Full opinion text
ORDER RICHARD H. KYLE, District Judge. Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Objections to the March 20, 2008, Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron, in which Judge Mayeron has recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. The summary judgment proceedings before Judge Mayeron were thoroughly briefed by the parties and Judge Mayeron heard extensive oral argument on January 18, 2008. The undersigned has reviewed de novo the Report and Recommendation and Plaintiffs’ Objections thereto; that review has included a review of the briefs submitted to Judge Mayeron and a transcript of the January 18th oral arguments, and the briefs submitted to the undersigned with respect to the pending Objections. Based on this de novo review, the undersigned is satisfied that Judge Mayeron’s recommendation is fully supported by the facts before her as well as applicable and controlling legal authority and should be adopted. In view of Judge Mayeron’s exhaustive analysis of both the factual record and legal issues, the undersigned can see no benefit of issuing a second opinion which would reach the same result as Judge Mayeron. Accordingly, and upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Objections (Doc. No. 198) are OVERRULED; 2. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 195) is ADOPTED; 3. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 147) is GRANTED; and 4. The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 25) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION JANIE S. MAYERON, United States Magistrate Judge. The above matter came on before the undersigned upon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 147], M. William O’Brien, Esq. and Justin Cum-mins, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiffs; Jacqueline Mrachek, Esq. and Nancy Bra-sel, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendants. This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation by the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c). I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs in this action, Francisca Sandoval, Ines Hernandez, Miriam Pachecho, Eva Reyes, Arminda Gomez, Nidia Guerrero, Lucila Marquez, Maria Perez, Azucena Garcia, Estela Laureano, and Marlene Giron, have sued defendant American Building Maintenance Industries, Inc. (“ABMI”), alleging sexual harassment and other employment-related claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). Plaintiffs Garcia, Laureano and Giron also have asserted these claims against defendant American Building Maintenance Co. of Kentucky (“ABM Kentucky” or “ABM”). ABMI now moves for summary judgment against all plaintiffs on the grounds that it has never been plaintiffs’ employer, nor can it be liable for the actions of ABM Kentucky, one of its subsidiaries. In addition, both defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that none of the plaintiffs can make out claims of sexual harassment, retaliation and gender discrimination. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Unigroup, Inc. v. O’Rourke Storage & Transfer Co., 980 F.2d 1217, 1219 (8th Cir.1992). “[S]um-mary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “ ‘Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’ ” DePugh v. Smith, 880 F.Supp. 651, 656 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep’t of Fire & Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir.2000). If the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995). “The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial.” Minnesota Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Swenke, 2003 WL 21521755, *1, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11439, *4-5 (D.Minn.2003) (citations omitted). The non-moving party “must substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in [their] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Wilson v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir.1995). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider admissible evidence. See Henthorn v. Capitol Commc’ns, Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir.2004); see also Stuart v. Gen’l Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 636 n. 20 (8th Cir.2000) (“To be considered on summary judgment, documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit made on personal knowledge setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence or a deposition that meets the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).”). III. ABMI’S LIABILITY Defendant ABMI seeks summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Title VII and MHRA claims on grounds that it is not plaintiffs’ employer. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at pp. 17-23. Liability under Title VII and the MHRA only apply to a plaintiff’s “employer.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. In opposition, plaintiffs argued that ABMI was plaintiffs’ sole employer, or in the alternative, ABMI is a joint employer or integrated enterprise with ABM Kentucky. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment (“Pis.’ Mem.”) at pp. 98-101. A. Factual Background The undisputed facts bearing on ABMI’s motion for summary judgment are as follows. 1. General Background In December 2004, American Building Maintenance Co. of Illinois (“ABM Illinois”), which had been operating in Minnesota since April 2001 under the assumed name of “ABM Janitorial Services,” entered into an agreement to transfer all of its operations in Minnesota, and other Midwestern states to ABM Kentucky. See Affidavit of Jacqueline Mrachek (“Mrachek Aff.”), Ex. 13 (Certificate of Assumed Name), Ex. 15 (Written Consent of the Sole Shareholder of ABM Illinois). At that point, both ABM Kentucky and ABM Illinois became wholly-owned subsidiaries of ABM Janitorial Services, Inc., which in turn, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ABMI. See Affidavit of Maria Natoli Miller (“Miller Aff.”), ¶ 4; see also Mrachek Aff., Ex. 40 (Southard Dep.), Deposition Exhibit (“Dep.Ex.”) 1 (Southard’s business card). ABMI owns all of the shares of ABM Kentucky, which has a fixed value of $2,500. See Affidavit of Justin D. Cum-mins (“Cummins Aff.”), Ex. 246 at pp. ABM07222-ABM7223. On December 12, 2004, the Minnesota Secretary of State issued a “Certificate of Authority to Transact Business” in Minnesota to “American Building Maintenance Co. of Kentucky.” Mrachek Aff., Ex. 12. The state of incorporation for ABM Kentucky is California. Id. According to the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, ABM Kentucky, d/b/a ABM Janitorial Services, became the successor employer to ABM Illinois effective January 1, 2005. Id., Ex. 18 (Unemployment Tax Liability Determination, ABM06661). ABM Kentucky operates in Minnesota under the name of “ABM Janitorial Services” and occasionally under the name of “American Building Maintenance Co.” See Miller Aff., ¶ 2. On January 31, 2006, the Minnesota Secretary of State issued a “Foreign Corporations Certificate of Revocation” for ABM Kentucky arising out its failure to file an annual report in violation of Minnesota Law. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 256, PABM 002970. The failure by ABM Kentucky to file an annual report stemmed from the illness of the individual who was in charge of filing the annual report with the Minnesota Secretary of State. