Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION HENRY H. KENNEDY, JR., District Judge. This action, which is brought under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, is before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part. I. BACKGROUND On or about March 16, 2003, plaintiff sent a FOIA request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters office in Washington, D.C. (“FBIHQ”) seeking information about himself including, but not limited to: “(1) arrest records, (2) investigation and/or investigatory reports, (3) reports or evidentiary and/or scientific information findings, (4) wants, warrants, and/or detainers, (5) final and closing investigation reports; and (6) any and/or all information, data, or reports not otherwise exempt by statute.” Complaint (“Compl.”), Exhibit (“Ex.”) A (FOIA Request). In response, on September 8, 2004, FBIHQ released 191 pages of redacted records and indicated that the re-dactions had been made pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D). In addition, FBIHQ notified plaintiff that it withheld another 62 pages of records pursuant to FOIA Exemption 3. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed FBIHQ’s decision to the Justice Department’s Office of Information and Privacy (“OIP”). Plaintiff filed the instant civil action in June 2005. His response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment prompted FBIHQ to conduct a second search for records responsive to his FOIA request. As a result of the second search, FBIHQ located a Legal Attache (“Legat”) Bridgetown main file, and from this file promptly released 63 pages of redacted public source documents, indicating that the re-dactions had been made pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 2, 5, 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F). Later, FBIHQ released 323 pages, out of 1,440 pages reviewed, indicating that the redactions had been made pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 2, 5, 6, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E) and 7(F). Among the responsive FBIHQ records located were documents which originated in full or in part with other government agencies or other components of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Documents were referred to the DOJ’s Criminal Division, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“BAT-FE”), the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”), the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), the Department of Defense (“DOD”), the Department of State (“State Department”), and to the Department of the Army (“Army”) for direct response to plaintiff. In addition, FBIHQ forwarded 312 pages of records to “another government agency for direct response to plaintiff.” Hardy IV Decl. ¶108. FBIHQ, however, did not identify the agency and the record of this case does not explain the disposition of these records. By this action, plaintiff challenges the responses to his FOIA request. II. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment in a FOIA Case The court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits or declarations, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Carp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Factual assertions in the moving party’s affidavits may be accepted as true unless the opposing party submits his own affidavits or declarations or documentary evidence to the contrary. Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C.Cir.1992). In a FOIA case, the court may grant summary judgment based on the information provided in affidavits or declarations when the affidavits or declarations describe “the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981); see also Hertzberg v. Veneman, 273 F.Supp.2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2003). Such affidavits or declarations are accorded “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and dis-coverability of other documents.’ ” Safe-Card Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. Central Intelligence Agency, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C.Cir.1981)). B. FBIHQ’s Searches for Responsive Records “An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’ ” Valencia-Lucena v. United States Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C.Cir.1990)); Campbell v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C.Cir.1998) (requiring agency to conduct its search using methods reasonably expected to produce requested information). The agency bears the burden of showing that its search was calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Steinberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C.Cir.1994). To meet its burden, the agency may submit affidavits or declarations that explain in reasonable detail the scope and method of the agency’s search. Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C.Cir.1982). In the absence of contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an agency’s compliance with FOIA. Id. at 127. But if the record “leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542. 1. FBIHQ’s Central Records System In its Central Records System (“CRS”), the FBI maintains its “administrative, applicant, criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defi’s Mot.”), Declaration of David M. Hardy (“Hardy I Decl.”) ¶ 11. The records are organized by subject matter, and a file’s subject matter may relate to an individual, organization, company, publication, activity, or foreign intelligence matter. General indices, which consist of index cards arranged in alphabetical order, are the means by which CRS records are retrieved. Entries in the general indices are either “main” entries or “reference” entries. Id. ¶ 13. The former “carr[y] the name corresponding with a subject of a file contained in the CRS;” the latter “are generally only a mere mention or reference to an individual, organization, etc., contained in a document located in another ‘main’ file.” Id. FBIHQ’s policy “is to search for and identify only ‘main’ files responsive to [FOIA] requests,” unless a requester specifically asks for a search of cross-references. Defendant’s Fourth Motion for Enlargement of Time, Second Declaration of David M. Hardy (“Hardy II Decl.”) ¶ 5. The decision to index names other than subjects, suspects, and victims is left to the discretion of the assigned Special Agent, the Supervisory Special Agent at the field office conducting the investigation, and the Supervisory Special Agent at FBIHQ. Hardy I Decl. ¶ 16. Without an index, “information essential to ongoing investigations could not be readily retrieved. The FBI files would be merely archival in nature and could not be effectively used to serve the mandated mission of the FBI.” Id. ¶ 17. Thus, general indices to the CRS files “are the means by which the FBI can determine what retrievable information, if any,” its files may contain on a particular subject. Id. 2. File Number 2I5-HQ-657 To locate records pertaining to a particular subject, such as plaintiff, FBIHQ staff search by the subject’s name in the CRS index. Hardy I Decl. ¶ 14. In this case, the search located one main file, 