Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOHINDER, JO-GINDER, PARKAR, AND HELPLINE’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS, AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS SARDAR AND SARDAR INTERNATIONAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS McMAHON, District Judge: I. Introduction The present case arises out of a series of international shipping frauds, allegedly perpetrated by now defunct New York corporations against A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S and its New York affiliate, Maersk, Inc. The New York-based fraudsters have flown the coup, and Plaintiffs are in the process of obtaining a default judgment as to them. Additionally, however, Plaintiffs allege that the remaining named Defendants were all participants, either as principals or co-conspirators, in the alleged frauds. Defendants, who are Indian nationals residing in Kuwait (or Kuwaiti businesses allegedly operated by these Defendants), move to dismiss the complaint against them for, inter alia, lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. For the reasons discussed below, these motions are granted as to Sardar Traders Est. and Sardar International Trading Có., and denied as to everyone else. II. Background This case has a complicated history, due both to the nature of the alleged schemes and the léngthy prior litigation. The exposition below is organized as follows: Il.a. Parties; Il.b. Frauds; II.c. Litigation History. a.Parties i. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs in this action are A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S and Maersk, Inc., together one of the world’s largest shipping companies. Moller-Maersk is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Denmark. Compl. ¶ 4. Maersk, Inc. is a New York corporation and affiliate of Moller-Maersk. Id. ¶ 3. ii. Defendants The Defendants are a variety of persons and businesses, with citizenships and residences across the globe. The general nature of the allegations against the Defendants is as follows: according to Maersk, the New York Defendants, including the younger generation of the Singh Sahni family and a number of “dummy” corporations that they established in New York, were half of an international shipping scheme. These New York Defendants allegedly arranged for the transport of at least three shipments to India and Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Defendants, including the older generation of the Singh Sahni family, were allegedly on the receiving end of some of these shipments in Kuwait, and assisted the New York Defendants by obtaining a fraudulent bill of lading and pursuing the New York Defendants’ fraudulent claims against Maersk in the Kuwaiti courts. The various frauds against Maersk, it alleges, are part of a larger international fraud conspiracy conducted by members of the Singh Sahni family and their cohorts abroad. The combination avoids detection, it is alleged, by shifting identities, establishing dummy corporations, bribing government officials and intimidating potential witnesses against it. In order to keep this tangled scheme straight, I have divided the Defendants into New York Defendants and Kuwaiti Defendants below. 1. New York Defendants a. Neewra, Inc. (“Neewra”) Neewra was organized as a New York corporation, but was dissolved by proclamation of the State of New York for failure to pay taxes. While this litigation was pending, Neewra once again became an active New York corporation by paying past due taxes. Compl. ¶ 8. In the process of reviving its existence, Neewra listed a fictitious address. Id. Neewra does not appear to have a valid address or phone number anywhere in New York or elsewhere. b.Rednihom, Inc. (“Rednihom”) Rednihom was organized as a New York corporation, but, like Neewra, was dissolved by proclamation of the State of New York in 2003 for failure to pay taxes. Id. ¶ 9. Also like Neewra, Rednihom does not appear to have a valid address or phone number. Rednihom has not revived its existence by paying its back due taxes. c.Aref Hassan Abul, Inc. (“Aref’) Aref was also a New York corporation that was dissolved by failure to pay taxes. It does not currently have a valid address or phone number. Id. ¶ 10. d. Arween Singh Sahni (“Arween”) Neewra and Aref (and perhaps Redni-hom) were formed and operated by Ar-ween Singh Sahni, an Indian national whose current residence is unknown. Id. ¶ 11. During the course of the conduct complained of, Arween resided and did business in New York and New Jersey, largely through Aref and Neewra. Ar-ween has not appeared in response to this lawsuit and apparently cannot be found. Id. Arween is the son of Joginder Singh Sahni, and the nephew of Mohinder Singh Sahni. He is the cousin of Mandeep Singh Sahni. These four members of the Singh Sahni family are all named as defendants here. e. Mandeep Singh Sahni (“Mandeep”) Mandeep Singh Sahni is an Indian national who, during all relevant times, resided in the New York. Mandeep is alleged to have helped form Rednihom Inc. by impersonating his father, Mohinder Singh Sahni. Id. ¶ 16. Mandeep is also alleged to have helped Arween conduct the fraudulent business transactions complained of through Rednihom and to have done so while posing as his father. Like Arween, Mandeep has not appeared in response to this suit, and apparently cannot be found. Id. Together, Arween and Mandeep are the younger generation of Singh Sahnis named by Maersk in the complaint. Mandeep and Arween are cousins, and the sons of Mohinder Singh Sahni and Joginder Singh Sahni, respectively. 2. Kuwait Defendants a.Mohinder Singh Sahni (“Mohinder”) Mohinder Singh Sahni is a 69 year-old Indian national residing in Kuwait. Id. ¶ 12. Although “Mohinder Singh Sahni” was listed as a principal of the New York corporations (i.e., Neewra and Rednihom), it has been determined that this was not Mohinder, but either his son Mandeep or his nephew Arween posing as Mohinder. See Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., 443 F.Supp.2d 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (RCC) (The data on the age and location of the “Mohinder” acting through Rednihom in New York “limits, if not eliminates, the possibility” that this was the real Mohin-der, who is now moving to dismiss). Mohinder is alleged to be involved in various businesses in Kuwait, including Sardar Traders Est., Sardar International Trading Co., and al Tamasok al Arabi Est., all of which are named Defendants here. Compl. ¶ 12. Apart from his alleged involvement in the various frauds, Mohinder does not appear to have any ties to the United States, although he admits having passed through New York en route to Canada on a couple of occasions. Mohin-der Deck ¶ 8. b. Joginder Singh Sahni (“Joginder”) Joginder Singh Sahni is an Indian national residing in Kuwait. He is alleged to be involved in various businesses in Kuwait, including Help Line Collection Co., Sardar Traders Est., Sardar International Trading Co., and al Tamasok al Arabi Est., all of which are named Defendants here. Compl. ¶ 14. Apart from his alleged involvement in the frauds, Joginder does not appear to have any ties to the United States. c. Dawood Tajuddin Parkar (“Parkar”) Parkar is an Indian national living in Kuwait. Id. ¶ 18. Parkar describes himself as a friend of Arween. Parkar Deck ¶ 4. Parkar admits helping to pursue Neewra’s claim against Maersk (see below) in