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 19 (Request for Admission No. 32). On July 11, 2006, the Minnesota Secretary of State issued a “Certificate of Reinstatement” allowing ABM Kentucky to conduct business in Minnesota. Id., ABM07908. As of March, 2007, ABM Kentucky has gone by the name of ABM Janitorial Services-North Central. See Miller Aff., ¶ 2. As stated previously, the assumed name “ABM Janitorial Services” had been used by ABM Illinois since April 2001 and then by ABM Kentucky after the transfer of ABM Illinois’ operations in Minnesota and other states to ABM Kentucky. See Miller Aff., ¶ 2; Mrachek Aff., Ex. 13 (Certificate of Assumed Name); Cummins Aff., Ex. 258, PABM 002951 (Business Organizations Inquiry). The Minnesota address for ABM Illinois was 760 Harding Street; the principal place of business for ABM Illinois is 160 Pacific Avenue San Francisco, California 94111. See Mrachek Aff., Ex.' 13 (Certificate of Assumed Name); Cummins Aff., Ex. 258, PABM 002951 (Business Organizations Inquiry). A Dunn and Bradstreet Company snapshot for ABMI provides that it is incorporated at 160 Pacific Avenue, Ste. 222, San Francisco, California; it also provides that ABMI has a branch located at 3150 Ranchview Lane, Minneapolis, Minnesota. See Cum-mins Aff., Ex. 103, PABM 3234, 3246. However, ABMI has no employees in Minnesota. See Miller Aff., ¶ 5. 2. ABM Kentucky Management ABM Kentucky is comprised of five branches that are located in Des Moines, Iowa; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri; and Omaha, Nebraska. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 1 (Summary of North Central Region). ABM Kentucky’s Regional Vice President is Jeffory Southard, whose office is located in the Minneapolis Branch. Id., Ex. 40 at p. 48, Ex. 1 (Southard Dep.). Southard reported directly to Jan Kaupas, the Executive Vice President of ABM Janitorial Services, Inc., and Jim McClure, the President of ABM Janitorial Services, Inc. Id. at pp. 11-13. While Southard was responsible for everything that occurred at ABM Kentucky, including the Minnesota Branch, McClure has the final authority on all matters of ABM Kentucky, which encompassed company policy, its implementation and enforcement. Id. at pp. 93-94. The Minneapolis Branch Manager for ABM Kentucky is Chuck Ketchem, who reported to Southard. Id., Ex. 38 at pp. 14, '29 (Ketchem Dep.). Each of ABM Kentucky’s branches has its own human resources director. See Affidavit of Jeffory Southard (“Southard Aff.”), ¶ 4. ABM Kentucky’s former Regional Human Resources Director, Julie Mork, the Assistant Regional Vice President, Blake Ahrens, and the Controller for ABM Kentucky, Troy Hanson, all reported to Southard. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 40 at pp. 94-95 (Southard Dep.). ABM Kentucky and ABMI share the same Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, Secretary and Vice President of Finance. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 28 at pp. 132-33; 244-45 (Southard Dep.), 246 (ABM07214, ABM07211, ABM07227-ABM07228). Further, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer for ABMI signed off on the appointments of the Executive Vice President, the Vice President of Finance, Secretary and the Board of Directors for a number of ABMI subsidiaries, including ABM Kentucky. Id., Ex. 246, ABM07239, ABM07236, ABM07214, ABM07220, AB M07220-ABM07221, ABM07215, ABM07236. 3. ABM Kentucky Operations On January 1, 1999, ABMI and ABM Kentucky entered into a Service Agreement whereby ABMI agreed to provide certain services to ABM Kentucky, including accounting services, administrative services, electronic services, employee benefits, human resources, insurance, legal services, safety advice and treasury services. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 242, Article 1. The accounting services set forth in the Service Agreement included providing financial policies and procedures, payroll tax, depositing, independent audits, and the preparing and filing of federal and state income tax reports. Id., ¶ 1.1. The administrative services included the negotiation and management of national accounts, management of uniform company logos and signage, and the purchase of business cards and stationary. Id., ¶ 1.2. Electronic services related to computer telecommunications systems included the purchasing of equipment, development of software and technical support. Id, ¶ 1.3. Employment benefits services included the administration of employee benefits programs. Id., ¶ 1.4. As it pertained to human resources, ABMI, through its human resources department, agreed to provide to ABM Kentucky the following services: a) Assist in the development of human resource policies applicable to Subsidiary; b) Assist on the development and distribution of employee handbooks and employment-related forms for use by Subsidiary; c) Assist Subsidiary with employment-related workplace posting requirements; d) Provide employee relations personnel to assist Subsidiary with employment-related problems; e) Provide employment related legal advice and guidance; f) Manage all employment-related lawsuits, claims and liability; g) Preparation of Annual Affirmative Action Plan(s); h) Provide support for Subsidiary in cases of governmental audits; i) Manage human resources information services; j) Develop and present employment-related division training programs. Id., ¶ 1.5. The insurance services included negotiating insurance coverage for workers and managing worker compensation insurance and claims. Id., ¶ 1.6. As to legal services, ABMI’s legal department agreed to provide to ABM Kentucky such services as the negotiation and drafting of service and procurement agreements. Id., ¶ 1.7. As related to safety, ABMI agreed to provide to ABM Kentucky advice necessary to enable ABM Kentucky to comply with laws dealing with the safety of employees, to develop and distribute safety-related training and education, and publish and distribute appropriate safety manuals. Id., ¶ 1.8. Treasury services included establishing and maintaining banking relationships. Id., ¶ 1.9. In exchange for these services, ABM Kentucky agreed to pay to ABMI 1% of its gross operating revenue and agreed to “follow policies and guidelines developed pursuant to the Service Agreement, as well as such corporate guidelines as may be developed and promulgated from time to time.” Id, ¶¶ 2.1, 2.3. ABM Kentucky budgets for the 1% gross operating revenue for the services provided under the Service Agreement. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 28 at p. 257 (Southard Dep.). On September 1, 2004, ABMI and ABM Kentucky executed the First Amendment to Service Agreement, which added real estate and marketing to the services to be provided to ABM Kentucky. Id, Ex. 242, ABM04018-19 (First Amendment to Service Agreement). In addition, pursuant to the Amendment, ABM Kentucky agreed to pay ABMI separate amounts for electronic services, employee benefits services, insurance services and safety services. Id, ABM04019. Vice President and Deputy General Counsel for ABMI, Miller, represented that the specific services provided to ABM Kentucky under the Service Agreement were “limited, ministerial, and based on economies of scale, rather than control.” See Second Affidavit of Maria Natoli Miller (“Second Miller Aff.”), ¶ 5. Miller also stated that ABMI purchased for ABM Kentucky workers’ compensation insurance, obtained licenses for sexual harassment videos, negotiated the contract for the Harassment Hotline, submitted motor vehicle record checks to a single provider, and drafted certain forms such as performance evaluations. Id. Southard stated that ABM Kentucky developed its own hiring policies and practices, investigation policies and practices, safety policies and practices, work rules, affirmative action plans, attendance policies and practices, and disciplinary policies and practices. Second Southard Aff., ¶ 5. In addition, ABM Kentucky developed and implemented its own human resources policies, and negotiated and maintained its own health insurance for its employees. Id., ¶ 3. ABM Kentucky’s Regional Human Resources Director and the Human Resource Director for the Minneapolis Branch, until September of 2007, was Julie Mork. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 2 (Business Card), Ex. 39 at pp. 20-21 (Mork Dep.); see also Declaration of Julie Mork (“Mork Deck”), ¶ 1. Mork’s office was located in the Minneapolis Branch for ABM Kentucky at 760 Harding Street, Minneapolis, MN 55413. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 2. Four additional ABM Kentucky employees, Tammy Rogers, Amy Severson, Robert Janecek and Mary Hesler also had human resource responsibilities for ABM Kentucky. Id., Ex. 39 at p. 133, Dep. Ex. 13 (Mork Dep-List of Human Resources Responsibility). Mork’s responsibilities dealt with workers’ compensation, harassment and discrimination claims, safety, affirmative action, payroll, insurance, and employee legal issues. Id. Rogers’ responsibilities included dealing with payroll questions and concerns; maintenance of hiring packages, W-4 changes, termination reports, and vacation; and handling levies and garnishments, union dues, stock and 401K and unemployment issues, Id. Severson was in charge of employee insurance, COBRA issues, assisting in hiring and recruiting, leave-of-absences, FMLA issues, short-term disability, and notifications of open positions. Janecek was in charge of supervisor development training, new hire training, performance recognition and safety. Id. Hes-ler dealt with administrative issues in the human resources department. Id. Mork testified that she handled employment legal issues and that whenever she received an employment-related administrative charge or lawsuit she would forward a copy of it to ABMI. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 20 at p. 96 (Mork Dep.). In addition, Mork dealt directly with union representatives in connection with handing grievances. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 39 at p. 126 (Mork Dep.). Mork also developed, with the help of her assistant, a document called the “Field Guide” for employees’ use. Id. at pp. 130-31, 161-62. According to Mork, any changes to the sexual harassment policy or procedure would be made by her, Ketchem and Janecek, all of whom were employees of ABM Kentucky. Id. at pp. 279-80. The training in Spanish was carried out by Janecek and an assistant by the name of Louis Camacho. Id. at pp. 63-64. Janecek also handled annual trainings for nonunion employees, and new hire orientation for union employees, which included a sexual harassment component. Id. at pp. 60-63, 67-70, 76. Further, ABM Kentucky staff provided annual training for union employees on sexual harassment. Id. at p. 76. In addition, Mork testified that she, Ketchem and Janecek put together a staffing office, the new hire orientation and training program for individuals in non-union positions. Id. at pp. 28-30, 60-62. ABM Kentucky employees have access to a Harassment Hotline, which provides a toll-free number for any employee to report “any allegation of sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, theft, or any safety concern that occurs in the workplace or any harassment by a third party.” See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 6 (Employee Information Regarding Harassment Hotline). With regards to the Harassment Hotline, ABMI was the contracting entity because ABMI could obtain the services at a lower cost. See Miller Aff., ¶ 14. Mork testified that ABMI employee training specialist, Clay Adams, would forward to her any complaints made via the Harassment Hotline. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 20 at pp. 106-07 (Mork Dep.); Ex. 237 (Contact Information for Clay Adams). Mork would then conduct the investigation without the assistance of Adams; however, Adams would ensure that there were resolutions to complaints and was available to talk to Mork if she needed to talk things through. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 20 at p. 107 (Mork Dep.). Mork would send a summary of her investigation to Adams. Id., Ex. 20 at p. 114. At least as to one investigation, Adams asked Mork to do some follow-up with an employee and Mork sent Adams a summary of her investigation of a complaint and asked if there was “anything she should do.” Id., Ex. 237, ABM06798-ABM06800 (February 2-3, 2005 email correspondence between Mork and Adams). Dan MacDonald, ABM Kentucky’s Regional Risk Management Director, and Ja-necek, who is now the Regional Safety Director for ABM Kentucky, assisted Mork in her investigations of complaints and sexual harassment training. See Mra-chek Aff., Exs. 39 at p. 119 (Mork Dep.); 37 at pp. 41-42, 49, 78-79 (Janecek Dep.); 41 at pp. 65-68 (MacDonald Dep.); Cum-mins Aff, Ex. 20 at pp. 96-97 (Mork Dep.). Mork stated that she spoke to ABMI’s corporate counsel including Maria Notoli-Miller, Katie Evens-O’Brien and Teuila Hanson regarding sexual harassment complaints. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 20 at pp. 97, 137, 152-53 (Mork Dep.). Southard also has consulted with ABMI human resource personnel regarding personnel issues, although he had not done so for three years, and has consulted ABMI in-house legal counsel. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 28 at pp. 137-41, 145 (Southard Dep.). Mork is the only person involved in making the determination or decision about the results of an investigation. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 39 at p. 118 (Mork Dep.) Mork had access to an ABMI human resources online manual, which she used to obtain clarification on policies or procedures. Id. at pp. 144-45. Mork stated that she would contact Miller or Adams if she ever had a question regarding policies and procedures found in the human resource manual. Id. at pp. 146-47. Mork also relied on ABMI Complaint Resolution Summary form and the ABMI procedures for processing an employee complaint from plaintiff Pacheco in September 2005, and the corporate human resource contact listed on the form was Adams. Id., Ex. 271, ABM04431-4432. According to Southard and Mork, ABM Kentucky makes all decisions with regards to hiring, firing, promotion, salary and wages, as it pertains to all employees in Minnesota, including plaintiffs. See South-ard Aff., ¶ 5; Mork Deck, ¶ 6. Similarly, Miller stated that ABMI does not make any employment decisions for ABM Kentucky regarding employees in Minnesota and does not control, participate, or have any involvement with ABM Kentucky’s hiring, firing, promotion, salaries, evaluations or discipline of its Minnesota employees. See Miller Aff., ¶ 8; see also Mork Deck, ¶ 6 (“ABMI does not control ABM’s employment decisions.”); Southard Aff., ¶ 5. Mork testified that she attended a training institute by ABMI for human resources and safety professionals. Cum-mins Aff., Ex. 20 at p. 9 (Mork Dep.). Southard stated that ABMI provided diversity training to managers in the region. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 28 at pp. 66-70 (Southard Dep.). According to Southard, someone outside of ABM Kentucky dictated mandatory sexual harassment training, and that he typically followed directives coming from ABMI on this issue, including from Adams. Id. at pp. 238-239. Directives from ABMI to its subsidiaries included a 2004 and 2005 interoffice memo enclosing copies of three items to be distributed as paycheck attachments or enclosures for all ABMI and all ABMI subsidiary employees: (1) unlawful harassment policy; (2) sexual harassment policy; (3) and a reminder of the harassment hotline. Id., Exs. 225, 226 (2004 and 2005 interoffice memo). The ABMI Human Resources Department also published for ABMI subsidiaries, a memorandum on how to recognize and deal with sexual harassment. Id., Ex. 227 (An Urgent Ten Minute Memo Recognizing and Responding to Sexual Harassment). Mork testified that she, MacDonald and Janecek, determined postings or distribution of employment policies. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 39 at pp. 83-84 (Mork Dep.). In 2004, ABMI employee Adams sent out an interoffice memo to human resources managers regarding mandatory unlawful harassment training. See Cum-mins Aff., Ex. 231. The memo provided that it was mandatory that all supervisory personnel complete the training annually, Id. With regards to administering the training, the memo required that the individual who was conducting the training have completed at least Level 1 of ABMI Human Resource Certification Program and that requests for exception from this requirement were to be made directly to Donna Bella, former Human Resources employee for ABMI. Cummins Aff, Ex. 28 (Southard Dep.) at pp. 139-40; Ex. 231. An April 2005 memo from Adams to human resources directors regarding 2005-2006 harassment training outlined a new training program and stated that it was mandatory that all supervisory employees participate in the training program. Id., Ex. 232. Again, with regards to administering the training, the memo required that the individual who was conducting the training have completed at least Level 1 of ABMI Human Resource Certification Program and that requests for exception from this requirement were to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Id. The training for ABM Kentucky was conducted in February 2006 by ABM Kentucky employee Ja-necek. Id., Ex. 233 (2006 ABM Annual Mandatory Unlawful Harassment & Right to Know Training Participant Roster), ABM03684. As a part of the training for non-union managers, ABM Kentucky used a sexual harassment videotape from ABMI. See Second Southard Aff., ¶ 4. The ABM Janitorial Services Employee Handbook includes a preamble from the President and Chief Executive Officer for ABMI, which notifies employees that the handbook is to serve as a useful reference for employment guidelines, procedures and policies and what is expected of employees. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 213, ABM00985. ABMI has. also promulgated a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, applicable to the employees of its subsidiaries, which addressed such issues as conflicts of interests; corporate opportunities and the duty of loyalty; gifts made to government and union personnel, customers and suppliers; fraud and theft; bribes; insider trading; compliance with laws, regulations and rules, including civil rights laws concerning harassment and job discrimination; protection of company assets; political contributions; confidentiality; accounting and employment safety as it related to using alcohol or drugs, making threats to other employees or possessing weapons. Id., Ex. 239, ABM07331-7334. ABM Kentucky has promulgated General Work Rules, under the name of ABM Janitorial Services, which are applicable to Minnesota employees. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 5 (ABM Janitorial Services General Work Rules). ABM Kentucky is the signatory to the Collective Bargaining Agreement with Service Employees International Union, Local 26, AFL-CIO. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 3 (Collective Bargaining Agreement). The most recent negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement with the union involved outside counsel, who was paid by ABM Kentucky, Southard, Mork, Ket-chem, and Chris Bouvier, inside labor counsel for ABM Janitorial Services, Inc. See Second Southard Aff, ¶ 6. The contract for the lease of ABM Kentucky’s Harding Street N.E. location was made by ABM Illinois. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 26. In addition, the cleaning contracts for the buildings where plaintiffs worked were in the name of ABM Janitorial Services, ABM Illinois dba ABM Janitorial Services, or American Building Maintenance. Id., Ex. 20. 4. ABM Kentucky Financials Ketchem, the Branch Manager for the Minneapolis Branch of ABM Kentucky, was responsible for the financial operation of the branch. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 38 at pp. 21-22 (Ketchem Dep.). Ketchem created a monthly financial report that also included a budget, Id. at p. 29. The information in the financial report included the financial performance, revenue billed out, labor costs and all other costs incurred by the Minneapolis Branch. Id. Ketchem’s financial report and budget was sent directly to Southard, Id. at p. 30. Southard received the branch budgets and either approved the budgets or sent them back to the branch manager with changes. Mra-chek Aff., Ex. 40 at pp. 77-78 (Southard Dep.). Southard prepared the regional budget, which is comprised, in part, of the budgets submitted by the branch managers and ABM Kentucky’s controller. Id. Southard submitted the regional budget to Jan Kaupas, Executive Vice President of ABM Janitorial Services, Inc., and Bob Juestel with ABM Janitorial Services, Inc. Id. at pp. 11-12, 78, 125-26. Southard also produced the financials for ABM Kentucky with the help of the accountant in his office, including monthly profit-and-loss statements. Id. at pp. 242-44. The profit- and-loss statement lists ABMI on the top of the document, as ABMI provides, pursuant to the Service Agreement, forms and software to create financials. See Miller Aff., ¶ 13. Miller stated that ABMI does not participate in the day-to-day finances of ABM Kentucky and its finances are not commingled with those of ABM Kentucky. Id., ¶ 12. ABM Kentucky did not have annual reports for 2004, 2005 and 2006, as its financial results are reflected within the annual reports filed by ABMI for those years. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 91 (Request for Admissions Nos. 36-38). Invoices or bills for supplies and equipment were submitted to “American Building Maintenance” at the 760 Harding Street N.E. address, and paid for by ABM Janitorial in Saint Louis, which was ABM Kentucky’s headquarters until it moved to Minnesota. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 35 (Invoices at Check Records); see also South-ard Aff., ¶ 7. With regards to payroll, Southard testified that ABM Kentucky in Minneapolis, generates the payroll records. See Mra-chek Aff, Ex. 40 at p. 242 (Mork Dep.); see also Ex. 38 at pp. 29-31 (Kethchem Dep.) The Federal Identification Number for ABM Kentucky is 94-3336249. See Mrachek Aff., Exs. 16 (W-9 Form; Request for Taxpayer identification Number and Certification); 18, ABM06652 (Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development-Employer Unemployment Quarterly Tax Report). Plaintiffs’ W-2 forms for 2005 identify the employer’s Federal Identification Number as 94-3336249. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 21 (ABMI1562-11563, ABM11565, ABM11567, ABM11569-11570, ABM11572, ABM11574, ABMI1576, ABM11578-11579). Likewise, the 2005 W-2 forms for Southard, Mork, MacDonald and Janecek list their employer’s identification number as 94-3336249. Id., Ex. 22 (ABM07206-07209). The name of the employer on the W-2 forms for 2005 was listed as ABM Janitorial Services and the address of the employer was listed as 760 Harding Street N.E., Minneapolis, MN 55413. Id., Exs. 21, 22. The Federal Identification Number for ABM Kentucky’s predecessor, ABM Illinois, was 36-2780789, as evidenced by plaintiffs’ and management’s 2003 and 2004 W-2 forms. Id., Exs. 21 (ABM11560-11561, ABM11564, ABM11566, ABM11568, ABM11571, ABM11573, ABM11575, ABM11577); 22 (ABM07198-07205). The W-2 forms for plaintiffs for 2003 and 2004 identify ABM Janitorial Services as the name of the employer and the address of the employer as 760 Harding Street N.E., Minneapolis, MN 55413. Id. ABMI’s Federal Identification Number is 94-1369354. See Miller Aff., ¶10. The Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development identified on the Unemployment Tax Liability Determination that American Building Maintenance Co. of Kentucky, doing business as ABM Janitorial Services, became the successor employer effective January 1, 2005, and set forth the amount of unemployment tax liability ABM Kentucky would owe for 2005. Mrachek Aff., Ex. 18 (Unemployment Tax Liability Determination, ABM06661). ABM Kentucky pays all taxes, including unemployment taxes. See Southard Aff., ¶ 3. In this regard, the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development sent a determination of unemployment benefits to American Building Maintenance Co. of Kentucky, doing business as ABM Janitorial Services, at the 760 Harding Street address to the attention of Mork. Mrachek Aff., Ex. 18, ABM11211-11213, ABM111191 (Unemployment Tax Liability Determination). B. Discussion 1. Is ABMI Plaintiffs’ Sole Employer? In response to ABMI’s motion, plaintiffs first argued that the evidence conclusively establishes that ABMI is their sole employer. See Pis.’ Mem. at pp. 98-100. In support of this assertion, plaintiffs point to the following documents that list ABM Industries, Inc., ABM Industries, ABMI, American Building Maintenance Industries, Inc., ABM Industries Incorporated, and make no mention of ABM Kentucky: tax forms for plaintiffs’ supervisors (Cum-mins Aff., Ex. 218), recognition forms to supervisors (id., Ex. 219), performance evaluations for plaintiffs’ supervisors (id., Ex. 220), a field manual on sex harassment policy and procedure for plaintiffs’ supervisors (id., Ex. 221), equal employment policy issued to plaintiffs’ supervisors (id., Ex. 222), business cards issued to supervisors (id., Ex. 223), an employee savings plan for plaintiffs’ supervisors (id., Ex. 254), a stipulation for settlement with plaintiff Hernandez regarding a workers’ compensations claim (Id., Ex. 78), and insurance filings (id., Ex. 224). See Pis.’ Mem. at pp. 98-99. In addition, plaintiffs argued that ABM Kentucky cannot be plaintiffs’ employer as none of their paychecks have listed the name of ABM Kentucky as required by Minnesota law (id., Ex. 93-101) and several supervisors testified that they had never heard of ABM Kentucky. Id. at 99-100 citing to various depositions of witnesses. Plaintiffs also asserted that ABM Kentucky’s corporate filings (Cummins Aff., Ex. 259) and lease agreements (id., Ex. 250) show that it is not operating in Minnesota. This Court concludes that the evidence in the record does not conclusively establish that ABMI was the sole employer of plaintiffs as maintained by plaintiffs. First, many of the documents relied upon by plaintiffs in support of this proposition are not admissible because they have not been properly authenticated. See, e.g., Cummins Exs. 220, 223, 224, 254,255. Second, even if all of the documents relied upon by plaintiffs were admissible, a number of them do identify ABM Kentucky, or its assumed name of ABM Janitorial Services, as the employer. For example, the recognition forms were directed to the branch managers of ABM Janitorial Services at the Harding Street N.E. address (Cummins Aff., Ex. 219); the performance appraisals stated the “Company” was ABM Janitorial Services, ABM — Airport 747-3, ABM, or ABM PNC, while listing ABM Industries Incorporated on the letterhead (id., 220); the field guide referenced ABM Janitorial Services on its cover (id., Ex. 221); ABM, along with ABMI, was listed on the letterhead of the equal employment policy (id., Ex. 222); the pay stubs issued to plaintiffs stated their employer was ABM Janitorial Services or ABM Jan. Services-N Central at the Harding Street N.E. address (id., Exs. 93-101). Third, the record is replete with documents that explicitly indicate that plaintiffs’ employer was ABM Kentucky or ABM Janitorial Services, the assumed name for ABM Kentucky and ABM Illinois. The W-2 forms for plaintiffs for 2003 and 2004 identify ABM Janitorial Services as the name of their employer and address at 760 Harding Street N.E., Minneapolis, MN 55413. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 21 (ABM11560-11561, ABM11564, ABM11566, ABMI1568, ABM11571, ABM11573, ABM11575, ABM11577). The Federal Identification Number, 36-2780789, listed on the W-2 forms for 2003-2004, was for ABM Kentucky’s predecessor, ABM Illinois. Id. Plaintiffs’ W-2 forms for 2005 identify their employer as ABM Janitorial Services, located at 760 Harding Street N.E., Minneapolis, MN 55413, and list the ABM Kentucky’s employer Federal Identification Number as 94-3336249. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 16 (W-9 Form; Request for Taxpayer identification Number and Certification); Ex. 18 (Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development-Employer’s Unemployment Quarterly Tax Report, ABM06652); Ex. 21 (ABMI1562-11563, ABM11565, ABMI1567, ABMI1569-11570, ABM11572, ABM11574, ABM11576, ABM11578-11579). ABM Janitorial Services and the Harding Street N.E. address are both listed on plaintiffs’ paychecks throughout 2005 and 2006 until the name of ABM Kentucky was changed to ABM Janitorial Services-North Central (same address) in 2007. See Cummins Aff, Exs. 93-101 (Paycheck Stubs). In short, plaintiffs’ own employee records show that ABM Illinois and ABM Kentucky, doing business as ABM Janitorial Services, served as plaintiffs’ employers. Fourth, while the Foreign Annual Reports filed by ABM Kentucky with the State of Delaware for years 2003 and 2004 do not list Minnesota as a state in which ABM Kentucky operated (Cummins Aff., Ex. 259), this is consistent with the fact that it was ABM Illinois that was operating out of Minnesota in 2003 and 2004, as ABM Kentucky did not take over the Minnesota operations from ABM Illinois until January 1, 2005. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 12 (Certificate of Authority to Transact Business in Minnesota issued by the Minnesota Secretary of State to “American Building Maintenance Co. of Kentucky” on December 12, 2004); Ex. 18 (Unemployment Tax Liability Determination, ABM06661, indicating that ABM Kentucky became the successor employer to ABM Illinois effective January 1, 2005). Finally, with regards to the lease agreement of the building located at 760 Harding Street N.E., Minneapolis, MN 55413, the lessee is listed as ABM Illinois, however, there is no mention of ABMI. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 250. As such, the lease does not support plaintiffs’ argument that ABMI was their sole employer. In summary, based on the documents proffered by plaintiffs, along with the other documents in the record (not to mention the testimony of witnesses as discussed in the next section), this Court concludes that ABMI was not plaintiffs’ sole employer during the relevant time period. 2. Is ABMI Responsible for the Actions of ABM Kentucky? “Employer” as set forth under Title VII is to be defined liberally. See Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.1977) (citation omitted). However, “[t]he law allows businesses to incorporate to limit liability and isolate liabilities among separate entities, (internal citation omitted). One way liability is limited in corporations is that shareholders generally are not liable for the acts of the corporation.” Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir.1993) (citing Johnson v. Flowers Indus. Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 980-81 (4th Cir.1987)). Under the doctrine of limited liability, the parent corporation retains the benefits of limited liability even if it exercised some control over its subsidiary. See Johnson, 814 F.2d at 980. “[0]wnership of a controlling interest in a corporation entitles the controlling stockholder to exercise the normal incidents of stock ownership, such as the right to choose directors and set general policies, without forfeiting the protection of limited liability.” Id. at 980 (citation omitted). Consequently, “[t]here is a ‘strong presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees, and the courts have found otherwise only in extraordinary circumstances.’ ” Brown v. Fred’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Frank, 3 F.3d at 1362); see also Johnson, 814 F.2d at 981 (“Such situations are the exception, however. The doctrine of limited liability remains the rule. The parent company is the employer only if it ‘exercises a degree of control that exceeds the control normally exercised by a parent corporation.’ ”) (citation omitted). “Although courts do, under certain circumstances, hold parent companies liable for the acts or omissions of their subsidiaries, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that it is appropriate in a given case.” Halvorson v. Conseco Finance Corp., Civil No. 01-1774 (RHK/AJB), 2002 WL 31371938 at *10 (D.Minn. Oct.21, 2002) (string citation omitted). In the Eighth Circuit, a parent company may be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary for the purpose of establishing liability under Title VII if: (1) “the parent company so dominates the subsidiary’s operations that the two are one entity and therefore one employer”; or (2) “the parent company is linked to the alleged discriminatory action because it controls ‘individual employment decisions.’” Brown, 494 F.3d at 739 (citing Johnson, 814 F.2d at 981; Leichihman v. Pickwick Int'l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1268 (8th Cir.1987)). The Fourth Circuit, in Johnson, explained these two factors in this way: First, the parent could control the employment practices and decisions of the subsidiary. If the parent company hired and fired the subsidiary employees, routinely shifted them between the two companies, and supervised their daily operations, it would be hard to find that the parent was not their employer. Second, the parent might so dominate the subsidiary’s operations that the parent and the subsidiary are one entity and thus one employer. For example, the subsidiary may be highly integrated with the parent’s business operations, as evidenced by the commingling of finds and assets, the use of the same work force and business offices for both corporations, and the severe undercapitali-zation of the subsidiary. The parent might also fail to observe such basic corporate formalities as keeping separate books and holding separate shareholder and board meetings. 814 F.2d at 981. “To hold a parent corporation liable for its subsidiary’s discrimination, there must be evidence that the parent corporation exercised control over the ‘individual employment decision! ]’ involved, ... (internal citation omitted). The penultimate question is: ‘[W]hat entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to the person claiming discrimination?’” Iverson v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 125 Fed.Appx. 73, 76 (8th Cir.2004) (citing Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir.1983))). “More than a normal parent-subsidiary relationship is required.” Id. (citing Leichihman, 814 F.2d at 1268). This Court will now determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to conclude that ABMI so dominates ABM Kentucky’s operations that the two companies are one entity and therefore, one employer, or whether ABMI is sufficiently linked to the alleged discriminatory action because it controls individual employment decisions. a. Does ABMI So Dominate ABM Kentucky’s Operations that the Two Are One Entity? i. Interrelation of Operations In assessing the interrelation of operations, “the key is the degree to which [ABMI] or its employees were in fact involved in the actual functioning of [ABM Kentucky].” Jackson, 2005 WL 1630532 at *5 (citation omitted). Factors that support a finding of interrelated operations include “sharing of employees and equipment between two companies and the transfer of employees from one company to the other.” Id. (citing EEOC v. Financial Assurance, Inc., 624 F.Supp. 686, 690 (W.D.Mo.1985)). On the other hand, “merely because [employees within a subsidiary] ultimately report to officers in the parent company”, or “because a parent corporation eventually benefits from the work of its subsidiaries”, is not evidence of interrelated operations. See Frank, 3 F.3d at 1362 (citations omitted). This Court finds that while ABMI had some involvement in the operations of ABM Kentucky, its activities were consistent with a parent-subsidiary relationship, and were not of the type or the extent to which a court could find that ABMI was involved in the actual functioning of ABM Kentucky, much less that it so dominated ABM Kentucky’s business practices that the two companies should be deemed to be one entity and one employer. See Johnson, 814 F.2d at 982 (“Nor does the exercise of ‘oversight’ permit disregard of the incidents of separate corporate entities. The district court specified that ‘the relationship between [the parent] and [the subsidiary] is one of general oversight, not attention to detail, and it is characteristic of a parent-subsidiary relationship.’ We agree that [the parent] did not dominate the business practices of [the subsidiary].”). Here, the day-to-day operations of ABM Kentucky were handled by ABM Kentucky employees and without the involvement or oversight of AMBI personnel. The lease for ABM Kentucky’s Minneapolis office was in the name of ABM Illinois, ABM Kentucky’s predecessor. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 250. The cleaning contracts for the buildings where plaintiffs worked were in the name of ABM Janitorial Services, ABM Illinois dba ABM Janitorial Services, or American Building Maintenance. Id., Ex. 20. ABM Kentucky, through its branch managers, was responsible for the performance of its accounts and customer relations, and no evidence was presented that ABMI had any involvement in the negotiation, oversight or performance of these contracts. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 38 at pp. 49-50 (Ketchum Dep.). In addition, invoices and bills for supplies and equipment were submitted to American Building Maintenance at the Harding Street N.E. address and were paid by ABM Janitorial in St. Louis, which was ABM Kentucky’s headquarters until it moved to Minnesota. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 35 (Invoices and Check Records); see also Southard Aff., ¶ 7. ABM Kentucky, and not ABMI, made all decisions with regards to hiring, firing, promotion, salary and wages, as it pertains to all employees in Minnesota, including plaintiffs. See Southard Aff., ¶ 5; Mork Deck, ¶ 6. ABM Kentucky employees were responsible for the day-to-day financial operations of ABM Kentucky, including creation of the monthly financial reports for the branches and the regional budget, which was submitted to ABM Janitorial Services, Inc., not ABMI. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 38 at pp. 21-22, 29-32 (Ketchem Dep.); 40 at pp. 11-12, 77-78,125-26, 242-44 (Southard Dep.). ABMI did not participate in the day-to-day finances of ABM Kentucky and its finances were not commingled with those of ABM Kentucky. See Miller Aff., ¶¶ 12,13. ABM Kentucky developed its own hiring policies and practices, investigation policies and practices, safety policies and practices, work rules, affirmative action plans, attendance policies and practices, and disciplinary policies and practices. See Second Southard Aff., ¶ 5. In addition, ABM Kentucky developed and implemented its own human resources policies, and negotiated and maintained its own health insurance for its employees. Id., ¶ 3. ABM Kentucky was the signatory to the Collective Bargaining Agreement with Service Employees International Union, Local 26, AFL-CIO, and the most recent negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement with the union involved ABM Kentucky’s outside counsel, Southard, Mork, Ketchem, and Chris Bouvier, inside labor counsel for ABM Janitorial Services, Inc. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 3 (Collective Bargaining Agreement); Second Southard Aff., ¶ 6. With respect to human resource functions, ABM Kentucky had its own human resources department. ABM Kentucky’s human resources director was located at the Minneapolis Branch for ABM Kentucky at the Harding Street N.E. address. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 2 (Business Card), Ex. 39 at pp. 20-21 (Mork Dep.); see also Mork Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. 2. ABM Kentucky’s human resource employees were responsible for all aspects of the employer-employee relationship including worker’s compensation, harassment and discrimination claims, safety, affirmative action, payroll, insurance, employee legal issues, payroll questions and concerns; maintenance of hiring packages, W-4 changes, termination reports, vacation, levies and garnishments, union dues, stock and 401K, unemployment issues, COBRA issues, hiring and recruiting, leave-of-absences, FMLA issues, short-term disability, and notifications of open positions, development of training, new hire training, performance recognition and safety. See Mraehek Aff., Exs. 38 at pp. 29-31 (Ketchem Dep.); 39 at pp. 67-70, 76, 126,133, 278-80, Dep. Ex. 13 (Mork Dep). Mork, ABM Kentucky’s human resource director, handled employment legal issues, and was the only person involved in making the determination or decision about the results of an investigation. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 20 at p. 96 (Mork Dep.); Mraehek Aff., Ex. 39 at p. 118 (Mork Dep.). In addition, Mork dealt directly with union representatives in connection with handing grievances. See Mraehek Aff., Ex. 39 at p. 126 (Mork Dep.). This is not to say that ABMI did not have some involvement in ABM Kentucky’s operations. For example, pursuant to the Service Agreement between ABMI and ABM Kentucky, ABMI provided to ABM Kentucky a variety of services and items, in exchange for payment of a fee, such as worker’s compensation insurance, obtaining licenses for sexual harassment videos, negotiating the contract for the Harassment Hotline, submitting motor vehicle record checks to a single provider, and drafting certain forms (such as performance evaluations). See Second Miller Aff., ¶ 5. ABM Kentucky managers received diversity training from ABMI, spoke to ABM Kentucky corporate counsel for guidance regarding sexual harassment complaints, had access to ABMI’s human resources online manual, contacted ABMI’s attorneys or human resource employees from time-to-time with questions regarding policies and procedures found in the human resource manual, received instructions on harassment training from ABMI and relied upon the ABMI Complaint resolution summary form and ABMI’s procedures for processing one of the plaintiffs complaints. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 20 at pp. 9, 71-74, 97,106-07, 137, 144, 146-47, 152-53 (Mork Dep.); Ex. 28 at pp. 66-70, 137-41, 238-239 (Southard Dep.); Ex. 271, ABM04431-4432. Further, ABM Kentucky employees were required to follow ABMI’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, (Cummins Aff., Ex. 239, ABM07331-7334), ABMI’s name was listed a variety of ABM Kentucky documents, (see e.g., Cummins Aff., Exs. 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 254), and ABM Kentucky’s financial results were reflected in the annual reports filed by ABMI for years 2004-2006. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 91 (Request for Admissions Nos. 36-38). However, this level of involvement in ABM Kentucky’s affairs does not show that ABMI dominated or controlled ABM Kentucky’s business or day-to-day practices. See Brown, 494 F.3d at 740-41 (finding that processing of payroll and performance of other services by the parent company for the subsidiary for a fee, and the appearance of the parent company’s name on plaintiffs paycheck did not suggest that the parent corporation and subsidiary were a single entity); Iverson, 125 Fed.Appx. at 76-77 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the parent corporation was his employer under the ADEA because various documents he had received had the name of the parent corporation on them); Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363 (noting that plaintiff had not presented the type of evidence routinely used to show interrelated operations such as “when the parent kept subsidiary’s books, issued its paychecks, and paid its bills”; the “parent and subsidiary had common employees, the same headquarters, common advertising, and the parent rented its properties to the subsidiary”; and the “parent and subsidiary shared services, equipment, employees and office space, and parent controlled subsidiary’s payroll and benefit programs.”); Johnson, 814 F.2d at 982 (finding that plaintiffs produced no evidence that the parent corporation excessively interfered with the business operations of the subsidiary where the subsidiary’s “management [was] responsible for the daily decisions in such vital areas as production, distribution, marketing, and advertising.”); McDonald, 2007 WL 1114159 at *6 (finding evidence of interrelation of operations between two defendant companies where one company had some supervision and control over the employees of the other company, some ability to participate