Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER Re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment MARILYN HALL PATEL, District Judge. Plaintiffs, consisting of the Okinawa du-gong, three individual Japanese citizens, and six American and Japanese environmental associations, brought this action against defendants Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, and the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) for violations of section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have approved the plans for construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (“FRF”)— a military air station off the coast of Okinawa Island — without taking into account the effect of the military facility on the Okinawa dugong, a marine mammal of cultural and historical significance to the Japanese people. Now before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Having considered the arguments and submissions of the parties and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order. BACKGROUND I. The Okinawa Dugong The dugong (Dugong dugon) is a species of marine mammal related to the manatee. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 2 (hereinafter “Undisputed Facts”). The waters surrounding Okinawa Island are habitat for the dugong whose range extends the costal and territorial waters of many countries in the Far East. Id. The greatest population concentrations occur in Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and Japan is at the northern edge of the dugong’s range. Id. The du-gong is classified as vulnerable by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) due to habitat destruction and degradation, as well as human exploitation. Id. The Japan Ministry of the Environment recently listed the dugong as critically endangered in Japan. Id. Dugong are significant in Okinawan culture. Id. ¶ 3. They are associated with traditional Okinawan creation mythology, sometimes being considered the progenitor of the local people. Id. Because of its cultural significance, the dugong is listed as a protected “natural monument” on the Japanese Register of Cultural Properties, established under Japan’s “Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties.” Id. Henoko Bay, on the northeast coast of Okinawa Island, is dugong habitat. Id. ¶ 4. There are many species of seagrass found in the shallow waters of Henoko Bay. Id. These seagrass beds are dugong feeding grounds, and dugong have been observed to feed in and traverse Henoko Bay. Id. The U.S. military’s Camp Schwab — where defendants propose to construct a military facility to replace an existing air station — are located adjacent to and in Henoko Bay. Id. II. The Futenma Replacement Facility (“FRF”) The United States has maintained a military presence on the Island of Okinawa, Japan, since the end of World War II in 1945. Undisputed Facts ¶ 5. After the U.S. military occupation of Japan ended, the Government of Japan permitted the United States to administer Okinawa pursuant to international agreements, while Japan retained residual sovereignty over Okinawa. Id. In November 1969, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato agreed to terminate the United States’ administrative control of Okinawa without detriment to the mutual defense interests of both governments. Defs.’ Mem. at 7. United States administration of Okinawa officially ended in 1972 when the two governments signed the “Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands” (“Agreement”). Undisputed Facts ¶ 6. Okinawa is one island in the Ryukyu Island chain that now comprises the Prefecture of Okinawa. Id. Under the Agreement, the United States relinquished to Japan all administrative rights and interests it had over the Okinawa Islands. Id. Japan assumed full responsibility and authority for the exercise of any and all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Islands, and Okinawa regained its pre-World War II status as Japan’s 47th prefecture. Id. Under Article III of the Agreement, Japan granted the United States exclusive use of facilities and areas in the Islands in accordance with the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” (“Treaty”) and the “Status of Forces Agreement” (“SOFA”). Id. The Treaty and SOFA were both signed in 1960, but did not take effect until U.S. administration of Okinawa ended in 1972. Defs.’ Mem. at n. 5. SOFA is a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan entered into pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty which states, “[f]or the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” Pls.’ Exhs. 14, 15. The Treaty and SOFA create the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (“SCC”) consisting of four members — the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Minister of Defense, the United States Secretary of Defense, and the United States Secretary of State. Id.; Defs.’ Mem. at n. 7. SOFA instructs that the SCC “shall serve as the means of consultation in determining the facilities and areas in Japan which are required for the use of the United States in carrying out the purposes of the [Treaty].” Pls.’ Exh. 15, SOFA, Art. XXV. The United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) maintains and controls a number of military bases on Okinawa, including the Marine Corps Air Station Fu-tenma (“MCAS Futenma”) which provides services and materials to support Marine Corps aircraft operations. Undisputed Facts ¶ 7. MCAS Futenma is located in Ginowan City and due to social and economic changes, is now completely surrounded by urban development. Moriya Dec. ¶ 3. Japanese officials have called for its closure and relocation to a more suitable site in order to ease the health and safety burdens on the citizens of Ginowan City. Id. ¶ 3, 5. At the same time, American officials have also called for the relocation of MCAS Futenma citing a desire to relocate military activities to a less congested area. Lawless Dec. ¶ 4. The project to relocate and replace MCAS Fu-tenma is referred to as the Futenma Replacement Facility (“FRF”) project. Under the auspices of the SCC, the United States and Japan formed the bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (“SACO”) to develop recommendations for the SCC on ways to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. military facilities and to adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa. Undisputed Facts ¶ 8. SACO recommendations can only be adopted with bilateral SCC approval. Id. In December 1996, the SCC members approved the SACO recommendation to replace MCAS Futenma with an offshore, sea-based facility somewhere off the east coast of Okinawa. Id.; Pls.’ Exh. 13, SACO Final Report. The final site selection and design of the FRF depended upon, among other considerations, U.S. operational requirements which the DOD established in September 1997. Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 8, 10; Pls.’ Exh. 16. The operational requirements were developed with the involvement of representatives of at least eight DOD sub-agencies and were approved by high-ranking officials in the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marines. Undisputed Facts ¶ 10. The 1997 operational requirements established parameters for any replacement facility Japan would construct and provide to the U.S. in accordance with the Treaty and SOFA. Id. While Japan would select the ultimate site of the FRF and fund and carry out its construction, DOD would oversee and monitor its design, engineering, and construction to ensure that the FRF met U.S. operational requirements. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 13. In August 2000, the Consultative Body of Futenma Relocation, composed of local and national officials from the Government of Japan, was established to produce a “Basic Plan” to identify the location, size, construction method, and runway orientation of the FRF. Id. ¶ 11. The Basic Plan, issued by the Consultative Body in July 2002, approved the decision to relocate MCAS Futenma to Nago City’s Henoko District, immediately offshore from Camp Schwab. Id. As already mentioned, the U.S. military’s Camp Schwab is located adjacent to and in Henoko Bay which is a dugong habitat. Although SACO’s initial recommendation called for the construction of the FRF as a sea-based facility, those plans were officially abandoned on October 29, 2005 when the SCC issued the “Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement” (“ATARA”). Id. ¶ 12; Pls.’ Exh. 18. The ATARA stipulated that the U.S. and Japan would locate the FRF in an “L-shaped” configuration that combined the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Henoko and Oura Bays. Undisputed Facts ¶ 12. Although Japan suggested locating the FRF entirely on the land area of Camp Schwab and/or the adjacent Central Training Area, DOD’s operational requirements made such an arrangement impossible. Id. The site selected to locate the FRF, as described in the ATARA, did meet DOD operational and safety concerns. Id. The ATARA also directed the respective staffs of both governments to develop plans for the initiatives agreed upon, including implementation schedules, no later than March 2006. Id. On May 1, 2006, following a meeting of the SCC that included U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in addition to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the other SCC members, Japan and the United States issued an agreement entitled “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (“2006 Roadmap”). Id. ¶ 13; Pls.’ Exh. 19. The 2006 Roadmap is a joint plan of action between the United States and Japan and reflects bilateral agreement on the initiatives set forth in the ATARA, including the plans for the Futenma Relocation Facility. Undisputed Facts ¶ 13. The Roadmap establishes that Japan will construct the FRF in a location and configuration that combines the Henoko-saki (Henoko Point) portion of the Camp Schwab installation and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays. Id. Instead of an “L-shaped” runway as stipulated in ATARA, the Road-map stipulates a “V-shaped” runway which will be partially built on landfill extending into Oura and Henoko Bays. Id. Each runway will be 1,600 meters in length plus 200 meters as “overrun” areas. Id. The 2006 Roadmap, like the ATARA, is a bilateral executive agreement between two sovereign nations which covers a number of restationing and military realignment issues in addition to the planned closure, return, and relocation of MCAS Futenma. Id. ¶ 14. The agreements reached in the Roadmap have received needed approvals at the national levels of both governments, but the Government of Japan is still working to obtain needed approvals from affected local and prefec-tural governments. Id. Both the U.S. and Japanese governments are now cooperating to implement the Roadmap, and construction of the FRF is targeted for completion in 2014. Id. The process has already begun in the form of surveys and testing by the Japanese government which, under Japanese law, is required to conduct an environmental impact assessment before construction of the FRF begins. Moriya Dec. ¶¶ 13-18. III. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 25, 2003 and amended the complaint on November 24, 2003. Defendants filed an answer on December 9, 2003 and moved to dismiss the first amended complaint on May 17, 2004 for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because both parties submitted matters beyond the pleadings, the court converted defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court issued its order on March 2, 2005, addressing the narrow issue of whether the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”) applies to the circumstances of this case. Dugong v. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106 (N.D.Cal. March 2, 2005). In that order, the court denied defendants’ motion and held that the Okinawa dugong is “property” protected under Japan’s equivalent of the National Register. Id. at *12. The court withheld judgment and ordered additional discovery on the issues of whether defendants’ activities related to the Futenma Replacement Facility constitute an “undertaking,” whether the activities “may directly and adversely affect” the dugong, and whether defendants have “taken into account” the effects of the replacement facility on the dugong. Id. at *16, 17, 18. Following the announcement of the 2006 Roadmap for the FRF, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on July 19, 2006. Defendants filed an answer on August 1, 2006. To avoid a dispute over pretrial discovery, the DOD compiled four separate administrative records, each covering a different aspect of the planning effort for the FRF. Now before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether defendants have taken into account the effects of the Futenma Replacement Facility on the Okinawa dugong, as required under section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act. LEGAL STANDARD I. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.1994). The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). II. National Historic Preservation Act Congress enacted the NHPA in 1966 with the goal of preserving the “historical and cultural foundations of the Nation ... in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people.” 