Kuwait. Id. Parkar is alleged to be involved with various businesses in Kuwait, including Help Line Collection Co., a named Defendant here. Compl. ¶ 18. Apart from his alleged involvement in the events leading to this lawsuit, Parkar does not appear to have any ties to the United States. d.Sabharwal Chandra Kumar (“Sabharwal”) Sabharwal is an Indian national who previously resided in Kuwait, but whose present location is unknown. Id. ¶ 15. He is alleged to be an employee of either Mohinder or Joginder in Kuwait. Id. Apart from his alleged involvement in the events leading to this lawsuit, Sabharwal does not appear to have any ties to the United States. e.Al Tamasok al Arabi Est. (“Al Tamasok”) Al Tamasok, a foreign corporation headquartered in Kuwait, is in the business of importing an exporting. Id. ¶21. Its owner, Dr. Adel Baroud, has disappeared. Id. Al Tamasok is alleged to have assisted the New York Defendants in various fraudulent transactions, and to be ultimately controlled by the Singh Sahni family in Kuwait. Id. Apart from its alleged involvement in the events leading to this lawsuit, al Tamasok does not appear to have any ties to the United States. Al Tamasok has not appeared in response to this lawsuit. f.Help Line Collection Co. W.L.L. (“Help Line”) Help Line is a foreign corporation with an office in Kuwait. Id. ¶ 17. Help Line apparently assists with the collection of debts. Al Asoosi Decl. ¶5. It is alleged that either Mohinder or Joginder owns or operates Help Line, and that Help Line assisted Neewra in its various fraudulent schemes. Compl. ¶ 17. As noted, Help Line allegedly employed, or was employed by, Parkar. Apart from its alleged involvement in the events leading to this lawsuit, Help Line does not appear to have any ties to the United States. g.Sardar Traders Est. (“Sardar”) and Sardar International Trading Co. (“Sardar Int’l”) Sardar and Sardar Int’l are foreign corporations headquartered in Kuwait, in the business of auto parts and tires. Id. ¶ 19-20. It is alleged that Sardar and Sardar Int’l are owned or operated by Mohinder or Joginder. Id. The relationship between the companies and the Singh Sahni family appears to be the only connection these companies have to this lawsuit, as the Sar-dar companies are not alleged to have played a role in the frauds complained of (see below). Sardar and Sardar Int’l do not appear to have any ties to the United States. b. Frauds With the major players identified, I now turn to the conduct that gives rise to Maersk’s complaints against the Defendants. The basis of this lawsuit is a series of frauds and attempted frauds allegedly perpetrated by Arween and Mandeep, with the help of the Kuwaiti Defendants, against Maersk. These frauds are also the predicate offenses for a claim of civil RICO against the Defendants. i. Tire Fraud The first fraud complained of by Maersk involved the shipment of used tires from the United States to India (“Tire Fraud”). Plaintiffs allege that in late April 2001, Arween, on behalf of his company Aref, requested a price quote from Maersk on the shipment of 720 container loads of used auto and truck tires to India. Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiffs also allege that Mandeep, posing as Mohinder and acting through Rednihom, sought a similar arrangement with other international shipping lines. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiffs allege that Aref obtained the used tires by contacting numerous facilities in New York, New Jersey, and elsewhere, and offering to dispose of their stockpiles by shipping the tires to interested buyers in India. Id. ¶ 33. Used tires, depending on their composition, qualify as solid hazardous waste under U.S. law, and hence are costly to dispose of. On or about May 2, 2001, Maersk, Inc. and Aref agreed to a service contract whereby Aref would deliver approximately 720 containers of tires to Maersk and Maersk would ship the containers to India in groups over time. Id. ¶ 31. The consignee of record in India, Golden Traders, would then pay Maersk on a freight collect basis (i.e., pay the cost of the ocean freight before receiving the cargo). Id. ¶¶ 28, 38. Plaintiffs allege that they received 260 containers from Aref for the Tire Shipment. On or about May 16, 2001, however, after 200 of the containers arrived in India, Plaintiffs learned that Golden Traders did not exist or lacked interest in the shipment. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. After notifying Aref of the problem, Plaintiffs allege that Arween, on behalf of Aref, provided Plaintiffs with a replacement consignee, Poonanam Ent. (“Poonanam”). Id. ¶39. Plaintiffs allege that on May 18, 2001, Poonanam informed them it was not interested in the tires, but that on May 21, 2001, Arween again told Plaintiffs that Poonanam would offer $1,000 per container for the tires. Plaintiffs allege that they accepted the offer from Poonanam, but that the offer did not exist and that Arween knew as much. Id. ¶¶ 40-42. On June 15, 2001, after Plaintiffs learned that Poonanam would not take any of the containers of tires, India Customs impounded the containers and Plaintiffs abandoned them. Id. ¶ 44. As a result of this scheme, Aref is alleged to have collected a substantial sum from the various New York and New Jersey tire dealers for the purported disposal, while leaving Maersk holding the bag (or, more precisely, the tires). Maersk alleges damages arising from this scheme in the amount of $5.25M. Id. ¶ 51. It is generally alleged that Mohinder acted in the Tire Fraud “directly and/or indirectly through Rednihom and Aref and/or authorized [Arween] and/or Man-deep to act on his behalf’ in furtherance of the scheme. Id. ¶ 45. Maersk also alleges that Mohinder was a principal of the New York Defendants for the purposes of the bill of lading signed by Maersk and Aref to effectuate the Tire Shipment. Thus, according to Maersk, Arween, Mandeep, Aref and Mohinder are jointly and severally liable to Maersk for approximately $5.25M. ii. Neewra Fraud The second alleged scheme involved the shipment of goods from the United States to Kuwait. On or about March 5, 1999, Arween, on behalf of Neewra, contracted with Maersk to ship a container said by Neewra to contain “20 crates of electrical spare parts” for delivery to Kuwaiti consignee al Tamasok. Compl. ¶ 71. The bill of lading issued by Maersk used the same description for the cargo, as did the export declaration submitted to the U.S. government. Id. The shipment arrived in Kuwait on April 10, 1999. Id. ¶ 74. According to the Complaint, al Tamasok — the Kuwaiti consignees — repeatedly attempted to convince Maersk to release the container without first being presented with the original bill of lading. Id. ¶¶ 72, 74, 78. Eventually, Arween, acting on behalf of Neewra, gave Maersk permission to release the container against al Tamasok’s bank check as security for the original bill of lading. Ar-ween presented al Tamasok with an invoice showing that container was worth less than $10,000. Id. ¶ 79. Maersk also confirmed with Kuwaiti customs that the value of the cargo in the container was approximately $10,000. Id. Based on this amount, Maersk informed al Tamasok that it would have to post security in an amount three times the value of the cargo to be released, namely $30,000. After al Tamasok gave Maersk its bank check for $30,000, al Tamasok took delivery of the Electronics Shipment on May 5, 1999 without the