to Crumpton was Informant Long, and she had been discontinued as an informant because she resumed the use of crack cocaine. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 15, n. 1, T. 103-104). 2. Information Known About Crump-ton Prior To The Crumpton Wiretap After the agents determined that Crumpton was a source of supply for Moore, they examined the following historical information about Crumpton prior to applying for the Crumpton wiretap, a. Information About Crumpton Preceding the Phoenix Investigation The case agents became aware of the following information from a review of Aurora Police Records. On November 5, 1993, Crumpton was arrested following an aggravated robbery. Crumpton was shot and “jacked” by rival drug dealers and was found with crack cocaine in his pockets. (Defendant’s Exhibit A). On February 26, 1994, Crumpton, Darían Hunter, Patrick Clemons and Cantrell Black were stopped by the Aurora Police Department. At the time of the stop, Crumpton was wearing body armor and carrying a Glock 9mm in his waistband. Cantrell Black was also armed and was later identified as Richard Stewart, a fugitive from Arizona. The four men were believed to have been part of the same drug crew. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 52-53) b. The Phoenix Investigation Prior to drafting the Crumpton Wiretap Affidavit, the case agents reviewed a MGTF Investigative Report (Defendant’s Exhibit A), relating to a prior investigation of Crumpton. That investigation occurred between fall 1994 and spring 1995. FBI Special Agent Carle Schlaff, also assigned to the MGTF, was the case agent on that investigation. This earlier investigation began in September 1994 when Patrick Clemons debarked a flight from Phoenix to Baltimore, and was arrested by DEA officials while in possession of 15 kilograms of cocaine in his luggage. Clemons agreed to cooperate and to make a monitored telephone call to Ms source in Phoenix. During the monitored call, Clemons and the source made references to “L.D.” and “Love-Daddy,” both aliases used by Crumpton. During the conversation, Clemons tipped- off the source to the fact that the call was being monitored and thereafter, refused to cooperate further. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 52-53). On November 2,1994, a cooperating witness (referred to as “CS-X” during the course of the wiretap hearings) approached Agent Schlaff and provided information about the Baltimore cocaine seizure. CS-X advised that the source of the drugs was Crumpton and that Crumpton’s main partners in Denver in the crack distribution business were Hunter and Gray. CS-X further stated that Clemons used to transport drugs for Crumpton. CS-X was reluctant to cooperate for two reasons. First, CS-X was a close associate of Crumpton, Hunter and Gray. Second, CSX told Agent Schlaff that he feared reprisal from Crumpton and his crew and specifically noted that, because Crumpton had been “jacked” in 1993, Crumpton now wore body armor and carried a 9mm. Glock. CS-X was in a position to know Crumpton and his crew well and he “was in fear and didn’t trust him with his life.” (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 55, 457, 617-518). On December 1, 1994, CS-X provided additional information to the Baltimore DEA agents regarding the arrest of Clemons and provided information about people who might be associated with Clemons, Crumpton and his crew. Included in this list were “Butter,” “Dwight,” “Dee” (an alias for Hunter), “Gooner Baby,” “Shed,” and “Wolf.” CS-X could not, however identify the cocaine source in Phoenix. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, Government’s Exhibit 31). In February 1995, Agent Schlaff approached Gray, advised him that he could be facing charges in federal court and asked for his cooperation regarding the Phoenix source. Gray refused to cooperate directly against Crumpton first because of a family relationship, and second because Gray was aware of Crumpton’s propensity for violence and was afraid for himself and his family. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 72-73, 459-460). Gray told Agent Schlaff that he did not know the Phoenix source and suggested that Hunter might be able to provide that information. On March 18, 1995, Hunter met with Agent Schlaff. Like Gray, Hunter refused to provide direct information against Crumpton but agreed to provide information as it related to the source of supply in Phoenix. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 78-79, 463-464). Hunter advised that the source in Phoenix was “Dub,” later identified as John Griffen. Hunter stated that Crumpton had purchased 10-15 kilograms of cocaine in the past but since Clemons’ arrest, Dub was no longer dealing with the Denver crew. In April 1995, Hunter agreed to travel to Phoenix with Agent Schlaff in order to help the investigation. Prior to maMng the trip, Hunter received a “Use Immunity” Letter from Assistant United States Attorney Craig Wallace. The trip did not develop any new leads and Hunter returned to Denver. Hunter was not willing to provide any further information related to drug activities in Denver and, therefore, Hunter was discontinued as an FBI informant. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 79-80, 464-465). In late May 1995, Agent Schlaff again met with Gray and told Gray that the Phoenix Investigation appeared to be at a dead end. Agent Schlaff asked whether Gray could provide information with respect to anyone else. Gray advised that he could engage in informant activities with respect to “John Last Name Unknown” (later identified as John Chavez, Jr.), who was a member of the “West Side Ballerz gang” from Commerce City. Gray further stated that “John Last Name Unknown” had sold kilogram quantities of cocaine to Tyrone Gray and other members of Gray’s drug organization, including Crumpton. Gray stated that “John Last Name Unknown’s” pager number was (303) 392-9168, and that this was the number Gray and Crumpton used to contact “John” to set up drug transactions. On June 7, 1995, Gray identified John Chavez, Jr. as “John Last Name Unknown” and the person who had previously supplied Gray and Crumpton with multi-ounce to kilogram quantities of cocaine. Gray further identified a picture of Crumpton and stated that he had observed Crumpton purchase kilogram quantities of cocaine from Chavez on more than one occasion. During those transactions, Gray stated that both sides displayed semi-automatic pistols in order to keep control of the situation. (Government’s Exhibit 32, ¶ 19(d), T. 75-76, 467-468). Gray also told Agent Schlaff that his and Crumpton’s relationships with Chavez, Jr. were on shaky ground and were not current. Nevertheless, Gray agreed to try and reestablish contact with Chavez, Jr., and agreed to attempt a controlled purchase of cocaine from Chavez, Jr. Gray did, in fact, talk to Chavez, Jr., on the telephone and attempted to set up a deal, however, none of the negotiations came to fruition. Agent Schlaff concluded from these failed deals that, as Gray had claimed, he and Crumpton were no longer “in” with Chavez. (T. 76, 468-472). In mid-June 1995, Agent Schlaff again contacted Gray and Gray indicated that he was considering “jacking” or robbing Chavez, Jr. After this, Agent Schlaff concluded that Gray could not be used proactively because of his dangerousness and discontinued using him as an informant. (T. 77, 471-473). At the time the Crumpton wiretap was initiated in August 1996, it had been over a year since Gray served as an informant. In November 1995, Agent Schlaff concluded that the Denver Investigation was at a standstill and stopped his investigation, and in January 1996, Agent Schlaff learned that John Griffen, the source in Phoenix, had been arrested. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 80-81, 466). 3. Communication Between Agents Schlaff and Langley Prior To The Crumpton Wiretap As previously discussed, in June 1996, Agent Langley and Officer Finnin, the case agents in the Moore investigation, learned that Crumpton might be one of Moore’s sources of supply. At that point in time, Agent Langley talked to Agent Schlaff about his prior investigation. First, with respect to the connection between Chavez, Jr. and Crumpton, Agent Schlaff testified that he could not recall whether or not he spoke with Agent Langley directly on this topic. Agent Langley recalled having a conversation with Agent Schlaff about the connection between Crumpton and Chavez, Jr., and remembered that Agent Schlaff decided the relationship was over, particularly in light of the fact that Gray stated he was going to rob Chavez, Jr. Prior to drafting the Crumpton Wiretap, Agent Langley reviewed the available toll records for Crumpton’s cellular phone covering June 1 through 30, 1996 and July 26 through 30, 1996. (Defendant’s Exhibit C, Bate Stamp No. 4570-4591, T. 207). Agent Langley saw no calls to any numbers previously associated with Chavez, Jr. Based upon Agent’s Schlaffs information, coupled with the lack of calls on the toll records, Agent Langley had no reason to believe that Crumpton and Chavez, Jr. were still dealing together. (T. 142-143). In June 1996, Agent Langley and Agent Schlaff also had a conversation about Hunter’s connection to Crumpton. At that time, Agent Schlaff advised that, based on the information he had received from CSX in December 1994, and his own association with Hunter in the spring of 1995, he believed that Hunter had been part of Crumpton’s crew along with other individuals