Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER JOYCE HENS GREEN, District Judge. In July 1991, banking regulators around the world seized the corporations collectively known as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”), uncovering the largest international bank failure in history. Eight years later, the effort to determine how the BCCI debacle happened and who is responsible for the fraud remains ongoing. This lawsuit, brought by the court-appointed Liquidators of the BCCI Group emerged out of that process. The defendants are two individuals, Abdul Raouf Hasan Khalil (“Khalil”) and Syed Ziauddin Ali Akbar (“Akbar”), and two companies owned and controlled by Khalil and Akbar — Capcom Financial Services Limited (“Capcom UK”), and Cap-com Futures Inc. (“Capcom US”). Only Khalil contested this suit; Akbar and the corporations have defaulted. Khalil is extremely wealthy, and was perhaps the largest depositor in BCCI. In 1987, Khalil withdrew nearly $100 million in deposits and interest from BCCI. The Liquidators did not contest Khalil’s right to the deposited funds. What the Liquidators do claim is that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, BCCI’s former management approached Khalil, offering to pay him handsomely for the use of his name and prestige to disguise three fraudulent schemes. According to the Liquidators, Khalil agreed to: (1)act as a nominee shareholder of the parent corporation of First American Bank — once the largest bank in Washington, D.C. — to disguise the fact that BCCI had illegally acquired an American bank without proper regulatory approval; (2) act as a nominee shareholder of BCCI Holdings to disguise the fact that BCCI had considerably less capital and support than was represented to depositors, regulators, and the public; and (3) allow his name, and that of his companies, to be used by BCCI’s investment arm to disguise BCCI’s risky investments and to give the appearance that certain sizable loans were being serviced when, in truth, they were in default. The Liquidators further alleged that BCCI directly paid Khalil nearly $30 million for this use of his name and that he reaped substantially more by less direct means. The Liquidators alleged that if Khalil had not allowed his name and prestige to be used to disguise BCCI’s true financial condition, the bank would have been closed down much sooner, preventing significant financial losses to thousands of creditors and depositors. Separately, the Liquidators also alleged that Khalil conspired with Akbar — a BCCI insider who managed the bulk of BCCI’s assets until 1986 — to create a commodities brokerage, Capcom, through which Khalil and Akbar further siphoned substantial BCCI assets. Shortly after the complaint was filed, Khalil moved for dismissal. That motion was denied. See BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. v. Khalil, 20 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.1997). After lengthy discovery this case was set down for a bench trial. Khal-il moved for trial by jury under Rule 39(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That motion also was denied. See BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. v. Khalil, 182 F.R.D. 335, 340 (D.D.C.1998). Trial to the Court commenced on January 25, 1999 and continued on January 27, January 28, February 1 and February 11,1999. This Opinion and Order constitute the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Any conclusions of law that constitute findings of fact or findings of fact that constitute conclusions of law shall be considered as having been determined accordingly. Having considered all the evidence, arguments, the parties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this matter, the Court will enter judgment in the amount of $388,402,534, not including attorneys’ fees or costs, in favor of the Liquidators on Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII. The Liquidators did not meet their burden on Count IV. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the damages are trebled to $1,165,207,602. I. Dramatis Personae A. Agha Hasan Abedi BCCI was the brainchild of Agha Hasan Abedi (“Abedi”), who, in 1972, established what he hoped would become an international Islamic bank. Initially, BCCI grew according to plan. Until taken under control by authorities around the world on July 5, 1991, the BCCI Group operated a coordinated international banking network, which at its peak had more than 400 branches in approximately 70 countries. The BCCI Group consisted of a number of corporate entities, including the corporate plaintiffs enumerated herein. The BCCI Group’s international banking network included offices in several of the United States, including the State of New York. Abedi served as the top corporate officer of the BCCI Group from 1973 until 1988, when he suffered a heart attack. Abedi did not testify in this trial. Indeed, the Court heard evidence that Abedi is deceased. See Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) (Testimony of Christopher Morris, UK-appointed Liquidator) at 136-37. B. Swaleh Naqvi Abedi’s chief lieutenant in the bank was Saiyid Mohammad Swaleh Naqvi (“Naqvi”), who succeeded Abedi in 1988. Naqvi remained in the senior executive position in the BCCI Group until 1990, when control of the BCCI Group formally passed to the sovereigns of Abu Dhabi. Naqvi served time in prison in Abu Dhabi before coming to the United States to plead guilty to charges here. He presently is incarcerated in FCI Allenwood, Pennsylvania. As part of his plea agreement, Naqvi agreed to cooperate with regulatory and law enforcement authorities attempting to unravel the intricacies of the rise and fall of BCCI. As with most of the fact witnesses in this case, Naqvi testified by deposition. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3) (listing circumstances in which deposition testimony may substitute for live testimony at trial). Naqvi was deposed in this case and in the First American case willingly; he did not understand that his plea agreement required him to testify in either case. C. Imran Imam Scrivener to the fraud was Imran Mohammed Ahmad Imam (“Imam”). Imam was a BCCI officer who assisted Naqvi from 1977 to 1991. Imam’s principal assignment was to maintain records of transactions. For example, BCCI extended loans to the individuals who became the record shareholders of First American’s parent corporation. Some of these loans were genuine extensions of credit, secured only by the shares; other “loans” were created to disguise BCCI’s direct equity investment in First American. Imam kept detailed records of these transactions. Financing for the record shareholders of BCCI Holdings was done in similar fashion, and Imam kept records concerning the holdings of both the genuine investors and the nominees. Imam testified through deposition in this case. Khalil’s counsel declined the opportunity to attend and cross-examine him. D. Ziauddin Akbar Defendant Akbar was a BCCI officer from approximately 1976 to 1986 and was in charge of BCCI’s Treasury Division from 1982 to 1986. As head of the Treasury Division, Akbar was responsible for managing and investing BCCI’s funds. Additionally, Akbar was the account officer for certain major customers of BCCI, including Khalil. At trial, Khalil and the Liquidators agreed that Akbar was central to most of the schemes alleged in the complaint, a rogue extraordinaire principally responsible for establishing shell