245-HQ-657, which “contain[s] information regarding a multi-subject drug investigation of numerous co-conspirators.” Id. ¶ 18. Its universal case file number indicates that the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (245) conducted the investigation, that FBIHQ was the investigation’s office of origin (HQ), and that it was assigned an individual case file number (657). Id. ¶ 15(a). Plaintiff challenged the adequacy of FBIHQ’s initial search for responsive records asserting that he “had contact with certain agents of the FBI since [the] early 1990’[s] and [had] information based on reliable sources that the FBI was involved with investigative operations related to [him] throughout the 1990’s.” Affidavit of Charles E. Miller in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment (“PL’s Aff’) ¶ 5. These investigations pertained to drug trafficking on the island of St. Kitts and events occurring while plaintiff was incarcerated at a United States Penitentiary. See id. ¶¶ 6-11. According to plaintiff, FBIHQ “should have [ ] additional records related to [him] considering [his] extensive history and association with international figures deeply involved in both illegal activity as well as law enforcement activities.” Id. ¶ 13. He argued that FBIHQ was not “acting in good faith by claiming that no other records exist on [him] at FBI that post-date” his prosecution resulting from the investigation of his activities in Rochester, New York. Id. 3. File Number 16SA-BB-610 Plaintiffs challenge to the first search prompted FBIHQ to conduct a “second search of the indices to the headquarters CRS, to include both main files and cross-references.” Hardy II Decl. ¶ 5. Staff used variants of plaintiffs name and alias, Cecil Connors, as search terms, and used his “date of birth to facilitate the identification of responsive records.” Id. In this manner, FBIHQ staff located a Legal Attache (“Legat”) Bridgetown main file, 163A-BB-610, entitled “Foreign Police Cooperation,” Id. ¶ 6, and several cross-refer-enees which ultimately led to the discovery of “documents ... in files classified as Foreign Political Matters, Administrative Matters and Racketeering Enterprise Investigation.” Hardy IV Deck ¶ 12. File Number 163ABB-610 “[i]nadvertently [was] serialized in CRS as a cross-reference on plaintiff.” Id n. 8. FBIHQ cured any defect in its first search by conducting a second search. The court concludes that, taken together, the searches of FBIHQ were reasonable and calculated to uncover all relevant records. C. Exemptions Each agency bears the burden of justifying its decision to withhold records or portions of records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Its declarant must describe the records withheld and show that the records fall within the claimed exemption or exemptions. Canning v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 848 F.Supp. 1037, 1043 (D.D.C.1994). FBIHQ addresses this obligation by submitting declarations and Vaughn indices from which the court may “derive ... a clear explanation of why each document or portion of a document withheld is putatively exempt from disclosure.” Manna v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 832 F.Supp. 866, 873 (D.N.J.1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1. Exemption 1 Exemption 1 protects matters that are: specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order[.] 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to Executive Order 13292, 68 Fed.Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003), information may be classified only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage. Exec. Order No. 13292 § 1.1(a). The phrase “damage to the national security” means “harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from the unauthorized disclosure of information, taking into consideration such aspects of the information as the sensitivity, value, utility, and provenance of that information.” Exec. Order. No. 13292 § 6.1(j). Information may be classified either at the “top secret,” “secret” or “confidential” level, id. § 1.2(a), and such classified information must fall within one of the following categories: (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or (h) weapons of mass destruction. Id. § 1.4. In a FOIA case, the court determines de novo whether an agency properly withholds information under a claimed exemption. See, e.g., King v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.Cir.1987). This is true even if national security matters are at issue. See Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C.Cir.1980). Courts generally defer to agency expertise in national security matters, however. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dep’t of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 109 (D.C.Cir.1982) (according “utmost deference” to classification affidavits); Goland v. Central Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); see also Krikorian v. Dep’t of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464-65 (D.C.Cir.1993) (acknowledging “unique insights” of executive agencies responsible for national defense and foreign relations). a. Military Plans, Weapons Systems, or Operations — Section 1.4(a) Among the records responsive to plaintiffs FOIA request are documents discussing a possible noncombatant evacuation operation (“NEO”). Def.’s Reply, Declaration of Richard Ellis (“Ellis Decl.”) ¶ 12. Although the events giving rise to the discussion of the NEO have passed, “disclosure of this information today would give great insight to individuals who could exploit that information to frustrate the future attempts by our military and U.S. Government to protect its citizens abroad and to evacuate them safely in the event it becomes necessary.” Id. ¶ 13. For these reasons, the Army redacts information regarding “[NEO] plans and security operations, plans for government personnel movements and responsibilities during a NEO, as well as host nation security forces involvement during a NEO and intelligence used to support a military plan.” Id. ¶ 12. The court concludes that the declarant’s explanation adequately supports the Army’s decision to withhold information pertaining to military operations under Exemption 1 as its release “could reasonably be expected to seriously damage national security.” Ellis Decl. ¶ 20. b. Foreign Government Information— Section 1.4(b) i. Army Of the two classified documents falling “under the cognizance of the Operations Directorate,” Def.’s Reply, Declaration of Salvatore F. Cambria (“Cambria DecL”) ¶ 4, the Army released one classified document in full. See id. ¶ 5 & Ex. I. It declassified the second classified document in part and redacted it to protect certain portions under Exemption 1 as foreign government information. Id. ¶ 6 & Ex. 2. The disclosure of this information, the Army stated, “could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.” Id. ¶ 11. The Army explains that the activities of the Operations Directorate of the United States Southern Command (“USSOUTH-COM”) depend “heavily on the cooperation of host nation countries and their forces in providing [USSOUTHCOM] with information that both