identified as “Wolf’ and “Gooner Baby”. Agent Schlaff claims that as of June 1996, he did not possess any current information regarding Hunter. (T. 474-475). Agent Schlaff did, however, agree to set up a meeting between CS-X and Agent Langley and Officer Finnin. On June 27, 1996, CS-X met with Officer Finnin and Agent Langley and provided much the same information that he had provided in December 1994, relating to “Butter,” “Gooner Baby,” “Shed,” and “Wolf.” (Defendant’s Exhibit B). Despite the fact that Agent Schlaffs report of the meeting, written on July 1, 1996, identified those individuals as “being” in Crumpton’s crew, Agent Sehlaff specifically told Agent Langley and Officer Finnin that CS-X’s information was historical, dating back to at least December 1994 and possibly a year earlier. Agent Sehlaff was confident of this fact because as of June 1996, CS-X believed that Crumpton knew that CS-X was an informant, (T. 86). Therefore, CS-X, by his own choice, had not been associating with Hunter and Crumpton for a long period of time. (T. 116-118, 408-412, 432-433, 475-478, 479-480). On April 19, 1995, Defendant Hunter was given a “Use Immunity Letter” by the United State’s Attorney’s Office. (T. 465). Agent Sehlaff never told Agent Langley, Officer Finnin or Deputy Volz that Hunter had been granted “use immunity,” and therefore Agent Langley did not learn of the immunity until November 1998. (T. 185,466). 4. Information Relating To Hunter Gained Dunng the Moore Wiretap On July 18, 1996, the Moore case agents intercepted a call which indicated that Moore and Crumpton were going to do a deal at a Denny’s restaurant. They established surveillance and observed Crumpton arriving at the Denny’s along with Hunter and another individual identified as Kendall Rhodes. The surveillance was videotaped and Agent Langley reviewed it a number of times. Hunter was seen walking briefly up to Moore’s car window, speaking to him for less than 30 seconds and then walking away. Crumpton then got into the car with Moore and they drove away and returned a short time later. From that surveillance, Agent Langley could not determine what role, if any, Hunter or Rhodes had in that transaction. (T. 116-120). Prior to drafting the Crumpton Wiretap, Agent Langley again reviewed the available toll records for Crumpton’s cellular phone which covered June 1 through 30, 1996 and July 26 through 30, 1996. Agent Langley did not see any calls to any numbers previously associated with Hunter. (T. 119-120). The Crumpton Wiretap Investigation By early August, 1996, the case agents on the Moore investigation believed that they had established that Crumpton was a crack and cocaine source of supply for Moore. However, the case agents had not satisfied the objectives of the investigation in that they had not identified Crumpton’s source of supply, his distributors (with the exception of Harden), or locations where Crumpton might be storing his drugs. (Government’s Exhibit 2, ¶ 11(c)). On August 14, 1996, Agent Langley applied for a wiretap on cellular telephone number (303) 807-2897, ESN H82F337EC, subscribed to by Noelle L. Poindexter, 18 Lansing Street, Aurora, Colorado 80010. The target of this investigation was the same as the target in'the Moore Wiretap, 1.e., the Moore/Crumpton drug distribution operation, their suppliers and distributors. The named interceptees were “Michael Andre Crumpton, a/k/a ‘Lucky,’ Larry Moore, a/k/a ‘Captain,’ Tyrone Gray, Lateshia Harden, and others as yet unknown.” (Exhibit 2, ¶ 2(a)). The objectives of the Crumpton Wiretap were also the same as the Moore Wiretap. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 12(c), T. 101-102). For this reason, the Moore Wiretap Affidavit was specifically incorporated fully by reference and attached to the Crumpton Wiretap Affidavit. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 18, T. 104). 1. Necessity For the Crumpton Wiretap In the Crumpton Wiretap Affidavit, Agent Langley summarized the facts which had occurred during the Moore Wiretap and included a section summarizing the “necessity” for the Crumpton Wiretap. (Exhibit 2. ¶¶ 49-65). First, based on the earlier detailed facts, Agent Langley discussed the fact that surveillance had been tried and had nearly compromised the investigation. (Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 50-53). Second, Agent Langley stated his intent to obtain a clone pager which might assist in the investigation. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 54). With respect to the use of confidential sources, Agent Langley stated that “none of the confidential sources in this investigation have been able to provide information regarding Crumpton’s drug organization.” (Exhibit 2, ¶ 56). In addition, the sources had not been able to purchase drugs from or introduce an undercover to Crumpton. Agent Langley explained that “the confidential sources in this case have knowledge of Moore’s drug organization only.” (Exhibit 2, ¶ 55). The confidential sources that Agent Langley was referring to consisted of “active informants” who could provide “current information” such as Long, Heck and Shapiro. (T. 441-442). Agent Langley did not consider Hunter or Gray to be active informants. Hunter had stopped cooperating in April 1995 and was subsequently deactivated as an informant, and Gray stopped cooperating in June 1995 and was discontinued because of his dangerousness and failure to produce. (T. 77, 79-80, 441-43, 464-65, 471-73). Neither Hunter nor Gray had been in contact with the FBI or had provided any information within the prior year and a half. Agent Langley and Officer Finnin considered and discussed the option of re-approaching Hunter and Gray to see if they would cooperate, but for a number of reasons decided that this would not achieve their objectives and might compromise the investigation. First, Agent Langley was aware that Crumpton, Hunter and Gray had a family relationship and were very close. Second, even when Hunter and Gray were threatened with criminal charges in 1995, they both specifically said they would not cooperate against Crump-ton. Third, neither Hunter nor Gray had been productive informants and Gray had shown a proclivity toward violence. (T. 404-407). CS-X was also not considered to be an active source because his information was old and he was no longer in a position to deal with the Crumpton crew any longer. (T. 85-86). Agent Langley claims that he failed to discuss this information in detail in the Crumpton Wiretap Affidavit because he believed the information was old. Instead, he opted to summarize the prior MGTF/Phoenix investigation for Judge Kane. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 15, T. 441-442). The affidavit further set forth that the case agents considered interviewing potential witnesses but rejected this technique because they believed the witnesses would fear retaliation. In support of this, Agent Langley set forth Crumpton’s prior criminal history and his arrests for possession of guns. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 59, 128-129). Two potential witnesses, CS-X and Gray, stated that they were afraid of Crumpton and CS-X specifically made reference to Crumpton’s criminal past. (Defendant’s Exhibit A, T. 55, 72-73, 75-76, 457, 459-460, 467-468, 517-518). The Crumpton affidavit further outlined how toll records and trap and trace devices had been used and why Crumpton’s secretive nature had rendered these methods unsuccessful. (Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 63-64). The Crumpton Renewal Wiretap On August 15, 1996, Judge Kane aütho-rized the interception of wire communications occurring to and from cellular telephone number (303) 807-2897, ESN H82F337EC, subscribed to by Noelle L. Poindexter, 18 Lansing Street, Aurora, Colorado 80010. Due to installation errors by AT & T, the case agents did not begin actual interception of calls until 11 days into the 30 day authorization period. (Government’s Exhibit 4, ¶¶ 41-43, T. 131). The 19 days that remained did not provide enough time to achieve the objectives of the investigation. (T. 131-133). Therefore, on September 13, 1996, Agent Langley applied for a 30 day extension in which to continue monitoring Crumpton’s cellphone. The target of the investigation and the objectives of the investigation had not changed. (Exhibit 4, ¶ ll(a)(c), T. 140). The named interceptees were “Michael Crumpton, Larry Moore, Tyrone Gray, Lateshia Harden, Michael Camack, Raspberry, Player, Poopsie and others unknown.” The additional names were added because, during the course of the 19 days of monitoring, the case agents had intercepted “Poopsie,” “Player,” “Raspberry,” and Michael Camack having conversations with Crumpton relating to drugs. The case agents could not identify who Poopsie, Player or Raspberry were. Therefore, no investigative steps were taken toward them. (T. 141). With respect to Michael Camack, the case agents did do surveillance of a deal between Crumpton and Camack and had Camack stopped and fully identified. (Exhibit 4, ¶¶ 30-33, T. 148-149). Although the agents continued to do surveillance, no new leads were developed with the exception of the identification of Michael Camack. (T. 148). On the issue of necessity, nothing had changed between the initiation of the Crumpton Wiretap and the application for the Crumpton Renewal Wiretap. There were no new informants, witnesses, locations to be searched or leads from surveillance. Therefore, the necessity section of the Crumpton Renewal Wiretap application generally repeated what was in the initial Crumpton Affidavit.. (Exhibit 4, ¶¶ 40-57, T. 147-150). 