Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER RANDOLPH F. TREECE, United States Magistrate Judge. This litigation has had a long history by virtue of a series of contested dispositive motions and an appeal to the Second Circuit. The matter has settled and the motion currently before the Court, hopefully, will be the epilogue to this litigation. Luessenhop has filed a Petition seeking the amount of $99,082.53 for attorney’s fees and costs. Dkt. Nos. 77, Pl.’s Not. of Mot, dated Oct. 29, 2007, & 81, Pl.’s Reply. The Clinton County Defendant vigorously opposes Luessenhop’s Petition. Dkt. Nos. 79, Robert Rausch, Esq., Aff., dated Nov. 15, 2007, with Exs., & 80, Def.’s Mem. of Law. In defense of her Petition, Luessenhop files a Reply Affidavit and another Memorandum of Law. Dkt. Nos. 81, Mark Schneider, Esq., Aff., dated Nov. 20, 2007, & 81-2, Reply Mem. of Law. Indicative of this vigorously contested litigation is the Fee Application itself. The parties’ respective counsel have battled recently over other fee applications in similar types of cases and this Application is no different. As done in the past practice, the litigators have poured significant energy into exhuming every conceivable factual and conceptual nuance, and maybe unnecessarily so, in supporting and opposing this Fee Petition, which will indubitably require us to plow enduringly through mounds of minutiae. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Normally, we would presume familiarity with the facts of this litigation. However, we are compelled to recite the procedural history to assign proper context for this Fee Application. This entire litigation arises out of Clinton County’s method of notifying Plaintiff of her delinquency in paying taxes due on her property prior to foreclosing on such property. After Luessenhop unsuccessfully pursued redress in the state courts, on March 11, 2004, she commenced this federal action alleging that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, County Defendants violated her Due Process rights by the manner in which they mailed Luessenhop a foreclosure notice. The parties were granted seven months to conduct discovery, and certain discovery issues culminated into a Motion which ultimately led to an Order. See generally Dkt. Nos. 16-18, & 19, Order, dated Oct. 19, 2004. On January 5, 2005, County Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 25, which Luessenhop opposed and filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 29. On July 20, 2005, this Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order, granting County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Luessenhop’s Cross-Motion, and dismissing each of her claims. Dkt. No. 37. A Notice of Appeal was immediately filed to the Second Circuit. On April 26, 2006, after the Appeal had been perfected, but before the Second Circuit had rendered a decision, the United States Supreme Court rendered a Decision in the matter of Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S.Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006), which had a pivotal consequence on the Appeal. Based upon the “intervening Supreme Court case of Jones v. Flowers,” the Second Circuit rendered a Decision determining that Clinton County’s efforts to provide effectual foreclosure notice to Luessenhop were insufficient, and “reversed and remanded [the matter] for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion.” Dkt. No. 43, 2d Circuit Mandate; Luessenhop v. Clinton County, 466 F.3d 259, 272 (2006). Immediately upon the remand, the parties engaged in negotiations, but were unable to fully settle the matter. Their inability to resolve the case provoked the County Defendants to file a Motion to Dismiss based upon the individual Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity and sought to dismiss both compensatory and punitive damages against all Defendants. Dkt. No. 48. On April 6, 2007, we issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order, granting in part and denying in part that Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 56. We found that the individual Defendants, Bin-gel and Duprey, were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed them from this action, and further found that punitive damages could not be pursued against a municipal defendant. Not to be deterred by this dispositive event, Luessenhop filed a Motion to Amend her Complaint, essentially alleging that Clinton County continued to violate her rights by refusing to reconvey her property back to her after the Second Circuit Mandate. Dkt. No. 59. On July 9, 2007, this Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part the Motion to Amend. Dkt. No. 67. Most of the requested relief was denied, but we granted Luessenhop permission to file a partial motion for summary judgment as to in-junctive relief. We further noted that failing the filing of this partial motion for summary judgment, the case would be deemed trial ready. Settlement negotiations renewed and on September 28, 2007, a Judgment dismissing the action by reason of settlement was filed. Dkt. No. 72. The crux of this settlement is that Luessenhop receives her property and the sum of $13,000. However, an agreement as to attorney’s fees could not be reached. As a prelude to this Fee Petition, Luessenhop sought reconsideration of a previous order denying discovery of Defendants’ counsel’s hourly rate and hours expended in defending this action. Dkt. No. 74. This Court issued an Order that, inter alia, denied reconsideration and invariably noted our informed discretion to deny this type of discovery in order to avoid needless protraction of this litigation and our ken of the fact that the hourly rate of the losing party is simply and generally not relevant to determining prevailing rates. Dkt. No. 75, Order, dated Oct. 15, 2007. II. DISCUSSION A. Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Luessenhop seeks attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $99,082.58. Dkt. Nos. 77-2, 78, & 81. In determining whether a civil rights plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs, the court must determine whether (1) the plaintiff is the prevailing party and (2) the fees requested are reasonable. Gatti v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene County, Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 496, 515 (N.D.N.Y.2003) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) & Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir.1996)). 1. Prevailing Party Our first order of business is to determine if Luessenhop is entitled to attorney fees. In any action to enforce a § 1983 action, a court may, in its discretion, allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and cost. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). As instructed by the Supreme Court, reasonable attorney’s fees should be awarded to a prevailing party unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). A party is considered a prevailing party if they “receive actual relief on the merits of [her] claim,” Gatti v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene County, Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d at 515 (citing, inter alia, Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 880 (2d Cir.1998)), or “if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the action,” Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933). As long as the relief either directly benefits the plaintiff or “materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendants behavior,” even if it is nominal damages, the party qualifies as prevailing. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566; Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) for the proposition that the “[r]elief ... need not be judicially decreed for a party to be eligible for a fee award”); United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Waterbury Conn., 605 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.1979) (intervenors contributed to consent decree and were found to be prevailing party). It is therefore axiomatic that “[t]he fact that [plaintiff] prevailed through settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees.” Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980) (quoted in Lyte v. Sara Lee Corp., 950 F.2d 101, 103-04 (2d Cir.1991)); Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d at 1202 (noting that a party is considered a prevailing party whether securing a formal judgment, settlement, or consent decree); Raishevich v. Foster, 247 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir.2001) (noting that a party prevails when achieving a result from settlement “of the same general type as the relief sought”). Here, Luessenhop settled this matter recovering her property from the legal clutches of Clinton County and the sum of $13,000. Dkt. No. 72, Judgment Dismissing the Action by Reason of Settlement. We conclude, a fortiori, that Lues-senhop is a prevailing party and may be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Clinton County argues that this Court should reject or significantly reduce any award of attorney’s fees because the settlement was the result of a dynamic change of law in the middle of the litigation and it would be totally unfair to hold them accountable for Luessenhop’s fees because of this shift. When confronted with a factual scenario similar to Luessen-hop’s and with the mission of resolving conflicts among the circuits, the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S.Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006), fundamentally changed the course of the case law and the manner in which foreclosure notifications must be provided in order to meet due process requirements. Because of this shift in the law, Clinton County concomitantly posits that it always acted and defended this case upon the existing, prevailing law and held positions that were “reasonable and substantially justified.” In this regard, Clinton County points the Court to Gildor v. United States Postal Serv., 510 F.Supp.2d 181 (N.D.N.Y.2007), in an effort to exonerate them from the imposition of such a fee. Dkt. No. 80 at pp. 2-3. Clinton County’s argument fails on two accounts. We need not rehash previous case law or our previous Memorandum-Decisions and Orders on the matter, but we will accept the County’s position that the existing law on due process implications of foreclosure notices sent by certified mail was leaning in its favor, at least within the Second Circuit, until Jones v. Flowers. The findings and ruling of Jones, however, affirmed Luessenhop’s position throughout this litigation, a position we did not initially accept. Furthermore, although the Second Circuit had not addressed our set of facts in previous due process decisions, there was no absolute certainty that the Second Circuit would not have viewed Luessenhop’s Appeal the same as Jones. That change in the law ushered by the Supreme Court allowed Luessenhop to prevail on her appeal and in this litigation. Whether the timing of Jones was fortuitous or eventual is of little moment. The current law shifted to her favor and because of that transmutation Luessenhop has, in fact, prevailed. The County does not cite, nor have we been able to find, any precedent to support the notion that a turn in the law during the course of the litigation precludes the winning party from being deemed the prevailing party. We further disagree that Gildor v. United States Postal Service, is analogous and Clinton County’s reliance upon this case is misplaced. Unlike our case, in Gildor, the United States Government was successfully sued and plaintiff sought, under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), entitlement to attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred while litigating the case. Gildor, 510 F.Supp.2d 181; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a),(b). Under EAJA, a court shall award a prevailing party attorney fees, “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This statutory provision is exclusively applicable to the United States as a party; there is no corresponding reference to state governments or municipalities. 28 U.S.C., Ch. 161, § 2401, et seq. Nowhere within this legislative chapter has Congress extended the EAJA to state and municipal governance. Though Clinton County’s position throughout this litigation, until Jones v. Flowers, may have been substantially justified, neither Gildor, other court precedents, nor the underlying statute provide a basis to prevent us from finding Luessenhop a prevailing party. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (defining “substantially justified” and further that the EAJA applies to suits against the United States). In a similar vein, the County asserts Luessenhop should not be permitted to recover attorney’s fees or, if fees are awarded, such award should be appreciably reduced because she only achieved partial success, at best. Clinton County points to Luessenhop’s lack of success on most of her causes of action, and the fact that most of her arguments after the remand were also denied. Dkt. Nos. 79 at ¶¶ 14-18, & 80 at pp. 4-5. In the County’s view, Luessenhop “did not substantially prevail on her claims and that her limited success in this case did not come about as a result of the efforts of her attorney.” Dkt. No. 79 at ¶ 19 (emphasis in original). Both the United States Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have clearly expounded on whether a prevailing party’s attorney’s fees should be reduced because of limited or partial success. We note the Supreme Court’s insightful instruction on this subject: We hold that the extent of a plaintiffs success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained. On remand the District Court should determine the proper amount of the attorney’s fee award in light of these standards. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The most critical factor “is the degree of success obtained[.]” Healey v. Leavitt, 485 F.Sd 68, 72 (2d Cir.2007); Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir.2005). The Second Circuit has followed the Hensley’s ruling that the plaintiff should not have his fee reduced because he failed to prevail on every contention, but they also conformed to the view that a district court has the authority to reduce the fee award for a partial or limited success, which is not restricted “either to cases of multiple discrete theories or to cases in which the plaintiff won only a nominal or technical victory.” Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d at 253 & 256; see also Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir.1998) (“[Plaintiff is] not entitled to a fee award for unsuccessful claims that were based on different facts and different legal theories[.]” (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)). But where both successful and unsuccessful claims are “inextricably intertwined, and involve a common core of facts or are based upon related legal theories[,]” a plaintiffs request for this type of relief should be granted. Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (noting that in cases where the “plaintiffs claim for relief ... involve[s] a common core of facts or [is] based upon related theories” the court should focus on the overall relief obtained). The focus always remains on the overall relief obtained in the litigation. Green v. Torres, 361 F.3d 96, 98-99 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933 and further noting that attorney fees may be awarded for unsuccessful claims as well as successful claims). We must now determine the extent of Luessenhop’s victory. Even when confronted with the obvious facts that most of her causes of actions did not survive and she endured several unfavorable rulings, Luessenhop hardly concedes any limitation in the degree of her success. The County’s argument that Luessenhop lost most of her applications before this Court and became victorious by virtue of legal happenstance may be considered by some to be a shrewed observation of the events, but it is not legally persuasive. Because Luessen-hop garnered the return of her property, money damages, and a possible change in county procedures-based upon a common core of facts and legal theories — we find that she significantly accomplished her overall objective and the relief she sought. If there were discrete theories or facts in this case, they cannot be readily distinguishable from the core principles permeating throughout her claim. In fact, the major thrust of her legal positions was vindicated by Jones v. Flowers and the Second Circuit’s Mandate. Dkt. No. 43. Moreover, it would be inappropriate for us to consider reducing the size of the award because the damages and the relief recovered were modest. Finding it impossible to calculate and enforce, the United States Supreme Court disapproved of the notion that there should be a rule of proportionality as to the award of attorney’s fees and the monetary damages. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (finding no authority within the statute to adopt such a rule); Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 522, 524-26 (2d Cir.1991) (citing DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.1985), for the proposition that attorney’s fees should not be reduced because of a lower amount for damages); Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d at 252 (rejecting the notion that the fee must be reduced because it would be “disproportionate to the financial interest at stake in the litigation”). Unless the quality of the representation was suspect, “[t]ying [the award of attorney’s fees] to the amount of damages would subvert the statute’s goal of opening the court to all who have meritorious civil rights claims.” Orchano v. Advanced Recovery, Inc., 107 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1997) (citations are omitted). Moreover, a prevailing party is not limited to recovery on successful motions alone. Indeed unsuccessful motions too are com-pensable as long as they are not frivolous. Blissett v. Casey, 969 F.Supp. 118, 130 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (citations omitted). Based upon this entire discussion, we find no reason to reduce any attorney’s fees that may be awarded based upon the level of success at each stage of this litigation and the ultimate outcome. 2. Reasonable Attorney Fees Now that we have decided Luessenhop is a prevailing party, we must turn our attention to determining what would constitute a fee that is reasonable. Recently, the Second Circuit disabused district courts from concentrating on calculating a reasonable fee and instead guided the focus toward setting a reasonable hourly rate. Once a reasonably hourly rate is set, it should be employed to calculate the “presumptively reasonable fee.” Arbor Hill Concerned, Citizens Neighborhood Assn’n v. County of Albany, 493 F.3d 110, 117 & 118 (2d Cir.2007). Although the Second Circuit loathes the employment of “lodestar” as a metaphor in this determination, it directs nonetheless that in order to set the presumptively reasonable fee we should utilize the traditional “lodestar method,” that is, multiplying the reasonably hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours expended. Id. at 111-12. The Circuit further extrapolated on the calculation methodology by stating that [w]e think the better course — and the one most consistent with attorney’s fees jurisprudence — is for the district court, in exercising its considerable discretion, to bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that we and other courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in setting a reasonable hourly rate. The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay. In determining what rate a paying client would be willing to pay, the district court should consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively. The district court should also consider that such an individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the case. The district court should then use that reasonable hourly rate to calculate what can properly be termed the “presumptively reasonable fee.” Id. at 117-18 (emphasis added); Rahiym-Amir v. Bellamy of Corinth, Inc., 2007 WL 4573409, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.26, 2007). In calculating this presumptively reasonable fee, we should use the “approximate market rate [now euphemistically called the prevailing rate] for an attorney’s services[.]” Arbor Hill, 493 F.3d. at 120 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989)). “[T]he equation ... of a reasonable hourly fee with the prevailing market rate contemplates a case-specific inquiry into the prevailing market rates” whereby a court looks “for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Farbotko v. Clinton County, 433 F.3d 204, 209 & 210 (2d Cir.2005); Reiter v. MTA New York City Trans. Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 233 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 210). The prevailing market rate is to be determined by those rates prevailing within the relevant community. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens, 493 F.3d at 118 & 119 (what a reasonable client in the relevant geographic area would pay). That relevant community is deemed to be district wide. Id. at 118 (citing Polk v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir.1983) for the proposition that the relevant community is where the district court sits); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir.1987) (finding the relevant community to be the district where the case is brought). Such a determination is best left to the district court because it is in “closer proximity to and has greater experience with the relevant community whose prevailing market rate it is determining.