Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge. Plaintiff, the National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”), brings this action against Defendants, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia (“Taylor”), the Honorable Nancy Erickson, Secretary of the Senate of the United States (“Erickson”), and the Honorable Lorraine C. Miller, Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States (“Miller,” and collectively with Erickson, the “Legislative Defendants”). The NAM challenges § 207 of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (“HLOGA”), Pub.L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735, which amended § 1603(b)(3) of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (“LDA”), 2 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and requires disclosure of organizations (hereinafter referred to as “affiliates”) that contribute significantly to the lobbying activities of a lobbyist’s client and actively participate in the planning, supervision, or control of those lobbying activities. The NAM argues that § 207 violates the First Amendment by impermissibly burdening its rights and those of its members to speak, associate, and petition the government, and further argues that § 207 is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied to the NAM. The NAM filed its Complaint in this action on February 6, 2008, along with a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction barring Defendants from implementing or enforcing § 207 until this Court issued a final ruling on the merits of the NAM’s First Amendment claims. The parties and the Court thereafter agreed to convert the NAM’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction into a decision on the merits, with the NAM’s Preliminary Injunction application serving as its opening brief. As a result, this opinion addresses the NAM’s motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The Court has conducted a searching review of the NAM’s opening brief, the Opposition filed by Defendant Taylor and the Opposition filed by the Legislative Defendants, the two amici briefs filed in this case by Citizens for Reform and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) and Campaign Legal Center, Democracy 21, and Public Citizen (jointly the “CLC Amici”), and the NAM’s Reply brief, as well as the relevant statutes and case law. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 207 is narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests, and is neither vague on its face nor as applied to the NAM. The Court shall therefore DENY [3] the NAM’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. I: BACKGROUND A. The Parties Plaintiff, the National Association of Manufacturers, is a non-profit trade association founded in 1895 “to promote trade, advocate for economic growth, and represent the interests of its members,” to “members and employees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, as well as policy-level employees and officers of the Executive Branch.” PL’s Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief (hereinafter “Compl.”) ¶ 4. The NAM’s membership includes “over 11,000 corporate members whose interests are allied with America’s manufacturing sector.” Id. ¶ 14. The NAM asserts that its website and other publicly-available materials make clear the types of interests it represents and identifies some of its members, including those represented on its board and in other leadership positions. Id. ¶ 4. Nevertheless, the NAM does not publicly list its members, id., and its membership list has been kept confidential for at least the past 30 years, see Decl. of Jan Sarah Amundson, Senior Vice Pres, and Gen. Counsel of the NAM, submitted in support of the NAM’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (hereinafter “Amundson Decl.”) ¶ 8. The NAM describes itself as a member-led organization, and asserts that “its members participate in a number of committees and a wide range of related activities to define and advance the NAM’s goals.” Id. ¶ 14. These activities include approximately 100 meetings per month and a “wide range of other contacts and activities, including telephone calls, emails, and mailings that provide the opportunity for members to participate in the NAM’s lobbying.” Id. In addition to this member participation, the NAM has approximately 35 employees who regularly engage in lobbying activities and whom it has identified in filings under the LDA since that law was enacted in 1995. Id. ¶ 15. The Honorable Nancy Erickson is Secretary of the Senate of the United States, id. ¶ 6(a), and the Honorable Lorraine C. Miller is Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States, id. ¶ 6(b). Under the amended LDA, Defendants Erickson and Miller’s official responsibilities include receiving mandatory reports concerning lobbying activities, reviewing them for any deficiencies, and referring cases of apparent noncompliance to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for enforcement action. Id. ¶¶ 6(a)-(b); 2 U.S.C. § 1605(a). In addition, the Legislative Defendants are directed by the amended LDA to “provide guidance and assistance on the registration and reporting requirements of [the LDA] and develop common standards, rules, and procedures for compliance.” Compl. ¶ 7; 2 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). Pursuant to this provision, Defendants Erickson and Miller promulgated a document entitled “Lobby Disclosure Act Guidance,” which became effective on January 1, 2008. Compl. ¶ 7; see http://www.senate.gov/legislative/ resources/pdf/Slguidance.pdf (hereinafter “LDA Guidance”). As the NAM notes in its Complaint, the Introduction section of that document states that the LDA “does not provide the Secretary or the Clerk with the authority to write substantive regulations or issue definitive opinions on the interpretation of the law,” and further states that the “guidance document does not have the force of law, nor does it have any binding effect on the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia.” Compl. ¶ 7; LDA Guidance at 1. The Honorable Jeffrey A. Taylor is the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶ 6(c). His official responsibilities include enforcing the penalty provisions of the LDA, which provide that the Legislative Defendants shall “notify the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia that a lobbyist or lobbying firm may be in noncompliance.” Id.; 2 U.S.C. § 1605(a). B. Statutory Background 1. Previous Lobbying Disclosure Regulations a. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of me In 1945, Congress established a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, which received numerous complaints about the “attempts of organized pressure groups to influence the decision of Congress on legislation pending before the two Houses or their committees,” and found that “professionally inspired efforts to put pressure upon Congress cannot be conducive to well considered legislation.” See Legis. Defs’ Opp’n at 5-6 (citing H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong. (1945) and quoting S. Rep. 79-1011, at 26). The Joint Committee recognized “the right of any citizen to petition the Government for the redress of grievances or freely to express opinions to individual Members or to committees on legislation and on current political issues.” S. Rep. 79-1011, at 26. Nevertheless, the Joint Committee concluded that it was “possible to improve the situation without impairing in any way this freedom of expression,” by providing for disclosure of information that “would prove helpful to Congress in evaluating their representations,” and recommended that Congress enact legislation “providing for the registration of organized groups and their agents who seek to influence legislation and that such registration include quarterly statements of expenditures made for this purpose.” Id. at 26-27. Congress reacted to the Joint Committee’s recommendations by enacting the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (“FRLA”), title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub.L. No. 79-601, §§ 301-311, 60 Stat. 812, 839-42, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270. See Legis. Defs’ Opp’n at 7. The FRLA required persons engaged for pay for the “principal purpose” of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of legislation in Congress to register with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate, and to disclose: their name and address; the name and address of the client for whom they work; how much they are paid and by whom; all contributors to the lobbying effort and the amount of their contribution; an accounting of all monies received and expended, specifying to whom the money was paid and for what purposes; the names of any publications in which the lobbyist has caused articles or editorials to be published; and the particular legislation they have been hired to support or oppose. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 104-339, pt. 1 at 2 (1995)). The FRLA provided for criminal penalties for violations. See Pub.L. No. 79-601, § 310, 60 Stat. 842. In 1954, the Supreme Court reviewed and upheld the constitutionality of the FRLA in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). The Supreme Court first addressed a due process vagueness claim, and construed the FRLA to apply to “persons” (1) who had “solicited, collected, or received contributions;” (2) where “one of the main purposes of such ‘person,’ or one of the main purposes of such contributions,” was “to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress;” and (3) where “the intended method of accomplishing this purpose” was “through direct communication with members of Congress.” Id. at 623, 74 S.Ct. 808. So construed, the Supreme Court held that the FRLA met “the constitutional requirement of definiteness.” Id. at 624, 74 S.Ct. 808. The Harriss Court then considered and rejected a First Amendment challenge to the FRLA, holding that, as narrowed, the statute “do[es] not violate the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment-freedom to speak, publish, and petition the Government.” Id. at 625, 74 S.Ct. 808. In so doing, the Supreme Court identified the “vital national interest” that the FRLA was designed to safeguard by explaining that: Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal. This is the evil which the [FRLA] was designed to help prevent. Id. at 625-26, 74 S.Ct. 808. Significantly, the Court noted that Congress had “not sought to prohibit these pressures,” but had “merely provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose.” Id. at 625, 74 S.Ct. 808. According to the Court, Congress “want[ed] only to know who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.” Id. The Court therefore concluded that the FRLA was constitutional, because Congress had used its “power of self-protection ... in a manner restricted to its appropriate end.” Id. at 625-26, 74 S.Ct. 808. b. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 Within a few years of the FRLA’s adoption, President Harry S. Truman began calling for Congress to make changes to the FRLA in order to close loopholes already evident in the bill. See 141 Cong. Rec. S10512 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin). Reform efforts continued in each decade through the 1990s, with one or both Houses of Congress passing lobbying reform bills that were never enacted into law. Id. Attempts to reform the FRLA picked up steam in the early 1990s, as the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (“Senate Subcommittee”) held hearings on the FRLA’s shortcomings and considered potential reform legislation in 1991 and 1992. See Legis. Defs. Opp’n at 8-9 (citing The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Hrgs Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. of the Senate Comm, on Gov’tal Affairs, 102d Cong., S. Hrg. 102-377 (1991), and S. 2279, The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1992: Hrgs Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. of the Senate Comm, on Gov’tal Affairs, 102d Cong., S. Hrg. 102-609 (1992)). Among other things, the testimony before the Senate Subcommittee indicated that “[cjorporations or other organizations occasionally hid their identities behind a coalition established or available for the purpose of preventing the public from learning of their efforts to influence congressional action. This plainly circumvents the [FRLA’s] public disclosure goals.” S. Hrg. 102-609, at 83 (statement of Thomas M. Susman, Chair, ABA Section of Admin. Law and Reg. Practice); see also id. at 34 (statement of Ann McBride, Sr. Vice Pres., Common Cause) (“Very often those coalition groups operate under very lovely-sounding names, without the public or sometimes even the Congress having a clear understanding of the groups that are backing them. The public has a right to know who is backing these coalition groups ... ”). The 103d Congress came particularly close to passing a lobbying disclosure bill, with both the Senate and the House passing bills mandating disclosure of affiliates that played a substantial role in lobbying by an association or coalition. See 139 Cong. Rec. 9435 (1993) (passing S. 349); 140 Cong. Rec. 6532 (1994) (passing S. 349 as amended). In 1995, Congress finally reached agreement on lobbying reform, passing the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 without opposition, which was signed into law by President William Jefferson Clinton. See 141 Cong. Rec. 20195 (1995) (bill passed Senate by vote of 98-0); id. at 34815-20 (bill passed House by vote of 421-0). Inter alia, the LDA: • Expanded coverage of lobbying to include contacts with congressional staff and senior executive officials, see Pub.L. No. 104-65, § 3(8), 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8); • Broadened the definition of lobbyist to include “any individual who is employed or retained by a client for financial or other compensation for services that include more than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that client over a six month period,” id. § 3(10), 2 U.S.C. § 102(10); • Added a minimum expenditure threshold that triggered disclosure of lobbying activities on behalf of a specific client, see id. §§ 3(7), 3(8), 4, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1602(7), 1602(8), 1603; • Mandated semi-annual reporting of (a) the total amount