original bill of lading. Id. ¶80. Five days later, on May 10, 1999, Neewra forwarded the original bill of lading to its bank in New York, Banco Popular, with instructions that it was not to release the bill of lading to al Tamasok until it had paid $1.86M for it. Plaintiffs allege that, meanwhile, Jogin-der and/or Mohinder sent intermediaries to corrupt one of Maersk’s employees in Kuwait, in order to obtain a blank bill of lading. Id. ¶ 81. Although it is Maersk’s (as well as the rest of the shipping industry’s) policy to never release blank bills of lading, the Kuwaiti Defendants were allegedly successful in obtaining one. Joginder and/or Mohinder and their co-conspirators then allegedly persuaded a web-site designer to “doctor” the blank bill of lading in such a way as to make it appear to be the original bill of lading for the Neewra shipment. Id. ¶ 83-84. According to Plaintiffs, the fictitious bill of lading was then provided to Maersk in return for al Tamasok’s original $30,000 security deposit. After Maersk had delivered the container to al Tamasok, and had returned al Tamasok’s security deposit, Neewra informed Maersk that it had never received payment from al Tamasok, and hence had not released the original bill of lading. Maersk then inspected the bill of lading it had received and realized that it was fraudulent. Maersk attempted to contact al Tamasok, but its phone went unanswered and its premises were abandoned. Neewra then informed Maersk that it would be held responsible for the loss of the container, and informed Maersk, for the first time, that the container held approximately $1.86M worth of Seagate brand hard drives. Neewra then filed an insurance claim with its cargo under-writer, Continental Insurance Company (“Continental”). During the course of investigating this claim, Continental discovered that (1) Neewra’s invoice for the hard drives, from a company called Micro-Spy, was fraudulent; (2) that Micro-Spy had never purchased that quantity of hard drives from Seagate; (3) that Seagate had never sold that quantity to Micro-Spy, Neewra, Arween, Aref or anyone else involved in the shipment; (4) that the container had been stuffed and sealed at an auto-parts company in a residential New Jersey neighborhood. Based on this evidence, as well as the various shipping and customs documents indicating that the shipment was of spare electrical parts worth less than $10,000, Continental concluded that Neewra’s insurance claim was fraudulent, and refused to pay it. Neewra then ■ brought suit against Maersk in New York alleging misdelivery and conversion of the shipped goods. Compl. ¶ 100. Plaintiffs allege that Neew-ra brought the New York Lawsuit in an attempt to defraud them. In the suit, Neewra claimed that the shipping container it had stuffed, sealed, and delivered to Maersk’s agent contained 2000 units of new computer hard drives, which Neewra had purchased from Seagate through Micro-Spy for $1.6M. Neewra alleged that it received an ocean bill of lading from Maersk’s agent upon delivery of the container, and thereafter negotiated the bill of lading to its bank. Neewra’s bank was to hold the bill of lading — the document entitling al Tamasok to claim the cargo from Plaintiffs in Kuwait — until al Tamasok paid the full purchase price of $1.86M to Neewra. Neewra claimed that misdelivery and conversion occurred when al Tamasok obtained a fraudulent bill of lading and thereby obtained the cargo in Kuwait without paying the purchase price. When Neewra’s New York attorneys were confronted with the evidence of fraud adduced by Continental (Neewra’s insurer), they withdrew the New York lawsuit. Id. ¶ 100. Not to be deterred, Neewra obtained New Jersey counsel and attempted to pursue the same claim there. Once again, when Neewra’s New Jersey attorneys were presented with the evidence of fraud, the claims were withdrawn. Id. 1Í101. In 2004, Neewra brought an action against Maersk in Kuwaiti court, claiming misdelivery of the Electronics Shipment and seeking to recover $1.86M. Id. ¶ 103. At the time of the suit, however, Neewra no longer existed under New York law, and Plaintiffs allege that Neewra enlisted Help Line, Parkar and others to pursue its claim via an invalid power of attorney. In connection with the lawsuit, Neewra caused Plaintiffs’ ship, the M/V Alva Maersk, to be arrested in Kuwait in April 2004. Id. ¶ 103. Plaintiffs posted cash security in the amount of $1.86M with the Kuwaiti court and obtained release of the ship. Id. ¶ 105. Later that month, Paolo Ghirardani, Plaintiffs’ London attorney tasked with investigating the possibility of fraud in connection with the Electronics Shipment, arranged a meeting in Kuwait with Neewra’s “decision maker” (“April 2004 Meeting”). Ghirardani Decl. ¶¶ 119, 123. Plaintiffs allege that at the April 2004 Meeting, Mr. Ghirardani met an individual introduced as “Mr. Joginder.” According to Plaintiffs, “Mr. Joginder” did not say much, and the meeting ended in less than 30 minutes, after an unfruitful discussion regarding settlement of the litigation pending in the Kuwaiti court. At the close of the meeting, “Mr. Joginder” handed Mr. Ghirarda-ni his business card for Help Line. In the litigation that followed, Neewra lost its claim in the Kuwaiti trial court but succeeded on appeal. Pursuant to the appellate court’s decision, Plaintiffs’ $1.86M bond was transferred to Neewra. Compl. ¶ 113. Plaintiffs allege that the Neewra Fraud, and the litigation it spawned, has caused it $2.25M in damages. Again, the New York Defendant’s role appears to be quite direct. The Kuwait Defendants are alleged to have participated by carrying out the procurement of the shipment by means of the false bill of lading; by pursuing Neew-ra’s fraudulent claim in the Kuwaiti courts; and by thwarting the investigation into that claim by intimidating witnesses and harassing Maersk’s employees. Thus, Maersk alleges that Neewra, Arween, Mo-hinder, Joginder, Parkar and al Tamasok are all jointly and severally hable to it for the amount of $2.25M. iii. Rednihom The third scheme described in the Complaint began in a manner similar to the Neewra Electronics Shipment. Plaintiffs allege that on July 20, 1999, Arween or Mandeep, posing as Mohinder and acting through Rednihom Inc., contracted with Maersk regarding a shipment that it claimed contained 4,000 pieces of “PC Parts” (“PC Parts Shipment”). The PC Parts Shipment occurred four months after the Electronics Shipment. By the time the PC Parts Shipment was discharged in Kuwait on August 20, 1999, Plaintiffs were already aware of problems with the Neew-ra Electronics Shipment. After noticing that the freight forwarder was identical for both shipments, and that Rednihom’s address was the same as Neewra’s (Ghirar-dani Decl. ¶ 76), Plaintiffs, along with the Kuwaiti Port Authority and Customs authorities, unsealed the container and found mostly used automotive parts. Plaintiffs allege that the cargo did not include any of the computer parts described in the bill of lading. Compl. ¶ 120. The PC Parts Shipment was abandoned by the named consignees for nearly three months, and Plaintiffs later discovered that the consignees did not exist. Id. ¶ 121-22. Plaintiffs allege that Help Line, through Joginder and/or one of Help Line’s employees, thereafter contacted Plaintiffs and requested (1) that they be permitted a survey of the container, and (2) that Plaintiffs send the container to a new consignee in Dubai. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were attempting to find an alternative way to present a false claim against Maersk with regard to the PC Parts Shipment. Maersk alleges that although this scheme was thwarted, it has still been damaged in the amount of $32,000, for which it claims Mohinder, Arween, Jogin-der, Mandeep, Help Line, Sabharwal and Rednihom are directly and jointly and severally liable. iv. Other alleged bad behavior Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants have engaged in other, similar schemes to defraud international shipping companies. Presumably, this allegation is made to bolster Plaintiffs’ claims under the RICO statute, or to establish a conspiracy between all of the named defendants that will subject the Kuwaiti Defendants to jurisdiction here. c. Litigation History i. The verified complaint and garnishment of Mohinder’s funds The present litigation began when Maersk filed the Verified Complaint on May 3, 2005. Two days later, Judge Casey issued a Maritime Attachment and Garnishment for seizure of the assets of the named Defendants. The Verified Complaint alleges the three frauds — with damages reaching over $8M — as well as civil RICO on the basis of those frauds, for which treble damages in the amount of nearly $25M is sought. In November of 2005, Wachovia garnished over $450,000 being transferred from Mohinder to Mandeep in Kuwait. On November 22, 2005, Mohinder received notification in writing from his Bank in India that Wachovia had restrained his wire transfer. On the same day, Plaintiffs received a phone call from an individual identifying himself as “Mohinder Singh Sahani.” During the conversation and several subsequent ones, this individual protested Plaintiffs’ interference with the transferred funds. Plaintiffs allege that this individual was not Mohinder, but rather his son, Mandeep. Mandeep told Plaintiffs that the likely target of the attachment order was another “Mohinder Singh Sahni who lives in Kuwait and has a questionable reputation.” See Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., 443 F.Supp.2d 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y.2006). This other “Mohinder Singh Sahni” allegedly was a prominent tire dealer and had a brother named “Abul Sabah,” which is another alleged alias of Defendant Arween. Id. During these calls, Mohinder consented to be deposed in Kuwait in connection with the attachment of his funds. In December 2005, Mohinder submitted to a deposition in Kuwait without the benefit of counsel. Mr. Ghirardani — whom the reader may recognize as Maersk’s London counsel in charge of investigating Neew-ra’s claim against Maersk in the Kuwaiti courts — attended the deposition, and recognized Mohinder as the same individual with whom he met at the April 2004 Meeting regarding the Neewra fraud. The individual at that meeting had identified himself as “Joginder,” not “Mohinder.” Plaintiffs’ senior employee in Kuwait, Bimal Kanal, who had accompanied Mr. Ghi-rardani to the April 2004 Meeting, also later identified Mohinder as the same individual who attended that meeting. Mohin-der has denied being present at the 2004 meeting, and his brother, Joginder, has submitted an affidavit stating that he, not Mohinder, was there. Joginder 2006 Decl. During the 2005 deposition Mohinder claimed that he was not the “Mohinder Singh Sahni” named in the complaint. He claimed that, for one, he spelled his name “S-A-H-A-N-I,” that is, with an extra “A.” Mohinder claimed that he was no longer close to his brother Joginder or his nephew Arween, and that he had no knowledge of or involvement with any frauds. Maersk’s attorneys then presented him with a variety of documents in which he had spelled his name “S-A-H-N-I,” and Mohinder was unable to explain the discrepancy. Mohinder also maintained that there was another Mohinder Singh Sahni who had been impersonating him and working with his family, and who was married to a woman named “Narinder,” which also happened to be his wife’s name. Other intriguing details of the 2005 deposition are in the record, and need not be recited here. See Ghirardani Decl. ¶¶ 143-58. On January 13, 2006, Plaintiffs informed Mohinder that his funds would not be released. Mohinder then retained counsel, and on May 8, 2006, filed an order to show cause why Plaintiffs’ attachment of his funds should not be vacated. Mohinder contested the garnishment order on a number of theories. First, Mohinder argued that service was not properly made on Wachovia on the relevant date. Second, Mohinder made the same claim he had made in his deposition, arguing that he was not the Mohinder Singh Sahni referred to in the complaint. Finally, Mo-hinder argued that even if he was the Mohinder named in the complaint, the complaint failed to state a claim against him, let alone a maritime claim. Maersk, 443 F.Supp.2d at 528-32. After an initial hearing on the motion, Judge Chin, as Part I Judge, ordered the parties to submit briefing only on the issues of service of process and the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ prima facie allegations. Judge Chin vacated the attachment after the second hearing, concluding that Plaintiffs had not served a valid Process of Attachment on Wachovia. After being asked to reconsider, Judge Chin reinstated the attachment, and referred the matter to Judge Casey. ii. Judge Casey’s August 1, 2006 decision In an opinion dated August 1, 2006, Judge Casey rejected Mohinder’s theory that service had not been properly made on Wachovia. See Maersk, 443 F.Supp.2d at 519. What is relevant here, however, is Judge Casey’s findings regarding Mohin-der’s other theory, namely that he is not the Mohinder Singh Sahni named in the Verified Complaint, and that even if he were, the complaint failed to state a claim against him. Judge Casey noted that Mohinder’s theory that he could not be the named “Mo-hinder” because he spelled his name S-AH-A-N-I rather than S-A-H-N-I was plainly contradicted by a host of documents in which Mohinder did spell his name S-A-H-N-I, including his application for war fund reparations from the Kuwaiti government. Id. at 529-30. Judge Casey went on to note that, “[Mo-hinder] has provided no explanation for these discrepancies, which do moré than merely discredit his assertion that he is not named in the Complaint; his dissembling has colored the Court’s overall perception of his credibility.” Id. at 530. Judge Casey went on to name various other behaviors that had seriously impaired Mohinder’s credibility: Movant Sahani has made largely unsubstantiated assertions that his brother and nephew cooperated with a different “Mohinder Singh Sahni,” a Kuwaiti businessman of ill-repute who deals in tires; he allowed his son, Mandeep, to speak not only for him but as him during several telephone conversations with Plaintiffs; and he dubiously obtained a last minute affidavit from his brother, Jogin-der, after having requested a protective order from the Court for fear that Jo-ginder would commit violence against him in connection with the instant litigation. Id. On the basis of this highly suspicious behavior, Judge Casey found “reasonable grounds” to believe that Mohinder was “intricately involved in the events alleged in the Complaint ...” Id. As a result, Judge Casey refused to release Mohinder’s funds from the maritime attachment on the basis of his not being the Mohinder named in the complaint. As to Mohinder’s argument that the Original Verified Complaint failed to state a cause of action against him, Judge Casey concluded that reasonable grounds existed to find that Mohinder was a principal of Neewra and Rednihom at the time of the alleged frauds. Id. at 531 (“Together with the Complaint, Plaintiffs extrinsic allegations and evidence provide reasonable grounds to believe that [Mohinder] was a principal of Neewra, Rednihom, and [Aref].”). Thus, Judge Casey concluded that clause 14(4) of the bill of lading between Neewra and Maersk could apply to Mohinder as a principal of Neewra. Mohinder’s motion for reconsideration and certification for appeal were denied on October 6, 2006. Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., 2006 WL 2854298, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.6, 2006) (RCC). iii. The amended verified complaint After the August 1, 2006 decision, Plaintiffs revised their theory regarding Mohin-der’s role in the frauds, and filed the Amended Verified Complaint on August 31, 2006. Rather than asserting that Mo-hinder himself carried out actions on behalf of Neewra and Rednihom in New York, Plaintiffs now allege that he instructed or authorized his son Mandeep and/or his nephew Arween to carry out those actions using his identity. The theory as to the other Kuwaiti Defendants is that they participated in, or directed, the conspiracy to defraud Plaintiffs. This includes not only authorizing the New York Defendants to act, or instructing the New York Defendants, but also fraudulently obtaining the Neewra shipment in Kuwait by defrauding various employees of Maersk and al Tamasok, as well as the website designer; defrauding the Kuwaiti court in the pursuit of Neew-ra’s fraudulent claim for the $1.86M connected with the Neewra shipment; attempting to obtain the release or diversion of the Rednihom shipment in pursuit of another fraudulent claim against Maersk; intimidating potential witnesses against the Singh Sahni family; and attempting to throw Maersk off their scent by impersonating one another both on the phone and in person. Specifically, Counts I and II are based on the Tire Fraud. Count I alleges breach of contract — the Maersk bill of lading for the Tire Shipment — against Arween, Man-deep, Aref and Mohinder, as their principal. Count II alleges a “fraudulent scheme” arising from the Tire Shipment, and seeks to hold the same four Defendants liable. Counts III and IV are based on the Neewra Fraud. Count III alleges fraud against Neewra, Arween, Mohinder, Jogin-der, Sabharwal, Parker and al Tamasok. Count IV alleges breach of contract — the Maersk bill of lading for the Neewra Electronics Shipment — against Neewra, Ar-ween, Sabharwal, al Tamasok, Joginder, Sardar and Sardar Int’l. Count V alleges fraud, on the basis of the Rednihom shipment, against Mohinder, Arween, Joginder, Mandeep, Help Line, Sabharwal and Rednihom. Count VI alleges civil RICO against all of the named defendants. Count VII alleges a common law conspiracy to commit fraud claim, on the basis of Counts I-V, against Arween, Mohinder, Joginder, Mandeep, Neewra, Rednihom, Aref, Help Line, al Tamasok, Sardar and Sardar Int’l. Maersk alleges damages arising from the three principal frauds described above (Tire Fraud, Neewra Fraud and Rednihom Fraud) in the amount of approximately $8.33M. Based on its civil RICO claim, Maersk seeks treble damages in the amount of approximately $25M. The New York Defendants — Arween, Mandeep, Neewra, Rednihom and Aref— have not appeared in response to either the Original Verified or the Amended Verified Complaint. On May 26, 2006, default judgment was entered against Neewra, Rednihom, and Aref. A damages inquest as to those Defendants is pending before Magistrate Judge Eaton. Plaintiffs received permission to serve Arween and Mandeep by publication on August 25, 2006, and have apparently done so. However, from all that appears, no default judgment has been entered against these Defendants. iv. The motions to dismiss On March 30, 2007, the moving defendants here submitted their various motions to dismiss. First, Mohinder moves to dismiss the complaint against him, arguing that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him; that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead fraud with particularity against him, defeating both the fraud claims and the RICO claim for which those frauds serve as predicates; and that in any event, the action should be dismissed as to him under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The rest of the moving defendants (Joginder, Parkar, Help Line, Sardar and Sardar Int’l) move for dismissal on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, and argue that the complaint should be dismissed as to them under the doctrine of forum non conveniens I address the issues as follows: personal jurisdiction as to all defendants (IH.a.), forum non conveniens as to all defendants (IILb.), and Mohinder’s remaining arguments (III.c.). III. Discussion a. Personal Jurisdiction i. Over Mohinder Mohinder’s first argument is that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, so that the complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 1. Standard of review on 12(b)(2) motion The plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant when served with a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.” Whitaker v. American Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). Where the court holds an evidentia-ry hearing to resolve factual disputes, the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. I refer to this standard as the post-discovery 12(b)(2) standard below. However, where a court rules on a 12(b)(2) motion based on pleadings and affidavits, the plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over the defendant. DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir.2001); Whitaker, 261 F.3d at 208. While personal jurisdiction “must be established either at an evidentiary hearing or at trial,” allegations submitted solely through competing affidavits are “construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and doubts are resolved in the plaintiffs favor, notwithstanding a controverting presentation by the moving party.” A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir.1993). I refer to this standard as the pre-discovery 12(b)(2) standard below. Maersk has had an opportunity to depose Mohinder (though not the other Kuwaiti Defendants), and submits voluminous exhibits in support of its personal jurisdiction argument over him. Thus, the post-discovery standard applies. I find that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden, and so deny Mohinder’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 2. Maersk’s Theories of Jurisdiction Maersk presents two theories under which Mohinder may be subject to this court’s jurisdiction. The first is the shipping contract between Maersk, Inc. and Neewra, embodied in Maersk’s standard bill of lading. Clause 14(4) of that bill of lading reads as follows: The Shipper, consignee, holder hereof, and owner of the goods, and their principals, shall be jointly and severally liable to Carrier for the payment of all freight, demurrage, Geberal Average and other charges due hereunder, without discount, together with any Court costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in collecting any sums due Carrier. (emphasis added). Maersk’s standard bill