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens, 493 F.3d at 121 (quoting Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 210). Although the fee applicant has the burden of showing by satisfactory evidence, which may include an attorney’s affidavit, that the requested hourly rate is the prevailing market rate, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), it is incumbent upon the district court to take judicial notice of rates in prior cases, the evidence submitted by the parties, and its own familiarity and experience with rates within its relevant community, Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 209 & 210-11. See also Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir.2006). And the court must set a fee, which is adequate to attract competent counsel but not produce a windfall, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at 893-94, 104 S.Ct. 1541, always “bearing] in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the ease effectively,” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens, 493 F.3d at 118. That fee is to be current, not historical. Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 882 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284, 109 S.Ct. 2463). a. Johnson Factors The parties are at great odds in terms of setting a reasonable hourly rate: Luessenhop seeks $260 per hour, which would establish a new rate for this District, while Clinton County argues that should we find Luessenhop to be a prevailing party, the rate should not exceed $210 per hour. In support of her Fee Petition for the hourly rate of $260, Luessenhop submits an Affidavit, her Attorney’s Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, an Economist Report, and five other Attorney Affidavits or Affirmations, one of which conducted a survey of practicing attorneys in the Albany area. See supra note 1. In light of the fact that Luessenhop is seeking to set a new district wide rate rather than “settle” for what has been the normal district rate of $210, we must review her attorney’s submissions within the framework of the other Johnson factors. Those twelve Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens, 493 F.3d at 114 n. 3 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974)). Attorney Schneider has been practicing law since 1981 and has practiced in the Second and Fifth Circuits. He has been practicing civil rights law since 1982 and has an active practice in the northern part of this District. This Court is familiar with Schneider’s practice within this District and further knows that has brought several cases that have reached conclusion, either by dispositive motion or trial, while others remain outstanding. Within the past seven years, he has argued at least seven appeals before the Second Circuit. We also accept the fact that Schneider is one of very few attorneys in the northern region of the this District who prosecutes civil rights actions, particularly when the case involves real estate foreclosures. He has the requisite skills to engage in such litigation. See generally Dkt. No. 77-2, Schneider’s Affirm. We further note that Schneider has had a long relationship with Luessenhop since approximately 2001, when he represented her on these very issues in New York state courts and then to conclusion in our Court. Although we initially did not agree with Luessenhop’s assessment on the law as it related to the facts of her case thereby causing her to appeal to the Second Circuit, overall, we do not find the case to be classified as “undesirable.” As a point of reference, it appears that Schneider has established a cottage industry on due process challenges within the foreclosure process, at least in Clinton County, so this issue is neither novel, nor difficult, nor undesirable to Schneider. Since craving out a niche as to these types of cases, accepting this case would only further his practice in this arena. Furthermore, in terms of the nature of the various and complex legal actions pursued in this District on a daily basis, this case did not present truly novel nor arduous questions. Although Schneider avers that he was “precluded from performing other legal work because of [his] work on this case,” Dkt. No. 77-2 at ¶ 14, we do not accept this as being true. In fact, his activities within the District during the relevant time period belie that asseveration. In reviewing the District’s records, we have confirmed that since 2004, the year when the Complaint in this matter was filed, Schneider has commenced approximately 110 other matters within this District, albeit the majority of which have been social security disability appeals. Furthermore, we have reviewed Schneider’s time sheets, which clearly indicate that he represented various clients concurrently with his representation of Luessenhop. See infra Part II.B. Considering what has been revealed to us, there was no specific time restraints imposed upon Schneider either by client, the Court, or the circumstances of the case. See generally Dkt. No. 77-2. In prosecuting this Fee Petition, Schneider did not share with us his customary hourly rate as he is required to do, leaving us to ponder whether Schneider has an established billing rate. He has admitted however that when representing Luessenhop on her state action, he charged her $150 an hour. See also Dkt. No. 77-6, Elizabeth Luessenhop’s Aff., dated Oct. 29, 2007, at ¶ 4. But, in reference to this federal case, Schneider accepted the case on a contingency fee basis. Dkt. No. 77-2. In terms of recent counsel fee awards extended to Schneider, in Farbotko there were two fee awards. The first fee award occurred in 2003 and Schneider received the hourly rate of $175. In 2005, after the Second Circuit addressed substantive issues and remanded the case back to the district court, Schneider sought $200 per hour for work performed in the District Court, an hourly rate of $250 for the appeal and an upward enhancement. Farbotko v. Clinton County, 433 F.3d at 206. When this later fee application was considered by the Honorable David R. Homer, United States Magistrate Judge, Schneider was, once again, awarded an hourly rate of $175. This award of attorney fees was successfully challenged on appeal and remanded for further review primarily because Judge Homer’s decision failed to mention or discuss Schneider’s evidence on the prevailing market rate and may have relied too heavily upon previous court determined rates. Id. at 207 & 210-11. Upon remand, the parties filed a succinct status report merely advising Judge Homer that the attorney fee issue was settled, without providing any details. Farbotko v. Clinton County, 99-cv-1946, Dkt. No. 191, Status Report, dated Jan. 31, 2006. Schneider has not shared with us that compromised attorney fee. In a recent contested bankruptcy case of Andrew T. Gregoire, the Honorable Robert Little-field, United States Bankruptcy Judge, granted Schneider an hourly rate of $200. Dkt. No. 79-4, Bankruptcy Court MDO, at p. 10 n. 6. Lastly, the Johnson opinions require courts to weigh the time and labor that is required. That analysis is below. See supra Part II.B. b. Calculation of the Hourly Rate Clinton County has substantial support for its argument that the hourly rate should be $210. Our survey of attorney fee awards within this District for the past year confirms that, in the vast majority of cases, the amount has been $210. There are two other reported cases within this District where the