of lobbying-related income from a specific client (or expenditures by -an organization lobbying in its own behalf), (b) the specific issues that were the subject of a lobbyist’s efforts, (c) the Houses of Congress and the federal agencies contacted by the lobbyist, (d) the employees of the registrant who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client, and (e) whether a lobbyist had been employed in the previous two years as a covered executive or legislative branch official, id. §§ 4(b), 5(b), 2 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1604(b); and • Created civil penalties for violations of the LDA, id. § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1606. See Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 10-11. In particular, with respect to affiliates, the LDA required registrants to disclose “the name, address, and principal place of business of any organization, other than the client that— (A) contributes more than $10,000 toward the lobbying activities of the registrant in a semiannual period ...; and (B) in whole or in major part plans, supervises, or controls such lobbying activities.” LDA, § 4(b)(3), 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3). The LDA defined “lobbying activities” as “lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.” Id. § 3(7), 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7). The House Judiciary Committee report on the LDA explained that the affiliate disclosure requirement was “intended to preclude evasion of the disclosure requirements of the [LDA] through the creation of ad hoc lobbying coalitions behind which real parties in interest can hide.” H.R.Rep. No. 104-339, at 18. However, the LDA, and the House Judiciary Committee report made clear that the term “organization” did not include individuals, LDA, § 3(13), 2 U.S.C. § 1602(13), and was only intended to require the disclosure of the identity of individual member organizations when those members had “become a client,” H.R.Rep. No. 104-339, at 13, 18 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)). Further, section 8(a) of the LDA explicitly stated that the provisions of the LDA were not to be “construed to prohibit or interfere with — (1) the right to petition the Government for the redress of grievances; (2) the right to express a personal opinion; or (3) the right of association — protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.” LDA, § 8(a), 2 U.S.C. § 1607(a). Like the FRLA, the LDA required lobbyists and entities whose employees act as lobbyists on their own behalf to file reports with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, see LDA, §§ 3(2), 4(a)(1), 5(a), 2 U.S.C. §§ 1602(2), 1603(a)(1), 1604(a), and directed those officers to “provide guidance and assistance on the registration and reporting requirements of [the LDA] and develop common standards, rules, and procedures for compliance with [the LDA],” id. § 6(1), 2 U.S.C. § 1605(1). See Legist Defs’ Opp’n at 12. 2. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of2007 The LDA substantially increased the number of individuals and organizations registering as lobbyists. See id. at 12 n. 6 (“In the first year under the LDA, the number of organizations and individuals registered or identified as lobbyists more than doubled.”) (citing General Accounting Office, Comparison of Lobbyists Registrations, NO. B-274543 (GAO/GGD-98-104R, Apr. 28, 1998), available at http://archive. gao.gov/paprpdf2/160463.pdf). N evertheless, recent Congresses continued to undertake new efforts to refine the LDA’s lobbying disclosure provisions, including disclosure of organizations that actively participate in lobbying coalitions and associations. See Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006, S. 2349, 109th Cong. § 217 (2006); Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong. § 107 (2005); Stealth Lobbyist Disclosure Act of 2004, H.R. 4937, 108th Cong. (2004). Spurred by the 2006 Congressional elections and a series of lobbying-related scandals, the Senate passed a lobbying reform bill (S. 1) in the first weeks of the 110th Congress. 153 Cong. Rec. S251 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2007) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“I believe one message that was very clear in the last election was the need for Congress to immediately take steps to restore the public’s trust”); id. at S252 (statement of Sen. Bennett) (“There is some sense that perhaps we are overreacting to the scandals of [Jack] Abramoff and [Randall “Duke”] Cunningham. I do not believe that S. 1 is an over reaction ... ”); id. at S746 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 2007) (S. 1 passed by a vote of 96-2). That bill would have required disclosure of affiliates that met the contribution threshold and “participate[d] in a substantial way in the planning, supervision, or control of such lobbying activities.” S. 1,110th Cong. § 217 (as passed by Senate, Jan. 18, 2007). Later in 2007, both Houses passed an amended version of the Senate bill, id. at H9210 (daily ed. Jul. 31, 2007) (passed House by a vote of 411-8); id. at S10723 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (Senate agreed to House amendments by a vote of 83-14), which was signed into law by President George W. Bush, and became the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub.L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735. See Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 13. The HLOGA includes a comprehensive set of reforms addressing Senate and House ethics rules, post-employment restrictions, gifts and travel restrictions, as well as strengthened lobbying disclosures. Id. Significantly, the HLOGA establishes criminal penalties and increased the civil penalties previously provided for in the LDA. HLOGA, § 211. As amended, the LDA requires the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate to “notify any lobbyist or lobbying firm in writing that may be in noncompliance with” the LDA. 2 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Section 1606 then provides for a civil fine of “not more than $200,000, depending on the extent and gravity of the violation,” upon proof of a “knowing violation by a preponderance of the evidence” for a registrant who “knowingly fails to — (1) remedy a defective filing within 60 days after notice of such a defect by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House ...; or (2) comply with any other provision of [the amended LDA].” Id. § 1606(a). With respect to criminal penalties, the amended LDA provides that “[w]hoever knowingly and corruptly fails to comply with any provision of [the LDA] shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years or fined ... or both.” Id. § 1606(b). The NAM’s challenge focuses on § 207 of the HLOGA, which amended the affiliate disclosure requirements at 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) in two ways. First, in light of the HLOGA’s new quarterly reporting requirement for registrants, Congress changed the monetary threshold for contributions by affiliates to the Ghent’s lobbying activities from $10,000 in a semiannual period to $5,000 in a quarter, and made clear that the contributions could be to either the registrant or the client. Id. at 14; Taylor Opp’n at 4; 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3)(A). Second, the HLOGA replaces the “in whole or in major part” standard for the level of participation in lobbying activities that triggers disclosure with a standard requiring disclosure of those affiliates that “actively participate [ ] in the planning, supervision, or control of such lobbying activities.” Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 14; Taylor Opp’n at 4; 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3)(B). Amended section 1603(b)(3) now requires registrants to disclose “the name, address, and principal place of business” of any affiliate that (i) “contributes more than $5,000 to the registrant or the client in the quarterly period to fund the lobbying activities of the registrant,” and (ii) “actively participates in the planning, supervision, or control of such lobbying activities.” 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3). Significantly, however, the HLOGA did not alter the definition of “actively participates,” but rather retained the definition in effect since the LDA’s enactment in 1995, more than twelve years earlier. That definition had never been subject to a First Amendment challenge, a fact that Senator Feingold noted during floor debate on S. 1. See 153 Cong. Rec. S736 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 2007) (reciting the LDA definition of “lobbying activities” and stating “[t]his term I just mentioned and defined has been in use for over a decade without controversy”). Section 207 of the HLOGA also adds another means of affiliate disclosure to 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3), providing that if an organization that “would be identified as affiliated with the client” by meeting the section’s disclosure requirement “is listed on the Ghent’s publicly accessible Internet website as being a member of or contributor to the client,” that organization need not be disclosed in the registrant’s filing unless it meets the higher participation standard of “in whole or in major part” planning, supervising, or controlling the registrant’s lobbying activities. Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 15; 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3). Section 207 of the HLOGA further clarifies that nothing in subparagraph (B) of 2 U.S.C.. § 1603(b)(3) “shall be construed to require the disclosure of any information about individuals who are members of, or donors to, an entity treated as a client by [the HLOGA] or an organization identified under that paragraph.” Id. In a joint statement described as a “section-by-section analysis” of S. 1, the bill’s principal authors, Senators Feinstein, Lieberman, and Reid, explained that § 207 “closes a loophole that has allowed so-called ‘stealth coalitions,’ often with innocuous-sounding names, to operate without identifying the interests engaged in the lobbying activities.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007). Similar pronouncements abounded throughout the floor debate on S. 1. For instance, when the bill was initially introduced, Senator Lieberman explained that it would also remove the cloak obscuring so-called stealth lobbying campaigns which occur when a group of individuals, companies, unions, or associations ban together to form a lobbying coalition. These coalitions frequently have innocent-sounding names that give the impression they are promoting positive mom-and-pop, apple pie goals. But, in fact, they lobby on a range of issues that could never be identified by the name of the coalition. 153 Cong. Rec. S260 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2007); see also id. at H5743 (daily ed. May 24, 2007) (statement of Rep. Doggett) (“for over five years I have attempted to close a gaping loophole in the [LDA] that has permitted various lobbyists to form over 800 stealth or hidden coalitions to avoid the requirements of the act ... This stealth lobbyist disclosure provision helps close this loophole.”). Section 207’s new affiliate disclosure threshold applies to registrations after January 1, 2008, and to quarterly reports covering activity beginning on January 1, 2008. HLOGA § 215. The first set of quarterly reports under amended section 1603(b)(3) are due on April 21, 2008. Id. § 201(a)(1)(B). Following the HLOGA’s enactment, the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House issued guidance on § 207, which explains that “[a]n organization ‘actively participates’ in the planning, supervision, or control of lobbying activities of a client or registrant when that organization (or an employee of the organization in his or her capacity as an employee) engages directly in planning, supervising, or controlling at least some part of the lobbying activities of the client or registrant.” LDA Guidance eff. Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/ resources/pdf/Slguidance.pdf at 4. The guidance distinguishes actively participating organizations from those that “though members of, or affiliated with a client, have only a passive role in the lobbying activities of the client (or of the registrant on behalf of the client),” and provides detailed examples of both active and passive participation. Id. The guidance thus echoes a distinction made in the joint statement issued by Senators Feinstein, Lieberman, and Reid, which emphasizes that “[ejntities or organizations that have Only a passive role — e.g., mere donors, mere recipients of information and reports, etc. — would not be considered to be ‘actively participating’ in the lobbying activities.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007). C. The NAM’s Allegations The NAM’s Complaint asserts that § 207, “if read literally” would require the NAM and other organizations “that petition the federal government for their members to publicly identify their organizational supporters in violation of the First Amendment.” Compl. ¶ 8. According to the NAM, hundreds of its “corporate members make annual contributions that, when allocated among the association’s activities, meet the financial prong of the amended [LDA’s affiliate] disclosure obligations.” Id. ¶ 14. The NAM further states that “[s]ome of those members have dozens of employees who participate in various committees and other activities.” Id. The NAM asserts that its “lobbying activities often touch on hot-button topics such as global warming, nuclear power, or labor relations that provoke responses beyond civil debate.” Id. ¶ 16. According to the NAM, “[tjaking policy positions that are unpopular with other groups may lead to boycotts, political pressure, shareholder suits, or other forms of harassment,” and may make companies litigation targets. Id. The Declaration of Jan Sarah Amund-son that the NAM proffers in support of its motion asserts that the NAM’s lobbying activities “may lead to adverse consequences for members identified as ‘actively participat[ing] in such efforts.” Amundson Decl. ¶ 10 (alteration in original). Ms. Amundson supports her assertion with citations to five newspaper articles and one lawsuit involving a labor union. Id. However, as the Legislative Defendants correctly note in their Opposition, the