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2). The Act establishes that “[i]t shall be the policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with other nations and in partnership with the States, local governments, Indian tribes, and private organizations and individuals to ... provide leadership in the preservation of the prehistoric and historic resources of the United States and of the international community of nations.” Id. § 470-1(2). Under section 106 of the NHPA, federal agencies are required, when undertaking any federally assisted action within the United States, to “take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.” Id. § 470f. The NHPA delegates to the Secretary of the Interior authority to expand and maintain a National Register of Historic Places. Id. § 470a(a)(1)(A). The NHPA also establishes the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), Id. § 470i, and delegates to the ACHP authority to promulgate regulations necessary to implement the section 106 take into account process, Id. § 470s. The section 106 regulations promulgated by the ACHP set forth a multi-step process by which an agency takes into account the effects of an undertaking. A basic review process includes: (1) identification of historic properties and consulting parties, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2, 800.4; (2) notice to consulting parties, including the public, of initiation of consultation, see id. §§ 800.2(d), 800.3(e)-(f); (3) assessment as to whether the project will or will not have an adverse effect on the historic property, see id. § 800.5(a)-(b); (4) notice to consulting parties of finding of no adverse effect and opportunity for consulting parties to respond, see id. § 800.5(c); and, if adverse effects are found, (5) continued consultation with the public and other parties to develop and evaluate alternatives or modifications to the undertaking that could avoid or mitigate the adverse effects, see id. §§ 800.5(d)(2), 800.6. An agency’s findings and determinations must be sufficiently documented to enable reviewing parties to understand their basis, see id. § 800.11, and must describe, for example, the undertaking, id. § 800.11(d)(1); its effects on the historic property, id. § 800.11(e)(4); and if appropriate, any conditions or future actions to avoid, minimize or mitigate the adverse effects, id. § 800.11(e)(5). In 1980, Congress amended the NHPA to implement the United States’ participation in the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage (“World Heritage Convention”). Pub.L. 96-515. The amendment added to the NHPA section 402 governing undertakings outside the United States. Section 402, therefore, is the international counterpart to section 106 governing domestic undertakings. The full text of section 402 is as follows: Prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking outside the United States which may directly and adversely affect a property which is on the World Heritage List or on the applicable country’s equivalent of the National Register, the head of a Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over such undertaking shall take into account the effect of the undertaking on such property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. The Secretary of the Interior is charged with directing and coordinating United States participation in the World Heritage Convention, and Congress has delegated authority to the Secretary to nominate properties to the World Heritage List. Id. § 470a-1. The ACHP regulations implementing section 106 domestic undertakings were first adopted in 1974, and thus, were in effect at the time Congress passed section 402 governing foreign undertakings. The domestic regulations, however, do not apply directly to section 402 and no separate implementing regulations have been promulgated for that section. Under NHPA section 110 each federal agency “shall establish, ... in consultation with the Secretary [of the Interior], a preservation program for the identification, evaluation, and nomination to the National Register of Historic Places, and protection of historic properties.” Id. § 470h—2(a)(2). An agency’s preservation program under section 110 “shall ensure,” among other things, “that the preservation of properties not under the jurisdiction or control of the agency, but subject to be potentially affected by agency actions are given full consideration in planning.” Id. § 470h—2(a)(2)(C). Section 110 also requires that an agency’s preservation program include procedures for compliance with the domestic section 106 take into account process, id. § 470h-2(a)(2)(E), and that the agency’s section 106 procedures are consistent with the ACHP regulations discussed above, id. § 470h-2(a)(2)(E)(I). The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to promulgate guidelines to assist other federal agencies in fulfilling responsibilities under section 110. Id. § 470a(g). Under this authority, the Secretary in 1998 published guidelines which “have no regulatory effect,” but nevertheless provide “formal guidance to each Federal agency on meeting” their responsibility under section 110 to establish a preservation program. 63 Fed.Reg. 20496-20508, 20496 (April 24, 1998). III. Administrative Procedures Act Because the NHPA does not provide an independent basis for judicial review of agency actions, an aggrieved party must pursue its remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2005). The APA authorizes judicial review of final agency actions “for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Final agency actions are defined as actions which “mark the consummation of the agency’s decision making process,” defined as not “merely tentative or interlocutory [in] nature,” and which determine “rights or obligations” or from which “legal consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Ripeness of agency action for judicial review turns on the “fitness of the issue for judicial decision” and the “hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration,” but in close questions, courts are “guided by a presumption of reviewability.” Cibar-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 434 (D.C.Cir.1986); Nat'l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 757 (D.C.Cir.2003). An agency action or decision may be set aside if the court finds it to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and a court may “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” id. § 706(1). A court’s inquiry must be “searching and careful,” but the standard of review is ultimately narrow. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). DISCUSSION Defendants assert five bases for barring the court’s review including: 1) lack of “final agency action" as required under the APA; 2) plaintiffs’ lack of standing; 3) non-ripeness of the claims for judicial review; 4) act of state doctrine; and 5) failure to join the Government of Japan as a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs argue that the court has a proper basis to review the matter and that they are entitled to summary judgment on the substantive issue of whether defendants have complied with the NHPA. They argue as a threshold matter that section 402 of the NHPA applies to the circumstances of this case because DOD’s involvement in the FRF constitutes a “federal undertaking” which “may directly and adversely affect” the Okinawa dugong, a “property” protected under Japan’s equivalent of the National Register. Compliance with section 402, plaintiffs argue, requires defendants to “take into account” the effects of the FRF on the Okinawa dugong by, among other things, consulting with the public and interested organizations and taking measures to mitigate or avoid adverse effects. Defendants assert that in the absence of any standards or regulations directly applicable to foreign undertakings, the DOD may determine, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, what requirements are necessary to comply with section 402. I. Limitations on Judicial Review A. Final Agency Action Under the APA Defendants argue that this case does not involve “agency action” that is “final” for purposes of triggering the court’s review under the APA. The APA authorizes a “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,” to bring suit seeking judicial review of that agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Agency action is statutorily defined to “include[ ] the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” Id. §§ 551(13), 701(b)(2). According to the Supreme Court, the five categories — rule, order, license, sanction and relief, as they are defined in 5 U.S.C. sections 551(4), (6), (8), (10) and (11) — each involve “circumscribed, discrete agency actions.” Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (hereinafter “SUWA”). The terms following those five categories — the “equivalent ... thereof,” “denial thereof,” and “failure to act” — are not defined in the APA. Id. “But an ‘equivalent ... thereof must also be discrete (or it would not be equivalent), and a ‘denial thereof must be the denial of a discrete listed action (and perhaps denial of a discrete equivalent).” Id. “The final term in the definition [of agency action], ‘failure to act,’ is in [the Supreme Court’s] view properly understood as a failure to take an agency action — that is, a failure to take one of the agency actions (including their equivalents) earlier defined in § 551(13).” Id. Thus, a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed “can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take. ” Id. at 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373. The requirement of discrete agency action “rule[s] out several kinds of challenges,” including “broad programmatic attack[s],” that “entangle[ ]” a court in “abstract policy disagreements” requiring it to “enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates.” Id. at 64, 66, 124 S.Ct. 2373; see also Center for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.2005). In this case, plaintiffs allege that DOD has approved the 2006 Roadmap, including plans to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility, without having taken into account the effects of the facility on the Okinawa dugong. Plaintiffs allege that this failure to take into account (1) is a failure to take agency action required under section 402 of the NHPA and (2) constitutes agency action that is unlawfully withheld and/or unreasonably delayed. Second Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief ¶ 3. Plaintiffs ask this court, under its authority in 5 U.S.C. section 706(1), to compel defendants to comply with the take into account procedures. Id. The court agrees with plaintiffs that DOD’s obligation to take into account is a discrete agency action that is non-discretionary and specific. NHPA section 402 states that a federal agency “shall” take into account the effect of an undertaking specifically “for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. Taking into account is discrete, required agency action, and therefore, the failure to take into account is also agency action reviewable under the APA. Far from launching a “broad programmatic attack” that requires the court to enter a “general order compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates,” plaintiffs complain of a circumscribed, discrete agency action mandated by a specific provision of the NHPA. This duty to take into account relates to how a specific DOD facility, located at a specific site on the coast of Okinawa and configured in a specific pattern, will adversely affect the Okinawa du-gong, a specific property of cultural and historic significance. Plaintiffs make a separate, but related argument that the 2006 Roadmap is also agency action for purposes of APA review. See Pls.’ Motion to Strike. Although DOD’s participation in and approval of the 2006 Roadmap are, in a colloquial sense, “actions” taken by a federal agency, they are not “agency actions” for purposes of the APA. As the court explains in the standing analysis that follows, plaintiffs do not “suffer[ ] a legal wrong” and are not “adversely affected or aggrieved” simply by virtue of DOD’s approval of design plans for construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility. Instead, plaintiffs’ injury is a procedural injury caused by DOD’s participation in and approval of the Roadmap, without having taken into account the effects of the facility construction on the Okinawa dugong. The relevant agency action which causes plaintiffs to suffer a legal wrong and which the court has authority to review, is the failure to take into account, not the approval of the Roadmap or the design and construction of the FRF. DOD’s approval of the Roadmap, however, is relevant for the court’s analysis in determining whether the failure to take into account is agency action that is “final.” In this case, the NHPA does not provide an independent basis for judicial review of agency action, and therefore, review is only proper if the agency action plaintiffs complain of is final. 28 U.S.C. § 704; SUWA, 542 U.S. at 61-62, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (“Where no other statute provides a private right of action, the ‘agency action’ complained of must be final agency action.’ ”). “As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be final: First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, ... [and] it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The finality requirement is to be applied in a “flexible” and “pragmatic” way, and courts are “guided by a presumption of reviewability.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-52, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). That DOD has not taken into account the effects of the military facility on the dugong, yet has already established operational requirements which the facility must satisfy and has also approved the Road-map containing final plans for the facility’s design and construction, implies that the failure to take into account is “final” for purposes of triggering review under the APA. Under the first prong of Bennett, the Roadmap is not tentative or interlocutory in nature. As already discussed, the Ro-admap is the final agreement between the United States and the Government of Japan marking the consummation of years of negotiation and planning. Defendants argue that the Roadmap is merely a “general commitment of the [United States Government] to commence a series of planning efforts ... to realign the United States-Japan military and security forces in the Western Pacific Ocean.” Defs.’ Reply at 4. The court does not agree with this overly broad characterization. Far from establishing a mere framework to commence planning efforts, the Roadmap contains detailed specifications for the FRF including where and how it will be built, when it is expected to be completed, how much it will cost, and the number of personnel that will be relocated there once it is operational. Planning efforts have not just recently commenced. Rather, those efforts have been underway for several years and have now been consummated in a formal agreement to move forward with the construction of the FRF. Under the second prong of Bennett, the Roadmap is an agreement by which rights and obligations are determined and from which legal consequences will flow. The Roadmap was approved by the Secretary of Defense and embodies DOD’s formal decision concerning final plans for the FRF. In its March 2005 order, the court held that DOD’s actions in 1997 establishing operational requirements for the FRF provided finality triggering judicial review. Dugong, 2005 WL 522106 at *17. The court stated that the establishment of operational requirements “triggered important legal consequences, because they established the benchmark by which” the ultimate decision to approve or reject the final implementation plans would be judged. Id. Since the court’s March 2005 order, the final implementation plans have in fact been approved and the earlier established operational requirements have in fact been incorporated into those final plans. Just as DOD’s earlier action establishing operational requirements provided finality triggering the court’s review in 2005, DOD’s more recent action approving the 2006 Roadmap also provides finality triggering the court’s review now. Finally, then, as now, the court is “guided by the presumption of reviewability and the risk of irreparable harm.” Id. Any question regarding final agency action, therefore, should be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. Moreover, as the court explains in Part III below, NHPA section 402 imposes an obligation to take into account within a certain time frame — that is, “[pjrior to the approval of any Federal undertaking.” 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (emphasis added). As explained in Part II below, defendants concede that approval of the 2006 Roadmap constitutes approval of a federal undertaking for purposes of triggering obligations under NHPA section 402. The failure to take into account, therefore, can never have any more finality than it does now. The court concludes that DOD’s failure to take into account pursuant to NHPA section 402 is agency action, and that the failure to take into account is final. B. Standing To demonstrate standing under Article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement, a litigant must show: (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Nuclear Info. & Resource Service v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 457 F.3d 941, 949 (9th Cir.2006); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In addition to the Article III constitutional requirements, a litigant must satisfy additional prudential standing requirements which, under the APA, requires: (1) a final agency action (which the court has discussed above and has resolved in favor of plaintiffs); and (2) an injury falling within the “zone of interests” protected by the statutory provision the plaintiff claims was violated. Nuclear Info., 457 F.3d at 950. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the requirements for standing, which on a motion for summary judgment, must be supported by affidavit or other evidence of specific facts the court assumes to be true. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. This action involves three groups of plaintiffs — the Okinawa dugong, three individual Japanese citizens, and six environmental organizations. The court will address the standing of each group in turn. 1. Okinawa Dugong The lead plaintiff that lends its name to this action is the Okinawa dugong, a marine mammal related to the manatee. The Ninth Circuit has held that although Article III does not prevent Congress from authorizing suits in the name of an animal, Congress did not in fact do so under the APA. Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.2004). Standing under the APA is conferred on “persons” statutorily defined as “an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(2), 701(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit in Cetacean declined to expand this basic definition to include animals such as whales, porpoises and dolphins. Id. at 1178. Plaintiffs concede that under Cetacean, the Okinawa dugong is an animal that does not have standing to assert this action under the APA for violations of the NHPA. Accordingly, the Okinawa dugong is dismissed. 2. Individuals The three individual Japanese citizens allege that they have been harmed by DOD’s failure to follow procedures required under the NHPA. Because procedural injury alone is insufficient to establish an injury in fact for purposes of standing, a plaintiff must show that “the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest ... that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-73 nn. 7-8, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2005) (“[a] free-floating assertion of a procedural violation, without a concrete link to the interest protected by the procedural rules, does not constitute an injury in fact”). The desire to use or observe an animal species, even for aesthetic or recreational purposes, is a concrete interest for purposes of standing. See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2004); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-563, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). The three individual plaintiffs in this case are Okinawan citizens who have made and will continue to make ongoing trips to Henoko Bay to observe the dugong. See, e.g., Higashionna Dec. ¶¶ 1, 5. These ongoing trips are concrete plans, not indefinite intentions to visit “some day” in the future. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Takuma Higashionna was born and raised near Henoko Bay and has been visiting the area and observing the Okinawa dugong since his childhood. Id. ¶ 3. He leads weekly snorkeling and scuba-diving tours to view dugongs and their habitat. Id. Yoshikazu Makishi was also born and raised in Okinawa and has been frequenting the Henoko coast and observing the Okinawa dugong for over a decade. Maki-shi Dec. ¶ 2. Anna Koshiishi moved to the coast of Okinawa when she was eight years old and has lived there ever since. Koshiishi Dec. ¶ 2. Like Higashionna, she also leads eco-tours to view the dugong. Id. ¶ 3. As averred in their affidavits, these plaintiffs have a concrete interest to preserve the dugong for cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational and economic benefits to themselves and their descendants. For example, Higashionna states that the dugong has particular cultural and historic significance because it is part of the creation beliefs of the Japanese and especially the people of Okinawa. Higashionna Dec. ¶ 4. He hopes to preserve the dugong so that it may enrich the lives of his descendants, as it has enriched his own life. Id.; see also Makishi Dec. ¶ 3, Koshiishi Dec. ¶ 5. These concrete interests are directly linked to the procedural injury caused by defendants’ failure to comply with the NHPA because to the extent that compliance with the “take-into-account” process leads to avoidance or mitigation of harm to the dugong, the very object of plaintiffs’ interest may be preserved and protected. Moreover, as required under the prudential standing requirements, plaintiffs’ interest in the preservation of dugong as historical and cultural property is precisely the zone of interests protected by the NHPA. In passing the NHPA, Congress declared that the purpose of the statute was to preserve a nation’s “irreplaceable heritage ... so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations.” 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4). While this preservation interest arguably is shared by the public at large, it is held with particular acuteness by plaintiffs in this case, long-time residents of Okinawa who benefit from the dugong in direct and palpable ways. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-574, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The court concludes, therefore, that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury in fact because they seek to “enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs.” Id. at 572, 112 S.Ct. 2130. In cases involving procedural injuries, the person who has been afforded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting the normal standards for redressability and causation. Nuclear Info., 457 F.3d at 950; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Here, plaintiffs’ showing of redressa-bility and causation is not defeated by the fact that DOD’s compliance with NHPA procedures would not necessarily prevent the construction of the military facility nor result in a change in its design, and that the actual construction of the facility is several years in the future. The NHPA itself does not require a particular outcome and it neither forbids destruction of a protected property nor commands its preservation. Coliseum Square Ass’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 225 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 40, 169 L.Ed.2d 11. It simply regulates the process by which an undertaking is approved, requiring a federal agency to “stop, look, and listen.” Id. The approval process must involve “informed decision-making” the aim of which is “to make government officials notice environmental [and other] considerations and take them into account.” Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir.2007). When an undertaking is approved without such informed consideration, the procedural injury alleged by plaintiffs has already occurred. Id. This is so even if informed consideration will not necessarily alter plans for the undertaking and even if the actual implementation of the undertaking is several years in the future. Defendants assert that because the Government of Japan bears ultimate responsibility for selecting the site of the military facility and funding and carrying out its construction, plaintiffs cannot fairly trace their injuries to the activities of the defendants in order to show causation. As is apparent from the discussion above, however, DOD does not violate the NHPA by virtue of its bilateral participation in the design, site selection, construction and operation of a military facility that threatens a protected property. The NHPA violation arises instead from DOD’s failure to take into account information relevant for making a determination as to whether the military facility will adversely affect the dugong and if so, how those effects may be avoided or mitigated. In other words, the challenged activity is not the undertaking itself, but the process by which the effects of the undertaking are considered and assessed. As the court elaborates in Part III below, section 402 of the NHPA places the responsibility to consider and assess on the DOD and the DOD alone. Plaintiffs’ injury, therefore, is directly traceable DOD, not the Government of Japan. In sum, the three individual plaintiffs have suffered a procedural injury linked directly to plaintiffs’ concrete interest in preserving the culturally and historically significant Okinawa dugong, an interest that is within the “zone of interests” protected by the NHPA. Plaintiffs’ injury is caused by the failure of DOD to comply with procedures under NHPA section 402 and can be redressed by a favorable decision requiring DOD to so comply. The court concludes that the three individual plaintiffs have standing to assert this action. 3. Associations For an association to have standing to sue on behalf of its members, it must show that (1) its members would have standing to sue “in their own right”; (2) the interests at stake in the lawsuit are “germane to the organization’s purpose”; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief sought requires members to participate individually in the litigation. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Nuclear Info., 457 F.3d at 950. Plaintiffs, as required on a motion for summary judgment, have provided affidavits related to four of the six environmental associations- — Save the Dugong Foundation, Center for Biological Diversity, Turtle Island Restoration Network, and Japan Environmental Lawyers Foundation. The two remaining two associations — Dugong Network Okinawa and Committee Against Heliport Construction/Save Life Society — have not submitted any evidence concerning their standing to sue and are dismissed accordingly. Save the Dugong Foundation member Takuma Higashionna is an individual plaintiff, and the court has already determined that Higashionna has standing to sue in his own right. Center for Biological Diversity member Jeff Shaw lives in Okinawa, is married to an Okinawan family that holds religious and spiritual beliefs based on the dugong, holds those same beliefs himself, has written articles and a book based on his research of the dugong, and is an avid scuba diver who has seen firsthand the seagrass beds on which the dugongs feed and hopes one day to view the dugong itself. Shaw Dec. ¶¶ 1-4. Both Turtle Island Restoration Network member - and director Todd Steiner and Japan Environmental Lawyers Foundation member Masato Murata aver that they and their fellow members make regular trips to observe, study, photograph, and film the dugong. Steiner Dec. ¶¶ 1-6; Murata Dec. ¶ 4. Like Higashionna, Shaw, Steiner, and Murata each have standing to sue in their own right. Moreover, the purpose of all