in or control hiring and firing, and some ability to determine compensation). Rather, at best, the evidence shows that ABMI provided some training and administrative assistance and advice to ABM Kentucky, and that the day-to-day operations of ABM Kentucky were run by ABM Kentucky personnel without the involvement or oversight of ABMI. Further, to the extent that ABMI reported its ABM Kentucky’s financial results in its annual report or required employees of all subsidiaries to follow its code of conduct, this conduct is consistent with normal incidents of stock ownership. The fact that a parent corporation exercises some control over its subsidiary, including setting general policies, does not negate the benefits of limited liability. See Johnson, 814 F.2d at 980. The parent company is the employer only if it “ ‘exercises a degree of control that exceeds the control normally exercised by a parent corporation.’” (citation omitted). Id. at 981. In summary, the evidence before this Court does not rise to level of establishing that ABMI and ABM Kentucky were related in such a way that a jury could conclude that ABMI dominated or controlled ABM’s operations. ii. Common Management and Common Ownership According to plaintiffs, the fact that there is common management between ABMI and ABM Kentucky, along with the fact that ABMI owns ABM Kentucky, confirms that ABMI is liable for plaintiffs’ claims. See Pis.’ Mem. at pp. 108-111, 113-115. ABM Kentucky’s Regional Vice President is Southard. See Mrachek Aff., Ex. 40 at p. 48, Ex. 1 (Southard Dep.). Southard reported directly to Jan Kaupas, the Executive Vice President for ABM Janitorial Services, Inc., and Jim McClure the President of ABM Janitorial Services, Inc. Id. at pp. 11-13. While Southard was responsible for everything that occurred at ABM Kentucky, including the Minnesota Branch, McClure of ABM Janitorial Services, Inc., and not ABMI, was the final authority on all matters of ABM Kentucky, which encompassed company policy, its implementation and enforcement. Id. at pp. 94-95. ABM Kentucky and ABMI do, however, share the same Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, Secretary and Vice President of Finance. See Cummins Aff., Exs. 28 at pp. 132-33; 244-45; 246 (ABM7214, 7211, 7227, 7228 PABM 2943-94). In addition, ABMI owns all of the shares of ABM Kentucky. See Cummins Aff., Ex. 246, ABM07222-23; see also Miller Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4. Evidence establishing common management and ownership between a parent and its subsidiary, alone, is insufficient to establish liability for a parent corporation, as common management and ownership are ordinary aspects of a parent-subsidiary relationship. See Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir.1997); see also Frank, 3 F.3d at 1364 (“It is undisputed that Defendant is the sole shareholder of Northwestern Bell. However, this factor, standing alone, can never be sufficient to establish parent liability.”); Colindres v. QuitFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 363 (S.D.Tex. March 31, 2006) (“The existence of common management and ownership and the ‘normal incidents’ of a parent-subsidiary relationship, such as the parent’s right to select directors and to set general policies, do not justify treating a parent and its subsidiary as a single employer.”). In other words, “[a] parent corporation’s possession of a controlling interest in its subsidiary entitles the parent to the normal incidents of stock ownership, such as the right to select directors and set general policies, without forfeiting the protection of limited liability.” Lusk, 129 F.3d at 778 (citation omitted); see also Johnson, 814 F.2d at 980-81 (quoting Baker v. Raymond Int’l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 180 (5th Cir.1981)) (“As the courts recognize, ‘(o)wnership of a controlling interest in a corporation entitles the controlling stockholder to exercise the normal incidents of stock ownership, such as the right to choose directors and set general policies, without forfeiting the protection of limited liability.’ ”). The doctrine of limited liability, however, does not hold that [the parent corporation] is an employer merely because it chooses the subsidiary’s directors, Id. at 982 (citing United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir.1985) (“One-hundred percent ownership and identity of directors and officers are, even together, an insufficient basis for applying the alter ego theory to pierce the corporate veil.”)). Instead, “[s]ome nexus to the subsidiary’s daily employment decisions must be shown.” Lusk, 129 F.3d at 778 (citation omitted). As stated in the previous section, plaintiffs have not been met their burden of showing that ABMI controls the day-today business practices of ABM Kentucky, nor as discussed in the next section, have they shown that it controls the employment decisions of ABM Kentucky. As such, this Court places little weight on the common management and ownership between ABM Kentucky and ABMI in determining whether ABMI should be held liable for plaintiffs’ claims against ABM Kentucky. b. Is ABMI Linked to the Alleged Discriminatory Actions of ABM Kentucky Because It Controlled the Individual Employment Decisions? Plaintiffs argued that ABMI handled the day-to-day labor-management functions in plaintiffs’ work place by developing human resources policies; developing and distributing employee handbooks; developing and presenting the employment-related training; providing human resources personnel for assistance; providing employment-related legal advice; handling lawsuits, human resources information systems, and the collective bargaining process; administering the employment-benefits programs; developing and updating human resources forms; and participating in investigations. See Pis.’ Mem. at pp. 111-12. Determining whether a parent corporation controls the labor relations of its subsidiary is a large part of the analysis of deciding whether to hold one entity responsible for the actions of another. See Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363 (citations omitted); see generally, Jackson, 2005 WL 1630532 at *6 (“ ‘centralized control of labor relations,’ is often considered to carry the most weight in this analysis.”). “To satisfy the control prong, a parent must control the day-to-day employment decisions of the subsidiary.” Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363; see also Iverson, 125 Fed.Appx. at 76-77 (in denying liability for the parent corporation, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the parent did not exercise control over the employment decisions in that case and the plaintiff did not allege facts that would show the sort of control of day-to-day employment decisions necessary for liability) (citation omitted). It is not enough that the parent issue “broad general policy statements regarding employment matters .... ” Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363. Rather, as stated in Iverson, “[t]he penultimate question is: ‘[W]hat entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to the person claiming discrimination?’ ” 125 Fed.Appx. at 75-76 (citing Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir.1983))). Courts, in addressing this factor, have looked to one company’s control over the payroll, hiring, firing, wages, hours, working conditions, daily activities or fringe benefits of the other company’s employees. See Jackson, 2005