1. The Decision Not To Name Darían Hunter In The Reneival Wiretap Hunter was also not named in the Crumpton Renewal Wiretap application due to Agent Langley’s belief that there still was not probable cause to believe that Hunter was engaged in criminal activity with Crumpton, and that Hunter would be intercepted over the target phone. However, it is true that prior to applying for the Crumpton Renewal Wiretap, Agent Langley did have pen register data which showed that there had been a phone call to Hunter’s parent’s home three months prior to the Crumpton renewal. (Defendant’s Exhibit C, Bate Stamp No. 4603). The first time that Hunter was intercepted over Crumpton’s cellphone was on August 31, 1996. At this time, however, Hunter was not calling from his parent’s home. Rather, he was speaking from a telephone number subscribed to by an “R. Collier” at 3327 S. Richfield Way, Aurora, CO. The agents later learned that this was the telephone of Hunter’s girlfriend, Shay-nelle Collier. (T. 120). During this conversation, Hunter and Crumpton talked about how many “computers” might be in an apartment. This conversation was later tied to a September 19,1996, plan to break into an apartment and steal a number of kilograms of cocaine belonging to Chavez, Jr. On September 19, 1996, communications intercepted from Crumpton’s cellular telephone revealed that Crumpton and Hunter were conducting a surveillance on a location unknown to the Title III monitors. Later intercepted communications demonstrated that Crumpton and Hunter were planning a robbery in an apartment complex. At approximately 7:22 p.m., Crump-ton made a call to (303) 807-4907,. and spoke to an unidentified male about an impending drug transaction. During the course of the evening, numerous other calls were intercepted between Crumpton and Hunter. At approximately 10:33 p.m., a conversation occurred during which monitoring agents/officer learned that Hunter and Crumpton were arranging for the purchase' of at least a kilogram of cocaine from an individual they referred to as “John.” However, it was quite apparent that what Hunter and Crumpton were really planning to do was to rob “John” and steal his cocaine and money. The ease agents then asked Agent Schlaff to run an emergency subscriber check to determine who Crumpton was speaking with. When Agent Schlaff learned that the phone was in the name Tracy Chavez, he made the connection that Crumpton was dealing with Chavez, Jr. At approximately 9:55 p.m., Crumpton spoke with Chavez, Jr. on telephone number (303) 412-9355. During the conversation Crumpton told Chavez that he had an automobile accident on the way to their meeting. Chavez, Jr. offered to send “Jaime” over to the accident to help out. Crumpton stated that he could not remember who “Jaime” was and Chavez replied “remember the last deal, it was at his (Jaime’s) apartment.” Crumpton again spoke with Chavez, Jr. at approximately 10:24 p.m. who stated that he “had the stuff,” and instructed Crumpton to go to a nearby convenience store and call him back. After it became apparent that Crumpton and Hunter intended to go through with them plan to rob Chavez, Jr. the supervising agents of the Title III made the decision to intervene and stop the robbery. Marked uniform officers stopped Crumpton and seized a locked gym bag from the trunk of the vehicle he was driving. A search warrant was later obtained for the gym bag, and the search uncovered evidence of the planned cocaine robbery including: a loaded 9mm handgun with an extra loaded magazine, two ski masks, body armor and a lock picking kit. Hunter was also identified on that night. (T. 143-146). Post-Wiretap Inventory and Notice To Interceptees The Moore wiretap expired on August 7, 1996. The tapes from this wiretap were sealed by Judge Kane on August 8, 1996. At the time the tapes were sealed, Judge Kane ordered that the notification/inventory provision of Title 18, U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), be postponed as to all parties intercepted during the electronic surveillance until further order of the Court. (Government’s Exhibit 7). The Crumpton Renewal Wiretap expired on October 11, 1996, and the tapes were sealed on October 16, 1996. Like the Moore wiretap, at the time the tapes were sealed, Judge Kane ordered that the notification/inventory provision of Title 18, U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), be postponed as to all parties intercepted during the electronic surveillance until further order of the Court. (Government’s Exhibit 8). Although the Orders signed by Judge Kane on August 8, 1996, and October 16, 1996, effectively delayed the notification