four of these organizations is to preserve and protect the dugong through research, fund-raising and advocacy, and thus the interests at stake in the lawsuit are germane to the organizations’ purposes. Higashionna Dec. ¶ 2; Galvin Dec. ¶ 2; Steiner Dec. ¶ 2; Murata Dec. ¶ 2. Lastly, because the claim and injunc-tive and declaratory relief sought do not require the individual participation of the members, the court finds that four of the six plaintiff organizations have standing to assert this action. C. Ripeness Whereas standing asks “who” may bring a claim, ripeness asks “when” a claim may be brought. Impson, 503 F.3d at 32. With respect to administrative decisions, the ripeness doctrine seeks to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148-149, 87 S.Ct. 1507. To determine whether a claim is ripe, a court “evaluate[s] both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507. Claims involving injury caused by a failure to comply with statutory procedure may be brought at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper. Ohio Forestry Ass’n Inc. v. Sierra Chib, 523 U.S. 726, 737, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998). In this case, plaintiffs allege that DOD has approved plans for construction of a military facility without having complied with procedures set forth in the NHPA. As the court explained in the preceding analysis of final agency action, the 2006 Roadmap is not an abstract proposal. It sets forth detailed specifications regarding the location and configuration of the replacement military facility. Two runways aligned in a V-shape will be built largely on landfill adjacent to the existing Camp Schwab, but will also extend more than a mile into the waters of Oura and Henoko Bays. Moreover, where a statute, like the NHPA, “simply guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular result,” a claim is ripe when the agency fails to comply with the procedure. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737, 118 S.Ct. 1665 (claim alleging violations of the National Forest Management Act was not ripe for review at the time of agency’s approval of logging plans because the statute, in guiding use of forests, was result driven, not procedure driven); see also Laub v. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1089-1090 (9th Cir.2003) (recognizing the distinction between substantive challenges directed at a result and procedural challenges directed at a review and approval process). Plaintiffs allege that DOD has failed to comply with statutory procedure required under the NHPA, and therefore “now is the appropriate time to complain that the agency failed to do its duty.” Impson, 503 F.3d at 32. The court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims are ripe for review. DOD argues that the claim is not ripe because before construction of the military facility can begin, Japan must obtain local approval and must complete an environmental impact assessment as required under Japanese law. Defendants in Impson asserted a similar argument. There, plaintiffs challenged the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) to comply with the NHPA prior to approval of a lease of tribal land to a developer for construction of a liquefied natural gas terminal. Id. at 25. The BIA argued that the claim was not ripe because implementation of the lease was contingent upon multiple factors, including review and authorization by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). Id. at 33. As a coordinating agency, the BIA would participate in the FERC review process and would consider the impacts of the lease. Id. The court in Impson stated that defendants’ points did not go to the issue of ripeness. Id. Instead, whether the BIA could fulfill its statutory obligations by participating in the FERC process was a question on the merits. Id. Likewise, whether DOD can fulfill its statutory obligations under the NHPA through Japan’s completion of an environmental review process is a question on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, not a question of ripeness. D. Act of State The act of state doctrine is “not a jurisdictional limit on courts,” but “reflects the prudential concern that the courts, if they question the validity of sovereign acts taken by foreign states, may be interfering with the conduct of American foreign policy by the Executive and Congress.” Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir.1992). The doctrine bars judicial review of an action “only if: (1) there is an ‘official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory’; and (2) ‘the relief sought or the defense interposed [in the action would require] a court in the United States to declare invalid the [foreign sovereign’s] official act.’ ” Credit Suisse v. United States District Court, 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1997). Defendants argue that the court is asked to “adjudicate a claim that questions the validity of decisions and acts [made by Japanese] officials taken under Japanese law.” Defs.’ Mem. at 24. They argue that the court should not “enjoin— even indirectly by an order directed only at the defendants — the [Government of Japan’s] ability and sovereign right to site and construct the FRF in satisfaction of its military and security treaties with the United States,” and to conduct an environmental assessment of the replacement facility as required under Japanese environmental laws. Id. at 6. Defendants asserted similar arguments in connection with their earlier motion in 2005. In ruling on that 2005 motion, the court found that the record at that time “[did] not currently describe an ‘official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory,’ but rather a process intertwined with United States Department of Defense decision-making.” Dugong, 2005 WL 522106 at *20. The court found that the planning process for the FRF was “a cooperative and bilateral venture undertaken to satisfy American military needs.” Id. The court held that, at that time, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the act of state doctrine because “[w]here a court evaluates the actions of a federal agency, the act of state doctrine is not implicated.” Id. The court did note, however, that further discovery would assist in resolving then-existing “disputed issues of material fact on the question of whether the United States Department of Defense instigated the Futenma relocation, established the requirements for fulfilling that relocation, and continues to aid logistically, and potentially financially, in the implementation of the project.” Id. at *19. The court contemplated that additional discovery might ultimately reveal that “the scope of Japan’s involvement in locating the replacement air station may prove to exceed the prudential limitations on this court’s authority under the act of state doctrine.” Id. Since the court’s 2005 order, defendants have compiled four separate administrative records, each covering a