helps [USSOUTHCOM] understand their vulnerabilities and capabilities, but also builds and maintains a level of trust that provides [ ] a source of information for a variety of purposes.” Cam-bria Decl. ¶ 13. “Disclosure of information gathered by the United States either about or by a foreign country could have negative diplomatic consequences between the two countries and may jeopardize reciprocal confidentiality between the two.” Id. ¶ 12. If information sharing between countries were hindered, the United States’ “ability to assess a situation and act accordingly in carrying out [its] mission [by] responding] to a crisis that threatens our national interest” may be limited severely. Id. The Court concludes that the Army properly withheld this classified foreign government information under Exemption 1 as its release reasonably could be expected to damage the national security. ii. State Department The State Department first remarks that confidentiality and mutual trust are essential to successful diplomatic exchanges. Def.’s Reply, Declaration of Margaret P. Grafeld (“Grafeld Deck”) ¶ 19. “Unwillingness or inability to maintain confidentiality in diplomatic exchanges would inevitably chill our relations with other countries” and “dimmish [ ] access to sources of information important to the successful implementation of U.S. foreign policy.” Id. If confidential information were disclosed, foreign officials likely would believe that “U.S. officials are not able or willing to observe the confidentiality expected in such exchanges.” Id. This belief, in turn, would lead foreign governments to be “less willing in the future to furnish information important to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, and in general less disposed to cooperate with the United States in the achievement of foreign policy objectives of common interest.” Id. In this way, disclosure of information “reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security.” Id. The State Department also relies on confidential sources, who may be private individuals or foreign government officials, in conducting foreign affairs. Grafeld Decl. ¶ 23. “Sources often provide information only because they are confident that their identities will be protected,” and a breach of this trust “undoubtedly will result in the unwillingness or inability of the source to provide further information.” Id. If the United States were to disclose the identities of confidential sources, the declarant explains that “damage to the climate of confidence that facilitates the conduct of relations beneficial to vital U.S. interests” would result. Id. The State Department’s explanations provide adequate support for its decisions to withhold information obtained by the United States government in confidence from foreign government officials deemed “essential to the formulation and successful implementation of U.S. foreign policy.” Id. ¶ 19. The records relevant to this discussion are telegrams from Embassy Bridgetown to the State Department containing foreign government information classified either at the secret or confidential level. First, the State Department withholds in full or in part portions of a series of telegrams (Docs. F36, F37, F47, F50 and F51) from Embassy Bridgetown to the State Department to the extent that they contain foreign government information. See Grafeld Decl. ¶ 62-66. One telegram (Doc. F36) “recounts a candid exchange between an Embassy official and a high-level St. Kitts government official” regarding “the extradition case of three drug kingpins.” Id. ¶ 68. Another (Doc. F37) includes information provided to Embassy officials by high-level Kittian officials regarding extradition proceedings of plaintiff and his co-defendants. Id. ¶ 69. A third telegram (Doc. F47) is redacted to protect an analysis of “the meaning of a flawed Kittian court order in plaintiffs extradition case[ ] addressing the possibility of judicial corruption.” Id. ¶ 70. All of a fourth telegram (Doc. F51) and portions of a fifth telegram (Doc. F50) are withheld to protect a discussion of “possible corruption and drug traffickers’ influence in St. Kitts.” 7&¶ 71. A second series of telegrams (Docs. F31, F34, F39, F40, F42 and F43), “analyze[s] in detail threats to the physical safety of American citizens on St. Kitts, the U.S. government’s planned response, ... and the St. Kitts police response and capabilities.” Grafeld Deck ¶ 81. Included in these telegrams is information “provided by St. Kitts officials and indicate involvement at important levels of the island’s government.” Id. From a third set of telegrams (Docs. F25, F35, and F52), the State Department withholds confidential information obtained from foreign governments in a description of the United States’ “judicial strategy and tactics of prosecuting [plaintiffs] extradition case.” Grafeld Decl. ¶ 93. Disclosure of this information, the declarant asserts, “would anger government officials and cause damage to our bilateral relationship” with St. Kitts. Id. Two telegrams (Does. F27A and F48) include “candid assessments of St. Kitts’ top officials, reported in confidence to U.S. officials, including the situation in the context of upcoming Kit-tian elections,” Id. ¶ 99, and four other telegrams (Docs. F33, F40A, F46 and F49) include information pertaining to “a discussion between a U.S. and a high level Kit-tian government official about next steps in plaintiffs extradition case.” Id. ¶ 107. The court concludes that the State Department properly withholds these telegrams in full or in part under Exemption 1 because they contain foreign government information, the release of which reasonably could be expected to result in damage to national security. See, e.g., Krikorian, 984 F.2d at 465 (holding that a telegram reporting discussion between agency official and high-ranking foreign diplomat regarding terrorism properly was withheld because its release “would jeopardize ‘reciprocal confidentiality’ ” between governments). In addition, the State Department justifies its decisions to withhold these same telegrams in part because the information contained therein falls within the category of “foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources,” under Exec. Order No. 13292 § 1.4(d), the disclosure of which would endanger the United States’ relationship with St. Kitts. The declarant explains that contents of these telegrams include “confidential sources and sensitive aspects of U.S. foreign relations, including, in particular, issues relating to the complicated extradition of a powerful and influential criminal.” Grafeld Decl. ¶ 22. The “complex nature of this [extradition] matter, including the fear and power exercised by the subject of the extradition action” leads the declarant to conclude that “certain information related to it has the potential to damage [United States] relations with and access to the government of St. Kitts.” Id. The court accepts the agency’s assessment that the information properly is classified and concerns foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources, for purposes of Exec. Order No. 13292 § 1.4(d). See Grafeld Decl. ¶¶ 22, 69-71, 81, 93, 99, 107. This