corporations to engage in sham transactions so as to misrepresent B CCI’s economic situation to the world, gambling BCCI’s assets in the commodities markets and disguising losses therefrom, transferring large sums of money in and out of shell corporations in which he had an undisclosed interest, and other illegal activities. After huge losses in the Treasury operations came to light internally, Akbar left BCCI in 1986. He continued to receive a salary for some time thereafter. After leaving BCCI, Akbar engaged principally in managing investment and financial trading businesses, acting as both the behind-the-scenes manager of Cap-com — his joint venture with Khalil — as well as manager of his own London-based Futures Advisory Services (“FAS”). In 1988, authorities in the United States arrested Akbar in connection with allegations that General Manuel Noriega’s drug money was being laundered through BCCI and Capcom. Although other BCCI employees were convicted in connection with those allegations, it appears that Akbar and Capcom U.S. were cleared. However, in September 1993, after BCCI had been seized, Akbar pled guilty to 16 counts of false accounting in the United Kingdom. Akbar was released from prison in the United Kingdom during the pendency of this litigation and returned to Pakistan. Akbar was deposed in Pakistan in both this case and in First American. Those deposition transcripts were introduced at trial. E. Abdul Khalil Defendant Khalil is a citizen and resident of Saudi Arabia. He has been married for 36 years to Taheya Badeeb, with whom he lives in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia along with their two sons, daughter, and grandchildren. Khalil was educated in Saudi Arabia and Cairo, Egypt, where he studied history. Khalil developed a passion for museums and antiquities which he has pursued throughout his adult life. When growing up, Khalil stood out as one of the brightest students in his class. After he completed school, he was one of a select group recruited to be trained in electronics and air traffic control at Dhar-an Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia. While at the base, Khalil alone was selected to work with United States Air Force personnel. Through that contact, Khalil learned English. Upon completion of his training, Khalil served as an air traffic controller for the Civil Aviation Department of Saudi Arabia and an instructor of air traffic control. He also was recruited to perform air traffic control duties during Saudi Arabia’s war with Yemen. After 22 years of service, Khalil retired and entered the real estate business. For reasons not entirely clear from the record, the real estate market in Saudi Arabia surged in such a way as to allow phenomenal profits — such as a 400 million riyal return on a 14 million riyal investment (plus the cost of improvements) within a short period. Through such dealings, Khalil became extremely wealthy. As is detailed below, Khalil deposited millions of dollars, in various currencies, in BCCI in the late 1970s and early 1980s. He withdrew those deposits, plus interest, in 1987, but he maintained contact with BCCI beyond that period. After BCCI was seized, Khalil came to London voluntarily to be interviewed by the SFO in connection with its investigation of Akbar. Unlike most of the other persons closely associated with BCCI, Khalil was not criminally charged, either in the United Kingdom or the United States. However, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve did bring an administrative enforcement action against Khalil in connection with his record shareholding in the parent corporation of First American. Although, in September 1992, Khalil granted Federal Reserve investigators an interview in his home in Saudi Arabia, and although, in June 1997, Khalil did travel to the United States to be deposed in First American, Khalil has not formally been served with the Federal Reserve’s administrative charges, which remain pending. At present, Khalil is in poor health. He spends considerable time working on his projects, including a huge museum filled with more than 60,000 antiquities, which he and his family have donated to the poor. Another project, Altayebat City, consists of classrooms, shops and 20 different museums to train, educate, clothe and feed the poor. Due to poor health, Khalil’s deposition in this case was postponed, and was taken well after discovery had closed. Because it appeared likely that Khalil would be unable to appear at trial, the Liquidators videotaped the deposition to allow the Court to see, hear and observe Khalil’s demeanor. Most of the 800-page transcript was admitted into evidence, along with the videotaped version in CD-ROM format. The Court regrets that Mr. Khalil was unable to testify in person at trial. F. Kamal Adham and Sayed Jawhary Khalil’s success in school and in the civil service brought him to the attention of Sheikh Kamal Adham (“Adham”). Adham had been an advisor to, and was a relative of, King Faisal. Adham came to work for the King’s son, Prince Turki, who served as chief of the Foreign Liaison Bureau and Chief of Intelligence. Adham recruited Khalil to work in the Foreign Liaison Bureau as Adham’s personal assistant, gathering and analyzing news media articles from other countries regarding Saudi Arabia. Khalil also started his own communications company designing satellite communications systems for the government of Saudi Arabia while working at the Foreign Liaison Bureau. Khalil worked in the Saudi Government with Adham for 16 years. Another close associate of Adham and Khalil was Sayed Jawhary (“Jawhary”). Jawhary is a resident of Saudi Arabia, who has worked for Adham as a financial advis- or since 1957. At relevant times, Jawhary also provided financial advice to BCCI, for which he was well compensated. Jawhary did not disclose the existence or terms of this side arrangement to either Adham or Khalil. Adham, Khalil, and Jawhary had a number of business deahngs in common. On occasion, Khalil undertook real estate transactions on Adham’s behalf. The three kept each other apprised of investment opportunities. It was Adham who suggested to Khalil that he deposit money with BCCI. Also at Adham’s invitation, Adham, Khalil and Jawhary became record shareholders of Credit and Commerce American Holdings, N.V. (“CCAH”), the ultimate parent corporation of First American Bank. First American operated in multiple states in the United States, with its principal place of business being the District of Columbia. G. Capcom Khalil, through Akbar, invited Adham and Jawhary to become record shareholders in defendant Capcom UK, a United Kingdom corporation incorporated in 1984 which was at all relevant times a broker-dealer in futures, options and commodities. In addition to being a shareholder, Khalil also was a director of Capcom UK. Capcom UK formed a subsidiary in the United States, Capcom US, to trade on the Chicago Board of Trade. Capcom U.S. is an Illinois corporation incorporated in 1985, which was at all relevant times a broker-dealer in futures, options and commodities. At relevant times, defendant Capcom UK was the registered owner of 82 percent of the shares of Capcom US. Capcom UK also formed another wholly-owned subsidiary, Brenehase Limited, which was incorporated in the United Kingdom. After the collapse of BCCI, Adham and Jawhary pled guilty to charges brought by the United States and the State of New York for their respective roles as nominee shareholders