lawsuit cited in Ms. Amundson’s Declaration involved harassment of a utility construction company in Alaska and its non-union employees by a labor union and its members, but did not include any suggestion that the company involved was a member of the NAM or was subject to harassment for participating in the NAM’s lobbying activities. See Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 32 n. 20; IBEW, Local 1547 v. Alaska Util. Constr., Inc., 976 P.2d 852 (Alaska 1999). Similarly, the newspaper articles Ms. Amundson cites do not describe participation in the NAM’s lobbying activities or harassment resulting therefrom. Thus, neither the NAM’s Complaint nor the Declaration supporting its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction describes actual harm or harassment that has befallen either the NAM, or any of its members whose identities are publicly available on the NAM’s website, as a result of the NAM’s lobbying activities. Nevertheless, the NAM posits that its members “will wish to avoid linkage to the association’s lobbying activities on particular issues.” Id. ¶ 17. As a result, the NAM asserts, “members that are concerned about the possibility of disclosure will limit their support for and participation in the NAM to the extent necessary to avoid the risk of being named in the NAM reports.” Id. ¶ 19. Further, the NAM asserts that its members are “urgently questioning whether continued support for and participation in core petitioning, speech, and associational activities will require disclosure.” Id. ¶ 28. According to the NAM, however, “given the ambiguous statutory language and the potential breadth of the disclosure requirements, the NAM is unable to provide clear guidance to its members as to what activities will or will not require public disclosure” under § 207. Id. ¶ 17. The NAM asserts that it will suffer First Amendment injuries as a result, because it relies extensively on member volunteers and “must self-censor to avoid initiating lobbying activities that members will be unwilling to support at the risk of disclosure or that may expose members to undesired disclosure.” Id. ¶ 20. In addition, the NAM claims that it “has no existing mechanisms to track and identify members who would be subject to disclosure,” and that “[attempting to establish such mechanisms would disrupt excessive associational activities and divert unrecoverable resources from core First Amendment activities.” Id. ¶ 29. Finally, the NAM asserts that it is not the only association facing difficulty, but rather that it has “determined that confusion over the meaning of [§ 207] is widespread.” Id. ¶ 23. The NAM’s Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction make three main claims, all premised on the First Amendment. First, the NAM claims that section 1603(b)(3), as amended by § 207, unconstitutionally burdens the First Amendment rights of the NAM and its members to speak, to petition the government, and to join in expressive associations because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. ¶¶ 26(b)-(c). Second and third, the NAM claims that § 207 is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to the NAM. Id. ¶ 26(a); NAM Mot. at 25-26. D. Procedural History The NAM filed its Complaint and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on February 6, 2008. On February 7 and February 8, 2008, the Court held telephone conference calls on the record with counsel for all parties participating, during which the parties and the Court agreed to treat the NAM’s preliminary injunction motion as a motion for judgment as a matter of law, with the NAM’s preliminary injunction application to serve as its opening brief. See Minute Order (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2008). Also during those conference calls, the Court set a schedule for the briefing of the NAM’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, as well as for any non-merits motions that Defendants deemed appropriate. Id. The Court and the parties agreed, however, that Defendants would not be required to file dis-positive motions, rather, in the event that the Court ruled in favor of Defendants on the merits, the NAM agreed to a dismissal of this action with prejudice. Id. None of the Defendants filed any non-merits motions. Instead, the Legislative Defendants and Defendant Taylor filed Oppositions on February 29, 2008, and the NAM filed its Reply on March 17, 2008. In addition, CREW and the CLC Amici filed motions for leave to file amici briefs, which the Court granted, and those briefs were filed on February 29, 2008. The NAM’s motion for judgment as a matter of law is therefore ripe for review. II: LEGAL STANDARD A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) shall be granted if the moving party demonstrates that “no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Peters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1992) (internal quotation omitted). The standard for reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Dale v. Exec. Office of President, 164 F.Supp.2d 22, 24 (D.D.C.2001). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require that a complaint contain “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the “grounds” of “entitlefment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65; see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). Instead, the com plaint’s “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (citations omitted). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F.Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C.1994). While the court must construe the Complaint in the Plaintiffs favor, it “need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff [ ] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). The court is limited to considering facts alleged in the complaint, any documents attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record. See E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997); Marshall County Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1993). Ill: DISCUSSION The NAM’s Complaint only challenges § 207 of the HLOGA, which, as discussed above, amended the affiliate disclosure requirement of the LDA. Nevertheless, the NAM’s briefs in connection with its motion for judgment on the pleadings describe what it perceives as the potential impact of § 207 in very sweeping terms. See, e.g., NAM Mot. at 25, NAM Reply at 2-3. The Court therefore reiterates at the outset what the NAM is not challenging in this action. In the NAM’s own words, it “does not challenge the power of Congress to require some registration of professional lobbyists and disclosure of their clients through precise and narrowly-tailored provisions.” Compl. ¶24. Moreover, as Defendants point out, many of the operative elements of § 207 — the definition of lobbying activities and the scope of the term lobbying contacts, for instance — have not changed since the LDA was enacted in 1995. Taylor Opp’n at 4-5, Legist Defs Opp’n at 37. Indeed, as noted above, pri- or to the HLOGA amendments, the LDA required disclosure of affiliates who contributed more than $10,000 to fund a registrant’s lobbying activities within a six-month period and who “in whole or in major part” planned, supervised, or controlled those lobbying activities. 