Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM THOMAS I. VANASKIE, District Judge. This is one of several actions brought by purchasers of property in the Pocono Mountain region of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs in these lawsuits claim they were the victims of a predatory lending scheme aimed at low income, unsophisticated home buyers lured into Pennsylvania by misleading advertisements. The plaintiffs assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO” or “Racketeering Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961— 1968, and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. §§ 201-1 to -9.3. These actions are brought against three categories of defendants: (1) the developers who sold the properties and arranged for financing; (2) the parties who appraised the properties; and (3) the lending institutions that provided the financing. In this action, all three (3) categories of defendants move for summary judgment against all seven (7) plaintiffs. Defendants’ motions will be granted as to all Plaintiffs with the exception of Almus and Marilyn Wilson. As to the Wilsons’ claims, the Lender Defendants’ motions will be granted, but the Developer and Appraiser Defendants’ motions will be granted only in part. Finally, the Lender Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim against Plaintiff Natalie Wilson will be granted. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 6, 2004, seven (7) individuals, claiming to be victims of an alleged predatory lending scheme, filed this action against twenty-seven (27) defendants. (Dkt. Entry 1.) The Plaintiffs, Almus and Marilyn Wilson, Charmaine Cooper, Marco and Maria Yagual, and Rayon McLean and Natalie Wilson, purchased four (4) different properties in the Pocono Mountain Region of Pennsylvania. The three groups of Defendants in this case are as follows: (1) the PK Defendants — the developers who sold the properties and arranged for their financing; (2) Lisa Marie’s Appraisal Service, Inc. and Lisa Marie Gibson (sometimes referred to collectively as “Lisa Gibson”), and Jenny Centrella — the parties who appraised three of the four properties at issue in this case; and (3) Bankers First Mortgage Inc. and Bankers 1st Mortgage Co., (“Bankers First”), New Century Mortgage Corporation (“New Century”), Ocwen Federal Bank (“Ocwen”), Firstar Bank, N.A. (“Firstar”), Keystone Financial Mortgage (“Keystone”), Bank of America Mortgage (“Bank of America”), Irwin Mortgage Corporation d/b/a IFC Mortgage Corp. and Irwin Mortgage Corporation (collectively known as the “IMC Defendants”), IndyMac Bank (“IndyMac”), Bank One, N.A. (“Bank One”), and West Coast Realty Services, Inc. (“West Coast”) — the lending institutions. In response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, the majority of Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss. On February 7, 2006, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. (Dkt. Entry 104.) Specifically, this Court declined to dismiss the first three counts of the Complaint, which asserted RICO claims. Lisa Gibson’s Motion to Dismiss was denied for failure to file a supporting memorandum of law. As to the claims under the UTPCPL (Counts Five, Six, Seven and Twelve), the Court denied the PK Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, but granted the Lender Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts Five and Six and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under the UTPCPL against the Lender Defendants without prejudice. The Court granted Defendant Bank One’s Motion to Dismiss under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639, et seq. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. (Counts Nine and Ten), were dismissed without prejudice, affording Plaintiffs leave to amend. Finally, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claim of negligent misrepresentations against all Defendants. On June 15 and 16, 2006, Bank One and Indymac filed Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Dkt. Entries 147, 148.) The Court granted both Motions and dismissed Bank One and IndyMac. (Dkt. Entry 221.) In addition to Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings, the following activity occurred after the Court resolved Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss: Defendant West Coast was dismissed for Plaintiffs’ failure to effectuate service of process (Dkt. Entry 136); Defendant Bankers First was dismissed because Plaintiffs did not file an Amended Complaint with respect to Counts Five, Six, Nine and Ten— thus Bankers First was no longer included in the case (Dkt. Entry 135); Plaintiff Charmaine Cooper agreed to the dismissal of Bank of America (Dkt. Entry 178); the PK Defendants agreed to dismiss without prejudice their cross-claim against Indy-Mac (Dkt. Entry 197); and Defendant New Century Mortgage Corporation filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy, thus staying this litigation as to it. (Dkt. Entry 228.) As a result of pretrial rulings and voluntary dismissal of parties and claims, the following are the extant claims of each group of Plaintiffs: Rayon McLean and Natalie Wilson have RICO and UTPCPL claims against the PK Defendants and Lisa Gibson. Almus and Marilyn Wilson have RICO and UTPCPL claims against the PK Defendants and Lisa Gibson, as well as a RICO conspiracy claim against Firstar and Ocwen. Marco and Maria Ya-gual have RICO and UTPCPL claims against the PK Defendants as well as a RICO conspiracy claim against the IMC Defendants. Finally, Charmaine Cooper has RICO and UTPCPL claims against the PK Defendants and Jenny Centrella, as well as a RICO conspiracy claim against M & T Bank. Following discovery, the remaining Defendants moved for summary judgment. Additionally, Defendant IndyMac has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim against Natalie Wilson. (Dkt. Entry 287.) The motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for resolution. II. BACKGROUND Because the seven (7) Plaintiffs in this case purchased four (4) different properties and obtained their financing and appraisals from different entities, the factual background of each property and the parties involved will be set forth separately. A. Natalie Wilson and Rayon McLean After reading advertisements in New York City newspapers and a booklet provided by Harmon Homes, Plaintiffs Natalie Wilson and Rayon McLean traveled to the Pocono Mountain region of Pennsylvania to investigate the homes for sale. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, Dkt. Entries 181-3 to - 4, at 156a, 246a-247a.) Thereafter, following several telephone conversations and additional visits to Pennsylvania, Ms. Wilson selected Lot 9 in Orchard View Estates, Monroe County, and executed an agreement for the purchase of this property from Eagle Valley Homes. (Id. at 117a, 118a.) Ms. Wilson made a down payment on her home in two separate installments: $2,000 on July 2, 2000 (id. at 124a), and $8,000 on July 14, 2000. (Id. at 125a-126a.) On July 16, 2000, Ms. Wilson paid for an appraisal and credit report, and also signed a mortgage application, authorizing Nations 1st Mortgage Co. to obtain financing for her home. (Id. at 124a, 126a.) It is disputed whether the PK Defendants disclosed to Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean that they owned and controlled Nations 1st Mortgage Co. (Id. at 148a.) Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLeans’ attempt to secure financing to construct a home ultimately failed when Nations 1st Mortgage Co. could not obtain a lender. As a result, Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean wanted to withdraw their deposit, but Nations 1st Mortgage Co. allegedly insisted on keeping the deposit and purportedly coerced Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean into purchasing an already constructed home on Lot 8 in Mountain Terrace. (Id. at 207a-208a.) After Ms. Wilson decided to purchase Lot 8 in Mountain Terrace, Nations 1 st Mortgage Co. obtained two mortgages for her, the first mortgage from IndyMac Bank in the amount of $188,000 and the second mortgage from Bank One in the amount of $47,000. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, at 132a-135a.) The PK Defendants allegedly advised Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean that the assistance of an attorney at the closing would not be necessary. (Id. at 227a.) Ms. Wilson executed the mortgage agreements on September 11, 2000, and September 14, 2000, respectively. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, at 132a~135a.) At the closing of the second mortgage with Bank One, Ms. Wilson had insufficient funds to close, so the PK Defendants lent her an additional $2,598.65 to cover the difference between her loans and the total costs (including closing costs). (Id. at 136a.) As part of the loan application process, Lisa Marie Appraisal Service appraised Ms. Wilson’s property on August 7, 2000, at $235,000, and subsequently submitted the appraisal to IndyMac Bank. (Id. at 137a-146a.) Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean assert that the appraisal proved problematic because it listed the acreage and square footage of the structure incorrectly, and included a non-existent hood range, fire place, refrigerator, washer and dryer. (Id. at 148a.) In 2003, after seeing a copy of them appraisal, (id. at 147a), Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean felt the appraisal was wrong and purportedly commissioned an appraisal of their property. Thomas Hill, the Chief County Assessor for the Monroe County Assessor’s Office, relying on an equalized property value from the year 1989, valued Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLeans’ property at $139,132. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Aff. Hill ¶ 8.), Dkt. Entry 181-4, at 232a.) The appraisal commissioned by Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean purportedly valued the property at $175,000. Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean have not included the latter appraisal in the record or indicated by whom it was performed. IndyMac Bank also hired an appraiser, who conducted a review appraisal of Lisa Marie Service’s original appraisal. The IndyMac appraiser concluded that the accurate value of the property in August of 2000 was $233,000. (Id. at 149a-153a.) Finally, the PK Defendants allegedly conducted another appraisal which valued the property as of January of 2004 at $258,000. (PK Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Motion Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, Dkt. Entry 181, at 4.) Mr. McLean experienced financial hardships after September 11, 2001, when the barbershop where Mr. McLean worked raised the price on the chairs he rented. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. of Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, at 154a-157a, 242a-245a.) Mr. McLean then switched his employment and drove trucks for several different companies. (Id. at 241a-242a.) Meanwhile, Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean received financial assistance from charitable organizations such as the American Red Cross and Salvation Army in the amounts of $3,312.78 and $1,638.48. (Id. at 249a.) Finally, when Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean could no longer afford the mortgage payments on their home, they attempted to refinance, but to no avail. (Id. at 224a.) Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean claim that, because the actual worth of their home was substantially less than its initial appraised value (the alleged inflated appraisal), they were unable to refinance their home. (Id.) No corroborative evidence for this assertion has been supplied. Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean filed applications for the Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program with the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, but were denied. (Id. at 190a, 191 a; PK Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, at 5.) They then decided to bring this law suit. At the time of the commencement of this litigation, Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean had halted mortgage payments and IndyMac Bank had instituted a foreclosure action on the property. (Id. at 184a-187.) B. Almus Wilson and Marilyn Wilson In the Spring of 1999, Almus Wilson and his wife, Marilyn Wilson, after reading advertisements similar to those read by Mr. McLean and Ms. Wilson, traveled from their home in Queens Village, New York to visit Eagle Valley Homes in the Pocono Mountains of Pennsylvania. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wil-sons, Dkt. Entry 240-5, at 198a-200a.) Following the visit, the Wilsons and Eagle Valley Homes exchanged several phone calls, discussing the potential purchase of a home. (Id. at 205a.) On June 20, 1999, the Wilsons executed an Agreement for the Sale of Real Estate for Lot # 503 in Candlewood Estates, Tunkhannock Township, Monroe County, Pennsylvania, for the amount of $184,900. (Sale of Real Estate Agreement, Dkt. Entry 240-3, at 116a-b.) The Wilsons made an initial down payment of $6,000 and paid an additional $1,000 on July 7, 1999. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ J. Re: Wil-sons, Dkt. Entry 240-6, at 293a-294a.) On July 6, 1999, the Wilsons filled out a Uniform Residential Loan Application for $165,600 in order to secure financing for their home. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ J. Re: Wilsons, Dkt. Entry 240-3, at 122a-123a.) The next day, the Wilsons received a Good Faith Estimate from Eagle Mountain Mortgage Co., estimating their monthly payments at $1,623.99. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ J. Re: Wilsons., Dkt. Entry 240-4, at 124a.) As part of the loan process, Lisa Marie Appraisal Service, Inc. performed an appraisal of the property and newly constructed home on July 15, 1999, assessing a value of $195,000. (Id. at 125a-134a.) At the closing on August 4, 1999, the Wilsons signed a Note and Mortgage Agreement in favor of New Century Mortgage Corp. in the amount of $166,140 at an 8.95% annual interest rate. (Id. at 143a-152a.) The Wilsons also signed a Prepayment Rider Adjustable Rate Loan and an Adjustable Rate Rider Addendum. (Id. at 153a-154a.) When the financing came up short, the PK Defendants lent the Wilsons $9,200 to cover the remaining costs. (Id. at 142a-143a.) The Wilsons, at an unspecified date, went to the Monroe County Tax Assessor’s Office, and saw that their property was valued at $117,889. (Pis.’ App. D, Dkt. Entry 250, at 111.) The Wilsons commissioned Charles Roth to conduct an appraisal. In a report dated May 16, 2001, Mr. Roth valued the Wilsons’ property at $150,000, some $35,000 less than they had paid for it. (Id. at 123-134.) Ocwen Realty Advisors also solicited Nasser Appraisal Service, Inc. to perform an appraisal of the Wilsons’ property. Nasser Appraisal Service, Inc. valued the Wilsons’ property at $140,000 as of February 22, 2002. (Id. at 112-114.) On August 12, 1999, New Century assigned the Wilsons’ loan to Defendant Firstar. (Ex. H, Dkt. Entry 235-4, ¶ 7.) On August 1, 2001, New Century transferred the servicing rights on the Wilsons’ loan to Defendant Ocwen. (Ex. S, Dkt. Entry 235-7, at 6.) There is no dispute that Ocwen was not involved in the marketing of property or financing the transaction. (Ex. F, Dkt. Entry 235-3, ¶¶ 12-16.) As noted above, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania conducted an investigation of the appraisals performed by Lisa Gibson. (Consent Agreement, Dkt Entry 249, at 84-106.) The investigation focused on three properties appraised by Lisa Gibson, one of which was the property bought by Almus and Marilyn Wilson. As a result of its investigation, the Commonwealth initiated a proceeding against Lisa Gibson before the State Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers. The action ultimately settled when the parties reached an agreement, resulting in the assessment of a $3,000 penalty, the costs of investigation, and a twelve month suspension followed by a period of probation. In the agreement, Lisa Gibson (identified as the Respondent) made the following admissions: d. Respondent represented that the land use described neighborhood at the time of the appraisals was 100% one family use. e. Contrary to Respondent’s representations, more than half the Township of Tunkhannock is dedicated to Open Space-Wetlands (OSW) and there are also small retail businesses, hospitality, a service station, etc., and the Pocono Raceway in close proximity.... f.Respondent’s representations concerning the Candlewood Court, Estates Drive and Candlewood Estates neighborhood boundaries were unreasonably broad.... i. In the neighborhood sections of the Candlewood Court and Estates Drive Appraisals, Respondent represented that the single-family housing values in the neighborhood ranged from a low of $60,000 to a high of $250,000 with a predominant value of $150,000. k. The true low sales price in the neighborhood (i.e., Tunkhannock Township) during the one (1) year period preceding the effective dates of the Can-dlewood Court and Estates Drive Appraisals was $18,500. l. The true high sales prices in the neighborhood (i.e., Tunkhannock Township) during the one (1) year period preceding the effective dates of the Can-dlewood Court and Estates Drive Appraisals was $203,000. q. Respondent’s representations concerning the low, high and predominant sales prices of single-family housing in the Candlewood Court and Estates Drive Property neighborhoods during the one (1) year preceding the effective dates of the Candlewood Court and Estates Drive Appraisals were not supported. v. In the Sales Comparison Approaches to the Candlewood Court, Estates Drive, and Candlewood Estates Appraisals, Respondent utilized properties of questionable comparability and/or Respondent failed to properly adjust the sales prices to accurately reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the comparable sale properties. x. In each of the Candlewood Court, Estates Drive, and Candlewood Estate Appraisals, Respondent reported the sales price of Comp 2 to be $195,000. y. Contrary to Respondent’s representations Comp 2 actually sold for $174,500. (Consent Agreement, ¶ 4.) Lisa Gibson adopted these findings in ¶ 12 of the Agreement, when she verified “that the facts and statements set forth in this Agreement are true and correct to the best of Respondent’s knowledge, information and belief.” (Id. ¶ 12.) In a separate action, the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s office initiated a criminal suit against Annette M. Peterson, owner of Mountain Valley Abstract. During the ensuing trial, Dana Kleintop, a former employee of Eagle Valley Homes and Eagle Valley Mortgage, testified to the manner in which the PK Defendants conducted their business affairs. Ms. Kleintop testified that the PK Defendants were “using an inflated appraisal for $200,000 when the house was truly being purchased for $180,000,” falsifying sales agreements and other documents, inflating sale prices, and using the HUD-1 Statements to cover the fact that the borrowers did not have down payments. (Kleintop Dep., Dkt Entry 255, at 307, 311.) On March 23, 2006, Defendants Parisi and Kishbaugh signed a Consent Petition to resolve criminal charges filed against them by the Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Criminal Prosecutions. (Pis.’ App. F, Dkt. Entry 246, at 244.) In.the agreement, the PK Defendants agreed to refrain from violating certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law, the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605, and Regulation “Z”, 12 C.F.R. 226, et seq. Defendants Parisi and Kishbaugh agreed to be permanently enjoined from any business activity as a mortgage banker, mortgage broker, or mortgage salesperson in Pennsylvania. (Id. at 246.) Parisi also agreed to remit to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the sum of $1,000,000 in restitution, penalties and costs, and pay $750,000 to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to be used to create a consumer restitution fund for the forty-one (41) consumers who filed complaints against the PK Defendants. {Id. at 248.) One criterion guiding disbursements from the fund was “the amount of any ‘bona fide’ disparity between the appraisal originally obtained when buying/building a home and a subsequent appraisal by a Pennsylvania licensed appraiser.” {Id.) The Consent Petition anticipated that Par-isi would enter a plea of “nolo contendere” to one count of forgery, and Kishbaugh would enter a plea of nolo contendere to one count of securing execution of documents by deception. {Id. at 250-251.) The PK Defendants entered this agreement without any admission of wrongdoing. {Id.) C. Marco and Maria Yagual Marco and Maria Yagual, similar to the other Plaintiffs, read several advertisements circulated in publications near their home in New Jersey listing homes and properties for sale by the PK Defendants. The Yaguals then decided to travel to the Pocono Mountain Region of Pennsylvania to see the properties and tour the homes. After several phone calls and meetings with the PK Defendants, on August 12, 2001, Mr. Yagual entered into a sales agreement to purchase Lot # 42, Terrace Drive, Mt. Terrace Estates, Chestnuthill, Pennsylvania for the price of $44,000. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ J. Re: Yaguals, Dkt. Entry 223-2, at 116a.) On that same day, Mr. Yagual executed a purchase order for the construction of a two-story home in the amount of $158,000. {Id. at 117a-118a.) Mr. Yagual stated that he was not subjected to any excessive sales pressure by the PK Defendants in purchasing his home. {Id. at 166a.) He also signed an Affiliation Disclosure form acknowledging the common owner of Eagle Valley Homes, Inc., P & K Developers, and Nations 1st Mortgage Company. {Id. at 216a.) The Yagauls made a $40,000 down payment to Eagle Valley Homes and P & K Developers, Inc., {id. at 165a), and later, on August 12, 2001, executed a series of documents with Nations 1st Mortgage Company, which included a Borrower’s Certification and Authorization, Mortgage Broker Fee Agreement, Servicing Disclosure Statement, Internal Revenue Form 4506, Borrower’s Certification and Acknowledgment, Mortgage Loan Origination Agreement, Notice of Applicant Right to Receive Copy of Appraisal Report, Housing Financial Discrimination Act of 1977 Fair Lending Notice, and Disclosure Notices. (Irwin’s Statement of Facts, Dkt. Entry 218, ¶ 4.) On September 9, 2001, Mr. Yagual signed a Good Faith Estimate procured by Nations 1st Mortgage Company for a mortgage in the amount of $178,269 with an annual interest rate of 9%. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ J. Re: Yaguals, Dkt. Entry 223-4, at 139a; Yaguals’ Statement of Facts, Dkt. Entry 238, ¶ 9.) The estimated monthly interest payment was $1,905.39. {Id.) On November 8, 2001, Nations 1 st Mortgage Company prepared another Good Faith Estimate, which included Mr. Yagual’s down payment of $40,000, for a mortgage of $170,500 at an interest rate of 8.25% and a monthly payment of $1,607.33. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ J. Re: Yaguals, Dkt. Entry 223-4, at 140a; Ex. F, Dkt. Entry 219.) These estimates were based on an appraisal performed by Stan Cheslock of NEPA Appraisal Services on August 17, 2001, valuing the Yaguals’ property and home at $206,000. (Id. at 125a-137a.) The closing took place on December 14, 2001, at which Mr. Yagual executed a Note in favor of IMC Mortgage in the amount of $170,500 with an interest rate of 8.25% and a monthly payment of $1280.91, and a mortgage on the property in favor of IMC Mortgage. (Exs. G, H & I, Dkt. Entry 220.) Mr. Yagual asked whether he would need an attorney and was told he would not. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ J. Re: Yaguals, Dkt. Entry 223-5, at 220a.) Mr. Yagual also received a Notice of Assignment and a Notice of Sale or Transfer of Servicing Rights from IFC Mortgage to Irwin Mortgage Corporation. (Irwin’s Statement of Facts, ¶ 9.) Shortly after the closing, the Yaguals received their 2002 tax notice, which increased due to the improvements on their property. As a result, the Yaguals allegedly contacted the Monroe County Assessment Office, who had valued them property at $129,948 for tax purposes. Suspecting some type of fraud, the Yaguals allegedly commissioned independent appraiser Scott Evans, who appraised their property at $177,000 as of June 16, 2003. (Ex. N, Dkt. Entry 220, at 58-59.) The Yaguals filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office, Bureau of Consumer Protection. The PK Defendants, as indicated in the Wilsons’ case, negotiated a Consent Petition with the Attorney General in which, inter alia, they pleaded “nolo contendere” to the counts of fraud against them. In 2002, - Mr. Yagual acquired employment as a longshoreman making $16 per hour. (PK DefsApp. Mem. Mot. Summ J. Re: Yaguals, at 169a.) That same year, he halted his mortgage payments. The following year, Mr. Yagual applied on two different occasions for assistance from the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, (id. at 171a-176a), but was denied on both occasions because he was not suffering financial hardship as required by the agency guidelines. (Id. at 173a, 176a.) Mr. Yagual brought this action on August 8, 2004, and subsequently conveyed title of the property to his wife in 2005. (Ex. J, Dkt. Entry 220, at 45.) D. Charmaine Cooper After reading advertisements in the New York Dally News of homes for sale, Plaintiff Charmaine Cooper became interested in owning her own home. (Cooper Dep., Dkt. Entry 269-5, at 22.) Ms. Cooper then decided to travel to the Pocono Region of Pennsylvania to explore the possibility of purchasing a home. (PK Defs.’ App. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Cooper, Dkt. Entry 281-6, at 290a.) She looked at homes owned by LTS, a real estate company in the area, but decided against purchasing from it. (Id. at 290a-291 a.) Later, Ms. Cooper contacted Eagle Valley Homes and, after receiving a promotional video and printed materials, scheduled an appointment to view its homes. (Id. at 293a.) On January 16, 1999, after viewing several homes owned by Eagle Valley Homes, Ms. Cooper agreed to purchase Lot 501, Candlewood Estates, located in Tunkhan-nock Township, Monroe County, Pennsylvania. (Cooper’s Statement of Facts, Dkt. Entry 285, ¶ 1.) She executed an Agreement of Sale for Real Estate with Steve Parisi and Donald Kishbaugh in the amount of $29,500. {Id. at ¶ 2.) On February 27, 2009, Ms. Cooper signed a Construction Agreement with Eagle Valley Homes for $165,500. (PK Defs.’ App. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Cooper, Dkt. Entry 281-3, at 118a-119a.) Ms. Cooper applied for financing with Bankers First. (M & T’s Statement of Facts, Dkt. Entry 267, at ¶2.) Bankers First, in response, provided Ms. Cooper with two Good Faith Estimates regarding a potential mortgage, which disclosed an estimated loan amount of $185,000, an interest rate of 7.75%, and a total monthly payment of $1,670.61. (PK Defs.’ App. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Cooper, Dkt. Entry 281-3, at 125a-126a.) The Good Faith Estimates, dated February 23, 1999, advised Ms. Cooper of her obligation to pay real estate taxes as well as premiums for private mortgage and hazard insurance. {Id.) The PK Defendants do not operate or manage Bankers First. {Id. at 320a.) As part of the loan process, Jenny Cen-trella, a Pennsylvania licensed real estate appraiser, performed an appraisal on Ms. Cooper’s property for Bankers First. (Jenny Centrella’s Statement of Facts, Dkt. Entry 258-2, ¶ 8.) Ms. Centrella priced Ms. Cooper’s property at $197,500 as of March 3, 1999. {Id. at ¶ 10; PK Defs.’ App. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Cooper, Dkt. Entry 281-4, at 136a-147a.) Some time in February or March of 1999, M & T, successor in merger to Keystone, received a request to evaluate the financing needs of Ms. Cooper. (Aff. Sheri Edwards, Dkt. Entry 268, ¶ 9.) According to Sheri Edwards, an Administrative Vice President of M & T, M & T did not contract to provide financing with Bankers First, but independently evaluated Ms. Cooper’s loan application using appropriate due diligence and underwriting. (Id. at ¶ 12.) M & T’s evaluation of the transaction included an assessment of the reliability of the Centrella appraisal. The closing on Ms. Cooper’s home took place on April 16, 1999. (Cooper’s Statement of Facts, ¶ 10.) At the closing, Ms. Cooper executed a mortgage in the amount of $185,000 in favor of M & T. (Aff. Sheri Edwards, ¶ 3.) Ms. Cooper also executed a HUD-1 Settlement Statement, (Ex. 17, Dkt. Entry 269-2, at 21-22), a Uniform Residential Loan Application, (Ex. 12, Dkt. Entry 269-2, at 9-13), a Construction Loan Agreement (which later converted to a permanent conventional loan), (Ex. 33, Dkt. Entry 269-3, at 32-33), two Truth in Lending Disclosures, advising that the estimated monthly payments would be $1,447,14, (Exs. 34 & 35, at 34-35), a Construction Disbursement Schedule, (Ex. 37, at 37), and an Acknowledgment of Modification of Fees, which reflected estimates of the charges Ms. Cooper would likely incur if she modified her construction loan. (Ex. 38, at 38.) Later, on July 19, 1999, Ms. Cooper executed a Note Modification Agreement with M & T, promising to pay M & T $185,000 at an annual interest rate of 7.75% over thirty years, with a monthly principal and interest payment of $1,325.37. (Ex. 18, Dkt. Entry 269-2, at 23.) She also executed a Monthly Payment Letter, advising her of the required monthly payments of $1,696.98, (Ex. 40, Dkt. Entry 269-3, at 43), a Truth in Lending Disclosure statement, and a Uniform Residential Loan Application based on the final modified terms. (Exs. 39 & 41, at 39 — 41, 44.) In August of 1999, M & T sold Ms. Cooper’s mortgage loan to Bank of America Mortgage. (Ex. 42, at 45.) In 2001, Ms. Cooper contacted the Monroe County Assessor’s Office, and learned that her property was valued at $137,214. Because the value was dramatically lower than her original appraisal, Ms. Cooper commissioned an appraisal by Mr. Charles E. Roth, who appraised her home at $140,000 as of April, 12, 2002. (PK Defs.’ App. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Cooper, Dkt. Entry 281-5, at 197a-211a.) Another appraisal was performed by Hubbard Real Estate, which valued Ms. Cooper’s home at $251,000 as of June 8, 2003. (Id. at 213a-215a.) In 2003 or 2004, Ms. Cooper stopped making payments on her loan with Bank of America. (Cooper Dep., Dkt. Entry 269-5, at 78.) She filed for bankruptcy protection on two separate occasions. In 2004 she made a few mortgage payments while under bankruptcy protection, but was dismissed from bankruptcy because she failed to continue making those payments. (Id. at 80.) In 2006 her bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed because she failed to attend credit counseling. (Id. at 84.) On October 10, 2006, Ms. Cooper agreed to a Loan Modification Agreement with Bank of America, in which her indebtedness under the loan and principal owed were added together for a total of $241,182.45. (Ex. 43, Dkt. Entry 269-4.) III. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “Facts that could alter the outcome are material facts.” Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir.1994). “[Sjummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Initially, the moving party must show the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Car trett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party, and the entire record must be examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir.1988). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the nonmoving party “must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Mere conclusory allegations or denials taken from the pleadings are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990). Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment if there was adequate time for discovery and a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. B. RICO Principles Central to each Plaintiffs claim is the appraisal that supported the financing for each transaction. Defendants contend that there is no admissible evidence of an inflated appraisal of the property each plaintiff purchased. Absent an inflated appraisal, argue the Defendants, Plaintiffs cannot show any injury attributable to a pattern of racketeering activity. The Racketeering Act provides civil damages for “any person injured in business or property by reason of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1995) (emphasis added). The question of whether a plaintiff made out a claim of injury to his or her business or property as a result of a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO has been described as a standing issue. See Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000) (considering standing in the context of whether appellants have alleged a valid RICO injury to business or property); see also Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 520 (3d Cir.1998) (pointing to section 1964(c) as the “standing requirement” for RICO suits). Along with the Article III constitutional and prudential standing requirements, a plaintiff seeking recovery under RICO must satisfy the additional standing requirement of injury to property or business as a proximate result of the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. See Maio, 221 F.3d at 482. A plaintiff “only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business and property by the conduct constituting the [RICO] violation.” Sedima, S.P.R.L., v. Imrex Company, Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). The Third Circuit has read section 1964(c) “as requiring two distinct threshold showings: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury to business or property; and (2) that the plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.” Maio, 221 F.3d at 483. Thus, whether viewed as a standing or substantive merits question, the ability of any Plaintiff to recover in this action depends upon proof of a fraudulent appraisal. In the instant case, in order to show a cognizable injury, Plaintiffs must set forth competent evidence that their property was overvalued. If Plaintiffs’ property was indeed overvalued, then they paid more than its fair market value, paid more in interest, and incurred a concrete injury as a result of the allegedly fraudulent appraisal that is the linchpin of the RICO claims. See Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 249 (3d Cir.2001) (finding that “when a defendant fraudulently misleads individuals into purchasing equity interests in real property, an injury occurs at the time of investment”); Maio, 221 F.3d at 489 (reasoning that when a property interest of tangible nature is at stake, an injury to that property may be demonstrated by reference to external conditions or the occurrence of events which cause the value of the real or personal property to be reduced); Heinold v. Perlstein, 651 F.Supp. 1410, 1411 (E.D.Pa.1987) (finding that even though the plaintiff was induced by misrepresentations as to the value of the diamond ring, the plaintiff did not suffer an injury in purchasing the ring because he did not pay more than its fair market value). C. The Wilson/McLean RICO Claims Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean have not set forth competent evidence that their property was overvalued. The sole evidence in favor of Plaintiffs’ allegations that the PK Defendants overstated the fair market value of the property is Ms. Wilson’s testimony. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, at 213a, 220a.) A party cannot simply rely on allegations, but must put forth evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party “must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The nonmoving party cannqt “simply reassert factually unsupported allegations contained in [the] pleadings.” Williams, 891 F.2d at 460 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548). According to the HUD-1 Settlement statements dated September 11, 2000, and September 14, 2000, Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean purchased their home for $235,000. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, Dkt. Entry 181-3, at 132a-135a.) The value of the home was based on an appraisal performed on August 7, 2000, by Lisa Marie Appraisal Service. (Id. at 137a-146a.) The PK Defendants have provided the complete ten page appraisal along with a review appraisal conducted by Lucarelli Appraisal Group on February 11, 2004. (Id. at 149a-153a.) The purpose of the review appraisal was to verify the accuracy of the factual data and conclusions, and to determine the reasonableness of the value opinion expressed in the Lisa Marie appraisal report. (Id. at 150a.) The Lucarelli report concluded that the market value of the real property was $233,000 as of August 7, 2000, the effective date of the original appraisal report. (Id. at 151a.) The value attributed to the property by the review appraisal indicates that the Lisa Marie appraisal was not grossly inflated as suggested by Plaintiffs. Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean submit as proof of them property’s lower market value their testimony as to what they saw at the Monroe County Assessor’s Office in 2003. (Wilson & McLeans’ Br. Opp’n PK Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. Entry 191, at 3; PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean (Aff. Hill ¶ 8.), Dkt. Entry 181-3, at 147a.) The Monroe County Assessor’s Office valued their property at $139,132 pursuant to 72 P.S. § 5453.602, which permits a county to adopt a base year market value in assessing properties. Monroe County has adopted a base year of 1989, the year of the last county-wide reassessment. (PK Defs.’ App. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean (Aff. Hill ¶ 8.), Dkt. Entry 181-4, at 231a-234a.) According to Thomas Hill, the Chief County Assessor, the actual value of $139,132 is an equalized value of the property (land and building), which represents the base year value of the property. (Id.; Aff. Hill ¶ 13.) It follows logically that Monroe County’s appraisal, expressed in terms of the value of the dollar in 1989, would be significantly lower than the appraisal conducted on August 7, 2000. Thus, Monroe County’s valuation based on the value of the property in 1989 dollars does not undermine confidence in the appraisal performed by Lisa Marie Appraisal Service. In addition to the Monroe County appraisal, Ms. Wilson testified that she commissioned an appraisal in connection with her attempt to refinance her home. (Id. at 122a.) She testified that the appraisal valued her property $175,000, making it impossible for her to refinance. (Id.) Her testimony as to the values expressed in some other appraisal is, of course, hearsay. This evidence is not competent and cannot be used to defeat summary adjudication of an issue. See Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 961 n. 1 (3d Cir.1996) (finding that a hearsay statement by an unknown individual is not capable of being admissible at trial); Olympic Junior, Inc., v. David Crystal, Inc., 463 F.2d 1141, 1146 (3d. Cir.1972) (noting that factual allegations not based on personal knowledge would be insufficient to avoid summary judgment); Gostin v. Nelson, 363 F.2d 371, 371 (3d Cir.1966). Neither Plaintiff has identified the appraiser or provided any information from which the identity of the appraiser could be determined. Nor is there any competent evidence that refinancing could not be secured because there was insufficient value in the property. The proposed lender or lenders have not been identified. Ms. Wilson’s testimony that refinancing could not be secured is hearsay. There is nothing in the record to indicate that refinancing could not be secured because the property was worth substantially less than the Lisa Marie appraised value. Therefore, the record lacks any competent proof that the property value was less than that presented in the 2000 appraisal. Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean insist that they will offer expert testimony at trial as to the real estate market conditions in 2000, but they are required at this stage to “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Williams, 891 F.2d at 460 (citations omitted). The trial stage is too late. A defending party cannot be put to the burden and expense of a trial based solely upon a plaintiffs unsubstantiated promise that pertinent evidence will be forthcoming. Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean further assert that the interest rate on the mortgages procured by the PK Defendants exceeded market rates. (Wilson & McLeans’ Br. Opp’n PK Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., at 9.) To support this allegation, Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean state that they “will be able to offer expert testimony regarding the market conditions in 2000,” (id. at 8), and “believe this rate [11.4%] exceeds market rates.” (Id. at 9.) The summary judgment process, however, does not contemplate allowing the non-moving party to avoid summary adjudication based on expressed intentions to gather evidence. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the rate imposed was for a subprime transaction. Plaintiffs cannot defeat summary judgment by simply claiming that the interest rate was too high. In short, Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean insist that they were defrauded on the value of their property, received an inflated appraisal, and consequently had to take out a larger mortgage loan, pay higher monthly payments, and pay higher interest rates. As a result of this alleged fraud, when they encountered financial difficulties, they were unable to refinance their home. All of these injuries stem from the alleged fraudulent estimate of their home’s market value. Since Ms. Wilson and Mr. McLean have not produced competent evidence of an inflated appraisal, the PK Defendants and Lisa Gibson are entitled to summary judgment on the RICO claims. D. Indymac’s Counterclaim against Natalie Wilson Defendant Indymac Bank asserts a counterclaim in mortgage foreclosure and breach of contract, seeking all amounts owed by Ms. Wilson for her Note of September 14, 2000 for $188,000. (Def. Indy-mac’s Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. Entry 287.) Claiming she was unable to make monthly payments because of this litigation, Ms. Wilson argues Indymac’s Motion for Summary Judgment is premature and should be stayed pending the outcome of this litigation. (PI. Natalie Wilson’s Br. Opp’n to Def. Indymac’s Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. Entry 297, at 2.) This Court has already dismissed Ms. Wilson’s claims against Indymac (Dkt. Entry 221). Ms. Wilson offers no valid reason why she can merely suspend making all payments on the Note under these circumstances. In-dyMac, as holder of the Note, is entitled to enforce its terms, even though Ms. Wilson pursues claims against other entities. Any recourse she has as to other Defendants does not relieve her of the obligations created by the Note and Mortgage. Ms. Wilson’s failure to make the payments on the Note is undisputed. In fact, she admits that “she has not made mortgage payments since approximately September of 2003.” (PI. Natalie Wilson’s Br. Opp’n to Def. Indymac’s Mot. Summ. J., at 2; PK Defs.’ App. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wilson & McLean, at 158a.) “Upon default, the holder of a mortgage can legally proceed to enforce the terms of the mortgage either by foreclosure proceedings or by obtaining judgment on the bond accompanying the mortgage and issuing a writ of execution.” Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1056-1057 (Pa.Super.Ct.1998). “The entry of summary judgment is proper if the mortgagors admit that the mortgage is in default, that they have failed to pay interest on the obligation, and that the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount.” Id. at 1057 (quoting Landau v. W. Pa. Nat’l Bank, 445 Pa. 217, 282 A.2d 335, 340 (1971)). Indymac has exercised its right to accelerate the principal, interest, late fees and other amounts due on Ms. Wilson’s Note and mortgage. Indymac seeks payments of principal in the amount of $182,655.72, interest of $63,928.94, late charges of $3,365.55, escrow of $25,154.63, and other fees of $25,058.29, for a total of $301,163.13. (Soven Deck, Dkt. Entry 288-2, ¶ 8.) Indymac also requests attorney’s fees and costs resulting from Ms. Wilson’s default in the amount of $2,500. (Id. at ¶ 9.) As the facts are undisputed and the liability is clear, IndyMac’s motion will be granted, and judgment will be entered against Ms. Wilson in the requested amount of $303,663.13. E. Almus and Marilyn Wilsons’ RICO Claims 1. The PK Defendants a. Statute of Limitations As a threshold matter, the PK Defendants have raised the statute of limitations defense. Civil RICO actions are governed for a four year limitations period. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 156, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (selecting a 4-year statute of limitations for civil RICO actions). Our Court of Appeals has adopted the injury discovery rule to determine when the four (4) year limitations period will begin to run. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 156, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (selecting a 4-year statute of limitations for civil RICO actions); Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471, 483-484 (3d Cir.2000) (adopting the injury discovery rule). The injury discovery rule functions to postpone the beginning of the statutory limitations period from the date when the alleged fraud occurred to the date when the plaintiff knew or should have known of their injury. Cetel v. Kirwan Financial Group, Inc. 460 F.3d 494, 507 (3d Cir.2006). Our Court of Appeals has recognized that the injury discovery rule contains both subjective and objective components. Id. The subjective component is satisfied “no later than when the plaintiffs themselves discover their injuries.” Id. “However, because the components are disjunctive [the court must] first perform an objective inquiry to determine when plaintiffs should have known of the basis of their claims, which ‘depends on whether [and when] they had sufficient information of possible wrongdoing to place them on ‘inquiry notice’ or to excite ‘storm warnings’ of ‘culpable activity.’ ” Defendants have the burden of showing the existence of “storm warnings,” or “any information or accumulation of data that would alert a reasonable person to the probability that misleading statements or significant omissions had been made.” Id. An analysis of the injury discovery rule is extremely fact-specific. Mathews, 260 F.3d at 250. “Since the applicability of the statute of limitations usually involves questions of fact for the jury, defendants bear a heavy burden in seeking to establish as a matter of law that the challenged claims are barred.” Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 498 (3d Cir.1985). The PK Defendants have not met the requisite “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the Wilsons knew or should have known of their injury before August 6, 2000, four years prior to the commencement of this action. The PK Defendants contend that the Wilsons were aware of the alleged fraud sometime in the year 1999, or at the latest early 2000, because the Wilsons failed to pay their property taxes in the year 2000. In support of their argument, the PK Defendants point to the Wilsons’ testimony that they stopped paying the property taxes as a result of the alleged fraud. The PK Defendants further rely on an Account History Listing of the Wilsons’ property by the Monroe County Treasurer’s Office that contains an accounting of the bills and payments on the Wilson’s property. (Account History Listing, Dkt. Entry 278-2, at SAIL) The Account History Listing and testimony are insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the Wilsons discovered them alleged injury before August 6, 2000. Almus Wilson testified that he stopped paying real estate taxes sometime in 2001 and 2002, when he discovered “there was fraud involved in the appraisal.” (Supp. App. Statute of Limitations, Dkt. Entry 278-2, at SA4.) Marilyn Wilson testified she stopped paying real estate taxes as a result of the fraud, namely the inflated appraisal, which occurred after 2000. (Id. at SA5.) The Account History submitted by the PK Defendants is unauthenticated evidence which cannot be considered on a motion for summary adjudication. The PK Defendants have failed to submit any testimony or foundation giving meaning and context to this document. See U.S. v. Dibble, 429 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir.1970) (“The foundation is laid for receiving a document in evidence by the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge of the facts who attests to the identity and due execution of the document and, where appropriate, its delivery.”). In short, the Wilsons’ testimony and the Account History Listing are insufficient to conclude that, as a matter of law, the Wilsons knew of their alleged injury before August of 2000. Thus, the PK Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the statute of limitations defense. b. The Racketeering Act Claims The mainstay of the PK Defendants arguments is that the Wilsons cannot prove that the price paid for their home exceeded its fair market value, (PK Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Re: Wilsons, Dkt. Entry 240, at 9), nor prove that a scheme to defraud existed or that they were injured or damaged as a result of mail or wire fraud. (Id. at 11.) As indicated above with respect to Rayon McLean and Natalie Wilson, plaintiffs are required to make a preliminary showing with competent evidence that they suffered an injury by reason of an inflated appraisal. As asserted at p. 12 of the Wilsons Opposition Brief, “[t]he basis for the conspiracy scheme was the inflated appraisal.” Thus, the viability of their RICO claims turns upon the question of whether they can show a fraudulent appraisal. In addition to the original appraisal of the property (attributing a value of $195,000), the Wilsons have submitted two other appraisals. The first appraisal, dated May 16, 2001, valued the Wilsons’ property at $150,000. (Pis.’ App. D, at 125.) The other appraisal, dated February 22, 2002, valued the property at $140,000. (Pis.’ App. D, at 114.) The difference between the original appraisal conducted in July of 1999 and the appraisal in May of 2001, a little less than two year period, was $45,000. To give context to this decrease in price, Plaintiffs have submitted “A Study of Mortgage Foreclosures in Monroe County,” which reports that the average mean sale price of properties between $25,000 and $500,000 increased from $94,030.45 in 1999 to $ 110,883.83 in 2001. (Pis.’ App. E., Dkt. Entry 251, at 209.) This evidence supports an inference that the Wilsons’ property value was substantially less than the appraised amount at the time of its purchase. This evidence, coupled with other evidence presented in the record, suffices to establish a genuine dispute of fact material to the question of whether the appraisal performed in connection with the sale of the property was fraudulent and thereby caused injury to the Wilsons. In this regard, the Wilsons point to admissions made by Lisa Gibson in the proceeding before the State Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers. In that action, the Wilsons’ property is spe-cifieally listed as a property affected by Lisa Gibson’s misconduct. In her settlement agreement, Lisa Gibson admitted that she improperly performed her appraisal of the Wilsons’ property by misrepresenting, among other things, the land, boundaries and sales prices of the surrounding properties. These admissions, coupled with the appraisals performed in 2001 and 2002, are sufficient to support an inference that a fraudulent appraisal caused the Wilsons to suffer injury to property. The PK Defendants still contend there is insufficient evidence of a scheme to defraud. (PK Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., at 13; PK Defs.’ Corrective Reply Mem. Law, Dkt. Entry 262, at 7.) The Wilsons claim that the PK Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which provides: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Four elements are required for a § 1962(c) claim: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). “Racketeering activity” is conduct proscribed by a number of specifically identified provisions under Title 18 of the United States Code, which include mail fraud (§ 1341) and wire fraud (§ 1343). 18 U.S.C. § 1961. A pattern of racketeering activity requires “at least two acts of racketeering activity within a 10-year period.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) (internal citations omitted). To prove mail or wire fraud, the evidence must establish “(1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails or interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme.” U.S. v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.1984); Walter v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 480 F.Supp.2d 797, 803 (E.D.Pa.2007)) (quoting United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 142 n. 3 (3d Cir.2002))). Identical standards apply to the “scheme to defraud” element under both the mail and the wire fraud statutes. Antico, 275 F.3d at 245 (citing United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 586 n. 11 (1st Cir.1996). As explained by our Court of Appeals, “a scheme or artifice to defraud ‘need not be fraudulent on its face, but must involve some sort of fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’ ” Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1415 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir.1978)). It is not essential that the scheme involve an affirmative misrepresentation, but “the statutory term ‘defraud’ usually signifies ‘the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.’ ” Id. (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987)); see also United States v. Frankel, 721 F.2d 917, 921 (3d Cir.1983). The fact finder may infer a defendant’s knowledge and intent from circumstantial evidence. Weaver v. Mobile Diagnostech, Inc., No. 02-cv-1719, 2007 WL 1830712, at *9 (W.D.Pa. June 25, 2007); see also Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., Inc., 46 F.3d 258, 270 (3d Cir.1995) (citations omitted). Proof of specific intent “may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir.1995) (citations omitted). In this case, there is sufficient evidence that the Wilsons were “deprived of something by deceit” — that they paid more than fair market value for their property as a result of a fraudulent appraisal. In considering the PK Defendants role in this alleged fraudulent appraisal, a jury could reasonably infer that they knowingly participated in the scheme to defraud, or knew of the inflated appraisal. Ms. Kleintop testified to alleged fraudulent practices of the PK Defendants. Moreover, Lisa Gibson’s admission that she misrepresented the Wilsons’ property value in her appraisal would logically implicate the PK Defendants. As an appraiser, Lisa Gibson would have little motivation to inflate property values except to benefit a party to the transaction. In contrast, the PK Defendants would have a significant interest in obtaining an inflated appraisal. A jury could infer that Lisa Gibson was working collusively with the PK Defendants. If a property’s value was insufficient collateral to support a loan, a financial institution would refuse to provide the financing, causing the transaction to collapse. Thus, by inflating the property value, the PK Defendants could secure financing. The PK Defendants could also make a larger profit upon selling the properties. Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the appraisal of the Wilsons’ property, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find the PK Defendants participated in, knew of, or should have known of a scheme to defraud. The PK Defendants argue that Ms. Kleintop’s testimony is irrelevant as to whether the PK Defendants violated RICO in selling a home to the Wilsons. (PK Defendants’ Reply Mem. Re: Wilsons, Dkt. Entry 262, at 3.) Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. Rule 401 does not impose a high standard. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir.1999). At least at the summary judgment stage, Ms. Kleintop’s testimony is relevant to the PK Defendants’ business practices and does make it more probable that the PK Defendants engaged in these practices in the Wilsons’ case. The mailing requirement may be satisfied by “innocent” mailings, ones that contain no false information, and mailings that are part of a routine practice. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989); see also Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1413 (1991). Furthermore, “[u]se of the mails and wires does not have to be an essential part of the fraudulent scheme. Rather, it is sufficient if the mailings are incident to an essential part of the scheme or a step in the plot.” Gilmour v. Bohmueller, No. Civ.A. 04-2535, 2005 WL 241181, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Jan.27, 2005) (citing United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir.1977)) (citations omitted). The PK Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on the use of the mails or interstate wires elements. It would appear that the Wilsons could meet these elements. Accordingly, the PK Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the Wilsons’ Racketeering Act claim. 2. Defendant Lisa Gibson Lisa Gibson contends that the Wilsons have no evidence to establish that she engaged in a conspiracy under RICO to inflate real estate prices. (Lisa Marie Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. Entry 280, at 1.) As mentioned previously, “a defendant may be held liable for conspiracy to violate section 1962(c) if he knowingly agrees to facilitate a scheme which includes the operation or management of a RICO enterprise.” Smith, 247 F.3d at 538 (emphasis added); Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64, 118 S.Ct. 469 (“If conspirators have a plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.”); Dongelewicz, 104 Fed.Appx. at 818. As noted above, there is competent evidence that supports an inference that the Lisa Gibson appraisal was a fraud. A jury could reasonably