information, too, properly is withheld under Exemption 1. iii. Air Force According to the Air Force, the one document referred to it contains foreign government information, the release of which could cause serious damage to national security. Def.’s Reply, Declaration of Richard M. Abboud (“Abboud Decl.”) ¶¶ 8-9. Its declarant does not identify or describe the document itself and does not articulate the potential damage that could result from its disclosure. The Air Force does not meet its obligation under FOIA by justifying its decision to withhold this document in full. c. Intelligence Sources or Methods— Section 1.4(c) i. FBIHQ FBIHQ withholds “detailed information provided by a human intelligence source targeted at a specific individual or organization of national security interest.” Hardy IV Decl. ¶ 25. Because the information “is specific in nature and reflects a specific vantage point from which the source is reporting,” its disclosure “would identify the intelligence source.” Id. The source’s physical well-being or that of his or her family members or associates could be jeopardized, or they may be subjected to “public ridicule and/or ostracism” if his or her identity were disclosed. Id. ¶ 28. In addition, because the information “pertains to national security matters,” its disclosure “could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the FBI’s intelligence and counterintelligence gathering capabilities.” Id. ¶26. “[Pjublicly identifying sources utilized in intelligence investigations” would negatively impact “the FBI’s ability to protect and recruit intelligence sources in the future.” Id. ¶ 27. For these reasons, the declarant concludes that the unauthorized disclosure of information provided by this human intelligence source could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Id. ¶ 22. The Court concurs that this information properly is withheld under Exemption 1. ii. DIA DIA withholds four documents (Nos.l, 3-5) in full and redacts two doeu-ments (Nos.2, 6) so that information classified at the secret level pertaining to or derived from intelligence sources is protected from disclosure under Exemption 1. Defs Reply, Declaration of Brian S. Kinsey (“Kinsey Decl.”) ¶ 12-13. Intelligence sources employed by DIA can be individuals (foreign or American), foreign entities, and intelligence or security services of foreign governments. Id. ¶ 10. These sources “can be expected to furnish information only when confident that they are protected from retribution by the absolute secrecy surrounding their relationship to the United States Government.” Id. DIA further describes the potential harm to an intelligence source whose identity is disclosed as follows: Sources who are compromised become extremely vulnerable to retaliation from a variety of entities including their own governments or others having a stake in the confidentiality of the information provided by the source. In certain parts of the world, the consequences of public disclosure to an individual that has served as a U.S. source are often swift and far reaching, from economic reprisals to possible harassment, imprisonment, or even death. Id. ¶ 11. Accordingly, the declarant asserts that Exemption 1 protects from disclosure secret information about or derived from intelligence sources because disclosure may damage national security. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. In addition, DIA withholds four documents (Nos.l, 3-5) in full and redacts two documents (Nos.2, 6) so that information classified at the secret level pertaining “intelligence methodology” is protected. Kinsey Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. These documents contain information that “describes intelligence sources and methods, counternar-cotics affiliations between DIA and other U.S. government entities and gaps in intelligence collection on counternarcotics.” Id. ¶ 17. Intelligence methods “are the means and the manner in which an intelligence agency collects information to support military operations, assist[s] in national poli-cymaking, assesses] military threats, and otherwise accomplishes] its mission.” Kinsey Decl. ¶ 14. According to DIA, such intelligence methods “must be protected from disclosure because such knowledge would be of material assistance to those who would seek to penetrate, detect, prevent, avoid or damage” the United States’ intelligence operations. Id. For example, disclosure of information acquired by the United States government “could reasonably be expected to enable foreign authorities to identify U.S. intelligence activities, methods or sources, and to emplace countermeasures to them.” Id. ¶ 17. DIA clearly and sufficiently explains that damage to the national security potentially may result from disclosure of this classified information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods. Consequently, the court concludes that the information is properly withheld under Exemption 1. in. State Department The State Department withholds information that could “enable opponents of United States foreign policy objectives to identify U.S. intelligence activities, sources or methods and to undertake countermeasures that could frustrate the ability of the U.S. government to acquire information necessary to the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.” Grafeld Deck ¶21. “[Disclosure of this information could put [a] human intelligence source in danger.” Id. Under Exemption 1, the State Department withholds classified information contained in six telegrams, the content of which is a detailed analysis of “threats to the physical safety of American citizens on St. Kitts, the U.S. government’s planned response, including intelligence activities, and the St. Kitts’ police response and capabilities.” Grafeld Decl. ¶ 81. The telegrams (Docs. F31, F34, F39, F40, F42 and F43) are withheld in part on the ground that their disclosure would compromise intelligence activities, sources or methods. Id. One telegram (Doc. F46) includes information from intelligence sources “discussing] the activities of key narcotics trafficking organizations in the Caribbean, including plaintiffs criminal activities and business alliances.” Grafeld Decl. ¶ 107. The State Department withholds this document in part on the ground that its disclosure compromises intelligence sources. Id. For this same reason, the State Department withholds from another telegram (Doc. F33) portions discussing “U.S. government options, in cooperation with top officials of the government of St. Kitts, for dealing with a serious threat from plaintiff and his associates to the physical security of American citizens on the island.” Id. The State Department’s explanation sufficiently supports its position that disclosure of this classified information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods reasonably could be expected to damage the national security. Therefore, its decision to withhold this information under Exemption 1 is proper. iv. Army The Army redacts information pertaining to “intelligence sources and methods that if released would compromise the tactics and techniques used to collect intelligence.” Ellis Decl. ¶ 14. Within