of lading also contains a forum selection and choice of law clause, designating this court as the exclusive forum for litigating certain disputes under the contracts. [TJhis contract is to be governed by United States law and United States Federal Court of the Southern District of New York is to have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all disputes hereunder, including any disputes relating to freight or other sums payable to the Carrier for carriage to or from the USA. See Pl.’s Opp. (Multiple Defendants) at 12. Maersk argues that, in light of his relationship with the New York Defendants, Mo-hinder is a “Merchant” under that contract, and hence subject to the forum-selection clause contained therein. Alternatively, Maersk argues that Mohinder is a “principal” of Neewra within the meaning of clause 14(4) of the shipping contract, and hence is liable for Neewra’s defaults, and subject to the forum selection clause. PL’s Opp. (Mohinder) at 1-8. Maersk’s second theory is that the New York Defendants (Neewra, Rednihom, Aref, Arween and Mandeep) were either Mohinder’s agents or his co-conspirators. As a result, Mohinder would be subject to New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (“Section 302”). Section 302(a)(1) states that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” (emphasis added). Under Section 302(a)(1), a defendant “who transacts business in New York will be subject to personal jurisdiction in New York if the acts were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between those acts and the plaintiffs claim.” Semi Conductor Materials, Inc. v. Citibank Int’l PLC, 969 F.Supp. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (citing PDK Labs. Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1109 (2d Cir.1997)). In reality, Maersk’s various jurisdictional theories all amount to the same thing: namely that the New York Defendants committed their various delicts either “on behalf of’ or “with instructions from” or “for the benefit of’ Mohinder. If this proposition is true, then personal jurisdiction attaches under any of Maersk’s theories. Mohinder would be a principal of Neewra under the shipping contract (and perhaps a merchant, though this is less clear), subjecting him to the forum-selection clause; he would be “transaet[ing] ... business within the state ... through an agent” for the purposes of 302(a)(1); and he would be a co-conspirator, subjecting him to jurisdiction pursuant to Section 302. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, Practice Commentaries C302:4, Commission of Acts “Through an Agent.” (“The New York activities of a co-conspirator may also be imputed to an out-of-state tortfeasor for jurisdictional purposes under an agency rationale.”). On the other hand, if — as Mohinder contends — the New York Defendants did not act at the direction of, for the benefit for, or on behalf of Mohinder, then all of Maersk’s theories fail. He could not be “Merchant” or “principal” under the contract, and he could not be a principal or co-conspirator under the statute. Nonetheless, there are important some differences between the theories. For instance, if Mohinder is found to be a principal under the terms of the bill of lading contract, then he is considered to have consented to jurisdiction here on the basis of the forum selection clause. D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener., 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir.2006) (“Parties can consent to personal jurisdiction through forum-selection clauses in contractual agreements.”) (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent., 375 U.S. 311, 315-16, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964)). In that case, there would be no need to engage in the Due Process analysis that is necessary if Mohinder is only subject to jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute. Second, the issue of whether Mo-hinder is bound by the contract is not just relevant to jurisdiction; it is the ultimate issue in the case. A ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction cannot and must not purport to determine the ultimate issue of liability for breach of contract. The same is true for a finding that Mohinder was or was not a principal for the purposes of Section 302: that issue is determinative of jurisdiction, and an element of Mohinder’s liability for the various alleged frauds and conspiracies. Third, Mohinder’s alleged liability on the contract is the basis for this court’s maritime jurisdiction, and hence the basis for the validity of the maritime attachment of Mohinder’s ETF. Finally, if Mohinder is bound by the contract and its forum selection clause, then his forum non conveniens argument has no merit. As discussed further below, Judge Casey has already found that Mohinder is bound by Clause 14(4) of the shipping contracts, though under a “reasonable grounds” standard of review inapplicable here. However, the outcome does not change under either the pre- or post-discovery 12(b)(2) standard, so that for jurisdictional purposes, Mohinder is bound by 14(4), and hence is considered to have consented to jurisdiction. It should once again be emphasized that this finding is not determinative of any substantive liability. While Plaintiffs have surmounted their 12(b)(2) burden, after further discovery Mohinder can renew his 12(b)(2) motion, or move for summary judgment on the contract claims, or argue to a jury that the factual basis for finding him a principal under the contract does not exist. The same is true with respect to a finding that Mohinder is an agent or co-conspirator under the long-arm statute; although this overlaps with Mohinder’s substantive liability, it does not determine it. Mohinder is free renew his arguments against these elements of his liability on a different motion or before a jury. Nonetheless, in the interest of thoroughness, I analyze jurisdiction over Mohinder both under the shipping contracts and under Section 302, Due Process analysis and all. To the extent that Mohinder’s liability under the contract becomes relevant to other arguments raised in Mohinder’s motion, it will be discussed when those arguments are being addressed. 3. Post-discovery standard I begin with the question of whether Mohinder is subject to jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1) as a principal of the New York Defendants, as this determination is sufficient — though not necessary — to establish that he is subject to jurisdiction as a principal under the contract. In determining whether an agency relationship exists for the purposes of Section 302, courts “have focused on the realities of the relationship in question rather than the formalities of agency law.” CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 366 (2d Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, the alleged agent “must have acted in the state for the benefit of, and with the knowledge and consent of, the non-resident principal.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). While the principal need not exercise absolute control over the decisions or acts of the putative agent, see id., a sufficient amount of control “may involve the ability of the principal to influence such acts or decisions by virtue of the parties’ respective roles.” Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 2000 WL 1154252, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.14, 2000); see also CutCo, 806 F.2d at 366 (sufficient control where agent and principal engaged in joint venture or joint partnership). As noted, the issue of whether a foreign defendant is engaged in a conspiracy within the jurisdiction of the court is similar. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, Practice Commentaries C302:4, Commission of Acts “Through an Agent.” (“The New York activities of a co-conspirator may also be imputed to an out-of-state tortfeasor for jurisdictional purposes under an agency rationale.”). Judge Casey described the reach of the co-conspirator theory under New York law as follows: To warrant the inference that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy [for jurisdictional purposes], Plaintiffs must show that “(a) the defendant had an awareness of the effects in New York of its activity; (b) the activity of the co-conspirators in New York was to the benefit of the out-of-state conspirators; and (c) the co-conspirators acting in New York acted at the direction or under the control or at the request of or on behalf of the out-of-state defendant.” In re Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 349 F.Supp.2d 765, 805 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quoting Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 778 F.Supp. 1260, 1268-69 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) (other citations, quotations and subsequent history omitted). Maersk alleges that Mohinder authorized his son Mandeep and his nephew Arween to use his identity to establish Neewra and Rednihom in the United States, Compl. ¶ 12; that in so authorizing, Mohinder was aware of the frauds those companies would be used to commit, id.; that Arween was acting as Mohinder’s agent when he entered the contract with Maersk for the Tire Shipment, id. ¶ 31; and that Mohinder participated as a principal in the Rednihom Fraud, id. ¶¶ 119-24. Plaintiffs faced an uphill battle in convincing me that Mohinder is part of an international shipping fraud syndicate, that runs a shadow operation across the globe, employs numerous shifting identities and dummy corporations, and that assaults potential witnesses, bribes and defrauds government officials, and routinely ransacks hotel rooms. The extraordinary nature of these allegations gives me pause, but does not lead me to find that no reasonable jury could believe them. Indeed, Paolo Ghirar-dani, whose declaration contains many of the more colorful allegations, is a well-respected investigator of shipping fraud and this court has no reason to doubt the veracity of his account. Mohinder, on the other hand, has not conducted himself in a trustworthy manner. Especially damning is the manner in which Mohinder conducted himself during the maritime attachment proceeding, i.e., claiming that he was not the same Mohin-der Singh Sahni named in the original Complaint. While Plaintiffs’ original theory as to Mohinder did prove flawed, this had nothing to do with Mohinder’s own theory, which was that he’d been mistaken for an altogether different Mohinder Singh Sahni, who spelled his name differently (sometimes) and had a bad reputation in Kuwait. By all accounts, Mohinder’s claims in this respect were patent lies, and were found to be so by Judge Casey. See Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., 443 F.Supp.2d 519, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Mohinder has now dropped this claim, but cannot explain why it should not destroy his credibility. Adopting a false identity in an attempt to bamboozle a government official makes Ghirardani’s allegations significantly more plausible. Indeed, Mohinder’s behavior led Judge Casey to conclude that “Together with the complaint, Plaintiffs’ extrinsic allegations and evidence provide reasonable grounds to believe that [Mohinder] was a principal of Neewra, Rednihom and [Aref|.” Id. at 531. Although this precise issue was not before Judge Casey, as he was not faced with a motion to dismiss, nothing in the submissions since his August 1, 2006 ruling leads me to believe that Maersk has not also established by a preponderance the existence of a principal-agent relationship. Although Maersk has little direct evidence linking Mohinder to the frauds, it presents sufficient circumstantial and inferential evidence to sustain such a connection. As noted, Mohinder allowed Man-deep to impersonate him during phone calls with Maersk’s representatives. Mo-hinder attempted to fool Judge Casey as to his identity. Maersk also alleges that Mo-hinder posed as Joginder at the April 2004 Meeting. Taken together, and in light of Mohinder’s non-existent credibility, this gives rise to a fair inference that Mohinder is involved in “an international web of suspect corporations and individual actors who employ tacit alliances and shifting identities as the primary tools of their malfeasance.” Id. at 530-31. It is at least sufficient to convince me that it is more likely than not that Mohinder was a principal or co-conspirator of the New York Defendants during the alleged frauds. Plaintiffs have therefore met their burden of showing personal jurisdiction over Mo-hinder. 4. Due Process My determination that Maersk has shown that Mohinder was a principal of the New York Defendants under the post-discovery 12(b) (2) standard is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Mohin-der on the basis of the contract, which binds principals. But there is more. This determination also establishes the applicability of New York’s long-arm statute to Mohinder. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (“A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.”) (emphasis added). However, to establish long-arm jurisdiction, the court must also consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mohinder based on Section 302 comports with constitutional guarantees of Due Process. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir.2002) (“If there is a statutory basis for jurisdiction, the court must then determine whether New York’s extension of jurisdiction in such a case would be permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). To do so, the court must analyze whether the defendant “has ‘certain minimum contacts [with the forum] ... such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., Ltd., 241 F.3d 135, 152 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)) (alteration in original; some internal quotation marks omitted). Where “the claim arises out of, or relates to, the defendant’s contacts with the forum” — i.e., specific jurisdiction — minimum contacts exist “where the defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being ‘haled into court’ there.” Id.; accord Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A state may assert “general jurisdiction”— i.e., jurisdiction irrespective of whether the claim arises from or relates to the defendant’s forum contacts — only where these contacts are “continuous and systematic.” U.S. Titan, 241 F.3d at 152; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Mohinder’s motion and declaration make much of the fact that he does not reside, own bank accounts, or otherwise spend time in New York. However, these arguments speak only to the assertion of general jurisdiction. Maersk’s theory, on the other hand, is that the activities of Arween and Mandeep, through Aref, Neewra and Rednihom, should be imputed to Mohinder for jurisdictional purposes