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) (1995). The NAM’s challenge is thus limited to the LDA amendment embodied in HLOGA § 207 that requires the NAM to disclose those of its organizational members that (1) contribute more than $5,000 in a quarterly period to fund the NAM’s lobbying activities, and (2) “actively participate” in the planning, supervision, or control of those lobbying activities. The Court now turns to that challenge, which includes three main arguments: first, that § 207 impermissibly burdens the First Amendment rights of the NAM and its members; second, that § 207 is unconstitutionally vague on its face; and third, that § 207 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the NAM. A. The NAM’s Claim That Section 207 Impermissibly Burdens the First Amendment Rights of the NAM and Its Members 1. The Court Shall Apply Strict Scrutiny to Section 207 The NAM’s first argument is that § 207 impermissibly burdens the core First Amendment rights of the NAM and its members. The parties (and amici) do not agree on the standard to apply to this challenge. According to the NAM, § 207 constitutes a burden on three fundamental First Amendment freedoms — the right to speak (particularly anonymously), the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, and the right to expressive and political association — and thus is only permissible if it survives strict scrutiny. See NAM Mot. at 16-18, 20-23. Defendants do not dispute the NAM’s claim that § 207 implicates the First Amendment rights of the NAM and its members, but rather argue that Harriss and other Supreme Court cases indicate that only intermediate or “exacting” (which Defendants suggest connotes something other than strict) scrutiny applies to the lobbying disclosure requirement at issue. In Harriss, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FRLA against a facial First Amendment challenge, finding that its disclosure requirement served a “vital national interest” “in a manner restricted to its appropriate end.” See 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808. Although Harriss was less than explicit about the level of constitutional scrutiny applied, it appears that the Supreme Court “did not subject the lobbying restrictions to the demands of strict scrutiny.” Fla. League of Prof. Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 460 (11th Cir.1996) (hereinafter “FLPL ”). As a result, a number of lower federal courts and state courts considering state lobbying disclosure requirements have interpreted Harriss as requiring less than strict scrutiny, “and have rejected broad constitutional attacks on lobbying disclosure requirements.” Id.; see also Comm’n on Indep. Colleges & Univs. v. New York Temp. State Comm’n on Reg’n of Lobbying, 534 F.Supp. 489, 497 (1982) (hereinafter “CICU”) (upholding New York lobbying statute); Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. 80, 665 A.2d 44, 47-48 (1995) (upholding Vermont lobbying statute); Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Sup. Ct. of Los Ange-les County, 25 Cal.3d 33, 157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46, 54 (1979) (upholding portions of California lobbying statute). Defendant Taylor argues that this Court should follow that trend and apply the equivalent of the modern intermediate scrutiny standard to § 207. See Taylor Opp’n at 9-10; Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) (intermediate scrutiny requires asking “whether the State’s interests ... are substantial, whether the challenged regulation advances these interests in a direct and material way, and whether the extent of the restriction on protected speech is reasonable in proportion to the interests served”). The Legislative Defendants take the Harriss argument a step further, asserting that § 207 is constitutional because its disclosure provision “falls within the scope of the lobbying disclosure approved in Har-riss ” because it is “nothing more than a requirement that a registrant disclose ‘who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.’ ” Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 20 (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625, 74 S.Ct. 808). However, as the NAM correctly points out, Harriss was decided before the Supreme Court formulated the levels of scrutiny currently applied in First Amendment challenges, and the provision at issue in Harriss, as narrowed by the Supreme Court in light of the vagueness challenge in that case, applied to a narrower scope of activity than § 207 does. As such, the Court cannot conclude that § 207 is constitutional on the basis of Harriss alone. Furthermore, the NAM alleges that § 207 impermissibly burdens its core First Amendment rights and those of its members. Specifically, the NAM argues that § 207 burdens speech itself because its disclosure requirements are triggered by “lobbying contacts,” which are defined as “any oral or written communication,” and activities undertaken in preparation for such contacts. NAM Mot. at 20; see also 2 U.S.C. §§ 1602(8), 1603(b)(3). To be sure, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment is to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). In addition, the NAM argues that § 207 burdens its members’ “rights of association and of petition” and in particular to join together with others of “common interests” to “freely inform the government of their wishes.” Calif. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); E. R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); see also NAM Mot. at 20-2. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the right to political association as “closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Although the NAM thus identifies at least three First Amendment freedoms— speech, petition, and association — implicated by § 207, it should be noted at the outset that the NAM alleges only an indirect burden on those rights because § 207’s disclosure requirements do not in anyway prohibit either the NAM or its members from engaging in protected First Amendment activity. Nevertheless, the Court accepts (as it must on a motion for judgment on the pleadings) the NAM’s claim that § 207 allegedly substantially burdens the core First Amendment rights of the NAM and its members, albeit indirectly. In Buckley, the Supreme Court considered, among other provisions of the Federal Election Commission Act (“FECA”), its requirement that political committees register and disclose the names and addresses of people making contributions or expenditures of over $100 to the political committee. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-64, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court upheld FECA’s disclosure requirement, but noted that “significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest.” Id. at 64-65, 96 S.Ct. 612. Rather, “the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny,” and there must “be a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.” Id. at 65, 96 S.Ct. 612. More recently, in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld new disclosure requirements included in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) based on the “important state interests” identified by the Buckley court. Id. at 196, 124 S.Ct. 619. Thus, as Defendants correctly argue, neither Buckley nor McConnell utilized the traditional language of the strict scrutiny standard. However, in other contexts, the Supreme Court has indicated that “exacting” and “strict” scrutiny are one and the same. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786, 98 S.Ct. 1407); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (determining that the regulation at issue “must be subjected to exacting scrutiny: The State must show that the ‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state, interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’ ”) (citations omitted). In sum, the relevant case law does not readily reveal the level of scrutiny that is properly applied to § 207’s disclosure requirement. However, as the D.C. Circuit recognized when faced with a similarly difficult decision as to whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny, “[i]f the [statute] can withstand strict scrutiny there is no need to decide the issue.” Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 943 (D.C.Cir.1995). Therefore, the Court applies strict scrutiny and, as discussed below, concludes that § 207 survives that level of review. 2. Section 207 Survives Strict Scrutiny In Blount, the D.C. Circuit described the strict scrutiny inquiry as involving the following three parts: (1) whether the interests the government proffers in support of [§ 207] are properly characterized as ‘compelling’; (2) whether the [section] effectively advances those interests, i.e., whether [Defendants have] shown that the ills [they claim the section] addresses in fact exist and the [section] will materially reduce them; and (3) whether [§ 207] is narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interests asserted, i.e., whether less restrictive alternatives to the [section] would accomplish the government’s goals equally or almost equally effective-iy[.] 61 F.3d at 944 (citations omitted). The Court addresses each requirement of the strict scrutiny standard in turn, ultimately concluding that § 207 meets all three. а. The Government Asserts Legitimate and Compelling Interests The Defendants’ Oppositions identify two main interests underlying the enactment of § 207. First, as described above, Congress’ professed purpose in enacting § 207 was to “close[ ] a loophole that has allowed so-called ‘stealth coalitions,’ often with innocuous-sounding names, to operate without identifying the interests engaged in the lobbying activities.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (statement of Sens. Feinstein, Lieberman, and Reid); see also 153 Cong. Rec. S260 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2007) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (explaining that S. 1 would “remove the cloak obscuring so-called stealth lobbying campaigns ... [by] coalitions that ... lobby on a range of issues that could never be identified by the name of the coalition.”); id. at H5743 (daily ed. May 24, 2007) (statement of Rep. Doggett). Indeed, in enacting both the 1995 LDA and the 2007 HLO-GA, Congress extolled the virtues of and the need for transparency regarding the influence of lobbyists on government decisions. See id. at S258 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2007) (statement of Sen. Collins) (“[t]he knowledge that the public will be able to scrutinize in detail the activities of a lobbying firm and contacts between Members and lobbyists will provide much needed transparency in this whole area” and “allow citizens to decide for themselves what is acceptable and what is not.”); 141 Cong. Rec. S10513 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“the public has a right to know, and the public should know, who is being paid to lobby, how much they are being paid, on what issue.”). In enacting the 1995 LDA, Congress expressly found that “responsible representative Government requires public awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public decisionmaking process in both the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government.” 2 U.S.C. § 1601(1). The Harass Court described this very interest as an “important” and “vital national interest,” proclaiming that “full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures.” 347 U.S. at 625-26, 74 S.Ct. 808; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court thus easily concludes that the interest in providing Congress and the electorate with information regarding “who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much,” Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625, 74 S.Ct. 808, is properly described as compelling. Defendants identify a second interest served by § 207 and other lobbying disclosure requirements: “avoid[ing] the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.” Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 22 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612 and citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, 124 S.Ct. 619). The Supreme Court has expressly noted that lobbying disclosures may support this interest, stating that “[t]he activities of lobbyists who have direct access to elected representatives, if undisclosed, may well present the appearance of corruption.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356 n. 20, 115 S.Ct. 1511. Congress similarly recognized this interest in enacting the LDA in 1995, finding that “effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase public confidence in the integrity of Government.” 2 U.S.C. § 1601(3). That sentiment was echoed during the floor debates on both the LDA and the HLOGA. See 141 Cong. Rec. S10512-13 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“If we want the public to have confidence in our actions, this business has to be conducted more in the sunshine. Lobbying disclosures will enhance public confidence in government by ensuring that the public is aware of the efforts that are made by paid lobbyists to influence public policy.”); 153 Cong. Rec. S258 (daily ed. Jan 9, 2007) (statement of Sen. Collins) (S. 1 “would reform the lobbying and ethics rules to increase disclosure and to ban practices that might be called into question or create' an appearance of wrongdoing. We need to assure the American people that the decisions we make are decisions of integrity, in which their interests are put first.”); id. at S10691 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (“This sweeping legislation shines much needed light in corners and corridors of this Capitol too long left in the dark. It should help restore the public’s trust now, a trust that is in much need of restoration.”). Again, the Court easily concludes that the interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption is a compelling one. As the Buckley Court explained, “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical ... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’ ” 424 U.S. at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973)). Indeed, in discussing the interests underlying the campaign finance disclosures at issue in that case, the Court declared that “[t]here are governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement [on First Amendment rights], particularly when the free functioning of our national institutions is involved.” Id. at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612. Since Buckley, a number of other federal and state courts have reached the same conclusion in considering lobbying disclosure requirements. See MCCL, 427 F.3d at 1111 (“Both the Supreme Court and this court have upheld lobbyist-disclosure statutes based on the government’s ‘compelling’ interest in requiring lobbyists to register and report their activities, and avoiding even the appearance of corruption.”); Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 48 (“lobbying disclosure laws are supported by several compelling interests”); cf. CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 494; FLPL, 87 F.3d at 460-61. Having thus concluded that the Government has met its first burden under the strict scrutiny standard, the Court turns to the next. b. The Government Has Shoum That Section 207 Will Materially Further The Compelling Interests Identified The NAM does not meaningfully dispute that the interests Defendants identify as underlying § 207 are compelling. Rather, the NAM argues that Defendants “ ‘must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured. It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate the harms in a direct and material way.’ ” NAM Reply at 7 (quoting FEC v. NRA, 254 F.3d 173, 191 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994))). The NAM is, of course, correct. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Defendants have done so in a manner appropriate to the scale of the change actually embodied in § 207. The Court’s discussion above of the compelling interests fostered by lobbying disclosures sufficiently establishes that the “recited harms are real, not merely conjectural.” Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Moreover, as the Legislative Defendants forcefully argue, “the specific disclosure provision at issue here, amended section 1603(b)(3) [HLOGA § 207], furthers these interests by ensuring that the LDA’s reporting requirements are not easily circumvented.” Legisl. Defs’ Opp’n at 24. As discussed above, prior to its 2007 amendment, the LDA required the disclosure of organizations, other than clients, that funded and participated in lobbying by registrants in order “to preclude evasion of the disclosure requirements of the [LDA] through the creation of ad hoc lobbying coalitions behind which real parties in interest can hide.” H.R.Rep. No. 104-339, pt. 1, at 18. However, because the LDA only required disclosure of affiliates who “in whole or in major part plan[ned], supervise^], or controlled]” a registrant’s lobbying activities, 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3) (1995), where no member of a coalition met that threshold, the LDA did not require disclosure of even those coalition members who were substantially involved in the coalition’s lobbying activities. CLC Amicus Br. at 12; Alison Mitchell, Loophole Lets Lobbyists Hid Clients’ Identity, N.Y. Times, July 5, 2002. Apparently, this very situation applied to the NAM itself; as a “broad-based association of over 11,000 members, such control by a member did not occur,” and the NAM was consequently not required to disclose the identity of those members who played a significant role in the NAM’s lobbying activities. NAM Reply at 22. As Senators Feinstein, Lieberman, and Reid explained in their joint statement, § 207 of the HLOGA was specifically intended to “close[ ] a loophole that ha[d] allowed so-called ‘stealth coalitions,’ often with innocuous-sounding names, to operate without identifying the interests engaged in the lobbying activities.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007). The NAM nevertheless argues that Defendants “do not show that the particular requirement challenged here was the subject of [] careful Congressional scrutiny and analysis,” and further, that the legislative history of the FRLA and the LDA do not justify the change § 207 represents to the LDA’s disclosure requirements. See NAM Reply at 7-11. The NAM’s argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, in arguing that the relevant legislative history does not sufficiently support § 207 in particular, the NAM compares that legislative record to the evidentiary record offered to defend the facial validity of BCRA in McConnell. See NAM Reply at 10-11. McConnell, however, represented a wholesale challenge to the constitutionality of BCRA, which in turn constituted a drastic and comprehensive reform of the Congressional approach to campaign finance regulation. As such, it is to be expected that the evidentiary record in that case included “a six-volume report summarizing the results of an extensive record” prepared by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129-32, 124 S.Ct. 619. In contrast — and despite the NAM’s protestations to the contrary— § 207 represents simply one component of the overall “sweeping reform legislation” embodied in the HLOGA, which includes changes in “a whole host of areas — gifts, travel, lobbyist disclosure, stealth coalitions, reporting of lobbyist contributions, the revolving door.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10716 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (statement of Sen. Reid). As such, it is not surprising that the depth of the legislative record regarding § 207 pales in comparison to that considered in McConnell. Moreover, the Court is unaware of any precedent requiring a particular quantum of legislative record in order to find a measure justified by a compelling government interest. See CICU, 534 F.Supp. at 499-500 (rejecting argument that a lobbying disclosure law “must be invalidated because there is not a sufficient legislative record to justify the legislation.”). Second, insofar as the NAM argues that the legislative history of the LDA cannot support the enactment of § 207, that argument is significantly undercut by the fact that many of the operative elements of § 207, including the definition of lobbying activities and the scope of the term lobbying contacts, have not changed since the LDA was enacted in 1995. Taylor Opp’n at 4-5, Legist Defs Opp’n at 37. Furthermore, as the Legislative Defendants convincingly explain, through the FRLA, the LDA, and the various proposals to amend those statutes, “Congress considered over many years various proposals for disclosure schemes that would best accomplish the vital governmental interests served by lobbying disclosure.” Legist Defs’ Opp’n at 30 (citing id. at 8-13). This “thoughtful and careful effort by our political branches, over such a lengthy course of time, deserves respect.” McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 434 (D.D.C.2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.); Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209, 103 S.Ct. 552 (“careful legislative adjustment ... in a ‘cautious advance, step by step,’ ... warrants considerable deference.”) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937)); cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 158, 124 S.Ct. 619