in BCCI’s acquisition of First American. In lieu of incarceration, Adham agreed to pay a fine of $105 million and Adham and Jawhary agreed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in their investigations of BCCI’s collapse. H. The BCCI Liquidators On July 5, 1991, banking regulators in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and the United States froze assets owned or controlled by BCCI Holdings, BCCI SA, BCCI Overseas, and ICIC Overseas. By the end of July 1991, officials in 44 countries had closed down BCCI branches and operations in their jurisdictions. Commencing in January 1992, the various plaintiff companies were placed into full liquidation and the Court Appointed Fiduciaries were appointed. BCCI Holdings was placed into liquidation in June 1992. ICIC Overseas was placed into liquidation in April 1992 and ICIC Holdings was placed into liquidation in July 1993. In denying Khalil’s motion to dismiss, this Court recognized the validity of the Liquidators’ appointments and their powers to act on behalf of the plaintiff corporations in this case. See Khalil, 20 F.Supp.2d at 4-5. For the reasons previously cited, and for those advanced by the Liquidators at trial, the Court holds that the Liquidators have standing to bring this action. I. Additional Witnesses The Court also received deposition testimony from a number of former officers, directors, or employees of Capcom. Khalil also presented deposition testimony from prosecutors in the United Kingdom concerning their opinion of Khalil’s and Akbar’s relative culpability. The Court also received live testimony from Christopher Morris, one of the English Liquidators; John Gilkes, an English forensic accountant assisting the Liquidators; Dr. Audrey Giles, the Liquidators’ expert in forensic document examination; Richard Small, Assistant Director of Banking Supervision and Regulation for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Irving Beimler, the Liquidators’ expert in credit and lending. J. Documentary Evidence To prove their case, the Liquidators relied at trial on B CCI’s records documenting Khalil’s relationship with the bank. Although the corrupt former management of BCCI used the bank to carry out fraudulent schemes from an early point in its history, in many other respects BCCI operated as a normal business. Account ledgers were maintained. Deposits, withdrawals, wire transfers, and other transactions were documented in the normal course of business. The BCCI Group followed industry custom in its numerous dealings with banks in the United States and around the world. Large, prestigious accounting firms audited the records of the various BCCI entities, and certified to the public for many years that all was above board. Indeed, among other reasons, it is because BCCI operated as a normal business in so many respects that it took banking regulators around the world so long to discover the massive fraud that was masked by the surface normalcy. Some of BCCI’s records concerning Khalil, and Khalil-owned companies, document real transactions as they occurred. The parties agree that many other BCCI records concerning Khalil evidence sham transactions. It appears that the former management of BCCI relied primarily on use of Khalil’s name and the names of Khalil-owned companies to disguise fraudulent transactions in the Treasury Division. On documents reflecting false transactions, and occasionally on those reflecting real transactions, Khalil’s name was often signed by Akbar or another BCCI employee. At trial Khalil objected on authenticity grounds to most of the Liquidators’ exhibits. The Court admitted the exhibits into evidence provisionally on condition that the Liquidators lay a foundation for their admission. That was done. To distinguish appearances from economic reality, the Liquidators relied on two experts. Dr. Audrey Giles (“Giles”) testified as to which signatures on key documents appeared to be Khalil’s genuine signature. Khalil did not offer a competing expert, and the Court finds Dr. Giles’ testimony to be credible and unrebutted. The Court finds that all of the signatures Dr. Giles testified to have been more likely Khalil’s than not, were in fact Khalil’s signatures. The Liquidators also relied on John Gilkes (“Gilkes”), who sifted through numerous documents recovered from BCCI and checked these against available outside sources to separate fact from fiction in the story told by the BCCI documents. II. Khalil’s Deposit Relationship With Bcci In or about 1975, Sheik Adham told Khalil he had a “very good bank” in England, and suggested to Khalil that he put his money in BCCI because the real estate market in Saudi Arabia was “quiet.” Khalil’s practice up to that point, like many living in Saudi Arabia, had been to keep his substantial wealth in cash, primarily in Saudi currency, locked in a strong room inside his house. Khalil testified that one reason that Saudis generally do not use banks is that the Koran places restrictions on followers of Islam from keeping interest earned on deposits. In any event, in or about 1977, Khalil began his banking relationship with BCCI. While in London, Khalil signed account opening forms, but did not deposit any funds at that time. Approximately three weeks later, representatives of BCCI came to Khalil's house in Jeddah to collect the first deposit. The details of how much Khalil deposited with BCCI are of critical importance. The Liquidators alleged that Khalil took from BCCI far more than that to which he was entitled. Khalil countered that his relationship with BCCI was economically detrimental, and that money he admits receiving from BCCI — nearly $100 million in deposits and $27.5 million in direct payments — -was due and owing to him. At the root of this dispute is a disagreement over the amount Khalil initially placed with BCCI and where it was kept. On this important point, Khalil’s recollection of the details changed between his deposition in the First American case and his deposition in this case. In this case, Khalil testified that a representative of BCCI who worked in Adham’s office in Jeddah came to pick up his first deposit: Q: So you give a gentleman from the representative office in Jeddah? A: Yes. Q: 10 suitcases? A: 10 suitcases. Q: Saudi riyal cash? A: 50 million more or less, total. Q: Did you count the money before you put it in the suitcases? A: It is there. Always when I sell something I take money from the people so I do accounting. I have three different suitcase. If this is the big— THE INTERPRETER: 150 notes. A: If this big one, you know, you don’t have big size, maybe you can put $10 million, maybe 50 maybe I can put 7 million. Maybe if it’s smaller I put five million in the suitcase, because it takes size like that. So I already count it. It is there. He’s been most of the day counting the money there. Q: Were you with him when he counted the money? A: Oh, yes, oh, yes. Khalil Dep. (BCCI), Nov. 16, 1998, at 22-23. In his First American deposition, taken 18 months earlier, Khalil had testified that it was Akbar who came to take the first deposit, that the money was not prepacked, but put into Samsonite suitcases in Akbar’s presence, that there were 11 suitcases instead of 10, and that he would have deposited more, but he ran out of suitcases. E.g., Khalil Dep. (FAC), June 4, 1997, at 11, 28, 41, 44-48, 69-70, 73-76. Khalil testified that he made one or two comparably large deposits via suitcase, along with periodic deposits in smaller