Judges set the hourly rates at $ 225 and $250, based upon a finding that each case was unique. But our analysis of reasonable hourly rate does not stop at this juncture. We must remain mindful that the Second Circuit directs us to consider the evidence adduced by the applicant and our own familiarity and experience with prevailing rates within the district. In support of the Fee Petition, Lues-senhop submits a Survey and Attorney Affidavits indicating a wide range of billing rates from a low of $175 to a high of $350 within this District. See Dkt. Nos. 77-3 to 77-10. Since Schneider practices in the “North Country” where civil right actions are infrequent, he has retained the service of Attorney Mark S. Mishler, an Albany lawyer, to conduct a survey on his behalf, presumably in order to determine a district wide prevailing market rate. Ostensibly, the overall billing rates in the northern region of the District are more depressed than in Syracuse, Albany, and Binghamton, which are litigation centers within the District. Attorney Mishler interviewed thirteen lawyers who practice in various sized firms with various types of litigation practices. Dkt. No. 77-3. Most of those rates reported to Mishler have a median value of approximately $260. Id. It is these billing rates that Luessenhop most relies upon in her application. Even though some of the attorneys expressed surprise that an experienced lawyer would handle a complex federal case for under $300 per hour, id. at ¶ 10, what is lacking from Mishler’s Affirmation, and probably because it was neither asked nor deeply probed, is whether these attorneys are billing all of their clients at these rates, or only their best paying, corporate-like clients. Also absent from this Affirmation is the realistic notion of whether these attorneys are actually collecting these rates from their lower level paying clients and the prospect of discounts. In this discussion, however, Mishler, who is a seasoned civil rights practitioner, critically appraised this information that he culled from litigators by extrapolating further that [d]ue to the fact that most potential civil rights plaintiffs do not have the resources to pay legal fees while their case is pending, I am not sure there can truly be a “market rate” for plaintiffs’ attorneys in civil rights cases, if “market rate” means the rate clients actually pay their lawyers to handle these types of cases. This is why my survey included some attorneys who handle plaintiff-side civil rights cases as well as some who handle other types of federal civil litigation. Id. at ¶ 17. In addition to these Attorneys’ Affidavits or Affirmations and survey, at least in terms of § 1983 actions, Luessenhop interjects a novel methodology to calculate a reasonable hourly rate for this community by hiring the service of an economist, Arthur Woolf, Ph.D., to perform an analysis entitled “Analysis of Civil Rights Lawyer Market and Costs.” Dkt. No. 77-4 & 5. Dr. Woolfs rudimentary approach in determining what should be the reasonable hourly rate for this District was to take the rate of $175, which was first set in 1992, and multiple that rate by the annual Employment Cost Index (ECI) for each of the past fourteen years thereby arriving at an equivalent rate of $287.33 for 2006. Although this is an interesting concept, this Court rejects this methodology for a host of reasons. Even Dr. Woolf recognizes the dilemma in calculating a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys. In fact, in one of the paramount sections of his report, “Market for Civil Rights Attorneys,” Dr. Woolf, who had to rely upon Schneider and another attorney’s Affirmation to supplement the underlying facts and enhance his appreciation of the complexity of this discourse, reveals all of the difficulties and variables in calculating a prevailing rate. Some of those salient factors are the level of legal experience, what a client is willing to pay or is able to pay, and the risk and uncertainties of the litigation itself, all of which cannot be measured on an economist’s slide rule. Id. at p. 2. Since this is a “thin market,” “one in which there are few buyers or sellers and hence there is no market clearing price for the good or service in question,” an economist cannot persuasively resort to his normal tools to arrive at prevailing rate for this District. One critical factor that Dr. Woolf and the index methodology cannot critically evaluate is the steep competition for fee paying clients within the legal profession. More significantly, the primary flaw of the ECI index methodology is the base number provided by Schneider upon which Dr. Woolf starts his calculation. Schneider, and now Dr. Wolf, incorrectly believe that compensation forces for lawyers cannot remain static for extended periods of time. By using the ECI annually for the past fourteen years, their methodology accepts the proposition that lawyer’s fees increase exponentially and uniformly. Whereas, experience has shown us that these rates can evolve rather slowly or increase by leaps and bounds based upon larger economic forces. As a critical example, the prevailing rate within this District had been $175 per hour as late as 2005, without any complaints or objection. See e.g., Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 2005 WL 3159600, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.16, 2005); DiSorbo v. City of Schenectady, 2004 WL 115009, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.9, 2004); Gatti v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene County, 263 F.Supp.2d 496, 515 (N.D.N.Y.2003); aff'd, 86 Fed.Appx. 478 (2d Cir.2004). If this fact is accepted, then we cannot consider factoring an annual ECI until approximately 2001 or 2003, to be generous to the Applicant. Under these circumstances, the annual value would certainly not reach $287 per hour. Additionally, Woolf admits that the ECI does not have a specific category for attorneys and thus he lumps attorneys in with a general “service-providing white-collar occupations.” Dkt. No. 77-4 at p. 3. Such categorization portrays the fallibility of this methodology. With the exception of EAJA cases and the policies of the District Court for the District of Columbia, no other court, including the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, or any other Circuit, has adopted, endorsed, or prescribed a methodology calculating reasonable hourly rates by utilizing either the CPI or ECI for purposes of awarding fees pursuant to § 1988. The EAJA applies specifically to litigation against the United States Government and has precise provisions as to awards of attorney fees and costs when a plaintiff prevails. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; see supra Part II.A. Under the EAJA statutory scheme, the rate for attorneys is fixed at $125 per hour. But, in deciding an award of attorney fees, a court has the discretion to increase the statutory rate by factoring in the cost of living. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2) (A) (ii)- Even within this Circuit and this District, when deciding attorney fees pursuant to EAJA, the courts have weighed the cost of living factor. See Kerin v. United States Postal Serv., 218 F.3d 185 (2d Cir.2000); Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.1992) (a social security disability case wherein the Second Circuit determined that the cost of living should be given its ordinary everyday meaning); Martin v. Sec’y of The Army, 463 F.Supp.2d 287, 291-92 (N.D.N.Y.2006) (finding that the EAJA’s cost of living factor was not warranted). Yet, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit have extended the EAJA statutory provisions in awarding attorney fees within the context of a § 1983 or Title VII or any other civil rights type of case. Congress could have but did not place a similar cost of living equation or any statutory cap in determining reasonable attorney fees under § 1988. Similarly, both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have been keenly aware for some time of the EAJA and its mechanism for calculating reasonable fees, and still neither have ever proposed that a court should contemplate a cost of living analysis when calculating hourly rates in civil rights cases. Schneider intimates that the Second Circuit considered such an analysis in Farbotko. When the Second Circuit remanded Farbotko for further consideration, it only stated, in dicta, that plaintiff was not barred from presenting the argument to the district court. The implication that the Circuit may have embraced the cost of living factor (CPI) is a misreading of that permission. Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 210 n. 10. For these reasons, this Court is not persuaded to use a cost of living index method to calculate a reasonable hourly rate. In this process of determining the prevailing rate, a court can and should consider its experiences and familiarity with the prevailing rates employed in the District. Arbor Hill, 493 F.3d at 117-18. This Court has attempted to remain attuned to such prevailing rates within this District. In addition to independent discussions with attorneys about the practice of law and billable rates, over the past three years, this Court has conducted two surveys, the most recent for this case. Similar to Mishler’s survey, this Court interviewed approximately a dozen attorneys in the Albany area, all of whom this Court knows to be experienced civil rights practitioners. Collectively, these attorneys advise this Court that there is a wide range of rates available to a reasonable paying client. Those hourly rates range from $175 to $300. Upon further inquiry by the Court, several attorneys admitted that their rate was set for their best paying clients and occasionally they had to discount their bills for their least resourceful clients. How often and to what degree the discounts occur defies calculation because the attorneys decide those events on a client by client basis. Further, a reasonable, paying client may consider that the law firm contemplating representing them in a civil rights matter “often obtain[s] considerable non-monetary returns — in experience, reputation, or achievement of the attorney’s own interests and agendas,” and that contemplation has enormous impact on what may be the rate that client is willing to pay. Arbor Hill, 493 F.3d at 121. We cannot ignore that a reasonable, paying client “might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the case.” Id. at 118. Although we should weigh what attorneys are currently billing, based upon the vagaries just noted, we are unable to say that these are the rates the market will bear in all instances. As a further illustration, a reasonable hourly rate should not be based upon the rates that “Hughes Hubbard” would charge is corporate clients. Id. at 112 n. 2 (quoting Pastre v. Weber, 800 F.Supp. 1120, 1125 (S.D.N.Y.1991)). As the Second Circuit astutely noted, “indeed the district court (unfortunately) bears the burden of disciplining the market, stepping into the shoes of the reasonable, paying client, who wishes to pay the least amount necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Id. at 112 (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that we should consider the hourly rates that have been set within other district courts. Arbor Hill settles this argument by requiring that the hourly rate be calculated on what a reasonable client in the relevant geographical area would pay, for the very obvious reason the client in most instances would hire an attorney within the district or an attorney whose rates were “consistent with those charged locally.” Id. at 119. Hence, we will not follow Plaintiffs importune. Defendant argues that if we are to determine the hourly rate on case specific basis and what is the least amount a reasonable, paying client would pay, we need not look any further than the facts and circumstances in this case and the hourly rate charged to Luessenhop on the companion state action. Lake v. Schoharie County Comm’r of Soc. Serv., 2006 WL 1891141 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006) (the process contemplates a case specific inquiry). That amount was $150 per hour. Dkt. No. 77-6, Luessenhop’s Aff. at ¶ 4. Although the argument is palatable, if we were to impose this rate, it would have a confusing and deleterious impact upon the establishment of the prevailing rate within the geographic market, that is the District as a whole. More persuasive, however, is the position that if Schneider, who practices in the North Country, where few if any lawyers prosecute civil rights cases, had not taken this federal case, more than likely Luessenhop would have had to seek representation in Albany or Syracuse, where the hourly rate appreciably exceeds $150 per hour. The repercussion to her then would be to pay the higher rates expected in the remainder of the District or forego prosecuting her Due Process rights, a consequence we cannot endorse. Under these circumstances, we find it prudent to apply an overall District-wide, market rate for a reasonable, paying client who is seeking to pay the least amount necessary to litigate this civil rights matter. We further note that the hourly rate of $210 recently fixed by several judges within the District, see supra note 13, may now, in some respect, be historical in that both Schneider’s and this Court’s surveys seem to reflect that attorneys within this District are billing at a higher hourly rate. Reiter v. MTA New York City Trans. Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 2006 WL 2068354 (2d Cir.2006); J.S. v. Crown Point Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 475418, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.9, 2007) (noting that the court should not rely exclusively on the rate structure in other cases as such is not a binding precedent). We also note that recently Judge Kahn and Judge Peebles have deviated from the hourly rate of $210 and increased the presumptive reasonable fee based upon the special circumstances in their respective cases. See supra note 13. Considering the discussion as a whole rather than piecemeal, we are persuaded that the current prevailing market hourly rate is now higher than $210. Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir.2006) (requiring the district court, “in addition to taking judicial notice of rates awarded in prior cases, consider [ ] evidence [from] the parties, and determine the prevailing rate within the relevant community for attorneys of comparable skill and experience performing work on comparable cases”). We also take into account that Luessenhop’s empirical evidence has some credibility but this does not necessarily mean that the evidence compels the conclusion that she urges. Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 157, 207 (E.D.N.Y.2006). Despite her urging for this Court to set the hourly rate at $260, which in her view mirrors her attorney survey, we are exhorted by the Supreme Court not to fail to appreciate that fee shifting statutes were “not designed as form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys nor were they intended to replicate exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a private fee arrangement with his client.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (I), 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). Accordingly, based upon the rates currently set by the Court, the billing rates of civil rights litigators in this geographical district, and our own experiences with the hourly rate a reasonable, paying client is willing to pay, and being further mindful of the relevant factors and that the rate should be sufficient to attract competent counsel without generating a windfall, we find the reasonable hourly rate to be $235. B. Calculating Reasonable Hours Now that we have calculated the reasonable hourly rate, our task is to ascertain the reasonable amount of hours that will be multiplied against the hourly rate to arrive at the reasonably presumptive fee award. Luessenhops seeks an award that will encompasses a total of 362 hours. Dkt. Nos. 77-2 at ¶ 30 & 81 at ¶ 61. The Court’s responsibilities in reviewing this Fee Application is to guarantee that the hours are not excessive, redundant, or unnecessary. Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 876 (2d Cir.1998) (citation omitted). It is incumbent upon Luessenhop to provide contemporaneous time records of the work performed to support the Fee Application. Kirsch v. Fleet Street Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir.1998); Lewis v. Coughlin, 801 F.2d 570, 577 (2d Cir.1986). Those records should indicate the “attorney who performed the work, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work.” Gatti v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene County, 263 F.Supp.2d at 518 (quoting New York Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir.1983)). A typed attorney’s affidavit which sets forth all of the charges may satisfy this record requirement. Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1160 (2d Cir.1994). Whether the billing information is provided by the contemporaneous time slips, attorney’s affidavit, or both, the party need not show in “great detail how each minute of his time was expended,” but the court should be able to glean the general subject matter of the time expenditure from the records. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1933. What is critical is that there is an adequate basis to determine the reasonableness of the claimed hours. Lake v. Schoharie County Comm’r of Soc. Serv., 2006 WL 1891141, at *7 (discussing the proper way the information should be presented). Failure to provide that adequate basis may lead to a downward adjustment. Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 991 F.Supp. 62, 65 (N.D.N.Y.1998). Initially, Luessenhop only provided a detailed Affidavit to support the claim for a fee. At the Court’s request, contemporaneous billing records were provided. Clinton County’s assailment of the records and the claimed hours is nothing short of a legal blitzkreig. Every conceivable attack upon the record keeping and the basis for claim has been mounted. Because of the sweeping and comprehensive nature of the assault, we must painfully pour through every record notation. First, Clinton County charges that Schneider’s billing records leave much to be desired inasmuch as they are vague and improperly employ block billing. Block billing is a prickly topic and often criticized because of the inherent complication such record keeping creates in evaluating the reasonableness of the claimed hours. Block billing is a record process which “groupfs] together both compensable and non-compensable time, making it impossible to distinguish between them and determine the number of hours for which the applicant is entitled to recovery [and] ... where items ... are not segregated but instead are improperly combined with other services to be compensated at full rates.” Lake v. Schoharie County, 2006 WL 1891141 at *7; Sea Spray Holdings, Ltd. v. Pali Fin. Group., Inc., 277 F.Supp.2d 323, 326 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (finding that block billing renders the fee review difficult to determine whether and to what extent there may be duplication). The consequence of block billing, inadequate, and ambiguous records is a reduction in the hours and costs. Gonzalez v. Bratton, 147 F.Supp.2d 180, 213 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (noting the inherent difficulties in parsing out reasonable costs from ambiguous records); Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 991 F.Supp. at 65 (grossly inadequate and vague records warranted a cut in the fee); In re Gregoire, Case No. 00-11564 (Brkpty Ct. N.D.N.Y.2002) (finding Schneider’s records woefully inadequate to such an extent that the records did not survive review and thus the fee was cut). But before we paint all block billing with a broad brush, the Court must appreciate the practicalities of conducting a law practice and the maintenance of these types of records. Our inquiry should not be about perfection but the reasonableness of the claim. Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 151, 158 (D.D.C.2006). Clinton County wants us to significantly reduce Luessenhop’s hours spent in pretrial litigation. Clinton County hones in on those hours spent on preparing motions or oppositions thereto on issues before this Court such as qualified immunity, punitive damages, summary judgment, all of which Luessenhop lost. Dkt. No. 79 at ¶¶ 27-28. We reiterate our earlier finding that, notwithstanding Luessenhop’s failure to succeed on her Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and other motions subsequent to the Second Circuit Mandate and Remand, she is the prevailing party and the award of attorney’s fees should not be reduced because of the County’s belief that Luessenhop was not completely successful. See supra Part II.A.1. This request will be denied. Similarly, Clinton County wants us to reduce the hours devoted to research on discovery demands used in “the pursuit of a meritless early discovery motion,” those hours devoted to supplemental submissions, and her research in support of her Bill of Cost before the Second Circuit. Dkt. No. 79 at ¶¶ 29-31. Acknowledging that Luessenhop did not win every legal skirmish, we cannot ignore that she still eventually prevailed on the common core facts that permeated every discussion and every point litigated. Likewise, this request will be denied. The next matter is the County’s challenges to Luessenhop’s hours in pursuit of her Appeal to the Second Circuit. First, all agree that the lodestar rate for appeals shouldn’t be any different from all other levels of the litigation. Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 212. But the County reminds us that Luessenhop’s Appeal was consolidated with two other cases handled by Schneider, Bouchard and Tupaz against Clinton County and others. Luessenhop v. Clinton County, 466 F.3d 259 (2d Cir.2006). In reference to Bouchard, the parties had partially settled the case before oral arguments, id. at 264, and after the appeal, the parties settled all other issues including the award of attorney’s fees, Dkt. No. 79 at ¶ 32. As to Tupaz, the matter had also been remanded and presently is before the Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy, United States Senior District Judge. The County contends that if Tupaz is successful, more than likely there would be a fee award then. Based upon these facts, it is asserted that Schneider “would essentially obtain a ‘triple recovery,’ ” and accordingly the County asks us to reduce the appellate hours by “one-third.” Id. We are persuaded that there is a strong likelihood that the hours spent and recorded for the Luessen-hop Appeal are also applicable to, or even duplicative of, Schneider’s efforts on behalf of Bouchard and Tupaz. Additionally, the prospect of a triple recovery through this Application appears veritable. In many respects, this is a scenario analogous to Schneider’s limited success in Farbotko where the district court reduced the number of hours claimed by 40% based upon the further recognition that the different claims overlapped only as to the legal issues and not the facts. 433 F.3d at 207 n. 5. A total of 88 hours has been identified with preparing, drafting, submitting, and arguing the appeals on behalf of Luessen-hop, Bouchard, and Tupaz. Consequently, these hours shall be reduced by one-third, or 29 hours. Next, the County interposes a boilersuit argument that many hours expended on behalf of Luessenhop were excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, in light of Schneider’s claimed experience with federal litigation, with the focus seemingly directed at specific areas of pretrial litigation. Succinctly, the discrete areas of this litigation being challenged as excessive and redundant are: (1) reviewing and drafting of complaint (4 hrs.); (2) discovery research and preparation (13.5 hrs.); (3) devotion to the Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (91.5 hrs.); (4) research and preparation of the Appeal (16.5 hrs.); (5) hours reviewing Respondent’s Appellate Brief (13.5 hrs.); (6) devotion to Tax Exemption Act before the Second Circuit (21.5 hrs.); (7) preparation for Second Circuit argument (28 hrs.); (8) research and preparation of motion regarding qualified immunity and damages (18 hrs.); and (9) research, investigation, and preparation of Attorney Fee Petition (52 hrs.). Dkt. No. 79 at ¶ 33. In order to determine the reasonableness of the time consumed in each of the projects identified above, we are required to review, once again, to the extent possible, those Motions and pleadings to assist us in assessing their qualitative and quantitative input and value. With that review placing us in a better posture to determine reasonableness, we find the following hours expended in this matter are reasonable: (1) researching and drafting of the Complaint (4 hrs.); (2) research and draft of a discovery motion (13.5 hrs.); and (3) some of the research and preparation for all aspects of the Appeal (69.5 hrs.). As to the Appeal, we find the time to review Respondent’s Brief and to prepare for oral argument to be excessive. Accordingly, we will reduce them collectively by ten (10) hours. We are inclined to agree with the County that employing 91.5 hours for opposing and submitting a cross motion, on its face, appears excessive. We initially gave pause to our inclination because Luessenhop submitted a forty-one page Memorandum of Law erupting with legal citations from every corner of the globe and at both state and federal court levels. This unabridged discourse tended to support the appearance of a necessary, albeit gargantuan effort to confront the issues presented in both Summary Judgment motions. Still, we find that it should not take a seasoned litigator of Schneider’s abilities on the topics at hand, to which he is very familiar, more than two weeks to research, compile and submit a cross motion. If our review was based solely upon actual hours rather than a determination of whether the time spent was reasonable and necessary, we would not be performing this very exercise. Thus, we will reduce the time spent on this Motion by 20 hours. Likewise, Luessenhop, in opposing a subsequent Motion to Dismiss in which qualified immunity and punitive damages were the crux of the debate, submitted a Memorandum of Law rippling with a plethora of citations from a very wide swath of federal and state courts. It appears to have the indi-cia of considerable research. Yet, considering that the Second Circuit has spoken so definitively and eloquently on both issues, it does provoke a query as to whether all of this research was necessary. In the final analysis, we cannot gainsay that all of this time was unnecessary, so we tip the scale in favor of Luessenhop and determine that the time consumed in researching and drafting for this motion was reasonable. However, we agree that the 52 hours expended to research and prepare this Motion for Attorney fees is unreasonable. We know from looking at other ease dockets in which Schneider was counsel that this investment in time for this Fee Application is excessive. We have compared Luessenhop’s Memorandum of Law with the Farbotko’s Memorandum of Law. See Farbotko, Case No. 99-CV-1946, Dkt. No. 160. In Farbotko, the memorandum of law is nearly two-thirds the length of Luessenhop’s Memorandum but Schneider sought only fifteen hours for the research and draft. Schneider also had previous discussions with some of the same attorneys who submitted affidavits and the economist in this case. In addition, Schneider adopted nearly verbatim at least five pages of text for Luessenhop’s Memorandum, so this Memorandum was not drafted from “whole cloth.” These replications notwithstanding, we further find the multitude of citations and effort to unearth them unnecessary in light of the Second Circuit’s comprehensive decision and sage guidance in Arbor Hill, 493 F.3d 110. Additionally, Luessenhop seeks an additional 9.9 hours for the Reply Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Attorney Fees. Dkt. No. 81. We find a significant portion of the Reply Affidavit to be a rehash of Plaintiffs initial Application and what new arguments and facts presented, we submit, could have been completed in half the time. Viewing both the Motion and the Reply, Luessenhop is asking for 62 hours for this Fee Petition. In reviewing fee application litigation and the struggle to determine what may be reasonable, we are persuaded by the reasoning in Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: I would be remiss if [I] did not trim some of the fat from [the] fee application in light of the clear excessiveness of the billing for its preparations. I will reduce by half the lodestar hours for this task. See Murray v. Mills, 354 F.Supp.2d 231, 241 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (citations omitted) (noting that even in a complex case a fee application should only tax 30 hours); Levy v. Powell, 2005 WL 1719972, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2005) (justifying an across-the-board 35% percent reduction in part on the 101.3 hours billed for the fee applicatio