the scope of the term “intelligence methods” are “intelligence collection requirements that indicate intelligence gaps and would provide outsiders insight into methods and capabilities used to collect different types of intelligence.” Id. Disclosure of such information “could significantly compromise” the Army’s ability to collect intelligence, allow adversaries to operate more freely, and thus reduce the Army’s ability to support its commanders in defending the United States. See id. The Army adequately explains its decision to withhold classified information because it pertains to intelligence methods, the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to damage the national security. Accordingly, this information properly is withheld under Exemption 1. d. Foreign Relations or Foreign Activities in the United States— Section 1.4(d) The Army withholds information “to protect foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States.” Ellis Decl. ¶ 15. Release of such information could cause serious damage to the national security by compromising the Army’s ability to collect intelligence, allowing adversaries to operate more freely, thus reducing the ability to support commanders and defend the country and its people. Id. As this information pertains to the evacuation of American citizens from St. Kitts and the involvement of St. Kitts authorities in planning such an operation, see id. ¶ 12-14, it falls within the category of foreign relations. Consequently, this information properly is withheld under Exemption 1. e. Vulnerabilities, Capabilities or Plans Relating to National Security— Section 1.4(g) The Army withholds information classified as secret pertaining to vulnerabilities, capabilities or plans relating to national security on the ground that it could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security. Cam-bria Decl. ¶ 11. Its declarant explains that the “security and safety of the US-SOUTHCOM hinges on [ ] continued trust with partner nations[’] militaries and police forces.” Id. ¶ 14. Disclosure of information about size, capabilities or strengths of partner nations’ military and police forces may fall into the hands of an adversary, such that the partner nations’ ability to protect their citizens and United States citizens working or traveling abroad may be weakened. Id. In addition, disclosure may “weaken[] the mutual relationship between the U.S. government and our partner nations[ ] supporting efforts in the region to combat narco-trafficking and terrorist threats.” Id. These “confidences [ ] must endure in order to accomplish the military objections of the USSOUTHCOM Operations Directorate.” Id. The Army thus demonstrates that its decision to withhold this information under Exemption 1 is proper. 2. Exemption 2 Exemption 2 shields from disclosure information that is “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). The phrase “personnel rules and practices” is interpreted to include not only “minor employment matters” but also “other rules and practices governing agency personnel.” Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C.Cir.1981) (en banc). The “information need not actually be ‘rules and practices’ to qualify under [E]xemption 2, as the statute provides that matter ‘related’ to rules and practices is also exempt.” Schwaner v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 898 F.2d 793, 795 (D.C.Cir.1990). Exemption 2 applies if the information that is sought meets two criteria. First, such information must be “used for predominantly internal purposes.” Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1074; see Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. United States Customs Serv., 802 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C.Cir. 1985). Second, the agency must show either that “disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation,” or that “the material relates to trivial administrative matters of no genuine public interest.” Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 794 (citations omitted). “Predominantly internal documents the disclosure of which would risk circumvention of agency statutes are protected by the so-called ‘high 2’ exemption.” Schiller v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 964 F.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C.Cir.1992). “High 2” exempt information is “not limited ... to situations where penal or enforcement statutes could be circumvented.” Id. at 1208. If the material at issue merely relates to trivial administrative matters of no genuine public interest, it is deemed “low 2” exempt material. See Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C, Inc. v. Smith, 721 F.2d 828, 830-31 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1983). “Low 2” exempt materials include such items as “file numbers, initials, signature and mail routing stamps, references to interagency transfers, and data processing references,” Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170, 175-76 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied sub nom. Scherer v. Webster, 440 U.S. 964, 99 S.Ct. 1511, 59 L.Ed.2d 778 (1979), and other “trivial administrative data such as ... data processing notations[ ] and other administrative markings.” Coleman v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 13 F.Supp.2d 75, 78 (D.D.C.1998) (citation omitted). a. FBIHQ i. Telephone and Fax Numbers From both main file 245-HQ-657 and Bridgetown main file 163A-BB-610, FBIHQ withholds telephone and fax numbers of FBI Special Agents (“SAs”) and FBI support employees. Hardy I Decl. ¶ 25; Hardy IV Decl. ¶ 34. This information is related to the agency’s internal practices “in that these [telephone and fax] numbers are used by these employees during the performance of their duties.” Hardy I Decl. ¶ 25. Their disclosure neither serves a public interest nor provides any public benefit. Id. ¶ 26; Hardy IV Decl. ¶ 34. Further, FBIHQ states that disclosure of the numbers “could subject these individuals to harassing telephone calls which could disrupt official business (including impeding the ability of SAs to conduct and conclude law enforcement investigations in a timely manner).” Hardy IV Decl. ¶ 34. The same rationale applies to FBIHQ’s decision to withhold from Bridgetown main file 163A-BB-610 telephone and fax numbers belonging to other federal agencies, including the State Department, DEA, and BATFE, as the numbers are used by their personnel in performing their official duties. Id. ¶ 35. FBIHQ sufficiently justifies its decision to withhold the telephone and fax numbers as “low 2” exempt information. The numbers are predominantly for internal agency use and are trivial administrative matters of no genuine interest to the public. ii. Source Symbol Numbers FBIHQ assigns a permanent source symbol number to a “confidential informant!] who report[s] information to the FBI on a regular basis pursuant to an ‘express’ grant of confidentiality.” Hardy IV Decl. ¶ 36. The source symbol number “consists of a two-letter abbreviation particular to the FBI field office where the symbol-numbered source is operating or has operated, followed by a sequentially assigned