amounts. E.g., Khalil Dep. (BCCI) at 100-01. There are some discrepancies between his two depositions regarding these additional deposits. In other respects, Khalil’s testimony concerning his deposits was largely the same in both depositions. For example, Khalil testified that although all the cash deposited came from money in his house, some of it belonged to partners whose identity he could not reveal. See, e.g., Khalil Dep. (BCCI), Nov. 16, 1998, at 30-33. Khalil stated that money placed in term deposit accounts was jointly owned by these unnamed partners, and that money placed in current accounts belonged solely to Khalil. Whether these partners in fact existed is immaterial because in any event Khalil had sole authority to transact business with these funds. Also, in both depositions Khalil testified that his first deposit was to be divided to pay for BCCI shares he had agreed to purchase, to be placed in term deposits (a.k.a. deposit accounts), and a substantial sum to be placed “in the hand” of Akbar, which would be immediately available to pay expenses as Khalil may from time to time direct. At trial, Khalil acknowledged through his counsel that the BCCI documents reflecting the total amounts deposited by Khalil show his deposits falling far short of the amount Khalil withdrew and received from- BCCI. Khalil’s first line of defense was that the Court should disregard those records as being fabricated, falsified, and incomplete. Along these lines, Khalil asserted that he had deposited more with BCCI than the records reflect. The only evidence offered to support this assertion was his own testimony. The Court cannot agree with Khalil’s assertion. It is telling that Khalil’s counsel, when offering Khalil’s version of how much he placed with the bank, was forced to argue from stray recollections by Naqvi and Akbar, e.g., Khalil’s Prop. Findings ¶ 13, because Khalil — who well remembered sums involved in real estate transactions more than 20 years past — testified as to having only a vague recollection and no independent records to establish that he had placed more with BCCI than is shown in the records on which plaintiffs rely. The Court finds that at the time Khalil handed over suitcases of cash, he received a receipt. See Khalil Dep. (FAC), June 4, 1997, at 69-70. The Court also finds that Khalil kept his own record of the amount deposited. Before the money was turned over, it was counted in a day-long exercise. Even if there had been no receipt, Khalil knew precisely how much he had placed with BCCI. That amount was reflected on the account statements Khalil received from BCCI, which he closely monitored. Although on certain occasions, Khalil complained that the amount he had deposited, or the amount of interest credited to his account, was not accurately reflected, the statements were adjusted at or near the time Khalil made such complaints. When Khalil withdrew his deposits from BCCI, he presented his account statements to Naqvi. Naqvi suspected that the account statements, which had been prepared at Akbar’s direction, overstated the amount Khalil had with the bank, but Naqvi was in no position to argue with Khalil. See Naqvi Dep., Mar. 27, 1998, at 74-76; Tr. (Akbar) at 456-58. Instead, Naqvi directed that Khalil receive the amount reflected on the account statements Khalil had presented to Naqvi. There was no unaccounted-for surplus. See also Tr. (Akbar) at 470. Realizing the Court may find that many of the BCCI documents bear sufficient in-dicia of reliability to be both admissible and entitled to evidentiary weight — as has been done here — Khalil’s fall back defense was that even if the Liquidators’ numbers were accurate, those figures do not account for the fund Khalil placed “in the hand” of Akbar, which, according to Khal-il’s counsel, was a sizable fund kept outside BCCI. Khalil’s testimony was quite inconsistent on this critical point. On a few occasions, Khalil presented testimony suggesting that the money in Akbar’s hand was kept outside BCCI. For example, when asked about a document he penned: Q: .... Does that refresh your recollection, sir, that in fact you had current accounts at BCCI? A: Just a moment. I don’t have current account. I have money with Mr. Akbar. And this is now he’s not putting — because he’s not putting the money in the BCCI. He’s putting the money outside the BCCI.... Khalil Dep. (BCCI) at 212; see also id. at 214 (“[T]his is my money with Mr. Akbar putting in another bank.”). However, on closer inspection, this issue was a red herring. Most portions of Khal-il’s testimony demonstrate that he knew the money “in Akbar’s hand” was kept in BCCI current accounts. For example: Q: .... Now, the first time that you put money in the bank somebody came to your home, collected suitcases and put all that money in deposit accounts at BCCI? A: .... They do like this. They put little deposit. They pay for the shares of the BCCI. They open account from the money in the hand of Mr. Akbar, okay. Because he needs to pay the expenses. Khalil Dep. (BCCI) at 52. ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ Q: What did [Akbar] do with that money? A: Which money? Q: The money that he came and took? A: He took it to the bank. He took it and he divide it, some in the deposit, some in his hand. Id. at 54. Not only did Khalil testify that all of his money was deposited in BCCI, but he also did not introduce any records of his own, or from any bank other than BCCI, showing that the money “in the hand” of Akbar was kept outside BCCI. It also is highly improbable that Khalil would have entrusted Akbar with funds to be kept somewhere other than BCCI when Khalil was hardly acquainted with Akbar at the time he made his first deposit with BCCI. On the contrary, Khalil understood that BCCI was his agent and that Akbar worked for BCCI, at least as to funds in his deposit and current accounts. See Khalil Dep. (BCCI) at 80. On balance, the Court finds that Khalil’s references to money “in the hand” of Akbar refer to funds kept in current accounts at BCCI. The memorandum accounts kept by Akbar at BCCI accurately tracked Khalil’s actual deposits with BCCI. There was no fund kept outside BCCI. III. Khalil’s Nominee Ownership of BCCI Shares The Court also cannot credit Khalil’s testimony that he actually paid for any of the BCCI shares registered in his name. BCCI shares were not publicly traded, they were sold through private placements on an invitation-only basis. In the late 1970s, Abedi sought new shareholders in BCCI to finance the bank’s expansion. Abedi approached his friend Adham to help recruit investors. Adham presented the “investment” opportunity to Khalil, who agreed in principle to invest. Abedi sought genuine capital infusions, but he also needed some investors to act as nominee purchasers of BCCI shares. Abedi wanted to give the appearance of new capital being placed with BCCI without diluting his control. Abedi envisioned that ultimately only a large institutional investor would be able to provide for BCCI’s continued viability. • Naqvi explained the “special arrangements” that BCCI offered to prospective shareholders such as Khalil until such time as an institutional investor could be found: Mr. Abedi wanted to make sure that a significant percentage of the shares is held by such holders who would be willing to sell those shares or transfer those shares to this new structure, whenever it takes place. So he wanted to have special arrangements with some of the shareholders to