requirement indefinitely, on January 24, 1997, the government applied for, and Judge Kane ordered that any service of wiretap notification and inventory be delayed for an additional period of 90 days, or until April 21, 1997. (Government’s Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12). Another 90 day delay was ordered on April 22, 1997. (Government’s Exhibits 13, 14, 15,16). In preparation for service of notice and inventory, the case agents, Agent Langley and Officer Finnin, prepared a list, based on pen register information, of all telephones called during the course of the wiretap investigation. From this list, the agents determined whether a person(s) had actually been intercepted in connection with the identified telephone. In cases where a specific person could be identified as having been intercepted, the case agents requested that a notification letter be prepared for that individual. Da-rían Hunters’ name was on this list. (Government’s Exhibit 17, T. 157-161). In June 1997, Ms. Ann Perez, secretary to the Government’s counsel, prepared notification/inventory letters for all individuals identified by the case agents. On May 13, 1997, the Government filed with Judge Kane a list of the wiretap interceptees who the Government intended to notify, along with a prepared form of order. Again, Darían Hunters’ name was on this list, however, the prepared forms of order where never signed. On or about June 9, 1997, Ms. Perez contacted Agent Langley and indicated to Mm that the interceptee letters were completed, to which Agent Langley responded that he and Officer Finnin wanted to hand deliver inventory notices to a select number of individuals that they deemed as important to the case and asked that these letters be removed from her pile. Ms. Perez removed these letters, made' copies, and gave the originals to Agent Langley. On June 9, 1997, Ms. Perez then sent the remaining letters via certified mail, return receipt requested. All these letters were signed by Ms. Perez on behalf of the Government’s counsel. (T. 165-167). Thereafter, Agent Langley and Officer Finnin attempted to hand deliver some of the inventory notices. However, this task proved to be difficult and time consuming, and Agent Langley opted to send the letters via regular mail instead. (T. 173— 176). Agent Langley claims that he mailed the inventory notice prepared by Ms. Perez to Hunter, and the letter was never returned as undeliverable. (T. 174). The address used by the case agents was believed to be Hunter’s parents’ residence and during each of his arrests since February 1990, Hunter provided the address used by the case agents as his home address. (T. 173-175). Agent Langley claims that he mailed the interceptee letters a few days before October 24, 1997. However, the Government admits that Agent Langley did not mail the notification letters by July 18, 1997— the final date of the extension granted by Judge Kane in the second extension order. This was allegedly due to Agent Langley’s mistaken belief that a third delay notification order had been applied for and granted and that he had until mid-October to send the letters. (T. 175-176) LEGAL ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Wiretap Standard of Review A wiretap authorization order is presumed proper, and the defendants bear the burden of overcoming that presumption. United States v. Killingsworth, 117 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir.1997), citing United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981, 110 S.Ct. 513, 107 L.Ed.2d 515 (1989). The defendants must come forward with a prima facie showing that the wiretap was conducted pursuant to an illegal order. United States v. Bennett, 825 F.Supp. 1512, 1518 (D.Colo.1993). Not every failure to comply with the requirements in the wiretap statute renders the interception of wire or oral communications unlawful. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974). The defendants must not only demonstrate a deviation from the requirements of the statute, but this deviation must be substantial. Id. Defendants Crumpton, Harden, and Camack have failed to make such a showing. Federal law permits wiretapping and tracing where certain findings and conditions are met. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1998). All applications for a wiretap must contain the following elements: (a) the identity of the law enforcement officials making and authorizing the application; (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that an order should be issued; (c) a full and complete statement as to whether other investigative procedures have been tried and failed, or why they seem unlikely to succeed if tried; (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained; and (e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). The defendants in this case have all challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained by the government through the use of wiretaps authorized by Judge Kane. Specifically, the defendants each argue that the information provided by the government in its wiretap applications did not conform to the requirements of the wiretap statute. I will address each of these arguments. Defendants Michael Crumpton, Lateshia Harden and Devon Camack Defendant Crumpton challenges the lawfulness of the Moore and Crumpton Wiretaps on the grounds that: (1) the government has failed to demonstrate “necessity;” (2) the government failed to properly “minimize;” (3) the wiretap orders signed by Judge Kane were facially insufficient; and (4) the government failed to name all of the intended interceptees in the wiretap applications. Defendants Harden and Camack have adopted Defendant Crumpton’s arguments on this issue. The government represents that the “necessity” and “minimization” requirements were met, that Judge Kane’s Orders were facially sufficient, and that the fact that all of the interceptees were not named in the application is not dispositive of the issue. 1. The “Necessity ” Requirement of Title 18, U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) As set forth in Title 18 U.S.C. § 2518, each and every affidavit for wiretap authorization must contain “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or appear to be too dangerous.” United States v. Quintana, 70 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1995). The purpose of the “necessity” requirement is to “ensure that the relatively intrusive device of wiretapping ‘is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would work.’ ” United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 429 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243, 116 S.Ct. 2497, 135 L.Ed.2d 189 (1996) (quoting United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153, n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974)). Thus, before issuing a wiretap order, the reviewing judge must independently determine that the wiretap is necessary, i.e., that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or appear to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir.1997), specifically addressed the issue of what the government must demonstrate with respect to the necessity requirements of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2518. First, with respect to the standard of review, the Court noted that the application of the necessity requirement is a “question of law” subject to de novo review, and therefore the judge reviewing the wiretap affidavit in a suppression motion does not owe deference to the findings of the judge that issued the wiretap. Id. at 1186. The Tenth Circuit then established four categories of “normal investigative procedures” that the government must address in its application. The Court held that the government must explain, with particularity: (a) whether these investigative techniques have been tried against the target of the wiretap; (b) if not, why law enforcement agents have failed to try these “normal” investigative techniques; or (c) set forth how “normal” tools were tried but failed to expose the crime or would be too dangerous to employ. Id. The four categories of “normal” techniques include: “(1) standard visual and aural surveillance; (2) questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary); (3) use of search warrants; and (4) infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants.” Id. at 1187. As a further requirement, the Court stated that the government should also attempt the use of pen registers and/or trap and trace devices prior to resorting to a wiretap. Id. Therefore, the affidavit should state whether these methods have been tried, and if not, why these less intrusive methods would be unsuccessful or too dangerous to employ. Id. The Tenth Circuit, however, specifically held that the “necessity” requirement of Title III was not an “exhaustion” requirement, and that “the government need not exhaust or explain its failure to exhaust every conceivable investigative procedure before resorting to wiretapping.” Id. at 1188. Moreover, where the government’s stated explanation for its decision regarding normal investigative techniques clearly encompasses each of these categories, it is not necessary for the government to formally address each category with an explanation. Id. Therefore, “the government’s failure to explain its failure to utilize one or more specified categories of normal investigative techniques [is] not fatal to the wiretap application if it is clear, under the government’s recitation of the facts of t