number.” Id. The number is an “administrative reporting tool” and appears in all written reports of information provided by that informant in place of his or her name in order to protect his or her identity. Id. Disclosure of the source symbol number could “indicate both the scope and location of FBI informant coverage within a particular geographic area,” and could “reveal [ ] connections to dates, times, places, events and names from which the source’s identity could be deduced.” Id. ¶ 37. According to FBIHQ, a source symbol number is an internal administrative tool of no genuine interest to the public. Id. The court concludes that FBIHQ properly withheld a permanent source symbol number as “low 2” exempt information. See, e.g., Lesar v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 485 (D.C.Cir.1980) (upholding decision to withhold codes of this nature); Long v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 450 F.Supp.2d 42, 56 (D.D.C.2006), order amended on recons., 457 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C.), and order amended, 479 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C.2007) (same), b.BATFE BATFE withholds under Exemption 2 “computer codes utilized for the organization of data in [BATFE’s] Firearms Trace System Database.” Defs Reply, Declaration of Averill P. Graham (“Graham Decl.”) ¶ 8. These codes, BAT-FE explains, are for administrative purposes only and are of no legitimate interest to the public. Id. In addition, it states that the disclosure of these codes “would risk the circumvention of law enforcement and investigatory efforts” by “providing] a computer-literate criminal with the means of decoding law enforcement data and potentially interfering with or altering [BAT-FE’s] Firearms Trace System Database.” Id. Thus, BATFE adequately justifies its decision to withhold these computer codes. See Boyd v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 496 F.Supp.2d 167, 171 (D.D.C.2007) (concluding that data displayed on screen prints of Treasury Enforcement Communications System properly withheld under Exemption 2); Truesdale v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 03-1332, 2005 WL 3273093, at *7 (D.D.C. July 22, 2005) (concluding that internal administrative codes used in criminal law enforcement databases properly withheld). c. DIA DIA withholds portions of six documents “because they contain office symbols, internal document or messaging codes, routing directions and telephone identifiers of U.S. government agencies and offices engaged in the collection of foreign intelligence information.” Defi’s Reply, Kinsey Decl. ¶ 19. These are the types of trivial internal information of no interest to the public properly withheld as “low 2” exempt material. See, e.g., Scherer, 584 F.2d at 175-76. d. DEA DEA withholds Geographical Drug Enforcement Program (“G-DEP”) codes and NADDIS numbers, part of DEA’s internal system of identifying information and individuals, under Exemption 2. Def.’s Reply, Declaration of Leila I. Wassom (“Wassom Decl.”) ¶33. A G-DEP code is assigned when the agency opens a case file and it is used to “indicate the classification of the violator, the types and amount of suspected drugs involved, the priority of the investigation and the suspected location and scope of criminal activity.” Id. ¶ 33(a). NADDIS numbers are “multi-digit numbers assigned to drug violators and suspected drug violators known to the DEA.” Id. ¶ 33(b). The numbers are unique to the violators to whom they are assigned. Id. If a NAD-DIS number were disclosed, a requester would have “a means of finding out not only drug violator information about the subject but also personal information about [the violator], relatives and any third parties identifiable with the violator.” Id. Release of G-DEP codes could help suspects decode information to identify priority given to narcotic investigations, types of criminal activities, and violator ratings. Id. ¶ 34. With this information, suspects could change their behavior so as to avoid detection and otherwise thwart the DEA’s investigative and law enforcement efforts. Id. G-DEP codes and NADDIS numbers fall within Exemption 2 and routinely are withheld. See Barbosa v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 06-0867, 2007 WL 1201604, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr.23, 2007) (concluding that DEA properly withheld violator identifiers consisting of G-DEP codes, NADDIS numbers, and confidential informant numbers which are part of the agency’s internal system of identifying information and individuals); Wilson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 414 F.Supp.2d 5, 12-13 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that G-DEP codes and NADDIS numbers properly are withheld as “high 2” exempt information, and that NADDIS numbers, insofar as they are part of the DEA’s internal system of identifying information in which there is no public interest, properly are withheld as “low 2” exempt information). Therefore, DEA’s decision to withhold G-DEP codes and NADDIS numbers under Exemption 2 is proper. e. Army The Army withholds “internal secure telephone numbers and message addresses” under Exemption 2. Ellis Decl. ¶ 16. These numbers and addresses are used by personnel assigned to USSOUTH-COM in the performance of their official duties. Id. ¶ 17. If disclosed, the declar-ant explains that these personnel could be subjected to “harassing telephone calls which could disrupt official business and impede the Intelligence Directorate from effectively accomplishing its mission.” Id. Moreover, these telephone numbers and addresses are “[r]outine administrative information” the disclosure of which serves no genuine public interest. Id. The Army adequately establishes that these telephone numbers and message addresses are internal administrative information properly withheld as “low 2” exempt information. 3. Exemption 3 Exemption 3 covers records that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” ... provided that such statute either “(A) [requires withholding] in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue,” or “(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); see also Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 582 (D.C.Cir.1987). a. FBIHQ FBIHQ withholds from main file 245-HQ-657 “information relating to the lawful interception of communications pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20.” Hardy I Decl. ¶28. Specifically, FBIHQ withholds the number assigned to the interception, the targeted individuals and locations, and information derived from the intercepts. Id. It is true that information pertaining to wiretaps may be withheld under Exemption 3. See, e.g., Queen v. Gonzales, No. 96-1387, 2005 WL 3204160, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov.15, 2005) (withholding information consisting of the identities of individuals and telephone numbers targeted in the FBI’s criminal investigation of Plaintiff, the dates, times, and participants in the wiretaps, and both the summarized content and the actual content of the transcript of a particular intercepted communication); Butler v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 86-2255, 1994 WL 55621, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb.3, 1994) (holding that affidavits submitted in support of a wiretap issued pursuant to Title III are exempt). FBIHQ’s declaration is incomplete, however, as it neither explains that it had no discretion on the decision to withhold this information nor sets forth the particular criteria applied in reaching its decision to withhold the wiretap information in full. b. BATFE BATFE’s decision to withhold in full “Firearms Trace Reports wholly derived from the contents of the Firearms Trace System Database,” Graham Decl. ¶ 13, is based on two public laws which prohibit the expenditure of funds to disclose records collected or maintained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(g). See id. ¶¶ 11-12. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, in relevant part provides: No funds appropriated under this Act or any other Act with respect to any fiscal year shall be available to take any action based upon any provision of 5 U.S.C. [§ ] 552 with respect to records collected or maintained pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3), (7) ], or provided by Federal, State, local or foreign law enforcement agencies in connection with ... the tracing of a firearm[.] Id. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, in relevant part provides: That no funds appropriated under this or any other Act with respect to any fiscal year may be used to disclose part or all of the contents of the Firearms Trace System database maintained by the National Trace Center of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives or any information required to be kept by licensees pursuant to section 923(g) of title 18, United States Code, or required to be reported pursuant to paragraphs (3) and (7) of such section 923(g), to anyone other than a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency or a prosecutor solely in connection with and for use in a bona fide criminal investigation or prosecution[.] Id. The Firearms Trace Reports at issue here are “derived from information required to be kept by a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(g).” Graham Decl. ¶ 13. Because Congress prohibits the expenditure of funds for release of such records, BATFE properly withholds them in full under Exemption 3. See Watkins v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, No. 04cv800, 2005 WL 2334277, *1 (D.D.C. Sept.1, 2005) (concluding that 2005 appropriations legislation “prevents] the public release of sensitive firearms trace data not so much for budgetary reasons than out of concern that such disclosures could jeopardize criminal investigations”). c. DIA DIA withheld portions of four documents under Exemption 3 “because they specifically identify the names, office affiliations and titles of DIA personnel.” Kinsey Decl. ¶ 21. Disclosure of such information, DIA explains, is prohibited under 10 U.S.C. § 424. Id. That statute prohibits the disclosure of “the organization or any function of’ the DIA, or “the number of persons employed by or detailed to [the DIA], or the name, official title, occupational series, grade, or salary of such person.” 10 U.S.C. § 424(a). DIA establishes that the withholding of this information is mandatory and thus is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3. 4. Exemption 5 Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memo-randa or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “[T]he parameters of Exemption 5 are determined by reference to the protections available to litigants in civil discovery; if material is not ‘available’ in discovery, it may be withheld from FOIA requesters.” Burka v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C.Cir.1996); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975). The deliberative process privilege “shields only government ‘materials which are both predecisional and deliberative.’ ” Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 117 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C.Cir.1997) (quoting Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C.Cir.1988) (en banc)). To show that a document is predecisional, the agency need not identify a specific final agency decision; it is sufficient to establish “what deliberative process is involved, and the role played by the documents at issue in the course of that process.” Heggestad v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 182 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2000) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C.Cir.1980)). A document is “deliberative” if it “makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.” Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C.Cir.1975). The deliberative process privilege is thought to “prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions.” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151, 95 S.Ct. 1504. Such protection encourages frank discussion of policy matters, prevents premature disclosure of proposed policies, and avoids public confusion that may result from disclosure of rationales that were not ultimately grounds for agency action. See, e.g., Russell v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C.Cir.1982). Attorney work product is among the types of material that is not available in discovery. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983). The attorney work-product privilege protects material gathered and memo-randa prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). Records are properly withheld as attorney work product if they contain the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney” and were “prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3). The privilege also “covers factual materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Heggestad, 182 F.Supp.2d at 8 (citing Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 117 F.3d at 620). Attorney work product can be protected under the deliberative process privilege. Heggestad, 182 F.Supp.2d at 7. a. FBIHQ Under Exemption 5, FBIHQ withheld information pertaining to “discussions between FBI officials and other law enforcement and prosecutory officials in the United States and St. Kitts and Nevis.” Hardy IV Decl. ¶ 42. The parties discussed “the caliber of evidence possessed against plaintiff and others, the proper jurisdictions and venues in which to bring possible legal actions against plaintiff and others, the type and nature of charges that could be brought, and the possible repercussions of such actions in the United States and in other countries.” Id. Also withheld was a memorandum prepared “after plaintiff issued threats to kill students at Ross University in St. Kitts if he was [sic] remanded into custody.” Id. Officials then “were discussing the vulnerabilities and options available to law enforcement if plaintiff attempted to carry out his threat.” Id. FBIHQ establishes that information reflecting discussions between and among officials in the United States and St. Kitts not only is predecisional but also is deliberative. It shows that the parties involved discussed options and potential