ensure that a good sized block of shares remain available to him for the purpose of this restructuring. And in one of those reviews, Mr. Abedi asked me [Naqvi] that if we will find out from Mr. Raouf Khalil whether he will hold part of his — part of the shares in his name under an arrangement which is like this nominee arrangement you have described. Naqvi Dep. at 19. Naqvi deputized Akbar to discuss the nominee proposal with Khal-il. Khalil knowingly agreed to serve, and did serve, as a nominee in conspiracy with senior officers of BCCI to act as a registered shareholder of BCCI Holdings. The Court finds that when Khalil first deposited money with BCCI, Khalil had an understanding with Adham that some of his funds would be used to purchase BCCI Holdings shares. However, the Court infers from the evidence that shortly thereafter, Akbar approached Khalil with the nominee proposal. Khalil, Akbar, and Abedi reached an agreement by which BCCI would advance Khalil loans on a non-recourse basis to finance the purchase of those BCCI Holdings shares that Khalil was to own beneficially and, in addition, Khalil would allow BCCI to “purchase” additional shares in his name in which he would have no beneficial interest. This agreement was entered into before any of Khalil’s genuine accounts had been debited for the purchase of BCCI Holdings shares. At no time were Khalil’s funds used for the purchase of the BCCI Holdings shares owned beneficially by Khalil. Although shares were accounted for in BCCI’s books as either “beneficially” owned by Khalil or nominee shares, BCCI funded all of the share purchases in Khal-il’s name and Khalil had no commercial risk with respect to any of the shares. Naqvi subsequently learned of this new financing arrangement and accepted it as consistent with his and Abedi’s overall agreement with Khalil. At no time did Khalil repay the loans taken in his name to pay for his beneficial BCCI Holdings shares. Khalil became a record shareholder of BCCI Holdings in 1979. Senior management made its first designated nominee purchase of BCCI Holdings shares in Khalil’s name in June 1980. Thereafter, periodically during the 1980s, BCCI management purchased additional shares in Khalil’s name. Imam recorded some of these as “beneficial” shares and others as nominee shares. In or around May 1985, Khalil and Akbar each signed a schedule which listed the “beneficial” and nominee purchases, and the loans taken out against each portion. See Naqvi Dep. 27-33 & Pis.’ Ex. 1489; Tr. (Giles) at 62-64; Pis.’ Ex. 1489A. Shares were purchased in the name of Khalil on the following occasions in the following amounts: Date # of Shares Share Price Principal Cost Oct. 1,1979 20,000.0 $125.00 $ 2,500,000 Dec. 21,1979 4,000.0 $125.00 $ 500,000 June 27,1980 40,000.0 $125.00 $ 5,000,000 Dec. 29,1980 10,315.8 $125.00 $ 1,289,475 Dec. 31,1981 10,526.3 $200.00 $ 2,105,260 Dec. 31,1981 6,666.6 $200.00 $ 1,333,320 Dec. 29,1982 21,054.0 $ 40.00 $ 842,160 Dec. 29,1982 13,334.0 $ 40.00 $ 533,360 Dec. 27,1984 34,386.0 $ 40.00 $ 1,375,440 Dec. 27,1985 51,579.0 $ 40.00 $ 2,063,160 April 14,1989 57,748.0 $ 40.00 $ 2,309,920 TOTAL $19,852.095 To make these purchases appear real, senior management of BCCI created loans from BCCI Group companies for both the “beneficial” and nominee share purchases. The accounting for these share purchases as loans was false. These were paper transactions, backed by transfers of funds from one part of the BCCI Group to another. To effect the share purchases, funds were transferred by wire from accounts in the Cayman Islands to accounts in the United States, and were then transferred to accounts in Luxembourg. The Court credits Gilkes’ testimony demonstrating that these transfers were accomplished using wire transfer facilities in the United States. In addition, instructions related to the transfers were sent by wire and United States mail. Khalil incurred no genuine, collectible debt in relation to the “loans” used to finance his share purchases, and BCCI obtained no genuine, collectible right to payment on the “loans” created to finance these share purchases. With respect to the nominee shares, Khalil had no obligation to repay the loans. With respect to the beneficial shares, BCCI could not collect on the loans financing those shares, but Khalil agreed that the profit he would take from the proceeds of any sale of such shares would be only the difference between the share price and the loan amounts as to those beneficial shares. However, if at the time of sale the share price was less than the outstanding loan amount, Khalil would not be obliged to repay the difference. Khalil signed documents which gave all rights over both the “beneficial” and nominee shares to ICIC, and which applied the proceeds of any sale to pay off the outstanding loans. Khalil also signed transfer deeds in blank. The effect of Khalil’s service as a nominee was to inflate falsely the share capital of BCCI. By agreeing to act as a nominee, Khalil understood that he was enabling BCCI to misrepresent to regulators, auditors and prospective depositors that BCCI Holdings had support through the investment of share capital by a wealthy investor when in fact that investment had not been made and the share capital, which supported the banking activity of the group, was in fact fictitious. BCCI records gave the appearance that Khalil had borrowed $19,852,095 from BCCI to purchase his BCCI Holdings shares. IV. Transactions Done In Khalil’s Name Shortly after Khalil agreed to hold BCCI Holdings shares as a nominee, his agreement with BCCI management expanded. Abedi still sought new sources of capital to fund the bank’s expansion. One potential source of income was to increase the bank’s trading operations. New financial instruments, certain kinds of futures and options, had been introduced into the London markets. Akbar, as a senior officer in BCCI’s Treasury operations had become the bank’s lead trader. From the evidence, the Court infers that Akbar had met with early success in the markets, and he was eager to manage a larger pool of funds for trading purposes. He also was eager to share in some of the returns he was providing to the bank. Akbar proposed that BCCI management approach certain customers. As Naqvi testified, “the basic arrangement was that ... the customers may be asked to permit the bank to trade in their name, the bank will provide all the funds, and the bank will take all the risks.” Naqvi Dep. at 36. With Naqvi and Abedi’s authorization, Akbar approached Khalil to discuss this proposal. The Court finds that Akbar did approach Khalil, but with two proposals. The first was the nominee arrangement outlined in Naqvi’s testimony. The second proposal was Akbar’s own. He proposed that he and Khalil form a partnership to invest the funds in Khalil’s current accounts, the funds put in his hand, in commodities, futures, and options. With great assurance, Akbar promised Khalil returns ranging from double to triple the interest that he could earn from BCCI. Khalil was interested in both arrangements, but he did not want to assume any of the risk. A. The Khalil-Akbar Partnership As to the Akbar-Khalil partnership, each agreed that Akbar could trade with Khalil’s funds, profits would be split evenly between the two of them, and Khalil’s capital would be guaranteed. Khalil was attracted to Akbar’s entrepreneurial energy but recognized the risks of allowing him too free a rein. Shortly after he had agreed to both the Treasury nominee