different aspect of the planning effort for the replacement facility. The facts in the current record reinforce the court’s earlier finding of a cooperative and bilateral process of intertwined decision-making. For example, the court acknowledges that Japan had ultimate responsibility for selecting the location of the replacement facility, and that Japan’s site selection was driven by its own concerns for environmental, engineering, political and cost factors. Lawless Dec. ¶ 10. Japan’s responsibility for selecting the site, however, was also constrained by operational requirements chosen and determined by the United States, and defendants’ own evidence supports the fact that Japan’s decision to locate the proposed FRF was influenced by the DOD. The Government of Japan initially preferred a plan that utilized the land area of Camp Schwab, rather than placing the facility into the waters of Henoko Bay. But the facility was placed in its currently proposed off-shore location because the United States preferred that location for operational reasons. Moriya Dec. ¶ 8. Ultimately, the United States could not accept any plan proposed by the Japanese government unless the plan conformed to U.S. operational requirements. Id. ¶ 10; Lawless Dec. ¶¶ 10, 13. As the court stated in its 2005 order, the activities involved in this case are not exclusively those of foreign governmental bodies. Rather, the United States has been substantially involved in the design and site selection for the FRF, will continue to monitor and oversee the construction of the facility to ensure that it meets U.S. requirements, and will have exclusive authority to operate the facility once it is completed. Japan’s involvement in the FRF project does not by itself implicate the act of state doctrine. The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n every case in which we have held the act of state doctrine applicable, the relief sought or the defense interposed would have required a court in the United States to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory.” W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Co., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 405, 110 S.Ct. 701, 107 L.Ed.2d 816 (1990). While this case may involve various activities, some of which are the responsibility of Japan, e.g., sitting and construction, and some of which are the responsibility of the United States, e.g., operational requirements, the only activities upon which the court sits in judgment are those obligations placed upon the United States under provisions of U.S. domestic law. The court’s jurisdiction in this case is premised on the NHPA and the APA and therefore, the only activities which this court reviews are DOD’s obligations related to the section 402 process of taking into account. As the court explains in Part III below, the obligation to take into account lies with the DOD and the DOD alone. Relief requiring the DOD to take into account, therefore, in no way invalidates Japan’s decision to locate the FRF in the particular area and configuration it has chosen and in no way interferes with Japan’s ability to conduct its own environmental assessment according to Japanese law. Again, the court reiterates that the NHPA compels a particular process, not a particular result. The NHPA requires and the court can only mandate that the DOD engage in an information gathering process which may eventually lead to such modifications and alterations if, as a result of the information gathering process, it is determined that those changes may mitigate adverse effects on protected property. Just as the court held in its 2005 order, the act of state doctrine is not implicated here because judicial review does not require the court to invalidate the sovereign acts of the Government of Japan. This court’s review is directed solely at DOD’s compliance with the NHPA. Defendants raise additional concerns that merit discussion here. Defendants recognize that NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F.Supp. 466 (D.D.C.1993), does not stand for the proposition that extraterritorial application of the NHPA is barred as a matter of law. Indeed, the court so ruled in 2005 when it held that section 402 of the NHPA contains express Congressional intent that the NHPA, unlike the National Environmental Protection Act at issue in NEPA Coalition, apply abroad. Defendants argue, however, that NEPA Coalition stands for “the broader proposition that a federal court should not apply a provision of United States environmental law in a manner that creates a ‘substantial likelihood that treaty relations will be affected.’ ” Defs.’ Mem. at 27. Defendants argue further that Any ruling requiring the [U.S. Government] to take action with respect to the dugong that is inconsistent with or contrary to the considered judgment of the [Government of Japan] regarding how best to protect one of Japan’s own cultural resources would undermine the carefully negotiated allocation of sovereign responsibilities agreed to by both nations in the Roadmap.... A court order requiring the DOD to take premature, inconsistent, or contrary action to that being taken by the [Government of Japan] ... and compelling the DOD to conduct its own assessment of potential impacts on cultural resources, apart from Japan’s ongoing effort, would frustrate Japan’s exercise of its own legal procedures for protecting and managing the environment and its cultural resources. Id. at 28. The court recognizes that these are valid and important concerns. But these concerns do not imply that the court must invoke the act of state doctrine and decline to rule on the merits of plaintiffs’ NHPA claim. Rather, these concerns, as the court elaborates in Part III below, delineate and give contour to the meaning and scope of the substantive requirement to take into account. As the court explains below, the concerns articulated by the defendants are precisely the reasons why the take into account process encourages and indeed requires cooperation and coordination with other agencies and governments. E. Necessary and Indispensable Party Defendants’ final attempt to prevent the court from reaching the merits of this case rests on a failure to join the Government of Japan as a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). But as the court has already discussed above, relief requiring DOD to take into account under section 402 can be fashioned without directly or indirectly interfering with any decision by the Government of Japan. Thus, the court’s review is not barred by virtue of FRCP Rule 19. F. Conclusion Defendants have asserted and the court has addressed five separate bases for barring the court’s review. The court holds that DOD’s failure to take into account the effects of the Futenma Replacement Facility on the Okinawa dugong is agency action that is final in light of DOD’s approval of the 2006 Roadmap and DOD’s establishment of operational requirements. The Okinawa dugong and two of the envir