consequences before taking action against plaintiff and others. Consequently, this information is protected from disclosure by the deliberative process privilege and properly is withheld under Exemption 5. b. Criminal Division The Criminal Division withheld “substantive or draft memoranda prepared by Division attorney’s [sic] in conjunction with their preparation for and development of plaintiffs extradition for drug related offenses from St. Kitts.” Def.’s Reply, Declaration of Kathy Hsu (“Hsu Deck”) ¶ 12. These memoranda were prepared “in anticipation of prosecuting the plaintiff for cocaine related offenses and his extradition for such crimes.” Id. ¶ 14. Reflected in the memoranda were “these attorneys’ legal analysis, thoughts, and assessments of facts and issues upon which an attorney could evaluate a case and formulate litigative strategies and positions.” Id. Disclosure of such information provides “insight into Division attorneys’ thought processes in developing a drug and extradition case,” well as their “general strategy and tactical approach to investigating and prosecuting such cases.” Id. ¶ 16. For these reasons, the Criminal Division withheld this information in full under Exemption 5 as attorney work product. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. The Criminal Division also withheld under the attorney work product privilege a formal opinion prepared by an English barrister at DOJ’s request pertaining to the decision of a St. Kitts magistrate denying the United States’ request for plaintiffs extradition. Hsu Deck ¶¶ 20-21. The barrister had “expertise in English law, a matter in which Justice Department attorneys would have only limited knowledge,” and offered his analysis of the facts and critique of the magistrate’s decision “against the background of English legal standards.” Id. ¶ 21. Although the barrister is an independent contractor, the Criminal Division contended that he acted “in the same capacity that a Department of Justice attorney would [have acted.]” Id. ¶ 22. The withholding of the information described above by the Criminal Division, including the barrister’s opinion, is proper as it is attorney work product shielded from disclosure by Exemption 5. c. State Department Under Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege, the State Department withheld in full an unnumbered draft telegram dated February 18, 2000 (Doc. F27A) from Embassy Bridgetown to the State Department. Grafield Decl. ¶¶ 25, 96. It was a draft, and for this reason the declar-ant concluded that its “predecision information is exempt from disclosure” under FOIA’s Exemption 5. Id. ¶¶ 100. While the declarant described generally the content of the telegram, portions of which properly were withheld under Exemption 1, it is not clear that the information at issue is deliberative in that it “makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.” Vaughn, 523 F.2d at 1143-44. The State Department also withheld telegrams under the attorney-client privilege. In telegram 1432 (Doc. F24), a lawyer representing the United States in plaintiffs extradition case “expresse[d] to U.S. officials his opinion about an aspect of the case that could affect the outcome.” Grafield Decl. ¶ 61. Also withheld were portions of telegrams 1593 (Doc. F23), 700 (Doc. F25), and 895 (Doc. F52), id. ¶¶ 87-88, 90, because they “contain[ed] information exchanged between the U.S. government and attorneys representing the U.S. government regarding the conduct of the case, information which is protected under the attorney-client privilege.” Id. ¶ 94. These telegrams properly were withheld under Exemption 5. d. EOUSA EOUSA withholds in full three documents: a draft grand jury indictment (3 pages), a “Certificate of Trial Attorney” (1 page), and a draft affidavit supporting the request for plaintiffs extradition (11 pages). Def.’s Reply, Declaration of John F. Boseker (“Boseker Decl.”) ¶¶ 11, 13. The declarant explains that these documents were components of a single fax transmission from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida to another DOJ office and pertained to grand jury proceedings involving plaintiff and other individuals. See id. The draft grand jury indictment bears neither a grand jury number nor a foreperson’s signature. Id. ¶ 11. The “Certificate of Trial Attorney” bears no case number, is signed by an Assistant United States Attorney, and includes an FBI notation that the document had been reviewed for classification status. Id. The draft affidavit of an unidentified third party anticipates the indictment of plaintiff and other individuals, includes handwritten revisions to the text, and refers to evidence and sources of evidence. Id. In addition, the documents mention the names of third parties and refer to the anticipated indictment and supporting evidence, including the sources of that evidence. See id. Relying both on Exemptions 3 and 5, EOUSA withholds these documents in full. The declarant explains that the records fall within the scope of Exemption 3 because their disclosure would “reveal the scope of the grand jury and the direction of the investigation by providing the identities of the targets of the investigation, the source of the evidence, as well as the actual evidence produced before the grand jury.” Boseker Decl. ¶ 15. To the extent that the documents “reflect such matters as trial preparation, trial strategy, interpretation, personal evaluations and opinions pertinent to Mr. Miller’s criminal case,” the EOUSA withholds them as attorney work product under Exemption 5. Id. ¶ 8. Lastly, because the documents reflect “predeci-sional communications among government personnel such as discussions of various litigation issues, alternatives, and strategies,” EOUSA relies, too, on the deliberative process privilege. Id. ¶ 19. These documents were properly withheld from disclosure in full under Exemptions 3 and 5. 5. Exemption 6 Exemption 6 protects from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar flies the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Information that applies to a particular individual meets the threshold requirement for Exemption 6 protection. See United States Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602, 102 S.Ct. 1957, 72 L.Ed.2d 358 (1982). Furthermore, the exemption requires “a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’ ” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976); see United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989). The privacy interest at stake belongs to the individual, not the agency. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 763-65, 109 S.Ct. 1468; Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C.Cir.1989) (noting individual’s significant privacy interest “in avoiding the unlimited disclosure of his or her name and address”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078, 110 S.Ct. 1805, 108 L.Ed.2d 936 (1990). It is the requester’s obligation to articulate a public interest sufficient to outweigh an individual’s privacy interest, and the public interest must be significant. See Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004). a. DIA DIA withholds from one docu