under either an agency or conspiracy rationale. Maersk sufficiently alleges facts supporting an exercise of transactional jurisdiction. It is clear that the contacts that are the basis of the cause of action, for instance the contracts and misrepresentations made in New York by Mohinder’s agents, are also the contacts giving rise to jurisdiction. These contacts also show Mohinder, through his agents in New York, purposefully availing himself of New York’s laws. For instance, the sham corporations allegedly established in furtherance of this conspiracy, which permitted Defendants to present a legitimate face to Maersk, were incorporated in New York. New York law likewise governed the contracts entered into in furtherance of the conspiracy. The execution and presumed enforceability of these contracts were necessary to inducing Maersk to be defrauded. Thus, the necessary minimum contacts exist here. The second part of the jurisdictional analysis asks, “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ — that is, whether it is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Courts are to consider five factors in evaluating reasonableness: “(1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.” Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 568 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), and Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174). Where a plaintiff makes the threshold showing of the minimum contacts required for the first test, a defendant must present “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Metro. Life, 84 F.3d at 568 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174). The importance of the “reasonableness” inquiry varies inversely with the strength of the “minimum contacts” showing — a strong (or weak) showing by the plaintiff on “minimum contacts” reduces (or increases) the weight given to “reasonableness.” Id. at 568-69 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174). On the assumption that Mohinder was a principal of the New York Defendants, the exercise of jurisdiction here is manifestly reasonable. Any burden on Mohin-der to litigate here is far out-weighed by New York’s interest in discovering and imposing liability for these frauds, which employed New York corporations and contracts to defraud a New York Plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ also have a weighty interest in obtaining relief for the nearly $8M it claims it lost as a result of the frauds. The interests of other states and the interstate judicial system are not particularly relevant, though one may imagine that they would have an interest in exposing and punishing an international scheme that might affect their ports as well. In conclusion, I have determined that Maersk has shown that it is more likely than not that Mohinder is a principal within the meaning of the shipping contracts, and thus satisfied the post-discovery standard for surviving a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss. As a result he is bound by the forum selection clauses in those contracts, and has therefore consented to jurisdiction here. I have also concluded, in the alternative, that Maersk has shown that it is more likely than not that Mohinder is an agent or co-conspirator under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), thus satisfying the post-discovery 12(b)(2) standard for surviving a motion to dismiss. Because the New York long-arm statute applies, and exercising jurisdiction comports with Due Process, Mohinder is subject to the jurisdiction of this court independently of the Maersk shipping contracts. ii. Over the other Defendants As with Mohinder, Maersk asserts two theories under which these Defendants may be subject to this court’s jurisdiction: under the shipping contracts, and as principals or co-conspirators for the purposes of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302. As will be seen, the availability of these theories varies from one Defendant to the next. Unlike Mohinder, however, these Defendants have not been deposed or subjected to anything resembling jurisdiction-related discovery. Thus, on this motion Plaintiffs bear the pre-discovery 12(b)(2) burden of alleging facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction over each of these moving Defendants. Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir.1998) (“Our cases show that ‘[pjrior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction,’ i.e., by making a ‘prima facie showing’ of jurisdiction.”) (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854, 111 S.Ct. 150, 112 L.Ed.2d 116 (1990)) (other citations omitted). Because the allegations as to each moving Defendant differ in important respects, each Defendant is addressed separately below. 1. Joginder Plaintiffs attempt to establish jurisdiction over Joginder as either a principal or co-conspirator of the. New York Defendants for the purpose of New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302. In determining whether an agency relationship exists for the purposes of Section 302, courts “have focused on the realities of the relationship in question rather than the formalities of agency law.” CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 366 (2d Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, the alleged agent “must have acted in the state for the benefit of, and with the knowledge and consent of, the non-resident principal.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). While the principal need not exercise absolute control over the decisions or acts of the putative agent, see id., a sufficient amount of control “may involve the ability of the principal to influence such acts or decisions by virtue of the parties’ respective roles.” Scholastic, Inc. v. Stauffer, 2000 WL 1154252, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.14, 2000); see also CutCo, 806 F.2d at 366 (sufficient control where agent and principal engaged in joint venture or joint partnership). As noted, the issue of whether a foreign defendant is engaged in a conspiracy within the jurisdiction of the court is similar. Section 302. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, Practice Commentaries C302:4, Commission of Acts “Through an Agent.” (“The New York activities of a co-conspirator may also be imputed to an out-of-state tortfeasor for jurisdictional purposes under an agency rationale”). Judge Casey described the reach of the co-conspirator theory under New York law as follows: To warrant the inference that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy [for jurisdictional purposes], Plaintiffs must show that “(a) the defendant had an awareness of the effects in New York of its activity; (b) the activity of the co-conspirators in New York was to the benefit of the out-of-state conspirators; and (c) the co-conspirators acting in New York acted at the direction or under the control or at the request of or on behalf of the out-of-state defendant.” In re Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 349 F.Supp.2d 765, 805 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quoting Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 778 F.Supp. 1260, 1268-69 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) (other citations, quotations and subsequent history omitted). Many of the allegations in the complaint that attempt to establish that Joginder is a principal or co-conspirator of the Ne