arrangement and the Khalil-Akbar partnership, Khalil consulted with Abedi and Naqvi concerning Akbar’s trustworthiness. They told Khalil to trust Akbar “more than the bank.” And, as it turned out, he did. The Khalil-Akbar partnership became incorporated as Capcom UK in 1984. As will be seen, Akbar, with Khalil’s knowledge and agreement, siphoned virtually all the start-up capital from BCCI, and Akbar managed Capcom UK’s affairs from behind the scenes until 1987. Akbar did not fully disclose the terms of the Khalil-Akbar partnership to Naqvi and Abedi. Akbar was a schemer on par with Abedi himself. Akbar sensed that down the line Khalil could be a willing patron to finance Akbar’s grander schemes. To disguise the extent of the profits he had earned with Khalil’s funds, Akbar told Naqvi that Khalil was demanding an increase in his fee for acting as a nominee for the Treasury trading. Naqvi agreed that Akbar should pay Khalil off. See Naqvi Dep. at 55. The Liquidators sought to show that a total of $1,261,968, divided into three payments, was deposited in Khalil’s accounts in 1980 and 1981 as a pay-off. However, Gilkes was only able to document that two of the three payments were made, and he referred to no documents showing that these funds had come from BCCI assets. In the absence of such evidence, the Court finds that the $1.2 million Khalil received actually came from trading profits. See Tr. (Akbar) at 496-97. B. The Treasury Nominee Scheme As to the BCCI Treasury proposal, Khalil agreed to, and did, serve as a nominee for transactions undertaken by the BCCI Treasury Division. Naqvi and Abedi guaranteed that Khalil’s deposits would not be at risk. Khalil and Akbar agreed that as to BCCI Treasury trading done in the name of Khalil or Khalil-owned companies, Khalil would receive approximately one percent of the total amount invested in his name as a nominee fee. Naqvi and Abedi later ratified this agreement. C. Khalil-Owned Companies and Unreimbursed Expense Outlays A number of the fraudulent transactions undertaken by Treasury were done either in Khalil’s name or in the name of a company owned by him. Capcom UK was the formal incorporation of the Khahl-Akbar partnership. Additional companies, wholly owned by Khalil, came into being as a tax vehicle for Khalil to purchase real property. For example, not long after Khalil began his banking relationship with BCCI, he decided to purchase a home in London known as Moneorvo Close. As part of what Khalil termed the “VIP service” offered to important customers of the bank, BCCI assisted Khalil in the purchase by providing a lawyer to handle the closing and an inspection company to inspect the premises. In addition, Akbar arranged transportation to and from the airport, made hotel reservations for Khalil and his family, and paid Khalil’s staff and utility bills for the new residence. At Khalil’s direction, Akbar had furnished and decorated Moneorvo Close so that the house would be inhabitable when Khalil and his family arrived. There is no dispute that Khalil authorized Akbar to set up an offshore company, Maram Trading Company (“Maram”), to hold title to Moneorvo Close for tax purposes. Maram was a Cayman Islands corporation owned by Khalil and named for his daughter. Khalil subsequently purchased three other homes in the same manner. Another company, Khalil Investment and Trading Company, a Panamanian corporation, was incorporated by Akbar at the request of Khalil. Of the three additional homes, Sunningdale in Berkshire, England and Lakeside Village in Rockwall, Texas, were purchased in the name of Khalil Investment and Trading Co. (Id. at 46, 69, 71, 292, 295). Seadunes, a home in New Smyrna Beach, Florida, was purchased in the name of Maram Trading Company. Khalil also acquired an interest in a property called Potato Patch in Vail, Colorado. For that acquisition he used a company, owned by him, called KINTRA Universal Company, Limited. As to his first acquisition, Moneorvo Close, Khalil paid the bulk of the actual purchase price from his own funds. However, as part of the “VIP service” for acting as a nominee, BCCI paid a small portion of the purchase price and the ancillary expenses. As Khalil’s leverage over the bank increased, BCCI came to pay nearly all costs related to the subsequent transactions. See generally Tr. (Gilkes) at 214-28 & exhibits referenced therein. In all, BCCI advanced $2,249,352 of its own funds in connection with these property transactions as payment to Khalil for his services as a nominee. Khalil did not repay this sum because he had no obligation to repay. Building on these real estate transactions in which Khalil had a beneficial interest, BCCI Treasury also used companies nominally owned by Khalil to purchase properties from BCCI at inflated prices. For example, in 1981, BCCI sold a Hong Kong property it had acquired on December 15th for $1,833,890 to a company nominally owned by Khalil for $3,962,580. The resulting $2.1 million was recorded as a profit in BCCI’s 1981 year-end books. These transactions were accomplished through the use of international and United States wire facilities. D. Commodities Trading As is the case with most gamblers, Akbar’s lucky streak in the markets ran out. In 1983, at Akbar’s direction, BCCI’s Treasury division acquired significant positions in silver and copper on the belief that prices of the metals would continue to rise. In fact, prices dropped, and BCCI was forced to take delivery of significant amounts of metal at above-market prices. Under normal business practices, if BCCI had been holding this metal at the end of the year, or had sold it at market price during the year, it would have recorded tremendous losses. Doing so would have shaken the confidence of the bank’s real investors and almost certainly would have invited increased regulatory scrutiny that would have led to the bank’s closure. Rather than record these losses, BCCI transferred the silver at above-market prices to two entities, Euro Commodities Limited and Notan Trading, which were controlled by Akbar and wholly-funded from BCCI’s Khalil-related nominee accounts. Although all of the funds for these “purchases” came from internal BCCI sources, the transactions were recorded as sales. Consequently, at the close of 1983, BCCI’s books showed a much smaller loss than the bank had actually suffered. E. Circular Transactions In addition, Gilkes testified as to how the BCCI Treasury division carried out a number of other fraudulent transactions done in the name of Khalil, or one of his companies. One type of transaction was a circular routing transaction done to disguise the fact that BCCI was servicing many of its own loans, giving the appearance that non-performing loans were viable assets. As an example: (1) On June 26, 1985, BCCI created two loans on its books and transferred a total of $82 million to Capcom UK’s subsidiary, Brenchase, by means of two U.S. dollar checks; (2) that same day Brenchase placed the money with its parent company Cap-com UK; (3) the next day, June 27, the $82 million plus interest was returned by Capcom UK to Brenchase; (4) Brenchase then divided the money into two parts: $42 million was sent back to Capcom UK by U.S. dollar check, which then paid the money to BCCI, thus giving the appearance that non-BCCI funds were coming into the bank; (5) the $40 million which remained at Brenchase was then transferred by international and United States wire to BCCI; (6) the $42 million sent from Capcom UK to BCCI was used to service an account at BCCI that had been previously used to forward money to Capcom UK that was never repaid; (7) the $40 million that was transferred from Brenchase to BCCI was used to create that false impression that substantial commercial loans were performing when they were not. See Tr. (Gilkes) at 286-88; Pis.’ Exs. 1514-22, 2409-11, 2429-30, 2436-39, 2444-45 BCCI engaged in similar circular routing transactions with the Bank of India and the State Bank of India. Each such transaction had the effect of hiding non-performing assets and creating false profits on the books of BCCI. See Tr. (Gilkes) at 289-96; Pis.’ Exs. 17-18. F. Akbar’s Authority A great deal of testimony was devoted to whether Khalil had authorized Akbar to undertake any of these activities, and if so, the extent of that authority. Khalil maintained that he gave Akbar only a formal power of attorney in relation to the creation of companies for the purpose of purchasing real property for Khalil’s own use and to finalize such purchases. Akbar certainly had apparent authority to transact a far wider range of business in the name of Khalil and Khalil-owned companies, both with BCCI’s funds and with Khalil’s funds. It may well be that some of the “power of attorney” forms bearing Khalil’s name that were introduced into evidence were in fact signed by Akbar. This does not lead to the legal conclusion that these documents were “forged.” On the contrary, the Court finds that in or about 1980 Khalil authorized Akbar, in both his capacity as a BCCI employee and as Khalil’s partner, to undertake a broad range of activities in Khalil’s name, and in the name of Khalil-owned companies, see, e.g., Jawhary Dep. (FAC) at 914-15. This authority included, but was not limited to, creating BCCI accounts in Khalil’s name and the name of his companies in which Khalil had no beneficial interest or obligation, and using such accounts to engage in fraudulent wire and mail transfers, to purchase and sell real property, and to trade in commodities, futures, and options. Akbar was further authorized to sign such documents in Khalil’s name as Akbar deemed necessary to carry out these activities. Akbar kept Khalil apprised of the progress of the overall scheme. Contrary to Khalil’s testimony that he could never find Akbar when he needed him, the Court finds that Akbar consulted with Khalil by telephone on a frequent basis. See Deposition of Lorna Wisdom at 20-21. However, unlike with his deposits, in which Khal-il’s own funds were at issue, Khalil willfully and deliberately kept himself ignorant of the details as to how Akbar exercised that authority. E.g., Khalil Dep. (FAC) at 5-6, 102-03, 119; Tr. (Akbar) at 462, 489-90, 496. His capital had been guaranteed, and he knew that he would be held harmless if any of the transactions turned out to be to BCCI’s detriment. The scale of these transactions increased steadily. E.g., Tr. (Akbar) at 477. Over time, Khalil was paid millions of dollars pursuant to this agreement. V. First Amerioan Share Nominee Arrangements Khalil also was instrumental in facilitating another aspect of Abedi’s grand design. Abedi badly wanted BCCI to pro-ride banking services in the United States. He wanted to tap into the profitability of the United States market, and he believed entry into the United States would allow him to ultimately regularize and legitimize BCCI’s operations worldwide. Abedi expected that some day he would allow the bank to come under a respected regulatory authority. He hoped that BCCI could acquire a controlling interest in an American bank and then come to an arrangement with the Federal Reserve. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Abedi believed that BCCI was not in a position to seek and obtain Federal Reserve approval to purchase a significant interest in an American bank. Consequently, Abedi and Naqri concocted a nominee scheme to take over what was later named First American Corporation, a regional bank holding company that controlled what was once the largest bank in the Washington, D.C. area. Under the nominee scheme, wealthy individuals from the Middle East would purport to own the shares of CCAH, the shell corporation that became First American’s parent. Some of these investors, such as Adham, would beneficially own some shares — often through loans supplied by BCCI — and also own additional shares as a nominee for BCCI. Sometime in late 1980 or early 1981, Abedi again asked Adham to help recruit investors. Adham again approached Khal-il. As part of his agreement to serve as a nominee for BCCI for a variety of purposes, Khalil also agreed to serve as a nominee in the acquisition and maintenance of control of the shares of CCAH. Khalil was one of several nominees who participated in the scheme. To carry out the scheme, BCCI created CCAH, which wholly owned CCAI, also a shell. CCAI came to own First American Corporation, which, in turn owned First American Bank, which owned the retail banks with whom many residents and businesses in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area did their banking. Ownership of CCAH meant ownership of First American. In order for CCAH to gain ownership of First American, approval of the Federal Reserve Board was necessary. In April 1981, some of the proposed owners, including Khalil, flew to Washington, D.C. to testify before the Board. Prior to testifying, Khalil had done no due diligence concerning his “investment.” The parties agree that Khalil knew very little about First American when he appeared at the Federal Reserve hearing. Khalil’s own testimony as to the circumstances of his acquisition of First American shares confirms his nominee status. Financial information on Khalil had previously been supplied to United States regulators through BCCI, although Khalil asserts that he did not know financial information was filed on his behalf. Khalil testified in this case that he knew virtually nothing about the bank he was purporting to acquire an interest in when he appeared in Washington in 1981. He did not know what percentage of the bank he was acquiring or precisely how much he was supposed to be investing. See Khalil Dep. (BCCI) at 379-84, 400, 407, 417. Khalil asserts that he gave Abedi discretion, within a specified range, to decide how much would be invested on his behalf and what percentage would be acquired. Khalil understood that the CCAH shares BCCI was purchasing in his name were being counted on to form the majority interest in First American, although Khalil testified that he heard it from Ad-ham instead of a BCCI officer. Khalil did not negotiate or discuss a voting trust or some other form of shared control by which “his” shares would be used to consolidate control. Moreover, Khalil knew that this transfer of control required regulatory approval, which is why he flew to Washington. Khalil flew to Washington with Akbar. On the eve of his Federal Reserve testimony, Khalil met with Clark Clifford and Robert Altman, partners in the law firm of Clifford & Warnke. From the record in this case, it is unclear whom Clifford and Altman represented in their dealings with Khalil. Khalil testified that when he arrived at Clifford & Warnke’s offices, he waited while Adham met with Clifford and Altman. Then, Khalil was given a prepared statement to read to the Federal Reserve. Khalil was asked to rehearse the statement with Clifford, who coached Khalil on his delivery. Khalil read the statement and did not claim that it was inaccurate in any way. Khalil delivered the statement, as prepared, to the Federal Reserve. On the basis of the testimony of Khalil and the other nominees, along with documentation supplied by BCCI, the Federal Reserve approved the sale of First American. The Federal Reserve was unaware that BCCI would be the beneficial owner of a controlling interest in First American. Had the Federal Reserve known that BCCI was behind the takeover of First American, transfer of control would not have been approved. The initial transfer of CCAH shares took place in 1982. Khalil tells an improbable tale to explain how he actually purchased his shares. According to Khalil, he authorized Abedi to buy between $5 million and $8 million of CCAH stock. Khalil testified that after the initial purchase, he received a statement from BCCI showing that $14,832,000 had been taken from his accounts to purchase between 4 and 5 percent of CCAH. Khalil testified that he was angry that Abedi had greatly exceeded the authorized amount. However, Khalil did not introduce this bank statement into evidence, nor did any witness who spoke with Khalil at the time testify that Khalil was upset. On the contrary, on the return flight from Washington in April 1981, Khalil acknowledged his nominee status to Akbar. At later times Khalil again acknowledged his nominee status with respect to CCAH shares in his name to both Akbar and Naqvi. The documentary record also demonstrates that Khalil was a nominee for BCCI. Three blocks of shares were purchased in Khalil’s name. There was an initial purchase of 8,240 shares in the tender offer of March 1982, and rights shares purchases of 1,667 shares in August 1982 and 3,343 shares in November 1983, amounting to a total purchase of 13,250 shares registered in Khalil’s name. None of the memorandum account statements kept by Akbar that were introduced, nor any of the account statements produced by Khalil, show that any of his deposit or current accounts were debited to pay for any of these purchases. Rather, the documents show that BCCI created false loans from BCCI Group entities to carry out the nominee purchases. The nominees, including Khalil, had no obligation to repay the loans; BCCI’s investment was concealed through the nominee lending. The total amount of BCCI’s direct investment in the shares of First American through the nominee scheme was $556,108,245. For the initial purchase, BCCI routed funds for the shares purchased in Khalil’s name through the Swiss bank account of another nominee shareholder, Sayed Ja-whary. BCCI created a false $30 million loan to Khalil in BCCI Overseas, Grand Cayman. Those funds were then sent to a false current account in Khalil’s name at BCCI, S.A., London. Most of these funds were subsequently transferred by wire from BCCI to United Overseas Bank, Geneva, to the credit of Adham’s and Ja-whary’s actual accounts. The funds sent to United Overseas Bank were then returned by wire to BCCI where they were pooled with funds for other nominees as well as beneficial shareholders and transferred to the ICIC Call Deposit Account, which was the collection account for the First American tender offer at BCCI Overseas. These funds were then remitted by wire to BCCI Overseas’ account at Bank of New York and then to First American’s account at Chase Manhattan. There was no commercial purpose for such a roundabout routing of funds, which concealed from the auditors and regulators the fact that the BCCI Group had supplied the funds for the purchase of shares in Khalil’s and others’ names. Khalil knew that the funds for purchase of the shares in his name had been routed through the Swiss account. Jawhary testified that he told Khalil that Jawhary’s Swiss account had been used to route funds and that “Khalil said fine.” Jawhary Dep. (BCCI) at 12-13. BCCI management carried out the second and third nominee purchases in Khal-il’s name in similar fashion. The second purchase of shares in the name of Khalil occurred in August 1982. A loan of $12,-060,000 was drawn down in the name of another nominee at BCCI Overseas, Grand Cayman. The funds were transferred from BCCI Overseas by wire to First American’s account at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York in August 1982. The transfer included $8,000,600 for shares in the name of Khalil and $9,059,400 for other nominees. Again, United States and international wires were used to effect the transaction. The third purchase of shares in Khalil’s name occurred in November 1983. A loan of $6,868,415 was drawn down in the name of Khalil at ICIC Overseas, Grand Cayman, which was aggregated with other loans drawn down at ICIC in the name of other nominees and remitted by wire to First American’s account at State Bank of Albany in New York. In total, $24,201,015 was paid by the BCCI Group to finance nominee shares for Khalil. These transactions were all recorded in BCCI’s books as loans. BCCI documented its ownership interest in First American in detail. With immaculate penmanship, Imam tracked on a regular basis BCCI’s internal carrying costs on these nominee loans. The accounting for these nominee purchases as loans was false; the financing did not represent genuine and collectible loans made to Khalil, and the purported loans were never repaid by Khalil. In support of his claim that he was the beneficial owner of his CCAH shares, Khalil testified concerning a 1984 trip he made to Washington, D.C. area, where Khalil’s son, Khalid, lived. Khalil entered a First American branch in Falls Church, Virginia and attempted to cash $100,000 in travelers checks. The teller explained that he only had permission to cash up to $3,000, and that authorization from a supervisor would be required. Khalil stated that he was a shareholder of the bank. The branch manager telephoned Altman, who authorized the transaction. See Khal-il Dep. (BCCI) at 352. Within the same week, Khalil visited Altman in his office to hear a report on First American’s progress. Khalil testified that during the meeting Altman showed him his CCAH share certificates but told Khalil that the certificates could not be delivered to him for another 18 months. The evidence does not support this version of events. The Court finds that Khal-il did travel to Washington, D.C. in 1984, and that he did meet with Altman. Although Khalil was a nominee owner of First American, he expected First American to extend to him the same “VIP service” he received from BCCI. Khalil sought information concerning First American’s success so that he could value his service to BCCI as a nominee. Altman did not have the CCAH share certificates; Imam did. See Imam Dep. at 74-75; cf. Khalil Dep. (BCCI) at 835 (testifying in regard to Capcom share certificates that “if you have the real shares why you give it to other people.”). It was illegal for the BCCI Group to acquire or maintain its beneficial interest in First American without approval by the Federal Reserve. By participating in the nominee scheme, through which BCCI acquired a controlling interest in violation of United States banking laws, Khalil and his co-conspirators subjected BCCI to criminal liability and substantial financial loss. VI. Term Deposits Khalil closely watched BCCI’s treatment of his term deposits. He had instructed BCCI to roll over his term deposits and to find him the best interest rates available. He expected BCCI to provide him with above-market rates. E.g., Khalil Dep. (BCCI) at 187, 209-10. Early on he detected problems with his accou